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Tc2642
07-25-2006, 12:05 PM
From The Independent,

http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article1195264.ece

Jedburgh
10-20-2006, 03:08 PM
Not the "next small war", but a good brief article on the ever-changing political environment in the Mid-East and the problems of perception management...

The Economist, 19 Oct 06:

Resistance to the West, and rejection of Israel, are the pillars of a rapidly strengthening alliance in the world's most volatile region. (http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8049730)

...So entrenched now is the idea of an American-led assault on Muslims that virtually any new development is immediately enlisted as further evidence. The fact that terror attacks on Westerners, carried out in the name of Islam, may have raised some hackles goes without mention. So does the fact that countries such as Syria, under the cloak of resistance to the West, continue to promote agendas in Lebanon and elsewhere that have nothing to do with anti-Americanism, but with cementing their own regional influence.

Even high-minded Western initiatives now arouse suspicion. The effort to deploy a tougher peacekeeping force in Darfur, where some 200,000 people have been killed and perhaps 1m displaced by a government-assisted slaughter of Darfuris, is widely seen as a subterfuge. The head of the Egyptian lawyers' union, a group which might be expected to defend the rights of the weak, recently declared that the true target of UN peacekeepers was Egypt: Sudan was simply “the next stop after Iraq on the road to the heart of Cairo”.

The manner of the ceasefire in Lebanon aroused scepticism, too. To many, the insertion of a UN peacekeeping force was aimed at recouping by diplomacy what Israel had lost by fighting. A recent poll found that 84% of Lebanese believe the war was “a premeditated attempt by the United States and Israel to impose a new regional order in the Middle East”. As for the international siege of the Palestinians until they renounce terrorism and accept the right of Israel to exist, the popular perception is that the West, having claimed to support democracy, is now punishing Palestinians for having elected Hamas in a fair vote...

SWJED
11-10-2006, 01:12 PM
Case studies recently posted at the United States Institute of Peace (http://www.usip.org/index.html):


Algeria: Transitions from Liberalized Autocracy? (http://www.usip.org/muslimworld/projects/case_study_algeria.html) by Robert Parks, University of Texas, Austin
Democracy in Jordan: Opportunities Lost (http://www.usip.org/muslimworld/projects/case_study_jordan.html) by Ellen Lust-Okar, Yale University
And Now for the Hard Part: Moving Beyond Liberalized Autocracy in Morocco (http://www.usip.org/muslimworld/projects/case_study_morocco.html) by Guilain Denoeux, Colby College
Transitions from Liberalized Autocracy: The Case of Egypt (http://www.usip.org/muslimworld/projects/case_study_egypt.html) by Jason Brownlee, The University of Texas, Austin
The Transition from Liberalized Autocracy? (http://www.usip.org/muslimworld/projects/case_study_kuwait.html) The Case of Kuwait by Michael Herb, Georgia State University

Jedburgh
04-18-2007, 09:27 PM
The thread title is taken from an article in Intelligence Review - 14 February 1946 (http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/intelreview1.pdf) - and as with that article, it is a bit misleading in regard to the substantive content of the piece. Although certain of the terms used clearly date the writing, it is clear not a helluva lot has changed from the basic premise back in 46:

The Present Estimate

If the Moslem states were strong and stable, their behavior would be more predictable. They are, however, weak and torn by internal stresses; furthermore, their peoples are insufficiently educated to appraise propaganda or to understand the motives of those who promise a new Heaven and a new Earth.

Because of the strategic position of the Moslem world and the restlessness of its peoples, the Moslem states constitute a potential threat to world peace. There cannot be permanent world stability, when one-seventh of the world's population exists under the economic and political conditions that are imposed upon the Moslems.

goesh
04-19-2007, 03:27 PM
1946, about the time the great oil boom was getting ready to start and untold hundreds of billions of dollars have been generated in oil revenues in the subsequent 61 years since that Intel report. I don't see much improvement in the quality of life for the average muslim on the planet despite the staggering wealth. In looking at social evolution in relationship to economic growth we here see steady expansion since 1946. In that year, Black veterans in many places couldn't sit down to eat in a cafe with fellow White veterans. Many Blacks couldn't vote. There were many jobs women simply didn't even apply for, let alone do. Lobotomies were a method of treatment for the mentally ill. The handicapped were pretty much excluded from employment. Kids with special needs never had their abilities developed. People that seriously mistreated animals for the most part were never prosecuted. Drunk drivers were often laughed at. Smoking was considered glamorous. I see little correspondence in social evolution in the Islamic world despite the presence of wealth to enable said evolution.

tequila
05-03-2007, 04:37 PM
Article (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun07/nasr.pdf)by Vali Nasr summarizing his book in the latest MR, arguing that the American invasion of Iraq and the subsequent election of a Shia-dominated religious government has empowered Shiism throughout the Middle East.

Jedburgh
05-25-2007, 01:05 PM
CEIP, 25 May 07: Fighting on Two Fronts: Secular Parties in the Arab World (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp85_secular_final.pdf)

Secular parties in the Arab world—a broad range of political organizations that vary in their political orientation from liberal positions to vaguely socialist programs—are facing a crisis. Caught between regimes that allow little legal space for free political activity on one side and popular Islamist movements that are clearly in the ascendancy throughout the Arab world on the other, they are struggling for influence and relevance, and in some cases even for survival.

Results of recent elections across the region have exposed the weaknesses of secular parties and thus created a new sense of urgency among their leaders and members. They no longer hide—from themselves or others—the depth of the crisis they are facing, but they have no ready solutions. They know that they have stagnant or even dwindling constituencies, whereas the Islamists have growing and increasingly well-organized ones. And most admit that, at present, they do not have a strategy on how to regain the ground they have lost in countries such as Morocco and Egypt or to take advantage of new opportunities in countries such as Yemen and Kuwait. There is often a plaintive tone to the arguments set forth by secular parties in the Arab world. They feel victimized by authoritarian governments that thwart their activities. They feel disadvantaged by the competition of Islamist movements that use mosques for proselytizing and charitable institutions to build constituencies. They feel, in other words, caught in the middle and fighting on two fronts...

Jedburgh
07-30-2007, 02:23 PM
First issue of a new pub from the World Security Institute (http://www.worldsecurityinstitute.org/): Arab Insight (http://www.worldsecurityinstitute.org/temp/ArabInsightVol1No1.pdf)

Unfortunately, individual articles are not linked, so you have to download the entire 112 page pdf:

U.S. Foreign Policy and Islamists

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?
Khalil al-Anani, Egypt

Alone at the Ballot Box: American Rejection of Islamists
Atef Abou Saif, Palestinian Territory

Trial and Error: Washington and Iraq’s Shiite
Ibrahim al-Baydani, Iraq

The Cold Embrace: U.S. & Islamists in North Africa
Mohamed el-Ghali, Morocco

Islam Outside the Mosque

Islamic Roots of Good Governance
Mazen Hashem, Syria

Islam and Human Rights: Revisiting the Debate
Jumana Shehata, Egypt

A Response to Western Views of Islamist Movements
Radwan Ziadh, Syria

Separation of Islam & Political Islam: The Case of Morocco
Hossam Tamam, Egypt

Nat Wilcox
07-30-2007, 04:03 PM
Thanks for posting this. I am getting into it.

I'm having some difficulty understanding the difference between these three terms:

Sharia

Islamic Law

Fiqh

I have a feeling, based on different things I have read, that there is a great deal of confusion concerning these three terms. Different sources (both Arab and English) seem to use them in different ways.

One of the three seems to correspond closely to what we in Anglophone countries would call "common law," but I have seen each of these three terms described in a way that resembles common law. One of the authors in Jedburgh's post describes fiqh as Islamic Jurisprudence which is then defined by the author as "an aggregation of individual opinions and juristic interpretations, which differ not only from one country to another, but which also change with the passage of time." That author then says that Islamic Law is based on fiqh. That sounds a lot like our idea of common law; but is that somehow a wrong metaphor?

One of them almost certainly has more to do with abstract principles, like "constitutional" parts of law. Is this Sharia? Or is Sharia an older version of Islamic Law?

Is there someone amongst us who has the sophistication to help me out on this?

Nat Wilcox
07-30-2007, 09:00 PM
I have an Arab friend who is an expert on Islamic banking and finance (which is intimately connected to Islamic legal thinking), so I asked him to help me out with the question I just asked. Here is his answer. Please note that it is one answer (he says "I have argued" which is a sure sign he means that his answer is his considered opinion and that there is some controversy here...fyi).


Hello Nat:

I have argued that practical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) has in fact been common-law like. The reason for lack of transparency, however, is that the rhetoric of Islamic law sounds as if it is an immediate interpretation of a canon law (Shari`a). To add to confusion, most Arab countries have secular civil codes, adapted from French and Swiss codes, and that has shaped their understanding of Islamic law as well.

Let me see if I can make the terms clear to you:

* Shari`a is the Arabic equivalent of the Jewish Halakha, an all encompassing code for life. It includes things such as honor, etc., which far exceed "law" in the narrow sense.

* Authors are often careless re the distinction between Shari`a and Fiqh. The formal legal definition of Shari`a refers to revealed, immutable Law (capital L), as present in the Canon consisting of the Qur'an and Prophet Tradition. Fiqh literally means "understanding", i.e. the application of the Law to a specific instance, which requires going through multiple stages: (1) understanding the issue, (2) legal framing of the question, (3) application of the Legal (capital L) principle to the specific event.

* It is very common for people to usurp Divine authority, as it were, by using the term Shari`a for matters that are really issues of fiqh. Legal scholars distinguish between the two by saying that Shari`a is immutable, but that fiqh, exercised through the two channels of qada' (court rulings) and fatwa (scholarly opinion), varies by time, place and circumstance. When you call your preferred policy an application of Shari`a, it sounds more authoritative, and makes it more difficult for others to argue against your position.

* People who use the term "Islamic law" often mean Shari`a, rather than fiqh. Unfortunately, Shari`a is consistent with many different interpretations, and there has not been a coherent codification of Islamic fiqh since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. That is why British courts twice dismissed provisions of applying Shari`a in contracts, since they concluded that different scholars will interpret Shari`a provisions differently for the cases before them, and "Islamic law" did not qualify as the law of a sovereign nation and therefore could not be applied based on the Rome convention.

I like the writings of Wael Hallaq, but they are a bit involved.

The book that best compares Islamic law to Anglo-American common law, as you requested, would be Lawrence Rosen's The Justice of Islam, Oxford, 2000.

A good text for western audience is Bernard Weiss's The Spirit of Islamic Law, U. Georgia Press, 1998.

I hope that this helps.

I'm afraid that this more or less confirms what I thought from my own reading. Different writers use these terms in varying ways, so we're stuck with paying attention to context and not expecting too much consistency of usage across authors.

Also, it sounds like we should be a little suspicious of claims that something is a matter of Shari`a, as my pal suggests that such claims are frequently little more than a rhetorical device.

Tom Odom
07-31-2007, 12:17 AM
I have an Arab friend who is an expert on Islamic banking and finance (which is intimately connected to Islamic legal thinking), so I asked him to help me out with the question I just asked. Here is his answer. Please note that it is one answer (he says "I have argued" which is a sure sign he means that his answer is his considered opinion and that there is some controversy here...fyi).

I'm afraid that this more or less confirms what I thought from my own reading. Different writers use these terms in varying ways, so we're stuck with paying attention to context and not expecting too much consistency of usage across authors.

Also, it sounds like we should be a little suspicious of claims that something is a matter of Shari`a, as my pal suggests that such claims are frequently little more than a rhetorical device.


