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gute
05-15-2010, 12:20 AM
I believe this may have been addressed before and if so I apologize. This topic is of great interest to me so I have continued to study it. It's my understanding that the HBCT has three major flaws: 1) two Combined Arms Battalions instead of 3-4, 2) an under armored RSTA squadron, and 3) the belief that the RSTA squadron may serve as a third maneuver element.

I have two questions for the members with the experience with armored warfare and the HBCT. 1) Is the current structure of the HBCT sufficient for offensive operations such as what the 3ID did in the run up to Baghdad during OIF? 2) Are the criticisms of the HBCT and the IBCT based on a lack of performance during stability ops or the current structures are ill suited for offensive ops? I seemed to have the same question twice - It seems to me the major critisms of the BCT have more to do with a structure that is performing stability ops and not offensive ops or maybe it makes no difference. Thanks.

82redleg
05-15-2010, 01:52 AM
This article was written shortly after the modular organizations were introduced http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-135843315.html

Based on the size of the BCT staff, I agree with the author- we should have gone for BIG (4 maneuver BN) BCTs, with comparably increased enabling/combat support assets, commanded by BG. The staff already in place can handle it. During my last rotation, my BCT had 1 BN detached, but recieved the attachment of 3 additional BNs, plus operated dispersed across Iraq. The only addition to the staff would be an aide for the CG.

When modularity was first announced, I thought that we were going to increase the HQs while we fought for an end-strength increase, then use that increase to put the third maneuver BN back in each BCT- unfortunately, we used the 30000 strength increase to build more BCTs, instead.

Finally, I'm not a heavy guy, but I don't think that the ARS (its not technically a RSTA) is underarmored for recon work. I think that M3s are plenty. It is anemic, with only 6 platoons. It should have at least 3 platoons per troop, if not 4 (I'd personally trade larger platoons, with a strong dismounted capability, for more smaller platoons). I certain situations (specifically enemy and terrain) tanks might be nice, but in another, infantry might be useful. Task organization of a tank or mech company is the solution, not building a bloated organization permanently, unless you know you will fight it. The ACR and the DIV CAV SQDN were appropriate to the Fulda Gap fight, but not everywhere.

THere's been plenty of discussions on this site regarding the employment of recon and cavalry units. It should be a pretty easy search.

Fuchs
05-15-2010, 08:28 AM
What's the current organisation of a U.S. Army brigade combat team (is it still being called unit of action?)?

gute
05-15-2010, 02:58 PM
Thanks for the response 82redleg. I have already the article - found it a couple of weeks ago - interesting and seems to be direction the army should go.

Fuchs: The U.S. Army is calling the Unit of Action either a Heavy BCT, Infantry BCT or Stryker BCT. The HBCT is commanded by a Colonel, has two Combined Arms Battalions (2/M1, 2/M2 companies each), one RSTA squadron, a fires battalion (2/SP155mm Paladin battety), a Brigade Support Battalion, and a Brigade Troops Battalion. The IBCT has the same structure, but with two infantry battalions. The SBCT has three maneuver battalions and it's structure is a little different. If you go to Wikipedia - Transformation of the U.S. Army you will find a write-up on the BCT.

Fuchs
05-15-2010, 04:46 PM
Mixed battalions in garrison - interesting. It has been tried many times and cancelled almost as often. I assume we'll have a well-founded understanding of their performance about five years after the formations returned to normal peacetime duty (after OEF/ISAF).

- - - - -

I think of brigades more in a mobile warfare environment than in an occupation environment. Surely a Bde HQ can handle less maneuver elements in mobile warfare than when sitting in the same place for months.

An important constant (or variable?) is the maximum size of a directly (first hand, in person, on the spot) controllable combat team (Kampfgruppe as envisaged in the first Bundeswehr Heer structure).
This seems to have been about 2-3 battalions historically. Battalions may be the wrong unit of measurement, though - it may be better to measure this in vehicle count (less motorcycles without sidecars) or road march length of the combat team.
Anyway; German division leaders were apparently unable to control much more than two or three battalions as vanguard during an advance.
We might have increased this limit with BFT and similar equipment, but then again management on LCD screens is not direct control (and leadership, especially inspiration!!!) of units and the further increased dispersion of troops was a powerful trend for decades.

So far, I assume that a combat team should be no larger than three battalions. That's two battalions infantry & armour plus a mix of many smaller support units (mortars, combat engineers) to me.

One such combat team is a mixed regiment to me, two are a small brigade, three a large brigade and four a division.


Large armies might go for the large brigade, smaller armies (than US, PRC or Russia) might go for the small brigade instead to get a meaningful quantity of Bdes.
Very small armies (Denmark, for example) should probably rather go for some kind of single combat team "not meant for the Schwerpunkt" light cavalry regiments for vanguard, rear guard, security, recce, counter-recce and raids in order to get a meaningful quantity of formations.
We got finally rid of the division structure in many armies (based on WW2 insights that were already accepted in NATO as correct insights back in the late 50's!) and that's fine. Four combat teams per formation are great on paper (many formation possibilities...3 up+1 back, 1 up+3 back, 2-2, 2 right+1 left+1 back, ...), and rather disappointing in reality. We've had this with ideas about four Bdes per Div already.


Looking at the small or large Bde, I'd like to propose a closer look at the support functions. Such a Bde of two combat teams could team up the support units with another light mech battalion (on APCs) that acts as reserve and security force.
The support elements themselves (arty, log, signals, AD, medical, Bde HQ) could be sized to provide their services to much more than the own combat teams. They could create a "support aura" of about 80 km diameter (especially with arty) in support of rather cheap or very small units (non-combined arms infantry Rgts without arty or light cavalry companies, battalions).

In addition to this, I'd add basic infantry training battalion at the home garrison (four to six months basic training).

This would create a Bde of
* two or three combined arms (mortars, not arty) combat teams
* a light mech infantry-reinforced bunch of support units that provide support services in a radius of up to 80 km (not only to its combat teams)
* a "Bn+civil services" stationary garrison element


Brigade structures usually look as if the brigades were meant to fight as quite solid blocks, when in reality we would need many rather small units or detachments to actually have an eye on (or control of) the surrounding terrain. Those many small eyes & daggers in the landscape would benefit greatly if the Bde in the field had the surplus support capability to assist them.


This extra capacity would also perform nicely with incomplete (non-combined arms) allied contingents attached in a campaign like the Afghan one.

Tukhachevskii
05-17-2010, 03:10 PM
I believe this may have been addressed before and if so I apologize. This topic is of great interest to me so I have continued to study it. It's my understanding that the HBCT has three major flaws: 1) two Combined Arms Battalions instead of 3-4, 2) an under armored RSTA squadron, and 3) the belief that the RSTA squadron may serve as a third maneuver element.

I have two questions for the members with the experience with armored warfare and the HBCT. 1) Is the current structure of the HBCT sufficient for offensive operations such as what the 3ID did in the run up to Baghdad during OIF? 2) Are the criticisms of the HBCT and the IBCT based on a lack of performance during stability ops or the current structures are ill suited for offensive ops? I seemed to have the same question twice - It seems to me the major critisms of the BCT have more to do with a structure that is performing stability ops and not offensive ops or maybe it makes no difference. Thanks.

You know I always considered the old ROAD 1986 mech div to be pretty much an all-arms smorgasboard task and mission tailorable (is that even a word?) as and where required. The Div cavarly Sqn/Bn even had organic helicopters and an artillery brigade. IMO the BCT are good in principle but for their actual combat effectiveness is hampered by a logistics and CS slice that gives it a 50/50 troop to tail ratio. The old Div86 format could sustain bdes with greater oversight, IMO, and greater felxibility (especially if CS units had been made organic to Bdes, thus making the division an ad hoc HQ element much like the old Soviet WWII era Corps structure). Losing the artillery bde for a fashionable belief that precision is more important than volume merely sets one up for a bloody nose (BCT arty bns have, what, 12 tubes?) Still, the deficiencies(sp?) of the Stryker BCTs (i.e., including the need for a third manouevre bn) was diagnosed long ago. Which see;

LtC S. J. Townsend, Alternate Organisations for Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415791&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Maj. A. L. Rocke, Is the Stryker Brigade Combat Team a Viable Concept (www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA416457&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Maj F. R. Moss, The Costs and Benefits of Adding a Third Manoeuvre Battalion to the Brigade Combat Team (www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA483239&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Steve Blair
05-17-2010, 03:16 PM
The only catch with the Vietnam-era division cavalry squadron was that its organic air cavalry troop was often snatched by division headquarters (or higher), and the ground troops were parceled out to individual brigades on many occasions. It was a damned good, flexible organization, but it had to be allowed to operate as a unit.

I put this out there because the 1986 ROAD division squadron was still similar to the Vietnam model.

swerve1
05-17-2010, 05:42 PM
I was a part of 2/4ID staff when it did its transition to the new HBCT design from the Force XXI model and later commanded a maneuver company in the BCT, which included a tour in Iraq. Early on we identified several shortfalls to the new design but made little headway with Big Army in affecting the changes we saw as necessary. Still, there are some definite positives within the new design.

First, the Combined Arms BNs are monsters. They have more infantry than the old tank BNs and more tanks than the old mech BNs. They also lend themselves very well to all companies task-organizing for combined arms opns.

Second, despite how large they are, the BCT HQ have many more capabilities than the old BDE HQ. It can sometimes be very unwieldy, but having so much organic C2 under one roof provides many capabilities.

On the other hand, the lack of a third CAB handicaps the BCT. the ARS has no ability, doctrinally or practically, to do any more than light reconnaissance and screening opns. It can't attack, defend, cover, guard, or screen. It also lacks adequate dismounts to field multiple long-term OPs. The mix of BFVs and HMMWVs wasn't the best idea either. The lack of platoons is also a problem. The ARS needs lots of external support to really make it combat capable. Now in the current fight in Iraq, one could make a credible argument that the ARS was sufficient for its tasks. However, it's very unlikely an ARS would have been able to do the same things 3-7 CAV did during the initial portion of the Iraq War.

The FA BN is woefully inadequate. In order to field more BCTs, the Army watered down its combat power and it's clear in these two-battery FA BNs. Supporting the CABs and the ARS simultaneously is a bridge too far without external support, which makes the BCT incapable of self-reliance.

The engineers are scattered across the BCT. Sometimes this is good, sometimes bad, but the problem is that BFV-equipped engineers get looked at like just another maneuver element instead of engineers who can maneuver if need be. Also, lacking a BDE EN limits the real visibility on the engineer situation.

CS support is inadequate. There's a need for more MPs and other combat enablers. CSS didn't seem to be much of a problem, but that's outside of my scope.

In the future, I wish the Army would reduce the number of BCTs in favor of making the existing ones much more robust and capable - real self-sufficient fighting forces, capable of throwing the kitchen sink at the threat. Add a 3rd CAB, make the ARS into an organization able to fight for information, field additional FS assets - both howitzers and mortars, include more dismounted scouts, and make the MP PLT an MP CO.

Infanteer
05-17-2010, 09:49 PM
In the future, I wish the Army would reduce the number of BCTs in favor of making the existing ones much more robust and capable - real self-sufficient fighting forces, capable of throwing the kitchen sink at the threat. Add a 3rd CAB, make the ARS into an organization able to fight for information, field additional FS assets - both howitzers and mortars, include more dismounted scouts, and make the MP PLT an MP CO.

Sounds like our Brigade Groups - because of our dispersed (small) Army and the need to do without a Division HQ (for now), our Army is formed around a Mechanized Brigade Group having:
2 Mech Inf Bns
1 Light Inf Bn
1 Armoured Bn (mix of MBTs and LAV Armoured Recce)
1 Combat Engineer Bn
1 Artillery Bn (M-777 - but I think its going to 2 batteries as we don't have enough to replace the old 105mm)
1 Support Bn (Tn, Log, Maint, etc, etc)
1 HQ Bn (HQ, Sigs Coy, MP Pl)

The Brigades also have light helicopter squadrons that are affiliated and based alongside them.

Potent organizations, although we've yet to deploy one complete. We usually send mixed Battlegroups formed around an Inf Bn with a Company from each of the other Bns.

Tukhachevskii
05-18-2010, 09:42 AM
I was a part of 2/4ID staff when it did its transition to the new HBCT design from the Force XXI model and later commanded a maneuver company in the BCT, which included a tour in Iraq. Early on we identified several shortfalls to the new design but made little headway with Big Army in affecting the changes we saw as necessary. Still, there are some definite positives within the new design.

First, the Combined Arms BNs are monsters. They have more infantry than the old tank BNs and more tanks than the old mech BNs. They also lend themselves very well to all companies task-organizing for combined arms opns.

Second, despite how large they are, the BCT HQ have many more capabilities than the old BDE HQ. It can sometimes be very unwieldy, but having so much organic C2 under one roof provides many capabilities.

On the other hand, the lack of a third CAB handicaps the BCT. the ARS has no ability, doctrinally or practically, to do any more than light reconnaissance and screening opns. It can't attack, defend, cover, guard, or screen. It also lacks adequate dismounts to field multiple long-term OPs. The mix of BFVs and HMMWVs wasn't the best idea either. The lack of platoons is also a problem. The ARS needs lots of external support to really make it combat capable. Now in the current fight in Iraq, one could make a credible argument that the ARS was sufficient for its tasks. However, it's very unlikely an ARS would have been able to do the same things 3-7 CAV did during the initial portion of the Iraq War.

The FA BN is woefully inadequate. In order to field more BCTs, the Army watered down its combat power and it's clear in these two-battery FA BNs. Supporting the CABs and the ARS simultaneously is a bridge too far without external support, which makes the BCT incapable of self-reliance.

The engineers are scattered across the BCT. Sometimes this is good, sometimes bad, but the problem is that BFV-equipped engineers get looked at like just another maneuver element instead of engineers who can maneuver if need be. Also, lacking a BDE EN limits the real visibility on the engineer situation.

CS support is inadequate. There's a need for more MPs and other combat enablers. CSS didn't seem to be much of a problem, but that's outside of my scope.

In the future, I wish the Army would reduce the number of BCTs in favor of making the existing ones much more robust and capable - real self-sufficient fighting forces, capable of throwing the kitchen sink at the threat. Add a 3rd CAB, make the ARS into an organization able to fight for information, field additional FS assets - both howitzers and mortars, include more dismounted scouts, and make the MP PLT an MP CO.

The HMWWVs in your recon elements always intrigued me. What was the rationale (assuming there was one) for marrying them with BFVs rather than more BFVs or even MBTs?

Ken White
05-18-2010, 01:30 PM
The HMWWVs in your recon elements always intrigued me. What was the rationale (assuming there was one) for marrying them with BFVs rather than more BFVs or even MBTs?General Purpose (GP -- precursor for the once ubiquitous 'Jeep') equipment rather than sensibly buying designed for purpose items.

The M3 Bradley was a political compromise purchased by the Armor and Cavalry folks to assure that the Infantry folks (who were buying the M2 Bradley) supported their buy of the M1 Tank. A part of the cost was cancellation of the XM8 Armored Gun system and of a dedicated Scout vehicle. The HMMWV is a lousy scout vehicle but is the standard, GP 'light' (???) wheeled vehicle.

IOW, there is no rationale. Both items were and are simply available and the best of many poor solutions given a refusal to buy dedicated equipment...

We do a lot of really dumb stuff.

We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...

We've identified a lack of effective Reconnaissance capability as a tactical and operational shortfall again and again -- we still haven't really fixed it, mostly because we're unwilling to buy dedicated equipment (or adequately train our people) and have impatient Staff Officers who are unwilling to wait for information...

swerve1
05-18-2010, 01:32 PM
I think the original reason for such a combination was that the OPFOR at NTC had scout platoons organized with BMPs (M113s) and BRDMs (HMMWVs), and the OPFOR was pretty successful against the rotating BLUFOR. Of course they had other advantages, but I think very little thought or analysis went into part of the new BCT design. I think $$$ drove much of the decision making, not capabilities.

Infanteer, do you have any more information on the British BDE Battle Groups? I didn't know there was such a unit in existance. I think the US Army really needs to reconsider its organization, and the DoD needs to really determine what the role of the Army will be in the future. This goes along with Sec. Gates consideration of what should the role of the USMC be. You can't talk about one without discussing the other.

Fuchs
05-18-2010, 01:59 PM
We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...

We've identified a lack of effective Reconnaissance capability as a tactical and operational shortfall again and again -- we still haven't really fixed it, mostly because we're unwilling to buy dedicated equipment (or adequately train our people) and have impatient Staff Officers who are unwilling to wait for information...

This happens to be relevant to my interests. :D

(1) The U.S. idea of a cavalry mission (dedicated force for recce, security, vanguard, rearguard) makes sense, but the execution is strange.
- too many helicopters organic at too low level (apparently too much funds for helos!)
- design of a brigade-sized "Regiment" for a mission that should be done by dispersed battalions, if not companies
- either heavy tracked or 4wd light approach

Armour, combat, heavyness, speed - that's all fine for recce, counterrecce, security, advance guard, rear guard - but it's just part of the solution. A turbine-driven MBT in a cavalry force is a very strange choice, of course.
Mobility (especially road range and reliability of mobility-critical components) should be emphasized over protection and firepower. Their combat role should be more akin to fencing with a Rapier than to a Roman legionary's charge.

The light "stealth" approach is also fine, but it takes time as you mentioned, and should thus be an effort that's even more independent of the plans of the brigades (combat formations). The slow, light approach should cover areas, establish picket lines or observe places of special interest. The stealth recce should be in place long before a Bde intends to move into their direction - just in case.
This requires many small and enduring teams - LRS basically.

The idea that you send recce elements ahead is outdated. It stems from a time when the mobility was very different and many divisions were advancing shoulder-to-shoulder or in the undefended areas behind a penetrated front line. Nowadays you have your brigades with some spacing and need to know what's up in the gaps and ahead. Recce needs to cover huge areas, not merely tell what lies ahead on a few favourited routes. Field manuals come close to recognize this, but force structures don't.
We have too many support and combat troops and too few recce elements. keep in mind; killing is easy nowadays once you have a positive ID and coordinates (+ movement vector) about the enemy.

The brigades should really be the triremes in an ocean of recce troops who already drowned every foe who was too weak to swim; ready to ram with speed and force, if possible multiple vs one.


All the new lightly armored 4wd observation cars (such as Fennek, or HMMWV with LRAS) can do very little in my opinion. They're a terribly expensive solution for the stealth part and useless for the "combat for recce superiority" and "cavalry" mission. 8x8-based recce vehicles are even more questionable because of their size. Luchs is great for route recce, but the concept is simply too expensive.

Infanteer
05-18-2010, 02:40 PM
We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...

I take it you don't buy into these conclusions?

http://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW%20Web-ExclusivePubs/Land%20Warfare%20Papers/LWP_53.pdf

Infanteer
05-18-2010, 03:01 PM
Infanteer, do you have any more information on the British BDE Battle Groups? I didn't know there was such a unit in existance.

The Brigade Group is, I think, a Canadian formation created as a response to being unable to deploy a Division (for various reasons) but still wanting to deploy everything and the kitchen sink. It borders on a mini-Division and is listed, doctrinally, as an "independant Corps asset" - mind you this is all Fulda Gap stuff when 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group formed the VII Corps reserve (I think I got this right).

Anyways, Battlegroups and Combat Teams are stuff that we in Canada live by when it comes to operations. I'm pretty sure the British use the same or similar doctrine when it comes to task-tailoring forces. Battlegroups are a task-tailored force built around either an Infantry Battalion or, uncommonly these days, and Armoured Regiment (battalion in everyday lingo). The battlegroup will have sub-elements of all the other arms of the Brigade that it requires to accomplish its mission. For example, the Battlegroup in Afghanistan (this is all open source from the CF website (http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/jtfa-foia-eng.asp)) is a Rifle Battalion with an Armoured Squadron (we call companies squadrons in Canada/UK), an Armoured Recconaissance Squadron (again company), a Combat Engineer Squadron (company) and an Artillery Battery. So, the Battalion Commander actually has quite a potent little combined arms force - everything down a notch from what the Brigade Commander has.

Combat Teams are the same thing, but at the Company level. Doctrinally, we work with square combat teams - an Infantry Company, an Armoured Squadron (company), a Field Engineer Troop (platoon), and a FOO/JTAC team. A Battlegroup commander will task-tailor one or more combat teams based off of how he sees the mission being accomplished. We are even seeing "Platoon Groups" in the dispersed operations - I had a section (squad) of Engineers attached to my platoon for almost the entire time in Afghanistan and at times I got a FOO/JTAC party as well. It wasn't uncommon to see a Platoon of Infantry and a Troop (platoon) of tanks married up to go do something. Makes life interesting for the lowly platoon commander!

So, in reality just a system of task-tailoring combined arms forces and, in some cases, who commands them - nothing too special but we do it as a matter of course in Canada because we have almost exclusively been deploying Battlegroups (sans Brigades) to multinational operations for the last 20 years or so. When it does show is when you look at units in and around Kandahar - the Canadian battalion has tanks, artillery and engineers while the American units are more conventional, branch pure units.

Ken White
05-18-2010, 03:29 PM
...The U.S. idea of a cavalry mission (dedicated force for recce, security, vanguard, rearguard) makes sense, but the execution is strange.Mostly due to limited equipment choices.
too many helicopters organic at too low level (apparently too much funds for helos!)In a sense, you're correct. Money to buy aircraft is in a different pot than that for ground vehicles...[/quote]design of a brigade-sized "Regiment" for a mission that should be done by dispersed battalions, if not companies.[/quote]More a tradition and cultural thing than a valid operational requirement. We give our branches too mush clout in structure decisions.
either heavy tracked or 4wd light approachAgain, an equipment available limitation.

I agree with your other points. Infanteer also provided a linked article and asked if I agreed with it -- actually, I do. Mostly due to this quote from that article:

"American military might is based largely on the ability to maintain an operational tempo that vastly exceeds that of an adversary. Operational commanders will not forfeit this enormous advantage to allow tactical units to fully develop the enemy situation."

I don't totally subscribe to that but it is firmly embedded in US military thought and is unlikely to change. That and our national lack of patience make ability to fight for information, on screens and such imperative.
The idea that you send recce elements ahead is outdated...Field manuals come close to recognize this, but force structures don't.
We have too many support and combat troops and too few recce elements. keep in mind; killing is easy nowadays once you have a positive ID and coordinates (+ movement vector) about the enemy.

The brigades should really be the triremes in an ocean of recce troops who already drowned every foe who was too weak to swim; ready to ram with speed and force, if possible multiple vs one.Yes.

To reconcile the conflicting reconnaissance (and equipment) needs you cited, my preference is for Infantry Battalions to have Scout AND Reconnaissance platoons (light wheeled vehicles for light infantry, slightly modified infantry carrier for signature confusion for mechanized units where they exist), for combined Arms or Armor, Armored Cavalry Platoons with a light tracked scout section, a Tank section, an Infantry section and a Mortar section plus the PL.

BCTs / Bdes should have a Cavalry Troop with the same four functional units except as platoons and not sections. The separate Cavalry or Reconnaissance Squadrons / Battalions should consist of four such troops plus support. All these 'Cavalry' elements are flexibly reorganized to fit situational METT-TC considerations.

Equally obviously, all those organization -- and new ones tailored for the operations at hand -- should be modified to fit the overall situation, location and operational goal.

Cavalry or something like it, a reconnaissance oriented but emphatically combat capable element, is required. It has to be prepared to fight. The issue of 'stealthy' reconnaissance is provided for by LRS companies and elements where appropriate and formation reconnaissance units should be capable of some stealth but must be able to fight for information and be usable as economy of force elements.

My issue with equipment is simply that we should provide special purpose equipment rather than trying to economize in purchases and training by buying one size fits all -- it rarely does.

William F. Owen
05-18-2010, 03:32 PM
I take it you don't buy into these conclusions?

http://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW%20Web-ExclusivePubs/Land%20Warfare%20Papers/LWP_53.pdf

From said study:

The first study, entitled Applying the National Training Center Experience: Tactical Reconnaissance, established ìa strong correlation between successful reconnaissance and successful offensive operations.î In fact, this correlation was so strong that Goldsmith argued that ìbeginning an attack . . . without appropriate intelligence is apt to lead to failure.î8
I hope it didn't take that study to point out something so blindingly obvious!

Question: If you are advancing to contact, why do you need reconnaissance?

Infanteer
05-18-2010, 03:49 PM
From said study:

I hope it didn't take that study to point out something so blindingly obvious!

Good point.


Question: If you are advancing to contact, why do you need reconnaissance?

So you hit the bad guy at the right angle? Although in this sense, "the lead guys" are the reconnaissance.

Fuchs
05-18-2010, 03:56 PM
Recce/scouts/whatever tied to Bn/Rgt/Bde can only cover a small radius around those units/formations adequately. They cannot scout ahead in a two-hour-march radius before the HQ has decided on the direction of the march.

The availability of eyes and fists ahead is important - and any such lack reduces the mobile warfare proficiency (especially the agility of command and formations). Stumbling around blindly is no fun when the pinata is aiming a gun at you.

Recce attached to divisions was OK in WW2 when recce had top speed of 60-80 km/h, tanks of 40 and infantry on foot ... well, you get the point.
Recce hasn't this speed advantage any more. We've used all-motorised forces since 1940 (UK), 1944 (U.S.) or 1955 (Germany). We need a new concept for recce.

Let me emphasis the recce-shall-already-be-in-place-before-a-formation-knows-it-want-to-move-to-that-place point.
This becomes as impractical for individual formations just as city walls have become impractical for city garrisons with ever-larger artillery ranges. They gave way for front lines (a higher level effort) that provided all cities with a defensive line that was shorter than the sum of city walls of a single province.
Defensive lines are about circumference; 2*pi*r. The area to be covered by recce is about circular area; r*r*pi. It grows much faster.
If nothing else, geometry and history tell us that we have a defect with our force structure.

Recce should be a corps-level job today (this is unlikely to become visible in our smallish training exercises). The combat units and formations use vanguard, security elements and if need be they can feel for a short range with a recce team. This is the "keep eyes open" part of the job. The real recce should be a Corps thing and should provide ~90% of the non-combat info on the enemy.
We should give the Corps several Cavalry Regiments of several autonomous companies ("squadrons" if you want) each and a LRS Bn or Rgt.

One more year and I might be finished with a 50-200 pages effort that's in part built on this assertion of mine.



From said study:

I hope it didn't take that study to point out something so blindingly obvious!

Question: If you are advancing to contact, why do you need reconnaissance?
It's actually not that obvious, but rather depends on assumptions.

This point can actually lead to another discussion of manoeuvre à priori/command push vs. manoeuvre à posteriori/recon pull.
Recce ahead loses some importance if you use the latter.

There's also the thing whose name I always forget; attacking an enemy ASAP to catch him unread to fight. Military history suggests that this can work extremely fine if you use the right forces.
Actually, Rommel drove over a French division on a road with a fraction of his Panzer-Division (about a third of it; he lead the vanguard, Vorausabteilung) simply because said division was resting along a road and didn't expect attackers, being 30+ km behind the front that was penetrated only a few hours before.

The quote from the study was actually rather context (NTC) specific and probably only right in ~80% of all cases.
A weak recce ahead (that needs to be sent ahead because it's not already in place!) can sometimes provide more early warning to the enemy than to yourself and waste your time.

Infanteer
05-18-2010, 05:25 PM
There's also the thing whose name I always forget; attacking an enemy ASAP to catch him unread to fight.

Spoiling attack?

Fuchs
05-18-2010, 06:01 PM
Not quite. Something with pre-, but neither preemptive nor preventive.

swerve1
05-18-2010, 06:28 PM
Recce/scouts/whatever tied to Bn/Rgt/Bde can only cover a small radius around those units/formations adequately. They cannot scout ahead in a two-hour-march radius before the HQ has decided on the direction of the march.

The availability of eyes and fists ahead is important - and any such lack reduces the mobile warfare proficiency (especially the agility of command and formations). Stumbling around blindly is no fun when the pinata is aiming a gun at you.

Recce attached to divisions was OK in WW2 when recce had top speed of 60-80 km/h, tanks of 40 and infantry on foot ... well, you get the point.
Recce hasn't this speed advantage any more. We've used all-motorised forces since 1940 (UK), 1944 (U.S.) or 1955 (Germany). We need a new concept for recce.

Let me emphasis the recce-shall-already-be-in-place-before-a-formation-knows-it-want-to-move-to-that-place point.
This becomes as impractical for individual formations just as city walls have become impractical for city garrisons with ever-larger artillery ranges. They gave way for front lines (a higher level effort) that provided all cities with a defensive line that was shorter than the sum of city walls of a single province.
Defensive lines are about circumference; 2*pi*r. The area to be covered by recce is about circular area; r*r*pi. It grows much faster.
If nothing else, geometry and history tell us that we have a defect with our force structure.

