Courageous Restraint "Hold fire, earn a medal"

[ODB]

Is this just an attempt to add more fruit salad to one's uniform or is there more to it?


U.S. troops in Afghanistan could soon be awarded a medal for not doing something, a precedent-setting award that would be given for “courageous restraint” for holding fire to save civilian lives.

The proposal is now circulating in the Kabul headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force, a command spokesman confirmed Tuesday.

“The idea is consistent with our approach,” explained Air Force Lt. Col. Tadd Sholtis. “Our young men and women display remarkable courage every day, including situations where they refrain from using lethal force, even at risk to themselves, in order to prevent possible harm to civilians. In some situations our forces face in Afghanistan, that restraint is an act of discipline and courage not much different than those seen in combat actions.”


“We absolutely support the right of our forces to defend themselves,” Sholtis said. “Valuing restraint in a potentially dangerous situation is not the same thing as denying troops the right to employ lethal force when they determine that it is necessary.”

Full article here LINK (http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/05/military_restraint_medal_051110mar)

I personally think this is a horrible idea....are we a military force or the peace corps? Why not blur the lines even more than they already are?

[Entropy]

Yeah, I don't get it.

[Schmedlap]

U.S. troops in Afghanistan could soon be awarded a medal for not doing something...

We already have that. It's called the Bronze Star Medal.

[Hacksaw]

the air you hear hissing is a result of the body blow I just took :D

I resemble that comment, of course I never expected or asked for a medal for doing my job as best I could either...

As for courageous restraint... I'm confused... reasoned restraint is good... measured restraint is legal... physical courage is paramount... courageous restraint, huh?

[Xenophon]

When I was in Iraq, my IA battalion was transferred from Diyala to Al Anbar (this was after we were transferred from Al Anbar to Diyala but before we were transferred from Al Anbar to Diyala). En route, we were ambushed at night by a group of insurgents who had stationed themselves in an apartment complex with numerous lights that shined in the direction of the road, washing out our NVGs. I had one Lance Corporal (gunning) who had the presence of mind to forego his .50 cal and use his M4 to engage targets so as to pose less of a risk to any civilians in the apartments and another Lance Corporal who refused to return fire at all for the same reason. Meanwhile, a lieutenant who was gunning in another vehicle lit the apartment complex up with his M240.

Sometimes doing nothing is the right thing, and going for blood is the wrong thing. We should reward doing the right thing, whether that is charging an enemy machine gun nest or refusing to let the enemy bait you into harming innocents.

[Rifleman]

Wonder if a lot of the awards will be posthumous? :eek:

[Majormarginal]

A medal for being timid? Our troops are going to be killed and wounded when they don't defend themselves.

[Kiwigrunt]

Sometimes doing nothing is the right thing, and going for blood is the wrong thing. We should reward doing the right thing, whether that is charging an enemy machine gun nest or refusing to let the enemy bait you into harming innocents.

Hey, I think that is a good point. Are most medals not already for good conduct, bravery etc.?
So in the context of “courageous restraint”, why should the ‘restraint’ bit be emphasized as a reason for a specific medal. If the restraint is in itself courageous than existing medals should be able to cover it; a bit like a medic saving lives under fire without firing a shot. If it is not courageous than it could well be going towards being criminal, or at least against ROE (identifying legitimate targets and all that).
It’s almost a bit like getting rewarded for not running over that pedestrian with the pram as opposed to being dealt with for doing the opposite.

I think I can see what they are trying to do here with regards to creating an environment where restraint counters a gung-ho attitude but I am not sure that this sort of incentive is the right way to achieve it.

[Chris jM]

Sometimes doing nothing is the right thing, and going for blood is the wrong thing. We should reward doing the right thing.


I think I can see what they are trying to do here with regards to creating an environment where restraint counters a gung-ho attitude but I am not sure that this sort of incentive is the right way to achieve it.

Restraint comes down to discipline and professionalism. Wearing the uniform and respective unit embellishments should be enough recognition of those qualities.

However, the article doesn't make it clear - could this just be a loosening of, say combat action badges or whatever they are known as? I don't know what is involved in their reward but it mightn't even be an actual separate medal but rather an action 'tab', as such, acknowledging you were in "combat" or "danger" even if you didn't fire back?

[William F. Owen]

Restraint comes down to discipline and professionalism. Wearing the uniform and respective unit embellishments should be enough recognition of those qualities.

Concur. Not doing something stupid is what you are trained to do. The idea behind this medal is moronic. The concept of "courageous inaction" needing to be rewarded is hopelessly impractical and the thin edge of slippery slope, - to mix a metaphor.

[Kiwigrunt]

Added to all of the above, most medals are in recognition of going above and beyond the call of duty. I fail to see how restraint is above and beyond……..that’s not to say it’s beneath and below, its just part of the job.

[Bob's World]

I will provide some ground truth on this as I was there when this was presented to the task force commanders in Regional Command South.

This does not mean that soldiers are expected to simply "take one for the team." A better example is one I personally know of where a SEAL patrol with their ANA partners entered a village and a small engagement ensued with 2-3 insurgent fighters. Two were put down quickly, and one turned and ran. The SEAL nearest to the man was within every aspect of the ROE and the tactical directive at that point in time to simply kill the runner. Instead he took off after him, ran him down and tackled him, taking him prisoner. It is this type of assumption of greater personal risk in the name of avoiding potentially avoidable casualties that is at the essence of "courageous restraint."

To be honest, this resonates better with the British military than it does with the Americans. The Americans see more utility in simply ensuring that you have your most experienced decision maker at the most likely critical time and place; and to ensure that you have worked through situational pre-combat drills to wargame in advance likely dangers and how to best address them within the tactical directives and guidelines for the escalation of force.


I guess the key is that the Commanders are recognizing that there is valor in protecting the mission, just as there is in protecting one’s self and fellow soldiers.

[Entropy]

BW,

Why does the action you describe require some unique award instead of what we already have?

[Schmedlap]

I guess the key is that the Commanders are recognizing that there is valor in protecting the mission, just as there is in protecting one’s self and fellow soldiers.

I'm not disagreeing in any way with what your wrote. But, if Commanders are "just now recognizing" valor in actions like this, then something is wrong. That would be another of many examples to demonstrate how clueless we were nine years ago and how slowly we've figured things out.

Regardless of the valor aspect, the notion of handing out awards for this stuff amplifies one of many poor messages that have been sent to Soldiers over the past nine years. Namely: "Do your job and get rewarded as though you've done more." Enough with the awards. I know guys who never left a FOB and have 3 BSMs. Even the Purple Hearts are out of hand.


... The SEAL nearest to the man was within every aspect of the ROE and the tactical directive at that point in time to simply kill the runner. Instead he took off after him, ran him down and tackled him, taking him prisoner. It is this type of assumption of greater personal risk in the name of avoiding potentially avoidable casualties that is at the essence of "courageous restraint."

