Afghanistan RFI

[Schmedlap]

I've looked, but haven't been able to find an answer to this.

What exactly is "government in a box"?

I have only found vague descriptions in newspaper articles. My understanding is that it is an attempt to swiftly install some kind of community body through which information can be relayed and collective decisions made, but that is only an educated guess. Even if that guess is correct, I have absolutely no idea what the specifics are. What types of units are involved? What are their tasks/purposes? What are their MoP/MoE? Etc?

[Bob's World]

Quite honestly it is an unfortunate play on words made by General McChrystal that he probably wishes he could take back.

We have "Radio in a Box," a mini radio station that can go anywhere and set up quickly and begin broadcasting.

What he meant by "Government in a Box" is that GIROA would identify leadership and a tashkil of authorized manning (ministers, officials, police, etc) to go into areas directly behind the "Clear" force where there previously was no true GIROA presence. Like these radio stations would come in as a package and be able to hit the ground running.

Unfortunately the phrase implys something packaged up by the Coalition; and when also delivered by Coalitoin security forces, in Coalition aircraft, to a newly "liberated" populace that has been receiving governance of some sort from the Taliban for years, and little to none from GIROA; it does create perceptions of illegitimacy that are largely unfair and certainly unintended, but there all the same.

[marct]

It also produces some interesting pictures...

http://merciarising.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/trapped_inside_the_box.jpg

[Bob's World]

I guess, sadly, most government is "in a box" in far too many ways.

You just don't want it to be in a box built and delivered by some foreign intity. Goes to good Strategic Communications. 80% what you do; or more importantly, HOW you do things.

[marct]

I guess, sadly, most government is "in a box" in far too many ways.

You just don't want it to be in a box built and delivered by some foreign intity. Goes to good Strategic Communications. 80% what you do; or more importantly, HOW you do things.

LOL - too true!

Actually, a pretty decent example of GiaB that (sort of) worked was the Roman expansion in the 1st century bce, or Alexander's planting of Greek cities. It's a hub and spoke model of governance that worked pretty well.

[Surferbeetle]

Andrew J. Bacevich (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_J._Bacevich) in the February 17, 2010 edition of the LA Times: 'Government in a box' in Marja (http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/17/opinion/la-oe-bacevich17-2010feb17)


The purpose of Operation Moshtarak (Dari for "together") is to clear the Taliban from the city and then to fix the place, winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Toward that end, said Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of Western forces in Afghanistan, "We've got a government in a box, ready to roll in." As government arrives on the coattails of the Marines, it will ensure law and order, set up schools and clinics, repair roads, revitalize the irrigation system and cajole farmers into cultivating something other than opium poppies. The successful transformation of Marja will demonstrate the viability of McChrystal's plan to transform Afghanistan as a whole. At least that's the idea.

The United States tried once before to transform Marja and its environs. An ambitious agricultural reform program sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development in the 1950s proved a total flop in terms of lasting changes.

[Schmedlap]

What he meant by "Government in a Box" is that GIROA would identify leadership and a tashkil of authorized manning (ministers, officials, police, etc) to go into areas directly behind the "Clear" force where there previously was no true GIROA presence. Like these radio stations would come in as a package and be able to hit the ground running.

Is there any research/experience/etc that suggests this could work? Particularly in Pashtun areas, it's my understanding that vesting powers in a sovereign isn't a popular idea and the communities generally prefer to reach decisions and settle disputes through consensus, reparation, and mediation. As I understand it, resistance to attempts to install governance have historically been perceived as attempts by the central gov't to grab power in ways incompatible with the values of the community.

Have attempts thus far suggested that this concept might now work? Or is this just a good idea that we're waiting to see how it goes?

[Steve the Planner]

Schmedlap: Yes and No.

Plenty of experiences doing it poorly and doing it OK.

Question is: Any successful experience comparable to Afghanistan? No.

Even where Afghans (with foreign backing) tried it, it blew up.

Local consensus structures used to work, but these are increasingly the "remnant" population of a very long, difficult period of massive social dislocation and strife.

How do you put the egg back together once many of the best fled, or have trickled out later. Leadership by the best and brightest (who leave) is now leadership of the worst class of virulent "survivors" in many places.

Can one re-nurture stability across the conflict and intergenerational divides?

My guess is that the only "breeding ground" for a next generation of forward looking consensus builders might be in more stable urban areas, but, like in the past, How are these folks going to relate to rural and Pashtun communities?

My guess is that effective "government in a box" is an explicitly "provisional" government that intentionally goes in to first, stabilize, and only then turn-over. All this stuff about schools and road paving is not necessary in a "provisional" stabilization mission---that's the carrot that comes from progress toward self-governance, not the unsustainable veneer of interim governance.

What happens when these folks have to come up with the taxes and commitment to support systems dropped on their head? A tax revolt? Prop 32? What are all these projects about? Just stabilize.

Jed and I added a bit to the Marjah thread. Same thing.

Steve

[Schmedlap]

All this stuff about schools and road paving is not necessary in a "provisional" stabilization mission---that's the carrot that comes from progress toward self-governance, not the unsustainable veneer of interim governance.

But what if they already have self-governance in place? And the central gov't comes along and says, "no, you need to govern yourselves in this different way." I wonder if we're assuming that governance can only occur by way of a state and not by way of customary practices. If so, I think we're wrong.

[Steve the Planner]

I assume that, due to human condition, if there are just two people in the world, there is a governance structure of some kind.

Assuming you are going to do a Marjah, to drive out a governance you don;t like, or are feeding on the people, something has to be put in place quickly and effectively to "stabilize," not to create and develop. Goal is to stabilize immediately once you drive out the old system---after stabilization, you worry about governance.

Otherwise, you are just pushing big instability around.

25,000 Marjans fled (probably the better and smarter). What's left, about 2500 desperately protecting their assets, homes or activities (good or bad)---and not the "best and brightest."