Recce should be a corps-level job today (this is unlikely to become visible in our smallish training exercises). The combat units and formations use vanguard, security elements and if need be they can feel for a short range with a recce team. This is the "keep eyes open" part of the job. The real recce should be a Corps thing and should provide ~90% of the non-combat info on the enemy.
We should give the Corps several Cavalry Regiments of several autonomous companies ("squadrons" if you want) each and a LRS Bn or Rgt.

One more year and I might be finished with a 50-200 pages effort that's in part built on this assertion of mine.



It's actually not that obvious, but rather depends on assumptions.

This point can actually lead to another discussion of manoeuvre à priori/command push vs. manoeuvre à posteriori/recon pull.
Recce ahead loses some importance if you use the latter.

There's also the thing whose name I always forget; attacking an enemy ASAP to catch him unread to fight. Military history suggests that this can work extremely fine if you use the right forces.
Actually, Rommel drove over a French division on a road with a fraction of his Panzer-Division (about a third of it; he lead the vanguard, Vorausabteilung) simply because said division was resting along a road and didn't expect attackers, being 30+ km behind the front that was penetrated only a few hours before.

The quote from the study was actually rather context (NTC) specific and probably only right in ~80% of all cases.
A weak recce ahead (that needs to be sent ahead because it's not already in place!) can sometimes provide more early warning to the enemy than to yourself and waste your time.

I don't quite agree with your view of reconnaissance - recce. While precision fires will only become more common, making every scout with a radio much more lethal, I think future battlefields will still place a premium on recon forces at all echelons below corps. PGMs may not be a viable option in an area with sensitive infrastructure or civilians, weather may make delivery of PGMs impossible, and the mission make dictate a task other than 'destroy.' In these cases, scouts may need to maintain eyes on the target and battle handover to another unit. I think we also need to keep in mind the role of reconnaissance forces as an economy of force. The old model had a RGT (a US BDE) cover a corps, a SQDN cover a DIV, etc. In this context, the old forces were economies of force relative to their parent unit.

As a company commander in Iraq, I would routinely use a squad or fire team as a recon force; I found eyes forward to be valuable even at my low level. Reconnaissance at all levels can be decisive - same for counter-recon.

Fuchs
05-18-2010, 06:42 PM
Your first disagreement is a misunderstnading. I separate the lareg area recce in armored cav squadrons and LRS. The LRS are meant for stealthy, slow work - especially observation.

The Cav would be agile, combat-worthy to some degree (against support/recce troops and against combat troops with the advantage of surprise/ambush) and fully capable of "maintain eyes on the target and battle handover to another unit. I think we also need to keep in mind the role of reconnaissance forces as an economy of force.".
I don't think that brigades need to be fully capable stand-alone forces, though. They should swim in an ocean of recce troops.

"As a company commander in Iraq, I would routinely use a squad or fire team as a recon force; I found eyes forward to be valuable even at my low level. Reconnaissance at all levels can be decisive - same for counter-recon."

Of course, but the timely recce effort of an infantry company in a major war has an effective radius that equals maybe ten minutes of driving (unless we talk about very, very open and featureless terrain).
I expect a degree of agility and I fear that enemies might have a degree of agility that necessitates an early warning more on the order of at least an hour for you'd otherwise be surprised when relatively unfit to fight.

again: "The real recce should be a Corps thing and should provide ~90% of the non-combat info on the enemy."

GI Zhou
05-18-2010, 07:11 PM
A little off topic, but as you are talking reconnaisance, is a vehicle like the small and agile British Scimitar, able to defeat light armour and soft skin vehicles, a good reconnaissance vehicle on the battlefield. I ask this because the People's Liberation Army have at least trialled their ZDB03 airborne combat vehicle as a reconnaissance vehicle. Besides having a 30mm automatic cannon, it can squeeze four paratroopers with small arms only in a rear compartment.

swerve1
05-18-2010, 08:19 PM
I would often deploy recon assets up to 24 hours prior to an operation. Of course, I had a static zone I was responsible for, but I think the idea is the same. On a more fluid battlefield where larger maneuver is the norm, recon at the company level may not be as important since it won't fight in a vacuum. I still think scouts at the BN and BCT are still necessary.

I also think aviation can play a critical role. The Army doesn't have too many helicopters, but they aren't employed in the most effective manner. I would argue that the Army should view ATK AVN in the same way the USMC views its air wings - as fire support platforms. But the Army should take it step further and consider them as an extension of reconnaissance and security forces as well.

This is a great topic.

Tukhachevskii
05-19-2010, 09:27 AM
General Purpose (GP -- precursor for the once ubiquitous 'Jeep') equipment rather than sensibly buying designed for purpose items.

The M3 Bradley was a political compromise purchased by the Armor and Cavalry folks to assure that the Infantry folks (who were buying the M2 Bradley) supported their buy of the M1 Tank. A part of the cost was cancellation of the XM8 Armored Gun system and of a dedicated Scout vehicle. The HMMWV is a lousy scout vehicle but is the standard, GP 'light' (???) wheeled vehicle.

IOW, there is no rationale. Both items were and are simply available and the best of many poor solutions given a refusal to buy dedicated equipment...

We do a lot of really dumb stuff.

We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...

We've identified a lack of effective Reconnaissance capability as a tactical and operational shortfall again and again -- we still haven't really fixed it, mostly because we're unwilling to buy dedicated equipment (or adequately train our people) and have impatient Staff Officers who are unwilling to wait for information...

Now you mention it I remember that the scout and MICV were melded for cost savings; I always had a soft spot for the XM-808 (http://www.amphibiousvehicle.net/amphi/L/twisterspecial/twister.html) "Twister" (http://www.warwheels.net/XM808TwisterGRIENKE.html) (doable, IMO, with todays composite, hybrid drive, digital technology), although the XM-800T (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM800_Armored_Reconnaissance_Scout_Vehicle) was probably more suitable. I only asked because I know the Danish army scout platoon had two tanks (tank section) and a light vehicle section (2 VW I think) and a single mortar vehicle. Apparently, they did very well at NATO training meets combining stealth with survivability (based on the firepower and protection of the tanks). Anyone who knows about the travils of Britain's FRES programme (essentially jumping on the US "medium weight" Stryker bandwagon) knows that the British Gov have just chosen a 30tonne MICV (that's pushing the "medium wieght" bit, IMO); personally I would have liked to have seen the UK go with the TRACER programme (http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/03/fres-scout-%E2%80%93-spot-the-difference/) (which see half way down the article). I think the German/Dutch Fennek (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fennek) is probably one of the better light recon platforms.

Tukhachevskii
05-19-2010, 09:44 AM
I think a large part of the problem is that the reconnaisance function/role tends to blur into the advance guard function/role which then confuses force design or, as in the case of Iraq, S/BCT recon elements are often used as a de-facto third manouvre element...so who's doing recon? Separating the two functions fully (stealth for the former and brawn for the latter) is probably going to the near impossible given actual rather than theoretical battle conditions and the fiscal and doctrinal problems of force design.

Fuchs
05-19-2010, 11:47 AM
I think a large part of the problem is that the reconnaisance function/role tends to blur into the advance guard function/role which then confuses force design or, as in the case of Iraq, S/BCT recon elements are often used as a de-facto third manouvre element...so who's doing recon?

The "third manoeuvre element" thing is a consequence of designing cavalry as a de-facto brigade instead of as many small autonomous units (Coy).
That's one of the reasons why the ACR concept is strange.

German WW2 doctrine gave the fast division's recce detachment some combat tasks, too. They were only capable of small combat missions, though.
Standard doctrine was to send small teams of armoured cars ahead and to increase their density in areas of interest. Those armoured cars would avoid combat if possible.
The recce detachment was reinforced with a fast-moving infantry Bn (initially motorcycle troops), though. They were able to punch through screening lines or to grab an important hill or bridge if necessary. Organic artillery and AT guns helped them (they did later go for long 75mm cannons on lightly armoured AFV for both direct fire support and AT support).

That wasn't enough to be misunderstood as an additional manoeuvre element. It was enough for small combat missions (especially against unprepared opposition) and was often mis-used as emergency reserves in times of crisis (this happened to everybody in uniform, though - engineers and recce troops were merely the first to be called upon).

William F. Owen
05-19-2010, 01:29 PM
A little off topic, but as you are talking reconnaisance, is a vehicle like the small and agile British Scimitar, able to defeat light armour and soft skin vehicles, a good reconnaissance vehicle on the battlefield.
IMO, Scimitar is an abysmal recce vehicle. Spartan was far better. You could at least deploy 4 guys to actually clear corners, wood lines and ridges.

I would often deploy recon assets up to 24 hours prior to an operation.
What were you commanding and what were your recce assets?

I also think aviation can play a critical role. The Army doesn't have too many helicopters, but they aren't employed in the most effective manner. I would argue that the Army should view ATK AVN in the same way the USMC views its air wings - as fire support platforms. But the Army should take it step further and consider them as an extension of reconnaissance and security forces as well.
Concur, but I think the AVN community really needs to think long and hard about how to address this. The Aussies are using Tiger, in an Armed Reconnaissance Role, and I know there are some muttering about this.

This is a great topic.
There used to be more!

Personally, I think almost every aspect of reconnaissance needs scrutiny, because there is far too much hold over from horse mounted cavalry thinking, and almost nothing from men on horses can be read across into the proto-modern warfare.

GI Zhou
05-19-2010, 05:00 PM
Bill,

Thank you for your reply. The ZDB03 was designed from the Russian BMD-3, and combines many of the features of the Spartan and Scimitar but no thermal imaging or small battlefield radars have been observed on this vehicle. They could of couse be shoehorned inside the vehicle.

BriMac
05-19-2010, 11:00 PM
The engineers are scattered across the BCT. Sometimes this is good, sometimes bad, but the problem is that BFV-equipped engineers get looked at like just another maneuver element instead of engineers who can maneuver if need be. Also, lacking a BDE EN limits the real visibility on the engineer situation.

They have changed this in most of the HBCTs to include 2/4. While they have had a BDE EN (as well as a deputy and a terrain team) for a couple years, they just recently merged the two EN companies that were in the CABs and placed them in the STB.

Tukhachevskii
05-20-2010, 05:25 PM
...…the following theses may be of interest regarding S/BCTs and the reconnaissance/third manoeuvre Bn conundrum;

Maj. C. D. Taylor, The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who will Fight for Information on the Future Battlefield? ( http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA437613&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf), MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2005;

This research seeks to determine if reconnaissance operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom required engaging the enemy in close combat in order to be effective. Qualitative examination of the interviews from the Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group yielded seven consistent themes that impact on this primary research question. Those seven themes are summarized below:

1. Tempo drives reconnaissance

2. The movement to contact is the most common form of the offense

3. Adaptive enemies often do not fit doctrinal templates

4. Commanders required human intelligence more than imagery

5. Most useful intelligence is bottom up

6. Lightly armoured scouts cannot support high tempo operations

7. Divisional heavy cavalry squadrons tend to fight as independent manoeuvre units. (p.40)

Maj. D. Mark, Effective or Efficient: The Conundrum of the Armed Reconnaissance Squadron ( http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA508021&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf), MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;

Brigade level reconnaissance units exist solely to allow the primary warfighting organization in the Army, the Brigade Combat Team, to have perfect Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding (SA/SU). However, much of the doctrine, organization, and technologies required to pursue RDO simply do not exist within the Army today. The Army's answer to the capability gap is the modular force and the centrepiece organization, the Brigade Combat Team. However, one of the primary failings of the modular
design was that the HBCT traded a manoeuvre battalion for a cavalry squadron. Although the ARS proves far more capable than the BRT it replaced, the ARS has lost its identity and has become a poorly resourced third manoeuvre element. As a result, the ARS does not even perform
reconnaissance missions well. Under the current construct, the ARS does not provide the brigade any unique capabilities (p. 23).


Maj. M. A. Dooley, Ignoring History: The Flawed Effort to Divorce Reconnaissance from Security in Modern Cavalry Formations ( http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463816&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf), MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006;

For all of the optimistic discussion in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 about making contact with sensors and developing a situation out of direct fire contact, there is little difference now between the realities of brigade reconnaissance squadron techniques and the capabilities of World War II ground reconnaissance. Other than the fact that reconnaissance squadrons no longer have the organic helicopter assets or armoured firepower formerly common to division cavalry, cavalry scouts must still execute their reconnaissance and security missions much as they have for the past sixty-five years. As a result, the newest reconnaissance squadrons no longer possess the critical assets historically required to bail themselves out of trouble once it is encountered.[...]
It seems the sensor troops that were to have sufficed as a replacement for organic combat power in the original FCS proposals are not controlled by the very reconnaissance forces that were to depend upon them. So long as the sensor systems remain controlled by brigade headquarters, the concept of sensor-to-sensor target handover, in most cases, will require constant coordination through multiple echelons of command. Without physical possession or operational control of sensor assets at the reconnaissance squadron level, the new HBCT and IBCT reconnaissance organizations technically do not even qualify to be labelled as “RSTA,” because they have no ability to acquire targets beyond the short range capabilities of normal ground recon troop assets. The much vaunted application of joint and precision fires, proclaimed in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 as a substitute for organic combat power, is thus not likely to occur efficiently if at all. (p. 72-4)

Maj. M. R. Howell, A CRITIQUE OF THE U.S. ARMY FORCE REDESIGN OF CAVALRY FORMATIONS WITHIN THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS ( http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA513692&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;

First, the new modular cavalry formations have severe flaws in their design. Second, the current mindset, doctrinal foundation and leader training focus of these cavalry formations have severe flaws in some of its key concepts. Finally, and most importantly, these new formations cannot perform the full spectrum of reconnaissance and security missions that cavalry formations doctrinally executed in the past. The combined effect of these flaws is likely to cause a serious capability gap to develop within BCT cavalry squadrons. These changes signalled a significant shift in the doctrinal roles and missions of the majority of current U.S. cavalry formations (excluding the 3d Armoured Cavalry Regiment). In sum, the transformation and modularization of the U.S. Army's BCT cavalry squadrons has had a negative impact on their effectiveness.(p. 1)

gute
05-20-2010, 09:49 PM
What's the difference (if any) between armoured infantry and mechanised infantry?

82redleg
05-21-2010, 01:57 AM
What's the difference (if any) between armoured infantry and mechanised infantry?

In US usage, mechanized infantry is mounted in Bradley IFVs. We no longer use armored infantry, that is a WW2 term for the 1/2track mounted infantry of the armored divisions.

My understanding of UK usage (I'm willing to be shown otherwise) is that armored infantry is mounted in Warrior IFVs (equivalent to US mechanized infantry), while mechanized infantry is mounted in wheeled Saxon APCs.

swerve1
05-26-2010, 06:01 PM
IMO, Scimitar is an abysmal recce vehicle. Spartan was far better. You could at least deploy 4 guys to actually clear corners, wood lines and ridges.

What were you commanding and what were your recce assets?

Concur, but I think the AVN community really needs to think long and hard about how to address this. The Aussies are using Tiger, in an Armed Reconnaissance Role, and I know there are some muttering about this.

There used to be more!

Personally, I think almost every aspect of reconnaissance needs scrutiny, because there is far too much hold over from horse mounted cavalry thinking, and almost nothing from men on horses can be read across into the proto-modern warfare.
I commanded a tank co/tm with 2 tank PLTs and 1 mech PLT. For recon, I would typically use either one of the BN sniper teams or a section from the BN SCT PLT. Sometimes a combination of both if necessary.

reed11b
06-03-2010, 06:34 PM
Of course, but the timely recce effort of an infantry company in a major war has an effective radius that equals maybe ten minutes of driving (unless we talk about very, very open and featureless terrain).
I expect a degree of agility and I fear that enemies might have a degree of agility that necessitates an early warning more on the order of at least an hour for you'd otherwise be surprised when relatively unfit to fight.



except that most light infantry has access to aviation and/or vehicular assets of some sort. Not sure what you are saying about LRS, and since I am a LRS scout, please clarify.
Reed

Hacksaw
06-03-2010, 08:03 PM
I've popped in and out of this discussion for a couple of weeks...
I have heard several different rules of thumb regarding force ratio vis a vis security mission... Of course it is all METT-TC dependent (especially enemy, troops, and terrain), but...
Cover Guard Screen
Corps DIV Regiment/BDE+ Squadron/BN+
Div Regiment/BDE+ Squadron/BN+ Troop/CO+
BDE Squadron/BN+ Troop/CO+ PLT+

Source FM 17-95

Fuchs
06-04-2010, 04:08 PM
except that most light infantry has access to aviation and/or vehicular assets of some sort. Not sure what you are saying about LRS, and since I am a LRS scout, please clarify.
Reed
My opinion is basically that recce results should be available before a commander even thinks about moving towards some grid coordinates.

The only assets that can flood a theatre with observation & reporting capability at reasonable costs and effort and provide that kind of coverage are either aerial (SAR/GMTI radar, Sigint), orbital (electro-optical, IIR, SAR/GMTI, Sigint) or LRS.
Aerial and orbital sensors have limitations that cannot be overcome without scouts on the ground, therefore I believe that an appropriate share for LRS would be a strong battalion per corps (unless the terrain is too open or the warfare too static or force densities in the theatre too high).

TAH
06-28-2010, 03:40 PM
In an era/organization of zero-sum, you are not going to be able to add something in one place without a corresponding reduction somewhere else.

From that, I propose the following organizational changes to the existing HBCT MTO&E

1. Consolidate all M3 CFVs into 6-vehicle recon/scout platoons. With 29 CFVs inside a HBCT there are enough for 4 platoons of 6 + 2 CFVs in Recon Sqdrn HQs + 1 (X2) in each of two Heavy Recon Troops. One CFV left (hold for now)

2a. Reduce number of tank companies in each CAB to one with 4 platoons of 4 tanks + 2 Co HQs tanks + 2 CAB HQs tanks for a total of 20 per CAB (down from 29). This also leaves 1 M2/M3 (S3 vehicle) from the CAB HQs left, Hold for now.

2b. Move remaining 9 tanks per CAB (total of 18) over into Heavy Recon Troops. I think you can see where this goes...

3a. Consolidate all recon HMMWVs for a total of 40. Re-org into four platoons of 6 HMWWVs (plus 4 reminder, hold for now). Assign four 6-HMWWV platoons to Light Recon Troop of Recon Sqdrn.

3b. Assign a 6-HMWWV scout platoon to each CAB.

4. "Re-organized" Recon Sqdrn now has two Heavy Troops and 1 Light Troop, all with four platoons.

5. Take reminder vehicles from above and create an "Escort and Security Company" under the STB. Create using personnel from eliminated Tank HQs and reduced need for FISTs in CABs. E&S Co gets: M2/M3 Co HQs with BFIST, HBCT MP PLT, NBC Recon PLT, the 4 remaining HMMWVs as Escort PLT, and a new/re-inforced Security PLT using the two left over M2/M3 and the 2 from the HBCT Security Section.

Some of the results:

Starting = 8 Companies manned, trained and equipped to conduct Full Spectrum Operations (FSO)
Re-org = 6 Companies and 2 Heavy Recon Troops manned, trained and equipped for FSO.

Start = 8 recon/scout platoons (3X5)
Re-org = 6 HMWWV scout platoons + 4 CFV scout platoons = 10

Increases the number of recon/scout platoons by two and moves towards standardizing Recon/scout platoons at 6 vehicles.

HBCT Recon Sqdrn should now be capable of acting as the 3rd maneuver element of the HBCT and still retain is primary role of recon. It can now guard, attack, defend, delay etc. By being able to occuplish thsse task/missions, it can also begin to address the enemy's INTENTIONS, a capability absent in the current organization.

Start = seperate/orphan platoons/sections 3 (MPs, NBC & Security)
Re-org = New Co HQs with 4 platoons (MPs, NBC, Security & Escort)

A company now resourced to enable the HBCT to begin to solve its area security concerns on its own. Also, addresses the issue of orphan platoons within the HBCT.

Down-side is a less capable recon/scout platoon in each CAB and smaller CABs (10 combat/maneuver platoons versus 12 in the original organization)

Comments?

TAH

Tukhachevskii
06-29-2010, 03:31 PM
HBCT Recon Sqdrn should now be capable of acting as the 3rd maneuver element of the HBCT and still retain is primary role of recon.
TAH

So its really more of an ACAV Sqn (as per the ACAV regiments) than a recon outfit right? Can it manouvre and conduct recon or only accomplish one mission at a time; me thinks the latter. Although it could dominate a movement to contact pretty well while guiding in the other two true manouvre bns in for the kill-hunter-killer style. In non MW scenarios however, like, for instance in Iraq, you've already got rcon sqns being used in manoevre roles to make up for the short-fall but become so ensconsed in that mission that they often can't perform their primary one...i.e., recon. Still, I can see from the simple reorganisation you propose that one could get greater bang for ones buck without needing to drastically shake up the entire system. But you really need to address the above problem.

TAH
06-29-2010, 04:34 PM
So its really more of an ACAV Sqn (as per the ACAV regiments) than a recon outfit right? Can it manouvre and conduct recon or only accomplish one mission at a time; me thinks the latter. recon.

Still, I can see from the simple reorganisation you propose that one could get greater bang for ones buck without needing to drastically shake up the entire system. But you really need to address the above problem.

Agree with the first half of the first statement. The intent was to re-create a more viable force using the same set of pieces. I disagree with the second part about not being able to conduct "Reconniassance"

When we say a unit is conducting reconnaissance, what do we mean? I mean the unit is out executing a tactical operation that seeks to confirm or deny assumptions made by staff/planners that will enable the commander to make effective tactical decisions.

Is that really an enemy force of dug-in infantry supported by tanks across that river or are they just high-res decoys? (composition/what they are) and dispostion/location-where they are). I also need a force that has the capability of acting as the advanced guard for the BCT to confirm/deny the enemy's INTENTIONS.

Lots of sensors of various types (SIGINT/ELINT/HUMINT/UAVs) are capable of determining the location and suspected composition of an enemy force. This can often be conducted passively from stand-off.

However, without the actions of the Adv Gd, we may never know if those bunkers are occupied, are those tanks real? is the enemy's plan to defend, delay, retire and attempt to break contact or surrender?:confused:

Discovery of the enemy's true intentions are as important (if not more important) then just figureing out who is where.

I believe that my suggested Recon/Cav Sqdrn can do both. Based on a read from the Intel guys, the BCT and recon commanders can determine/agree on a scheme of maneuver for the ARS (Armored Recon Sqdrn). Lead with Hvy Recon only, Light Recon only or combination of both.

With only two maneuver battalions, none of the BCTs can afford an entire battalion's worth of resources designed, equipped, manned and trained for two relatively simple tasks - conduct recon and conduct screen. Recon should be a tactical task or mission that any/all units are capable of executing within their own specific limitations.

Effective March of this year (2010) the doctrine changed and now "allows" ARS to be employed to conduct guard missions as well as attack & defend. However, the baseline organiozation has yet to be adapted to make that possible.

Thus my proposal.

PS. Secondary efforts were to address the tactical limitations of the two-platoons troops, the fact that the ARS brings nothing to the fight other then C2, and to begin simplify the organizations of BCT scout/recon platoons and troops.

Once the 3rd ACR transforms to and SBCT, there will be three seperate and distinct monuted recon platoons, the 3X5 CFV-HMWWV platoon found in HBCTs, a 6 HMMWV platoon found in IBCTs and a 4 Recon Carrier Variinat found in the SBCTs. There are also two seperate/distinct troop organizations, troops of two platoons in the HBCT and troops of three platoons in both the IBCT and SBCTs.

TAH

Ken White
06-29-2010, 07:14 PM
I also need a force that has the capability of acting as the advanced guard for the BCT to confirm/deny the enemy's INTENTIONS...Discovery of the enemy's true intentions are as important (if not more important) then just figureing out who is where...I believe that my suggested Recon/Cav Sqdrn can do both.Far more important -- and correspondingly far, far more difficult to ascertain. Exponentially so...

OTOH, your force can determine his capabilities which are the next best thing. :wry:

William F. Owen
06-30-2010, 04:20 AM
Far more important -- and correspondingly far, far more difficult to ascertain. Exponentially so...

OTOH, your force can determine his capabilities which are the next best thing. :wry:
Ain't that the truth. In all my time in Recce I don't ever remember being tasked with discovering the enemy's intent. His location and activity yes.

Fuchs
06-30-2010, 12:11 PM
intent:
* from fusing & interpreting recce reports
* from prisoners

William F. Owen
06-30-2010, 01:02 PM
intent:
* from fusing & interpreting recce reports
* from prisoners

Thus I was ordered to:
Make reports on enemy activity and locations
Capture prisoners.

Discover the enemy's intent NEVER featured in a stated mission.

TAH
06-30-2010, 01:21 PM
intent:
* from fusing & interpreting recce reports
* from prisoners

Agree with both up to a point...

Point 1, what if the reports we are intercepting are part of the enemy's deception plan? :eek:

Point 1.1 BCT has only a very limted capability in its MICO to accomplish directly got the BCT CDR. An attack by a "Re-org" ARS can achieve the results shortly after contact.

Point 2. See above about who has the capability to conduct (hint the Counter-Intel and/or the HUMINT folks in the MICO, assuming they have the correct language capability).

Point 2.1 While some EPWs will get nabbed "steathly" the majority will come following a successful attack. Consider the Brits in the Fauklands, the Italians in WW2, the Iraqis in the first Gulf War....

The ARS was designed based on the "Quaility of Firsts" (Now out of Voque). It was intended to be a Recon-pull Organization. May have worked great twenty years ago. Against any OPFOR that is well-trained, well-armed and primarilty dismounted the wheels begin to come off as it crosses the LD.

We tried the same "Recon by Steath" approach in WW2 with the mounted Cavalry/Recon units. Mounted fails against anything other then lmited resistence. Dismounted can, given time and suitable terrain work but the overall OPTEMPO must allow for it.

Ken White
06-30-2010, 01:30 PM
intent:
* from fusing & interpreting recce reports
* from prisonersbut will it give you that enemy commanders intentions or merely his capabilities and some indications? I don't think either of those will put you inside the mind of an opposing commander. Not to mention a good deception plan can lead one astray. Badly...

This is partly semantic but it has very real and important point. You can learn things, assess what you've learned and usually determine possibilities and even occasionally, enough to ascertain probabilities -- however you must consider that the other guys is at least as smart and experienced as are you and is as capable of a startling and innovative effort. Not stating his 'intentions' is simply to avoid the mindset "that's what he's going to do..." That's a strong human predilection without reinforcing it by believing you might have learned his intentions.

It is simply avoiding target fixation. More particularly, potentially wrong target fixation...

TAH
06-30-2010, 01:32 PM
Thus I was ordered to:
Make reports on enemy activity and locations
Capture prisoners.

Discover the enemy's intent NEVER featured in a stated mission.

While "determine the enemy's intent" may have never been a stated mission, having and understanding of the full enemy situation: composition (what and possibly who-what unit or unit type) disposition (where-location(s)), capabiities (what he is able to do) AND intentions (he is likely planning on doing) is important for the commander to make correct decisions.

Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent. By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.

Could the HBCT use a CAB instead, sure, but with only two it limits the flexibility of the exiting HBCT.

A similar epiphany is occuring at the division, corps and JTF levels with the realization that the "old" dic cav and ACRs are gone and that the Battlefield Surveillance Bdes lack the resources to execute many their old tasks (conduct guard, conduct cover force, conduct economy-of-force, conduct reconnaissance-in-force etc). Div and above cdrs are now having to employ a BCT instead.

William F. Owen
06-30-2010, 01:47 PM
While "determine the enemy's intent" may have never been a stated mission, having and understanding of the full enemy situation: composition (what and possibly who-what unit or unit type) disposition (where-location(s)), capabiities (what he is able to do) AND intentions (he is likely planning on doing) is important for the commander to make correct decisions.
Well I believe commanders should base decisions on what is actually known about the enemy and not what is suspected. One of our huge doctrinal faults is basing plans on predicted enemy courses of action, and not on actual observed enemy courses of action.

Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent. By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.
True reconnaissance is merely finding and observing the enemy. That does not leave you open to deception unless you are very stupid and the enemy knows you are watching. Fighting the enemy (nose punching) is an entirely different objective, which basically tells the enemy you've found him.

TAH
06-30-2010, 01:53 PM
Well I believe commanders should base decisions on what is actually known about the enemy and not what is suspected. One of our huge doctrinal faults is basing plans on predicted enemy courses of action, and not on actual observed enemy courses of action.

Amen Brother!

Ken White
06-30-2010, 01:54 PM
...AND intentions (he is likely planning on doing) is important for the commander to make correct decisions.

Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent.and is easier said than done.
By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.No one here is suggesting that, only saying that all the aggressive recon work in the world will not reliably and accurately provide you intentions. You ascertain capabilities and infer probabilities but you cannot determine intent.

TAH
06-30-2010, 02:12 PM
True reconnaissance is merely finding and observing the enemy.

A bit of semantics here too, I think.

Some folks use the terms two reconnaissance and surveillance inter-changably. I do not.

