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View Full Version : Afghanistan: Sealing the deal in the "build" phase?



Schmedlap
03-27-2010, 12:10 AM
This is going to be a lot of questions, but here goes...

1. What is the approach that we are using in Afghanistan right now?
a) Shape-Clear-Hold-Build
b) Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer
c) Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer
d) Something else (please specify)

I've read or heard (a), (b), and (c) from fairly knowledgeable sources.

2. My impression is that we are dropping the ball in the "build" phase. If so, do you think this is due to (one or more of the following)?
a) Inability to establish local governance
b) Inability to establish a relationship between community and provincial/central government
c) Inability to provide basic services (security, water)
d) Something else

Finally, if you think we are dropping the ball in the "build" phase for one of the reasons above (or in a different phase) or for some other reasons, why do you think that is the case? And do you see any indication that we have figured out a better way?

Okay, that was a lot of questions, so to clarify more or less what I was hoping to get for feedback, I'll give my impression.

A: I see no indication that we have any short-term prospects to "transfer" any community because this requires that the host nation be able to at least provide security. One step back from that, it seems that, given our past tendency to "mow the grass", we're not able to seal the deal on the "build" phase either. The obstacles to that, as I see it, include one or more of the following:
a) locals lack the means to provide their own security
b) locals lack the incentive to not collude with the Taliban (either through poppy cultivation or fighting) once it returns because they have no other viable means of earning an income
c) locals distrust the central government and do not want to associate with it
d) locals do not want state legal codes imposed upon them at the expense of customary law
e) locals, even if they were acquiescent to state legal codes, are not yet ready to accept central gov't law due to the perception of corruption and lack of responsiveness.

As for indications that we are addressing/correcting any of these issues, I suppose we are attempting to stand up ANSF forces. One would hope they are local ANP to police their own locales, so that we have fewer incidents of ANP from outside the district coming in and partaking in boy-love Thursday festivities. Item (b) seems fairly difficult to overcome, given the lack of infrastructure, education, and security outside of the community (intra-community trade only goes so far). Item (c), one would think, is fairly hopeless given that bribes = 1/4 of GDP and Karzai's election was about as legitimate as Saddam's 2002 approval vote. Item (d) seems like it could be addressed, but I wonder if we're trying or have any plans to try. And item (e) seems a combination of (c) and (d).

Hopefully that's somewhat clearer than mud.

jcustis
03-27-2010, 01:37 AM
a) Inability to establish local governance
b) Inability to establish a relationship between community and provincial/central government
c) Inability to provide basic services (security, water)
d) Something else

My own assumptions have been challenged these past few weeks, starting with a definition of what local governance is, in terms of a practical framework...put another way, what do Afghans think local governance should be doing for the people, as opposed to what we think it should be doing.

I think that you can't dissect local (or tribal for that matter) governance from essential services piece. But what if the people don't need the essential services that we are mobilized to provide, which run a whole range of things we may believe they need.

You're likely most right about dropping the ball in the build phase, but the problem is, we've built a ton of stuff already. Is it tied to the people in a way to be an incentive to get them over to our side?

Entropy
03-27-2010, 02:21 AM
I think you've made a pretty good analysis; the missing element is local powerbrokers. In Helmand, for example, there is Mohammed Akhundzada, who was governor from 2001-2005 (his family is one of the most influential in the province). After the US (or UK, depending on who you ask) forced Karzai to fire him, he consistently undermined subsequent governors through a variety of means and wants to get the governorship back (he currently serves in the Parliament). He's done things like offer to "help" the governor maintain security using Akhundzada's private forces. I'm not sure there's much the US can do to either reign these powerbrokers in (especially since some of them are Karzai favorites) or weaken their influence.

Schmedlap
03-27-2010, 04:32 AM
...put another way, what do Afghans think local governance should be doing for the people, as opposed to what we think it should be doing.

Well, governance is the process by which decisions are made and enforced. I would say the only way to answer the question of what they think governance is - is to sit back and observe. Unfortunately, while the locals will probably revert to customary law, the central government (and I suspect ISAF) will want them to adhere to state legal codes. My understanding is that the locals are not opposed to state legal code, but they simply have no faith in the current government's willingness to apply it fairly or consistently or in a responsive manner.


But what if the people don't need the essential services that we are mobilized to provide...
Perfect!