Nat

The differences in what many wrongly characterize as a rigid religion are what have driven the creation and the conflict between the various and many schools of Islamic thought. There is no simple answer for the question you posed to your friend or us here. It was a good question, one impossible to answer terms or any fashion combining both brevity and accuracy.

Best

Tom

bourbon
08-17-2007, 04:40 PM
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: The Middle East. (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/363/363.pdf)
Eighth Report of Session 2006–07
Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence
Published on 13 August 2007 by authority of the House of Commons

Hat Tip: Prof./Col. Richard Augustus Norton (http://bostonuniversity.blogspot.com/)

Jedburgh
10-05-2007, 01:33 PM
WINEP, Sep 07: Pushback or Progress? Arab Regimes Respond to Democracy's Challenge (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus75initial.pdf)

....Arab regimes usually neutralized the democratic challenge by using a multilayered response that included repression, redefinition, and co-optation. In some cases—which deserve more attention than they have received to date—governments even made some domestic changes. Clearly, every country managed the issue in different ways.

What is most significant, however, is not that the democratization project was largely a failed effort, but rather that the way regimes responded to this challenge is defining how Arab governance will work in the coming decades. Assessing whether Arab regimes will become weaker and more unstable because of this reaction, as well as how such efforts have affected the relative chances of competing forces in the future, is extremely important.

Although the balance differs in each country, the main responses include reassertion of a traditional agenda, delegitimization of opponents, repression and harassment, pretense or co-optation, and, finally, actual reforms. Both liberal and Islamist oppositions have adjusted in this process, and the strategies of both are examined in this paper....

Jedburgh
10-09-2007, 06:25 PM
Arab Insights, Fall 2007: Missing in Action: The Democracy Agenda in the Middle East (http://www.arabinsight.org/aiarticles/170.pdf)

Over the last several decades, the United States government has claimed to have significantly changed its policies toward the Middle East. After decades of supporting repressive and undemocratic Middle Eastern regimes during the Cold War, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would begin a policy of democracy promotion in the Middle East. However, that democratic agenda has been unevenly applied and even reversed when democratic elections produce governments that did not favor U.S. policies. Supporting elections in Egypt and the Palestinian Territories until the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas were democratically favored, the U.S. government appears to show only conditional support for Middle East democracies. In its occupation of Iraq, the U.S. has made an even greater blunder: under the guise of “spreading freedom,” it has actually increased chaos and insecurity throughout the Middle East.

Arab perceptions of America have been greatly harmed by the ways in which the U.S. government has attempted to spread democracy in Iraq and beyond. The negative perceptions of the United States fostered by Cold War policy could have been alleviated by peaceful promotion of democracy in the Middle East; instead, however, the forceful methods and double standards of democracy building have further damaged the U.S. image in the Arab world.....

Jedburgh
12-12-2007, 04:17 PM
USIP, Nov 07: The Challenge of Islamists for EU and US Policies: Conflict, Stability and Reform (http://www.usip.org/files/berlin_report.pdf)

....In the first section of this volume, two contributions look at the challenges for and the framing of policies for the Muslim world. The contributions offer insights into the diverse factors that shape US debates and policies towards the region, including threat perceptions and geo-strategic interests. While Daniel Brumburg focuses on the question of why certain foreign policy paradigms dominate at certain times, Steven Heydemann develops a matrix to understand the different elements that add up to specific policies at particular junctures. The second section examines the political inclusion of Islamists in Muslim majority democracies. Steven Cook points out the tremendous reform achievements that the Islamist AKP government in Turkey has realized. Felix Heiduk stresses the complexity of the Islamist scene in Indonesia. In both Turkey and Indonesia, EU and US policies, while being quite different, have been inadequate with regards to promoting democratic transitions. The third section focuses on the use and abuse of Islam in framing conflicts and policies. Two contributions, from Dorina Bekoe on Sudan and Anette Weber on Somalia, analyze the role of Islam in violent conflicts and point to the multiple sources of conflict behind religious appeals. They also underscore teh relevance of the inclusion of Islamist actors for the peaceful transformation of conflicts. The fourth section on the political participation of Islamists in authoritarian systems discusses the relevance of Islamist actors for the peaceful transition of authoritarian systems and European and US policies towards Islamist movements, parties and authoritarian governments. Eva Wegner looks at the effects that political inclusion has had on the development of the Islamist movement in Morocco. Mona Yacoubian points out the relevance of the Islamist-secular opposition alliance in the case of Yemen. Les Campbell summarizes the experiences that the National Democratic Institute (NDI (http://www.ndi.org/)) has made in engaging Islamists in democracy promotion efforts. A final paper by Muriel Asseburg sketches out elements of a shared US-EU agenda towards the Muslim world in the fields of democracy promotion, stabilization policies and efforts to peacefully transform conflicts......

Jedburgh
01-11-2008, 03:39 PM
CSIS, 10 Jan 08: Security and Stability in the Greater Middle East (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080110_mesecuritylong.pdf)

Six Strategic Challenges

• Energy export capacity and security

• Adjustment of military posture in Iraq, and the Gulf.

• Deciding how to deal with Iranian proliferation, growing asymmetric warfare capabilities, and use of proxies.

• The lack of near-term prospects for a real Arab-Israeli peace process, and potential further military clashes in Lebanon and between Israel and the Palestinians and/or Syria.

• The region-wide impact of Neo-Salafi Islamist extremism. The franchising of Al Qaida, and its impact inside and outside the region.

• Dealing with the war in Afghanistan, potential destabilization of as nuclear Pakistan, and its impact on proliferation and Islamist extremism in the Middle East.
Complete 53 slide briefing in pdf format at the link.

Jedburgh
01-23-2008, 02:50 PM
22 Jan 08 testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on That Which is Not Obligatory is Forbidden: Censorship and Incitement in the Arab World:

Joel Campagna (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/cam012208.htm), Committee to Protect Journalists

Richard Eisendorf (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov:80/110/eis012208.htm), Freedom House

Kenneth Jacobson (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov:80/110/jac012208.htm), Anti-Defamation League

Jedburgh
02-02-2008, 01:45 PM
FIIA, 1 Feb 08: Sectarian Identities or Geopolitics? The Regional Shia-Sunni Divide in the Middle East (http://www.upi-fiia.fi/document.php?DOC_ID=242#WP56.pdf)

The purpose of this study is to enhance understanding of the new geopolitical situation currently unfolding in Middle Eastern politics that has emerged since the onset of the United States-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The paper focuses on the notions of the Sunni-Shia divide and the Rise of the Shia.

In this study it is argued that the present dynamics of the regional-level Sunni-Shia divide are reinforced and catalysed by both geopolitical considerations and the national security interests of states. History and identity alone are not sufficient to explain the logics of the divide at the regional level. The study seeks to explain how and why geo- and power politics reinforce the present-day sectarian divide in the Middle East. It also suggests that the divide has the potential to become an era defining feature of the post-Saddam Middle East in the way pan-Arabism and pan-Islam have defined the past decades of the region.

The study takes as its point of departure the division of Middle Eastern politics into two levels of analysis: the domestic level and the regional level. Different kinds of geopolitical readjustments and power balancing take place at the two levels, on which different fault lines can be identified. The analysis in this study is concentrated on the regional level, where the sectarian dynamic or rhetoric is not yet as apparent as at the domestic level (in some states), where sectarian struggles have brought two states, namely Iraq and Lebanon, almost to breaking point....
Complete 62 page paper at the link.

Jedburgh
02-27-2008, 01:12 PM
CEIP, 26 Feb 08: The New Middle East (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/new_middle_east_final.pdf)

.....The Middle East of 2008 is indeed a vastly different region from that of 2001, and the war in Iraq has been the most important driver of this transformation, although by no means the only one. The outcome, however, is not what the Bush administration envisaged. On the contrary, the situation has become worse in many countries. Despite the presence of over 160,000 U.S. troops in Iraq at the end of 2007 and an improvement in the security situation, Iraq remains an unstable, violent, and deeply divided country, indeed a failed state. Progress is being undermined by the refusal of Iraqi political factions to engage in a serious process of reconciliation, as the Bush administration has repeatedly warned. Furthermore, with the demise of Saddam Hussein, the balance of power between Iran and Iraq has been broken, increasing the influence of Tehran in the Gulf and beyond. Meantime, Iran continues its uranium enrichment program undeterred by United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions or the threat of U.S. military action.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains unsolved, but its parameters have changed considerably, with a deep split in the Palestinian ranks and the effects of decades of unilateral Israeli actions calling into question whether a two-state solution can possibly be implemented. Although Lebanon has been largely liberated from direct Syrian domination, the country is deeply divided and teeters on the brink of domestic conflict. The power of Syria has been diminished by the forced withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon, but the country maintains its potential as a spoiler. The threat of nuclear proliferation is not just limited to Iran; from Morocco to the Gulf, a growing number of countries are declaring their intention to develop a nuclear capacity—for civilian use, to be sure, but a nuclear capacity nevertheless. Confessional and ethnic divisions have acquired greater saliency in many countries.

There has been no successful democratic revolution in any Middle Eastern country. Instead, the democratic openings advocated and supported by the United States have either led to sectarian division or revealed the greater popular appeal and strength of Islamist rather than liberal organizations, one of several reasons the United States has retreated from democracy promotion. Far from having leapfrogged over old problems, the United States is now confronting most of the old problems, often in a more acute way, as well as new ones.....
Complete 48 page paper at the link.

Tom Odom
02-27-2008, 02:21 PM
I am sure this will be warmly reviewed at AEI...

Jedburgh
04-16-2008, 08:00 PM
Parameters, Spring '08: The Mythical Shia Crescent (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/08spring/proctor.pdf)

Sometime in late 2006, America awoke to the realization that, by deposing Saddam Hussein and toppling his Ba’athist regime, it had inadvertently removed a major obstacle to Iranian dominance in the Middle East. Assessments of the associated events reached hyperbolic levels. Dire warnings of a growing Iranian hegemony began to surface. Sunni leaders such as Jordan’s King Abdullah II began to warn the West of an emerging “Shia Crescent,” led by Iran and encompassing Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The idea caught fire in American media and became the dominant narrative in discourse on Middle East policy.

But how realistic is this amalgamation? Is a Shia Crescent really emerging that is capable of challenging more than a millennium of Sunni domination in the Islamic world? Will Iran lead it? On the surface, the idea appears plausible. Yet, a more in-depth examination of the prospective members of this geopolitical realignment raises numerous questions. This intellectual shorthand may be blinding the United States to opportunities that could yield tangible progress on several strategic fronts in the Middle East, while providing a new ally in the global war on terrorism.....

Jedburgh
06-05-2008, 10:16 PM
CEIP, 4 Jun 08: Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: Restoring Credibility (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb_60_ottaway_final.pdf)

The Bush administration’s effort to foster democratic transformation in the Middle East has not had a significant impact on Arab countries, which remain largely autocratic. After a brief period of ferment in 2004–2005, Middle Eastern politics has become stagnant again. Moreover, the Bush policy—never clearly defined, long on rhetoric, short on strategy, and fitfully implemented—has undermined U.S. credibility and will make it more difficult for the next administration to devise a successful approach to political reform in the region.

The new administration must devise a new policy. While it is imperative that the United States abandon the mixture of simplistic assumptions and missionary fervor of the last few years, ignoring the need for reform and simply supporting friendly regimes are not a viable alternative. Such policy will not maintain stability in a region that is transforming rapidly economically and socially, because stability will depend on the ability of regimes to adapt to change rather than cling to the status quo. Moreover, fewer countries now, and even fewer in the future, are willing to embrace the United States unconditionally: “Friendly to the United States” has become a relative concept at best. Thus, the United States needs a new approach toward regimes that are facing deep political challenges but do not see the United States as either a model to imitate or a reliable ally....