A basic functional distinction often proposed is that surveillance tends to be more passive, the watch and listen mode, while reconnaissance tends to be more active,

A time and a place for both types of gathering intel.

My real basic issue with the BCT Recon Sqdrns was that they are out of step with current tactical reality and lack the ability for "Fight for Information" that now appears the more likely need, at least in Major Combat Operations.

COIN/Stability Ops is a whole other ballgame.

An intersesting note to me is that a USMC Division has both a Recon Bn (with the sneak and peek types) and a LAV Bn for "Classic" CAV missions.

TAH

Fuchs
06-30-2010, 02:16 PM
Operational deception is a problem for MI analysts and commanders, not for recce folks in the field. They report what they have.

Large-scale deception works rarely, and almost never without the assistance of the fooled ones. The German army had almost no air reconnaissance on the Eastern Front after summer of 1944 and never got seriously surprised again.
Large operations require large preparations.

I'm sure it was possible to learn about Tet in advance as well, but sometimes MI and commanders provoke being fooled by being too fixed in their beliefs.

Nevertheless, recce can yield the opposing commander's intent.

Again - judgment of recce reports is not the problem of recce folks in the field.
Everything can be misunderstood - even orders (charge of the light brigade...).

Ken White
06-30-2010, 02:36 PM
Operational deception is a problem for MI analysts and commanders, not for recce folks in the field. They report what they have.True -- and they can be and have been fooled by tactical deception...
I'm sure it was possible to learn about Tet in advance as well, but sometimes MI and commanders provoke being fooled by being too fixed in their beliefs.Totally true -- and a belief that they knew the opponents intent lulled them into not expecting the magnitude of the attacks. Thanks for recalling that... :D
Nevertheless, recce can yield the opposing commander's intent.How?
Again - judgment of recce reports is not the problem of recce folks in the field.True and no one here is saying that it is as nearly as I can tell. However, recall that some Commander, somewhere, is going to make use of those reports to determine capabilities and to try to infer probabilities. He will not in most cases be able to get into the mind of his opponent.

What Wilf and I are saying is that you can ascertain capabilities and even, if you're lucky -- or really good -- probabilities but you can not determine the opposing commanders intentions. Further, that even if you were able to do so, he can change in a second to do something unexpected and you can be working of what was or has become an erroneous conclusion. You have to ass u me intentions, never a good plan...:D

TAH
06-30-2010, 02:44 PM
Ken and Wilf say potato Luchs and I say patato :)

Within some limits, agressive recon/recce gives you insights into what the enemy may do next. However, there is a chance that that's exactly what the sneaky SOB wants you to think. :)

Target on the Mover ???:confused:

William F. Owen
06-30-2010, 02:45 PM
A bit of semantics here too, I think.
Words matter

Some folks use the terms two reconnaissance and surveillance inter-changably. I do not. Nor do I.

A basic functional distinction often proposed is that surveillance tends to be more passive, the watch and listen mode, while reconnaissance tends to be more active,
IMO, its even more simple. Reconnaissance is seeking. Surveillance is watching. Both are normally done by the same folks.

My real basic issue with the BCT Recon Sqdrns was that they are out of step with current tactical reality and lack the ability for "Fight for Information" that now appears the more likely need, at least in Major Combat Operations.
I think the "fight for information" is less useful, than "seek to contact." Contact may just mean locating the enemy and not blundering into them 25m the wrong side of the ridge line.

COIN/Stability Ops is a whole other ballgame.
You still need to find the enemy. Different type of enemy, that's all.

Good stuff TAH. You've clearly given this stuff some thought and that is always good regardless of my pedantry!

Ken White
06-30-2010, 03:43 PM
Ken and Wilf say potato Luchs and I say patato :)

Within some limits, agressive recon/recce gives you insights into what the enemy may do next. However, there is a chance that that's exactly what the sneaky SOB wants you to think.

Target on the Mover ???:confused:Your "within some limits" sort of equals my "...you can ascertain capabilities and even, if you're lucky -- or really good -- probabilities but you can not determine the opposing commanders intentions." (all emphasis added / kw). That's sorta semantic, I guess...

As an aside, I agree with you on the principles of cavalry / reconnaissance operations and capabilities with the caveat that recon by stealth can work in MCO and it has been done by us if rarely. Other armies do it more often, we just don't usually have the patience for it ala your comment on OpTempo (as desired by some Cdr somewhere...). :wry:

So, as on old Cav Colonel once said "...we just go out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have armor." :D

Fuchs
06-30-2010, 05:39 PM
Here's a really simplified description of ground recce. I just feel like dropping it here. :cool:

Commanders send small units on reconnaissance missions till they run into a deadly ambush in order to avoid that the whole formation runs into deadly ambushes.


From this point of view, it's no wonder that modern ground reconnaissance doesn't seem to be highly successful. Nowadays, we want to keep all own troops away from deadly ambushes.

Hacksaw
06-30-2010, 05:44 PM
So, as on old Cav Colonel once said "...we just go out looking for trouble and to do that, you have to have armor." :D

Now that resembles the Army I knew... I know... and that I have no reasonable expectation will change (regardless of merit) :eek:

Sabre
09-12-2010, 03:27 PM
While "determine the enemy's intent" may have never been a stated mission, having and understanding of the full enemy situation: composition (what and possibly who-what unit or unit type) disposition (where-location(s)), capabilities (what he is able to do) AND intentions (he is likely planning on doing) is important for the commander to make correct decisions.

Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent. By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.

Could the HBCT use a CAB instead, sure, but with only two it limits the flexibility of the existing HBCT.

A similar epiphany is occurring at the division, corps and JTF levels with the realization that the "old" div cav and ACRs are gone and that the Battlefield Surveillance Bdes lack the resources to execute many their old tasks (conduct guard, conduct cover force, conduct economy-of-force, conduct reconnaissance-in-force etc). Div and above cdrs are now having to employ a BCT instead.

Hmm... enough of an epiphany to actually *do* something about it? (Besides dismantling the last heavy ACR on schedule, of course...)

It's funny, whenever I hear of proposed changes (read: increases) in headquarters or intelligence personnel, I see leaders reaching for the rubber stamp that says "Approved" - REGARDLESS of the rationale. ...but when it comes to increasing combat power, it's always met with a cautious "Well, there's a lot to consider..."

It's as if increases in support are seen as the "mature" thing to do - but I don't ever see anyone saying "Enough!" We'll end up with an army composed of just one rifle squad and 500k+ of "multipliers".

Tom Odom
09-13-2010, 01:18 PM
It's funny, whenever I hear of proposed changes (read: increases) in headquarters or intelligence personnel, I see leaders reaching for the rubber stamp that says "Approved" - REGARDLESS of the rationale. ...but when it comes to increasing combat power, it's always met with a cautious "Well, there's a lot to consider..."

It's as if increases in support are seen as the "mature" thing to do - but I don't ever see anyone saying "Enough!" We'll end up with an army composed of just one rifle squad and 500k+ of "multipliers".

Amen, brother Sabre, Amen...

Personally I have come to look at tactical headquarters expansion as a sort of TDA creep into the field force.

Tom

82redleg
09-14-2010, 02:15 AM
Amen, brother Sabre, Amen...

Personally I have come to look at tactical headquarters expansion as a sort of TDA creep into the field force.

Tom

Amen and Amen, again.

See a five year old argument regarding the modular BCT:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/melton.pdf

LTC Melton describes a model for modular BCTs that would have resulted in a reduction of 8 BN/BDE HHCs, instead of the increase in 10 BN/BDE HHCs in each division. Our "transformation" increased headquarters, instead of reducing them.

Cavguy
09-14-2010, 04:27 AM
Amen and Amen, again.

See a five year old argument regarding the modular BCT:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/melton.pdf

LTC Melton describes a model for modular BCTs that would have resulted in a reduction of 8 BN/BDE HHCs, instead of the increase in 10 BN/BDE HHCs in each division. Our "transformation" increased headquarters, instead of reducing them.

Interestingly, he was my tactics instructor at CSGC last year ... He also has a book, The Clausewitz Delusion (http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Delusion-American-Screwed-Afghanistan/dp/0760337136). he also had a humorous in-class riff on the US Army's fascination with tents (when indoor space is available) and TOC-mahals.

gute
09-14-2010, 07:04 PM
Is there anything to gain by eliminating the scout platoon in the CAB and replacing one of the companies in the CAB with a Cav Troop of 6x2 M3 and 4x2 M1? The remaining three companies are: two infantry companies with three infantry platoons and one tank platoon each, the fourth company is a tank company. Also, add two more scouts to each M3. The ARS is used for pure recon while the scouts look for trouble.

82redleg
09-15-2010, 02:10 AM
Is there anything to gain by eliminating the scout platoon in the CAB and replacing one of the companies in the CAB with a Cav Troop of 6x2 M3 and 4x2 M1? The remaining three companies are: two infantry companies with three infantry platoons and one tank platoon each, the fourth company is a tank company. Also, add two more scouts to each M3. The ARS is used for pure recon while the scouts look for trouble.

A couple of questions:
1- Are you going to re-organize the troops in the ARS, too? (or will they remain 3+5)
2- Are you going to retain the scout platoon in the HHC?

Anyway you cut it, your idea is a significant increase in force structures- a platoon of tanks and at 2 platoons of M3s (plus the scouts) in each BCT.

At least part of the reason for the 3+5 platoon is lack of Bradleys- they had to take the BSFVs and convert them back to troop carriers. The conversion of 1/1AD and 3ACR might free up some vehicles, but the personnel strength

I think that your organization is fightable, but not realistic for the US Army at this juncture.

gute
09-15-2010, 04:35 PM
A couple of questions:
1- Are you going to re-organize the troops in the ARS, too? (or will they remain 3+5)
2- Are you going to retain the scout platoon in the HHC?

Anyway you cut it, your idea is a significant increase in force structures- a platoon of tanks and at 2 platoons of M3s (plus the scouts) in each BCT.

At least part of the reason for the 3+5 platoon is lack of Bradleys- they had to take the BSFVs and convert them back to troop carriers. The conversion of 1/1AD and 3ACR might free up some vehicles, but the personnel strength

I think that your organization is fightable, but not realistic for the US Army at this juncture.


Yes, I would organize the troops in the ARS with a Stryker RSTA (I have a black check).

Yes, I would eliminate the HHC scout.

My idea would increase the number of tanks by two from the current CAB of 28. Big increase in M3 and I did not know that the 3+5 set-up was due to a lack of carriers. Sure, the M3 vehicles would become available with the conversion of the 3rd ACR to a SBCT, but additional Strykers would need to be purchased to equip all HBCTs with a Stryker RSTA. The Stryker seems to be suitable vehicle for this role - reconnaissance and surveillance, snooping in the white area while the CABs are maneuvering with the scout troops/companies out front lookin for trouble and have the firepower to deal with trouble.

82redleg
09-15-2010, 11:00 PM
Yes, I would organize the troops in the ARS with a Stryker RSTA (I have a black check).

Yes, I would eliminate the HHC scout.

My idea would increase the number of tanks by two from the current CAB of 28. Big increase in M3 and I did not know that the 3+5 set-up was due to a lack of carriers. Sure, the M3 vehicles would become available with the conversion of the 3rd ACR to a SBCT, but additional Strykers would need to be purchased to equip all HBCTs with a Stryker RSTA. The Stryker seems to be suitable vehicle for this role - reconnaissance and surveillance, snooping in the white area while the CABs are maneuvering with the scout troops/companies out front lookin for trouble and have the firepower to deal with trouble.

I don't know that it was totally due to lack of carriers, but I do know that the BSFVs (M6?) were converted back, and that available numbers were at least part of the consideration.

I've heard that the Stryker RV (M1127) has limited eyeball capability, and limited dismount ability- the second may be to MTOE, not a capacity, issue.

I like the idea of a Stryker RSTA in the HBCT, but I would change the organization (in both BCTs): Each troop would contain 2 Recon Platoons with RVs (4 x M1127, 16 dismounts + 8 crew = 24 pax total), 1 MGS Platoon (4 x M1128, 12 pax total), 1 Rifle PLT (4 x M1126 ICV, 44 pax total). 3 line troops like this, with an HHT. Alternatively, (with a blank check) we could replace the RVs with M3s, the ICVs with M2s and the MGS with M1s in the HBCT- I am in favor of keeping the same organization between the HBCT and SBCT, with the primary difference being the platforms used.

I'm not sure of the need for the Surveillance Troop n the SBCT RSTA. In the HBCT and IBCT, these elements are part of the BSTB. Maybe instead of the Surveillance Troop (or in addition to it) the HBCT RSTA could have a fourth line troop with the Stryker platforms, or they could go into a SQDN Scout PLT in the HHT. I believe that 3-73 AR (the 82nd ABN Sheridan BN) tested a LAV-25 scout platoon, maybe even deploying it to OPN Desert Storm.

gute
09-16-2010, 03:12 AM
I don't know that it was totally due to lack of carriers, but I do know that the BSFVs (M6?) were converted back, and that available numbers were at least part of the consideration.

I've heard that the Stryker RV (M1127) has limited eyeball capability, and limited dismount ability- the second may be to MTOE, not a capacity, issue.

I like the idea of a Stryker RSTA in the HBCT, but I would change the organization (in both BCTs): Each troop would contain 2 Recon Platoons with RVs (4 x M1127, 16 dismounts + 8 crew = 24 pax total), 1 MGS Platoon (4 x M1128, 12 pax total), 1 Rifle PLT (4 x M1126 ICV, 44 pax total). 3 line troops like this, with an HHT. Alternatively, (with a blank check) we could replace the RVs with M3s, the ICVs with M2s and the MGS with M1s in the HBCT- I am in favor of keeping the same organization between the HBCT and SBCT, with the primary difference being the platforms used.

I'm not sure of the need for the Surveillance Troop n the SBCT RSTA. In the HBCT and IBCT, these elements are part of the BSTB. Maybe instead of the Surveillance Troop (or in addition to it) the HBCT RSTA could have a fourth line troop with the Stryker platforms, or they could go into a SQDN Scout PLT in the HHT. I believe that 3-73 AR (the 82nd ABN Sheridan BN) tested a LAV-25 scout platoon, maybe even deploying it to OPN Desert Storm.

Interesting organization. Question: Why infantry in the reconnaissance platoon? The reason I ask this is based my reading on this site and linked publications about scout and recon functions. It seems to most on this site that the opinion is we do not do recon well - we would rather roll in into a fight fast and keep going. Also, a linked publication that discussed the history of reconnaissance in the U.S. Army and others and concluded with the position that general units can perform the task. So my thinking is the a scout company leads the CAB into the fight and the RSTA does reconnaissance and not rolling into or lookin for a fight.

82redleg
09-16-2010, 12:13 PM
Interesting organization. Question: Why infantry in the reconnaissance platoon? The reason I ask this is based my reading on this site and linked publications about scout and recon functions. It seems to most on this site that the opinion is we do not do recon well - we would rather roll in into a fight fast and keep going. Also, a linked publication that discussed the history of reconnaissance in the U.S. Army and others and concluded with the position that general units can perform the task. So my thinking is the a scout company leads the CAB into the fight and the RSTA does reconnaissance and not rolling into or lookin for a fight.

The original design of the ACR had an IN CO in addition to the Tank CO, but it lost out to force structure. The original ACR fielded did have an IN squad in each PLT.

1- I think that the cavalry troop needs the ability to fight, not just do recon. US Cavalry has always done economy of force missions- mor successfully when organized for them (see ACR) than when not (see mechanized cavalry squadrons in WW2, the lessons learned from which led to the ACR).

2- I've heard that the Stryker RVs have situational awareness problems. By placing a PLT of ICVs in the troop, I've allowed the troop commander a number of different options he can utilize IAW METT-TC.

Overall, I think that we should minimize the different types of organizations that we have, and build larger organizations out of common building blocks.

References for past cavalry organizations:

https://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/armormag/backissues/1980s/1989/1989SeptemberOctober.pdf

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/cameron_fight.pdf

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/scouts_out.pdf

Fuchs
09-16-2010, 05:07 PM
God winks and we have a perfect brigade TO&E.

Such a brigade is being sent to war, gets a rough handling ('Kasserine') and has 10-30% personnel losses after a few days or weeks of intense combat.

The losses are not even among the units, and there are also effects from material losses (both damaged and lost equipment).


Do you think this once 'perfect' brigade can go on? Or maybe the combat troops had much higher losses than 10-30% and failed, exposing the support troops and leading to the shattering of the whole formation?

Would a different balance that stresses the ability to sustain losses more yield a better TO&E?

What does this tell us about company-sized or smaller specialist units in the formation? Does it make sense to pay much attention to small specialist yet high risk units such as a dedicated recce Coy?
Would it make sense to have all vital support function duplicated, in two identical and separate units to avoid a total loss of a vital function in a single ambush on a convoy?

gute
09-17-2010, 01:22 PM
God winks and we have a perfect brigade TO&E.

Such a brigade is being sent to war, gets a rough handling ('Kasserine') and has 10-30% personnel losses after a few days or weeks of intense combat.

The losses are not even among the units, and there are also effects from material losses (both damaged and lost equipment).


Do you think this once 'perfect' brigade can go on? Or maybe the combat troops had much higher losses than 10-30% and failed, exposing the support troops and leading to the shattering of the whole formation?

Would a different balance that stresses the ability to sustain losses more yield a better TO&E?

What does this tell us about company-sized or smaller specialist units in the formation? Does it make sense to pay much attention to small specialist yet high risk units such as a dedicated recce Coy?
Would it make sense to have all vital support function duplicated, in two identical and separate units to avoid a total loss of a vital function in a single ambush on a convoy?


Once again Fuchs you have me curiously aroused.

I was thinking along the lines of three maneuver CABs, each with it's own scout coy. The Brigade would have a separate recon company similar to the third troop of the IBCT.

Fuchs
09-17-2010, 03:32 PM
It's probably a good thing I don't get everything... :D


I was actually hinting at the idea that the battle strength doesn't need to equal the administrative formation strength.
An obvious example for this are administrative and basic training units which often stay at the garrison when the formation deploys. This might be modified for combat troops (which are the most likely candidates for heavy losses).

A deployed brigade could have several battlegroups and a support group.

Army developers might assume that this brigade would sustain heavy losses in its mission (I'm most likely not writing about an expedition cabinet war here).*
An almost obvious choice would be to add one battlegroup "too much" and keep it under corps control in a calm area until it gets exchanged with the most exhausted battle group. This would start a permanent rotation which could enable the formation to keep going at useful strength for quite long.

Another army developer might assume different, shorter missions.
He could instead add an infantry battalion as dedicated security element to the support group. The battle groups could be reinforced from this initially not very battered battalion when their own infantry is too much exhausted or if the mission (terrain) requires more than the usual battlegroup's infantry strength. This extra infantry battalion would serve as a brigade reserve, and it would take a self-disciplined Bde Cmdr to use it like this.


------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally my reasoning about cavalry / scouts / armoured recce and the likes at Bn to Div level: This is an obsolete concept.

Scouts cannot move faster than combat troops today - unlike at the time of horse cav when cav was able to march several times as far per day as infantry or even artillery.
The armoured truck scouts of WW2 had a range, speed and maintenance needs advantage over WW2 tanks as well.

Today there's no such time difference and a well-trained formation could (if it avoids many typical but avoidable shortcomings) move many times as fast as in WW2. Today's armoured forces would not need to wait for foot march infantry forces.

This loss of a speed advantage puts the classic armoured recce approach in question.

The (AFAIK) best and most encompassing answer would be to pre-position scouts and surveillance teams up to a huge depth (~300 km). No matter which direction your Bde turns to, it would always have scouts ahead and cav for security available for its flanks.
This is obviously not practical with organic manoeuvre formation scouts.
Scouts and surveillance teams (this excludes dedicated FOs for fires) should be directly corps-attached troops.

This does btw also solve the issue how to cope with uneven cav/scout losses among Bdes. Scouts would always be available (except if the campaign sucks globally).
The security and close recce job should therefore be assigned to combat troops, as it happens in many armies of the world.

The U.S. Army sported a huge amount of talk and blather about "situational awareness". Shouldn't it be obvious that having scouts already at or close to locations which only very recently got your attention rather than to send them out when you become interested in a location?

The quite disappointing state of Operational Art today is the culprit. A look at a brigade alone cannot reveal the needs of a Corps or Threatre commander and whether the Bde is prepared to meet these needs. Sadly, a lack of corps-scale real and free-play manoeuvres means that we don't learn enough about our shortcomings on Corps level.



------------------------------------------------------------------------

About my "*":
It's perfectly fine to use all available forces (even if only as reserve) when you look at a battle (= most common and most influential training scenario for brigades).
It's different for a series of battles (campaign). The Eastern Front 1941-1945 saw man fresh or refreshed armour divisions joining the front with hundreds of tanks. They lost extreme quantities of tanks and had to make do with just a few dozen tanks for the final weeks (if not months) before they were withdrawn for rebuilding.
Paradoxically, German generals recognized that losses are smaller if available forces are smaller (the opposite was true in fighter vs. fighter air combat, such combat dynamics are really interesting!).
It would have been better to sustain a mediocre strength.

A campaign leader (Corps Cmdr) thinks even farther; he is concerned about the culminating point of attack; how far he can advance and how much he can achieve until he needs to let his forces rest and regain strength.
The culminating point of attack is a most important variable - one of the great levers for short and not terribly brutal wars.
The sustainment of combat power among the formations is of greatest interest for this.
The far culminating point of attack of German forces in 1940 explains why Germans conquered France in six weeks while the Western Allies took six months for reconquering it (despite much, much better motorization).
The quick advance in 1941/42 and slow withdrawal in 1943-1945 on the Eastern Front can be similarly attributed to the inferior Soviet preparations for long campaigns (most notoriously their lack of vehicle repair capabilities in the field).

Tukhachevskii
09-18-2010, 06:56 PM
The (AFAIK) best and most encompassing answer would be to pre-position scouts and surveillance teams up to a huge depth (~300 km). No matter which direction your Bde turns to, it would always have scouts ahead and cav for security available for its flanks.
This is obviously not practical with organic manoeuvre formation scouts.
Scouts and surveillance teams (this excludes dedicated FOs for fires) should be directly corps-attached troops.

[snip]

The U.S. Army sported a huge amount of talk and blather about "situational awareness". Shouldn't it be obvious that having scouts already at or close to locations which only very recently got your attention rather than to send them out when you become interested in a location?

The quite disappointing state of Operational Art today is the culprit. A look at a brigade alone cannot reveal the needs of a Corps or Threatre commander and whether the Bde is prepared to meet these needs. Sadly, a lack of corps-scale real and free-play manoeuvres means that we don't learn enough about our shortcomings on Corps level.



IIRC this was exactly US army doctrine between the 60s and early 80s before their technological fetishism got the better of them...remember the LRRPs and LRSU units (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA098947&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)? Force multipliers if ever their were any. Just imagine what the Afghan theatre would look like if those old LRRP regiments were let loose covering the gaps between IBCTs/Bde groups with UAVs used to cover gaps or cued by LRS patrols ... in fact you'd be getting close to the recce-strike concept hindered only by RoE and civilian considerations. If I'm not mistaken OP Anaconda started out exactly like that. Perhaps our American collegues (if I may be so presumptious) could enlighten us further (especially if I have misunderstood the current state of affairs).

82redleg
09-18-2010, 07:27 PM
The MOST LRS we ever had in the US Army was a detachment of 4-6 (?) patrols/teams in each DIV/separate BDE, and a company of 18 (?) patrols in each Corps. I don't think this is anywhere near the ratio that would be required to execute Fuchs concept.

I'm not opposed to increasing the number of LRS elements, but I'm not sure they belong in the BCT. Heck, I can't see the utility of the 4 small mounted PLTs in the current BFSB, I think that we would be better off trading the force structure for a second (or larger) LRSC, maybe even putting a LRSC back in the DIV HHB. That would also allow us to eliminate the Recon SQDN HHT and FSC, a further savings (that could go back into the BCTs, or allow the addition of the required LRSC if we put one in each DIV). Ken or some others can speak better than I can about the # of LRS elements that can be effectively sustained in a given force structure- not every 11B is cut out to be a LRS guy, and I'd imagine that the LRS NCOs are even fewer. As a fire supporter, I'd like to see an FO on each team, if for nothing else than the ability to accurately call for precision fires, but I'm not sure that we can provide that many quality 13Fs.

Fuchs
09-18-2010, 08:50 PM
The MOST LRS we ever had in the US Army was a detachment of 4-6 (?) patrols/teams in each DIV/separate BDE, and a company of 18 (?) patrols in each Corps. I don't think this is anywhere near the ratio that would be required to execute Fuchs concept.

I agree. A corps would probably need an impressive LRS regiment.

That - and other parts of my concept - leads to a discussion about the proper balance between reconnaissance and strike forces (budget, personnel, doctrinal attention), but I just regained my self-discipline and won't fire off yet another XXL forum reply.

reed11b
09-19-2010, 03:44 AM
Ken or some others can speak better than I can about the # of LRS elements that can be effectively sustained in a given force structure- not every 11B is cut out to be a LRS guy, and I'd imagine that the LRS NCOs are even fewer. As a fire supporter, I'd like to see an FO on each team, if for nothing else than the ability to accurately call for precision fires, but I'm not sure that we can provide that many quality 13Fs.

On 13F JSO, I agree, also a medic would be really helpful, and maybe a 25 series guy since HF and SATCOM radio's are little complicated for us grunt types. Wait, that kinda looks like the CA equivelent if a 1/2 ODA. SOCOM would smack us into the dark ages. Many LRS limitations are in fact based on the conflict between SOCOM and DOA. I love the LRS job, but I'm about ready to give up on it, and give the LRS mission to SF and be done w/ it.
Reed
P.S. notice how Div recon went bye bye in the USMC?

Fuchs
09-19-2010, 07:27 AM
Such cryptic number-number-letter conversations among Americans always look really pointless to me.
An army should develop its structure, its organization, manpower requirements and then simply train and cross-train the manpower.
That's such a self-evident and general thing that I cannot understand why the technicalities of qualifications attract so much interest.

A small team such as a LRS team cannot make do with specialists only. Everyone needs at the very least to learn the same skills the unofficial way (from the specialist, not at a school).

JMA
09-19-2010, 08:09 PM
Such cryptic number-number-letter conversations among Americans always look really pointless to me.
An army should develop its structure, its organization, manpower requirements and then simply train and cross-train the manpower.
That's such a self-evident and general thing that I cannot understand why the technicalities of qualifications attract so much interest.

A small team such as a LRS team cannot make do with specialists only. Everyone needs at the very least to learn the same skills the unofficial way (from the specialist, not at a school).

I tend to agree that there is too much specialization. Much of what appears to need specialization these days, radio op/signaler, weapons (any), even medical to an extent should be common to all. I would like to think that in an army where operational deployments are seldom more than a quarter of their time there is plenty of time to cross-train.

82redleg
09-20-2010, 01:00 AM
I tend to agree that there is too much specialization. Much of what appears to need specialization these days, radio op/signaler, weapons (any), even medical to an extent should be common to all. I would like to think that in an army where operational deployments are seldom more than a quarter of their time there is plenty of time to cross-train.

Which army are you talking about?


To Fuchs, the discussion of how to train and organize units IS the discussion of structure and organization. I have never heard of any modern military that doesn't train infantry, artillery observers/joint fires controllers, medics and signallers separately, although I am open to being corrected.

Even US SF, probably the ultimate in cross training, have all but one of those skills as a primary skill (they also have engineer and intel analysis as primary skills).

On a small team (like a LRS team), I would think that having specialist in each requisite skill would ADD to the ability to cross train the team, instead of hindering it. Having 2 NCO observers in the LRS platoon (what we have now) probably contributes to the cross training, but not nearly what having an observer on each team would. Especially with the training/certification requirements to control precision strike munitions, which I would think would be an extremely desirable capability in a LRS team, having a specialist makes sense to me. I also, from the very beginning, freely admitted my professional bias as an artilleryman.

TAH
09-20-2010, 02:26 PM
I don't know that it was totally due to lack of carriers, but I do know that the BSFVs (M6?) were converted back, and that available numbers were at least part of the consideration.

I've heard that the Stryker RV (M1127) has limited eyeball capability, and limited dismount ability- the second may be to MTOE, not a capacity, issue.

I like the idea of a Stryker RSTA in the HBCT, but I would change the organization (in both BCTs): Each troop would contain 2 Recon Platoons with RVs (4 x M1127, 16 dismounts + 8 crew = 24 pax total), 1 MGS Platoon (4 x M1128, 12 pax total), 1 Rifle PLT (4 x M1126 ICV, 44 pax total). 3 line troops like this, with an HHT. Alternatively, (with a blank check) we could replace the RVs with M3s, the ICVs with M2s and the MGS with M1s in the HBCT- I am in favor of keeping the same organization between the HBCT and SBCT, with the primary difference being the platforms used.