... the problem is, we've built a ton of stuff already. Is it tied to the people in a way to be an incentive to get them over to our side?
Well, I would assert that if we are giving them stuff in order to get them over to our side (other than for short-term tactical gains), then we were seriously misguided. We should be giving them stuff that gives them the tools to become self-governing and self-sufficient. If the central government is going to have a role in that, then it will someday need to be able to ensure security and access to the legal system in remote areas. To do that, it will need to collect tax revenue. Collecting taxes in distant villages will need to be worth the expense, so roads will need to be built to connect villages to Kabul. Villages will not pay taxes unless they view the government as halfway legitimate, so the police forces need to be acceptable and the legal service consistent with their values and beliefs - and the gov't will somehow need to shed its corrupt image. Villages will have no money with which to pay taxes unless they have a source of income. They will have no significant source of income other than poppy until some infrastructure is developed to facilitate something more than subsistence living or intra-district trade.

The only solution that I see to this is for the central government to be a money spigot for the foreseeable future (meaning lots of donor countries pony up aid indefinitely). As it turns out, the NSP has been a very efficient money spigot, but the development projects that it has performed have been a lot of nice gestures without any clear connection to the larger ISAF operation (I'm not aware of any coordination between NSP and ISAF - anyone else?). If ISAF could hand off the build phase to NSP, what with its money, years of experience, ability to communicate and organize, you'd think we could make something happen. Especially if NSP were allowed to do its thing under the cover of ISAF security and with assistance of ISAF logistics.

Schmedlap
03-27-2010, 04:33 AM
After the US (or UK, depending on who you ask) forced Karzai to fire him...
Do we know why?

davidbfpo
03-27-2010, 10:44 AM
The first answer I found why Mohammed Akhundzada was removed as Governor is from Wikipedia:
Sher Mohammed was accused of links to drug smuggling. In 2005, nine tons of opium and heroin were discovered in his basement. He said the drugs had been planted by the British, whose army was providing security in Helmand Province as part of ISAF.[1] He was sacked by President Karzai under pressure from the United Kingdom [2].

Link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sher_Mohammad_Akhundzada

He came to notice again, in November 2009, with this story: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6615329/Afghan-governor-turned-3000-men-over-to-Taliban.html

Looks like the UK is the villain - in some people's eyes this time.

Curiously his surname does not appear in this late 2009 report on Kandahar, which I usually rely on and have posted before: http://www.understandingwar.org/files/The_Talibans_Campaign_For_Kandahar.pdfhttp://www.understandingwar.org/files/The_Talibans_Campaign_For_Kandahar.pdf

jcustis
03-27-2010, 02:10 PM
Well, governance is the process by which decisions are made and enforced. I would say the only way to answer the question of what they think governance is - is to sit back and observe. Unfortunately, while the locals will probably revert to customary law, the central government (and I suspect ISAF) will want them to adhere to state legal codes. My understanding is that the locals are not opposed to state legal code, but they simply have no faith in the current government's willingness to apply it fairly or consistently or in a responsive manner.


Perfect!


Well, I would assert that if we are giving them stuff in order to get them over to our side (other than for short-term tactical gains), then we were seriously misguided. We should be giving them stuff that gives them the tools to become self-governing and self-sufficient. If the central government is going to have a role in that, then it will someday need to be able to ensure security and access to the legal system in remote areas. To do that, it will need to collect tax revenue. Collecting taxes in distant villages will need to be worth the expense, so roads will need to be built to connect villages to Kabul. Villages will not pay taxes unless they view the government as halfway legitimate, so the police forces need to be acceptable and the legal service consistent with their values and beliefs - and the gov't will somehow need to shed its corrupt image. Villages will have no money with which to pay taxes unless they have a source of income. They will have no significant source of income other than poppy until some infrastructure is developed to facilitate something more than subsistence living or intra-district trade.

The only solution that I see to this is for the central government to be a money spigot for the foreseeable future (meaning lots of donor countries pony up aid indefinitely). As it turns out, the NSP has been a very efficient money spigot, but the development projects that it has performed have been a lot of nice gestures without any clear connection to the larger ISAF operation (I'm not aware of any coordination between NSP and ISAF - anyone else?). If ISAF could hand off the build phase to NSP, what with its money, years of experience, ability to communicate and organize, you'd think we could make something happen. Especially if NSP were allowed to do its thing under the cover of ISAF security and with assistance of ISAF logistics.


Sounds solid, but like a plan we don't have patience for. And that is too bad.

Entropy
03-27-2010, 02:15 PM
Yes, my mistake, it was the British and the Dutch that pushed for Akhundzada to be fired. A lot of this is detailed in Giustozzi's "Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop" which I pulled out this morning to check those portions.