Building a self-governance system around these folks (especially in an Afghan cultural context) is just setting up a new power block as an obstacle for the real folks when they try to come back. Only a "provisional government" can stabilize to get all the folks back, before you start dealing with self-governance.

Making permanent governments from fragments of remnant populations is a very dumb and bad idea with no history of success.

Steve

[Schmedlap]

I agree with much of that, but it seems there is another way not considered.

If an area is little more than subsistence farmers or has very limited trade, then what kind of governance do you really need for, say, a few months, until the others start returning? You probably need some kind of dispute resolution mechanism. But do you need to immediately stand up any kind of functionality other than that?

Regarding dispute resolution, it seems that one could simply arrange for the parties to avoid each other until a jirga can be adjourned (upon the return of the individuals who would sit in on it) or until an acceptable mediator can be brought in. Those tasked with ensuring separation of the parties in the meantime can be paid. Do you really need to import central gov't representatives for this?

Even if a purpose for central gov't reps is rationalized, aren't those reps going to be perceived as agents of a regime that is incompatible with the values of the locals and, thus, not well received anyway?

And, again, why do you need to "build" a self-governance system? I wonder if we've made a careful assessment of the resiliency of the customary practices that have so often filled the gaps in Afghanistan and whether we've explored the possibility of reviving a literate, educated Hanafi ulema as an alternative to the Taliban nutbars.

[Dayuhan]

Even if a purpose for central gov't reps is rationalized, aren't those reps going to be perceived as agents of a regime that is incompatible with the values of the locals and, thus, not well received anyway?


I get the feeling we've set ourselves up for a whole lot of problems like this with the initial decision to work through a centralized, top-down government structure. I've also felt for a long time that our initial decisions regarding government structure and the pace at which governments needed to be established in both Iraq and Afghanistan were driven less by a desire to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the host country populace than by a desire to establish legitimacy in the eyes of Americans. Given the questions raised about the legitimacy of both wars that desire is perhaps understandable, but the decisions can still haunt us for a long time.

[Steve the Planner]

Now you are starting to sound like Mohammed, the Peace Maker.

My point about "provisional" governance is that it is not a new permanent power broker from outside---just a freeze and hold. Once you bring back the central gov, you run substantial rsik of recreating what brought the Taliban in in the first place.

Plus, a "provisional" gov focuses attn on transition ---tie breaking, coming to resolutions, rather than power shifting to a permanent gov in which few have confidence. None of these folks voted for whatever is arriving in our helo, be they Afghan or otherwise.

Problem with "gov in a box" might sound great to some who don't live there, but, if they do, it is like Dorothy dropping from the sky---hope they don;t think you are the wicked witch!!! More often, it seems to fall on somebody's dad or brother.

[Bob's World]

Guys, understand that General McChrystal must work within the left and right limits set by the Constitution of Afghanistan. Perhaps that is the true box at work here, and when I read through it a couple months ago to better understand some seemingly crazy decisions in regards to governance, I knew we were in trouble. Fear of Militias, I imagine, by both Karzai and the West, drove a document that disconnects the local populace from governance in many ways.

Marjah was not an official District, as such there was no authorizatoin for "governance" to Marjah. So, easy decision, make it a District and gain a Tashkil for governance. But once a region is an official District, the governance is then selected from Kabul and delivered to your doorstep (or not, too often it simply stays in Kabul); owing its complete loyalty and job security back up to those who appointed them (appointments that typically come with payments that must be made).

I'm not sure how one truly overcomes this without fixing the Constitution.

Historically there were local shuras of local elders recognized locally for their positions. There was also a position called the "Khan" who was also selected locally, but recognized by the King offically as well. That blend of local legitimacy and centralized officialness that is sadly missing from today's "box ingredients." McChrystal would be as wrong for trying to fix the current system as Karzai is for keeping it in place.

The goal for Hamkari is two-fold: To achieve representative governance and opportunity. This must be done within the confines of the Constitution; and in the face of many powerful men, not all "Taliban", who have no desire for such equity.

[Schmedlap]

This must be done within the confines of the Constitution...

Hypothetical: it is not done within the confines of the Constitution.

Question: Who has standing to lodge a complaint? Against whom? And, if you know the answer to the first question, who actually would lodge the complaint? And then - I don't know how Afghan Constitutional law compares to US Con Law - isn't there a problem with the complaint not having any means of obtaining relief? If I'm Bacha the goat herder and I hire me a long-bearded lawyer to file suit against the GIRoA for not adhering to the Constitution, what exactly am I seeking to obtain from the court? A court order requiring the GIRoA to do something that it is incapable of doing? An injunction to force ISAF to stop doing something? If it's the latter, then perhaps the problem is not so much the Constitution, but the absurd idea of making GEN McChrystal subordinate to Karzai?

In any case, I'm a bit surprised that we're boxed in by the Constitution. Constitutions need to be interpreted and I'm not aware of much case history clarifying the nuances of the Afghan Constitution. I think one could very easily argue that Constitutions can be both written and unwritten (US versus UK) and that other written general principles can guide interpretation (think France, for example - or, for Afghanistan, there is Sharia, which the Constitution is apparently not supposed to violate) or even unwritten general principles can guide the interpretation (Afghanistan's fairly well developed customary law). One can argue that certain provisions do not have effect until implemented. I'm guessing there's a lot of arguments that haven't been explored here - or am I just completely ignorant?

[Dayuhan]

Historically there were local shuras of local elders recognized locally for their positions. There was also a position called the "Khan" who was also selected locally, but recognized by the King offically as well. That blend of local legitimacy and centralized officialness that is sadly missing from today's "box ingredients."

Possibly slightly off topic... but the reign of Mohammed Zahir Shah is often cited as evidence that centralized Government can work in Afghanistan. I've long wondered how centralized that Government really was, in terms of practical day to day control over local affairs. If anyone knows of any good material describing the actual (as opposed to structural/theoretical) relationship between central and local governments in the Zahir Shah period, I'd be interested in looking. Of course I realize that the period in question was extended and saw considerable evolution and change, but it remains an interesting question, even if there's no short simple answer.