I'm not sure of the need for the Surveillance Troop n the SBCT RSTA. In the HBCT and IBCT, these elements are part of the BSTB. Maybe instead of the Surveillance Troop (or in addition to it) the HBCT RSTA could have a fourth line troop with the Stryker platforms, or they could go into a SQDN Scout PLT in the HHT. I believe that 3-73 AR (the 82nd ABN Sheridan BN) tested a LAV-25 scout platoon, maybe even deploying it to OPN Desert Storm.

The current HBCT has:

58 tanks, 29 in each CAB. Gute's suggestion would increase the number of tank platoon per CAB from 6 to 8, total number of tanks from 29 to 37. Crew requirement would be the CAB Scout platoon of 36. Doable with 4 PAX left over.

58 M2 BFVs, 29 in each CAB

30 M3 CFV, 5 in each CAB and 20 in the ARS.

When equipped with LRAS3, the M1127 has excellent opics, just no mounted weapon. Its an either or situation. Mount LRAS or the 50cal/Mk-19.

Like the idea of standarizing the ARS in HBCT & SBCTs, addes a bit of deception from the other side of the hill (I'm I up against an HBCT or SBCT, don't know yet, have not seen any tracks...)

Like the 2X6 + 2X3 RV/MGS mix, very CAV old school. Again, three SBCT platoons of 24 (72 PAX) down to 2 platoons of 6 (6 PAX each) 36 PAX per platoon. Need 18 PAX to man your MGS, 4 from the new CAB and 14 from somewhere. Probably doable, especially if you start with 28 PAX per platton (current MTOE). 28x3 = 84, 84-72 = 12, 12+4 = 16 only 2 PAX required to field the modified SBCT recon Troop. very doable.

Really the BCT UAVs should proably all be under the command of their respective ARSs. That's who will be asking for them the most/first.

Infantry in the ARS solves the issue of robustness/sustainablity. IIRC thye "old" bundeshere recon Bns had a company of infantry mounted on Fuches.

gute
10-02-2010, 08:21 PM
Can the CABs provide the armored reconnaissance mission required by the BCT commander? If so does it make sense to replace the ARS with a third CAB or reinforce the ARS with armor and additional scouts?

Ken White
10-02-2010, 09:17 PM
What are all the METT-TC factors? Have to know those to answer your question.

A TOE is an administrative tool to aid budgeteers and planners, the most inflexible of all bureaucrats. Organization for combat rarely is straight TOE for many reasons. Thus, in broad measure, how many sub-elements or widgets are assigned is not terrible important for comabt operations; what counts then is what you actually have available. Over rigid adherence to TOE design is a part of the problem. Training is another part...

The whole point with the BCT concept was to be modular and adapt unit fill and assignments to the job at hand. Too many try to forget that. Two maneuver Bns not enough; assign a third. Need more Recon capability, plug it in...

The massive juggling of which BCTs went where in Afghanistan and Iraq was in part a measure to force flexibility. Unfortunately, a good practice and idea was ruined by the type of war we were fighting; it just wasn't appropriate in wars where continuity of effort is far more important than in MCO.

The problem with the modular approach is lack of flexibility of both the institution and some commanders. The same thing that killed the old Pentomic design -- lack of flexibility on the part of the senior officers. They are raised in a structured instead of a chaotic environment, then thrown into the chaos of combat and many -- not all; the good 20% or so do not -- have trouble adapting to the rapid thinking and flexibility required. They want stability and constancy. Unfortunately, in warfare, you can't really have that. Our training and education again let us down...

gute
10-02-2010, 09:39 PM
[QUOTE=Ken White;107386]What are all the METT-TC factors? Have to know those to answer your question.

Same type of mission the 3ID had in the march-up to Baghdad in OIF1.

82redleg
10-02-2010, 10:14 PM
Same type of mission the 3ID had in the march-up to Baghdad in OIF1.

An ARS could not do what 3-7 CAV did for the 3ID in 2003, and neither can the BFSB CAV SQDN. Simple numbers comparison proves it. An ARS has 18 M3 and 30 HMMWVs in platoons actually doing recon and/or fighting- 3-7 CAV has 36 M3 and 24 M1s in platoons. The BFSB CAV SQDN has only 24 HMMWVs.

The ARS can handle the mission the BRTs did- mostly LOGPAC and CP security, as I understand it.

The CAB is better suited to handle the DIV CAV mission, with 24 M1, 24 M2, 3 M3 and 5 HMMWVs in platoons. Whether or not it is trained to execute recon and security like the DIV CAV is another question.

Of course, if the division commander pulls a CAB to be his advance guard or otherwise fill the DIV CAV role, he's leaving a BCT as a rump with 1 maneuver battalion.

gute
10-02-2010, 10:20 PM
Ken,

Below is a CAB organized to include recon as a general function and not the responsibility of an ARS:

A Troop 6x3 scout platoons, 1x4 tank, 2xmortar
B Company 4x3 inf platoons, 1x4 tank platoon, 2xmortar
C Company 4x3 inf plt., 1x4 tank, 2xmortar
D company 4x3 tank platoons, 2xmortar
E Company 4x3 eng platoons, 2xmortars
F Company FSC

Ken White
10-03-2010, 12:38 AM
remember, I'm old. A CAB to me is a Combat Avaiation Brigade. I could stretch it to include the new Combat Action Badge but beyond that...

I don't recognize your organization...
Below is a CAB organized to include recon as a general function and not the responsibility of an ARS:

A Troop 6x3 scout platoons, 1x4 tank, 2xmortar
B Company 4x3 inf platoons, 1x4 tank platoon, 2xmortar
C Company 4x3 inf plt., 1x4 tank, 2xmortar
D company 4x3 tank platoons, 2xmortar
E Company 4x3 eng platoons, 2xmortars
F Company FSCHowever, working off what's there, I'm unsure why you've mixed things up as much as you have and I presume the "B Company" for example is what used to be called a Company Team with elements from two or more Companies under command of the B Co Cdr. I have no idea what logic dictates A Co, don't know what 6x3 Scout Platoons means (3 Plts w/ 6 veh each?). Why does D Co have no Inf? Why do I give the engineers mortars? May make sense, may not. Do I take the FSC with me or not? Depends...

Having said that, I would need a whole bunch more info than "going to Baghdad" ala the 3d ID in 03 before I use the organization you offer. For instance, while that 'situation' gives me a rough idea of the terrain, climate and enemy it does not give me adequate knowledge of the terrain to decide your organization would be acceptable to my plan and that plan would depend on a few other factors, i.e. leaving Kuwait? First day? Tenth day? Who else from what unit is where? Am I the lead Bn for a Bde or just in the column?

If I'm the lead and in the absence of more knowledge I would have if actually there, I'd go with two Cos of Tanks (w/ one Inf Plt ea) and two of Inf (w/ one Tk Plt ea. Open terrain, Tanks lead, close or urban, Inf leads; broad diamond in the open, Column avoided at all costs. Need to know medevac, fuel and resupply plan...

Also, I'm going to change my task organization and formations probably at least daily and most probably more often, situation dependent...

To go back to your original question to which I responded, the broad general answer is yes but there will be exceptions (METT-TC again...) and there will be shortfalls in performance unless the Bn in question has worked at the Recon effort a few times. It's not optimum but it will work.

That study from Leavenworth that you cited did a lot of damage because it was misunderstood and because the US Army solution to Reconnaissance is, basically, not to do it. We don't have the patience or the training to do it right, so our Cav elements too often just went out looking for trouble. That may be combat, may even be Cav to the max -- but it ain't reconnaissance.

Thus, in effect, for the US, we elect to have gaps and shortfalls in our knowledge of the terrain and enemy ahead because since late 1944, we have always had the combat power to make up for that shortfall so its been acceptable from then to now. It was NOT acceptable early in WW II in Europe or all through WW II in the Pacific, where we did do some great Recon work.

Prescribed Organization is relatively unimportant, Task Organization for combat can fix most of the ills the TOE designers foist on us. Just taks a bit of flexibility. And knowledge of METT-TC.

Mostly METT-TC...

gute
10-03-2010, 04:26 PM
Thanks Ken for the critique and information. The CAB I was referring to is the Combined Arms Battalion of two M1 companies and two M2 companies.

I based my CAB structure on a couple of things. First, the HBCT having only two maneuver battalions, and second, BCT commanders wanting more boots. So, I re-arranged the charis on the deck and looked at the definitions of scouts, reconnaissance and surveillance.

First, re-organizing the cav troops into mechanized infantry companies. This of course adds an additional infantry company to the battalion (boots). This of course would place scouting responsibilites on the battalion commander, but if scouting responsabilities are capable of being conducted by regular infantry the battalion commander would have three companies to rotate through this responsability or use his best one.

Secondly, the battalion scout platoon conducts RSTA. To me scouts are out looking for the enemy and eventually run into them and the fight begins. Reconnaissance is out to find the enemy without being seen and then calling in the fighters. Surveillance already has a pretty good idea where the enemy is at, but keeps the enemy under observation to learn more.

So, the battalion looke like this:

scout/sniper platoon w/10 vehicles
mortar platoon w/seven mortars (BCT has 14)

M1 company
M2 company/M1 platoon
M2 company/M1 platoon
M2 company/M1 platoon

or

2xM1 companies
3xM2 companies

Infanteer
10-03-2010, 05:05 PM
Why so focused on battalion organization? Up here, we use (and continue to use) branch pure battalions and "battle group" them as required. Essentially, all companies from any branch are like lego blocks for a Battle Group.

gute
10-03-2010, 06:23 PM
Why so focused on battalion organization? Up here, we use (and continue to use) branch pure battalions and "battle group" them as required. Essentially, all companies from any branch are like lego blocks for a Battle Group.

Could you provide me with an example or describe how the organization looks or maybe provide a link? Thank you.

Fuchs
10-03-2010, 06:32 PM
Both pure battalions (need to be reorganized for action) and mixed battalions have their pro and contra.
Pure battalions are better to train in more basic skills while mixed ones are better to train on large unit level and have less friction in early battles.

Sooner or later all formations and large units in battle are a patchwork, either because not all soldiers deployed and the unit design doesn't fit the mission (small wars) or because of attrition of personnel and material (great wars).

Ken White
10-03-2010, 06:38 PM
IMO excessive focus on the tree can obscure the old forest...;)

We mixed and matched Tanks and Infantry into Co Tms and Battalion TFs for specific missions as required for years with no problem -- now we're supposed to be so-o-o-o much smarter -- and that's too difficult for us to do?

BCT (that used to be 'Basic Combat Training' before that abbreviation got purloined by people who ignore history -- and common sense; one abbreviation for one item or you confuse the world...) or Bde Cdrs will always want more people -- they aren't boots, they're people or Soldiers or Marines, not boots -- Tough munchies for the Commandantes. They get what the TOE guys -- and the Bean Counters -- allot. The TOE is to provide a mean, no more.

Combat is not fought in TOE packets, but by forces task organized for the specific missions and conditions envisioned.

Given the fact that everyone acknowledges that the current concept is undermanned, trying to reorganize within existing authorizations strikes me as seeking to perpetuate flawed logic. IF a major wars starts, we will rapidly reorganize and all the flawed designs, driven as much by a more flawed personnel management system trying to provide enough Officer spaces so the HRC job is simplified, will go by the wayside as they have in every war.

We, the US, are penalized by several myths in combat organization. One is that with proper education and training, most all can command effectively in combat. Not so. Another is the triangular organization, adopted by the Germans to force better tactical though by not allowing balance formations in combat. Probably fair idea at the time but that was almost 100 years ago; things have changed a bit. The third is that Reconnaissance problem. We have never designed a force or used the idea well since mechanization appeared. You're correct on Recon and on surveillance but it takes training to do both jobs. If you're just going to charge out looking for bad guys, then a lot of extra training can be ignored. Thus our mediocre training (which can be fixed) and our aggressive impatience (which can also be fixed but is far more difficult and entails better selection for command criteria) lead us to just go charging into the fray. So, yeah, an Infantry Bn can do that.

The questions really are, should an Infantry Battalion be so employed and is their lack of all relevant training and capability acceptable; and is that failure to have Recon and Svlnc unit, be they Cav or whatever really the best solution?

For one answer to that question, look at the RSTA Sqns in todays Bdes. Their organization is questionable and tales I've heard on their employment could give even Custer gray hair. Go back in time, look at the Bn Recon Plts in Viet Nam -- almost all woefully misused leading to allowing the enemy to initiate far too many contacts. Smae thing is happening today in Afghanistan...

IMO, Bns need Scout or Recon Plts and a Bde needs a Co or Troop and they need to be trained as Scouts, as Surveillers and as Combat capable elements who can and will fight for information and who are capable of delaying an opposing force. We can easily 'organize' elements to answer that -- can we easily get the US Army to properly employ such units? The answer on that is decidedly mixed...

You can put Tanks and Mech Infantry together at Plt, Co, Bn or Bde / Div level. Where you do it is really sort of academic and all the various mixtures have advantages and disadvantages, not least maintenance and resupply. Regardless of how you do the organization, the critical factor is flexibility in adapting the organization to changing situation -- sometimes rapidly changing. So in the end, what is where and how many there are is not immaterial but it is not nearly as important as the mind set and the training of those who are in the units.

RE:Your question to Infanteer. Check this LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structure_of_the_Canadian_Forces_Land_Force_Comman d), pull the wiring diagram up and zoom in on it. Google has plenty of links for more detail.

gute
10-03-2010, 08:31 PM
Thanks Ken. You are absolutely right - why re-design within a flawed structre.

Ken White
10-03-2010, 08:53 PM
I care to recall led me to make that statement. If you "redesign within existing allocations" all you're doing is telling the bean counters they were right -- and they rarely are. I found out years ago and the hard way that you have to challenge the system and processes to achieve glacial forward movement. It isn't easy but it can be done but they will try their hardest to convince you that nothing can really be changed, you can only tinker around the edges -- that way, life is better for them.

Shouldn't be the driver; missions accomplished at minimum costs should be. Unfortunately, they don't have to do the missions so that's not a major issue to them...

Resources have to be considered, no question, so do personnel and equipment availability but to constrain yourself to cutting and pasting -- which is the typical Army methodology -- instead of trying to a little imaginative and design a structure that is oriented to the most likely missions at hand and not cater to the personnel and RM folks is a better approach.

Instead of letting them force you into a familiar box with a bell and whistle or two, design one that may make them work a bit harder but that provides the tools for the guy on the ground... ;)

P.S.

With all due respect to Hacksaw, don't have planning cells. Make the operators plan; the planners tend to give you unconstrained plans. The guys who have to execute will be a little more realistic.

Balance in all things. Balance and METT-TC... :wry:

gute
10-03-2010, 08:54 PM
So, if we seem to be doing it wrong who is doing it right? Is there a consensus on this site that a particular military seems to be doing it right?

Pete
10-03-2010, 09:45 PM
A TOE is an administrative tool to aid budgeteers and planners, the most inflexible of all bureaucrats. Organization for combat rarely is straight TOE for many reasons. Thus, in broad measure, how many sub-elements or widgets are assigned is not terrible important for comabt operations; what counts then is what you actually have available. Over rigid adherence to TOE design is a part of the problem.
If I recall correctly at the time of Pearl Harbor the Army had Tables of Organization and Tables of Equipment. In 1942 they were merged together into the TOE to avoid the need to cross-reference repeatedly between the two while new units were being raised from the ground up. Their main function was to aid in the rapid activation, manning, and equipping of lots of units in a hurry. A TOE is not an inflexible guide for the conduct of operations, which often requires task-organizing to suit the particular mission.

Infanteer
10-03-2010, 09:56 PM
Could you provide me with an example or describe how the organization looks or maybe provide a link? Thank you.

Just use your imagination. The Bde Commander is doing task X, so he mixes his 3 Infantry Battalions, his Armoured Bn, his Eng Bn and his Arty Bn as he sees fit. When bns are mixed and match like this, they become "battle groups" (armoured/infantry groupings) or Battalion Groups (augmented Inf Bns) in our parlence.

Within the Battle Group, you see the same thing happening. The Battle Group Commander mixes his companies up depending on his task. Combined arms companies become "Combat Teams" (armoured/infantry groupings) or "Company Teams" (augmented Rifle Coys).

In doctrine, the Square Combat Team is probably one of the most potent organizations around. It is the 15 vehicle Mech Inf Coy combined with a 15-19 vehicle Tank Coy (Squadron for us), a 4-6 vehicle Engineer Platoon (Troop for us) and, of course, a FOO team. Thus, the combat team commander (either the inf or arm comd, dependant on a few things) has over 30 vehicles to hit the enemy with.

Lately, "Platoon Groups" have become a reality as well.

Pete
10-03-2010, 11:09 PM
Speaking as a former Battalion Motor Officer, the conduct of operations is influenced not only by the amount of equipment -- the reportable items, mainly vehicles, aircraft, and commo -- authorized by the TOE, but how much of it is running. Where the TOE becomes important and can have an effect on the reputations of unit commanders is in the periodic reports submitted up the chain of command. The Materiel Condition Status Report on DA Form 2406, the proverbial "Deadline Report," includes an operationally ready rate based upon the assigned items of reportable equipment. That report in turn feeds the monthly Unit Status Report of Army Regulation 220-1. Commanders can get in a lot of hot water when they report low levels of readiness.

gute
10-03-2010, 11:26 PM
Just use your imagination. The Bde Commander is doing task X, so he mixes his 3 Infantry Battalions, his Armoured Bn, his Eng Bn and his Arty Bn as he sees fit. When bns are mixed and match like this, they become "battle groups" (armoured/infantry groupings) or Battalion Groups (augmented Inf Bns) in our parlence.

Within the Battle Group, you see the same thing happening. The Battle Group Commander mixes his companies up depending on his task. Combined arms companies become "Combat Teams" (armoured/infantry groupings) or "Company Teams" (augmented Rifle Coys).

In doctrine, the Square Combat Team is probably one of the most potent organizations around. It is the 15 vehicle Mech Inf Coy combined with a 15-19 vehicle Tank Coy (Squadron for us), a 4-6 vehicle Engineer Platoon (Troop for us) and, of course, a FOO team. Thus, the combat team commander (either the inf or arm comd, dependant on a few things) has over 30 vehicles to hit the enemy with.

Lately, "Platoon Groups" have become a reality as well.

Trust me. I'm using my imagination - that should explain some of my questions - too much imagination.

The current U.S. Army Combined Arms Battalion would quality as a square combat tem x2 - yes?

Infanteer
10-03-2010, 11:55 PM
Trust me. I'm using my imagination - that should explain some of my questions - too much imagination.

The current U.S. Army Combined Arms Battalion would quality as a square combat tem x2 - yes?

Sure. Essentially, the Combined Arms Battalion CO could make two square combat teams with his resources.

Rifleman
10-04-2010, 01:40 AM
Have many of the light/airborne/air assault BCTs deployed to Afghanistan been reinforced with a third battalion or have most deployed as is?

Pete
10-04-2010, 03:09 AM
A lot could be said about the Unit Status Report on DA Form 2175-R, as well as its effect on the integrety of officers. However, the reporting of readiness began with good intentions -- the impetus for the old Technical Manual 38-750, The Army Maintenance Management System, is said to have been the result of a cavalry squadron that was unable to move out of its motor pool at Fort Meade during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Pete
10-05-2010, 05:17 AM
What are all the METT-TC factors?
There goes another Infantry guy carrying on about METT-TC, the way they always do. Look, when the Infantry has a problem they should ask for an artillery preparation, we'll fire it in HE and VT, maybe even with some ICM.

Then, after that, all the Infantry has to do is advance to the objective, in platoon columns of fours singing Jody Cadences. The company commander and first sergeant should be out front with the guidon.

When the Infantry reaches the objective and counts the bodies, all they have to do is report back on how the artillery won the war.

Fuchs
10-05-2010, 05:29 AM
Irony or serious? :confused:

82redleg
10-05-2010, 12:18 PM
Have many of the light/airborne/air assault BCTs deployed to Afghanistan been reinforced with a third battalion or have most deployed as is?

For a time (04?-05-06), there was a separate USMC Infantry BN (not part of a MAGTF) in A-stan. The last USMC BN finished its rotation working for the first BCT (I was in the last BDE TF, replaced by the first modular BCT in 2006).

I know that the ARNG BN tasked as PRT security has been employed as a battle-space owning maneuver element (with its HQ, residual combat power after parceling out its platoons to PRTs, and separate MPs, EN, ADA, etc).

The BCT that deployed as combat advisors had at least one BN detached as a battle-space owning maneuver element.

I don't know of any modular BCTs that have deployed with a third infantry battalion, although some have picked up a third battalion based on task orgs in theater. The sources I know of are noted above.

TAH
10-05-2010, 04:36 PM
Can the CABs provide the armored reconnaissance mission required by the BCT commander? If so does it make sense to replace the ARS with a third CAB or reinforce the ARS with armor and additional scouts?

In a sense I stated the latter position in my re-arranged HBCT. Re-org the HBCT recon/scout platoons to put all in the ARS. Organize them in platoons of 6. Assign HMMWV scout platoons (6 vehicles for doctrinal stanardization) to each CAB. Limit the roles/missions of the CAB scouts. If they need more combat power, they can either assign one of their own combat platoons or request a CFV platoon thru Bde from the ARS.

Too much time, effort and resources has been spent under the umbrella of recon = unit. Recon is a MISSION, NOT a Unit! Any/all maneuver combat units (including most types of combat support units) should be able to conduct platoon/company level recon (Route, Area, Zone).

Tukhachevskii
10-05-2010, 05:28 PM
I thought this might provie interesting. In the late 80s, beofre the SU collpased, they were ehading toward brigade based formations. Their first task was the Sov style CAB (see attached jpeg). Time, resources and the collapse of the USSR prevented this. It's still a desire, however, with the Russian Army.

From Soviet Non-Linear Combat: The Challenge of the 90s (http://www.stormingmedia.us/98/9871/A987132.html) (sorry, I don't have a more accessable link).

Tukhachevskii
10-05-2010, 05:30 PM
Outline of planned, but never completed, Soviet combined arms battalion (c.1989) courtesy of SASO (now FMSO) and Lester Grau...

TAH
10-05-2010, 08:58 PM
With some re-organization this is very like a Stryker Infantry Like in the aggregate.

SBCT In Bn
42 ICVs
4 RVs
4 120mm SP Stryker Mortar carriers in a Hvy Mortar PLT
6 more mortars (2 with each company)
9 MGS
No ADA/MANPADs/SAMs
3 Stryker ATGMs (Attached from Bde)

40-45 BMP/BTRs
3 recon vehicles
4 2S9 120mm SP Mortars
10 tanks
3 MANPADs
AT PLT

Pete
10-06-2010, 04:12 AM
Irony or serious? :confused:
I was being ironic, and also jerking a certain person's chain, one who has forgotten more about the Army than I'll ever know.

Tukhachevskii
10-06-2010, 11:49 AM
With some re-organization this is very like a Stryker Infantry Like in the aggregate.

SBCT In Bn
42 ICVs
4 RVs
4 120mm SP Stryker Mortar carriers in a Hvy Mortar PLT
6 more mortars (2 with each company)
9 MGS
No ADA/MANPADs/SAMs
3 Stryker ATGMs (Attached from Bde)

40-45 BMP/BTRs
3 recon vehicles
4 2S9 120mm SP Mortars
10 tanks
3 MANPADs
AT PLT

Indeed, but I'd have to say that the Sov model envisaged artillery support to be a little more "robust" than the US model. Apart from the structure of the CAB I'd have t say that's my second gripe with the stryker and HBCTs. Note that the Bn has as many arty tubes as your Bdes do. In the soviet concept the bde would have had three to four manourvere Bn, an engineer Bn and a compiosite artillery battalion with 2-3 bty (8 SPH each) and 1-2 MRL bty (each 6-8 MRL depending upon calibre, larger caliber equals small No.).

TAH
10-06-2010, 12:55 PM
Ah, but we became enamoured with "High-tech" (also read very expensive) artillery/rocket systems.

Even though it has been highly praised for its use in Iraq, I read somwhere recently that the US Army is considering cutting back/eliminating Excaliber (GPS guide 155mm) and GMLRS based on costs. Standard 155mm HE was around $500 per round. Excailiber was over $10,000 per round.

Oh well....

Eden
10-06-2010, 01:27 PM
Too much time, effort and resources has been spent under the umbrella of recon = unit. Recon is a MISSION, NOT a Unit! Any/all maneuver combat units (including most types of combat support units) should be able to conduct platoon/company level recon (Route, Area, Zone).

The real question is whether the BCT needs a 'cavalry' capability vice a 'recon' capability. That is, the ability to perform the other missions associated with cavalry (guard/screen/delay, etc). Traditionally the answer has been no, with cavalry capabilities located at the division level, but with the impending death of the division, one wonders just where we will put our cavalry and what level of command will have control over it.

And, yes, theoretically, any maneuver element can also perform 'cavalry' missions...but theoretically any unit can serve as infantry. My professional experience indicates that having a unit dedicated to reconnaissance results in better reconnaissance at every level. The only valid debate is how heavy and lethal your cavalry should be, and that has gone unreolved since the days of Stuarts and Greyhounds.

Time spent discussing reconnaissance is never wasted.

TAH
10-06-2010, 05:11 PM
BLUF
In addition to conducting the full range of Combat (attack, defend, delay) and Security (Screen, guard cover) missions, Cavalry units are capable of conducting effective all three reconnaissance missions (Route, aone, area).

Our current Recon Sqdrons are only effective in conducting surveillance (watching and listening) and very limited "active recon" (most often limited to screening) against weak or passive opponents. With augmentation is the phase that is often thrown about to allow/enable the ARS to do other things/tasks/missions. Read, Rob Peter to pay Paul.

What makes the current set of Recon Squadrons so bad is their lack of organic capablity to develope the situation while in contact (read fight for information). Against a determined opponent, they will bump up against the front edge of his security force/zone and call for the commitment of the Main Body. Fine if that call does not come too early.

This is situation is made worse because both the division and corps are "out of the Cav business". No division or corps level units (other then a BCT) to fight for information and develop the situation prior to commiting the main body. No unit (other then a BCT) available for economy-of-force or deception missions. Taking any unit away from a BCT to preform these tasks/missions "breaks" that BCT.

BCTs need Fully Mission cabable Cavalry Squadrons to enable them to develop situations while the rest of the BCT is out of contact and commit the BCT at the time/place of the CDR's choosing vice the enemy's.

Ken White
10-06-2010, 07:30 PM
BCTs need Fully Mission cabable Cavalry Squadrons to enable them to develop situations while the rest of the BCT is out of contact and commit the BCT at the time/place of the CDR's choosing vice the enemy's.Armored (Heavy), Infantry (Light) and Airborne Infantry (Light) Bdes need a Cav Sqn plus a third maneuver Bn. What's also needed are true Armored Cavalry Regiments (NOT Stryker units).

If we're going to have a total of an arbitrary (on affordability grounds) 60 Bdes, AC/RC, the IMO we should aim for:

10/20 Armored or Heavy
10/5 Infantry or Light
5/5 ACR
5/0 Abn Inf (aka Light)

The design of the Bns that comprise those Brigades is largely totally immaterial as long as they are anywhere near current or historic US norms and allow Commanders to rapidly tailor AND constantly adjust their force for METT-TC parameters *. Forcing them to do so would be even better until we improve our training...

If we temporarily have more Bdes, plus up the Infantry and ACRs only on a 1/1 ratio. For the Stryker fans, three to five of the Armored or Heavy Bdes could be Strykerized if one insists. While the stryker has merit, it is not adequately survivable of maneuverable for MCO. The 'medium ' role should be filled by the TRACK vehicle mounted ACRs, one of the best economy of force designs yet to appear. I'd personally go for more ACRs but the Inf / Armor communities would then squabble. :wry:

The Cav Sqn and ACR -- particularly the 1945-70 variants were the only organizations that offered true combined arms training to all members and young Cav LTs were versatile and flexible Dudes who could and would delegate...

For those who say Airborne units are unnecessary and obsolete, I totally agree BUT we have not developed, deliberately or inadvertently, the capability of otherwise moving and inserting a Bn or larger sized force 10,000 or so miles and getting it on the ground, a useful strategic capability. Until we do, that capability is better maintained than discarded. I'm aware of the traffic bump jokes. I'm equally aware of the damage LGOP (LINK) (http://pagentsprogress.com/?p=555) can wreak on Armor. The last three lines of the Rules are particularly to be noted. With perhaps emphasis on lines 5 and 8... ;)

I'm also aware of the capabilities and limitation of Armor units in the Guard. METT-TC... :cool:

* As the Actress said to the Bishop, it's not really what you have, it's how you use it... :D

Tukhachevskii
10-06-2010, 07:54 PM
I've been wondering about this for a while and thought I'd keep it to myself (you know, so as not to appear too idiotic:o). Anyway, I thought I'd ask the wsie...why no more motorcycles in the recon sqns? IIRC the M3 was supposed to be able to carry a motorcycle.

reed11b
10-06-2010, 08:13 PM
What I fail to understand, is how the request for re-enforced or strengthened brigades led us to an Army of understrength brigades. This almost insured the need for a Div type level of command. Oh, that's why:rolleyes:.
Also KW, I agree with your number for brigades, but I would switch your RC light and armored numbers. Maintaining armored vehicles is nearly as expensive in RC units as it is in AC units. Infantry however.....
Reed

Ken White
10-06-2010, 09:00 PM
Tukhachevskii:
Anyway, I thought I'd ask the wsie...why no more motorcycles in the recon sqns? IIRC the M3 was supposed to be able to carry a motorcycle.Accident rate, training time and a not fully capable heavy fuel engine plus METT-TC -- no real need at this time.