We should keep in mind that much of what's going on today has played out before. Akhundzada was one of several governors who were replaced as the coalition focus shifted to a "good governance" strategy, but that effort failed and the potential exists for that earlier failure to be repeated today. As Giustozzi puts it:


While the "better governance" project harvested few positive results due to an already compromised situation and the resistance of elements of the central government, the replacement of the old governors created a vacuum of power, as communities that had sided with the pro-Karzai strongmen were now unhappy and afraid of their forthcoming marginalisation or in any case of losing the privileges and positions they had acquired.

He goes on to note how Akhundzada and others used the local "power blocs" they'd built up to ensure subsequent governors would fail to bring "good governance." There are still "elements of the central government" that continue to pursue their own agendas which negatively impact stability in the provinces and undermine the ability of provincial governors to perform their jobs. Of course, I've long been against concentrating provincial power in governorships appointed from Kabul. This kind of centralization is, IMO, an enduring hindrance to effective provincial governance.

MikeF
03-27-2010, 03:02 PM
From the conventional perspective, as far as phases of a counter-insurgency go in the lifecycle of a small war, Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer probably best defines what an external actor is trying to accomplish in supporting the host nation (SF community would take a different approach all together*). Simultaneously, the guerilla is attempting to shape, clear, hold, and build to replace the host nation in an effort to gain territory and overtime secure control. In other words, that's the rules of the game. Within this model, several decision points are reached if the insurgency is not quelled as introduced in various essays in SWJ:

1. Break Point- point at which the guerilla overtakes the gov't creating a denied area. (McCormick, NPS).

2. Tipping Point- point at which the local populace turns against the insurgency or actions/greivances of the shadow government outweigh those of the host nation. (Anbar, Maj Neil Smith, COL MacFarland).

3. Point of Intervention- External actor (US and coalition) act to retake denied area.

4. Transition Point- Point at which external actor regains control, population is effectively seperated from insurgency, and host nation is capable of retaking ownership for governance and security (A'stan RC-East, MAJ Nate Springer).

So what is build and when can we transition? The easy answer is that it depends, and it's based off METT-TC. The hard answer is that I don't know. Ultimately, this model is an untested theory, and we don't know if it will work.

Here's two remarks from guys much smarter than me that better describe the real issues in the equation.

From David Donovan's website (http://ddonovanbooks.com/faq.html) (Once a Warrior King):


Q: Do your experiences in Vietnam speak to the counterinsurgency effort being made today in Iraq and Afghanistan?
A: Absolutely. Anyone having read OWK would have been able to anticipate the difficulties imposed by cultural and religious differences when a western country goes to war against a country in the east. They should have known that local corruption would be a cancer eating at the heart of any effort to rebuild or reconstitute such a country. They should also have known that westernized elites from those countries often over-promise the democratic tendencies of their more traditionalist countrymen. Also, the traditions of tribe or village over country are difficult for westerners to give credence to, yet they are a part of the experience discussed in OWK. On the other hand, for the soldiers, especially soldier-advisors, in the current conflicts, I hope the incidents, emotions, and methods mentioned in the book can be some sort of guide. What is now called “asymmetric war” is at its heart counterinsurgency. It is small-unit, in-the-bushes warfare conducted in an atmosphere where winning the approval, even the affection of locals is vital to success. OWK is the story of one such war in one village, but its application, I think, is much more general.

From SWC's own MarcT (http://marctyrrell.com/2010/03/19/reading-writing-and-thinking/#comments)


Let me just make a short comment on the theoretician (social scientist) vs. practitioner (military) note. All too often, IMO, we (Anthropologists / Social Scientists) classify some entire range of action as “Bad”, so “obviously” we should have nothing to do with it. This shows up clearly in the lackm of debate and common understanding of what “Harm” means in a context of ethics. “Harm”, at least in the discursive tradition I grew up in, is not the same as “hurt”, and “critical analysis” should not be a synonym for “you hurt my feelings! Wah, wah wah!”.

I truly believe that many social scientists have lost that intimate connection both with lived reality and with a transcendent ideal that characterized Boaz. We seem to have forgotten that Boaz held “science” (actually, the Baconian ideal of a via negativa form of science) as a transcendent ideal, and that one of our “missions” as scientists and Anthropologists was to come as close to ultimate “truth” as we could, always knowing that we would fail. As scientists, at least according to my reading of Boaz, we were required to produce our best understanding of “Truth” based on what we actually observed and saw. A critical component of that lay in our own, personal development and throwing away of preconceptions. Like the military, we were supposed to take what we observed, analyze it, and come to our best “solution”; and, if that meant attacking an institution, a power broker, or whatever, we had a moral imperative to do so.

