The Dumbness of Oneness

[SJPONeill]

In a couple of projects that I've been working on this year, I have come across very strong drivers towards what I call the PLA uniform approach i.e. only one colour and one size fits all. There are three examples that keep coming up.

The first is the drive towards 'one fuel' policies even though to achieve the efficiency of the 'one fuel' we may have to sacrifice effectiveness at the tactical level where some capabilities will not work at all or as well due to the lack of specific fuels. Capabilities driven my small capacity engines are one example e.g. lightweight motorcycles and outboard motors.

The second is the drive towards a common ammunition 'fleet', the 'all the way with 5.56' crew even though they has been some fairly robust science and operational analysis that shows that different rounds and calibres fill specific capability niches in specific operation environments. This 'oneness' seems even more ludicrous when you consider that even within the 5.56mm fleet, even ammunition types to the same specification e.g. SS109 may not work and play well in weapons from other nations.

The final instance is the drive towards unified doctrine. While obviously divergent doctrine is probably not a good thing, does a trend towards convergence in doctrinal principle and approaches not run the risk of emptying out the toll box that our commanders at whatever level should be able to reach into and select the best approach for the situation? As one researcher said last year "Does doctrinal blandness lead to conceptual laziness?"

To me, it seems that we are still reluctant to give up our rooms at the Fulda Gap Railway Station, and cast off the legacy of an industrial age military and transform into nichist force predicted in the Tofflers' War And Anti-War in the mid-90s. For twenty years since DESERT SHIELD/STORM we have been in the game of working with shake'n'bake coalitions, that might loosely be described as task-organised but it is only now that maybe perhaps we are starting to recognise the true complexity of war as a coalition where not one member is prepared to waive their national card in favour of going down a coalition path of oneness in logistics, doctrine or key policy...?

Do we need to make a concerted effort to shake the 'dumbness of oneness' at all levels and focus more on coming to grips with the internal complexity of the contemporary environment (just the coalition, never mind the bad guys)?

[William F. Owen]

I cannot say I have ever really encountered the "dumbness of oneness" in the terms described.

I think one-fuel type for all A and B vehicles makes perfectly good sense, but yes, keep speciality fuels for specialist applications. You certainly do not want A and B vehicles with the terrible "multi-fuel" engines like we tried in 1970s.

For a whole lot of reasons I am very happy with a good 5.56mm round and 7.62mm belt as the major rounds in the platoon. Maybe some specialist sniper ammunition natures and some 9mm for pistols - not a problem really.

As concerns doctrine, we keep drinking the bath water because most folks do not know what doctrine is and thus cannot write it - so yes, when you have "Joint Doctrine," you probably make a bad idea, very much worse.

Personally I see too much diversity as we flip-flop from one fad to the next. The British Army has procured 8-11+ specialist vehicles in the last 6 years, and we now have more platoon weapons than at any time in history!

[Van]

A technical point-

- re: one fuel - Diesel motorcycles (http://www.dieselbike.net/militaryproduction/militaryproduction.htm) are in production and use. I suspect that if you can make a diesel motorcycle, other small diesels are not to challenging, technologically. Given the tremendous logistical simplification from a single fuel, I think you're on shaky ground with this point.

[Firn]

Indeed not (http://www.fiatpress.com/index.php?lng=2&group=1&method=cartelle&action=zoom&id=4594). Modern engines can be surprisingly compact, light and efficient (well compared to older models), see also here (http://green.autoblog.com/2010/02/24/geneva-preview-fiat-twin-air-pumps-up-the-power-eases-the-emis/) and there (http://www.autospies.com/news/VW-s-Twincharged-Four-Cylinder-Steals-Engine-Of-The-Year-Award-From-BMW-s-Twin-Turbo-Six-45155/).

Some aircrafts (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l0BhcIT2V1s) run btw. also on modern diesels.

Considering that fuel makes up the big bulk in shipping overall simplification and lower fuel consumption make sense.

Firn

[KenWats]

Considering that fuel makes up the big bulk in shipping overall simplification and lower fuel consumption make sense.