Rex Brynen
07-02-2008, 01:20 AM
2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International) Professor Shibley Telhami, Principal Investigator.

Survey conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE

Some key findings:


Iraq: Only 6% of Arabs polled believe that the American surge has worked. A plurality (35% ) do not believe reports that violence has in fact declined. Over 61% believe that if the US were to withdraw from Iraq, Iraqis will find a way to bridge their differences, and only 15% believe the civil war would expand. 81% of Arabs polled (outside Iraq) believe that the Iraqis are worse off than they were before the Iraq war.

Iran: In contrast with the fears of many Arab governments, the Arab public does not appear to see Iran as a major threat. Most believe that Iran has the right to its nuclear program and do not support international pressure to force it to curtail its program. A plurality of Arabs (44%) believes that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be more positive for the region than negative.

The Arab Israeli conflict: There is an increase in the expressed importance of the Palestinian issue, with 86% of the public identifying it as being at least among the top three issues to them. A majority of Arabs continues to support the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, but an increasing majority is pessimistic about its prospects. If the prospects of a two state solution collapse, 50% believe it would lead to a state of intense conflict for years to come, while only 9% believe it would lead to a one-state solution, and only 7% believe that the Palestinians would eventually surrender.

Palestinian Divisions: In the conflict between Hamas and Fatah, only 8% sympathize with Fatah most, while 18% sympathize with Hamas, and 38% sympathize with both to some extent. In so far as they see Palestinians as somewhat responsible for the state of affairs in Gaza, 15% blame Hamas’s government most, 23% blame the government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas, and 39% blame both equally.

The Lebanese Crisis: Only 9% express sympathy with the majority governing coalition in the current internal crisis in Lebanon, while 30% sympathize with the opposition led by Hizbollah, 24% sympathize with neither side, and 19% sympathize with both to some extent.

Popular Leaders: Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, increased his popularity as the most admired leader in the Arab world (26%) There was also an increase in the popularity of President Bashar Assad of Syria. Also striking, however, was the emerging popularity of modernizing Sunni Arab leaders, particularly Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid al Maktoum of Dubai, when respondents identify the two leaders they admire most.

Attitudes toward the US: 83% of the public has an unfavorable view of the US and 70% express no confidence in the US. Still, Arabs continue to rank the US among the top countries with freedom and democracy for their own people. 32% believe that, from the point of view of advancing peace in the Middle East, American policy will remain the same, no matter who wins the US elections. 18% believe that Barack Obama has the best chance of advancing peace, 13% believe Hillary Clinton has the best chance, while 4% identify John McCain as having the best chance for advancing peace.

Global Outlook: France continues to be the most popular country, China continues to make a good showing, and views of Pakistan have declined.

Media: Al-Jazeera continues to command the largest share of the Arabic news market, with 53% of Arabs polled identifying it as their first choice for news, with practically no change from last year. Egyptian Television and Al-Arabiya have made some gains over last year. To a plurality of respondents, the quality OF both Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera has improved over previous years, with only a small minority perceiving a decline.

Full version here (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2008/0414_middle_east/0414_middle_east_telhami.pdf) (.pdf) and here (http://sadat.umd.edu/surveys/index.htm) (.ppt).

Jedburgh
07-17-2008, 01:53 PM
CEIP, 17 Jul 08: The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S. (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp94_ottaway_regional_diplomacy_final.pdf)

Many Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are showing increasing reluctance to follow Washington’s lead in addressing regional problems. This tendency toward an independent foreign policy is particularly evident among the Gulf countries. Even states that host major U.S. military facilities on their soil, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, consider U.S. policy in the region counterproductive and are forging a new diplomacy.

Gulf countries have refused to enter into an anti-Iranian alliance with the United States, and have chosen instead to pursue close diplomatic contacts with Tehran, although they fear its growing influence. They are trying to bring about reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, while the United States is seeking to isolate Hamas. They have helped negotiate a compromise solution in Lebanon, while the United States has encouraged the government to take a hard-line position. Yet, the new diplomacy of the Arab countries is not directed against the United States, although it contradicts U.S. policies.....

Jedburgh
11-08-2008, 04:30 PM
ISN, 15 Oct 08: Conceptualizing the Sunni-Shi'i Encounter in the Modern Period (http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=47&fileid=A737D1E9-E387-E461-8846-61BDE2637913&lng=en)

This study examines the issues of religious authority and legitimacy in Islam. The author compares and contrasts traditions of jurisprudence and juridical authority in Sunni and Shia Islam. The author considers the major related points of discussion among Islamic religious scholars, especially on the issue of interpretation. The study also considers the Islamic Revolution in Iran, its impact on Islamic ideology and the revitalization of the study of Islam.

Jedburgh
11-23-2008, 08:46 PM
NPR, 20 Nov 08: Speaking of Faith: The Sunni-Shia Divide and the Future of Islam (http://speakingoffaith.publicradio.org/programs/2008/future_of_islam/)

We seek fresh insight into the history and the human and religious dynamics of Islam's Sunni-Shia divide. Our guest says that it is not so different from dynamics in periods of Western Christian history. But he says that by bringing the majority Shia to power in Iraq, the U.S. has changed the religions dynamics of the Middle East......

Jedburgh
06-05-2009, 03:44 PM
USIP, Jun 09: Justice Interrupted: Historical Perspectives on Promoting Democracy in the Middle East (http://library.usip.org/articles/1012235.1110/1.PDF)

Summary

• Foreign affairs experts routinely use historical analogy to develop and justify policy. However, as professional historians have long noted, attractive analogies often lead to bad policies. Officials regularly choose analogies that neglect or distort the historical case they aim to illuminate. Nonetheless, history can be used effectively in international relations.

• To do so, practitioners must first recognize the difference between historical analogy and precedent. Historical precedent, drawn from the past of the region in question, is a safer guide to policy than historical analogy, which is based on comparisons to events in other regions. Because historical precedent is a self-limiting form of analogy restricted to a certain place, people, and time, it provides a better indication of how a certain society understands and responds to a given situation.

• The recent U.S. intervention in Iraq highlights the misuses of history: American leaders employed analogies to World War II to justify the invasion and to predict success in establishing a democratic regime after. These analogies proved to be a poor guide to nation building in the short term. In the long term, they have deeply aggravated U.S. relations with Iraqis and the rest of the Arab world.

• A more effective use of history would have been to refer to the precedent of World War I, a crucial moment when American policy could have supported indigenous Arab constitutional democracy—but, fatefully, did not.

• For the new administration, the Arabs’ experience of “justice interrupted” after World War I can still be a useful touchstone for promoting democracy in the region.1 This precedent alerts us that foreign intervention can spark a deep-seated and negative political reaction in the postcolonial Arab world and that reform in Arab politics must begin with respect for national sovereignty. It also reminds us that constitutionalism and the desire to participate in the community of international law are enduring values in Arab politics.

pjmunson
06-21-2009, 01:24 AM
The Telhami poll is must reading for anyone who is considering American policy in the Middle East. It is also very depressing. Even on an interpersonal level, I found it very difficult to get to any reasonable middle ground when talking to Arabs in the region about politics. Our starting points as to what a reasonable middle ground should be are so different that it is very difficult to get to any common understanding on key issues. For instance, one might think that some shared perception of an Iranian threat could spur cooperation in the Gulf, yet even in that case, the polls show that Gulf Arabs do not share American concerns.

tequila
06-21-2009, 03:45 AM
The 2009 Arab public opinion poll is out:

PPT (http://www.sadat.umd.edu/2009ArabPublicOpinionPresentation(052009).ppt)& Key Findings (http://www.sadat.umd.edu/2009ArabPollKeyFindings.doc).


Summary of Key Findings:

1. Attitudes Toward the President of the United States: Overall, 45% of Arabs polled have a favorable view of President Obama (50% outside Egypt), 28% are neutral, 24% have negative views. Remarkably, 79% of Saudis have a favorable view of President Obama and only 14% have negative views. Consistently, in all six countries, the negative views of the President are remarkably low.

2.Attitudes Toward the United States: The most important consequence of their favorable views of President Obama appears to be expressed hope for American foreign policy in the Middle East. After a few weeks of the Obama administration, a majority in all countries, 51% (59% outside Egypt) expressed hopefulness about US Middle East policy, 28% were neutral, while only 14% were discouraged.

3.Attitudes Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Unlike the case of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war, when most Arabs believed Israel lost the war and Hezbollah won, most Arabs polled believe that Israel was the biggest winner of the Gaza war in 2008-2009, and that the Palestinian people were the biggest losers.

4.Attitudes on Iraq: 65% of Arabs polled (compared with 61% in 2008) believe that if the US withdraws its forces from Iraq as planned by the end of 2011, Iraqis will find a way to bridge their differences. 72% believe Iraqis are worse off than they were before the Iraq war, but this is a decrease from 82% in 2008.

5.Attitudes Toward Iran: There are indications the criticism of Iran, particularly in Morocco and Egypt, is having some impact. 13% identify Iran as one of their two biggest threats (compared with 7% in 2008), and outside Egypt, 20% see Iran as one of the two biggest threats to them, compared with 11% in 2008.

6.Attitudes on Global Leadership: The attacks on Hezbollah’s leader Hasan Nasrallah, especially in Egypt and Morocco, appear to be having an impact. In an open question to identify the leader they admire most outside their own countries, only 6% identify Nasrallah (in contrast with 2008, when he led with 26%). However, he maintains solid popularity in Jordan (21%). The net winner is Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela, who was identified as the most admired leader with 24% of those polled (compared with only 4% in 2008).

7.Media Trends: The use of the internet continued to grow with 36% stating that they use the internet at least several times a week and only 38% stating that they never use the internet (compared with 52% in 2008).

Jedburgh
06-22-2009, 05:03 PM
The Berkman Center, 16 Jun 09: Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere: Politics, Culture and Dissent (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Mapping_the_Arabic_Blogosphere_0.pdf)

This study explores the structure and content of the Arabic blogosphere using link analysis, term frequency analysis, and human coding of individual blogs. The authors identified a base network of approximately 35,000 active Arabic language blogs (about half as many as we found in a previous study of the Persian blogosphere), discovered several thousand Arabic blogs with mixed use of Arabic, English and French, created a network map of the 6,000 most connected blogs, and with a team of Arabic speakers hand coded over 4,000 blogs. The goal for the study was to produce a baseline assessment of the networked public sphere in the Arab Middle East, and its relationship to a range of emergent issues, including politics, media, religion, culture, and international affairs.

Jedburgh
01-30-2011, 05:59 PM
CEIP, 28 Jan 11: Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/OttawayHamzawy_Outlook_Jan11_ProtestMovements.pdf)

Over the past decade, the Arab world has seen an increase in protests, strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of social protest. The uprising that started in Tunisia in late 2010 was not a completely new development, but rather a more dramatic example of the unrest common across the region, particularly in Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan.

But the protest movements in the region have severe limitations. The various organizations involved—labor groups, youth organizations, bloggers, political parties, and Islamist movements—have different constituencies, demands, and organizational styles. Indeed, in some countries there has been, until recently, a deliberate decision not to coordinate and particularly to keep socioeconomic and political demands separate. This helps incumbent authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes stay in power despite the high levels of discontent in many countries.

Despite the absence of large cohesive movements, Arab regimes are right to worry about the possibility of an uprising in their countries. The underlying conditions of difficult social and economic conditions coupled with political repression, lack of political freedoms, and corruption exist everywhere. Publics in Arab countries are also right in feeling inspired by events in Tunisia and in believing that they can force change. Ultimately, however, change depends not on Tunisia’s example, but on the ability of protesters to coordinate their efforts and link socioeconomic with political demands and on the governments’ response—that, plus the imponderable catalyst.