All of this is a round-about way of getting at your last comment: most of the military folks I know want to make people’s lives “better”. That may be based on screwed up assumptions of what “better” means, but I have only met one person who didn’t want to do so out of the hundreds of military folks I know.

In the end, we're testing how much we can help others. IMO, one can only help someone that asks or wants to be helped. Additionally, we have to really question whether or not we are qualified to help. Is our solution "better" than the status quo?

v/r

Mike

*Under FID and the traditional SF indirect model, they would not take control. Instead, the would only assist the Host Nation to conduct COIN.

Schmedlap
03-27-2010, 03:23 PM
In the end, we're testing how much we can help others. IMO, one can only help someone that asks or wants to be helped. Additionally, we have to really question whether or not we are qualified to help. Is our solution "better" than the status quo?

That hasn't been my impression at all. Perhaps I let my cynical guard down in pondering this, but I have assumed (perhaps naively) that there is a larger purpose in Afghanistan beyond "helping others." We're not trying to set up a central gov't because we think it is better for the people. We're trying to do it because some decision maker(s) in our gov't think that this advances our interests.

MikeF
03-27-2010, 03:34 PM
That hasn't been my impression at all. Perhaps I let my cynical guard down in pondering this, but I have assumed (perhaps naively) that there is a larger purpose in Afghanistan beyond "helping others." We're not trying to set up a central gov't because we think it is better for the people. We're trying to do it because some decision maker(s) in our gov't think that this advances our interests.

That's the valid counter-argument to my thoughts. Like I said, I don't know. The answer is probably somewhere in the middle. IMO, foreign policy must be driven out of an ideological ideal and not political expediancy as in domestic issues. For now, I'm content to simply describe what is happening as I attempted in the last post.

v/r

Mike

MikeF
03-27-2010, 04:04 PM
That hasn't been my impression at all. Perhaps I let my cynical guard down in pondering this, but I have assumed (perhaps naively) that there is a larger purpose in Afghanistan beyond "helping others." We're not trying to set up a central gov't because we think it is better for the people. We're trying to do it because some decision maker(s) in our gov't think that this advances our interests.

Actually, there is some evidence in my argument of our tendacy to help others, but it depends on one's interpretation of the motives and reasoning behind the documents. Take a look, or relook, the National Security Strategies of the Bush and Clinton Administrations.

The "jist" of these documents is that our foreign policy must help others in advancing capitalism and democracy IOT ensure our own interest.

Mike

Steve the Planner
03-27-2010, 05:16 PM
Schmedlap:

Sounds like you are back to square one: Why has Afghanistan traditionally been viewed as a graveyard of empires?

Because it defies the ability of empires to apply empirical solutions through traditional top-down, national and provincial level controls through an established system of governance consistent with empirical understandings.

Does that mean it is ungoverned and ungovernable? No.

It is just isn't what we are hoping for, and does not fit within our models.

I would argue, instead, that many of our ill-fitting definitions and solutions are actually the "harm" that helps to drive conflict.

There is a very interesting correlation to Iraq circa 1950's when the balance was shifting in its most pronounced ways from tribal/rural to urban/national, and the duality of governance in such places.

Not unlike Iraq in that period, Afghanistan presents (and has since doomed attempts at nation-forward efforts in the past) a dynamic split of regions and societies with pronounced regional, local, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and basic philosophical differences, many of which are underscored by cross-border affiliations, and embedded in a framework driven by external competition and conflicts (of which we are one of many substantial players).

How did Iraq deal with this period of dualities as it marched down the rocky and unstable road from traditional/rural to urban/national (a march which continues today)?

Answers included substantial political instability, changes of government and government structures, dual governance structures for (bedoiun, religious communities, and urban societies), a marked public opposition to outside interference while, in reality, outsiders were substantial drivers, allies, opponents. A very complex history, still playing out, but with bedoiun and other minorities as more of a historical artifact, and, after this election, tribal affiliations giving way to more potent religious/ethnic affiliations.

Is Afghanistan really on that same transitional road (as a nation), or are we just trying to make it so?