[Chris jM]

Marjah was not an official District, as such there was no authorizatoin for "governance" to Marjah. So, easy decision, make it a District and gain a Tashkil for governance. But once a region is an official District, the governance is then selected from Kabul and delivered to your doorstep (or not, too often it simply stays in Kabul); owing its complete loyalty and job security back up to those who appointed them (appointments that typically come with payments that must be made).


Correct me if I'm wrong, but Afghanistan political appointments work in the following way:

Presidential elections appoint the President and his ruling government.

The President appoints District Governors.

District Governors appoint District Sub-Governors.

Locals vote in separate elections to appoint their Shura representatives, who then report direct to the DSG.

And parallel to this would be the Mullah/ Malauwi network, who would somehow be connected through their own hierarchy to Kabul or to extremist elements in Pakistan, depending upon their affiliations?

Further tying the regions to Kabul would be the ANP chain of command, whom have representation in each Governor's office but actually report to a centralised regional HQ that in turn is linked to Kabul, unless I am mistaken.

I'm trying to picture ithe elements of Afghani government to better understand what Steve and Bob are talking about, especially with Bob's reference to the historical position of a 'Khan'.

[Schmedlap]

If anyone knows of any good material describing the actual (as opposed to structural/theoretical) relationship between central and local governments in the Zahir Shah period, I'd be interested in looking.

http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2009/12/28/buy-this-book/

[Bob's World]

Guys, I'm no expert on Afghanistan, just sharing my perspective, so it may be a bit off on a few points;

But for Dayuhan, I suspect is was a fairly decentralized form of centralized governance under the king. Local Shuras were empowered, and connected up to Kabul through this missing link of the Khan. I doubt there was ever much demand for centralized services, nor that much was provided.

For Schmedlap, I would cautions strongly about over-riding local systems in order to ensure outcomes we desire. I believe that it is just such control-based foreign policy that planted the roots of the AQ movement and terrorist attacks against the west. We need just the opposite I think. We need to adopt the realizaiton that the less we control, the better we service our national interests. But that is a totally "new" (as in not how anyone currently alive and in politics in DC has done it) way of thinking, so we need to figure it out. We built a lot of influence in this region behind the scenes when it was "controlled" by European powers, and built a lot of good will in doing so. Problem is that that we took over the "controls" over the course of the past 80 years or so, and now seem to have a hard time evolving.

For ChrisjM what you laid out is essentially how I understand it to work as well.

[Dayuhan]

For Schmedlap, I would cautions strongly about over-riding local systems in order to ensure outcomes we desire.

Our over-riding local systems to ensure outcomes we desire is only half the problem, and likely the more manageable half. The other half is the likelihood that the government in Kabul will use the system we helped design, and may even use our armed force, to over-ride local systems to impose an outcome they desire, which is likely to mean achieving control over smuggling, opium production, and other profitable sidelines. When that happens we share the blame and have little control over the outcome.


I believe that it is just such control-based foreign policy that planted the roots of the AQ movement and terrorist attacks against the west.

I was under the impression that the AQ movement had its roots in opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, rather than in a reaction to US control of anything...

[Bob's World]

Well there is AQ the organization, which I believe was primarily invigorated by the Saudi's rejecting Bin Laden's offer to protect them from Iraq in favor of allowing the US to come in with a large military presence to defend Saudi Arabia and Liberate Kuwait,

Then there is the broad base of support to AQ from popualces across Muslim dominated countries, primarily in country's that have been heavily manipulated and controlled at the governance level by the West; or have heavily relied on the West to stay in power often rather manipulating it rather than being manipulated themselves.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob: Right, the mission is defined by conditions which cannot produce success without changes to the underlying constitution.

Governance, for most folks and most circumstances, is not a national affair, but a local delivery/control/representation structure. Sub-national governance is the most complex, intricate and ever-evolving "war by another means" as states, counties, municipalities continuously "manage" inherent conflicts within a web of competitive budgets, interlocking governmental "authorities," all aimed at delivering a service down to users.

Nice to believe that "big gov" is the "big deal," but, under most circumstances, it is the tail trying to wag the dog. US democracy is delivered by a city or county maintenance truck, fireman, or processing clerk--all based on inherently unique systems of evolved local processes, authorities, and inter-relationships.

When "big gov," ala Iraq and Afghanistan, fools around with restructuring a country without any actual clue as to sub-governance, how sub-governance is and has to be arranged to function, and the way things work, you have these inevitable problems.

Iraq's constitution, TAL and present, are amazing documents for a sub-governance person. It is all about stock markets and crap related to US big gov issues. Once dissembling the national authority, it merely directs, as to local laws, that things will be as they were.

Nobody in charge actually knew what that meant even five years later, and the disconnects and confusions are still playing out.

In 2008, UN constitutional law folks went through many of the "enactments" which Sadaam would routinely send down to his "representative" bodies for ratification. One paper in a confused and ill-considered constitution, every one would be applicable.

What should have occurred, after removing a brutal dictator, was a "role back" of every category of abuse to pre-dictator status. But nobody on our side knew what that would be either. Oh, the problems that arise when our starship lands on alien planets.

Back to Afghanistan, once again, we created a nation, but it is not one that works, or that could work in that country. All because of the sub-governance structural and administrative sphere (local governance).

As Bob points out, those are the rules. Unless something changes, we are lost in a dysfunctional system which we are constantly trying to subvert.

One thing we do know: The problems are not addressed in the current system, raising the questions: Are the system defects actually a substantial basis for legitimate opposition/conflict? Will the defects, if unaddressed, preclude stability, end of conflict, regardless of any interim efforts?

[Schmedlap]

For Schmedlap, I would cautions strongly about over-riding local systems in order to ensure outcomes we desire.

That is essentially my position as well. The entire experiment with the Karzai regime seems to be an exercise in forcing something upon the rural communities that they do not want and will continue to resist, regardless of how good the ANSF gets, how much poppy we eradicate, and how many schools we build.