Reed11B:
...Maintaining armored vehicles is nearly as expensive in RC units as it is in AC units. Infantry however.....Maybe even more expensive in some respects but the real issue is current needs versus a true Strategic Reserve for future problems that may need more than walking Infantry -- who can really better cope with today's problems (and who can use non-standard vehicles without degrading critical armor vehicle handling skills)...

Plus it'll deter call ups for dumb wars (I'd really opt for just five AC Heavies + 25 RC and 15 AC Inf + 0 RC but that'd never fly politically...). :D

Plus you can put all that Armor out west where it can use big ranges and not have so many maneuver constraints. Eastern armor units have to severely degrade training due to range and maneuver enviro concerns.

Plus it gives the affected States more vehicles (wheeled, GP) for State missions.

Plus, as I love to tell the Armor folks, it's harder to train good infantrymen than it is to train good Armor crewmen. ;)

SJPONeill
10-06-2010, 10:13 PM
Tukhachevskii:Accident rate, training time and a not fully capable heavy fuel engine plus METT-TC -- no real need at this time.

Accident rates and training item go together but the training time and time to maintain m/c skillsets is not onerous and probably less so if the capability fills a useful niche.

I think that the engine/fuel issue has been resolved although the weight is an issue for what might be more of a recon than a mobility platform...off-topic but i'd be keen to hear from anyone who had experience mounting m/c on vehicles for us when required as opposed to the outrider approach...

Fuchs
10-06-2010, 10:30 PM
Almost all modern motorcycle designs are fair-weather designs, unable to stand long use (such as decades, as usual in the military) and ill-prepared for very cold or wet weather. Many fuel systems and batteries also cause troubles when the motorcycle isn't upright, but on the side.

SJPONeill
10-06-2010, 10:35 PM
Almost all modern motorcycle designs are fair-weather designs, unable to stand long use (such as decades, as usual in the military) and ill-prepared for very cold or wet weather. Many fuel systems and batteries also cause troubles when the motorcycle isn't upright, but on the side.

Modern i.e. COTS motorcycles have been used in militaries for at least the last 30 years with considerable success and relatively few problems. My question relates not to whether motorcycles can be used for military purposes (they can) but specifically to their employment as a capability that is carried until needed as opposed to their use as a platform that is ridden all the time...

Fuchs
10-06-2010, 11:06 PM
OK, then a bit German MilHistory here.

The German army had several military motor sports events (air forces had them as well) during the 30's. One of these events happened in 1938; expert drivers (often test drivers from the factories) were driving very agile, light (300 ccm) motorcycles and triumphed.
The army bought such light motorcycles and heavier ones (500ccm) - the heavier ones were necessary for sidecars anyway. The picture looked rosy in peacetime.

The war in Poland happened and motorcycles proved to be OK. The war in France happened (a few weeks longer, but better roads) and again motorcycles were OK.

Then came Barbarossa, and within a few months the motorcycle inventory crashed (as did the inventory of captured civilian trucks from France and almost all Czech design trucks). The light models were completely unsuitable and many models (even 500ccm) were simply not durable enough.
750ccm motorcycles arrived, but their price was comparable to a Type 82 Kübelwagen (lighter jeep equivalent), so their inefficiency was obvious. Some types of 500ccm and the later 750ccm motorcycles proved to be irreplacable in the war for couriers, but their other roles were diminished.

Then came the 50's Bundeswehr, and the first motorcycles bought were very, very light ones; nobody expected a long WW3 (at least not for Germans) and we (Westerners) also expected to fight in Central Europe with its fine road network.

The enduro type appeared, and some medium enduros were introduced during the Cold War (and a newer model after the CW) - the power output had to be reduced in order to make the engines more durable (typical with post-WW2 military motorcycles).

The increasing confidence in radios (and satcom) and increasing personnel budget pressures have even led to a 80% reduction in motorcycle strength in the Bundeswehr.


Could motorcycles be used as specialty vehicles, just in case? Maybe. I guess it doesn't happen because of their many limitations.


Motorcycles have a moderate efficiency as transportation vehicle.
Vyou cannot leave one man behind who could move transport vehicles for 10 men into safety if necessary - unlike with a truck.
They're loud.
They don't stand a good annual training rate (and mistreatment by drivers who do not own the bike) well.
Very few of them can drink diesel or JP8.
The chains require maintenance and oil and do not tolerate mud and dust well. Cardan shaft models have often gearbox durability issues.
Some roads eat up motorcycle tyres as if they were designed for this purpose (Belgian highways can ruin a motorcycle tyre in 200 km!).
There's no way how motorcycle troops could transport spare wheels without sidecars (~ATV then) and run flats don't work properly on a motorcycle.
Motorcycle tyres are never compatible with car or truck tyres (even ATVs use different ones).
Motorcycles exhaust their drivers in off-road driving quite quickly, especially the heavy ones (and everything beyond 400ccm is quite heavy).
Motorcycles have almost always inferior road ranges in comparison to cars.
Motorcycles do not offer protection against adverse weather.
All-wheel drive is very rare among motorcycles (practical examples appeared only a few ears ago; only up to 17% of power on front wheel) despite being able to reduce the skill requirements for the driver very much.
You need a helmet which provides good crash protection for riding a motorcycle, especially if you're a bit tired (as soldiers are quite often in wartime). There are few motorbike helmet designs which double as ballistic protection.
...
(There are more problems, but I'm too tired at this time.)

SJPONeill
10-07-2010, 12:21 AM
OK...you could have just said that you know nothing about the topic and left that space for perhaps someone who does...have you ever ridden a motorcycle in a military context? From that diatribe, unlikely and even then you still didn't get the question...I have a good handle of general use of military motorcycles from my own experiences, frozen extremities, missing skin, bruised muscles -...never managed to break a bone though but not through lack of trying...I asked a question about a specific use of military motorbikes...

TAH
10-07-2010, 12:44 AM
Armored (Heavy), Infantry (Light) and Airborne Infantry (Light) Bdes need a Cav Sqn plus a third maneuver Bn. What's also needed are true Armored Cavalry Regiments (NOT Stryker units).

If we're going to have a total of an arbitrary (on affordability grounds) 60 Bdes, AC/RC, the IMO we should aim for:

10/20 Armored or Heavy
10/5 Infantry or Light
5/5 ACR
5/0 Abn Inf (aka Light)

The design of the Bns that comprise those Brigades is largely totally immaterial as long as they are anywhere near current or historic US norms and allow Commanders to rapidly tailor AND constantly adjust their force for METT-TC parameters *. Forcing them to do so would be even better until we improve our training...

If we temporarily have more Bdes, plus up the Infantry and ACRs only on a 1/1 ratio. For the Stryker fans, three to five of the Armored or Heavy Bdes could be Strykerized if one insists. While the stryker has merit, it is not adequately survivable of maneuverable for MCO. The 'medium ' role should be filled by the TRACK vehicle mounted ACRs, one of the best economy of force designs yet to appear. I'd personally go for more ACRs but the Inf / Armor communities would then squabble. :wry:

The Cav Sqn and ACR -- particularly the 1945-70 variants were the only organizations that offered true combined arms training to all members and young Cav LTs were versatile and flexible Dudes who could and would delegate...

For those who say Airborne units are unnecessary and obsolete, I totally agree BUT we have not developed, deliberately or inadvertently, the capability of otherwise moving and inserting a Bn or larger sized force 10,000 or so miles and getting it on the ground, a useful strategic capability. Until we do, that capability is better maintained than discarded. I'm aware of the traffic bump jokes. I'm equally aware of the damage LGOP (LINK) (http://pagentsprogress.com/?p=555) can wreak on Armor. The last three lines of the Rules are particularly to be noted. With perhaps emphasis on lines 5 and 8... ;)



A better mix AC to RC is 36 AC to 20 RC support their respective deployment cycles of 1 by 3 for AC and 1 by 5 for RC.

HBCT 12 AC 5 RC
IBCT 12 AC 10 RC
SCR 6 AC 5 RC
IBCT (ABN) 6 AC 0 RC


A re-org'ed SBCT could become a Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR) of three squadron.

Each Squadron has:
three Stryker Cav Troops converted from Stryker Infantry Companies
2 platoons of 6 RVs + 2 platoons of 3 MGS + 2 120mm SP Mortars
one Stryker Infantry Company (Stryker Dragoon Troop)
one Heavy Troop (Tank Company of 10-14 tanks)

Provides scouts in lightly armed/armored platforms (RVs) supported by light armor (MGS) backed-up with infantry (Dagoons) and tanks (heavy troop).

Still lacks right amount of Arty and any aviation. Still working the math on those :confused:

Three companies of 30-42 tanks will require 135 to 195 additional soldiers per SCR, might be able to get some from a re-org'ed Support Squadron.

Using Strykers as the base vehicle reduces the SCT over-all weight and support footprints. Fewer fuel trucks, fewer mechanics, fewer/lighter parts etc.

I'm not emotional about the whole wheel versus track thing but would be interested in swapping some/all of the Stryker RVs with Canadian Coyotes or Aussie ASLAVs with 25mm with thermal but no ATGM (guys in the back are carrying Javalins).

SJPONeill
10-07-2010, 02:34 AM
I'm not emotional about the whole wheel versus track thing but would be interested in swapping some/all of the Stryker RVs with Canadian Coyotes or Aussie ASLAVs with 25mm with thermal but no ATGM (guys in the back are carrying Javalins).

Might be better off going for LAVIII over ASLAV as its chassis is essentially the same as Stryker so you have better commonality of parts, training, maintenance etc...ASLAV is based on the smaller LAV-25 but is amphibious if that was a useful addition to organic capability...

Ken White
10-07-2010, 02:53 AM
A better mix AC to RC is 36 AC to 20 RC support their respective deployment cycles of 1 by 3 for AC and 1 by 5 for RC.

HBCT 12 AC 5 RC
IBCT 12 AC 10 RC
SCR 6 AC 5 RC
IBCT (ABN) 6 AC 0 RCDon't agree with designing a total force for what is now occurring and may not be in two to five years -- it'll take six to eight years to get ANY major reorganization embedded in both components. I also think the USAR should still have combat units but that's another thread. I also think the strategic reserve (small 'r') should be at least the size of the AC. Design a force base on 15 to20 years out, not today. It takes that long, in peacetime, to get the force up and operational.
A re-org'ed SBCT could become a Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR) of three squadron...You can do that; someone probably will -- after all, some squirrel wanted to put Strykers on Oahu. :confused:

Part of the 'rationale' for that was that they would be good in the jungle. Obviously, that person hadn't spent much time in anyone's jungle...:eek:
Provides scouts in lightly armed/armored platforms (RVs) supported by light armor (MGS) backed-up with infantry (Dagoons) and tanks (heavy troop).The Stryker will be with us for a while but it was IMO a poor purchase decision. It is not terribly mobile (12.50x20 tires???) and is inadequate for heavy combat. It's okay if you cannot afford something better -- we can.

I do agree with Scouts being lightly armed and armor for them is okay provided is does not constrain vehicle mobility and agility. The old 1/4 ton was a good Scout vehicle, you could get it most anywhere and it wasn't armored so it kept the Scouts honest, they didn't take dumb chances 'cause they were Armored (HMMWV is too big).
Using Strykers as the base vehicle reduces the SCT over-all weight and support footprints. Fewer fuel trucks, fewer mechanics, fewer/lighter parts etc.Brings to mind the old quote "You get what you pay for..." And you always pay, one way or another.
I'm not emotional about the whole wheel versus track thing but would be interested in swapping some/all of the Stryker RVs with Canadian Coyotes or Aussie ASLAVs with 25mm with thermal but no ATGM (guys in the back are carrying Javalins).I get emotional about it because I don't want to see people killed unnecessarily. Wheeled Armored Vehicles are either immobile (MRAPS) or easy targets (Strykers, Armored HMMWVs and such). Agility saves lives, armor can also do that but it takes tracks to move it in combat.

I'm not a 25mm fan, nor of ATGM mounted on lightly armored vehicles (I include the Bradley in that); it tends to make people think they have a light tank and often to act accordingly. The .50 Cal is adequate for any infantry carrier.

Armor and excessive armament are dangerous, the Armor can make troops develop Cocoonitis, overweaponing can make 'em think they're unstoppable. A few days heavy combat will cure that but you'll kill a lot of folks needlessly in the interim.

B.Smitty
10-07-2010, 03:36 AM
The Stryker will be with us for a while but it was IMO a poor purchase decision. It is not terribly mobile (12.50x20 tires???) and is inadequate for heavy combat. It's okay if you cannot afford something better -- we can.


At the time, what would've been better? It was supposed to be an "interim", medium-weight vehicle. Everything would've been a compromise. Anything much heavier would push it into Bradley territory. FCS was supposed to be the objective system.

The C-130 restriction was misplaced. But, IMHO, Stryker is a reasonable balance. Better than an armored HMMWV, but not a Bradley.

Ken White
10-07-2010, 04:18 AM
At the time, what would've been better? It was supposed to be an "interim", medium-weight vehicle. Everything would've been a compromise. Anything much heavier would push it into Bradley territory. FCS was supposed to be the objective system.IMO, nothing would've been better. Literally.

What is the war fighting rationale for the Stryker and its cousins?

Essentially that they are cheaper, cheaper to operate (that old "you get what you pay for" thing again...) and are lighter, thus more transportable by air. Well maybe...
The C-130 restriction was misplaced. But, IMHO, Stryker is a reasonable balance. Better than an armored HMMWV, but not a Bradley.Most anything is better than an Armored HMMWV and I'm not a Bradley fan either -- it too was and is a compromise. All compromises are just that, effectiveness compromised for something else. We make too many politically oriented and acceptable purchases and both those vehicles -- and MRAPs -- are examples of that.

The basic problem with the Stryker and most wheeled combat vehicles (those that are truly agile being the exceptions) is that they cannot operate in the face of a reasonably competent, moderately well armed opponent. They are a peace time, look tough piece of equipment. They are doing good work in the current fights but they aren't really suitable for contested entries or sustained hard combat.

Stryker's have fans, as do ASLAVs, Coyotes and similar vehicles. All are compromise vehicles; none are really survivable in heavy combat. Many say that's not a problem, we are unlikely to have such combat in the near term. I agree we are unlikely to have to do that, I do not agree that adopting lightly armored, marginally cross country mobile vehicles is acceptable in the interim. That for a variety of reasons including training (of all concerned...). Add in the procurement cycle and yet again we could -- hopefully won't but could -- enter another major war with an inadequate vehicle like the M2/M3 tanks in WW II or the M4A3E8s in Korea. Not really good planning. Not that anyone at DA is concerned with my opinion -- and I know that many disagree with me and that's okay. ;)

SJPONeill
10-07-2010, 04:53 AM
The basic problem with the Stryker and most wheeled combat vehicles (those that are truly agile being the exceptions) is that they cannot operate in the face of a reasonably competent, moderately well armed opponent. They are a peace time, look tough piece of equipment. They are doing good work in the current fights but they aren't really suitable for contested entries or sustained hard combat.

Maybe the key part of this is "...They are doing good work in the current fights..." And the indications seem to be that the nature of those 'current fights' may be more common in the near future than it was pre-2000 so there is probably a useful role for these vehicles and their units...more so when the heavies like Bradley, Abrams, Challenger, etc may not be as suitable for the environments in which those fights are being fought...

As I understand it, the US, UK, Canada, Australia are still maintaining heavy armour forces with no intention to do away with them so it is not like it is an either/or choice between vehicles like Stryker/LAVIII and heavy armour; nor is anyone proposing the Stryker/LAVIII units would be expected to hold their own on the leading edge of a conventional Fulda Gap style conflict.

Out of the US model, Stryker/LAVIII is a better choice for those smaller nations that do have to 'pick one' than either LAV-25, Armoured Humvee, or an MBT that they probably couldn't afford to run enough to meeting training needs...

Pete
10-07-2010, 04:59 AM
I thought the main impetus for the Stryker was the strategic deployability thing, it had to be transportable by the C-130. When I was doing Army Medical Department consulting work around 2001 medics got into this thing as well, the surgical ward in an expandable ISO shelter had to fit inside a C-130. Then 9/11 happened and our attention became focused on more urgent things.

The same thing happened years ago in '83 when my old unit the 7th Infantry Division went to the light TO&E. The division had to be transportable by a certain number of C-141 sorties, 600 if I recall correctly. That's all well and good, but what happens to them once they get there and start fighting? What we need is the ability to plus-up these austere TO&Es with attached units. During WW II straight-leg triangular infantry divisions had attached armor battalions. My first TO&E assignment was in a Corps artillery unit, 175mm SPs.

SJPONeill
10-07-2010, 05:18 AM
I went to a brief by a guy who'd been with the first SBCT to go to Iraq...he felt that the whole C-130 thing was a big red herring as the C-130 didn't have the legs to transport Stryker between theatres and that once they started operating in Iraq, the mobility of Stryker allowed to to drive most places and achieve surprise that way by turning up at dawn someplace 100s of km from where they seemed to have laagered up the previous night...

Infanteer
10-07-2010, 07:07 AM
They are doing good work in the current fights but they aren't really suitable for contested entries or sustained hard combat.

Stryker's have fans, as do ASLAVs, Coyotes and similar vehicles. All are compromise vehicles; none are really survivable in heavy combat. Many say that's not a problem, we are unlikely to have such combat in the near term.

What are we supposed to use in combat than? Guys have went in lesser vehicles in "big wars" and won. We've had LAVs take 7 RPG hits and drive away.

It may be a compromise, but it's only a compromise between getting something like a Namer. I don't think all heavy combat involves driving into the teeth of tanks and dug in AT missile systems. In fact, I'd argue that doing that (while necessary at times) is foolish.

Infanteer
10-07-2010, 07:08 AM
I went to a brief by a guy who'd been with the first SBCT to go to Iraq...he felt that the whole C-130 thing was a big red herring as the C-130 didn't have the legs to transport Stryker between theatres and that once they started operating in Iraq, the mobility of Stryker allowed to to drive most places and achieve surprise that way by turning up at dawn someplace 100s of km from where they seemed to have laagered up the previous night...

I'm too lazy to look up the link to the Rand Report on this issue. It says that the amount of C-130s to move a Stryker Brigade mooted the point.

Fuchs
10-07-2010, 08:14 AM
OK...you could have just said that you know nothing about the topic and left that space for perhaps someone who does...have you ever ridden a motorcycle in a military context? From that diatribe, unlikely and even then you still didn't get the question...I have a good handle of general use of military motorcycles from my own experiences, frozen extremities, missing skin, bruised muscles -...never managed to break a bone though but not through lack of trying...I asked a question about a specific use of military motorbikes...

Ahh, you get personal, thus you do most likely know no real arguments and are thin-skinned.

Most importantly, you don't seem to get that a dislike for a tool in general application usually affects the readiness to accept a tool for a specific application. Nor do you seem to appraise the logistical reasons.

Oh, and I forgot; you provided no real reason for the pro case.
Why should any team carry 150 kg of dead weight on their truck most of the time? Wouldn't two spare tires be a better deal?

Fuchs
10-07-2010, 08:20 AM
What are we supposed to use in combat than? Guys have went in lesser vehicles in "big wars" and won. We've had LAVs take 7 RPG hits and drive away.

There are two good armour 'thicknesses' against RPGs:

1) 'Thick' enough to keep explosion and copper jet out (this includes cages if the crew is lucky).

2) 'Thick' enough to keep the explosion out, 'thin' enough to not offer much material for secondary fragmentation due to the copper jet penetration and baked up by an spall liner to limit the copper jet and fragments effects to a ~10° cone.


This explains why many thinly armoured vehicles are surprisingly survivable against HEAT-type weapons (the portable ones, not the huge warheads from 125mm guns which smash a lightly armoured vehicle with their explosion). All it takes is a bit luck (of the crew) in regard to hit placement and vector.

TAH
10-07-2010, 09:55 AM
Might be better off going for LAVIII over ASLAV as its chassis is essentially the same as Stryker so you have better commonality of parts, training, maintenance etc...ASLAV is based on the smaller LAV-25 but is amphibious if that was a useful addition to organic capability...

My Bad::o

Commonality is best.

The "Iron Mountain" that has to deploy to support the "tip of the Spear" needs to be as small as possible. Common parts help.

TAH
10-07-2010, 10:01 AM
Don't agree with designing a total force for what is now occurring and may not be in two to five years -- it'll take six to eight years to get ANY major reorganization embedded in both components. I also think the USAR should still have combat units but that's another thread. I also think the strategic reserve (small 'r') should be at least the size of the AC. Design a force base on 15 to20 years out, not today. It takes that long, in peacetime, to get the force up and operational.You can do that; someone probably will -- after all, some squirrel wanted to put Strykers on Oahu. :confused:

Part of the 'rationale' for that was that they would be good in the jungle. Obviously, that person hadn't spent much time in anyone's jungle...:eek:The Stryker will be with us for a while but it was IMO a poor purchase decision. It is not terribly mobile (12.50x20 tires???) and is inadequate for heavy combat. It's okay if you cannot afford something better -- we can.

I do agree with Scouts being lightly armed and armor for them is okay provided is does not constrain vehicle mobility and agility. The old 1/4 ton was a good Scout vehicle, you could get it most anywhere and it wasn't armored so it kept the Scouts honest, they didn't take dumb chances 'cause they were Armored (HMMWV is too big).Brings to mind the old quote "You get what you pay for..." And you always pay, one way or another.I get emotional about it because I don't want to see people killed unnecessarily. Wheeled Armored Vehicles are either immobile (MRAPS) or easy targets (Strykers, Armored HMMWVs and such). Agility saves lives, armor can also do that but it takes tracks to move it in combat.

I'm not a 25mm fan, nor of ATGM mounted on lightly armored vehicles (I include the Bradley in that); it tends to make people think they have a light tank and often to act accordingly. The .50 Cal is adequate for any infantry carrier.

Armor and excessive armament are dangerous, the Armor can make troops develop Cocoonitis, overweaponing can make 'em think they're unstoppable. A few days heavy combat will cure that but you'll kill a lot of folks needlessly in the interim.

Styker = bad
Bradley = bad
HMMWV = bad
MRAP = bad
Jeeps = Good:confused:

As a serving member of the RC, we have made the shift as an institution from Strategic Reserve to Operational Force (on a rotating basis). There are issues, but they are not tactical or technical, they are administrative.

A 50/50 spilt is possible but :) Make the Math work for you.

AC rotates on a 1 by 3 cycle. RC is using 1 by 5. So each sides number should be divisible by those numbers.

TAH
10-07-2010, 10:06 AM
I thought the main impetus for the Stryker was the strategic deployability thing, it had to be transportable by the C-130. When I was doing Army Medical Department consulting work around 2001 medics got into this thing as well, the surgical ward in an expandable ISO shelter had to fit inside a C-130. Then 9/11 happened and our attention became focused on more urgent things.

The same thing happened years ago in '83 when my old unit the 7th Infantry Division went to the light TO&E. The division had to be transportable by a certain number of C-141 sorties, 600 if I recall correctly. That's all well and good, but what happens to them once they get there and start fighting? What we need is the ability to plus-up these austere TO&Es with attached units. During WW II straight-leg triangular infantry divisions had attached armor battalions. My first TO&E assignment was in a Corps artillery unit, 175mm SPs.

The C-130 issue was a fallacy, but was picked as the most numerous Intra-theater lift A/C.

Lots of techincal issues getting 15-18 tons of stuff inside a C-130, getting the A/C off the ground, flying a reasonable distance, landing with that much weight and then taking-off.

MOG (Maximum on Ground) is what feeling kicks butt. MOG is the total number of A/C that can be on the ground at the same local. Its a space to move around, taxi etc thing.

Built up time was measured in days not hours.

TAH
10-07-2010, 10:18 AM
What are we supposed to use in combat than? Guys have went in lesser vehicles in "big wars" and won. We've had LAVs take 7 RPG hits and drive away.

It may be a compromise, but it's only a compromise between getting something like a Namer. I don't think all heavy combat involves driving into the teeth of tanks and dug in AT missile systems. In fact, I'd argue that doing that (while necessary at times) is foolish.

If heavy combat means lost of heavy ATGMs and tanks, then any light or medium vehicle loses.

Our infantry carrier needs to be reasonably protected against man-portable RPG-type weapons (but RPG-29 can kill tanks) and mendium ATGMs.

IEDs are probably here to stay but for combat vehicle with good x-country mobility, get off the road and you avoind most/all IEDs. So naybe the V-shaped hulls and added belly armor are not really as important.

Good study out years ago about x-country mobility. Up to about 12 tons wheels with 3 or 4 axels have comparable capabilty to tracks in most terrain sets. Deep sand, snow and heavy mud tracks still do better but cab still get stuck.

Maybe part of this discussion should include a timeframe. How soon do we want/need a "new" set of BCTs? 3-6 years = dance who you came with (what we have now). 6-10 years whatever is currently in production or at least off the drawing board. 10+ years allows us to start with a clean slate.

All my comments are focused short term and seek to solve the issue within current limits. I want to do better with the same.

Ken White
10-07-2010, 04:19 PM
...indications seem to be that the nature of those 'current fights' may be more common in the near future than it was pre-2000 so there is probably a useful role for these vehicles and their units...I agree that the indications are that. However, I strongly believe those indications should be changed and I believe they will be. The question is whether that change will be forced on the west after considerable waste or will be made early by not playing the opponents game on his pitch...

Western Armed forces who desire or at least do not object to such operations are making a bad mistake. Equipment influences policy; if you have a certain piece of kit, there is pressure to use it. Ponder that for a bit...
Out of the US model, Stryker/LAVIII is a better choice for those smaller nations that do have to 'pick one' than either LAV-25, Armoured Humvee, or an MBT that they probably couldn't afford to run enough to meeting training needs...I agree and said as much.
the whole C-130 thing was a big red herring as the C-130 didn't have the legs to transport Stryker between theatres.True. It was a politically oriented purchase and not a particularly smart one.

Infanteer:
What are we supposed to use in combat than?METT-TC. As I said it works in the current kind of combat. My counter question is why would you want to engage in this kind of combat? There are other options.
Guys have went in lesser vehicles in "big wars" and won.At what cost in those lesser vehicles? Also, many of those lesser vehicles weren't really lesser, most were smaller and far more agile -- most also were 'successfully' used in Northwest Europe. You guys had a lot of problems with the Staghound in Italy with a far poorer road net...

None were used in the Jungles and their success in Mountainous terrain was marginal. METT-TC...;)
We've had LAVs take 7 RPG hits and drive away.How many hit with even a Sagger, a Kornet, a 76mm, much less a 120mm or 125mm...
It may be a compromise, but it's only a compromise between getting something like a Namer. I don't think all heavy combat involves driving into the teeth of tanks and dug in AT missile systems. In fact, I'd argue that doing that (while necessary at times) is foolish. I doubt anyone would advocate that. I certainly don't.

The Piranha class of vehicles has uses, no question. It's a good, even great, vehicle for Paramilitary use. My dislike of the vehicle revolves around it's lack of capability for major combat -- and the fact that, as I remarked to SJPO'Neill above; if you have a piece of equipment, the pressure to use it is significant.

Thus I ask if we're engaging in wars of choice because we have a capability or do we need the capability because we must engage in wars of choice? I suggest the answer is the former and that it is unwise -- and I fully realize that such engagement is effectively a political and not a military decision. An LAV type vehicle is a policy decision, not an equipment decision. It may be driven by economic factors in less wealthy nations -- but neither the US or Canada have to buy it...

TAH:
Styker = bad
Bradley = bad
HMMWV = bad
MRAP = bad
Jeeps = GoodIn order:

Yes, period -- as a COMBAT vehicle against any reasonably well armed and trained opponent.
Yes in the sense that was a poor political compromise between the the then Chiefs of Armor and Infantry and really satisfied neither branches requirements; too small for the Inf, too large for Armor -- and the "Light Tank" issue.
The HMMWV is excessively large and heavy for most of its roles and is too small for others; it resulted from the Army's fetish for GP items, trying to make one size fit all instead of buying purpose designed equipment that's truly fit for the job it's supposed to do.
Yes, absolutely; it cocoons Joe nad he's reluctant to get out of it; it is big has low mobility and guys currently in Afghanistan tell me that the 'MRAP mentality' is definitely impeding operational success.