Absent some substantial reconceptualization and resource identification, Afghanistan's path, unlike Iraq's, does not guarantee a unity of geography or peoples, nor a "fixed arrow" toward national unity under the type of significant national structure that underpins many of ours and the many other international actors' implicit and very confusing efforts in this hot and pressure-filled stew pot.

The fact is that there are many ways, as evident by our human histories there and elsewhere by which peoples can come to accommodations that allow them (if some choose) to move forward without extreme disruption by others, and without posing untenable threats to others.

As evident in the recent NYT article on Kandahar, we have not figured out the ways, and, to my way of thinking, have yet to initiate credible deliberations about viable alternative ways:

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/world/asia/27kandahar.html

In Iraq, we went into 2008 with a focus from Iraqis and the "Coalition" to bring conflict to an end, and move the Iraqi "march" back into Iraqi's hands.

In Afghanistan, instead, we entered 2010 with a maelstrom of competing international actors all going in different directions, while the actual Afghan circumstance and future remains un-agreed, uncertain, and undefined.

Look just to our own US confusing and contradictory efforts: CIA & SF are still trying to re-win 2001 based on tactics that are actually, to a great extent, in conflict with the 2010 realities; the military efforts are piecemeal, and have not demonstrated a consistent strategy, ability, or logistical basis to "hold" anything; on the civilian side, "Whole-of-government," a euphemism for bureaucratic "hot potatoes" where no actual person or agency is responsible or focused on the big picture; and, on the external level, so many of the parties are completely at cross-purposes.

A previous critique of US efforts to "Clear-Hold-Build" came from Joanne Nathanson:
I don't understand the concept; you clear, clear and re-clear without any administrative purpose or capability.

Nathanson's comments are still on-point, and we have not, to date, come up with an actual picture on which a solution can be built.

The answer is in the people (peoples) but it is a lot more complicated. The risk is that dividing into regions and factions, each with its own solutions and objectives, goers against our explicit efforts. What we keep seeing, however, is that workable solutions always end up being local, but there is no frame or support structure for them to attach to or build on.

Afghanistan is, in my opinion, clear evidence that the big knowledge gap about this places and these places (far beyond just Flynn's military info gap) between the current military and civilian efforts continues to limit any possible solutions that could be accepted and sustained in Afghanistan.

I'm just waiting, as with Iraq, for somebody to cut the Gordian Knot, and actually start on a process toward solutions, instead of just demands and efforts to force our solutions which don't work.

Even if Afghanistan remains a graveyard of empires, it doesn't mean that credible non-empirical objectives could not be accomplished, but we haven't started on that discussion yet.

Schmedlap
03-27-2010, 06:09 PM
Steve,
Interesting thoughts, but that was kind of a long stream of consciousness.:p

Actually, I am not at square one. I am not flustered by the seeming impossibility of the mission. I am wondering why we are repeatedly dropping the ball in the "build" phase. I think this speaks more to poor planning and execution than to the size of the challenge.

Steve the Planner
03-27-2010, 06:32 PM
Right, but planning implies a structured process and approach levied against a pre-determined end.

Without a structured end, all these bits of efforts and pieces of tactics just don't add up.

Our stated mission requires substantial one plus one equals three or more results, but can't seem to get one plus one to equal one.

If most of the district schools are not operating, what was/is the point in building more---but the current plan is based on continued civil service structures without the administrative and societal framework to create value.

What, hopefully, we can demonstrate is that some areas with meaningful population and transportation control value can be held, and then built-out for sustainable and enduring value.

Question is that either these little mini-systems are going to be self-sustaining (taxes), supported by a provincial/national system, or just one-offs on foreign life-support.

The military framework for plan-resource-do somehow crashes when this "do" involves civilian stabilization. How do we create a viable "build" framework without something to build it on?

MikeF
03-27-2010, 06:48 PM
Real quick, then I'm headed off for a Post-Surge Company reunion to see my boys, celebrate some good times, and remember our boys that didn't make it home.

Kudos Schmedlap for addressing a difficult topic. As usual, Steve and others have provided more questions than answers so I have no doubt that good discussion will follow.

Stepping back another level past build, past COIN, maybe we're getting back to the original decision making process.

What is build? What is our purpose? What is our endstate?

Back to war stories :D, I always asked my bosses what they wanted me to do? WTF is this build? Do you want Fayetteville? Do you want Raleigh? Do you want Atlanta? GEN Patraeus would suggest build is just enough. I was always weary of that answer.

So, what is good enough?