Bill Moore
02-27-2011, 05:36 PM
Has anyone shown a correlation between OIF and recent uprisings against non-democratic governments in the Arab World? Was the former administration right that removing Saddam would be a catalyst for the spread of democracy in the Middle East? I suspect this has been addressed, but I haven't seen any studies, articles or commentaries on this line of thought. Please share if you have seen it.

Marc
02-27-2011, 06:24 PM
Has anyone shown a correlation between OIF and recent uprisings against non-democratic governments in the Arab World? Was the former administration right that removing Saddam would be a catalyst for the spread of democracy in the Middle East? I suspect this has been addressed, but I haven't seen any studies, articles or commentaries on this line of thought. Please share if you have seen it.

I think few, if any, analysts saw this recent wave of uprising coming. I have not seen any article showing a relation between the removal of Saddam and current events. There are some studies that show that as long as a muslim autocratic regime maintains a defiant stance towards the West, it has less to fear from its own population than when it is seen as a lackey of the West (e.g. because it fails to denounce western military operations in the Middle East).

However, I think that - with the benefit of hindsight - studies will be written that show a correlation between OIF and the recent uprisings against non-democratic governments in the Arab World.

Surferbeetle
02-27-2011, 08:28 PM
Has anyone shown a correlation between OIF and recent uprisings against non-democratic governments in the Arab World?

Brother Bill,

It would seem to stand to reason (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observer_effect_(physics)) that after dropping a trillion dollar rock into an oxbow lake (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxbow_lake) waves from that event would travel to every point in the lake; I would argue that it’s still too early to say conclusively that that event has fully reconnected things (when using the Assyrian Empire (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo-Assyrian_Empire), the Ottoman Empire (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Empire), etc. as reference points) to the mighty multi-generational river that is globalization (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globalization). IMHO Iraq, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia are just a few of the interesting places to look to for hints.

Let’s consider three ‘substantive’ viewpoints from Iraq

Iraq’s last patriot (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/magazine/06ALLAWI-t.html), by Anthony Shadid, NYT, 4 February 2011


“We came in naïve about what the problems were in Iraq,” Gen.Raymond Odierno, the American military commander in Iraq, told me last August, a few days before he was to end his third tour. He had spent four years in Iraq. “I don’t think we understood what I call the societal devastation that occurred, we didn’t realize how damaged Iraq had been from 1980, in the Iran-Iraq war.” The list went on: Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the 1991 gulf war, international sanctions that crippled Iraq’s middle class. “And then,” Odierno added, “we attacked to overthrow the government.” The same naïveté affected American efforts to mold Iraqi politics, with its ethnic and sectarian divisions. “We just didn’t understand it,” Odierno said.


Maliki’s victory ended eight months of utter political dysfunction, and what have become Iraq’s key players were all represented in some fashion. “A big step for Iraq” is how an American briefing paper described the result. “A government that is made in Iraq.” Former American diplomats were less encouraged. Before it had all finished, Crocker offered a typically insightful prediction. “There will be a little for everybody, probably,” he said. “It’s going to be fairly inclusive among the elite. But the promises that are made, the deals that are dealt, are really not going to involve any promises or commitments to make life better for people in Iraq. That’s just not what the transaction is in Iraqi politics.”


In my first interview with Allawi, back in May, he offered a suggestion, with a laugh. “This is my advice to you — go and ask President Bush how Iraq is going to get out of this mess. Bush, Bush, your Bush, Bush Jr., you ask him. He’ll probably have the right answer. I think so. He introduced the de-Baathification, he introduced the dismantling of the army, he introduced the sectarian quotas in the Governing Council. He should know what he did — the process, how this process is going to move forward.”


I asked which was better — the Iraq of Saddam Hussein or the Iraq of today. He shook his head with the disdain of an expatriate. “The only difference is that we have this democracy.” He uttered the word with contempt.

I would argue that the OIF experience, good and bad, has raised the expectations of the hoi polloi (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hoi_polloi), and as a result many of the changes resulting in some level of transparency & accountability (Al Jazeera style) at the Nahiya (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nahiyah), Qada (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qadaa), Province, and National levels in Iraq are unstoppable, and will indeed continue.

Al-Maliki gives Iraqi officials 100 days to improve — or else (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/27/al-maliki-gives-iraqi-officials-100-days-improve-o/), By Rebecca Santana, in the Washington Times on 9:53 a.m., Sunday, February 27, 2011


BAGHDAD (AP) — Iraq‘s prime minister, following a string of deadly anti-government protests, gave his ministers on Sunday 100 days to improve their performance or risk being fired.

The warning from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came two days after thousands of protesters took to the streets across the country to demand better public services. It demonstrates the worries Iraqi officials have that protests here inspired by the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt could spiral out of control.

If we accept that Egypt is indeed the cultural vanguard of the Arab World, it’s interesting to think about the demographics of the country and who might be representative of the different viewpoints associated with a market segmentation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_segmentation) analysis. Yusuf al Qaradawi (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yusuf_al-Qaradawi) (25 to 30 percent of the Egyptian populace is said to favor a Muslim Brotherhood derived vision), General Ismail Etmaan(Egyptian Army, Higher Military Council), Al Jazeera (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Jazeera) (New Media (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_media)), and ‘Arab Youth’ (60 percent of the Arab region is said to be under 25 years of age) are part of the topology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Topology).

After Long Exile, Sunni Cleric Takes Role in Egypt (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/world/middleeast/19egypt.html) By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK, Published: February 18, 2011 in the New York Times


Sheik Qaradawi, a popular television cleric whose program reaches an audience of tens of millions worldwide, addressed a rapt audience of more than a million Egyptians gathered in Tahrir Square to celebrate the uprising and honor those who died.

“Don’t fight history,” he urged his listeners in Egypt and across the Arab world, where his remarks were televised. “You can’t delay the day when it starts. The Arab world has changed.”

Person in the News: the Arab youth (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2979958a-411a-11e0-bf62-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1FBvwfY5m), By Rould Khalaf, Published: February 25 2011 22:33, Financial Times


He is the young Egyptian who occupied Tahrir Square, and awakened a sleepy population. She is the young Libyan defying the madness and brutality of Muammer Gaddafi. He is the empowered Bahraini and Yemeni youth raising his voice in a resolute call on governments to listen to their people instead of oppressing them. Each revolt has drawn in swaths of its own society, but it is the young Arab who is the driving force; the unassuming leader. Whether in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen or Libya, the more established forces in society, including political parties, tribes and the military, have been followers, forced to jump on the bandwagon lest they too are left behind.

Middle East: Uncertain horizons (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d6ebf1fc-3f91-11e0-a1ba-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1FBv4WCvH), By Tobias Buck in Jerusalem, Published: February 23 2011 21:51, Financial Times


The real problem for the IDF, however, lies not so much in the human fallibility of senior officers but in their inability to formulate a coherent response to a changing security environment. That, at least, is the thesis advanced by Ron Tira, an Israeli military analyst and a former air force pilot. “We are now facing a new warfare paradigm by the enemy. The old approaches are not very useful, we need to come up with something new – and we are not there yet,” he says.

The threat today is not invasion or battlefield defeat. Instead, argues Mr Tira, Israel’s enemies in Iran, Syria, southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip have launched a war of attrition aimed at the “long-term erosion of the Israeli will and the long-term erosion of Israeli legitimacy”. The approach cleverly combines political and military elements, conventional and non-conventional warfare, and draws on the international community’s increasing frustration with Israel.

Citizens not serfs can save Saudi Arabia (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/48c1af5c-42a2-11e0-8b34-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1FBxfQg4q), By David Gardner, Published: February 27 2011 19:06, Financial Times


On his return from months of hospitalisation and recuperation in the US and Morocco, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was characteristically unstinting in his generosity. He lavished $36bn on his subjects, in pay rises and debt forgiveness, and to help them buy houses and start businesses. As munificence goes, this was princely. Whether it was politic is another question.

It might buy off whatever unrest is brewing underneath the kingdom’s thick layers of political, military and religious control. Or it may be perceived as the panicky response of an absolute monarchy to the wave of revolution unfolding across the Arab world; the rulers of neighbouring Bahrain offered their people a similar bribe but they took to the streets anyway. Yet King Abdullah’s decision to hose Saudis with money to pre-empt any revolt is certainly old politics in a new era – and unless it is followed by political reforms the king himself has timidly championed, the future of the kingdom must be in question.

Bill Moore
02-27-2011, 09:12 PM
Marc and Steve,

I agree it is too early to tell. While we successfully removed Saddam's regime, our attempt to transform Iraq is still largely a failed experiment in forcing Western values and political processes upon a people who didn't embrace them. I don't think any of the popular uprisings desire to follow the model we established there, BUT on the other hand, our occupation of Iraq probably motivated some interesting political discussions among the youth in several Arab nations and they decided they wanted change so much, that it broke the bonds of fear that the government had over the people.

Unfortunately in my view, we see people throughout the Middle East demonstrating against their corrupt and inefficient governments and seeking a greater say in governance, yet because these corrupt governments are our allies in the war on terror we don't have a policy for responding to these events. We seem to be paralyzed and letting a potential opportunity to let the Arab people reform the Middle East (something we can't do) slip through our fingers. It seems by our actions, or lack of action, that we would have preferred the status quo to remain, because the bastard you know may be better than the bastard you don't, but on the other hand we claim our policies are at least partially based on human rights, freedom and democracy. Once again we're losing credibility in the Middle East.

From my very bias seat, I see this as the a great opportunity for Special Forces to support the oppressed rise up against their corrupt governments, but, and maybe with good reason, we're too nervous about the morning after to engage.

Marc, I agree that the anti-western rhetoric in the Middle East had legs, but that seems to be waning a little. If we don't always support Israel, if we get past our desire to re-make the Middle East in our image, and we support legimate change that is desired by the Arab people, etc., then there will be less reason for the anti-western rhetoric to resonate. Saddam didn't have any answers, and I don't recall any other leaders in the Middle East who played the anti-western theme to their advantage that were effective in providing for their people. Iran isn't in the Arab world, but their anti-western rhetoric isn't winning them the support of their people. Saddam's anti-western rhetoric didn't win support from his people, but it did generate support from various anti-Israeli extremists, much like Qadaffi's anti-western rhetoric (before he allegedly became our friend) won more support from radicals outside Libya than his own people.

I think we'll be learning and relearning lessons for a long time based on these current upraisings. I only fear we'll discover the truth too late to act in ways that would benefit our interests and the Arab people.

Pete
02-27-2011, 09:27 PM
Elliot Abrams had an opinion piece to that effect in the Washington Post about a month ago.

Bob's World
02-27-2011, 10:02 PM
I would argue that in many regards the current rise of democratically minded protest is in spite of, rather than because of OIF and our GWOT efforts. I do believe that in the long run Iraq has the potential to provide a powerful example of how to evolve toward a form of effective democracy appropriate to this region, but that is a future benefit.

Consider that the countries where the populaces are rising up now, emboldened by the success of Tunisia and the US response, are also the countries that were:

1. The greatest source of foreign fighters to travel to Iraq and fight against the US under the AQ banner;

2. All (Libya new to that first list) U.S. Allies and all topping the charts of the "least free" nations on earth;

3. All countries where the US has focused CT efforts and capacity building efforts to help these regimes more effectively deal with the "terrorists" within their borders. One man's freedom marcher is another man's terrorist; and our GWOT focus has been decidedly in support of the perspective of these despotic leaders in that regard. Even Libya became an ally in our war on terror, and leveraged that to gain greater license in the suppression of her own people.