Firn

I would also add that in addition to big bulk, it requires specialized vehicles to move around (for the most part) and those specialized vehicles are easily identifiable and make nice juicy targets. Reducing the number of those big juicy targets can't be a bad thing and should be weighed in the balance at any rate.

[SJPONeill]

A technical point-

- re: one fuel - Diesel motorcycles (http://www.dieselbike.net/militaryproduction/militaryproduction.htm) are in production and use. I suspect that if you can make a diesel motorcycle, other small diesels are not to challenging, technologically. Given the tremendous logistical simplification from a single fuel, I think you're on shaky ground with this point.

I don't think you could class a 667cc KLR as a 'lightweight motorcycle'...by lightweight, I mean a bike that can be easily manhandled over obstacles, mounted on the back of a 'mother' vehicle, etc along the lines of the FX bike (www.fxbikes.com) - that's the one that I've seen although there are no doubt others...To get a diesel to efficiently power a bike in this class without inflicting an undue weight penalty has yet to be done...

So far as "..tremendous logistical simplification..." is concerned, you might was well extend that same 'logic' to the military health sector and only accept soldiers with a common blood type; only have one style of MRE menu (now we're talking potential mutiny!); only recruit soldiers within a specified median of size in order to 'tremendously simplify' clothing and footwear items of supply; and only have one information system that does everything.

This is all very much 90s thinking from an era dominated by management graduates encouraged by the myth that logistics won DESERT STORM. in 2000 a MAJ Morris wrote a great paper on flying columns (http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Papers/morris.pdf) and he makes a couple of comments regarding this arrogance of logisticians, who in the final analysis are just one of a number of supporting acts to operations...

he injunction of Field Marshal Rommel to
watch closely the quartermasters is particularly apt in an inherently tenuous OMFTS logistic environment.

As the commander usually pays great attention to his quartermaster and allows the latter's estimate of the supply possibilities to determine his strategic plan, it has become the habit for quartermaster staffs to complain at every difficulty, instead of getting on with the job….
The best thing is for the commander himself to have a clear picture of the real potentialities of his supply organization and base all his demands on his own estimate. This will force the supply staffs to…produce many times what they would have done left to themselves." B.H. Liddell Hart,, ed., The Rommel Papers (New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1953), 96-97.

These 'oldies' like Rommel and Liddel-Hart, in fact, pretty much ALL military commanders up to and including DESERT STORM seem to have quite capably coped with logistic complexity in the interest of greater effectiveness. As Wilf says above, coping with a variety of ammunition types at platoon level never used to be a problem and my recollections at that level are the same where we had to juggle 7.62 ball and belt and 5.56 ball and belt at platoon and section level. Sure it would be nice to have a common ammunition nature that does everything but NOT at the expense of effectiveness...

[SJPONeill]

I'm just watching discussion on the current nuclear summit on TV and it strikes me that if the logistic imperative for simplicity is such a driver then perhaps we should be seriously considering either directly nuclear powered vehicles or more practically, electrically powered vehicles topped up by portable nuclear generators. Not only would that greatly reduce the logistic chain for fuels, but it would also reduce carbon emissions (for those who care)...in this era of 'nice' war, it's not likely that anyone would really shoot at us and mean it - would they?

[SethB]

The DoD Energy Blog had a story about using nuclear energy to make hydrogen to power Strykers...

That said, the SFC uses JP8 to power everything. In reality, almost everything would run off diesel fuel, which is more energy dense. But then I hear that fuel is graded and best of it is used in aircraft anyway.

So the SFC might be best divided into ground and air fuels.

[KenWats]

Agreed that logistics shouldn't drive the train, but it should be a consideration at least? Otherwise why bother with standardizing anything? Are there operational benefits to (some) standardization?

Some balance should be arrived at between "one size fits all interchangeable parts" and "everybody gets to be a special snowflake that gets their own special ammunition, food, and fuel". You say it's going to close to the "one size fits all" side of the spectrum. I don't know and won't argue with you on that. My information and experience would be ten years out of date at any rate.