Mike

Schmedlap
03-27-2010, 07:11 PM
Right, but planning implies a structured process and approach levied against a pre-determined end.

Steve, that is an interesting statement. I agree, but wonder if we have the same definition of "end." Speaking strictly on a community by community basis, to me, the end that we need to seek is not a functioning community of schools, running water, and medical clinics (though that would be nice). To me, the end that we need to be seeking is just a community where people make decisions about their own fate. That requires security. It likely requires money. Our outside-imposed condition for that end is that they can choose what they want, so long as it is not Taliban rule or warlordism. Other than that, go for it. That, imo, should be the "build" endstate for an Army or USMC battalion.

JPS
03-27-2010, 07:25 PM
One of the principle problems that needs to be addressed is corruption. Unless that issue is addressed, the efficacy of state building endeavors will be in doubt as there will be a ready basis of anger, within the populace, that insurgent groups will be able to tap.

The other issue is one of the conundrum of nation building (i.e. the building of national identity). Increasing the role of local governance will come at the expense of national governance if it is not done correctly. Conversely, increasing the role and scope of national governance, in a region that has seen more local governance than anything else, has its own problems and issues.

Steve the Planner
03-27-2010, 08:05 PM
We keep bumping into these two opposing structures: taliban/warlords vs.... and local vs. national.

All have us have read US civilian comments about: How can those people not rise up on their own to help us defeat....

The reality is that this was a complex place which was just barely rising into something better (in some places) before it was demolished by conflict and internal and external conflict, which left little positive in its wake for decades.

Now, this fractured and destabilized place is supposed to rise up to accomplish something very hard to grasp and structure (we haven't figured it out yet).

Some places are moving along just fine (the essence of viable governance being to resist detrimental forces in order to maintain forward momentum for the whole), while others are not to such an extent that they threaten the others.

Is our role to minimize the external threats to the viable places, even if by theirs or ours warlordism, etc...? Right now, we are in the unfortunate place of supporting a governmental structure which is often seen as warlordism and detrimental, and our presence can create as much danger as not. But our temporary end results are not bringing much value to either relevant piece.

Sure, we can improve aspects of a corrupt provincial or local structure, but can we fix the problem?

I've heard this "stronger tribe" stuff before, but I can't believe that people really, in a best light, see us as a "stronger tribe at the moment" which has to be carefully balanced against a reality that we all the outside forces are like locusts (seasonal). So they are struggling to find a survival balance against that reality.

I'm still very much of the opinion that, absent a serious provisional government strategy---take over and run it for a while---you can't purge the bad from the good, or really create an enduring peace and prosperity thing.

That is not to say "take it all over" or build a nation. Just serious and structured efforts to stabilize, hold and build a place until it can find a safe and prosperous way forward. Some of these scattered places are just not there yet.

On the backside, I keep watching the emergence and growth of cities in a very chaotic and unsustainable format. If they start to fall to chaos do to basic emerging and unaddressed urban issues, the whole thing collapses.

To date, we are just playing "whackamole" with very limited resources to either build or hold a viable governance system. Defending a city does not assure survival of a city; attacking enemies across the landscape pushes refugees and instability into the cities (accelerating a background urban to rural pattern). It would be nice if we (the international community) could get a grip on the whole before other parts of the system begin to explode---but I don't see it happening.

Surferbeetle
03-27-2010, 10:04 PM
Gents,

So what are the end states we are seeking in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas in which we work? Let's assume that all of these locations can impact our long term interests and merit the effort and resources we put forth.

People are more important than hardware. Lasting governmental/community institutional systems, managerial systems, human resource systems and associated infrastructure systems, are all dependent upon people who have the capacity to develop, staff, and maintain them. The level of complexity of a particular system drives the amount of preparation needed to run it.

We in the US generally feel that it takes 12 years at a minimum (HS Diploma) to educate a person so that they will be able to functionally participate in a beginning role in our various societal systems. For the 1% or so of us who join our military systems additional education/training is required before we are entrusted with our national resources. More than 1% of the US population continues on for an additional four, six or more years of formal education before they are considered able to fill the roles and responsibilities associated with a beginning position in one of our various systems.

Articulating the desired end state helps to visualize the ways, means, schedule, and cost of the capacity building effort required. Capacity Building as described in the October 2008 version of FM 3-07, Stability Operations (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf)is an interesting read. FM 3-24 and FM 3-24.2 are too. MDMP and Work Breakdown Structures/Statements of Work/Cost Estimates/Schedules are two formal/standardized methods which we in the West use to articulate and visualize ends, ways, and means and gain economies of scale for this type of work.