Sadly, the many populaces standing up to oppression are in large part doing it is spite of the US support to their governments, rather than because of the US support to concepts of liberty and democracy. Our words have been of the latter, but our actions have been firmly toward the former.

The key is how we move forward from here. How does the U.S. recover and refocus to lend stability to what could easily become a violent and chaotic process that is not in our best interest, or the best interest of the people involved. Dark forces will absolutely step up and seek to exploit these tumultuous conditions for their own purposes and we will need to be alert. Hopefully the CT guys are dialed up, because there is a good chance some of the real terrorists may break cover or get careless as they seek to grab this advantage. We need to scrub those target lists hard though, because I suspect there are many on the list that are nationalist patriots rather than international terrorists, and we do not want to fall back into the business of being manipulated by our allies to take care of their problems for them.

We live in dynamic times.

Presley Cannady
02-27-2011, 10:18 PM
Sadly, the many populaces standing up to oppression are in large part doing it is spite of the US support to their governments, rather than because of the US support to concepts of liberty and democracy. Our words have been of the latter, but our actions have been firmly toward the former.

Couldn't be helped. Americans were damned lucky to tear those governments away of the Soviet sphere in the first place.

Fuchs
02-27-2011, 11:04 PM
I think few, if any, analysts saw this recent wave of uprising coming. I have not seen any article showing a relation between the removal of Saddam and current events

The least indirect link is probably the rise of Al Jazeera (pushed by the Iraq War) and AJ's influence (it's rather more liberal than state media outlets were).

Surferbeetle
02-28-2011, 12:49 AM
Unfortunately in my view, we see people throughout the Middle East demonstrating against their corrupt and inefficient governments and seeking a greater say in governance, yet because these corrupt governments are our allies in the war on terror we don't have a policy for responding to these events. We seem to be paralyzed and letting a potential opportunity to let the Arab people reform the Middle East (something we can't do) slip through our fingers. It seems by our actions, or lack of action, that we would have preferred the status quo to remain, because the bastard you know may be better than the bastard you don't, but on the other hand we claim our policies are at least partially based on human rights, freedom and democracy. Once again we're losing credibility in the Middle East.

Bill,

If you can be both soft and tough enough you can simultaneously be friends with Venus and fight alongside of Mars. Our friend Sun Zu knew how, unlike much of our old guard who are slaves to CvC in all things. In short we lack balance in our approach.

So much for the past; what is a possible solution to help us move forward?

Pragmatism = DIIME+PPP = whole of government approach + public private partnerships = inputs< outputs

What if we were to have a five person strong government working group regularly sitting at our President’s table providing him with sound whole of government advice regarding DIIME issues outside our nation’s borders? We, fortunately, see synergies with the Team Clinton-Gates (DoS and DoD – the D and M of DIIME) just as we did with Team Crocker-Odierno in Iraq. As for I (Intelligence ) once upon a time the Central Intelligence Agency was just that, however it now falls under some administrative fiefdom or another, while our 16 member strong intelligence community appears to happily drift along while burning through 50 billion USD or so a year. Horrible things have happened to the USIA and it appears that we have no one at the table who can represent or speak to our nations governmental Information needs. Similarly who would represent governmental Economics issues for our nation; USAID (external), Department of Commerce (Internal), the Export-Import Bank, etc?

What if we had a five person strong private partnership working group regularly sitting down with our President providing him with sound private partnership advice regarding DIIME issues outside our nation’s borders? What if membership was limited to a single representative from the top US Company in each of the DIIME arenas and membership was transparently reviewed and competed for every two years?

What if these two working groups had to develop quarterly combined work break down structures, schedules, cost estimates, and workplans for their proposals that would be subjected to our Executive, Legislative, and Judicial systems? What if working group members were held accountable for their successes and failures and concepts such as Return on Investment were used as benchmarks? What if the process was transparent and accountable to the population of the US?

Either it’s the beer or I must have bumped my head…. :D

Steve

Dayuhan
02-28-2011, 06:31 AM
From my very bias seat, I see this as the a great opportunity for Special Forces to support the oppressed rise up against their corrupt governments,

Counterproductive, I suspect. When the operation ceased to be secret (wouldn't take long) those rising up would be de-legitimized, branded pawns of a meddling foreign government. Foreign intervention, especially if it involved arms, would also make it much easier to justify an armed crackdown, and once we are revealed as a participant we'd lose any credible status as mediator.

These uprisings are good things and should be helped along, but it has to be very subtle and if we go out trying to provoke them we are likely to make a mess.


All countries where the US has focused CT efforts and capacity building efforts to help these regimes more effectively deal with the "terrorists" within their borders. One man's freedom marcher is another man's terrorist; and our GWOT focus has been decidedly in support of the perspective of these despotic leaders in that regard. Even Libya became an ally in our war on terror, and leveraged that to gain greater license in the suppression of her own people.

Calling Libya a "US ally" is well exaggerated. They came off the "untouchable pariah" list but that's about all.

The Libyan regime never asked for or needed any license to oppress. Not many people do, really. They do it because its what they do; they don't ask permission and they don't care what we think.

Bob's World
02-28-2011, 12:17 PM
Couldn't be helped. Americans were damned lucky to tear those governments away of the Soviet sphere in the first place.

Presley,

Agree, the US waged the Cold War hard in the Middle East. And well from our perspective. The problem is that we locked those Cold War control measures in place and rode them from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the fall of the Twin Towers. Then, we modified them by adding an aggressive CT layer of engagement and HN security force capacity building directed at capabilities to go after "terrorists." AQ guys are really very few. AQ AP, HOA and Maghreb are made up primarily of nationalist insurgents with a handful of AQ hardcores running the UW program to organize, train, finance, supply, etc.

We let our intel guys throw a big net over the whole mess and call it "terrorism" and granted hunting licenses, provided support and encouraged aggressive pursuit of all.

If we are going to do Security Force Capacity Building with some Ally we need to focus it on dealing with external threats 99% of the time. Help the Saudis deter or defeat an attack by Iran? No problem. Help the Saudis round up the dissenting members of their own populace? I have a problem with that. If the Saudis want to do that, that is there business, but it flies in the face of US principle and law and it weakens us globally when we support suppression abroad of actions that are legal, encouraged, and honored at home.

Bottom line is that we got off track. Our handling of the current rash of popular uprisings, both in how we deal with those governments and how we deal with those populaces, is critical to getting back onto azimuth with our national ethos and principles. We will still do hard things when hard times such as the Cold War dictate. But now is not such times, and there must be healing when conditions change.

Bob's World
02-28-2011, 12:30 PM
Calling Libya a "US ally" is well exaggerated. They came off the "untouchable pariah" list but that's about all.

The Libyan regime never asked for or needed any license to oppress. Not many people do, really. They do it because its what they do; they don't ask permission and they don't care what we think.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/07/26/us-libya-usa-idUSN2621135520070726?pageNumber=1

We started down that path in 2007. I suspect there is little coincidence that this coincided with the Surge in Iraq, what with Libya being one of the major sources of foreign fighters to that conflict.

Dayuhan
02-28-2011, 12:30 PM
Help the Saudis round up the dissenting members of their own populace? I have a problem with that.

The Saudis, like the Libyans, have never needed our help or asked our permission to round up dissenting members of their own populace, nor would they stop doing it if we told them we didn't like it.

Bob's World
02-28-2011, 12:38 PM
The Saudis, like the Libyans, have never needed our help or asked our permission to round up dissenting members of their own populace, nor would they stop doing it if we told them we didn't like it.

Agreed. Yet we used our power and influence to encourge this behavior all the same. And I suspect you underestimate our ability to either push things in the direction we desire, or steer them elsewhere. Here we pushed where we should not have, and we will never know what might have happened if we had tried to steer in stead.

Marc
02-28-2011, 06:37 PM
Marc, I agree that the anti-western rhetoric in the Middle East had legs, but that seems to be waning a little. If we don't always support Israel, if we get past our desire to re-make the Middle East in our image, and we support legimate change that is desired by the Arab people, etc., then there will be less reason for the anti-western rhetoric to resonate. Saddam didn't have any answers, and I don't recall any other leaders in the Middle East who played the anti-western theme to their advantage that were effective in providing for their people.

Bill, you are right. The effect of anti-western rhetoric is waning. However, the anti-western theme is still important. One analyst that did see the Egyptian uprising coming is David B. Ottaway, who published an occasional paper entitled "Egypt at a tipping point" in the summer of 2010. This is what he wrote about Mohamed ElBaradei:


A Ph.D. graduate in international law from New York University
School of Law, the balding, owlishlooking diplomat has spent his entire professional career working abroad either for the Egyptian foreign ministry or
at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Geneva. For 12 years he was the IAEA’s director general, emerging from bureaucratic obscurity with his outspoken criticism of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003

In other words Ottaway says that ElBaradei's OPPOSITION increases his credibility on the Egyptian political scene.

Another thing. There are leaders in the Middle East who played the anti-western theme to their advantage AND were effective in providing for their people. This approach is at the core of many Islamist movements' strategies. Hizbollah, Hamas and Sadr's movement all combine effective humanitarian and social services programs with anti-western rhetoric.

I agree with you that anti-western rhetoric is no substitute for a lack of attention for the people's need, but I think that an emerging leader that combines anti-western rhetoric with effective policies concerning education, health care, and social assistance will quickly gain massive popular support.

Marc
02-28-2011, 06:40 PM
Marc, I agree that the anti-western rhetoric in the Middle East had legs, but that seems to be waning a little. If we don't always support Israel, if we get past our desire to re-make the Middle East in our image, and we support legimate change that is desired by the Arab people, etc., then there will be less reason for the anti-western rhetoric to resonate. Saddam didn't have any answers, and I don't recall any other leaders in the Middle East who played the anti-western theme to their advantage that were effective in providing for their people.

Bill, you are right. The effect of anti-western rhetoric is waning. However, the anti-western theme is still important. One analyst that did see the Egyptian uprising coming is David B. Ottaway, who published an occasional paper entitled "Egypt at a tipping point" in the summer of 2010. This is what he wrote about Mohamed ElBaradei:


A Ph.D. graduate in international law from New York University
School of Law, the balding, owlishlooking diplomat has spent his entire professional career working abroad either for the Egyptian foreign ministry or
at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Geneva. For 12 years he was the IAEA’s director general, emerging from bureaucratic obscurity with his outspoken criticism of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003

In other words Ottaway says that ElBaradei's OPPOSITION to OIF increases his credibility on the Egyptian political scene.

Another thing. There are leaders in the Middle East who played the anti-western theme to their advantage AND were effective in providing for their people. This approach is at the core of many Islamist movements' strategies. Hizbollah, Hamas and Sadr's movement all combine effective humanitarian and social services programs with anti-western rhetoric.

I agree with you that anti-western rhetoric is no substitute for a lack of attention for the people's need, but I think that an emerging leader that combines anti-western rhetoric with effective policies concerning education, health care, and social assistance will quickly gain massive popular support.

tequila
02-28-2011, 08:36 PM
For those interested, the Ottaway paper is here (http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Egypt%20at%20the%20Tipping%20Point.pdf). I would disagree with the characterization that Ottaway saw the revolution coming - he rated such an event as highly unlikely.




Might Egypt have its own version of Eastern Europe’s “color revolutions” or Iran’s mass street protests? No Egyptian I talked to felt either was very likely. They cited the apolitical and easy-going nature of most Egyptians, the limited number of activists and the government’s skill in keeping economic and social discontent from turning into a political opposition—at least so far. “The Dream of the Green Revolution,” the title of a new book timed to ElBaradei’s return, was pretty much just that.