For what it's worth, if you replace "SEAL" with "20-year old Infantryman" then it would describe at least three similar instances that I am aware of - including one that I witnessed - five years ago in Iraq. In the one that I witnessed, we brought the shooter (a 15-year-old who was paid 10,000 dinars to shoot at us) to his home and told his father what happened. His father went back into his home, re-emerged with a wooden rod, and then commenced one of the most vicious ass-whoopings that I'd witnessed in a long time. We restrained him because we thought he was going to kill the kid.

I hope that we're not "just now recognizing" the value of actions like this. And if the creation of this new award is an indicator of that, then once again I am concerned that senior leaders are just coming around to understanding what many younger Soldiers figured out years ago. And, even worse, they're addressing it in the wrong way. If the only way that leaders can influence Soldiers is to promise them awards for doing their jobs, then they're not really leaders.

[Ken White]

I hope that we're not "just now recognizing" the value of actions like this. And if the creation of this new award is an indicator of that, then once again I am concerned that senior leaders are just coming around to understanding what many younger Soldiers figured out years ago. And, even worse, they're addressing it in the wrong way. If the only way that leaders can influence Soldiers is to promise them awards for doing their jobs, then they're not really leaders.but this comment by Schmedlap bears repeating -- 'cause it's the truth. :mad:

[Bob's World]

Like I said, it resonated with the Brits, but not so much with the Americans. I think it might be getting over played and twisted a bit by those who have heard the words, but lack the context.

The primary point the commander was conveying was that under the new tactical directives we are asking the soldiers to assume much more personal risk in order to preserve and advance the larger strategic goals of the operations; and that leaders needed to do a more effective job of recognizing those who did so.

[Greyhawk]

A quote from the first news story I saw on the topic (http://ap.stripes.com/dynamic/stories/A/AS_AFGHAN_COURAGEOUS_RESTRAINT?SITE=DCSAS):


NATO commanders are not planning to create a new medal or military decoration for "courageous restraint," but instead are looking at ways of using existing awards to recognize soldiers who go to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties, Hall said.

And a more recent one from General McChrystal (http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4624):

Q General... Is it true that you are contemplating -- awarding some sort of special honor for soldiers who make a special effort to avoid civilian casualties?
GEN. MCCHRYSTAL: ...The issue of courage -- we have a number of ways to recognize courage in uniform. And I think courage in uniform can come under enemy fire in the most traditional ways, or it can come under actions that may not be as expected or as traditional -- involve killing the enemy; it may involve protecting civilians.
There's a great photograph from the Marja operation. I think it's a U.S. Marine shielding an Afghan man and an Afghan child with his own body. He wasn't shooting anyone; he didn't kill any Taliban; but I would argue that he showed as much courage as any that I've seen on the battlefield.
So when we talk about courage, I think -- I don't think we need a different medal to differentiate different kinds of courage.

And one from Rush Limbaugh (http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_051210/content/01125115.guest.html)

I'm up to speed on it now. So we're going to have courageous military medal for showing restraint... I can just see the ceremony. Obama at the White House presenting the Distinguished Yellow Cross.

That last one included here as only as explanation why this is suddenly getting attention a week after the first stories appeared.


I think it might be getting over played and twisted a bit by those who have heard the words, but lack the context.

I've heard that same point made by others over there, even before Rush chimed in...


If the only way that leaders can influence Soldiers is to promise them awards for doing their jobs, then they're not really leaders.

True.

So... Company Commander A in village A engages local leaders, establishes rapport, gets through a tour pretty much unscratched. In fact, never fires a shot. Over in village B Company Commander B experiences constant kinetic activity, high casualty rates...

End of tour. You're the Btn Commander. Who went "above and beyond?" How do you recognize them for it?

[Schmedlap]

So... Company Commander A in village A engages local leaders, establishes rapport, gets through a tour pretty much unscratched. In fact, never fires a shot. Over in village B Company Commander B experiences constant kinetic activity, high casualty rates...

End of tour. You're the Btn Commander. Who went "above and beyond?" How do you recognize them for it?

Is this really a quandary? Again, five years ago, a platoon in my battalion caught heat... not for restraint, but for over-aggressiveness. I'm not kidding when I say this: they were put on "time-out" (the CO's exact words). They were stood down for three days to review their SOPs, do maintenance, and pull PB security. The PL never lived it down. It was a black mark. Once again, five years ago.

Who went "above and beyond"? Whomever got the best results, given the situation that they were handed. Kind of similar to what, in the financial world, they call "alpha (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha_%28investment%29)".

[Ken White]

And one from Rush Limbaugh (http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_051210/content/01125115.guest.html)Why, Greyhawk, I'm surprised you listen to him. Never heard the guy speak, m'self. :D

But then I tend to ignore all the taking heads as they rarely contribute much.:wry:
That last one included here as only as explanation why this is suddenly getting attention a week after the first stories appeared.Perhaps you're correct but I'm more inclined to blame sloppy main stream media reporting and editing added to civilian lack of knowledge. As Bob's World said, out of context...
So... Company Commander A in village A engages local leaders, establishes rapport, gets through a tour pretty much unscratched. In fact, never fires a shot. Over in village B Company Commander B experiences constant kinetic activity, high casualty rates...

End of tour. You're the Btn Commander. Who went "above and beyond?" How do you recognize them for it?Not nearly enough info. Did the rapport actually accomplish anything or did it just exist? How kinetic was it, who initiated most of the contacts and how well did he do in the fights he had?

The real questions that Bn Cdr must answer have little to do with those two variables which are really sort of meaningless, rather they have to do with how well each did his job in totality for the deployment given the situations (plural) with which he had to deal. Their Cdr has all sorts of methods of rewarding -- or punishing, if warranted -- performance ranging from OERs (unimportant to some, vital to others) to hero badges (same discrimination criteria apply) to a slap on the back (always appreciated unless the Cdr is an @$*hole). Hopefully he knows his people, knows where their buttons are, knows what's important and does not have too much "help" from above...

And, most importantly; is fair.:cool:

Or we could use the simple or Ranger solution -- Bronze Stars for both and a "V" for the more kinetic locale. :rolleyes:

Added: Apologies to Schmedlap, somehow I missed his intervening post. I coulda just said "What he said."

[MikeF]

So... Company Commander A in village A engages local leaders, establishes rapport, gets through a tour pretty much unscratched. In fact, never fires a shot. Over in village B Company Commander B experiences constant kinetic activity, high casualty rates...


That sounds so simple in a classroom. It is logical and rational. It makes sense. I would caution that there are so many other scenarios. I will give you mine as a company commander. This is one of the times that it's good that I use my real name. Others can verify or just say he's full of crap :eek:.

As a commander, I had a wealth of contacts and friends within the villages. I engaged in and out everyday with the various elders. As it were, I was in a highly kinetic area, and I became one of the most violent commanders in Diyala Province. The Iraqis called my IA CDR and I the Lions of Diyala. The Americans called us the War Machine. In that area, we had the fewest casualties.

There are so many different scenarios in war.

[Greyhawk]

That sounds so simple in a classroom...There are so many different scenarios in war.

Yes, was keeping it to a broad hypothetical starting point. From that point there are as many examples as there are soldiers. Didn't mean to imply anything's simple or easy.

Hypothetically, is there a situation where a guy could get a Silver Star for actions under fire and a reprimand for 'allowing' his unit to be attacked?