[Entropy]

Possibly slightly off topic... but the reign of Mohammed Zahir Shah is often cited as evidence that centralized Government can work in Afghanistan. I've long wondered how centralized that Government really was, in terms of practical day to day control over local affairs. If anyone knows of any good material describing the actual (as opposed to structural/theoretical) relationship between central and local governments in the Zahir Shah period, I'd be interested in looking. Of course I realize that the period in question was extended and saw considerable evolution and change, but it remains an interesting question, even if there's no short simple answer.

There was no control over local affairs. Briefly, here's what Louis Dupree wrote 40 years ago in "Afghanistan (http://www.amazon.com/Afghanistan-Louis-Dupree/dp/0195776348/)":


The recent history of Afghanistan reveals the story of a piece of real estate trying to become a nation-state, its external patterns uncontrollably linked with those of the two great imperialist powers in the region [Russia and Britian]. More important than the drawing of boundaries was Afghanistan's internal integration, hampered by a plethora of independent and semi-independent ethnic and linguistic units.

Therefore, Afghanistan discovered that the most important elements in the creation of a national consciousness are the attitudes of the people, for a nation-state must evolve as a state of mind as well as a geographic entity. The essence of the modern nation-state involves a reciprocal set of recognizable, definable, functioning rights and obligations between the government and the governed. All twentieth-century nations, including Afghanistan and the United States, still strive, in varying ways, to achieve this ideal, although in Afghanistan, as in most of the developing world, many social, political, and economic rights and obligations occur within kinship-oriented, not government-oriented, institutions.

BTW, the book is in print again, so if you want a copy, you can get it for about a third of what I paid....

Also, this may be of interest (http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2008/03/17/afghanistans-local-power-structures-exploit-restructure-or-destroy/) for a number of reasons, not least of which it contains more relevant quotes from Dupree.

I've been thumbing through "Afghanistan" again recently and the sense I get from this 4-decade old seminal work is that Afghanistan, on a fundamental level, hasn't changed all that much. Bob's World is right about the Constitution and the over-centralization of power it promotes is probably the most serious obstacle to any kind of central governance.

[Dayuhan]

There was no control over local affairs.

That's pretty much what I expected.


Bob's World is right about the Constitution and the over-centralization of power it promotes is probably the most serious obstacle to any kind of central governance.

Sounds right to me as well, though I'd suggest that it's not only an obstacle to central governance but to any kind of functional governance... which need not be and probably should not be central.

We made our bed and now we get to lie in it; I've no idea how we're going to work our way out of this one.

[Schmedlap]

Afghanistan got new Constitutions in 1923, 1931, 1964, 1977, 1980, 1987, 1990, a proposed one in 1992, and then the recent one in 2004. I'd say that Afghanistan is about due for a new Constitution. Given how crappy the current one is and given how often new ones are promulgated, one would think it is somewhat doable.

On that note, I think the COIN-mania has gone a bit too far, but there is an article in a 2008 issue of the Harvard Law Review titled "Counterinsurgency and Constitutional Design" (121 Harv. L. Rev. 1622 for those of you with access). It cites many of the sources of emulation and saints of the COIN faith - Kilcullen, Galula, 3-24, Petraeus, Nagl, Sepp, Barno - and even cites McCulloch v. Maryland to keep it legal.

[Steve the Planner]

Tracking back a few centuries, my understanding of the ancient empires in which Afghanistan's territory was actually a part, I think of them in terms of I'll pretend to be in your empire if you don't bother me, and I get something out of it---maybe that's the local leaders getting payments, or more lucrative trade routes (same as today), or I get access to markets/goods I need.

If anybody wants to pretend they are a part of their empire, there is always something that has to be worked out.

I just finished reading the new Exum Report for CNAS---somehow it always comes back to---its not military, it is political, so the US really needs to ramp up the billions, send tons of civilians, and transform the country. Alway military think tank guys with no clue what they are actually talking about, and no domestic, economic will/support for it.

I did, however, appreciate the marked shift from "lets do CERP," to the realization that our money is creating a lot of the instability and obstacles we face. Why not just all sit down and pass crack pipes amongst each other while playing russian roulette. Whether you win or lose, you lose.

Given the real resources and commitments, what is the best strategy to accomplish realistic US goals? The practical demands, resources and time needed to "create" a new Afghanistan are different orders of magnitude than the $53 billion used to stabilize/minimally reconstruct Iraq. They are two completely different problems.

Forget the clear hold bribe that worked in Iraq, and the billions in payola washing through Kabul, and get them focused on taking control of their country with their resources. (No it will not have a school building in every community, and health clinics will be far between, but it is theirs and sustainable.

What if we took over and really ran things badly? Would that help to promote indigenous efforts to run themselves better? Why does everything have to end, not in teacups, but in mega-NGO contracts, and projects?

COIN is not a strategy, it is a tactic or technique to be applied when and where it can work, and our resources can be aligned to a successful outcome. If COIN is the only answer to Afghanistan (which it is not), then let's find a real strategy that macthexs the problem.

[Schmedlap]

I just finished reading the new Exum Report for CNAS---somehow it always comes back to---its not military, it is political, so the US really needs to ramp up the billions, send tons of civilians, and transform the country. Alway military think tank guys with no clue what they are actually talking about, and no domestic, economic will/support for it.

I just read that today, too, and agree with your assessment.


COIN is not a strategy, it is a tactic or technique to be applied when and where it can work, and our resources can be aligned to a successful outcome. If COIN is the only answer to Afghanistan (which it is not), then let's find a real strategy that macthexs the problem.

You know, his blog quoted a passage from some article (about his "report") that stated...

"'Good counterinsurgency tactics and operations cannot, in and of themselves, win a campaign,' according to the report being released Thursday."

When I read that, I first thought, "holy crap, they're waking up." Nope. Reading on, Exum drops this whopper...