Bottom line, the SWJ crowd continually nails it...it all boils down to effectively training people so that they can accomplish the mission. As we all know from experience, training people takes time and there are no short cuts.

Schmedlap
03-27-2010, 11:00 PM
Okay, I'll try a different approach...

Is there anything wrong with the concept of shape-clear-hold? Is that much of the plan about right? Is that a necessary pre-condition for whatever it is that needs to be done?

Dayuhan
03-28-2010, 02:18 AM
Increasing the role of local governance will come at the expense of national governance if it is not done correctly. Conversely, increasing the role and scope of national governance, in a region that has seen more local governance than anything else, has its own problems and issues.

Might be more accurate to say that an increased role for local governance should come at the expense of national governance, if it is done correctly. Unfortunately, this creates a situation where the national government is likely to actively oppose the development of effective local governance.

It seems to me that one of our great mistakes in the early stages in Afghanistan was the focus on creating a centralized, top-down government structure... and that we did this not because that kind of structure suited the Afghan populace, but because it suited us. In the process we created a Government that is not accountable to a rather distant citizenry, is primarily interested in self-preservation and personal gain, which cannot govern and is likely to pursue the personal interests of those who govern at the expense of the interests of the governed. Probably not an exaggeration to say we created a bit of a monster, which is more obstacle than asset at this point.

The question is to whom local governance should be accountable - to the local community or to the national government - and to whom they actually are accountable in practice. Realistically, local governance that serves communities is often not going to be in the interests of the central government, who would rather see local governance accountable to them... a very difficult conflict to resolve.


Is there anything wrong with the concept of shape-clear-hold? Is that much of the plan about right? Is that a necessary pre-condition for whatever it is that needs to be done?

Don't you have to clear before you can shape?

The theory seems fine as far as it goes, but unless we propose to govern Afghanistan, what do we do after "hold"? We haven't the resources to hold everything, and our natural impulse after clearing will be to move on and clear somewhere else. That's not altogether wrong, but it assumes that there is some entity with the capacity to govern that will come in and govern effectively in the interest of the community... and all too often there isn't.

Schmedlap
03-28-2010, 02:35 AM
I was trying to avoid this becoming a catch-all thread of every problem under the sun in Afghanistan. Here is another attempt to narrow down the scope...

At the battalion level, in one given community, in the transition from the "hold" to the "build" phase, assume the following tasks are assigned to the battalion...
1) Conduct continuous area reconnaissance of populated area and surrounding terrain to prevent return of irreconcilable Taliban / warlords
2) Recruit and train a local ANP force
3) Identify damaged or missing critical infrastructure and begin necessary movements to repair or provide it
4) Identify - or facilitate the creation of - some administrative or governing body or individual agent who has the consent of the community to speak on their behalf to the unit responsible for the AO.

Are we capable of doing this? If so, have we demonstrated the ability to do this? If not, why are we unable to do this? Or do these tasks simply not even come close to resembling the mission that a battalion or similar element is given when going into a location like, say, Marjah?

jmm99
03-28-2010, 02:44 AM
from Dayuhan
Don't you have to clear before you can shape?

Explanation earlier today by MikeF, Importance of Shape (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=95613&postcount=83) - a noted mover and shaper :D :


from MikeF
SHAPING THE ENVIRONMENT
1. Prepare a General Area Survey (HTTs, past opsums, past intsums, past data, current physical and human terrain).
2. Talk to the stakeholders past, present, and future.
3. Develop a Hypothesis on the problem definition.
4. Conduct Reconnaissance and Surveillance to test hypothesis.
5. Based on the collection of evidence (R&S), define your environment.
6. Develop your plan.
7. Conduct influence operations (propaganda, deception, and disruption operations) to set the conditions for clearance.

So, shape, clear & hold.

------------------------------
? to Schmedlap - How long do you "hold" ?

The timespan would seem to be a variable depending on whether you are an indigenous "holder" or a transient foreign occupier who is on a short timeline determined by its own politics.

Regards

Mike

JPS
03-28-2010, 03:33 AM
Might be more accurate to say that an increased role for local governance should come at the expense of national governance, if it is done correctly. Unfortunately, this creates a situation where the national government is likely to actively oppose the development of effective local governance.