Sometimes doing nothing is the right thing, and going for blood is the wrong thing. We should reward doing the right thing, whether that is charging an enemy machine gun nest or refusing to let the enemy bait you into harming innocents.

Exactly right, says I. But that part of the conversation is countered (in media reports and elsewhere) by claims that we're confusing young soldiers with mixed signals, sprinkled with quotes re: "this 'courageous restraint' award will only be given posthumously" then wrapped into the "ROE are getting our troops killed" narrative, and met with exclamations about the "wussification of the military."


...if Commanders are "just now recognizing" valor in actions like this, then something is wrong... I hope that we're not "just now recognizing" the value of actions like this.

Is this really a quandary? Again, five years ago, a platoon in my battalion caught heat...

More likely an ongoing discussion ("are we sure we're rewarding the 'right' behavior?" - one that should be held at all levels) made public BECAUSE it can be wrapped into the ROE/'wussification' story line. (Which, btw, can also be blamed on Obama - see Limbaugh, Rush.)

But whether ongoing or inexcusably late, I don't think the discussion itself is "bad."


Why, Greyhawk, I'm surprised you listen to him. Never heard the guy speak, m'self. :D

But then I tend to ignore all the taking heads as they rarely contribute much.:wry:Perhaps you're correct but I'm more inclined to blame sloppy main stream media reporting and editing added to civilian lack of knowledge...
Hopefully it's clear I agree with your second paragraph. To the first: ouch. Actually I caught that via Matt Gallagher (http://kerplunkjournal.blogspot.com/2010/05/on-coin-courageous-restraint-and-clowns.html), who has his own story from experience at that link. Knowing him I doubt he's a Rush listener either. But an awful lot of people are, so like it or not, he's influential.

And here's more of what his listeners heard this week (http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_051210/content/01125115.guest.html):

"US troops in Afghanistan could soon be awarded a medal for not doing something, a precedent-setting award that would be given for 'courageous restraint' for holding fire to save civilian lives. ... 'The idea is consistent with our approach,' explained Air Force Lt. Col. Tadd Sholtis. 'Our young men and women display remarkable courage every day, including situations where they refrain from using lethal force, even at risk to themselves, in order to prevent possible harm to civilians. In some situations our forces face in Afghanistan, that restraint is an act of discipline and courage not much different than those seen in combat actions.' Soldiers are often recognized for non-combat achievement with decorations such as their service's commendation medal. But most of the highest US military decorations are for valor in combat. A medal to recognize a conscious effort to avoid a combat action would be unique. ... 'We absolutely support the right of our forces to defend themselves,' Sholtis said."
We have to say that? We're not talking about a basketball team is not allowed to go to Arizona here, folks! We're talking about the US military. We have to say this? We've got this guy saying, "We absolutely support the right of our forces to defend themselves." Well, that's comforting. Is that in the policy manual someplace, somebody have to take a test on that? "'We absolutely support the right of our forces to defend themselves,' Sholtis said. 'Valuing restraint in a potentially dangerous situation is not the same thing as denying troops the right to employ lethal force when they determine that it is necessary.' A spokesman for the 2.2 million-member Veterans of Foreign Wars, the nation's largest group of combat veterans, thinks the award would cause confusion among the ranks and send a bad signal.
Of course "we have to say that" because of people like Rush Limbaugh, but that irony is likely lost on most of his listeners.

[Schmedlap]

The difference between showing "courageous restraint" and showing gallantry under fire is that in the former situation you have more control over the degree of danger that you face. You can opt at any moment to not restrain your actions. In the latter situation - say, for example, braving enemy gunfire to save a wounded comrade - you don't have quite so much control over the situation. If things turn worse, you can't tell the enemy to stop shooting.

Maybe I'm "old school" having now passed a whole 2 years since ETS. Our Soldiers didn't kill people if they didn't have to. What is now apparently "new math" to our senior leaders (kill 2 gunmen and create 8 more) was "common sense" to our Soldiers at least five years ago and understood by many at least seven years ago.

Now if we can just rack our brains to try to remember how we influenced those Soldiers to do the right thing...:rolleyes:

[82redleg]

Hypothetically, is there a situation where a guy could get a Silver Star for actions under fire and a reprimand for 'allowing' his unit to be attacked?


You're being fascetious, right?

That is EXACTLY what happened to CPT Matt Myer following our VICTORY in the battle of Wanat in 2008.

[Ken White]

But that part of the conversation is countered (in media reports and elsewhere) by claims that we're confusing young soldiers with mixed signals, sprinkled with quotes re: "this 'courageous restraint' award will only be given posthumously" then wrapped into the "ROE are getting our troops killed" narrative, and met with exclamations about the "wussification of the military."I submit we are now as we have for a great many years confusing young soldiers with mixed signals. Mostly because we don't train them adequately but partly because the leadership is often hypocritical and inconsistent -- that mostly the fault of poor selection but also due to inadeqaute training (and education...).

The quotes you cite and the influence you mention of the Limbaughs and other talking heads in this country are due to the poor education proffered by the bureaucracy of this nation...:mad:

The ROE issue is problematic due to a lack of clarity in order to allow loopholes and a lack of candor by DoD in this as many other things. Not only the ROE issue but this unnecessary award kerfuffle could be avoided if they were more forthcoming and rejected reaction for pro active public affairs policies. I hate that 'pro active' phrase -- but here, it's appropriate.

The wussification issue is quite real (but then, I'm really old...) in many senses but certainly not in all. Suburban living trends that way. It was exemplified a few years ago when the Mountain Ranger Camp invited back a bunch of old, retired former Ranger Instructors to view current training. At a sit down afterward, they were asked for their opinions. The generic comment: "...place is full of wusses." The 4th Bn Cdr replied that, yes, the students were soft. The old guys responded "Yeah, them too..."
...BECAUSE it can be wrapped into the ROE/'wussification' story line. (Which, btw, can also be blamed on Obama...)WHAT! He replaced Clinton? Why wasn't I informed...:eek:

I had just gotten clear that it was Clinton and not Carter as I long suspected... :o

[Schmedlap]

The wussification issue is quite real (but then, I'm really old...) in many senses but certainly not in all. Suburban living trends that way. It was exemplified a few years ago when the Mountain Ranger Camp invited back a bunch of old, retired former Ranger Instructors to view current training. At a sit down afterward, they were asked for their opinions. The generic comment: "...place is full of wusses." The 4th Bn Cdr replied that, yes, the students were soft. The old guys responded "Yeah, them too..."

Aint' that the truth. I went through the last hard class. I hear that they now allow the students to wear boots. When I went through the mountain phase (in January), we learned that the best way to deal with the cold was to wait for your extremities to go numb. We didn't even have boots in our rucks, let alone on our feet, because that was precious space that could be filled with something heavier, like more 7.62 ammo.

[Ranger94]

I held fire in '05. Was ridiculed by the team that replaced mine, by my 1SG and had to explain my actions to the XO (Acting CO; CO was on leave). I asked "Sir, if I ordered SPC Joe ####head to shoot, would it have been legal?".