Last fall, I sat down with LTG (Ret.) David Barno and asked him what he thought was missing from our research on Afghanistan. He said that while we had done a good job talking about counterinsurgency at the tactical and operational levels, we had not tackled counterinsurgency at the strategic and political levels.

W.T.F.?:confused: Oh yeah, the strategic and political things. Did we forget about that? I mean, did Colonel Gentile not nail this problem a few months ago when he pointed out that our COIN fetish is a bunch of tactics that are driving strategy? This is the smoking gun.

[Steve the Planner]

PS

The real clock ticking in Afghanistan is the national election cycle. This problem will be well on the way to success before then, or it will be remarkably transformed by a relentless domestic problem---budgets.

For those of you who remember domestic budget cycles (adopted in June for FY2011, 12), there is serious emerging crisis, patched over last year by stimulus grants.

When the locals start screaming for help, and there is no more borrowing capacity without inflation, a new hand will be dealt. We will begin to see the domestic state and local budget cards in June of this year, and June of next.Then we have to watch how the deck is shuffled, dealt and played.

Going in to Afghanistan was a serious endeavor. Suppressing OBL/ Taliban was real. Creating a new Afghanistan (or improving our relationship with Karzai, etc., as Exum suggests) is the smoke coming out of a hash pipe.

[Steve the Planner]

Schmedlap:

We cross-posted that last one.

Really. They need a better quality of advisers. If it is not a military problem, find somebody who is not military to answer it.

My fingers are crossed that in then next review, the White House will ask the same unanswered questions from last year, and start to realize how very wide the chasm is between problem, tools, and solution paths (currently being employed) and, with a relentless eye on the election clock, finally say: Let's get real, here.

What are we trying to achieve and how can we really achieve it.

[Bob's World]

I haven't seen the Harvard piece; but I will lend my vote that the greatest COIN tool in the US is not the military nor the state department, but is our Constitution. But most of us really don't appreciate that fact, and even fewer still appreciate why this position is likely true.

In 1976, my 8th grade civics teacher (who as a member of the 82nd Airborne made the jump on Normandy) taught as about how the Judiciary, Legislative and Executive Brranchs are designed to complement, counter, and balance each other. But it has only been in recent years that I really have come to appreciate "the fourth Branch" (hmmm, there is a book, or at least an article in that) of the populace. Today many 8th grade civics teachers probably think Desert Storm was "The Big One."

It was the Bill of Rights that really empowered The Fourth Branch. Amendments one and two ensured we could preserve access to the truth and the ability to think and believe what we individually want to think and believe, not what the government wants us to collectively think and believe; and that the governement would never forget that the people are both informed and armed, and not for the other three branches to get together and impose their will upon us.

The rest of the Bill primarily identified some specific and recent abuses of such power and prohibited them specifically as they were known to drive a populace to insurgency; closing with a couple of catch-alls to keep crafty lawyers in check from circumventing the intent of the bill.

The Fourth Branch will express itself. A good constitution will determine the frequency and legality of that expression. Keep it between the lines, so to speak.

A bad constituion forces The Fourth Branch to act out illegally; most often, violently, to voice their rights to good governance.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

You puncuate the accidental, divine, or historical collection of facts and circumstances that led to the creation of a viable USA---many of which are, in fact, outside the system and structure of governance. Some of the many peices:

=A common british heritage of constitutional law, writs and rights of the people;

=A population that was generally consistent in language, culture and essential religious positions;

=A common challenge/opportunity (facing a great and dangerous continent chock full of unexploited opportunities);

=Contact with indigenous populations w. organizational systems adapted for life on the big continent; and,

=And a tradition of information-sharing rapidly expanding due to the printing press and news systems (pamphleteers, Franklin's postal routes).

Even with all of that, our constitution had to be strong and resilient enough to survive and adapt to: civil wars, massive corruption, major economic failures (growing pains) that took at least 150 years to survive to a modern era that later encompasses waives of immigrants and industrialization.

What lessons do we take from this about the complexity of trying to turn Afghanistan into something like us? First, it is a chance collection of facts, resources and cultural heritage not really applicable there. Second, it is internally created, and not imposed from outside. Third, it takes generations, and so many external supporting factors that it could not come in a box, or be pushed of the ramp of a truck or helo.

[Bob's World]

Simple, flexible, designed by and for the populace that will be governed by it; and designed to keep individuals, organizations or government itself from being able to abuse power to subjugate others. And also designed preserve the four causal perceptions of Good Governance: Respect, Justice, Legitimacy and Hope; for everyone.

Our role should be one of mentoring rather than directing, and if the government insists on adopting something outrageous to simply say "good luck with that" and leave them to their devises. If we are too much the "big brother", when it goes bad or is tested, and it will be tested, it will be blamed on us.

I just don't know how you can get to Legitimacy and Hope with the current Afghan Constitution, even in the near-term, yet alone over time. I'd advice the "good luck with that" approach as the best bet for the coalition; or at least have that conversation and be willing to play that card.

[Steve the Planner]

PS:

What history, structure and opportunities do Afghans have that are different from ours, and define the what can and should happen there in a nation and organizational sense?

Consensus based formal and informal systems across a resource-limited and geographically distinct and disaggregate environment.

Very different, and very limited in producing a modern high-performing, service-intensive nation state.

Build a school? Great. Funded by foreign aid? Sure. (that's eating fish, not teaching to fish)

Build a self-sustaining national system of public schools for universal and compulsory K-12 education for 12-14 million students? With armies of supporting bureaucracies, teachers (400,000), textbooks, and facilities maintenance.) Impossible without a structure and system to sustain it. Taxes, accounting, logistics, distribution of authority, decision-making. Many internal languages, religions, historical and cultural narratives.

That's a multi-billion dollar intergenerational effort predicated on an effective national political, economic and governance system that has never existed in Afghanistan, to date.

Things can be done there, but only within the limits of what is possible.