On the other hand, Western diplomats reported that the Mubarak government appeared to live in constant fear of a major social explosion at any moment. They worried how long Egypt could remain peaceful while faced with such a yawning gap between rich and poor, a bulging population, mounting worker unrest, worsening living conditions in Cairo and high unemployment among the of thousands of graduating university students.

I would posit that "anti-Western rhetoric" is not going to be central to the next Egyptian government, which will likely be focused overwhelmingly on economic and institutional reform issues.

Note that the organizations you listed all originated as clandestine resistance movements in countries under Western military occupation, which might have something to do with their penchant for such rhetoric.

Marc
02-28-2011, 08:58 PM
Note that the organizations you listed all originated as clandestine resistance movements in countries under Western military occupation, which might have something to do with their penchant for such rhetoric

Tequila,

Hamas is an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Gaza was Egyptian until 1967). Please note that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's ideologue at the time (Said Qutb) never needed a Western military occupation to have a penchant for anti-western rhetoric. In case you still have a doubt, please consult Qutb's writings.

tequila
02-28-2011, 09:25 PM
Hamas != the Egyptian MB. It has no operational ties with the MB and has evolved in quite a different direction. Hamas post-1982 has little in common with the original network of mosques.

The Egyptian MB also had its roots in resistance to British occupation, BTW. As for Qutb, that's a much longer conversation that needs its own thread, but I would categorize him as a political Islamist who saw Islam and unswerving adherence to sharia as constituting the perfect society, and those who deviated or disagreed (including non-Muslim Western powers, but principally non-Islamist Muslims) as enemies of God.

Also, it should be noted that el-Baradei was proven 100% correct with regards to his objection to OIF.

Regardless of the above details, I do not think that Egypt's main political concerns going forward will involve foreign policy unless a crisis is forced upon it.

omarali50
02-28-2011, 11:24 PM
A few quick random thoughts (sorry, not systematically thought out):
1. The US does not seem to have the agility needed to interfere positively (on a case by case basis, not on some general principle) in most crises.
2. Anti-American feeling in the Arab world is derived primarily from support for Israel, only secondarily from any support the US gives to local tyrants. Egypt was being aided on behalf of Israel, not because the US has any special fondness for the free officers group or any other group of thugs who may have grabbed power. Since US support for Israel is likely to continue, so is a background level of anti-Americanism.
3. The idea that good deeds can buy goodwill does not seem to stand up to scrutiny. Propaganda (skillful propaganda, not the USIS variety) and tribal identity (friend of my friend, enemy of my enemy and so on) plays more into goodwill than actual good deeds. And bad deeds stick around much longer than any good deed. Since the US is bound to be involved in some bad deeds, is a friend of Israel, and has been successfully cast as an opponent of the success of Islamdom (never mind whether that dream has any rational basis or not), its hopes of buying goodwill by throwing money at some corrupt local officials are basically nil. Why bother?
4. Remaining despots will be looking for ways to forge better links with China and Ukraine and Belarus. But its not like the US can stop this trend by toning down some rhetoric or going easy on democracy. There is just no way the US can go as easy on democracy as China or Belarus. Why try?
5. ISI must be celebrating with champagne since the Saudis may now be willing to pay through the nose for good mercenaries. But this is not a general trend, it just happens to be the case for Saudia and Pakistan. Overall, the spread of these revolts is good news. Just not as good as Americans would like.
6. It seems to me, in my naive amateurism, that the US would not be any worse off trusting democracy and encouraging open-ness. The US has strengths here. China and Russia and Belarus do not. Why not play to your strengths, even if some anti-Americanism is going to hang around?

Dayuhan
03-01-2011, 01:33 AM
Agreed. Yet we used our power and influence to encourge this behavior all the same. And I suspect you underestimate our ability to either push things in the direction we desire, or steer them elsewhere. Here we pushed where we should not have, and we will never know what might have happened if we had tried to steer in stead.

I think you hugely overestimate our ability to control others, or to steer them... especially in matters of domestic policy that they perceive as essential to their own survival.

If we push them to do things our way they make a show of agreement, moan in private over our naivete, and keep doing things their way... if, that is, they need something from us. Many of these countries need nothing from us, and wouldn't even bother to fake it.

People generally resist being steered, especially in a direction they don't want to go.

tequila
03-01-2011, 02:23 AM
I think Americans do overestimate our ability to influence others, as well as our overall centrality in the politics of other states. However, especially when it comes to our client states, the U.S. can often play a positive role.

Taiwan and South Korea are two examples directly relevant to my own personal experience. Both countries experienced peaceful transfers of power to opposition parties. In our own hemisphere. El Salvador recently elected an FMLN President with no threat of violence from a military which killed thousands fighting the FMLN. The Turkish military has subordinated itself to civilian authority in a similar way, partly due to EU and U.S. pressure. The Bush Administration successfully orchestrated a democratic transition in Pakistan, from Musharraf to a civilian government.

As the example of Pakistan shows, the departure of the dictator hardly means that the problems of the country end. But at the very least it means that the progress can, hopefully, get started.

Bob's World
03-01-2011, 07:05 AM
A former CIA counterterrorism official that I can agree with. This article by Robert Grenier is IMO spot on and parallels my own beliefs and experiences within the SOF/military community.

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/2011226173255184637.html

Marc
03-01-2011, 08:37 AM
Hamas != the Egyptian MB.

No, Hamas is not the Egyptian MB. Hamas is an offshoot of the MB.


The Egyptian MB also had its roots in resistance to British occupation, BTW.

Your point was that Hamas, Hizbullah, and Sadr’s movement had a greater penchant towards anti-western rhetoric than autocrats because of their emergence under occupation:
Note that the organizations you listed all originated as clandestine resistance movements in countries under Western military occupation, which might have something to do with their penchant for such rhetoric. The Brotherhood’s roots in resistance to British occupation is not a differentiating factor in its penchant towards anti-western rhetoric. Almost all political organizations in the Middle East (including the autocratic regimes themselves) have their roots in resistance to colonial occupation.

BTW, anyone familiar with Qutb’ biography knows that his anti-western rhetoric does not have its origin in his opposition to colonialism, but in his rejection of western civilization after experiencing it himself during his exile in the United States. See for this: Man, Society, and Knowledge in the Islamist Discourse of Sayyid Qutb By Ahmed Bouzid p.21


But what is clear is that by the time Qutb returned from his exile in America in 1951, his commitments to Islam and his rejection of "materialist" culture were explicit and fully articulated. His rejection of American society was apparently so sanguine that the Ministry of Education forced him to resign from his post.

http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-3398-184043/unrestricted/Final.pdf

Dayuhan
03-01-2011, 10:11 AM
A former CIA counterterrorism official that I can agree with. This article by Robert Grenier is IMO spot on and parallels my own beliefs and experiences within the SOF/military community.

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/2011226173255184637.html

I quite agree that these revolts are good things, that there's no need to fear them, that they need to happen and where they are happening we should not oppose them, and indeed that we should help them along in appropriate way.

If we take that one step further and go out and try to provoke them in countries where they aren't yet happening, or support them too energetically (giving the impression that they are our pawns or doing our bidding) we will turn a good thing into an unholy mess.

Bob's World
03-01-2011, 12:43 PM
Agree that this is not the time and place for provoking. We do, however, need to be in front of these and engaging the governments hard to open talks now with the people to ward off more turmoil. Not broadsides of advice from US podiums, but private talks. Not against blazing into town in Airforce one to have those private talks, but give these guys the ability to come out and announce their own changes without the words being fed to them acorss the airwaves.

My advice is contained in my model. First create "hope" through giving the people legal, trusted and certain means to engage and shape government. What these are will vary by culture, country, time. This is first because these are things that can be designed and approved at the stroke of a pen, and because this is the off ramp from insurgency.

Then I would advise them to look hard at how they can shore up and repair the populaces perceptions as to the legitimacy of the government. To look at and address how just the populace finds the rule of law to be and also to address deep-seated perceptions of disrespect where they exist. These are the drivers of insurgency.

Are the people hungry and poor? Certainly, but that alone does not make an insurgency. It typically takes the presence of some disconnected royal living in unearned opulence that can casually suggest when told that the people are staving and that they have no bread to "let them eat cake." A populace also without hope, with no justice under the law, treated with disrespect, and that has come to question a legitimacy to rule that they may once have supported.

Dayuhan
03-01-2011, 01:12 PM
Agree that this is not the time and place for provoking. We do, however, need to be in front of these and engaging the governments hard to open talks now with the people to ward off more turmoil. Not broadsides of advice from US podiums, but private talks. Not against blazing into town in Airforce one to have those private talks, but give these guys the ability to come out and announce their own changes without the words being fed to them acorss the airwaves.

My advice is contained in my model. First create "hope" through giving the people legal, trusted and certain means to engage and shape government. What these are will vary by culture, country, time. This is first because these are things that can be designed and approved at the stroke of a pen, and because this is the off ramp from insurgency.

Then I would advise them to look hard at how they can shore up and repair the populaces perceptions as to the legitimacy of the government. To look at and address how just the populace finds the rule of law to be and also to address deep-seated perceptions of disrespect where they exist. These are the drivers of insurgency.

Are the people hungry and poor? Certainly, but that alone does not make an insurgency. It typically takes the presence of some disconnected royal living in unearned opulence that can casually suggest when told that the people are staving and that they have no bread to "let them eat cake." A populace also without hope, with no justice under the law, treated with disrespect, and that has come to question a legitimacy to rule that they may once have supported.

I don't think these governments have the slightest interest in our advice, or in our meddling, which is closer to what they would call it. Probably they wouldn't tell us that, but would listen very seriously, promise to think deeply on what we said, then go on doing what they want.

We've a very limited capacity, if any, to change how others govern.

Bob's World
03-01-2011, 02:20 PM
Yes, but you also have told me countless times that there is no insurgency in these countries as well...

I think you might be surprised at how much clout the US has, we just haven't been too skilled at employing the more subtle aspects of it. This is why in the geo-politics of the Middle East it is so essential for the US to build and sustain working relationships with Turkey and Iran as these two states continue to rise. It is the art of balancing smaller states against and with each other that creates and sustains a stability that supports one's interests. If properly positioned, a simple private conversation between leaders is probably enough. In many ways this is like a giant game of poker

The new player in this old game is the power of the populaces themselves. The President has been playing that card. He didn't deal it, but when it landed on the table he looked at these guys and suggested that they might want to fold, or at least not raise their bet. Qaddafi over bet his hand and went all in and will end up dead, in prison or in miserable exile. Mubarak folded and will likely live the dignified life of a wealthy former head of state. Currently there are a whole lot of despots still sitting at the table looking at the cards showing and nervously checking and rechecking their hole cards as they attempt to calculate the odds of drawing a winning hand.

Being a despot is a good gig until the people call your bluff.

tequila
03-01-2011, 04:25 PM
I don't think these governments have the slightest interest in our advice, or in our meddling, which is closer to what they would call it. Probably they wouldn't tell us that, but would listen very seriously, promise to think deeply on what we said, then go on doing what they want.

We've a very limited capacity, if any, to change how others govern.

However we have seen that the U.S. does have the capacity to change how our allies govern - especially when we have good military-to-military relations. The Philippines, El Salvador, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, and Turkey have all made substantive political moves towards democracy in part due to U.S. pressure and influence. In several of those countries, military governments either surrendered power or acquiesced to a reduced political role and the election of former enemies. How does this not qualify as changes in governance?

I doubt we will know the full picture for a long time, but I imagine there was not a little behind-the-scenes pressure on the Egyptian military by the Obama Administration as well.

Marc
03-01-2011, 06:19 PM
However we have seen that the U.S. does have the capacity to change how our allies govern - especially when we have good military-to-military relations. The Philippines, El Salvador, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, and Turkey have all made substantive political moves towards democracy in part due to U.S. pressure and influence. In several of those countries, military governments either surrendered power or acquiesced to a reduced political role and the election of former enemies. How does this not qualify as changes in governance?