Three days later they came back with a "Yes". If we shot, for 72hours, we would have not known if we were going to Ft. Leavenworth for 30years.

Most of you on this site advocate a new (or at least a redefined) type of war (This includes Gentile). Yet, most of you also fail to advocate for a new type of recognition.

This is a failure of leadership

[Ken White]

in Viet Nam and even in Korea. METT-TC. Nothing new in that, either. There have been races between punishments and rewards for showing -- or not showing -- restraint during combat actions for a great many years.

Most notably and within the memory of some, a few people involved at My Lai in Viet Nam refused orders to fire on civilians and / or tried to stop that criminal stupidity; most got in trouble initially and were only later properly vindicated and rewarded.

[William F. Owen]

Most of you on this site advocate a new (or at least a redefined) type of war (This includes Gentile). Yet, most of you also fail to advocate for a new type of recognition.

This is a failure of leadership

Just because it is new to some in the US does not make it new. War cannot change. Warfare is changing very slowly and in no way we cannot comprehend.

The failure of leadership is to recognise and explicitly state the above.

[Bob's World]

Just because it is new to some in the US does not make it new. War cannot change. Warfare is changing very slowly and in no way we cannot comprehend.

The failure of leadership is to recognise and explicitly state the above.

I'll agree with WILF as to his statement above, but then drive him to an immediate reply with my follow-on comment:

The nature of war indeed does not change quickly, though TTPs adjust continually to technologies, METT-T, etc. HOWEVER; what I see here is that perhaps leadership is coming to recognize that looking at intervention in the insurgency of some foreign country as warfare is to put it in the wrong category to begin with.

It is not that war or warfare is changing, it is that we are slowly coming to realize that this is far more Military Support to Civil Authorities for a very violent Civil Emergency than it is warfare. Our ROE and Tactical Directives are slowly working us around to the back door on this realization, as we are hard set to be macho warfighters in name, but realizing that macho appoaches simply don't fit.

Were not being overly wussified warfighters, as Ken discussess; instead we are being overly machofied MSCA providers.

Once we properly categorize the nature of our engagement, the logic of the tactical directives begins to fall in place as well.

Okay, WILF, fire away...:)

[William F. Owen]

Okay, WILF, fire away...:)

Dammed decent of you Sir! Don't mind if I do. Rude not to! :wry:

The Army is an armed force. It uses armed force against armed force. It cannot do anything else well, apart from to kill or threaten to kill. Thus it uses these things to defeat the armed element of an insurgency. ALL else is Politics.

Are we violently agreeing?

[Hacksaw]

I held fire in '05. Was ridiculed by the team that replaced mine, by my 1SG and had to explain my actions to the XO (Acting CO; CO was on leave). I asked "Sir, if I ordered SPC Joe ####head to shoot, would it have been legal?".

Three days later they came back with a "Yes". If we shot, for 72hours, we would have not known if we were going to Ft. Leavenworth for 30years.

Most of you on this site advocate a new (or at least a redefined) type of war (This includes Gentile). Yet, most of you also fail to advocate for a new type of recognition.

This is a failure of leadership

This thread has become rather long... so I understand why it may appear as if it is composed of a bunch of old has beens bitching about how things used to be... but that is pretty far from the truth...

I think you might find that "almost" everyone is in full agreement with McCrystal... valor is valor, sometimes bravery is to assume risk to self so as not to endanger the non-combatant, but this isn't new and we don't need a new type of medal to recognize such actions.

Restraint has and always will play an important role in combat (or support to Civil authorities) operations... to be honest I think this one has played out...

Wilf and COL Bob are about to discuss the differences between how a military force should do employed from a policy perspective and how best to employ a military force... or in other words... if all you have is a hammar and you need to secure two pieces of nice lumber... do you hammer in the screw or wait for a screwdriver they may never emerge, then again maybe you don't need to even secure the two pieces :eek:

[Ken White]

...what I see here is that perhaps leadership is coming to recognize that looking at intervention in the insurgency of some foreign country as warfare is to put it in the wrong category to begin with.Your final clause is absolutely correct. However, I wish I was more convinced that "leadership" was beginning to recognize that; more importantly that they would do something about it...
It is not that war or warfare is changing, it is that we are slowly coming to realize that this is far more Military Support to Civil Authorities for a very violent Civil Emergency than it is warfare. Our ROE and Tactical Directives are slowly working us around to the back door on this realization, as we are hard set to be macho warfighters in name, but realizing that macho appoaches simply don't fit.The really sad thing about that statement is that many realized that -- variously -- before, during and after Viet Nam. That realization, however got buried for the sake of political expediency and a major misreading of goat entrails.

We really need to avoid repeating that mistake.
Were not being overly wussified warfighters, as Ken discussess; instead we are being overly machofied MSCA providers.We're both correct -- and thus, we risk creating a creature that is neither an effective warfighter or a competent MSCA provider.

What will hopefully be realized is that both those functions are required and the key to successful employment of the Armed Forces in each role is designing a force that has structures and organizations that are trained and equipped to do both. That is not impossible, it is not even particularly difficult or overly expensive.

What is difficult is getting senior policy makers to agree to a course and then getting our political masters educated about capabilities.

And developing in both the above the will required for the proper use of the correct amount force at the right time...
Once we properly categorize the nature of our engagement, the logic of the tactical directives begins to fall in place as well....Yes... :cool:

[Schmedlap]

I held fire in '05. Was ridiculed by the team that replaced mine, by my 1SG and had to explain my actions to the XO (Acting CO; CO was on leave). I asked "Sir, if I ordered SPC Joe ####head to shoot, would it have been legal?".

Three days later they came back with a "Yes". If we shot, for 72hours, we would have not known if we were going to Ft. Leavenworth for 30years.

If that is accurate, then it is an indictment of the leadership in your unit and nothing more. Drawing larger conclusions from that example would require that we assume that all leaders suck as bad as yours apparently did. That's not reasonable.

[Infanteer]

This seems to be alot of gusto for nothing too much - or maybe I'm not looking at it right. The military has meritorious awards and gallantry awards; just issue the meritorious rewards to those who show things like "courageous retraint" to further the mission, a high-degree of cultural awareness and an affinity for operating amongst a foreign populace. Heck, we recognize Majors for designing fancy training support stuff, you think we could give a Sergeant the same award for being good at "Small Wars".

It's all in how you write the citation.

[Ranger94]

in Viet Nam and even in Korea. METT-TC. Nothing new in that, either.

The 'C' was not taught in Army schools until the late '90's.

Pre-deployment training did not include "Shout, Show, Shove, Shoot (to Warn), Shoot (to disable), Shoot (to Kill)" unitl 2004.

Aurguments for/against "Strategic Corporal", "4GW" "COIN" etc are irrelevant. We are asking new troops to conduct this type of "war". More importantly, Senior officers and NCOs are asking new troops to conduct these types of missions while the tactics are still being defined. (I submit David Kilcullen's 28 Articles from 2006 as example

As for the charges that the new troops need a "medal for being timid", I counter with the reality that every Battalion/Brigade CO forces every patrol to drive the MRAP. All these "leaders" can quote FM3-24 yet fail to see how a big metal box seperates us from the local population.