[Schmedlap]

I just don't know how you can get to Legitimacy and Hope with the current Afghan Constitution, even in the near-term, yet alone over time. I'd advice the "good luck with that" approach as the best bet for the coalition; or at least have that conversation and be willing to play that card.

I'm curious if anyone knows what kind of constitution Afghanistan has. For example, in France there is a saying (not sure if this translates exactly) that the law is a screen. Once a law is promulgated, its constitutionality cannot be challenged because its passage is the implementation of the will of the people, expressed through the parliament. Our own Constitution contains rights and powers that aren't even articulated (for example the "right to privacy" that is unmentioned but apparently exists under a "prenumbra") and "implied powers" of Congress that are pretty broad.

In Afghanistan, if a law is passed that defies the constitution, but goes unchallenged, and is in accord with Islam (at least Hanafi fiqh), then would this really be problematic? If the government took some actions not explicitly laid out in the constitution, but were "necessary" then is this unconstitutional?

Building upon the second question... while I understand that the 2004 constitution provides for a hierarchy of provincial/district/other bodies, I'm curious if this necessarily means that there cannot be parallel, unofficial structures relied upon until those state agencies mature. Okay, we need to establish a provincial office and district offices. So what? Why can't we also establish district jirgas, if the people prefer that, and provincial jirgas, if the people want that as well? Similarly, if courts in a rural area are inaccessible or suffer from lack of legitimacy, then what's wrong with using a court of sharia or a mediator as screening mechanism? If the court of sharia or mediator works out - great. Or, if the parties are not satisfied then they bring their case to the state court - voluntarily - thus bolstering the legitimacy of the state court and not creating an impression of the state forcing itself upon the community.

I've read lots of comments, here and on other sites, about the apparent straightjacket that the constitution places us in. But I wonder if this is a straightjacket that we can't break free from - or a wet paper bag that we're not struggling against.

[Dayuhan]

Our role should be one of mentoring rather than directing, and if the government insists on adopting something outrageous to simply say "good luck with that" and leave them to their devises.

The only problem with this formulation is that it overlooks the reason why we're there in the first place. We didn't go to Afghanistan to mentor the Afghans on governance: if governance were the issue we'd never have gone near the place. We went there to deny sanctuary to AQ, and if we "leave them to their own devices" at this stage we will compromise that goal, or more likely surrender it.

We have a dog in this hunt; that's why we're there. That reality limits our options, but it's still reality.

[Steve the Planner]

Dahayun: Right. We have a dog in the hunt.

In the US, the saying goes (ala Oil Spills): I doesn't matter what law is adopted; it depends on how (and if) it is implemented.

Discussing al lot of this stuff is almost and academic one absent any viable implementation structures or capacity. What difference does it make what type of sub-national structure, if: (1) there isn't much effective juice in any; and (2) the leaders are appointed by the national government (not locals). Same with justice/security structures, and property and individual rights.

As much as anything, we may actually be intentionally disrupting much of what we gripe about. Absent national appointments of local administrators, there is "no telling" who might get appointed or whether we could control it, so there are tons of mixed messages across ours and there systems.

In Iraq in 2008, the US ground-reconstructors were desperate to get cash flowing in the provinces, while IMF was desperate to restrict cash (money supply) due to inflation concerns. Two conflicting views; both correct in their spheres; each workingagainst the other. Sounds familiar, no?

[Bob's World]

The only problem with this formulation is that it overlooks the reason why we're there in the first place. We didn't go to Afghanistan to mentor the Afghans on governance: if governance were the issue we'd never have gone near the place. We went there to deny sanctuary to AQ, and if we "leave them to their own devices" at this stage we will compromise that goal, or more likely surrender it.

We have a dog in this hunt; that's why we're there. That reality limits our options, but it's still reality.

But of course, it is not.

We did not go to Afghanistan to "deny sanctuary" any more than we went to Iraq to "deny WMD."

We went to Afghanistan to bring revenge and destruction down on the head of one Mr. B. Laden and his AQ organization in response to their attacks against the U.S. on 9/11; and also to disrupt, deter, dissuade the same from attempting that sh#* again. Period.

Did they use Afghanistan as a friendly base for training, etc? Certainly. But they also use safe houses in a dozen friendly countries and the U.S. itself as equally effective sanctuary.

There has been horrible mission creep in Afghanistan. We did not describe our origianal operations for what they really were; and then did not describe our subequent operations for what they really were (using Afghanistan as a convenient base of operaitons for continuing our vendetta against AQ, while we paid little attention to how Afghanistan and its people were doing in there transition from the TB to a new governance we delivered); then when that started to snowball, shifting to "COIN" (actually FID to support Afghan COIN) to keep our long ignored base of operations (Sanctuary?) from unraveling beneath us.

At the policy level we:
1. Rarely say what we really mean when we do something big;
2. Don't understand the essence of Insurgency and what is really important, and what is merely a symptom of larger problems/issues; so have tended to focus on symptoms, but only where we can link them to groups or states that we have pre-existing issues with; and
3. Have taken an approach to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and those before and after as being totally and completely things that must be fixed by changes in behavior by everyone else in the world except the U.S. (i.e., victim mentality)

Not exactly a recipe for success. But that's just one man's opinion.

I believe that the word of General Roberts, commander of the second British debacle in Afghanistan following his return to England in 1880 are informative (He led the relief party down from Kabul that won a decisive victory at Kandahar following a crushing defeat to forces under the command of Gerneral Burrows at Maiwand; then led the remnants of the Army back into India):

"We have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself. It may not be very flattering to our 'amour propre', but I feel sure I am right when I say tha the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan, or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interest if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime."

[Schmedlap]

Building upon the hunting dog meme, I'm reminded of the wise words of my old CSM when he was berating one of his NCOs...


Sergeant, that dog ain't gonna hunt! Heck, that dog don't even have any legs! You know what a dog with no legs does? Nothing! He ain't got no legs!!

We do have a dog in the fight. But a dog with no legs might be a better metaphor.