[SJPONeill]

The DoD Energy Blog had a story about using nuclear energy to make hydrogen to power Strykers...

That said, the SFC uses JP8 to power everything. In reality, almost everything would run off diesel fuel, which is more energy dense. But then I hear that fuel is graded and best of it is used in aircraft anyway.

So the SFC might be best divided into ground and air fuels.

What's 'SFC'? I looked it up and could only find 'Sergeant First Class' which as we know probably does run most of the military but not too sure how it might fit into fuels management.

As soon as you start grading fuels, you could argue that it actually better to have different types so that there is a lesser chance that someone would accidentally top up with the wrong grade. This is obviously pretty key in the aviation world as it is a lot harder to fly than it is to walk when the engine cuts out...

Will check out the DoD Energy Blog re the hydrogen fueling - sounds interesting but probably from an Army After Next POV...

[Chris jM]

Not only would that greatly reduce the logistic chain for fuels, but it would also reduce carbon emissions (for those who care)...

For the first time, I saw the term 'carbon-neutral military' in defense documentation yesterday. Wow.

Fear us, Al Qaeda, for while you are having to pay carbon credits we will be enjoying the efficiencies and feel-good factor of a green military-economic machine well into the future!

[SJPONeill]

Scary, eh, Chris? I wondering if the takfiri jihadist will be quaking in their boots at the mere thought of their upcoming carbon taxes - or just laughing their bollocks of as we get distracted from the Main Effort to ensure that we are carbon compliant...

Love your signature quote but I think it needs a follow on statement that having gained their infantry experience these soldiers should be seconded off to intel, logistics and other areas too important to be left to the rest...

[William F. Owen]

Love your signature quote but I think it needs a follow on statement that having gained their infantry experience these soldiers should be seconded off to intel, logistics and other areas too important to be left to the rest...

Comes from Wavell's "The Good Soldier" - another forgotten infantry classic, and was quoted in the Times newspaper in 1949, IIRC.

[SethB]

What's 'SFC'?

Single Fuel Concept.

[SJPONeill]

Comes from Wavell's "The Good Soldier" - another forgotten infantry classic, and was quoted in the Times newspaper in 1949, IIRC.

Thanks, Wilf...reading that quote and the two in the original post, and noting the era all three hail from, I wonder if commanders back then had a far better handle on combined than a. we credit them for, and b. we do now before we tried to make all the BOS' equal in someone's eyes...?

[William F. Owen]

I wonder if commanders back then had a far better handle on combined than a. we credit them for, and b. we do now before we tried to make all the BOS' equal in someone's eyes...?

I have massive respect for the skill of 1945/6 and 1918/19 British and Commonwealth Armies. They were simply good at what they did based on experience. We cease studying them at our peril.

[SJPONeill]

I have massive respect for the skill of 1945/6 and 1918/19 British and Commonwealth Armies. They were simply good at what they did based on experience. We cease studying them at our peril.

I expect that there was a large element of natural selection in both wars that saw, in most cases, the cream rise to the top. Certainly we saw this in 2NZEF after Greece, Crete and the early days int eh Western Desert where legacy appointments from WW1 and others who generally didn't cut it were shuftied off to the side in favour of commanders who were proving themselves in their take on a 'new war'.

Since WW2, we have had many opportunities to develop extremely good tactical leaders and commanders, but few if any to truly develop operational and strategic commanders. I'm starting to think that the likes of Schwartzkopf and Petraeus are exceptions that prove the general rule and that we have swung the pendulum way too far to one side trying to make a simple 2 + 2 = 4 science out of what has always been a complex art form. This woolly science-based thinking, with its efficiency driven focus, is what gets us into rationalised policies like SFC (thanks, Seth) at the expense of effectiveness.

[Firn]

I expect that there was a large element of natural selection in both wars that saw, in most cases, the cream rise to the top.
.

or dies.