Indeed, The Philippines, Colombia, and El Salvador demonstrate that a combination of political pressure, low profile military engagement, and economic incentives can result in an effective U.S. capacity to change how our allies govern. However, alle these operations had/have one goal: to promote democracy. Until now, our track record on the promotion of democracy in the Middle East is less clear than it was/is in the three aforementioned examples.

Steve the Planner
03-01-2011, 06:45 PM
Marc:

I continue to monitor the Rage events with a focus on something different.

We tend to focus not on promoting democracy but on establishing or maintaining nation-state power structures.

The debate in the Arab world, in my opinion, has, over the last 90 years or so, focused on who gets to control the apparatus of a strong central government descending from the ancient Persian/Greece/Roman empire models, which place sub-national governance/government in a very inferior position easily controlled from above.

What is fascinating to me about Libya is that, unlike the perennial battle over who gets to be in charge (ultimately creating one form of dictatorship over the previous), is that, with no pre-existing pattern, people are beginning to form, admittedly on an experimental and informal basis) sub-national governance structures.

The question they raise, which is markedly different from other countries, is not "who?," but "how?," which, I believe is the first crack in a wall that has, for the most part, held Arab peoples back, and diverted their attention from the issues needed to be addressed in more sophisticated and urbanized systems like they once had in Babylon, etc...

While the results are unpredicatable, in my view, the challenges raised and faced in Libya (free from distortion of anti-imperialism and poverty of resources) are fundamental ones: How do we, as a modern, young Arab society wish to govern ourselves to provide essential services and opportunities?

The Arab World's future may be re-shaped by these nascent Libyan experiments, which, hopefully will impact all the old, unworkable and externally-derived nation-state systems.

Notably, in a world of Nation-States, the shell and trappings are needed, but how can sub-national governance open opportunities (maybe not immediately) for Arab self-determination and civic advancement?

I heard a lady on CNN talking from Benghazi about what she wanted--- greater services, education, opportunities, freedom---voting rights, while perhaps significant vehicles to those ends, where not a front-runner.

Marc
03-01-2011, 07:55 PM
Marc:

We tend to focus not on promoting democracy but on establishing or maintaining nation-state power structures.

The debate in the Arab world, in my opinion, has, over the last 90 years or so, focused on who gets to control the apparatus of a strong central government descending from the ancient Persian/Greece/Roman empire models, which place sub-national governance/government in a very inferior position easily controlled from above.

What is fascinating to me about Libya is that, unlike the perennial battle over who gets to be in charge (ultimately creating one form of dictatorship over the previous), is that, with no pre-existing pattern, people are beginning to form, admittedly on an experimental and informal basis) sub-national governance structures.

The question they raise, which is markedly different from other countries, is not "who?," but "how?," which, I believe is the first crack in a wall that has, for the most part, held Arab peoples back, and diverted their attention from the issues needed to be addressed in more sophisticated and urbanized systems like they once had in Babylon, etc...

While the results are unpredicatable, in my view, the challenges raised and faced in Libya (free from distortion of anti-imperialism and poverty of resources) are fundamental ones: How do we, as a modern, young Arab society wish to govern ourselves to provide essential services and opportunities?

The Arab World's future may be re-shaped by these nascent Libyan experiments, which, hopefully will impact all the old, unworkable and externally-derived nation-state systems.

Notably, in a world of Nation-States, the shell and trappings are needed, but how can sub-national governance open opportunities (maybe not immediately) for Arab self-determination and civic advancement?

I heard a lady on CNN talking from Benghazi about what she wanted--- greater services, education, opportunities, freedom---voting rights, while perhaps significant vehicles to those ends, where not a front-runner.

Steve,

The nation-state has been a somewhat problematic concept in the Middle East. The current borders have been drawn by European colonial powers. Pan-Arabists, Islamists, and Arab Nationalists all claimed to hate and reject them. So, in theory you are right. Because current borders have questionable legitimacy, it should be possible to change them. However, this is not what happened in reality. "Very soon after gaining independence, new leaders concentrated all power in their own person. They set up single-party political systems, military dictatorships, or absolute monarchies. Almost all of them quickly abandoned the idea of Pan-Arabism and sanctified the borders they once claimed to be artificially drawn to divide them." http://www.amazon.com/Stalemate-Conflicts-Democracies-Islamists-Autocrats/dp/0313384444/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpi_1#_ p. 25. So, in practice, most Middle Eastern leaders strongly adhered to nation-states and their borders. Therefore, I am very pessimistic about the opportunities offered by sub-national governance. Until now, experiments have been problematic at best: Kurdistan under Saddam Hussein (an attack with chemical weapons against Kurdish insurgents), nowadays Kurdistan (attempts to change borders to include oil fields in the autonomous territory), Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, North and South-Yemen,... One of the main problems is that nobody knows how to draw the borders. Like in Kurdistan, all parties will try to include as much oil fields as possible in the territory they control. Perhaps, the power-and-oil-sharing process in Iraq can serve as a model here, but its outcome is still uncertain.

Tukhachevskii
03-01-2011, 08:17 PM
What is fascinating to me about Libya is that, unlike the perennial battle over who gets to be in charge (ultimately creating one form of dictatorship over the previous), is that, with no pre-existing pattern, people are beginning to form, admittedly on an experimental and informal basis) sub-national governance structures.


Concur with everything but the above. The interesting (basket?)case that is Libya (or Lybia according to one American book I read!) is that the people are not plucking sub-national governance structures out of thin air. The particular structural trajectory that the Libyan state took under Ghaddafi is intriguing. He styled himself as a revolutionary socialist-Islamic ruler (is that Glenn Beck I hear in the background?:D). Consequently, in order to undermine the tribal structure of Libya as it existed under the previous monarch (Ghaddafi's own tribal lineage was singularly "unimpressive" so he couldn't draw on that power structure to prop himself up) Ghaddafi introduced popular councils, revolutionary committees, &c at all levels of government (talk about un-intended consequences!). Partly, this was to upset the tribal structure of Libya (which he has been largely succesful in suppressing, until now) but mostly it was to diffuse power to such a degree as to leave him the only centre of authroitative power in the hub-spoke system. He periodically, shook up those councils too. But the Libyan people, more perhaps than any other Arab or African state have a great deal of expertise in political management and organisation (http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=05UnWONrmuoC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=libya+political+structure&ots=hPeOO0f2zK&sig=MltoBd3FYepxbR-TjJXfFLktY5U#v=onepage&q=libya%20political%20structure&f=false) even if it was, ultimately, stunted by the presence of Ghaddafi, but the damage was done; the Libyan people got a taste of "civil society". He did the same thing with the Armed forces (http://padis2.uniroma1.it:81/ojs/index.php/JMEG/article/viewPDFInterstitial/240/224) (after all, he's still only a Col.:eek:) especially after the return of Libyan jihadis from Afghanistan and the numerous (almost Nasserite) officer revolts since the late 70s. In fact, it was the absence of any real vertically authoritarian system that enabled the "revolt" to spread so quickly, given that there was no reliable coercive instrument to rely upon other than a few loyal "revolutionary" militias. He diffused his power so effectviely throughout the system that, in the end, he had nothing to back it up in an emergency (especially one in which the international system was not conducive to his particular brand of conflict resolution). It's a wonder he was in power so long (but that's nepotisim, clientelism, et al for you). What we are seeing now is the self-organisation of Libya based upon years of exerience but without Ghaddafi's braking mechanism. In the end, nothing succeeds like success; the question we have to ask ourselves is would the "revolt" have occured without Tunisia and Egypt? Which makes generalisations about the "causes" of revolution in general even more suspect.

Steve the Planner
03-02-2011, 12:06 AM
Tukhachevskii:

Ain't it grand and amazing?

What if the new national structure clones into two or more structures, or just local councils?

Who controls the oil?

Question remains whether they will be able to carve out something positive for themselves.

Whether good or bad, the majority of the population is urban and young. There is little room for survival of "ancient" tribal systems that, by definition, argue against youth and urban empowerment.

What was that Jurassic Park quote: Life will out?

Now to find out what kind of life....

Steve the Planner
03-02-2011, 12:15 AM
Marc:

Lots of people actually know how to create borders---but they must be definitive, accepted, and defensible if they are to survive without conflict.

Demographics, culture and economics often run over poorly defined borders that are obstructed from natural change (or correction).

This idea of borders cannot change is what stands against the march of history: read USA, Germany, Pakistan, etc...

History has been, and will continue to be written by conflicts surrounding improperly set, or conflicting borders and national/sub-national governance structures.

Aversion to change is a characteristic of empires, often creating the history of conflicts.

Dayuhan
03-02-2011, 01:36 AM
However we have seen that the U.S. does have the capacity to change how our allies govern - especially when we have good military-to-military relations. The Philippines, El Salvador, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, and Turkey have all made substantive political moves towards democracy in part due to U.S. pressure and influence. In several of those countries, military governments either surrendered power or acquiesced to a reduced political role and the election of former enemies. How does this not qualify as changes in governance?

Changes in governance, yes, but the degree to which US pressure was involved is debatable in all cases. In the Philippines US pressure was really not a factor at all. In other cases possibly more so, but in no case would I call it conclusive.


I doubt we will know the full picture for a long time, but I imagine there was not a little behind-the-scenes pressure on the Egyptian military by the Obama Administration as well.

Presumably so. Whether it played a decisive or a significant role will depend on who is doing the talking and on what circumstances emerge... as in whether people wish to claim credit or assign blame. If things go bad you can be sure it will all have been America's fault!

If you're going to try to apply pressure, you have to press with the tide, not against it, and to choose your time right. Try to pressure people who feel secure in their position and who see your prescriptions as contrary to their interests and they'll tell you to deposit it gently where the sun don't shine. When - and if - the masses are rattling the gates, they may sing a different tune. Timing is all.


Yes, but you also have told me countless times that there is no insurgency in these countries as well...

As traditionally defined, no, there isn't. Change the definition and it can be anything you want it to be. As stated above, applying pressure on these governments when they see no need for change is going to do nothing.


I think you might be surprised at how much clout the US has, we just haven't been too skilled at employing the more subtle aspects of it.

A bit hypothetical, that. Has our influence not moved anyone because we haven't used it right, or because we haven't as much of it as we thought we had? Hard to verify that. I see no reason to believe, though, that governments will change their domestic policies because we want them to. Do we change our policies on health care or capital punishment because they don't meet European standards?


This is why in the geo-politics of the Middle East it is so essential for the US to build and sustain working relationships with Turkey and Iran as these two states continue to rise. It is the art of balancing smaller states against and with each other that creates and sustains a stability that supports one's interests. If properly positioned, a simple private conversation between leaders is probably enough.

Remember that they are pursuing their own balances on the side, and that we're not necessarily a part of those balances. I can't imagine any position that would, for example, allow an American leader to tell a Saudi leader what domestic reforms he ought to undertake with any sort of positive results. People don't like that sort of thing. They never have. We wouldn't like it either. They might endure it if we had a real stick to wave, or a carrot they really really wanted, but that's not so much the case these days.


Currently there are a whole lot of despots still sitting at the table looking at the cards showing and nervously checking and rechecking their hole cards as they attempt to calculate the odds of drawing a winning hand.

Being a despot is a good gig until the people call your bluff.