Jeeps are good for what they were designed to do -- be a small, light, unarmored utility car. They are not good trucks. The HMMWV was designed to be part car and part truck and it does neither job well. It was armored due to plitical pressure. I mentioned the jeep as a Scout Vehicle. Actually, we really need and have long needed a purpose designed light, agile scout vehicle -- I prefer unarmored because that keeps your Scouts honest; they don't begin to think they're immortal but Armored is okay as long as it's small and agile.
As a serving member of the RC, we have made the shift as an institution from Strategic Reserve to Operational Force (on a rotating basis). There are issues, but they are not tactical or technical, they are administrative.I think they're more than administrative but that's another thread. The question I ask is: Is that current policy wise and was it necessary? My answer is No to both; YMMV.
A 50/50 spilt is possible but Make the Math work for you.Whether it works for me is immaterial; what's best for the Nation -- not the Guard or the AC or any State(s) but the Nation -- is the point.
AC rotates on a 1 by 3 cycle. RC is using 1 by 5. So each sides number should be divisible by those numbers.That's designing a military force to cope with a domestic political problem. You may think that is necessary and / or wise and / or necessary or unavoidable. I think it is none of those, it's just taking the easy route. We can do better.

Policies can be changed easily and quickly -- sometimes by unforeseen events (think 25 June 1950 or 11 Sep 2001) -- Force structure changes are far more difficult, expensive and time consuming. I say again, do not design a force for here and now; ideally we'd design for five to ten years out but we're so bureaucratically sclerotic that we need to look almost 20 years out...
If heavy combat means lost of heavy ATGMs and tanks, then any light or medium vehicle loses.Umm. yes, that was my point. I'd add that agility can decrease losses and that in some othercases, losses must be accepted. I would like to keep that latter number low by using the best vehicle for the job.
Our infantry carrier needs to be reasonably protected against man-portable RPG-type weapons (but RPG-29 can kill tanks) and mendium ATGMs.I'd go heavier, Namer-like -- and fewer.
IEDs are probably here to stay but for combat vehicle with good x-country mobility, get off the road and you avoind most/all IEDs. So naybe the V-shaped hulls and added belly armor are not really as important.So called IEDs have been a feature of most combat since the late 19th century, they are the poor mans artillery. So I agree with you, get off the roads, use unexpected routes -- and do NOT fight poor people on their turf...
Good study out years ago about x-country mobility. Up to about 12 tons wheels with 3 or 4 axels have comparable capabilty to tracks in most terrain sets. Deep sand, snow and heavy mud tracks still do better but cab still get stuck.Anything can get stuck if you don't use it right and go dumb places -- that's a training issue and we do not do that well. I'm aware of a number of such studies. I'm also aware that the GM XM1 outperformed the Chrysler XM1 on all counts but that we bought Chrysler to help them avoid their first impending bankruptcy...

Good, specially selected and trained or experienced drivers can put wheels most places one can put a track -- problem is that new, poorly trained or just poor drivers can put tracks many places poor drivers cannot put wheels...
Maybe part of this discussion should include a timeframe...10+ years allows us to start with a clean slate...All my comments are focused short term and seek to solve the issue within current limits. I want to do better with the same.Understood but, no slam intended, you're in effect putting Bandaids ® on the problem. That's the Army way -- and that's why we are we are. My point is that is probably not where we should, could or can be. There's never enough time or money to fix it right -- but there's always enough to do it over. And over...

Fuchs
10-07-2010, 04:28 PM
I was under the impression that the whole Stryker "interim" vehicle thing was a result of Shinseki and most army leadership panicking.

1999. They lost the "race" against the BTR-riding Russians which drove from Bosnia to Kosovo. They were unable to deploy a brigade-sized element to Albania and get it operational in time. Air forces (and naval air) had just won the first hot armed conflict which saw no ground or naval action.
There were panicky articles about how the army was threatened to become "irrelevant" around 1999- 9/11.

They panicked badly and sought some brigades which could
- be flown into theatre in days
- become operational in days
- move hundreds of km in a day without tank transporters and without many vehicle breakdowns.

The panicked generals didn't understand that the air force was unlikely to support the whole fantasy and it didn't understand that these medium brigades would lack an armoured combat vehicle or two despite all those RMA promises.


Now if you call this "political" - OK. I do -obviously- emphasize the "panic" aspect rather than the "politics" aspect.

B.Smitty
10-07-2010, 05:05 PM
The Piranha class of vehicles has uses, no question. It's a good, even great, vehicle for Paramilitary use. My dislike of the vehicle revolves around it's lack of capability for major combat -- and the fact that, as I remarked to SJPO'Neill above; if you have a piece of equipment, the pressure to use it is significant.


I don't believe the thought ever was to use them in an MCO without augmentation. Attach a tank battalion to an SBCT to soak up the ATGM hits while the Strykers deploy infantry. Or dole out Stryker battalions to heavy units to augment their dismount capability.

Certainly they still have tactical mobility limits, but so do M1s. OTOH, they have theater and strategic mobility advantages over heavy units. An SBCT certainly isn't a speed bump in the same way as a light infantry unit. Each infantry squad has a Javelin at its disposal, IIRC. That's a lot of AT firepower.

TAH
10-07-2010, 06:16 PM
I don't believe the thought ever was to use them in an MCO without augmentation. Attach a tank battalion to an SBCT to soak up the ATGM hits while the Strykers deploy infantry. Or dole out Stryker battalions to heavy units to augment their dismount capability.

Certainly they still have tactical mobility limits, but so do M1s. OTOH, they have theater and strategic mobility advantages over heavy units. An SBCT certainly isn't a speed bump in the same way as a light infantry unit. Each infantry squad has a Javelin at its disposal, IIRC. That's a lot of AT firepower.

As I understand it, the dismounted infantry squad is the center-piece of both the IBCT and the SBCT.

Strykers are there to carry the squad, their stuff, provide the digital comms, protect them from small arms, indirect-fire and get the squad to the right place to dismount and go fight. The Stryker is very much an APC NOT and IFV. OBTW, a full nine-man squad gets off the stryker vice 5-6-7 Soldiers from a BFV. To a large degree the same situation applies to any APC versus IFV comparison.

BTW, seperate Tank Bns longer exist in the US Army. You could re-org a HBCT CAB into a Tank Bn and a Mech Bn but then are robbing Peter to pay Paul. Not sure anyone did that even with all the detailed intra-BCT re-orgs that happened in Iraq.

Pretty sure we don't need/want to go back to a force structure of just heavy (HBCTs) and Light (IBCTs). SBCTs are the Medium/middleweight force that take less strat lift and less time to deploy vice heavy and provide a degree of mobility and protection once they get there.

Awhile back in this thread, I posted a fairly detailed description of a re-org'ed HBCT. The end state would provide the CDR with three viable maneuver Bn/Sqdrns with NO additional expenditures in either personnel or equipment. In fact there were sufficient savings to create a "new" company fof escort and security troops to assist in rear area operations.

So, yes most of my input has been short-term band-aides but they worked.:wry:

Rifleman
10-07-2010, 06:54 PM
Attach a tank battalion to an SBCT to soak up the ATGM hits while the Strykers deploy infantry. Or dole out Stryker battalions to heavy units to augment their dismount capability.


Your proposal reminds me that the Army experimented with a so-called TRICAP division after Vietnam. It had an armor brigade, airmobile brigade, and air cavalry combat brigade. I guess it was not what was needed for the cold war.

Does something like the TRICAP concept deserve another look at brigade/regiment level? Maybe a cavalry regiment with squadrons of air, armor, and Stryker?

Ken White
10-07-2010, 07:31 PM
However, anyone who really thinks decently trained Infantry is a speed bump is in for a rude awakening. There's a reason knowledgeable Tanker insist on Infantry accompaniment. So too is thinking three Javelins for a Platoon can always trump two likely to be dangerous...

I'm aware of the Stryker procurement rationales (there were several, which in itself is a clue to sloppy thinking at DA), I just do not agree with it / them. Don't have to, nor, obviously does anyone have to agree with me. I think it is a decent vehicle that has it uses. I do not think the US Army has any real use for it that would not be better met by other means. I also think the LAV 25 makes sense for the Marines. Ponder that...

My belief is that the IFV concept was a non-starter and should never have been pursued (as it was for the Bradley initially, yet another of its compromises *). APCs make sense and two flavors are needed. A heavy to accompany armor and a light for utility -- and not in direct MIC/HIC but for police/FID and similar action -- uses. IOW, had it been me making the decision, I'd have upgraded all the 113s to A3 Plus and six roadwheels with Soucy Tracks. It wasn't my decision, so that's that.

It's all about METT-TC and today's fight may not be tomorrows. The Bandaids ® are applied to the immediate wound and thus may not prepare one for other, perhaps far larger wounds that may require an air impermeable pad, lots of adhesive tape, a Large Battle Dressing and a bunch of Quik Clot. Nothing wrong with Bandaids ®, they have their uses -- and as I said, that's the Army way because substantive change is hard -- not impossible, just hard. I've watched those things applied all over the Army corpus for about 70 years and most have worked. They also, as I said, have put us where we are. So, yeah, they can work -- they can also obscure more dangerous conditions or lead to a false diagnosis.

I question if where we are is where we want to be or, more importantly, should be. IMO, so should everyone else be asking questions instead of defending the status quo or rearranging deck chairs...


* A reminder that designing future structure or equipment based on current fads may not be a good idea. IFVs were a fad; wheeled combat vehicles are a fad...

Rifleman
10-07-2010, 07:51 PM
I question if where we are is where we want to be or, more importantly, should be. IMO, so should everyone else be asking questions instead of defending the status quo or rearranging deck chairs...


* A reminder that designing future structure or equipment based on current fads may not be a good idea. IFVs were a fad; wheeled combat vehicles are a fad...

...so will re-arranging some deck chairs enable us to get more out of our fads? If neither the Bradley or Stryker is a good option for intented role would combining them at lower levels enable the strengths of one to make up for the weaknesses of the other until we have something better? That was my point when asking if considering something like a TRICAP brigade or cavalry regiment was worthwhile.

Fuchs
10-07-2010, 08:05 PM
The original IFV concept (Schützenpanzer) made sense for a short period - in 1944-1945 when infantry AT had ranges smaller than rifle range.

Ken White
10-07-2010, 08:46 PM
The original IFV concept (Schützenpanzer) made sense for a short period - in 1944-1945 when infantry AT had ranges smaller than rifle range.Yes, and that remained true until the very late 50s. Because of the length of equipment development cycles, the majority of IFVs hit the ground in the early 70s (80s for the Bradley -- we're somehwat slow...) -- AFTER the things that made them less necessary if not undesirable, the effective ATGM and better tank fire control, were fielded. Armies do not think ahead at all well...

Rifleman:
If neither the Bradley or Stryker is a good option for intented role would combining them at lower levels enable the strengths of one to make up for the weaknesses of the other until we have something better?Two different things IMO. The Bradley is what you say. With the Stryker, I question what, precisely, the 'role' is...

In any event, we're stuck with both for the forseeable future so they'll have balance each other in a sense. The Bradley has been improved to the point where it is almost acceptable for its role and it'll do okay until a big war comes and we can then get a batter vehicle. Same for the Stryker which will disappear from the inventory earlier. Partly because the role will possibly if not probably evaporate.

We may possibly do better. Armored warfare requires systems; the Tank and the Infantry carrier -- if not combined into one vehicle (with humungous advantages) should at least be a complimentary, rationalized and almost interchangeable pair of packages. The movement of Armor and Infantry to the 'Combined Arms Center of Excellence' may truly get some coherent and non-parochial thinking going. We can do better. We need to do so.
That was my point when asking if considering something like a TRICAP brigade or cavalry regiment was worthwhile.Tri Cap was a Division concept, two heavy Bdes and an Air Cav Bde (which included Hoptiflopter lift for a Bn worth of Mech Inf). 1st Cav Tested it in the early 70s and, as you note, it didn't proved adequate MASSS in the eyes of some for Cold War purposes. My vote for the Div would be no because the air Cav Bde is not an effective full substitute for a third ground maneuver Bde.

However, IMO it would work as you describe. For a Bde as you described, my vote would be an emphatic yes -- with two caveats. First, such an organization would be limited so 'organizing' some units like that would create another case of 'it's there, use it.' You'd only be able to use it fairly benign scenarios (birds are delicate...). However, the Army should be able to task organize such a Force as and when required. It could do that today but that gets us to the second caveat.

The Commanders in the chain of such organizations would have to be intuitive, flexible and innovative. We have such people -- but the pipeline doesn't always provide them.

Thus, yet again, I fear a really good idea would probably flounder because our terrible personnel system and our not the best in the world training added to our terribly inefficient and bureaucratic equipment procurement system couldn't or wouldn't provide what was needed to make a good concept work.

I also believe I should note that the three big problem areas I cited are not solely the fault of the Army -- Congress almost forces most of those failures with a slew of laws that mean well but have terrible unintended consequences.

Still, to develop and use such an organization would mean very different ways of doing business. Not a bad thing at all...

Pete
10-07-2010, 09:03 PM
When I used to write technical proposals at one of the consulting firms I worked for there would usually be an organizational chart showing how we'd task-organize ourselves to perform the work and what our chain of command would be. The owner of one these firms would invariably jack with the organizational charts I'd put in my draft documents. I eventually learned to leave that part of the proposal blank until I put the final finishing touches on the draft proposal -- otherwise the company owner would keep having me redo the chart about a dozen times until it was to his satisfaction. My point is that everyone, soldiers included, loves to diddle with organizational charts. :cool:

Fuchs
10-07-2010, 09:34 PM
My point is that everyone, soldiers included, loves to diddle with organizational charts. :cool:

Well, there's the petty fantasizing (or 'to diddle', finally a new word for my vocabulary), the professional messing up of organizations and finally a form of drawing TOE as a thought experiment in a long chain of theoretical conceptual work that began at strategic or operational level and broke down requirements to unit level.


The very sad fact is that formation-level TOE are often a function of politics, ego and budget, not of a thorough optimization process incl. a red team. Many layman TOE designs make more sense than certain actually realized brigade designs. There are some brigades which have no better indirect fire weapon than 40mm UBGLs... :mad:

-----------

@Ken; as you certainly know, the very original SPz concept required a frontal hardening against AT guns. This can be understood as a protection requirement against at the very least the ubiquitous, proven and crew-movable 76.2mm ZIS-3 gun (in 1944-1945); ~82mm RHAeq. This protection requirement evolved with the introduction of more recoilless guns; the SPG-82 and the increasing presence of 85mm guns probably made the SPz concept obsolete by the early 50's, if not already in the immediate post-War years.
The much-increased penetration of these weapons was to much for the concept, we would probably have seen the beginning of the age of HAPCs if there had been many modern mechanized campaigns in the 50's.
It's probably no mere coincidence tat the Israelis never adopted the IFV/SPz idea.

Tukhachevskii
10-08-2010, 12:17 PM
Modern i.e. COTS motorcycles have been used in militaries for at least the last 30 years with considerable success and relatively few problems. My question relates not to whether motorcycles can be used for military purposes (they can) but specifically to their employment as a capability that is carried until needed as opposed to their use as a platform that is ridden all the time...

That was essentially my train of thought. It was triggered as much by wondering if it would be of use in deep reconnaissance situations (a la LRDG with a few ATMPs for log support) as it was reading a Russian land weapons brochure which stated that the Metis-K ATGM was suitable for motorcycle applications....which got me thinking after having read some reports of the use of motorcycles in Afghanistan and Iraq by dickers, mobile ambush teams, etc. It seems to me modern motorcycles 9esp. off road variants) have some useful niche capabilites.

B.Smitty
10-08-2010, 12:35 PM
With the Stryker, I question what, precisely, the 'role' is...


I don't see a problem with the Stryker's role. It provides protected mobility for infantry in a package that's lighter, has a lower logistics footprint, and has much higher on-road mobility than the Bradley. It provides greater protection (esp. vs underbelly attacks) and a lower logistics footprint than the M113. It fills the niche between unarmored trucks and heavy units.

Future Strykers are getting a double v-shaped hull to further improve underbelly protection (up to "MRAP 2" levels).

Estimates put fuel usage of an SBCT at almost a third of that of an HBCT (~100 tonnes/day and ~300 tonnes/day, respectively). (source: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG649.pdf)

Yes, the Stryker vehicle itself does sacrifice some off-road mobility to do so.

IIRC, light infantry platoons don't have any organic Javelins right? They all come from the company. Maybe I'm misremembering.

Ken White
10-08-2010, 01:41 PM
I don't see a problem with the Stryker's role... It fills the niche between unarmored trucks and heavy units.Filling the niche in low intensity combat is beneficial. Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant. The niche has limited value in other types of combat but if it exists, it will be used even if inappropriate. It's sort of the case my Mother warned me of; 'Be careful what you want, you might get it...'

That limited utility leads to follow on questions; should the US Army be involved in paramilitary efforts? If so, is the Stryker the best vehicle or is it excessively expensive and over armored and gunned for the role while offering inadequate mobility and protection for even low intensity combat against a moderately equipped force?
Future Strykers are getting a double v-shaped hull to further improve underbelly protection (up to "MRAP 2" levels).Yes, I know, making them more expensive and heavier thus using more fuel and developing more mechanical problems while being even more roadbound and simply encouraging the bad guys to use more explosive...

Armor has benefits. It also has disadvantages. Two are weight and cocooning -- the protection offered leads to both a false sense of security and a reluctance to dismount (the antithesis of getting out among the populace in FID / COIN-like efforts... :rolleyes:). The weight impact impedes mobility and increases resupply needs and maintenance thus inducing tactical constraints.

Consider also that you can only add so much Armor and you thus confer an advantage to the feared IED user. In combat, agility almost always beats armor. :cool:
Estimates put fuel usage of an SBCT at almost a third of that of an HBCT (~100 tonnes/day and ~300 tonnes/day, respectively). (source: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG649.pdf)That's a benefit, no question and I agree that it's important -- I also again state that you get what you pay for -- and you always pay, one way or another.
Yes, the Stryker vehicle itself does sacrifice some off-road mobility to do soThus providing opponents with a greater ability to predict what the force equipped with it might do, where they might appear and what will impede their actions...

It's a paramilitary vehicle with limited combat utility. It is good at what it does. For the US Army, the question remains is it what it does required or even beneficial. I'd vote no on both. YMMV.
IIRC, light infantry platoons don't have any organic Javelins right? They all come from the company. Maybe I'm misremembering.Old light with the worthless Dragon, yeah, Co level. Today, Javelin, two per Platoon in the Light Inf Bns. Specifically to avoid being speed bumps. The light folks are also heavy on the TOWs and the kids are willing to get close to put an M4 up a tailpipe. :D

Eden
10-08-2010, 03:05 PM
Yes, I know, making them more expensive and heavier thus using more fuel and developing more mechanical problems while being even more roadbound and simply encouraging the bad guys to use more explosive...

I was in at the birth of the Stryker - I remember at the time thinking that no organization or weapon system ever characterized as 'medium' had ever lasted very long. The irresistable urge to make it better by adding armor or lightening it up inevitably push it toward one end of the spectrum or the other.

B.Smitty
10-08-2010, 05:12 PM
Filling the niche in low intensity combat is beneficial. Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant. The niche has limited value in other types of combat but if it exists, it will be used even if inappropriate. It's sort of the case my Mother warned me of; 'Be careful what you want, you might get it...'

Don't know if I buy the notion that "Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant".

We didn't have a medium-weight units in Kosovo, but we still went in anyway. Heavy units took way to long to get there. Light units weren't enough of a deterrence.

We need them because our nation has shown a consistent desire to intervene in LIC/COIN/paramilitary efforts. The Army can argue it should or shouldn't get involved efforts, but if the President says "go", the Army will go.


That limited utility leads to follow on questions; should the US Army be involved in paramilitary efforts? If so, is the Stryker the best vehicle or is it excessively expensive and over armored and gunned for the role while offering inadequate mobility and protection for even low intensity combat against a moderately equipped force?Yes, I know, making them more expensive and heavier thus using more fuel and developing more mechanical problems while being even more roadbound and simply encouraging the bad guys to use more explosive...


I don't see this "limited utility". SBCTs have all the MCO utility of an infantry unit, but with far greater mobility, protection and firepower than light infantry.

As an infantry company commander, you not only have your soldier's weapons, you also have 3 x MGSs, 2 x 120mm mortar vehicles, and a .50 cal or 40mm on every Stryker.

If you need to perform pure dismounted ops, you have full 3x9+7 rifle platoons, a sniper team, 60mm mortars, and a FIST to call upon.

A heavy mech inf company in the same situation has, at best, smaller 3x9 platoons, no mortars, no snipers, no fire support team.

The Stryker upgrades will include a more powerful engine (450hp vs 350hp), larger tires and an improved suspension. It will also have a lower center of gravity to reduce rollover risks. So it may end up being a net mobility gain, even though it's roughly 1 ton heavier.


In combat, agility almost always beats armor. :cool:

I don't know if i agree with the "almost always" part. In Iraq, even with all of our whiz-bang ISR technology, most engagements resulted from movements to contact. So units have to absorb the initial volley before reacting. In fact, more agile HMMWV-mounted scouts were relegate to rear-area security duties because their commanders felt they were unsurvivable.

IMHO, if Stryker units had been available for OIF MCO, they would've performed well. They have just enough armor to defeat the Iraqi's primary anti-armor system (RPG-7), and have many more dismounts than heavy units.

Clearly if you're fighting Hezbollah on their home turf, movements to contact in a Stryker will result in a lot of dead Strykers. So you don't use them that way, in that situation. Let heavy forces lead the way. (and even they may not be heavy enough)


It's a paramilitary vehicle with limited combat utility. It is good at what it does. For the US Army, the question remains is it what it does required or even beneficial. I'd vote no on both. YMMV.

It's an APC with good enough tactical mobility for most situations.

SBCTs fill a whole in the capability matrix. Infantry-centric, but not foot mobile. Armored, but not "heavy".

Just MHO.

Fuchs
10-08-2010, 05:52 PM
In Iraq, even with all of our whiz-bang ISR technology, most engagements resulted from movements to contact.

This is not robust logic. We may see a repair of the sad modern armoured reconnaissance which can prevent a repetition of this poor tactical performance.

B.Smitty
10-08-2010, 07:26 PM
This is not robust logic. We may see a repair of the sad modern armoured reconnaissance which can prevent a repetition of this poor tactical performance.

IMHO, it isn't flawed logic. Ken asserted that "agility almost always beats armor". Frequent movements to contact, and relegation of unarmored forces to supporting roles in OIF, stand in opposition this. The OPTEMPO did not allow for more deliberate recc (where unarmored reconnaissance units could've use their stealth and agility).

In fact, to a point, armor enables battlefield agility under fire.

Ken White
10-08-2010, 08:29 PM
Don't know if I buy the notion that "Filling the niche in peace time can lead to low intensity combat due to a capability being extant".Well, I've been to several LIC efforts, all because we could do that and really for little more reason -- all at least marginally successful, all at a great cost for the benefit derived. If a capability exists it WILL be used, the system demands that it be... :mad:
We didn't have a medium-weight units in Kosovo, but we still went in anyway. Heavy units took way to long to get there. Light units weren't enough of a deterrence.Oh? Better check your history. The Marines and 82 Abn elms that went in first were doing fine; SSGs were playing Village Mayor, LTs playing Disctrict Governors and they were getting things done -- until Do Do Bird Sanchez finally got there and delivered his first brilliant order "All Elements outside base camps will be accompanied by a field grade officer." :rolleyes:
We need them because our nation has shown a consistent desire to intervene in LIC/COIN/paramilitary efforts. The Army can argue it should or shouldn't get involved efforts, but if the President says "go", the Army will go.Not the Army's place to make that argument. It is the Army's job to provide capability to execute likely missions. ALL likely missions -- over emphasis on one sort of mission is as bad as denying the existence of mission sets.
I don't see this "limited utility"...Okay.
...So it may end up being a net mobility gain, even though it's roughly 1 ton heavier.We'll see. If I were a bettor... :D
I don't know if i agree with the "almost always" part...In fact, more agile HMMWV-mounted scouts were relegate to rear-area security duties because their commanders felt they were unsurvivable.We all make judgements based on our experience. As for the HMMWVs, my son then in the 82d roamed all over Baghdad and Fallujah for a full tour with unarmored HMMWVs. Had a few IED hits but basically, went okay. Risk aversion is not a determinant of capability.
IMHO, if Stryker units had been available for OIF MCO, they would've performed well. They have just enough armor to defeat the Iraqi's primary anti-armor system (RPG-7), and have many more dismounts than heavy units.Could be. Been interesting to watch.

Fuchs
10-08-2010, 08:29 PM
My quote was too short.


In Iraq, even with all of our whiz-bang ISR technology, most engagements resulted from movements to contact. So units have to absorb the initial volley before reacting.

Here's the flawed logic; a failure in one example does not allow the conclusion that this is how it needs to be ("have" instead of "had").

82redleg
10-08-2010, 11:05 PM
A heavy mech inf company in the same situation has, at best, smaller 3x9 platoons, no mortars, no snipers, no fire support team.

I agree with your point, but you're wrong in one detail.

Mech IN CO FIST is 4 man HQ (LT, SSG, SPC, PFC) and 3 x 2-man PLT FO parties (SGT, PFC).

SBCT IN CO FIST is 4 man HQ (LT, SSG, SPC, PFC) and 3 x 1-man PLT FOs (SGT).

The addition of an RTO to the PLT FO (making it an FO party) is of limited value in mounted operations, but a great enabler in dismounted operations, as we're discussing here.

Pete
10-08-2010, 11:26 PM
As for the HMMWVs, my son then in the 82d roamed all over Baghdad and Fallujah for a full tour with unarmored HMMWVs. Had a few IED hits but basically, went okay. Risk aversion is not a determinant of capability.Could be. Been interesting to watch.
How did we ever make it through World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam with thin-skinned wheeled vehicles? All of a sudden in 2003 and 2004 unarmored vehicles became a big deal, a major case of negligence on the part of the U.S. Army. Rumsfeld was right on that one, you go to war with the Army you have.

Fuchs
10-09-2010, 07:20 AM
It has to do with the absence of robust front-lines in modern warfare.
This absence is less related to a supposed rise of 'irregular' warfare than to decreased force densities (my opinion, obviously).

The fights of today are similar to encounters with hostile stragglers in WW2 or with red infiltrating infantry in Korea (IMO).

Years ago I reasoned that armoured trucks make only sense for mechanised brigades and convoys which attempt to supply them - the trend towards armouring everything will likely end in a few years when large quantities of vehicles need to be replaced.

Rifleman
10-10-2010, 12:30 PM
There were always times when two manuever elements were enough. There were always times when four were needed. Three manuever elements seems to be the common sense starting point to task organize up or down from.

Lot's differences about details but the general consensus seems to be three manuever battalions, cavalry squadron, artillery battalion, and support battalion.

Arguments about wheeled vehicles and IFVs aside, is this the starting point for a brigade whether heavy, medium or light?

JMA
10-11-2010, 07:40 AM
How did we ever make it through World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam with thin-skinned wheeled vehicles? All of a sudden in 2003 and 2004 unarmored vehicles became a big deal, a major case of negligence on the part of the U.S. Army. Rumsfeld was right on that one, you go to war with the Army you have.

Probably because today (or at least recently) we tend to drive up and down the same roads day in, day out. Took these clowns awhile to take advantage of the situation but now it is a headache. It is natural to want to protect your soldiers from such a treat (in the case of Afghanistan also on foot). Rhodesia and South Africa achieved much in Taming the Landmine (http://www.amazon.com/Taming-Landmine-Peter-Stiff/dp/0947020047) but note that the project process time followed by the procurement process time make it all but impossible for the western armies to keep up with the innovations being used against them. There should be a fabrication works right there in Afghanistan turning out and modifying vehicles on the fly. As the threat changes so you recall the vehicles on rotation to carryout the necessary mod.

Its not about beating the enemy... its about beating the bureaucracy.

On yes and when the war is over... leave the vehicle there.

TAH
10-12-2010, 03:46 PM
There were always times when two manuever elements were enough. There were always times when four were needed. Three manuever elements seems to be the common sense starting point to task organize up or down from.

Lot's differences about details but the general consensus seems to be three manuever battalions, cavalry squadron, artillery battalion, and support battalion.

Arguments about wheeled vehicles and IFVs aside, is this the starting point for a brigade whether heavy, medium or light?

Pretty much what the current SBCT in the macro.

Have to be careful about straight unit/echelon comparisons.

Back in the 80s a US Tank Company had 17 tanks, three companies and 54 in the Bn.
Under Div-86, company size dropped to 14, added a fourth company and total tanks in the Bn rose to 58.
The Army-of-Excellence :rolleyes: (AoE) dropped the fourth company and the Bn went to 44 or 45.

The total tanks in a Hvy CAB is back to 58 spread across the two Bn (No more Tank Bns in the US Army of today).