This is all very much 90s thinking from an era dominated by management graduates encouraged by the myth that logistics won DESERT STORM. in 2000 a MAJ Morris wrote a great paper on flying columns and he makes a couple of comments regarding this arrogance of logisticians, who in the final analysis are just one of a number of supporting acts to operations...

About the G6 howitzer and choice to go wheels (http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol091ig.html) of the SADF.


A choice had to be made as to whether wheels or tracks would be used. Wheels were opted for, due to strategic implications for the following reasons: Wheels were preferable for the long distances which were encountered by the SADF between bases, during operations and when travelling from South Africa to South West Africa. These distances had to be covered in the shortest possible time and a tracked vehicle would require tank transporters while a wheeled vehicle could simply fall in with a convoy. Wheels required less maintenance than did tracks and maintenance was less complicated. Wheeled vehicles also used less fuel, a most important factor when it was considered that operational distances could be 1 000 km.(30)

... from the paper


The 20 Brigade operated at the end of a long and tenuous supply line. Moving fuel,ammunition, food, parts, and casualties from SADF bases in Namibia to the fighting zoneproved a significant challenge. It was approximately two hundred miles from Rundu, the major staging base south of the border, to the area of operations around Cuito Cuanavale. From there it was another hundred miles northwest to the battlefields near Cuito Cuanavale. No developed roads or convenient rivers provided easy access to the combat zone. Supplies moved in trucks via primitive paths through the bush or were flown in via transport aircraft to the strip at Mavinga, which served as an intermediate forward
operating base (FOB).101

The dense vegetation and rough ground in the theater took a surprisingly heavy toll
on the fuel consumption of the brigade's vehicles. Diesel usage rates for cross-country
movement proved much higher than expected for off-road travel. Keeping the several
hundred SADF vehicles full of gas was a constant worry; at times the columns had to be
withdrawn from combat prematurely or redistribute gasoline within the battle groups to
reach the refueling points. Fuel moved by air and ground to Mavinga, from there tanker
trucks shuttled back and forth to the front. On previous external operations SADF mobile
columns often resupplied their helicopters with fuel; the tanks of the Ratels and supply
lorries provided a sort of mobile FARP for the aviation element. During Modular helo
operations were limited by the air threat to night time casualty evacuation, so ground
based fuel for wide ranging C2, air assault, and fire support helicopters wasn't
necessary.102


So fuel efficiency and standardization of the fuel can be (of course) a huge issue. One additional small arms ammunition is (also of course) far far less problematic.


Firn

[Ken White]

The quibble is solely on Schwartzkopf. He did okay but not great -- and he did okay mostly because a few subordinates including Cal Waller, a couple of smart Colonels and yes, Tommy Franks, saved him from himself. Colin Powell had to virtually force that to happen...

That said, I totally agree with your hypotheses. We do tend to overdo the 'oneness' bit. In the old US Army it was GP -- General Purpose -- and it was and is overdone.

I'm firmly convinced that attempts to make battle command and tactical decision making a 'check the box, matrix driven, quasi scientific exercise is not only flawed but is in fact downright dangerous.

Combat is an art, pure and simple. Some attempts to codify aspects to assist those who are competent artists (as opposed to the few great ones...) and to determine who possesses the basic talent are necessary. However, it is not necessary simply so anyone can perform the functions to achieve some mythical plateau of egalitarianism to attempt to convert the art into a science. Unnecessary and inimical to force survival, mission accomplishment or goal attainment.

That gets people killed unnecessarily. As you say, there was an element of natural selection in both major wars and it was highly beneficial at all levels from Private through Flag Officer to President or Prime Minister. We cannot totally replicate that in peace time but we can certainly do a far better job than we are doing (that applies to the US but I suspect elsewhere as well).

Wilf is correct on the very good at what they did comment. That too cannot be completely copied lacking all the trauma -- but we can do a much more competent job of producing combat soldiers and leaders than we are at present...

[William F. Owen]

I'm firmly convinced that attempts to make battle command and tactical decision making a 'check the box, matrix driven, quasi scientific exercise is not only flawed but is in fact downright dangerous.