[Dayuhan]

We did not go to Afghanistan to "deny sanctuary" any more than we went to Iraq to "deny WMD."

We went to Afghanistan to bring revenge and destruction down on the head of one Mr. B. Laden and his AQ organization in response to their attacks against the U.S. on 9/11; and also to disrupt, deter, dissuade the same from attempting that sh#* again. Period.

Did they use Afghanistan as a friendly base for training, etc? Certainly. But they also use safe houses in a dozen friendly countries and the U.S. itself as equally effective sanctuary.

Certainly Afghanistan wasn't the only sanctuary, but it's the one OBL et al were using. There's a reason for that: there are levels of sanctuary, and a protective state provides a level of sanctuary that you just don't get in a European safe house, or anywhere else.

In any event, revenge, destruction, disruption, deterrence, and dissuasion were more or less what I meant when I spoke of denying sanctuary, so we don't really disagree there. We wanted to get them out of there and make sure they didn't come back, and presumably we still want that. That makes it difficult to walk away from Afghanistan if the government we started doesn't live up to our expectations, because if we do we surrender that objective. The Taliban come back, AQ come back with them, and very likely sooner or later we do it all over again.


At the policy level we:
1. Rarely say what we really mean when we do something big;
2. Don't understand the essence of Insurgency and what is really important, and what is merely a symptom of larger problems/issues; so have tended to focus on symptoms, but only where we can link them to groups or states that we have pre-existing issues with; and
3. Have taken an approach to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and those before and after as being totally and completely things that must be fixed by changes in behavior by everyone else in the world except the U.S. (i.e., victim mentality)

I'm not sure "the essence of insurgency" really made much difference: we didn't have an insurgency problem until we created one by occupying nations and trying to define the terms of their governance. Of course if we'd understood insurgency better we might not have done that, so in some ways we don't disagree there either.

I suspect, again, that you are assuming that 9/11 and the rise of AQ's jihad against the west was a consequence of American policy, and again I am not convinced that this is the case. Once the Soviets were out of Afghanistan OBL needed someone to hate, and given the realities of world power, who else was there? He'd have come after us regardless, because he had to come after someone and there was nobody else.

I'd love to agree with General Roberts, and I would certainly prefer to avoid all interference in Afghan affairs. There is a salient difference, though: we do have something to fear from Afghanistan. People determined to make war on us have used Afghanistan as a base in the past, and if given the opportunity they will do so again in the future. That's why we're there.

[Bob's World]

It's a matter of cause and effect.

I take a minority viewpoint as to "cause", but came about that position through honest labor, study and experience. Might be wrong, but I'm comfortable with that possibility.

Therefore we take different positions on potential Effects as well as Cures. Quite reasonable.

But remember, those who based in Afghanistan to attack the US were largely Saudis. Don't try to understand the US-Afghan relationship to determine why citizens of Saudi Arabia would be compelled to launch suicidal attacks against the U.S.; you must study the U.S. - Saudi relationship to understand that one.

This is way bigger than Afghanistan, who like Poland, Israel and several other places in the world gets sucked into conflicts primarily because it is either key terrain in of itself or is merely the easiest way to get from Point A to Point B.

Like I said before, we have had massive mission creep in Afghanistan. If it was simply a matter of COIN we would have been helping the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. No, it was about U.S. interests there, and while the interests probably have not changed much, we keep changing our mind as to how best service those interests. I offer that General Robert's 130 year-old advice is still a valid COA to keep in mind.

As an aside, I made my final presentation to the morning brief here today. Again, just one man's insights:

[slapout9]

BW,Finally some real Green Beret Thinking, massive cool man:). Billy Jack would give you a Gold Star! US Politicians should look at this presentation to better understand what is happening in the US not just overseas.

[MikeF]

Here's another way to look at it using different x and y axis- control over time.

Few's Model of Lifecycle of a Small War

[MikeF]

I put that together as an example of when an insurgency starts from nothing, gains momentum, is full-blown, and then the host nation successfully quells it.

I think it flows nicely with COL Jones' Model IF we assume that control is a function of popular perception.of governance coupled with the actual governing measures of the gov't.

[Bob's World]

The key for me is that it is primarily about the populace's perceptions on these key causal factors. That if one is out on the ground doing Yeoman's work on "C-H-B-T"; but not addressing the causal perceptions, you are just spinning your wheels.

On the other hand, a major effort that targets the perceptions effectively, but does virutally no C-H-B-T may quell an insurgency decisively. Best is to target the perceptions as one's main effort, and then use your actions on the ground as supporting efforts.

Big Article today in the Washington Post about Presidents Obama and Karzai. This coming visit is so critical, and for my money both President's get it. Karzai must establish Legitimacy in the coming Shuras and Jirgas if the surge is to have a prayer. The coalition must appreciate that it is a supporting effort to Karzai establishing his own legimacy with his popualce, showing them respect, giving them a voice, and producing and distributing an equitable justice system. We can merely enable and shape conditions on the ground to assist.

[MikeF]

The key for me is that it is primarily about the populace's perceptions on these key causal factors. That if one is out on the ground doing Yeoman's work on "C-H-B-T"; but not addressing the causal perceptions, you are just spinning your wheels.

On the other hand, a major effort that targets the perceptions effectively, but does virutally no C-H-B-T may quell an insurgency decisively. Best is to target the perceptions as one's main effort, and then use your actions on the ground as supporting efforts.

Concur, sir, and I think you nailed the important points on your second slide, IMO. I put my model together as a way of showing the lifecycle or history, not a how-to guide. I was trying to capture the current literature of McCormick and NPS, Rand, and SWJ into a simple picture to explain to young paratroopers.

BTW, vanishing point, an architecture term coined by Filippo Brunelleschi, would be the point when the insurgency is successfully suppressed.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Thanks for the brief.

I'll memorize it.

Steve

[Dayuhan]

But remember, those who based in Afghanistan to attack the US were largely Saudis. Don't try to understand the US-Afghan relationship to determine why citizens of Saudi Arabia would be compelled to launch suicidal attacks against the U.S.; you must study the U.S. - Saudi relationship to understand that one.