Three maneuver Bns of three companies of three platoons + CAV sqdrn of 3 or 4 Troops of 3 or 4 platoons works for me. In a perfect non-Bill Payer world (nod to Ken).

Really believe that fewer, bigger BCTs is the real answer.

82redleg
10-12-2010, 10:52 PM
Really believe that fewer, bigger BCTs is the real answer.

That's why I like 4BNs x 4 COs (plus appropriately sized recon, FA and support).

The BDE staff can control this- the BDE CDR should be able to command this. If he can't (we only need to select 15-20 each year), we need to re-look our entire officer development program (Ken and others would probably say that we do).

I think that gives much greater flexibility in conventional operations, and more boots on the ground in SASO (or whatever other buzzword you want to use). It also allows various combinations of IN and AR (3-1, 2-2, 1-3), both as task organization options and as a standing base (the SBCT IN BN is essentially 3 x 3 IN-1 AR COs, although the internal organizations of those platoons is somewhat problematic).

TAH
10-12-2010, 11:49 PM
That's why I like 4BNs x 4 COs (plus appropriately sized recon, FA and support).

The BDE staff can control this- the BDE CDR should be able to command this. If he can't (we only need to select 15-20 each year), we need to re-look our entire officer development program (Ken and others would probably say that we do).

I think that gives much greater flexibility in conventional operations, and more boots on the ground in SASO (or whatever other buzzword you want to use). It also allows various combinations of IN and AR (3-1, 2-2, 1-3), both as task organization options and as a standing base (the SBCT IN BN is essentially 3 x 3 IN-1 AR COs, although the internal organizations of those platoons is somewhat problematic).

Assuming 3 platoons per company 4 x 4 x 3 = 48 platoons

Existing HBCT = 12(13 including scout) + 12/13 + 6 = 30/32 about a 50-60% increase
Existing IBCT = 13 (14 including scout) + 13/14 + 8 = 34/36 about 35% increase
Existing SBCT = 12(13 including scout) +12/13 +12/13 + 9 = 45/48 nearly there:D

TAH
10-13-2010, 01:11 PM
With the SBCT being at or near the 48 platoon level, what might improved HBCTs and IBCTs look like?

HBCT
Two Combined Arms Bn-Mech (CAB-M)
3 Mech Hvy Tms of 2 Mech Inf Plts + 1 Tank PLt + 120mm SP Mortar section
1 Tank Hvy Tm of 2 Tank Plts + 1 Mech Inf Plt + 120mm SP Mortar section

Total per CAB-M of 7 Mech Inf Pts + 5 Tank Plts + 8 2-gun 120mm Mortar sections

One CAB-Armor of
3 Tank Hvy Tms (same as above)
1 Mech Hvy Tm (same as above)

Total in CAB-A of 7 Tank Pts + 5 Mech Inf Plts + 8 2-gun 120mm Mortar sections

HBCT CAV Sdrn (All scout Platoons of the BCT)
2 Hvy/Tracked CAV/Recon Troop of two 6-vehicle (CFV/BFV) scout Plts + 1 CAV Tank Plt of 6 tanks + 120mm SP Mortar section.
1 Lt/Wheeled Recon/CAV Troop of 3 6-scout/armored car Plts + 120mm Towed mortar section
1 Dragoon Troop of 3 Mech INF Plts + 120mm SP mortar section

HBCT Totals
Mech Inf Plts = 22, increase of 10 (420 PAX added)
Tank Plts = 19, increase of 7 (112 PAX added)
Scout Plts = 7, decrease of 1 (72 PAX subtracted)
120mm Mortar sections = 24 2-gun sections 34 mortars added (136 PAX)
Net increase of 596 PAX added.

IBCT
three Infantry Bns
3 Infantry Co of 3 infantry Plts + 120mm T mortar section
1 Mounted Weapons Co of 4 Mounted Weapons PLts

IBCT CAV Sqdrn
3 Lt/Wheeled Recon/CAV Troop of 3 6-scout/armored car Plts + 120mm Towed mortar section
1 Dismounted Recon Co of three dismounted recon Plts.

IBCT Totals
Inf Plts = 27, increase of 9 (378 PAX added)
Weapons Plts = 12, increase of 4 (76 PAX added)
Scout Plts = 12, increase of 2 (48 PAX added)
120mm Mortar sections = 24 2-gun sections 0 mortars added
Net increase of 502 PAX added.

Tukhachevskii
10-13-2010, 01:22 PM
With the SBCT being at or near the 48 platoon level, what might improved HBCTs and IBCTs look like?

HBCT
Two Combined Arms Bn-Mech (CAB-M)
3 Mech Hvy Tms of 2 Mech Inf Plts + 1 Tank PLt + 120mm SP Mortar section
1 Tank Hvy Tm of 2 Tank Plts + 1 Mech Inf Plt + 120mm SP Mortar section

Total per CAB-M of 7 Mech Inf Pts + 5 Tank Plts + 8 2-gun 120mm Mortar sections

One CAB-Armor of
3 Tank Hvy Tms (same as above)
1 Mech Hvy Tm (same as above)

Total in CAB-A of 7 Tank Pts + 5 Mech Inf Plts + 8 2-gun 120mm Mortar sections

HBCT CAV Sdrn (All scout Platoons of the BCT)
2 Hvy/Tracked CAV/Recon Troop of two 6-vehicle (CFV/BFV) scout Plts + 1 CAV Tank Plt of 6 tanks + 120mm SP Mortar section.
1 Lt/Wheeled Recon/CAV Troop of 3 6-scout/armored car Plts + 120mm Towed mortar section
1 Dragoon Troop of 3 Mech INF Plts + 120mm SP mortar section

HBCT Totals
Mech Inf Plts = 22, increase of 10 (420 PAX added)
Tank Plts = 19, increase of 7 (112 PAX added)
Scout Plts = 7, decrease of 1 (72 PAX subtracted)
120mm Mortar sections = 24 2-gun sections 34 mortars added (136 PAX)
Net increase of 596 PAX added.

IBCT
three Infantry Bns
3 Infantry Co of 3 infantry Plts + 120mm T mortar section
1 Mounted Weapons Co of 4 Mounted Weapons PLts

IBCT CAV Sqdrn
3 Lt/Wheeled Recon/CAV Troop of 3 6-scout/armored car Plts + 120mm Towed mortar section
1 Dismounted Recon Co of three dismounted recon Plts.

IBCT Totals
Inf Plts = 27, increase of 9 (378 PAX added)
Weapons Plts = 12, increase of 4 (76 PAX added)
Scout Plts = 12, increase of 2 (48 PAX added)
120mm Mortar sections = 24 2-gun sections 0 mortars added
Net increase of 502 PAX added.

Why the compicated set-up? Why not pure Bns and task org as and when needed? I don't see an organic arty/fires Bn. Would that be attached from a (proper) arty Bde? Although I have to say, I do like the profusion of 120mm SPMs...now imagine the SPM were twin barrelled (http://www.patriahagglunds.fi/pdf/amos.pdf)...drool. Could easily free up the Arty Bde (with 3-5 155mm Bns and a couple of MLRS Bn, locating and ISTAR Bn, etc.) to concentrate on the deep fight- and cover the non-contigous gaps between depoloyed formations -while the mortars are more than enough for the close punch-up.

TAH
10-13-2010, 02:13 PM
Why the compicated set-up? Why not pure Bns and task org as and when needed? I don't see an organic arty/fires Bn. Would that be attached from a (proper) arty Bde? Although I have to say, I do like the profusion of 120mm SPMs...now imagine the SPM were twin barrelled (http://www.patriahagglunds.fi/pdf/amos.pdf)...drool. Could easily free up the Arty Bde (with 3-5 155mm Bns and a couple of MLRS Bn, locating and ISTAR Bn, etc.) to concentrate on the deep fight- and cover the non-contigous gaps between depoloyed formations -while the mortars are more than enough for the close punch-up.

Left off the non-manuever parts. Four Manuever Bns would require at least a big cannon Bn (maybe a cannon/rocket Bn? 3 by 1).

Would also need, more engineers, big Sustainment/Support Bn

An argument can be made that if combined arms is good at the higher levels, its good at lower levels too.

It enables getting to know each other, the strenghts, weakness and personalities etc.

Could go back and make one of the companies in each CAB "pure". The thing is a bit like the old-school Bundeswehr Bdes in some respects.

82redleg
10-13-2010, 02:30 PM
With the SBCT being at or near the 48 platoon level, what might improved HBCTs and IBCTs look like?

HBCT
Two Combined Arms Bn-Mech (CAB-M)
3 Mech Hvy Tms of 2 Mech Inf Plts + 1 Tank PLt + 120mm SP Mortar section
1 Tank Hvy Tm of 2 Tank Plts + 1 Mech Inf Plt + 120mm SP Mortar section

Total per CAB-M of 7 Mech Inf Pts + 5 Tank Plts + 8 2-gun 120mm Mortar sections

One CAB-Armor of
3 Tank Hvy Tms (same as above)
1 Mech Hvy Tm (same as above)

Total in CAB-A of 7 Tank Pts + 5 Mech Inf Plts + 8 2-gun 120mm Mortar sections

While I don't usually disagree with more infantry, I don't see the need for two different organizations. I would add a two more CABs to the HBCT, making a total of 24 mech platoons and 24 armor platoons, 6 of each in each of 4 BNs. I think that your 1 CAB-A has only 4 x 2-gun 120mm mortar sections. We got rid of mortars in the mech/armor companies with the introduction of Bradley in the 80s. As a redleg, I'm all about indirect, but I don't like the current 2-gun mortar sections that lack a real FDC capability, especially in 120s, since it limits their effective range to LOS. Particularly in the CAB, I'd prefer to see a USMC style mortar platoon, with a PLT HQ, 2 x section FDCs, and 2 4-gun sections. With a little risk acceptance, the 3 HQs and split 4 ways and provide FDC capability to 4 x 2-gun sections, but generally plan to operate as 2 x 4-guns.


HBCT CAV Sdrn (All scout Platoons of the BCT)
2 Hvy/Tracked CAV/Recon Troop of two 6-vehicle (CFV/BFV) scout Plts + 1 CAV Tank Plt of 6 tanks + 120mm SP Mortar section.
1 Lt/Wheeled Recon/CAV Troop of 3 6-scout/armored car Plts + 120mm Towed mortar section
1 Dragoon Troop of 3 Mech INF Plts + 120mm SP mortar section

Why differentiate between light heavy troops? Either they are going to do only recon (in which case they need a Wiesel, or something similar), or they are going to do CAV (more likely, in which case the CFV has been an acceptable compromise). I also don't like the differing tank platoon organization- in my mind, they should all be the same. 4 tanks seems to be an agreeable compromise. I think that the ACR CAV troop, with 2 scout PLTs and 2 tank platoons, was a decent organization- adding a third scout PLT would enhance capabilities at fairly low overhead costs, although your Dragoon troop is similar strength, but adds a CO HQ overhead. Maybe putting the three mech platoons into three armored cav troops is a better compromise, so, in the Armored Cav SQDN, we have 3 Armored Cav Troops, each with 2 x scout (6 x CFV), 1 x tank (4 x M1) and 1 mech (4 x M2, 3 x squads).


HBCT Totals
Mech Inf Plts = 22, increase of 10 (420 PAX added)
Tank Plts = 19, increase of 7 (112 PAX added)
Scout Plts = 7, decrease of 1 (72 PAX subtracted)
120mm Mortar sections = 24 2-gun sections 34 mortars added (136 PAX)
Net increase of 596 PAX added.

You left off all the HQ overhead in figuring your numbers. One of my biggest issues with the current BCT designs is the proliferation of HQs and staffs for minimal combat power. My 4 BNs x 4 COs + CS would result:
Mech IN platoons= 27/28 (increase of 15/16) (x/y, x is 3 troop squadron, y is 4 troop squadron)
Tank platoons= 27/28 (increase of 15/16)
Scout platoons = 10/12 (increase of 2/4)
2 gun 120mm Mortar sections = 35/36 (increase of 28/29).
The headquarters and staff cost for this increase is 2 BN HQs (the BCT and CAV SQDN remain the same)


IBCT
three Infantry Bns
3 Infantry Co of 3 infantry Plts + 120mm T mortar section
1 Mounted Weapons Co of 4 Mounted Weapons PLts

120mm is overkill in light infantry. The BN mortar platoon already has arms room 81s or 120s- increasing that platoon to 8 tubes and 2 section FDCs is sufficient (IMO)- the CO 60mm section needs an additional squad leader and 4 additional ammo bears (11 men total for 2 tubes).


IBCT CAV Sqdrn
3 Lt/Wheeled Recon/CAV Troop of 3 6-scout/armored car Plts + 120mm Towed mortar section
1 Dismounted Recon Co of three dismounted recon Plts.

IBCT Totals
Inf Plts = 27, increase of 9 (378 PAX added)
Weapons Plts = 12, increase of 4 (76 PAX added)
Scout Plts = 12, increase of 2 (48 PAX added)
120mm Mortar sections = 24 2-gun sections 0 mortars added
Net increase of 502 PAX added.

Again, you neglected to account for the HQs and staffs involved in your increases, just the platoons. Your two additional scout platoons are different- the dismounted platoon in the recon squadron is 28 pax (3 x 8 + 4), the infantry battalion scout platoon is 22 pax (3 x 6 + 4). I think we can go to 6-man squads for all the dismounted scouts, and put 4 platoons in the dismounted company. We should add another mounted troop, too, so the SQDN is 3 x 3 + 1 x 4

With these additional maneuver elements, the CS elements (FA, EN, HCTs, etc) and CSS (trans, especially) will have to be increased, too. The current IBCT has the capability to haul 4 of 6 rifle companies with organic assets (more if you take risk with supplies like artillery ammo), assuming no change in the BSB (other than the FSC with additional battalions) means a 4 x BN IBCT would only be able to haul 6 out of 12 (50% instead of 66%). This may be acceptable, but its something we need to discuss.

Again, going to 4 BN x 4 COs plus CS results in
Rifle platoons = 36 (increase of 18)
AT/WPNS platoons = 16 (increase of 8)
dismount Scout platoons = 8 (increase of 4)
mounted scout platoons = 9 (increase of 3)
120mm mortar sections = 35 (increase of 29)
with the same increase of 2 BN HQs.

TAH
10-14-2010, 01:40 PM
82redleg.

Got me :rolleyes: I didn't cover the various Hqs and their PAX counts.

1. It looks like you are proposing a 4+1 configuration of 4 maneuver Bns + 1recon/CAV Bn/Sqdrn.

2. Prefer 3-gun versus 2-gun mortar sections. All could/maybe should be consolidated into a single Battery (like the USMC) with a couple of FDCs to enable split operations. Think the standard should be foe them to get task org'ed out. Back in the day, I was cross-attached to a mech Inf co with its own 81mms. The Company Cdr got VERY responsive fires when/where he needed them. Current Bn hvy mortar platoons can be overlooked in the "Big" Bn fight.

3. Nothing wrong with a 2 X 2 CAV troop. Was trying to get the biggest bang for the smallest buck (Ken :), Like the option of 2 scout, 1 tank and 1 mech inf with organic mortars.

4. Have an asymeteric CAV Sqdrn because sometimes all you need is to sneak-n-peek (light/wheeled) and sometimes you really need to fight for information (CFVs). Also, I consolidated all the scouts under the CAV to enable flexiblity in cross-attachment. CAV could give away one or more platoons to the maneuver bns, or troop(-) or a whole troops an get more tanks and mech inf.

5. Had comdined arms companies to foster better working relationships. Get to know the other guy, his capabilities, his limitations and his personalities. Could go make a change to put one "pure" company of mech or tanks in each Bn type.

82redleg
10-14-2010, 09:43 PM
82redleg.

Got me :rolleyes: I didn't cover the various Hqs and their PAX counts.

1. It looks like you are proposing a 4+1 configuration of 4 maneuver Bns + 1recon/CAV Bn/Sqdrn.

2. Prefer 3-gun versus 2-gun mortar sections. All could/maybe should be consolidated into a single Battery (like the USMC) with a couple of FDCs to enable split operations. Think the standard should be foe them to get task org'ed out. Back in the day, I was cross-attached to a mech Inf co with its own 81mms. The Company Cdr got VERY responsive fires when/where he needed them. Current Bn hvy mortar platoons can be overlooked in the "Big" Bn fight.

3. Nothing wrong with a 2 X 2 CAV troop. Was trying to get the biggest bang for the smallest buck (Ken :), Like the option of 2 scout, 1 tank and 1 mech inf with organic mortars.

4. Have an asymeteric CAV Sqdrn because sometimes all you need is to sneak-n-peek (light/wheeled) and sometimes you really need to fight for information (CFVs). Also, I consolidated all the scouts under the CAV to enable flexiblity in cross-attachment. CAV could give away one or more platoons to the maneuver bns, or troop(-) or a whole troops an get more tanks and mech inf.

5. Had comdined arms companies to foster better working relationships. Get to know the other guy, his capabilities, his limitations and his personalities. Could go make a change to put one "pure" company of mech or tanks in each Bn type.

Yes, 4 maneuver + CAV/recon + artillery + support.

To me, more tubes are always better. With the proliferation of AC2 requirements, I think that a BN is better able to control mortar fires, especially 120mms, with their extended range (and thus increased max ord and coordination requirements). You can shoot a 60mm like a big M203, visually clearing the airspace you are going to occupy (temporarily). This is much harder to do with a 120mm.

I thought they wanted more dismounts in the 2 x 2 CAV troops (the mech helps this somewhat, I think).

I'll buy your recon vs fight for info organization. Task org works, if you have enough combat power to task org without emasculating the subordinate (like you do to a current BCT if you take a BN out, as DIV Reserve, covering force, etc)

I like pure companies for training reasons- the company is the level of training management, and complicating that makes training weaker, IMHO. I was asking about why not just keeping balanced BNs, instead of going 3/1 and 1/3.

TAH
10-15-2010, 02:52 PM
I thought they wanted more dismounts in the 2 x 2 CAV troops (the mech helps this somewhat, I think).

I'll buy your recon vs fight for info organization. Task org works, if you have enough combat power to task org without emasculating the subordinate (like you do to a current BCT if you take a BN out, as DIV Reserve, covering force, etc)

I like pure companies for training reasons- the company is the level of training management, and complicating that makes training weaker, IMHO. I was asking about why not just keeping balanced BNs, instead of going 3/1 and 1/3.

The issue/problem I have with pure companies is that while making it simple for the unit to train and administer itself, it loses the opportunity to learn about the other guy on a regular and re-curring basis. A common thread about tank-infantry teamwork (or lack thereof) was the way the seperate tank Bns got shuttled around. The result was poor understanding on both sides of the capabilities, limitations and just as important individual personalities.

A revised HCT could/might be:
2 CAB-M of
2 Mech Hvy Tms
1 Mech Pure Co
1 Tank Hvy Tm
8 Mech Inf Plts + 4 tank Plts

1 CAB-A of
2 Tank Hvy Tms
1 Tank Pure Co
1 Mech Hvy Tm
8 Tank Plts + 4 Mech Inf Plts

CAV Sqdrn
2 Hvy/Tracked/Armored Troops (2 CFV mounted scout plts + 1 tank Plt + 1 Mech Inf Plt)
2 Light/Wheeled Troops (3 Scout/armored car mounted recon Plts + Stryker Inf Plt)
10 scout/recon Plts (4 Hvy + 6 Light) 2 Tank Plts + 2 Mech Inf Plts + 2 Stryker Inf Plts

HBCT total
16 Mech/Stryker Inf Plts + 14 Tank Plts + 10 Scout/recon Plts.
increase of 2 Mech Inf, 2 Stryker Inf, 2 tank Plts & 2 scout/recon Plts from HBCT baseline.

Adding an additional maneuver Bn (CAB-M) could/would result in HBCT total of:
24 Mech/Stryker Inf Plts + 22 Tank Plts + 10 Scout/Recon Plts
Increase of 10 Mech Inf, 2 Stryker Inf, 6 Tank & 2 scout/recon Plts from baseline.

82redleg
10-15-2010, 08:06 PM
The issue/problem I have with pure companies is that while making it simple for the unit to train and administer itself, it loses the opportunity to learn about the other guy on a regular and re-curring basis. A common thread about tank-infantry teamwork (or lack thereof) was the way the seperate tank Bns got shuttled around. The result was poor understanding on both sides of the capabilities, limitations and just as important individual personalities.


Understand on the tank-infantry teamwork, but I think that mixed BNs are enough. COs train PLTs, which are generally NOT mixed, BNs train companies. With mech and tank COs organic to a BN, there shouldn't be any issues with shuttling BNs around.

I like common building blocks. Your 2 different CABs contain 4 different types of companies, to get a total of (assuming 3 CAB-M and 1 CAB-A) of 28 mech and 20 tank PLTs. My 4 balanced CABs (1 BN organization) contain 2 types of company organization, with a total of 24 platoons of each (could be 32, if you go to 4 PLT / CO).

Is the differing organizations simply to get more infantry?

My answer to achieve that is a heavy SBCT, using the SBCT organization, while substituting tank for MGS (why are these two organizations different again?), IFV for ICV and CFV for RV. This organization (with 4 BNs of 4 COs) would provide 16 tank PLTs and 48 mech PLTs, while retaining identical organizations, which would simplify training and RIPs.

gute
10-16-2010, 04:08 AM
From all that I have read on this thread I am coming to the conclusion that right size for the HBCT is to combine two HBCTs into one - three CAB maneuver battalions, each with a scout platoon with six M3. Infantry and armor support for the scout platoon comes from the battalion. The fourth CAB supplies the ARS which has three troops with 13xM3 and 9xM1 each. A fourth troop has a mech infantry company with a tank platoon. The remaining mech company falls under the STB as is used for security or whatever the BCT commander orders.

Infanteer
10-16-2010, 04:33 AM
Of course, all these detailed numbers mean nothing after first contact. As others have said, TO&E are largely administrative. The crucial aspect here, that has been hit upon, is at what level your combined arms are "ad hoc" and at what level they are permanent.

TAH
10-16-2010, 03:18 PM
From all that I have read on this thread I am coming to the conclusion that right size for the HBCT is to combine two HBCTs into one - three CAB maneuver battalions, each with a scout platoon with six M3. Infantry and armor support for the scout platoon comes from the battalion. The fourth CAB supplies the ARS which has three troops with 13xM3 and 9xM1 each. A fourth troop has a mech infantry company with a tank platoon. The remaining mech company falls under the STB as is used for security or whatever the BCT commander orders.

By combing two BCTs you would get fewer bigger units and get a personnel savings from the reduced number of HQs (BCT HHC(185 PAX), FA Bn HHB (86 PAX), STB HHC (165 PAX), & CSS Bn HHC (85 PAX)). By using a CAB HQ as the ARS HQ you save 290 PAX.

Two "standard" HBCT = 3711 X 2 = 7422

7422 -185 (extra BCT HHC) - 86 (extra FA HHB) - 165 (extra STB HHC) - 85 (extra CSS HHC) - 290 (ARS HHTs) = 6610

TAH
10-16-2010, 03:24 PM
Of course, all these detailed numbers mean nothing after first contact. As others have said, TO&E are largely administrative. The crucial aspect here, that has been hit upon, is at what level your combined arms are "ad hoc" and at what level they are permanent.

One of my pints has been that a "permanent" combined arms unit should perform better one that is Ad Hoc.

If you assess that most of the time a company will fight pure, then organize your compnaies that way. If you assess that most of the time Tank/Mech tms will be needed most often, then task org that way. I think it will be the latter.

No debate that pure is easier for the Company Cdr to train. But if its not how he will normally fight you end up training for a set of circumstances different in training. A VERY bad thing. Train hard or harder to make combat easy:)

Infanteer
10-16-2010, 03:31 PM
One of my pints has been that a "permanent" combined arms unit should perform better one that is Ad Hoc.

I guess an important question to address is "is it easier to "brigade" units up (ie: combined TOW platoons into a TOW company) or "ad hoc" units down (ie: combine a TOW platoon with an infantry company as needed".

Pure companies are like building blocks, and the mixing-and-matching is highly dependant on the task. What's the point in having a permanent mixed company if you are stripping tanks away the next day because those Riflemen are needed somewhere else?

Up here, we are "branch pure" up to battalion level, although we have the "optimized battle group" experiment seeing a battalion organized as a battle group from the get go. I'm still not too sure if permanent pushing of assets down to low levels is a huge advantage if there already exists a philosophy of combined arms training that persists within the organization.

82redleg
10-16-2010, 05:30 PM
If you assess that most of the time a company will fight pure, then organize your compnaies that way. If you assess that most of the time Tank/Mech tms will be needed most often, then task org that way. I think it will be the latter.

No debate that pure is easier for the Company Cdr to train. But if its not how he will normally fight you end up training for a set of circumstances different in training. A VERY bad thing. Train hard or harder to make combat easy:)

Most training should be at the small unit level. Obviously, when training company level operations, the CO should be combined arms, but the combination depends on the mission. When conducting platoon or lower level training (which is what should be happening, most of the time), pure is better. The company doesn't have a staff, your expertise is resident in the CO and 1SG, making it very difficult to manage other branch training (this is why we consolidate "low density" training at BN level).

It also increases flexibility- if your CAB-A CDR wants a mech heavy company, he has only one way to get it (using his mech heavy CO) without moving more than 2 platoons. A balanced BN CDR has at least 8 ways (3/1 or 2/1 based on each of his mech COs with a platoon from each tank CO) that involve only 1 or 2 platoons working for a different company.

I think pure companies in combined arms battalions are the way to go, and we can agree to disagree.

82redleg
10-16-2010, 05:41 PM
By combing two BCTs you would get fewer bigger units and get a personnel savings from the reduced number of HQs (BCT HHC(185 PAX), FA Bn HHB (86 PAX), STB HHC (165 PAX), & CSS Bn HHC (85 PAX)). By using a CAB HQ as the ARS HQ you save 290 PAX.

Two "standard" HBCT = 3711 X 2 = 7422

7422 -185 (extra BCT HHC) - 86 (extra FA HHB) - 165 (extra STB HHC) - 85 (extra CSS HHC) - 290 (ARS HHTs) = 6610

Details, but the savings is really more than this. At least the CO HQs in the BSB can be saved (consolidating larger maint, med and distro COs, although maybe justifying split supply and trans COs with the increased scope). Same with the FSC for the FA BN and ARS (some of the capability needs to be retained, but these COs are already far smaller than their maneuver peer). MI and SIG COs, too, so you've saved at least an additional 6-7 CO HQs. At an average of 10 pax, that's another 65 pax.

Elements of the FA BN TGT Acquisition Platoon (radar, met and survey) are in the same position. At a minimum, you don't need 2 platoon HQs. A single met section can support a BN, whether 2 or 4 batteries, and a you don't need 4 survey teams, either (each BN still has 2, the same as the old 3 battery BN- at most you need 3 of the 4).

That's almost an additional 100 people, plus the excess capacity in the BSB and BSTB. I'm not smart enough on these organizations to know the details, but I know that our BSB supported 3 additional BNs, plus some other additional units (on an area support basis) AND provided manpower for other missions- definitely don't need all the pax. Likewise, the elements of the SIG CO and MICO that augment the BCT staff (analysis, NET OPS) are still supporting the same BCT HQ, although the analysts can probably be used to process additional information, the platoon HQ that supports them isn't needed, and the SIG CO is still only supporting 2 CMD posts.

gute
11-06-2010, 02:54 PM
Came across this article in Army Magazine. I like the author's ideas, but we do seem to be past it now (article written in Mach 2005).

http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2005/3/Documents/Lowe_0305.pdf



If the above link does not work this one should:

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_200503/ai_n11852055/

Infanteer
11-12-2010, 01:06 PM
I like the nice pictures!

I work in a Brigade with 7 subordinate units (and 2 OPCOM at times) - it is big and, in my opinion, a bit unwieldy. He's advocating Brigades with 10 subordinate units. I don't know if that is the greatest idea.

Ken White
11-12-2010, 03:41 PM
(one was occasionally even a bit larger with about 15 direct subordinates at one time) that operated quite successfully, IMO it is a matter of how much autonomy is granted subordinate units. If they are trusted to perform, they will -- provided the Bde doesn't go into the overcontrol mode.

It probably helped that both Bdes had Commanders whose philosophy echoed the words of one as he retired to his tent nightly "Wake me if all the Bns are in heavy contact." :wry:

Infanteer
11-12-2010, 04:08 PM
IMO it is a matter of how much autonomy is granted subordinate units. If they are trusted to perform, they will -- provided the Bde doesn't go into the overcontrol mode.

I'll agree to an extent - it depends on what the units are doing. If you're doing some sort of pacfication where the Bde gives areas A,B,C,D,E,F and G to its units, then yes it can be easy as the superior HQ is a "caretaker". This could be taken to the unit (bn) level as well. I'm sure you'll agree with me that anyone above the rank of major in a small war has a limited tactical role.