Combat is an art, pure and simple. Some attempts to codify aspects to assist those who are competent artists (as opposed to the few great ones...) and to determine who possesses the basic talent are necessary.
Concur 100%. Personally I believe that useful codification is very useful, but context is everything and yes it does require skill.

Vauban codified siege craft and fortification, -which was good - but I bet a good many Commanders still managed to screw it up

.... and maybe Ken saw them do it? :D

[JMA]

The dense vegetation and rough ground in the theater took a surprisingly heavy toll on the fuel consumption of the brigade's vehicles. Diesel usage rates for cross-country movement proved much higher than expected for off-road travel. Keeping the several hundred SADF vehicles full of gas was a constant worry; at times the columns had to be withdrawn from combat prematurely or redistribute gasoline within the battle groups to
reach the refueling points. Fuel moved by air and ground to Mavinga, from there tanker trucks shuttled back and forth to the front. On previous external operations SADF mobile columns often resupplied their helicopters with fuel; the tanks of the Ratels and supply lorries provided a sort of mobile FARP for the aviation element. During Modular helo operations were limited by the air threat to night time casualty evacuation, so ground based fuel for wide ranging C2, air assault, and fire support helicopters wasn't necessary.

The US would have handled the logistics of this with a breeze (in my opinion).

One needs to look towards the competence of the staff officers and logistics units before reading too much into all this.

[SJPONeill]

The US would have handled the logistics of this with a breeze (in my opinion).

One needs to look towards the competence of the staff officers and logistics units before reading too much into all this.

If MODULAR had been a US operation, there would have been no air threat for a start - the USAF, USN and the Marines would have dealt to the Angolan Air Force in detail on Day One. But few if any other nations have the sheer combat power to inflict control totally over an AO in a conventional conflict (as opposed to PSO or irregular war) the way the US does. I guess that kind of makes it a moot point as even the Brits, French or Germans would have had to overcome the same issues that faced the SADF for MODULAR.

The unchallenged combat and logistics power of the US is another reason to question the Single Fuel Concept as it simply doesn't need to do it and can actually afford, more than anyone else, to operate specific niche systems for even greater effectiveness. But instead it seems that it is the smaller forces that would ironically benefit more from a SFC in the long term, that are overcoming the issues inherent in multiple FOL and basically just getting on with the job...

[J Wolfsberger]

Comes from Wavell's "The Good Soldier" - another forgotten infantry classic, and was quoted in the Times newspaper in 1949, IIRC.

Thanks, also, from me, Wilf. I've long thought that the best BE Generals in NA were such as Wavell, Auchinleck and O'Conner (and not the individual who seems to have grabbed all the attention). I didn't know about this title, and now I'll have to get it.

[SJPONeill]

I was just sorting through my Facebook links today and came across this article (http://www.getfrank.co.nz/schama-on-new-zealand/) - I think it offers some more insights into other forms of oneness and the financial/business bottom line motivators that drove this philosophy...


But beyond that, these people see only money. They measure the worth of a society solely in terms of GDP. As a result, they are utterly blind to our real achievements, and place no value on them.

[mikefx]

A technical point-

- re: one fuel - Diesel motorcycles (http://www.dieselbike.net/militaryproduction/militaryproduction.htm) are in production and use. I suspect that if you can make a diesel motorcycle, other small diesels are not to challenging, technologically. Given the tremendous logistical simplification from a single fuel, I think you're on shaky ground with this point.

The HDT diesel motorcycle is up around 300kg/650lb, used as a convoy outrider, base transportation etc.

My company has tested our 57kg/125lb gasoline motorcycles with the NZ Army (Infantry and SAS) and had a request for quotation from the US Army.

Applications: recon, special operations, mobility over tight, broken terrain and obstacles, transportability on mother vehicles.

Unfortunately it is impossible to reduce the size/weight of a diesel engine to anything much less than the HDT scale.

So the choice is simple given the current and foreseeable technology: allow for alternative fuels to gain additional capabilities, or go without.