The US-Saudi relationship might be less relevant than the relationship between AQ and the Taliban, which made the sanctuary possible, and the relationship between AQ and the Saudi populace, which made it necessary.

We all know that the US was not OB's first choice of target for his post-Soviet jihad. He wanted to go after the Saudi government. What he discovered was that many of the Saudis who were perfectly happy to support him when he was killing infidels in faraway Afghanistan wanted nothing to do with him when he was threatening to rock the boat at home. AQ was able to pull in a small number of highly radicalized supporters, but for the populace at large the message was simply rejected: even in the depths of the oil glut, a very bad time for Saudi Arabia, the message just didn't resonate.

Of course the Saudi security apparatus came down on OBL and his people, as anyone would expect, but they are not omnipotent. If the message was truly gaining traction the crackdown would have only accelerated its spread, as we've seen in so many other places (Ayatollah Khomeini, for one, was quite able to drive a successful insurgency from exile, because his message resonated with the populace).

Once in exile, OBL was in a hard spot... the jihad against the Soviets was over, the jihad against the Saudi royals had failed. The only way he could put himself back on the map was to force somebody to invade a Muslim country... hence the jihad against the US.

The problem with the assumption that AQ's jihad is a response to US policy is that it places the US at the center of the picture, often ignoring or downgrading other factors and other relationships. In our minds we may always be at the center of the picture, but from other perspectives it may not necessarily be so. Certainly the US stands as a symbol of the rise of the secular West and the fall of Islam, but in terms of specific policies... other than the continuing irritant of reflexive support for Israel, I can't think of anything we could have changed, pre-9/11, that would have made a difference.

The picture of Afghanistan makes sense, but it all seems to hinge on the assumption that the US and the GIROA are and are perceived to be two separate entities... again, I get the feeling that the problem is being treated as an intervention in a pre-existing fight between a Government and an insurgency. Certainly we want to see it this way, but is that how the Afghans see it?

Do the Afghans see the GIROA as their government, not a product of and extension of a foreign intervention? Do they see the conflict as a fight between the GIROA and the insurgents, with the foreigners assisting the GIROA... not as a fight between the Taliban and the foreigners, with GIROA as a threadbare front for the foreign invader?

If the answer to those questions is affirmative, the picture you're drawing makes perfect sense. If it's not, then we are assuming conditions that do not exist.

[Steve the Planner]

Wash post's Josh Partlow explains the ins and outs of the Shinwari fiasco:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/09/AR2010050903257.html

The idea was to work with the Shinwari tribe to oppose the Taliban in exchange for $1 million of special construction contributions for the tribe (and guns and pick-up trucks, and prestige for the tribe). The result: new inter-tribal conflicts; opposition by State and Afghanistan; deal all screwed up.


"This clash split the Shinwari in two," said Malalai Shinwari, a parliament member. "It will take years and years to rejoin these two tribes together."

Perhaps a well-intentioned effort, but poorly conceived, and poorly executed. The old parables about "No good deed goes unpunished."

[Schmedlap]

I'd love to see some evidence that "development" aid has any chance at all of getting a community to reject the Taliban and/or connect to any level of the state government. I'm not holding my breath.

[Ken White]

Blue only looks good in 3-D...:D

Biggest problem with development aid is the majority is spent on people projects and people have notoriously short attention spans and are remarkably ungrateful...:rolleyes:

[Dayuhan]

I'd love to see some evidence that "development" aid has any chance at all of getting a community to reject the Taliban and/or connect to any level of the state government. I'm not holding my breath.

I wouldn't hold my breath either.

I suspect that our definition of "good governance", in many places, overrates "development" and "service delivery" and underrates ownership. There are a lot of people in the world who would prefer "bad" government that's theirs to "good" government from afar. Given their long-term experience with governance from afar, it's often hard to blame them.

To this day I really don't understand the reasoning that went into the decision to build such a centralized government structure in Afghanistan. Surely there must have been reasons... but what were they?

[Steve the Planner]

Dahayun:

Sure. The opposite of Iraq (provincial w/ weak central government).

If each province,district in Afghanistan had its own voice, it might pick folks who's allegiances, family/tribal ties, and communities actually oppose a central government in Kabul, or certain factions of it. Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazara, Pashtun, etc...

The unspoken theory was, if provincial/district officials are appointed by a central government favorable to us, then the sub-national government will be favorable to us. How's that working out????

[Ken White]

We're control freaks. :rolleyes:

We fail miserably at it but just cannot help trying again and again... :wry:

[Schmedlap]

To this day I really don't understand the reasoning that went into the decision to build such a centralized government structure in Afghanistan. Surely there must have been reasons... but what were they?

If you look at the plan for how the Constitution was supposed to be written (lots of public consultation by a large drafting committee over an 18-month period and an orderly loya jirga to ratify), and then look at how it actually was written (divided drafting committees, secretive process, last-minute changes by Karzai and the international community and a disorganized jirga), it becomes clear that there was no reasoning - at least not outside of a very small circle powerful Afghans and a lot of non-Afghans.

To the extent there was any sanity in the process, it was modeled after the 1964 constitution. The problem is that in 1964 there was an existing state and bureaucracy upon which to build. The 1964 constitution merely replaced an earlier constitution and improved upon, within the context of a functioning government. In 2004, there was nothing. That would be like the US attempting to stand up the entire federal gov't apparatus that we have today, but to do it in 1776. I'm sure the colonies would have taken nicely to the volumes of federal statutes and regulations that we currently have.:rolleyes:

[Steve the Planner]

Schmedlap:

The back stories from those involved at the constitutional level have to do with the maneuvers to keep out the King, and put something in to our liking. Long, winding story.

Your analogy is spot on. How the hell could you implement it?

But, remember that there still was a civil service core left in the early 2000 era. They left afterwards (or got wired in).