The leaders are timid.

[Ken White]

The 'C' was not taught in Army schools until the late '90's.after the turn of the Century IIRC. Before that, for about 25 years it was METT-T. The The third 'T' was added in the 70s to remind people they had to adapt to the developing foolishness of MDMP. :mad:

I say foolishness because there will not be time to do that in a war of movment. Viet Nam taught the Army some really bad habits and it also was buried so people forgot why we had those bad habits...

When I started, it was just METT but METT there was and those four are the parameters that'll determine based on your interpretation whether you live or die. The added '-TC' is just nice to have stuff, it isn't necessary as are the first four letters.

Only METT was used in Korea and Viet Nam, however, the 'third T problem' existed even without MDMP and though it was not part of the mnemonic at the time. The 'C' problem existed in spades -- thus accusations (accurate) of mass killing of Korean civilians and literally hundreds of incidents in Viet Nam. The new kids in both those war (and even further back, much further. Picture the problem in the Civil War...) had to deal with the same parameters and problems, they just had more aggressive leadership and a little more inclusive training.
Pre-deployment training did not include "Shout, Show, Shove, Shoot (to Warn), Shoot (to disable), Shoot (to Kill)" unitl 2004.For the 'Army' as a whole perhaps and for some units, others units did variations on that theme as far back as 1/82's deployment on OEF 1.5 in 2002. They did it again before going to OIF 2 -- and again before going back to the 'Stan...

Good units have always been better trained than the Army norm and have generally led the institutional army to new techniques.
...We are asking new troops to conduct this type of "war". More importantly, Senior officers and NCOs are asking new troops to conduct these types of missions while the tactics are still being defined. (I submit David Kilcullen's 28 Articles from 2006 as exampleSame thing occurred in Korea where there were some guerrilla activities and for ten years in Viet Nam with Galula precursor to Kilcullen just as Rex Applegate did for Korea (and WW II...). So none of this is new; it's just new to the people who are doing it now.

That's not a problem, the kids can cope -- it's the more senior types who have trouble adapting. That leads, if those leaders are into overcontrol, to hideound, ill-adapting units...

I'd also suggest the tactics had better be continually being defined -- and redefined and questioned and modified in view of experience. If they are not, the Army with static tactical principles will produce a lot of unnecessary dead bodies.
The leaders are timid.We can agree on that. :cool: (that,too is a VN hangover... :( )

[Schmedlap]

Pre-deployment training did not include "Shout, Show, Shove, Shoot (to Warn), Shoot (to disable), Shoot (to Kill)" unitl 2004.
It did the for Balkans rotations prior to 9/11 and it was incorporated into our new ROE while in Iraq in 2003, soon after we began the occupation. In fact, most of us with Balkans deployments under our belts (vast majority of NCO's in my unit and a few of us O's) simply fell back upon the peacekeeping ROE and instructed our Soldiers to abide by it. If not incorporated into OIF pre-deployment training until 2004, well, that seems about as early as it could have been. Most units replacing us in late 2003 weren't really sure what to expect. But they got the same ROE brief that we did when they RIP/TOA'd. And, really, the "five S" rule isn't all that complicated.

As for "new"ness, I still remember my NCOs lecturing their men often in 2003: "we're going to pick our fights carefully. You piss these people off today and they'll be shooting RPGs at you tomorrow. Our job is to identify the dickheads and let everyone else just do their thing so we don't make more enemies." That's about what I would have told them at the time, but I didn't even need to. It was almost common sense. Today it's new math that our senior leaders have apparently just discovered in the past couple of years or so.

[gute]

I finally read something about this medal and I gotta say the idea is one of the dumbest I've ever heard. I realize I did not add much to the discussion, but come on!

[sapperfitz82]

Perhaps this was really just an all points bulletin to encourage commanders to do exactly what most here would advocate is needed to run a successful counter-insurgency.

What the senior commanders in Astan seem to be trying to do is change the paradigm from the battalion sweep in MRAPs to the population-centric fight.

The trick is how to go about doing that, given the units in country come from all different commands and backgrounds. Find what is common to all and tweek it would be one way. Awards fit that bill.

I'm not sure that this was the intent (pure conjecture here) but were I to try to tackle the problem, this might be a method.

Nonetheless, I see a great deal of room for this to go wrong without some further clarification. The level of uncertainty on this forum alone makes one wonder what S-1 is churning out for the citation of the new ARCOM-R medal.

[Ken White]

Nonetheless, I see a great deal of room for this to go wrong without some further clarification. The level of uncertainty on this forum alone makes one wonder what S-1 is churning out for the citation of the new ARCOM-R medal.I have no problem with the basic intent -- but do believe the current award / reward / deterrence / punishment systems can cope with the issue.

The problems, if any, would come with implementation as different Commanders add their take on who, what, when, where and how. It is yet another non-problem that appears to be significant but is not and the perception exists simply because some poor commanders and Leaders cannot get things done the way the current Boss want 'em done. Instead of fixing the problem, in the best military tradition, this idea attacks a symptom.

It really erupts only due to someone who should know better simply thinking out loud. I'm reminded of one the better Creighton Abrams quotes:

"Generals should be noted for their silences..."

[Schmedlap]

It is yet another non-problem that appears to be significant but is not...

I think you nailed it. Reminds me of people claiming that our small unit leaders "don't get COIN" or "need to learn COIN" when, in fact, it was the person making the assertion who just finally came around to understanding what COIN is. Assuming all others were as ignorant as the speaker was prior to this epiphany, he assumes that he is part of some small cadre of truth-bearers holding a secret revelation that others haven't been exposed to when, in fact, the exact opposite has been the case.

That is a particular problem in this instance. Our senior leaders discuss the "new math" of killing 2 insurgents possibly leading to creation of 10 others. Thanks for the heads up Colonel, but my Squad Leaders were explaining that concept to their Soldiers in 2003. But I guess the only way that our younger leaders will "get it" in the minds of some staff officers is to substitute awards for leadership until we come to the realization that those young Soldiers are "getting it." And then, I suppose, lacking any causal evidence, we will assume that we changed the organizational culture by this formal recognition of restraint rather than relying on the tired old, tried and true concept of hands-on leadership and clear communication of commander's intent.

Too bad lower enlisted Soldiers can't likewise influence the chain of command by creating awards. I'd like to see the creation of awards for strategic planning, accepting risk, and trusting subordinates.:rolleyes:

[Ken White]

Too bad lower enlisted Soldiers can't likewise influence the chain of command by creating awards. I'd like to see the creation of awards for strategic planning, accepting risk, and trusting subordinates.:rolleyes:Good heresy, though...

Amazing how many have eyes but do not see, ears but do not hear...

We're not really going to improve to any significant degree until those three items are remediated. Hmm. Nope, not a strong enough word -- until they're fixed...

[Ranger94]

Reminds me of people claiming that our small unit leaders "don't get COIN" or "need to learn COIN" when, in fact, it was the person making the assertion who just finally came around to understanding what COIN is.