It seems to me that one of our great mistakes in the early stages in Afghanistan was the focus on creating a centralized, top-down government structure... and that we did this not because that kind of structure suited the Afghan populace, but because it suited us. In the process we created a Government that is not accountable to a rather distant citizenry, is primarily interested in self-preservation and personal gain, which cannot govern and is likely to pursue the personal interests of those who govern at the expense of the interests of the governed. Probably not an exaggeration to say we created a bit of a monster, which is more obstacle than asset at this point.

The question is to whom local governance should be accountable - to the local community or to the national government - and to whom they actually are accountable in practice. Realistically, local governance that serves communities is often not going to be in the interests of the central government, who would rather see local governance accountable to them... a very difficult conflict to resolve.

The contextual problem that one has with the local governance concept in Afghanistan is through whom will it be managed? With a history of tribalism, warlordism, etc. how can one reasonably go about creating effective local governance without setting the stage for the recreation of the same problems that that have plagued the region previously? The crystallized forms of local governance that we have seen previously have been more accountable to the leadership of the local governance apparatus itself rather than to either the local community or the national government. It certainly is a conundrum...

Schmedlap
03-28-2010, 03:53 AM
How long do you "hold" ?

The timespan would seem to be a variable depending on whether you are an indigenous "holder" or a transient foreign occupier who is on a short timeline determined by its own politics.

I suspect that one would only wish to "hold" for as long as necessary in order to get on with "build." Or, put another way, "hold" for as little time as possible. And, just to be clear, I am asking strictly in the context of a tactical unit. I suspect their timeline has much more to do with their higher headquarters than with the big picture strategery.

Entropy
03-28-2010, 03:26 PM
My sense is that we are capable of doing this for one community given enough time and resources and provided the community isn't too large for a single battalion.

The problem with the approach is that there are rarely the time and resources and a battalion will probably have responsibility for too large an area. Additionally, a community doesn't exist in a vacuum, and this battalion will need direct and indirect outside support. We can't possibly do this for every, or even most, communities.

I think these problems are compounded by local social, economic, cultural and political factors. For example, given similar resources and time, consider how a shape, clear, hold strategy would work in a Somali community compared to almost anywhere in Europe.

Edit: I just thought of the Balkans. Isn't that a case of "holding?" Tactically, "holding" can work, but the Balkans suggests it's would have to be indefinite.


I was trying to avoid this becoming a catch-all thread of every problem under the sun in Afghanistan. Here is another attempt to narrow down the scope...

At the battalion level, in one given community, in the transition from the "hold" to the "build" phase, assume the following tasks are assigned to the battalion...
1) Conduct continuous area reconnaissance of populated area and surrounding terrain to prevent return of irreconcilable Taliban / warlords
2) Recruit and train a local ANP force
3) Identify damaged or missing critical infrastructure and begin necessary movements to repair or provide it
4) Identify - or facilitate the creation of - some administrative or governing body or individual agent who has the consent of the community to speak on their behalf to the unit responsible for the AO.

Are we capable of doing this? If so, have we demonstrated the ability to do this? If not, why are we unable to do this? Or do these tasks simply not even come close to resembling the mission that a battalion or similar element is given when going into a location like, say, Marjah?

jcustis
03-28-2010, 05:37 PM
The problem with the approach is that there are rarely the time and resources and a battalion will probably have responsibility for too large an area. Additionally, a community doesn't exist in a vacuum, and this battalion will need direct and indirect outside support. We can't possibly do this for every, or even most, communities.

Aye, and then the next community over wants what that favored community wants, and that leads to tension, and a sense of disenfranchisement in a way, perhaps? So then, does that tension become released via the laying of an IED?

This makes me ask if there are open sources that lay bare the reasons why cell members, or even the out-of-work man, lay IEDs there. I know they intend to kill us with them, but do the intend to achieve strategic victory, or do they have an appreciation for using them as a delaying tactic?

Schmedlap
03-28-2010, 06:26 PM
The problem with the approach is that there are rarely the time and resources and a battalion will probably have responsibility for too large an area.

Just focusing on the resources piece, for now, is the problem that they do not exist or that we are not good at leveraging them?

Steve the Planner
03-28-2010, 10:47 PM
Unfortunately, like the Battle of Marjah post (another town every six months), when you put it all together into The Big Picture, there is no Big Picture---just a lot of little stuff that amounts to nothing.

Kandahar, regrettably, is the real deal, so lets hope there is something more substantive than has been done so far. It is a very different thing when you move to larger population centers, and particularly Kandahar.

Fingers crossed.