When you start moving pieces together in a smaller battlespace it'll get a bit harder; every subordinate beyond two adds an additonal layer of friction; I guess the question is when does the difficulties outweigh the benefits?

I'll also add my own perspective from peactime management. Training and managing 8000 people is harder than training 4000 people. Unscientifically, I'm willing to bet two Bde Comds with 50-man staffs and 4000 people will accomplish more than 1 Bde Comd with a 100-man staff and 8000 people.

Ken White
11-12-2010, 05:40 PM
However, two points occur to me. First, that in combat, while the old METT-TC rules and a good commander can make most anything work, it is foolish to design for the latter factor (given mandatory democratic nation personnel policies) and too many folks, even experienced people who should know better, lose sight of the former factor...

Secondly, we make an error, I think, in designing a lot of stuff during peace time that does not work well in combat. The bureaucratic tradeoffs necessary in organizing, funding, staffing and just getting things done in peace can -- should -- disappear in combat and thus the operational rules can and will differ. Unfortunately, I doubt there's any way around that. :wry:

Fortunately, the troops most always make it work in spite of the impediments. ;)

TAH
11-13-2010, 12:25 AM
I'll agree to an extent - it depends on what the units are doing.

Training and managing 8000 people is harder than training 4000 people.

Unscientifically, I'm willing to bet two Bde Comds with 50-man staffs and 4000 people will accomplish more than 1 Bde Comd with a 100-man staff and 8000 people.

1. Things always end up depending on the specific situation :D

2. Not sure I agree with its easier to train 4K versus 8K. Once you get a training opertion/plan up and running, it get easier the biger you get. There will be thru-put issues but the same cocnept that worked for 4K will work for 8K.

3. Well, you could use a Blue/Gold way of doing business and then I might agree. With 4K versus 8K you probably don't need the full 100% increase in staff to handle the 100% increase on BOG. More likely the 8K staff would end up being around 60-70 unless you make a shift/jump for O6/Colonel level to a GO Command. General's need/get a whole lot more staff sections that don't really get used lower down , (PAO, Military History Section) O6 commands also don't need as many folks in the S8 (funding) and S4 (CSS) sections as you will find in a G8 or G4.

For the most part, once you carve out functional sections like scouts, mortars, medics, MPs, etc the Bn and Bde Hqs are 100-125 folks doing staff work.

TAH
11-22-2010, 02:34 AM
Same number and organization of 12 maneuver companies.

2 big Bns of 6 companies or

3 Bns of 4 Companies or

4 small Bns of 3 companies.

2 versus 3 versus 4 Bn Hqs of the same size

2 versus 3 versus 4 FSC of different sizes

An estimate would be 500-600 Hq/support PAX for a 2 X 6

900-1000 for 3 X 4 and 1000-1400 for 4 X 3

Fewer bigger Bns allows for an overall PAX savings that could be turned into more Bns and possibly moer BCTs. Of just savings overall.

Ski
12-30-2010, 02:48 PM
The Modular BCT's were a derivative of MacGregor's ACR concept. That concept was way too expensive for the Army to ever afford, so decisions were made as a compromise to capture the combined arms nature of the ACR. Even after the initial drafts of the Modular BCT's were examined, there was an issue with the costs associated with the BCT's.

Then an "either/or" scenario appeared. The Army was forced to decide between BCT's with three infantry/combined arms battalions and a recce squadron, which would result in X number of BCT's, or they could accept a two infantry/combined arms battalions and a recce squadron and have Y number of BCT's. The Y number resulted in more BCT's - which is why it was accepted.

There have been rumors floating around for a year or so now about returning to the three infantry/combined arms battalion structure. If enacted, it would reduce the number of BCT's to the X level mentioned earlier. There's no such thing as a free lunch when it comes to force structure.

Fuchs
12-30-2010, 03:08 PM
The army was downsizing, so how could that concept have been too expensive? There was surplus equipment from saved formations for almost whatever structure you could think of IIRC.

gute
12-30-2010, 05:07 PM
The army was downsizing, so how could that concept have been too expensive? There was surplus equipment from saved formations for almost whatever structure you could think of IIRC.

When the decisions were made the U.S. Army was growing due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. I believe the 3ID was the first division to convert when it rotated back to the U.S. after the invasion in 2003. Now with the draw down in Iraq the large numbers of BCTs are not needed so the Army is able to consolidate the BCTs into three maneuver battalion BCTs like they wanted at the beginning but could not because of the requirement for troops in Iraq. IMO the U.S. Army took the best of a bad situation and made it work.

It's my understanding that the Army is conducting a force review and we should all know in a couple of months if the modular BCT is the way forward or a passing fad.

Cavguy
12-30-2010, 07:51 PM
The army was downsizing, so how could that concept have been too expensive? There was surplus equipment from saved formations for almost whatever structure you could think of IIRC.

The real $$ in our budget is personnel costs, not equipment. (IIRC around 60%).

Agree all else. Now that Iraq is over I expect a re-design of the modular BCTs within the next few years. Interestingly, Stryker units retained three maneuver BNs plus recce squadron.

TAH
01-01-2011, 01:21 PM
Correct on the biggest cost is for personnel.

A bit about the Strykers.

1. They didn't really retain three battalions, they have always had three battalions.

2. They cut corners: No Bn Headquarters for the Engineer Co, AT Co, MI Co, Signal Co, they have only 4 vehicles in their recon/scout platoons as opposed to the "standard" of 6, the MGS platoons were cut down to 3 (from the standard of 4) and then they eliminated the extra/fourth crewmen, same thing happened with the AT Platoons 3 versus 4 vehicles.

In order to stay inside current troop levels, the follolwing could be done to add a third maneuver battalion to each HBCT/IBCT.

Standdown 5 HBCTs, convert total number of troops to new maneuver Bn + third FA Battery, additional Forward SPT Co, and an additional Engineer Co.

Standdown 9 IBCTs, same method as above.

Impacts at the DIV level:
1. Reduce the number of BCT per DIV from 4 to 3.
2. Increase the number of maneuver Bn per DIV from 8 to 9.
3. Same increase in FA Firing Batteries.
4. Increase the number of Engineer Co from 4 to 6
5. Reduce the number of Special Troop Bns, FA Bn, Support Bns & BCT HHCs from 4 to 3. Fewer BN Command opportunities for Engineers, MP, NBC, FA, & Log O5s.

Happy New Year BTW

Ski
01-01-2011, 04:47 PM
Modularity wasn't approved until 2004 and the real effects didn't even take place until 2005.

The Active Duty Army was on the increase from 480,000 to 520,000, then up to 569,000. The Guard also transformed their BCT's from the old Limited Division XXI or Army of Excellence design to Modular formations...shedding a lot of old Armor/Mech equipment in the process.

There was NO surplus equipment. The Redlegs in IBCT's were short of howitzers to such an extent that one gun had to be taken off a ski resort in California (used for avalanche control) and a number had to be bought off the Taiwanese (we had sold them these guns well in the past) before the new howitzers (M119A2's) were introduced...which has taken years.

The BCT's also had a massive influx of ABCS equipment - III Corps and a few SBCT's were the only units to really have a full compliment of ABCS equipment. We also replaced a bunch of rolling stock, switching out 30 year old 2.5 ton and 5 ton trucks for newer versions. This was all done within increases in the budget as well.

Of course, we also suffered from the giant sucking wound known as FCS which diverted billions of dollars that could have been used on existing programs.

Modularity also had significant increases in field grade officers and senior NCO positions over the old force structure, which led to additional costs.

The costs associated with Modularity were and are enormous. I think the Guard alone has had close to $30B of equipment pumped into it over the last decade...




The army was downsizing, so how could that concept have been too expensive? There was surplus equipment from saved formations for almost whatever structure you could think of IIRC.

Rifleman
01-03-2011, 02:17 AM
How is the Army any more modular now than it had been all along since getting rid of Pentomic for ROAD?

I read the idea behind going to brigade HQs in the division was to recreate the flexibility found in the combat commands of the WWII armored division. The brigade had home battalions, but I know battalions were often cross attached to other brigades within the division for operations. And I think 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Divison was OPCONNED to the 101st in Vietnam.

I thought that was modularity. Maybe it's just flexibility?

82redleg
01-03-2011, 03:12 AM
How is the Army any more modular now than it had been all along since getting rid of Pentomic for ROAD?

I read the idea behind going to brigade HQs in the division was to recreate the flexibility found in the combat commands of the WWII armored division. The brigade had home battalions, but I know battalions were often cross attached to other brigades within the division for operations. And I think 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Divison was OPCONNED to the 101st in Vietnam.

I thought that was modularity. Maybe it's just flexibility?

It has to do with deployable units, or what level is modularly deployable.

In early OEF/OIF, when a division deployed a BCT, the BCT required a slice of the divisional MSCs (a BN from DIVARTY and DISCOM, and ENG if a heavy DIV, and companies from the MI BN, ADA BN, EN BN if a light DIV, SIG BN. A couple of separate platoons, too (MP and CHEM, IIRC). This offered the division the opportunity to fatten the first BCT deployed, at the expense of follow on BCTs. It also created issues with prep and training- when do you stop falling under your organic functional command and fall under the BCT you will deploy with. I can remember my BN CDR bouncing between the BDE and the DIVARTY, getting conflicting guidance. Despite a DIV directed task org effective, it was a negotiation on which DIVARTY events we would still participate in, rating changes effective, etc, etc, etc. Then, when a DIV deploys separate from its BCTs, those functional commanders have nothing to command- yeah, they are still special staff officers, but they have full time representatives for that.

There are also administrative details that are difficult when you are attached to a BCT. As a BN, its not too bad, but some things cause confusion to change over and back between the organic and attached HQ. For companies and platoons, its even worse (since they aren't set up to be administratively separate, but when deployed with their BCT are separated from their organic HQ).

I think that the BCTs are better overall- most of the training issues attributed to modularity are really attributable to a shortage of force structure and rapid turn around between deployments- than the division based force- we had 7 de facto BCTs before 2004 (only 82d, 101st and 1st CAV had all of their BCTs co-located).

Fuchs
01-03-2011, 11:59 AM
Let's face it; the modern brigade is the equivalent of World War divisions. We could simply rename them divisions, for they aren't much smaller than the Russian idea of a division anyway.

You need a combined arms team including
* the capability to penetrate MBT frontal armour (AT),
* the capability to shoot building-destroying shells in direct and indirect fire (105mm HE and greater),
* the capability of electronic reconnaissance (triangulation and monitoring) and radio jamming,
* the capability to deploy enough infantry to search a large village or fight your way through a forest road,
* the capability to sustain the force itself for at least three days without major supply deliveries
of a much smaller size than a brigade or division.

The really, really interesting formation is therefore rather a mixed and reinforced battalion (battalion battle group / Kampfgruppe) with a three-digit head count
and
for missions that emphasize economy of force and reconnaissance the correct size would be a mixed company (this one would then substitute infantry with a dismount scout platoon).

I understand that the approach of "pure" administrative units is still widely preferred, but I don't get why a formation such as a brigade has even today still only one TO&E.
It should have several ones:

An early training TO&E (training within units; equipment proficiency, typical unit missions, reaction drills).

A late training TO&E (advanced training in mixed battle groups).

A Battle group / maneuver team / Kampfgruppe / fighting column type of TO&E for a combat-heavy land campaign.

An occupation / blue helmet TO&E.

A skeleton self-defence TO&E (support units serve as makeshift infantry and AT troops, original combat units down reduced by attrition down to a third by assumption).

TAH
01-03-2011, 01:26 PM
I think that the BCTs are better overall- most of the training issues attributed to modularity are really attributable to a shortage of force structure and rapid turn around between deployments- than the division based force- we had 7 de facto BCTs before 2004 (only 82d, 101st and 1st CAV had all of their BCTs co-located).

Being on the outside, I've heard that there are training issues with the modular BCTs. Mostly revolve around low-density situations, FISTs/FOs in the maneuver Bns, Planning of fires across BCTs, collective training of MI, MP and Engineers.

TAH

82redleg
01-03-2011, 01:59 PM
Being on the outside, I've heard that there are training issues with the modular BCTs. Mostly revolve around low-density situations, FISTs/FOs in the maneuver Bns, Planning of fires across BCTs, collective training of MI, MP and Engineers.

TAH

Yes, I lived in a BCT for 3 years. There are issues, but I think that most of them come from the deployment/optempo, not the organization.

How much influence does the BN staff have on individual training? Not much, its the responsibility of the PLT and CO chain of command.

How much MOS specificity do you need for, for instance, MI platoon training? Again, IMO, not much- it is integrated into manuever training, not a stand alone event.

Yes, there are some difficulties, but they are not insurmountable.

Rifleman
01-03-2011, 06:20 PM
The really, really interesting formation is therefore rather a mixed and reinforced battalion (battalion battle group / Kampfgruppe) with a three-digit head count...


Indeed it is interesting. I was fortunate enough to be in one when many considered it the choice duty in the cold war army of the '80s.

But I understand it came with it's own problems (or special considerations), although not insurmountable. For instance, I believe our battalion combat team's battery commander had a previous battery command in the 82d to learn his trade under an FA battalion commander before being considered for battery command in the battalion combat team. The engineer platoon leader might have been likewise, I remember he was a 1LT.

FWIW, the USMC MEU(SOC) is a similar concept.

Infanteer
01-03-2011, 06:58 PM
I understand that the approach of "pure" administrative units is still widely preferred, but I don't get why a formation such as a brigade has even today still only one TO&E.
It should have several ones:

Sounds like the Commonwealth model - Canada employs forces in a method very similiar to your description.

gute
02-06-2011, 05:41 PM
Came across this a couple of days ago. There is also a monograph out there by Maj McGee that recommends the same.

http://www.usace.army.mil/about/LeadersEmeritus/Documents/Info_Papers/27_-_Brigade_Combat_Team_Engineer_Battalion_(BEB).pdf

gute
02-06-2011, 06:48 PM
Here is the link to the monograph:

http://cdm15040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=2595&CISOBOX=1&REC=8

gute
02-10-2011, 03:23 PM
Here is a link to more talk of restructuring the modular BCT:

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2011/02/08/army-seeks-new-model-doctrine/

gute
02-10-2011, 06:46 PM
Sorry, Unified Quest not Qwest.

Fuchs
02-18-2011, 12:00 AM
related:

Leichte Divisionen vs. ACR (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2011/02/leichte-divisionen-vs-acr.html)

TAH
06-23-2011, 01:57 PM
Thought I saw something earlier this week (Army Times?) that talked about adding a third maneuver battalion and an engineer battalion to each BCT.

Will be interesting to see if that happens and how it gets "paid for" with a projected down-sizing of the acitve Army by 40,000 or so.

gute
06-23-2011, 02:31 PM
Thought I saw something earlier this week (Army Times?) that talked about adding a third maneuver battalion and an engineer battalion to each BCT.

Will be interesting to see if that happens and how it gets "paid for" with a projected down-sizing of the acitve Army by 40,000 or so.

I would think that with the decrease in combat tours/brigade rotations that the Army will consolidate BCTs, which will for the most part put support troops on the chopping block. I read that the engineer school reached out to the combined arms maneuver center and suggested replacing the the special troops battalion with a brigade engineer battalion. The BEB would obviously command the engineer forces in the brigade along with the signals and MI companies.

TAH
06-27-2011, 02:26 PM
Post Number 100!

Confirming what Gute said, the BEB (Brigade Engineer Battalion) will take the place of the existing BSTBs in HBCT/IBCTs and get added into SBCTs.

The "bill payers" will be EBA (Echelon Above Brigade) engineer units.

What is getting added to the existing BSTB will be a second engineer company with a vertical construction platoon, a horizontal contruction platoon and a route clearance platoon.

The new BEB will retain C2 of the existing Signal, MI, MP and NBC units inside a BSTB. Much easier when the Engineers, MPs, and NBC guys all report to the same two-star at Leonard Wood. :)

gute
06-29-2011, 02:29 PM
Are there enough engineer battalion headquarters to go around to fill all 45 BCTs? The Army must be planning on cutting the number of brigades and consolidating maneuver battalions.

gute
06-29-2011, 02:32 PM
Maybe the BEB should actually be called the MEB for Maneuver Enhancement Battalion. Anyways, it seems to be a step in the right direction.

Infanteer
06-29-2011, 11:27 PM
We call them "Combat Engineer Regiments"

TAH
06-30-2011, 12:46 PM
Are there enough engineer battalion headquarters to go around to fill all 45 BCTs? The Army must be planning on cutting the number of brigades and consolidating maneuver battalions.

From what I've read, they will covert the existing Special Troops Bn Hqs toan Engineer Bn Hqs (Means an Engineer O5 CMD slot vice MP or Eng or Chem or Signal or MI). Pretty mush as wash for the 73 (45 AC + 28 ARNG) BCTs.

Some work to do for the SBCTs as they don't already have STBs.

The "Arms & Legs" increases (construction and Route clearing) are getting re-programed from EAB (Echelon Above Bde). A shell game.

They did a similar thing back in the 90s to create the Engineer Groups in the heavy divisions. Moved Corps GroupHQs & Bns down into the division.

Good idea? Probably. Increases the level of engineer support at the BCT level and retains an O5 Hqs to potentially be the Rear Area Operations C2 node.

TAH
06-30-2011, 12:48 PM
We call them "Combat Engineer Regiments"

Oh you Commonwealth guys :wry:

Fuchs
06-30-2011, 04:06 PM
It's most funny with the Swiss, most of whom ordinarily speak a funny version of German, but with strong French influences.

They call engineers "Genietruppen" - to a German, that means 'genius troops'.

Kiwigrunt
06-30-2011, 07:37 PM
It's most funny with the Swiss, most of whom ordinarily speak a funny version of German, but with strong French influences.

They call engineers "Genietruppen" - to a German, that means 'genius troops'.

The Dutch also call them 'Genie'. So in their case it must mean 'genius engineers' then:p

gute
06-30-2011, 11:20 PM
As I wrote before, IMO the BEB is a step in the right direction, but do believe that calling it a Maneuver Enhancement Battalion makes more sense. Assign at a minimum a company each of MPs, chemical and engineers - ADA when needed.

Signals and MI would be assigned to the RSTA - a battalion organization and not a squadron. Add the target and acquisition platoon from the fires battalion to the RSTA HHC, signals is A company, MI is B, Recon is C and surveillance and sensors D. The arty batteries assigned directly to the maneuver battalions.

Yes/no?

82redleg
07-01-2011, 03:14 AM
As I wrote before, IMO the BEB is a step in the right direction, but do believe that calling it a Maneuver Enhancement Battalion makes more sense. Assign at a minimum a company each of MPs, chemical and engineers - ADA when needed.

Signals and MI would be assigned to the RSTA - a battalion organization and not a squadron. Add the target and acquisition platoon from the fires battalion to the RSTA HHC, signals is A company, MI is B, Recon is C and surveillance and sensors D. The arty batteries assigned directly to the maneuver battalions.

Yes/no?

Signal and MI are tactically controlled by the BCT staff- large portions of those companies work in the BCT TOC and augment the S2/S6. It really doesn't matter which battalion staff conducts their administration, although the BSB or STB/BEB make more sense to me than the RS (only the SBCTs have RSTA) because their other assets are more probably more closely located.

Target Acquisition platoon from the fires BN includes survey and MET that don't fit well with the RS mission set, and directly support the fires mission- the only element that is really target acquisition is the radar. The radar is limited as a target acquisition asset- it is really a counterfire asset. While the counterfire fight and the RSTA fight have to be coordinated, I think that the FA BN HQ should manage the CF fight.

FA batteries assigned directly to maneuver BNs is a horrible idea. The battalions (with a LTC CDR, a CSM and a staff) are barely able to train themselves in the BCTs- separate batteries in the maneuver BNs will be even worse trained. Separate batteries has worked in the past, but in highly specific circumstances and with specially selected leadership, not as the general organizing principle. In addition, the FA BN command and staff bring the capability to manage a centralized, massed fight to the BCT CDR- it will be much more difficult to create this from scratch for the situtations where it is required (high intensity fighting) than to let batteries operate autonomously in the current fight.

In addition, the FA BN brings an additional BN C2 capability to the BCT- look at all the different mission sets that have been given to FA BNs- maneuver/land owner HQ (whether with organic elements re-roled as maneuver or with attached maneuver units- I've seen it done both ways), counterfire/artillery HQs, MiTT coordinator, civil support/CA coordinator, I'm sure I've missed some. The point is that the BN HQ gives the BCT commander a great deal of flexibility he would lose if you simply put the firing batteries in the maneuver BNs, which are already pushing the limits of span of control.

gute
07-01-2011, 04:08 AM
Signal and MI are tactically controlled by the BCT staff- large portions of those companies work in the BCT TOC and augment the S2/S6. It really doesn't matter which battalion staff conducts their administration, although the BSB or STB/BEB make more sense to me than the RS (only the SBCTs have RSTA) because their other assets are more probably more closely located.

Target Acquisition platoon from the fires BN includes survey and MET that don't fit well with the RS mission set, and directly support the fires mission- the only element that is really target acquisition is the radar. The radar is limited as a target acquisition asset- it is really a counterfire asset. While the counterfire fight and the RSTA fight have to be coordinated, I think that the FA BN HQ should manage the CF fight.

FA batteries assigned directly to maneuver BNs is a horrible idea. The battalions (with a LTC CDR, a CSM and a staff) are barely able to train themselves in the BCTs- separate batteries in the maneuver BNs will be even worse trained. Separate batteries has worked in the past, but in highly specific circumstances and with specially selected leadership, not as the general organizing principle. In addition, the FA BN command and staff bring the capability to manage a centralized, massed fight to the BCT CDR- it will be much more difficult to create this from scratch for the situtations where it is required (high intensity fighting) than to let batteries operate autonomously in the current fight.

In addition, the FA BN brings an additional BN C2 capability to the BCT- look at all the different mission sets that have been given to FA BNs- maneuver/land owner HQ (whether with organic elements re-roled as maneuver or with attached maneuver units- I've seen it done both ways), counterfire/artillery HQs, MiTT coordinator, civil support/CA coordinator, I'm sure I've missed some. The point is that the BN HQ gives the BCT commander a great deal of flexibility he would lose if you simply put the firing batteries in the maneuver BNs, which are already pushing the limits of span of control.

Can not argue with experience and knowledge. Thanks for the detailed explanation.

I find the modular BCTs and transformation fascinating - why, I don't really know. Maybe it's the idea of change, technology and fighting in the 21st Century.

I take it you believe the FA BNs should be removed from the BCTs as an organic element and only assigned when needed?

82redleg
07-01-2011, 11:55 AM
I take it you believe the FA BNs should be removed from the BCTs as an organic element and only assigned when needed?

No, the BCT is the right place for the (used to be DS) fires BNs. Without the in-lieu-of missions competing for training time, the BNs can train themselves- especially once we start getting BCTs commanders that have grown up with the idea that they are responsible for everyone, not just training maneuver and everyone else shows up trained. The only thing the BN really needs help for is planning/resourcing battery level external evaluations, and that can be worked out. My proof for this is the 7 de facto separate BDEs we had since the 90s drawdown (from 1995 or so, only 1st CAV, 101st ABN and 82nd ABN had all 3 of their BDEs co-located with the HQs- the other 7 divisions had a BDE at another post as a de facto separate BDE).

What would help would be providing every division with a fires BDE, so that there is a COL commander that can supervise/coordinate this training for the division.

Rifleman
07-01-2011, 03:00 PM
What would help would be providing every division with a fires BDE, so that there is a COL commander that can supervise/coordinate this training for the division.

So you want to keep the divison vs. the COL MacGregor idea of eliminating the two-star HQ? How do most company and field grades feel about this?

Also, will light infantry brigades go back to a brigade base of three maneuver battalions?

82redleg
07-01-2011, 04:28 PM
So you want to keep the divison vs. the COL MacGregor idea of eliminating the two-star HQ? How do most company and field grades feel about this?

We discussed this a while ago- if you eliminate the divisions from OIF, V Corps would have had like 70 something subordinates. I agree with COL MacGregor that span of control can be extended beyond three, but I don't believe that eliminating the division echelon is possible. The trend in thought currently seems to be that the division is not as capable of modularity as our doctrine assumes, and the division CGs would rather deploy with their habitual BCTs.

The other big problem with modularity is that we cut the number of enabling brigades, so divisions don't have the subordinate HQs that our doctrine assumes for missions like river crossings, counterfire, etc.

I can only speak for the small group of officers that I've discussed this issue with, but I think that most agree that we need the division echelon.


Also, will light infantry brigades go back to a brigade base of three maneuver battalions?

Don't know. Everyone acknowledges that all BCTs should have at least 3 maneuver BNs, and that the RS/RSTA doesn't substitute effectively across the full spectrum of operations (although they have been an effective stop-gap during the current COIN/LIC operations in OIF and OEF). The real constraint is $$, which constrains people. I'm anxious to see what happens in the drawdown we are sure to face soon.

gute
07-02-2011, 02:37 PM
We discussed this a while ago- if you eliminate the divisions from OIF, V Corps would have had like 70 something subordinates. I agree with COL MacGregor that span of control can be extended beyond three, but I don't believe that eliminating the division echelon is possible. The trend in thought currently seems to be that the division is not as capable of modularity as our doctrine assumes, and the division CGs would rather deploy with their habitual BCTs.

The other big problem with modularity is that we cut the number of enabling brigades, so divisions don't have the subordinate HQs that our doctrine assumes for missions like river crossings, counterfire, etc.

I can only speak for the small group of officers that I've discussed this issue with, but I think that most agree that we need the division echelon.



Don't know. Everyone acknowledges that all BCTs should have at least 3 maneuver BNs, and that the RS/RSTA doesn't substitute effectively across the full spectrum of operations (although they have been an effective stop-gap during the current COIN/LIC operations in OIF and OEF). The real constraint is $$, which constrains people. I'm anxious to see what happens in the drawdown we are sure to face soon.

What are the rumors going around regarding the BCTs? When the drawdown comes do the BCTs get a third maneuver battalion (except SBCTs)? Does the equipment and organization of the ARS and RSTA change, etc? Is the whole idea of "transformation" and the "modular" force going bye-bye and the U.S. goes back to the legacy force (which won the Gulf War and OIF)?

I see that you addressed the third maneuver battalion in a previous post.

gute
07-06-2011, 12:43 AM
It's my understanding that recommendations were to made about restructuring the BCT after this years Unified Quest - anyone here have any info on that?

What should a Full Spectrum BCT look like? Combined Arms Battilions like the HBCT or Combined Arms like the SBCT? Maybe a one battalion each of HBACT/IBCT/SBCT? ACR design?

SethB
07-06-2011, 12:36 PM
What would help would be providing every division with a fires BDE, so that there is a COL commander that can supervise/coordinate this training for the division.

FiBs have their own issues. The ones at Sill are pretty squared away, but the ones at Lewis and especially Hood are manpower pools for taskings. Training is an afterthought under those conditions.

Not to mention that most FiBs don't have cannon units which means that there is no opportunity to rotate personnel through them to maintain competency on rocket and tube systems, let alone other artillery skills.

For that matter, should the FiBs have cannons? I can only think of two that do.

82redleg
07-07-2011, 03:53 AM
FiBs have their own issues. The ones at Sill are pretty squared away, but the ones at Lewis and especially Hood are manpower pools for taskings. Training is an afterthought under those conditions.

Not to mention that most FiBs don't have cannon units which means that there is no opportunity to rotate personnel through them to maintain competency on rocket and tube systems, let alone other artillery skills.

For that matter, should the FiBs have cannons? I can only think of two that do.

I can't speak for the (mis)-use of FiBs as tasking pools, but the COL-level CDR and staff allows the planning/execution of BTRY EXEVALs and BN level training, which is impossible in the BCTs. We've always had support cycles, and as the BCT deployments slow down, so will that kind of distractor.

The lack of cannon expertise is a problem, although the FiB HQ should have the requisite expertise, with or without assigned cannon units. Lewis and Bragg do, Hood was supposed to get a cannon BN, don't know about Sill. I think that every FiB should have a cannon BN.

TAH
07-07-2011, 11:23 AM
It's my understanding that recommendations were to made about restructuring the BCT after this years Unified Quest - anyone here have any info on that?

What should a Full Spectrum BCT look like? Combined Arms Battilions like the HBCT or Combined Arms like the SBCT? Maybe a one battalion each of HBACT/IBCT/SBCT? ACR design?

Pretty sure that in order to minimize the overall personnel increase, the size of HBCT Bns will drop from 4 to 3 companies. Overall increase of 8 to 9.

Adding a third Bn will also require increases is: Artillery (third firing Btry), BSB (additional FSC), and probably engineers (more platoons or a second company).

Will we keep CABs? Hmmm, probably, but as tank or mech heavy. Could we go the SBCT route with tanks organic to mech companies? Sure we could, but should we? :eek:

All being done against a "slow down" or operartional deployments and a return to "conventional" operations as well as the decrease in Active-duty end strenght and smaller DoD budgets.

Pretty sure costs will have a big impact on this issue.