You just described the turn-a-round of leadership for Gen. Odierno and the re-writting of history of Col. Gentile

[VMI_Marine]

The primary point the commander was conveying was that under the new tactical directives we are asking the soldiers to assume much more personal risk in order to preserve and advance the larger strategic goals of the operations; and that leaders needed to do a more effective job of recognizing those who did so.

Ah, but in order to recognize we have to quantify. :wry:

It's so much easier to write an award for Cpl Jones, who killed XXX number of insurgents, than for Cpl Smith, who held fire because of the danger of killing noncombatants.

That said, I've seen awards for valor presented in the past for acts that did not involve an enemy body count. One of my Marines received a Navy Comm with V for pulling an Iraqi family out of the line of fire in 2003 (I take no credit for the writeup, he was in another battalion at the time of the action). Like others have said, there is no need to create another medal to recognize these acts, but leaders need to understand, appreciate, and recognize when their Soldiers or Marines go above and beyond the call by showing judgment and restraint.

[Red Rat]

Just to add fuel to the fire, this is the UK direction. Personally I have only just seen it and IMHO I think it is off the mark - but I cannot quite put my finger on what it is that disagrees with me. :confused:


Population-Centric COIN and protecting the people makes different demands and arguably requires a wider form of courage. Much of this we call ‘Courageous Restraint’ as you know. But we must now recognise this and redefine our interpretation of gallantry accordingly. It is no longer sufficient to accept gallantry in its current sense. A soldier who does not fire and gets killed by a SIED is the equivalent of the soldier who ‘took the hill’ in more contemporary operations.

I like the idea mooted on this thread for meritorious medals for restraint and good judgement and gallantry for gallantry.

[Infanteer]

A soldier who does not fire and gets killed by a SIED is the equivalent of the soldier who ‘took the hill’ in more contemporary operations

Wow - what kind of ridiculous statement is that (and who issued it). The guy who does not fire and gets killed by the SIED is dead - that's about it. I don't think "courageous restraint" is supposed to recognize those unlucky/unskilled individuals who don't recognize combat indicators.

[William F. Owen]

One of my Marines received a Navy Comm with V for pulling an Iraqi family out of the line of fire in 2003 (I take no credit for the writeup, he was in another battalion at the time of the action).
Courage above that shown by others. I think this one is easy. In the UK he might have got the George Cross.

...but leaders need to understand, appreciate, and recognize when their Soldiers or Marines go above and beyond the call by showing judgment and restraint.
OK, but don't you get paid to exercise restraint and judgement. When is there an option ever not to do it?
There isn't a minimum standard. You are either doing it or not. Restraint actually means doing nothing, and ROE exist to ensure that violence is used instrumentally and in line with policy.
Wouldn't you say that "Good judgement" is either there or not?

[Schmedlap]

Restraint actually means doing nothing, and ROE exist to ensure that violence is used instrumentally and in line with policy.
Wouldn't you say that "Good judgement" is either there or not?

I have comments on this issue already, so I hope it's clear that I think such an award is stupid. That said, restraint in the context of this issue is not necessarily "doing nothing." Doing nothing is what you do on a FOB.

If de-escalation occurs as a measured risk that you choose to take, in order to obtain an outsized reward, in the form of an outcome that can do more to advance the mission, then you are not "doing nothing." I think that is what is trying to be encouraged. Unfortunately, a bunch of senior leaders apparently think that issuing awards is the path to that objective, rather than the tired old method some of us once knew as "leadership."

[Seabee]

IMHO it would take a brave man to wear such a medal.

Lets be honest, there is a macho thing that would make someone like that an outcast.

2 short anecdotes come to mind.

1) The week before my unit went into iraq in Desrt Storm my platoon did a mock attack on an abandoned Saudi Border post. As we were approaching the door opened and a bootless scarecrow came up with his hands up... never has a platoon locked and loaded so fast... never has an LT run forward and stopped 40 men doing something silly so fast... 5 months of sand made everyone prety eager to get a shot in.... The LT was seen as a Wus.

2) When an operation in Africa finished so fast almost noone got to fire a shot... the devil makes work for idle hands... all over the town we were in guys were hatching plots on how they could instigate a fight

3) Once in Sarajevo 2 of our APCs were fired on from an apartment block. The 20mm AA Gunner was told by his sgt to fire at the building... he refused as there were probably/possibly women and kids in it. (I am not even sure the sgt was authorised to give the order). Was only light weapons fire anyway, just bounced off. The gunner became a pariah, not for disobeying orders or anything, simply because he gave up a chance to shoot in a city where everyone was hoping and praying that today would be their day to shoot.

Yup... with age and hindsight the LT did the right thing (was an iraqi deserter who had spend 3 days walking to get there, the guys looking to start a firefight were wrong, and the gunner did the right thing.....

back when I was 23 I saw it very different... yup indeed.....

[Kiwigrunt]

IMHO it would take a brave man to wear such a medal.

Lets be honest, there is a macho thing that would make someone like that an outcast......

So maybe it is more about the actual conversation that about the medal. Lets hope that the conversation educates people enough to avoid this sort of silliness from being as common place in the future as it was in the past. How else so we cut through the macho crap?

[Seabee]

How else so we cut through the macho crap?


Its difficult.... I can discuss it rationally now.... but make me 19 again, give me a gun, grenades and an attitude... and a section of other young guys all trying to prove they are harder than the next guy..... and its a different ball game.

[Ranger94]

COIN has changed how we define success on the "battelfield" yet the award system (and by extension the promotion system) has not changed. In Khost Province last year we had a CSM flying out to Sabari District to measure sideburns (!!). This was a "combat tested" CSM.

On the enlisted level, the NCO ranks still does not get leadership credit for MiTT or ETT (SQD LRD/PLT SGT/1SG).

Success needs to be rewarded. If not, then COIN knowledge will be lost just like it was lost after Vietnam (late '70s/80/90)

[Schmedlap]

COIN has changed how we define success on the "battelfield" yet the award system (and by extension the promotion system) has not changed.
Are you suggesting that it should? If so, why?


In Khost Province last year we had a CSM flying out to Sabari District to measure sideburns (!!). This was a "combat tested" CSM.
Welcome to the Army.:p


Success needs to be rewarded. If not, then COIN knowledge will be lost just like it was lost after Vietnam (late '70s/80/90)
Is the suggestion here that awards are the only reward? Or the most preferable award? Something else? We generally reward success with evaluations reports, promotions, and desirable duty positions and stations. Even if we get rewards right, knowledge can still be lost.

[Ranger94]

Are you suggesting that it should? If so, why?


Welcome to the Army.:p


Is the suggestion here that awards are the only reward? Or the most preferable award? Something else? We generally reward success with evaluations reports, promotions, and desirable duty positions and stations. Even if we get rewards right, knowledge can still be lost.

If 4-Star Generals and Brigade Col. are asking SGTs and SSGs to wage a redefined type of combat then yes I think they should be rewarded.

At the same time we were in Khowst Province, two different SF CSMs were in the AO. We did not get a single report of them measuring sideburns. Of course they did Robin Sage and are trained in FID.

The suggestion here is not that awards are the only reward. I present the opinion that senior leaders are training one way and asking soldiers to perform another way in combat. When those same soldiers do well in combat ("well" defined as successfully operating out of 3-24) we then ask the same soldiers to go back to being an MP or 11B or Gun Bunny.

As I understand it, the argument is conduct COIN but maintain traditional, "stay in your lane" MOS specific skills. My argument is MOS specific skills are a baseline and "joint" training now starts at the E5 level and not at the 04 level.

Think combat leadership is being rewarded? Walk around Crystal City and count the lack of combat patches.

[Schmedlap]

It's been over a month, so maybe I need to refresh my memory, but I'm not sure I understand what you are arguing. As I understand it, you assert that we're fighting a "redefined type of combat," whatever that is, and this, I guess, justifies some kind of award?:confused:

After that, you completely lost me with the random comments about sideburns, Robin Sage, vague assertion about "senior leaders are training one way and asking soldiers to perform another way," some apparent gulf in skills required by COIN and other ops, and combat patches in Crystal City.

[Ranger94]

you assert that we're fighting a "redefined type of combat," whatever that is, and this, I guess, justifies some kind of award?:confused:

Let me use this analogy, while in a combat zone, as an NCO, I tell a PFC that he has to man a Browning .50cal.

We all know this is not a new weapon system. It has been in the US Army inventory for almost 90yrs. But to the new PFC it is a new weapon.

If, as an NCO, I toss the FM at the PFC and say "learn it, oh and tell me what you learned" then the PFC deserves a reward.

There is a major flaw in my argument. With COIN, prior to 3-24 the PFC did not even have an FM.

[Ken White]

There is a major flaw in my argument. With COIN, prior to 3-24 the PFC did not even have an FM.Check this LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/index.html) and this LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/90-8/toc.htm) plus this LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/7-98/index.html). The latter two are References in FM 3-24 which effectively supersedes the first one...

[Schmedlap]

Let me use this analogy, while in a combat zone, as an NCO, I tell a PFC that he has to man a Browning .50cal.

We all know this is not a new weapon system. It has been in the US Army inventory for almost 90yrs. But to the new PFC it is a new weapon.

If, as an NCO, I toss the FM at the PFC and say "learn it, oh and tell me what you learned" then the PFC deserves a reward.

There is a major flaw in my argument. With COIN, prior to 3-24 the PFC did not even have an FM.

Okay, so I guess if someone learns something on their own, then they deserve a reward. I further infer that you believe Soldiers are learning things on their own without significant assistance or training from their superiors. Apparently one of those things is COIN, a collective endeavor performed by units, which I guess we're to believe is spontaneously performed without guidance or direction from leaders, or something. And then, this justifies a reward for restraint, or something?

Forgive me if I stop responding.

[Ranger94]

Check this LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/index.html) and this LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/90-8/toc.htm) plus this LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/7-98/index.html). The latter two are References in FM 3-24 which effectively supersedes the first one...


You guys are smart, that is why I and others come here. But how many 11B2P or 3V read FM90-8 in 1998? 1999? Yet, how many of them "fought" on the "Island" of "Cortina"? The FTX's of the '90 never went enough towards the clean up of some missions.

Going back to my analogy, the PFC went to OSUT and the .50 cal manual existed but the military school did not put it as a priority for training. Does it matter that the manual was available?

[Ranger94]

Okay, so I guess if someone learns something on their own, then they deserve a reward. I further infer that you believe Soldiers are learning things on their own without significant assistance or training from their superiors. Apparently one of those things is COIN, a collective endeavor performed by units, which I guess we're to believe is spontaneously performed without guidance or direction from leaders, or something. And then, this justifies a reward for restraint, or something?

Yep


Forgive me if I stop responding.

When doing an AAR check ego at the door. very respectfully, I am pointing out my perspective based on my training and deployments

[Ken White]

You guys are smart, that is why I and others come here. But how many 11B2P or 3V read FM90-8 in 1998? 1999? Yet, how many of them "fought" on the "Island" of "Cortina"? The FTX's of the '90 never went enough towards the clean up of some missions.The 11Bush - 2s that is, most of those guys shouldn't have been expected to read them. An exceptionally sharp kid might have, good for him...

However, the 11B/19D3-whatevers should have been at least aware of their existence and every 11B4-whatever and every combat arms LT and CPT should have read them. For their Bn Staff Officers and Senior NCOs to not have read them is, IMO, inexcusable.*

It's not Joe's job to read that stuff; it is Joe's job to screw off as much as he can. It IS the job of those other guys to take care of Joe and lead him to do what's necessary. That means making sure he can do what he has to do. That's done by his Honchos using the knowledge they have gained through training and experience -- and reading unassigned but relevant material -- to get him trained. But you know that...:cool:

The chain of command was given a job it had not trained for. The Doctrine was available but training wise, it was ignored for 25 years. So you've got a very valid complaint on the fact that 1990s era (and personally, I'd go for 1975-2002...) training Army wide was broadly inadequate -- and the responsibility for that lies at the then COL and above level.

Yeah, the guys in Vernon Parish blew it. So did those around Bicycle Lake. So too did the BCTP guys who trained the Cdrs and Staffs here and there. When victory was declared, they turned off the computers and the lights and no one gave a thought to what came next. Simply put, the Army screwed up, big time... :mad:

We do not train entering officers or enlisted people as well as we should. We never have and while I keep hearing noise about improvements in NCO and Officer training and education, I sure don't see many indications of greater tactical competence in open sources.:wry:

* Though in fairness, given all the furor over FM 3-24, it is obvious a number of the senior people involved in the production committee of that Great American Novel were not as familiar with the older manuals as one had a right to expect. One almost senses in some cases they started writing their 'new' bible, stumbled across the old one and grudgingly said "I guess we oughta put that in there..."

[Ranger94]

However, the 11B/19D3-whatevers should have been at least aware of their existence and every 11B4-whatever and every combat arms LT and CPT should have read them. For their Bn Staff Officers and Senior NCOs to not have read them is, IMO, inexcusable.*

The 11B/19D3-whatevers in the 2000's were the E4s and E5s of the '90s. Outside of Robin Sage graduates, how many Arty, MP or INF soldiers had "Master of FM90-8" as a bullet comment on a DA 4856 or NCOER? If they did not receive recognition for mastering a manual outside (way outside) their MOS then why would the new senior leaders reward new, lower enlisted?

The tactics have been refined but the reward system has not.

In case some missed this.

http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6690267n&tag=contentMain;cbsCarousel

"You talk about restraint. What do you mean by that?" Pelley asked.

"As I told the Marines before we deployed, it's about a three second decision, especially with his personal weapon. The first second is 'Can I?' The next two are 'Should I?' 'What is going to be the effect of my action? Is it going to move the Afghan closer to the government or further away?'" he explained.

Rewarding Soldiers/Marines for making a 3 second strategic decision? (and it is strategic http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm

I vote 'Yes'

And what is the cost?

"It's frustrating," Quiceno said. "I don't know if anybody really understands the amount of stress that the guys are already starting to feel because of that. You know? Simply just having their hands tied behind your back, if you will."

[Ken White]

...If they did not receive recognition for mastering a manual outside (way outside) their MOS then why would the new senior leaders reward new, lower enlisted?The problem is it's not outside their MOS. Not one bit. You're focusing on the wrong level, as I said earlier: "and the responsibility for that lies at the then COL and above level." The fact they were not given training that was 100% applicable to their MOS is borderline criminal but it is not the fault of those then CPTs and below. It was the then COLs and Generals -- it was the Army...
The tactics have been refined but the reward system has not.I'm not sure the tactics have been refined, I see a lot of stuff that'll get people killed, not least guys moving tactically 5 to 20 feet apart when they should be more than that many meters apart.

In any event, the training doctrine and material existed in the 1975-2002 period, it was just not used. That's a lick on the Army as an institution. There's an adequate reward system in place today -- if it's not being used properly, that, too, is a lick on the Army.
...I vote 'Yes'

And what is the cost?

"It's frustrating," Quiceno said. "I don't know if anybody really understands the amount of stress that the guys are already starting to feel because of that. You know? Simply just having their hands tied behind your back, if you will."So do I. It is harder, no question. Been there and done that -- so I know it can be done and I know that if you put it to the Troops properly, most (less the always with us 10%... :( ) will understand and do well. However, if the Troops, Army or Marine, feel as if their hands are tied today, then someone, somewhere in the chain of command is not doing their job. I hate to fall back on the annoying and old "It's a leadership problem" bit -- but it is. That, too is not a problem attributable to those now CPTs and below... :rolleyes:

Though they're the ones, as always, that have to fix it. Shouldn't be that way but it generally is. :mad:

All that's why I said in the other comment above that our training does not really seem to have improved...

[Ranger94]

You're focusing on the wrong level, as I said earlier: "and the responsibility for that lies at the then COL and above level." The fact they were not given training that was 100% applicable to their MOS is borderline criminal but it is not the fault of those then CPTs and below. It was the then COLs and Generals -- it was the Army

My post from 17 May 2010

"Most of you on this site advocate a new (or at least a redefined) type of war (This includes Gentile). "

My post from 23 May 2010.

"Quote:
Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
Reminds me of people claiming that our small unit leaders "don't get COIN" or "need to learn COIN" when, in fact, it was the person making the assertion who just finally came around to understanding what COIN is.
You just described the turn-a-round of leadership for Gen. Odierno and the re-writting of history of Col. Gentile"

I understand that Col and Gen. need to be held accountable. I am not sure this site does.


In any event, the training doctrine and material existed in the 1975-2002 period, it was just not used. That's a lick on the Army as an institution.

I agree and that is why the reward system (and Awards count for promotion points) should be revised.


There's an adequate reward system in place today -- if it's not being used properly, that, too, is a lick on the Army.

Funny, I was walking in Crystal City underground today and two friends of mine spotted me and asked why I had a stern look on my face. I did not even realize that I did it or the reason.

I looked back and I saw an E8 that did not have a combat patch. In 9years of a nation at war we still promote to the senior ranks those that do not have combat experience. ( NOTE: HRC may add Promotion Points for combat experience in June 2011)

[Ken White]

I looked back and I saw an E8 that did not have a combat patch. In 9years of a nation at war we still promote to the senior ranks those that do not have combat experience. ( NOTE: HRC may add Promotion Points for combat experience in June 2011)Believe it or not, there a few that are almost totally CONUS bound, nothing for them to do overseas. Makes little sense to send them over anyway, all they're likely to do is hassle people or get someone killed. Takes all kinds...

FWIW, I rarely wore any of my right arm patches, merit badges or the CIB unless in formation when I was supposed to do so. Usually just had my wings on...

Combat experience used to be considered -- then after 1975, we didn't have any combat for a long time so it got dropped. Now it's back, better late than never. We can agree the personnel system is in really bad shape and too slow to modernize...

[William F. Owen]

"Most of you on this site advocate a new (or at least a redefined) type of war (This includes Gentile). "

We do? News to me. Maybe some, but I would contest "most." - and why? War is war.

[Ranger94]

The problem is it's not outside their MOS. Not one bit. The quote below and supporting article seems to suggest that soldiers train on MOS specific mission and then, later in the year, train on FM3-24. So is "train like we fight" no longer valid.

"Under the Force Generation model, brigade-sized elements should conduct two maneuver exercises before heading back to a combat zone. One concentrates on basic skills and the unit’s general mission, with the other focusing on a rehearsal of the tasks the unit will face in an upcoming deployment."

http://www.stripes.com/news/gao-army-brigade-combat-team-training-found-lacking-1.111964

Two missions, one soldier. Leaders that can function in that environment should be rewarded.

[Ranger94]

We do? News to me. Maybe some, but I would contest "most." - and why? War is war.

So most on this site reject FM 3-24? Most on this site reject elevating Sustainment Operations to the level of Offense and Defense Operations?

Look at the spectrum of operations as a line drawn left to right. On the far left is Total war (slightly to the right is Nuclear War) to the far, far right is "Broken Window Policing".

Along that line, where is FM 3-24?

How fast are junior leaders being asked to jump from the middle right side of the line (FM3-24) to the middle left side of the line (FM7-8)? You have Three seconds to answer


War is war.

Go back to Schmedlap's quote from 05-18-2010. If war is war and training is training and "COIN is not new" then why did I have to justify my actions?

[William F. Owen]

So most on this site reject FM 3-24? Most on this site reject elevating Sustainment Operations to the level of Offense and Defense Operations?
War is war. War does not change. It remains the same. Warfare evolves - and usually does so slowly.

Armies should train to fight. What does "sustain" actually mean? The base level requirement for last 160 years has been to be able to do combat and security operations against both regular and irregular forces. That will not change. Almost no weapon or tactic the US/NATO forces encountered in Iraq or A'Stan was new.

If you were training the right way in 1985, you should be still doing the same training today.

To quote you, Ranger 94 "This is a failure of leadership." If you haven't been trained when to shoot and when not to, you were badly trained. My Army suffered the exact same problem in the 1970's with Ulster ROE. ROE are to support the policy. You are an instrument of Policy.

[Bob's World]

So most on this site reject FM 3-24? Most on this site reject elevating Sustainment Operations to the level of Offense and Defense Operations?

Look at the spectrum of operations as a line drawn left to right. On the far left is Total war (slightly to the right is Nuclear War) to the far, far right is "Broken Window Policing".

Along that line, where is FM 3-24?

How fast are junior leaders being asked to jump from the middle right side of the line (FM3-24) to the middle left side of the line (FM7-8)? You have Three seconds to answer



Go back to Schmedlap's quote from 05-18-2010. If war is war and training is training and "COIN is not new" then why did I have to justify my actions?



But then I think it might be the first FM for this broad area of military activity (currently a couple of directives are out there)

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/CNGR_Milit-Support-Civil-Authorities.pdf


I think the military needs to DETER-DEFEAT and do MSCA; and that COIN falls under MSCA.

[Red Rat]

Now we have ROE that tell us when we are allowed to open fire, and a somewhat more nebulous 'Courageous Restraint' telling us when we should open fire; the boys on the ground are confused :confused: I hear that they have retermed 'Courageous Restraint' as 'Command Cowardice'; read into that what you will. ;)