Possibly so, but it's the people who call the bluff, not the USA. We may be able to push a bit with the tide, once it flows, but pushing while it ain't flowing won't do anything. There are very real and very significant limits to what we can do, and if we try to do what we can't, we don't improve things for ourselves.

tequila
03-02-2011, 01:30 PM
If you're going to try to apply pressure, you have to press with the tide, not against it, and to choose your time right. Try to pressure people who feel secure in their position and who see your prescriptions as contrary to their interests and they'll tell you to deposit it gently where the sun don't shine. When - and if - the masses are rattling the gates, they may sing a different tune. Timing is all.


In South Korea, Taiwan, El Salvador, and Turkey, significant reforms and democratization occurred without any major crisis or mass demonstrations.

Bob's World
03-02-2011, 01:52 PM
A good constitution disrupts the government from becoming overly effective/powerful, while at the same time providing trusted, legal and certain means to the populace to raise such issues without resorting to illegal means.

Even when such means don't exist, sometimes you get lucky, such as when Mr Gorbachev made the conscious decision to not resist the illegal popular movements for liberty that swept across Eastern Europe a generation ago. A different decision and that would have been a bloody disaster.

Most populaces are like that criminal staring up into the dark bore of Dirty Harry's .44 magnum, "you've got to ask yourself one question: Do I feel lucky? Well, do ya, punk?"
Up until recently they didn't. Now they do. The question will be how many of these governments pull the trigger.

With stability in this region (rather sustaining any particular government of any particular state) being in the US's best interest, the question for the US is how do we best wield our influence see that populaces have better options and to prevent those triggers from being pulled.

Marc
03-02-2011, 02:23 PM
Marc:

Lots of people actually know how to create borders---but they must be definitive, accepted, and defensible if they are to survive without conflict.

Demographics, culture and economics often run over poorly defined borders that are obstructed from natural change (or correction).

This idea of borders cannot change is what stands against the march of history: read USA, Germany, Pakistan, etc...

History has been, and will continue to be written by conflicts surrounding improperly set, or conflicting borders and national/sub-national governance structures.

Aversion to change is a characteristic of empires, often creating the history of conflicts.

Steve,

Recent history shows that, contrary to what you think, it is very difficult to create borders. It is possible to change the function of an existing border. For instance, a provincial border can become a nation-state border after a secession. That is what happened on numerous occasions in the last three decades (the baltic republics, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, East Timor, Kazachstan, Ukraine,...). However, creating new borders is difficult to impossible. Becoming an independent state or a state inside a federation to a large degre depends upon the existence of borders suitable to define this new state. In instances where such borders do not exist (Bosnia, Kurdistan, Palestine,...) the political and diplomatic problems are much more difficult than when such borders do exist.

A good document on the complexities surrounding the "creation" of borders is "Negotiating the Dayton Peace Accords through Digital Maps" by Richard G. Johnson.

http://www.iapad.org/publications/ppgis/Negotiating_the_Dayton_Peace_Accords_through_Digit al_Maps.pdf

Steve the Planner
03-02-2011, 02:50 PM
Marc:

Borders are easy. Borders WITHOUT conflict ARE the hard part.

Fortunately, only a few percent of any borders are actually disputed at one time, but that are are are Doozies.

Fuchs
03-02-2011, 05:04 PM
A quick list is here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_territorial_disputes).

Bob's World
03-02-2011, 06:21 PM
A quick list is here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_territorial_disputes).

We should have this cleaned up in no time! A smidge of development, a dash of pop-centric COIN, Clear-Hold-Build to taste, and viola!

Fuchs
03-02-2011, 06:35 PM
I kept reading there a bit; this
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bir_Tawil
seems to be an interesting place. No state claims it. Sounds perfect for a new Sodom and Gomorrha with booze (would need to be locally brewed or flown in, of course) and gambling; an African Vegas. :D

The concept would depend on sufficiently open borders and traffic connections, of course. :(

Marc
03-02-2011, 06:35 PM
Marc:

Borders are easy. Borders WITHOUT conflict ARE the hard part.

Fortunately, only a few percent of any borders are actually disputed at one time, but that are are are Doozies.

Steve,

So what does this have to do with Libya?

Fuchs
03-02-2011, 06:40 PM
Oh com on, it's just a little bit OT.

Besides, think about why Mr. G was able to call upon Saharan mercenaries...

Steve the Planner
03-03-2011, 12:45 AM
Marc:

Back to my original point.

Libya uniquely raises the issue of How not just Who.

I remain interested in How this will play out. Folks in BenGhazi are not finding over, for example, taking the capitol, suspending the national assembly, re-writing the national constitution.

What might emerge is an open question.

To me, answering that question raises unique questions in the Arab World.

Bob's World
03-03-2011, 12:02 PM
Marc:

Back to my original point.

Libya uniquely raises the issue of How not just Who.

I remain interested in How this will play out. Folks in BenGhazi are not finding over, for example, taking the capitol, suspending the national assembly, re-writing the national constitution.

What might emerge is an open question.

To me, answering that question raises unique questions in the Arab World.

But it is a question for the affected populaces to answer.

The key to remember is that causation for these insurgencies radiated outward from the governments, not inward from whatever organization, leader or ideology employed during the insurgency itself. The key for the west is to not get overly anxious about the role of AQ or MB or any others who seek to exploit this situation, but rather to focus on helping to shape conditions that allow the moderate majority the opportunity to either reform the existing government or build a new government that is designed to avoid abuses and to provide the degree and nature of governance this populaces needs.

As an example, it was communists who exploited the poor governance (effective sure, but illegitimate, racist, exploitive, etc) of Great Britain in Malaya. Once the unacceptable aspects of that governance were withdrawn and new, acceptable governance formed, the communists became moot. The survivors came back in from the cold, where they had been driven by the security forces, and found that there was no longer a market for the product they offered.

So too in the Arab World have Islamist organizations offered the best hope for the people. Now that the people have taken the situation into their own hands this is no longer the case. Played correctly we can help render these Islamist groups as moot in the Arab world as communism has become in much of Asia. Played incorrectly, and we will drive the populace into their arms and deny them this rare opportunity at liberty and self-determination.

Steve the Planner
03-03-2011, 07:58 PM
Bob:

I think it's a bit premature to guess how the current events radiated, spread, etc...

My experience is that the US has lots of indirect "intelligence" about some countries which it too often tries to extrapolate into knowledge or wisdom, to the detriment of many things. But Libya is not one of them.

Playing Islamists correctly or incorrectly presupposes that Islamists, or any other religionists, are, by definition, a problem source with no possible merits for solution. I just can't accept that leap.

Although purged from European history books, Islam, under different circumstances and conditions, played a significant role in making possible the advancement of modern society.

Bob's World
03-03-2011, 09:13 PM
Bob:

I think it's a bit premature to guess how the current events radiated, spread, etc...

My experience is that the US has lots of indirect "intelligence" about some countries which it too often tries to extrapolate into knowledge or wisdom, to the detriment of many things. But Libya is not one of them.

Playing Islamists correctly or incorrectly presupposes that Islamists, or any other religionists, are, by definition, a problem source with no possible merits for solution. I just can't accept that leap.

Although purged from European history books, Islam, under different circumstances and conditions, played a significant role in making possible the advancement of modern society.

This has been building for 60+ years,(or much longer depending on where one draws the cut lines in history) and boiling at an increasing rate for the past 20, so just because all moved suddenly doesn't mean it just started.

Certainly many groups viewed as radical or even as terrorist today will evolve into much more moderate organizations once the mission of throwing off oppressive regimes who don't allow moderate opposition is accomplished. Just as most Americans attend protestant churches today with little awareness of the role they played in the insurgent wars that reshaped Europe 300-500 years ago.

Dayuhan
03-04-2011, 12:33 AM
Certainly many groups viewed as radical or even as terrorist today will evolve into much more moderate organizations once the mission of throwing off oppressive regimes who don't allow moderate opposition is accomplished.

Unless of course they take over and become the new oppressive regime... which they will do if they can.

Ken White
03-04-2011, 12:35 AM
Truer words were never spake... :D

Marc
03-04-2011, 10:45 AM
Unless of course they take over and become the new oppressive regime... which they will do if they can.

For a concise analysis on the way ahead in Libya: http://abcclio.blogspot.com/2011/02/libya-another-power-bank-subjected-to.html

Bob's World
03-04-2011, 12:01 PM
Unless of course they take over and become the new oppressive regime... which they will do if they can.

Most of those even evolve over time, as the USSR, China, Cambodia and Vietnam to name a few show. Currently being an average citizen in a country that was "lost" to communism in the post WWII upheaval is often a better deal than being an average citizen in one of the many buffer states where the US implemented the control measures of a long containment strategy that has nurtured the rise of the majority of the states that top the "least free" list.

Ideology is over sold and over played. Bad ideologies may be just the ticket to carry an insurgency to success. That is the role of ideology, to take a position that the state either cannot or will not co-opt, that speaks to the target populace and motivates them to join and stay the course. Good ideologies can work for that too; but the good ones tend to endure into the peace while the bad ones all seem to evolve over time to more sustainable models.

But my point was that the populace no longer needs a bad ideology as their best option to move against the government, they moved on their own. So the issue now is what waits for them after the victory parade? The US does our own national interests a disservice when we cling to friends or foes alike after situations evolve, or in this case revolve. We need to stand ready to work with what ever or whomever emerges; we need to be prepared to use influence or even reasonable force where necessary to protect populaces from the government as well as from the insurgent; and we need to have an open offer of support on the table to help new groups organize and get their feet on the ground as they take on the overwhelming task of governance. But that does not mean latching onto new despots to replace old ones as we too often do; or forcing a made in America solution up the backside of these emerging populaces.

As an aside I flipped by Fox news yesterday and the anchor was talking about Libya and how "Qaddafi is willing to murder his populace to stay in office" as they debated the option of a no-fly zone. I could not help but think "How is this different from Mr. Karzai and his willingness to murder his populace to stay in office, or our commitment to help murder his populace to keep him in office? This is what state's do in COIN when they see it as war by the people against the state, they wage war back and murder the populace that dares to challenge their flawed governance, even if or particularly if they have offered the populace few to no less violent options to express their discontent.

COIN is governance rising to civil emergency by a government in its role of serving and protecting the entire populace. No more, no less. COIN is continuous and most often innocuous and prophylactic in nature. It only becomes reactive as the proactive measures begin to fall short. It only becomes war only when the government has totally failed and is desperately seeking to simply crush those who dare to defy their rule.

I don't know how we do "neutral intervention" to facilitate the best possible self-determination (ass assessed from the perspective of the recipient populace). We've never done it before.

Dayuhan
03-04-2011, 10:42 PM
Currently being an average citizen in a country that was "lost" to communism in the post WWII upheaval is often a better deal than being an average citizen in one of the many buffer states where the US implemented the control measures of a long containment strategy that has nurtured the rise of the majority of the states that top the "least free" list.

Debatable assertion. In Latin America, which probably saw the most egregious US meddling in the Cold War, the only state on the "not free" list is Cuba. Most of the states once ruled by US puppet dictators have made the transition out of dictatorship.

In East Asia, another area which saw Cold War era meddling on a grand scale, the "not free" list is dominated by North Korea, China, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam.

If you look at the Freedom House "Least Free" list, you get this:

1. Burma
2. Cuba
3. Libya
4. North Korea
5. Somalia
6. Sudan
7. Turkmenistan
8. Uzbekistan

How many of those saw US-implemented "control measures" during the Cold War? How do you justify talk of "a long containment strategy that has nurtured the rise of the majority of the states that top the "least free" list"?

Even at the next tier, you get:

1. Belarus
2. China
3. Chad
4. Equatorial Guinea
5. Eritrea
6. Laos
7. Saudi Arabia
8. Syria
9. Zimbabwe

Not exactly a collection of places where the US has implemented "control measures". The US has very little influence in any of these, certainly not enough to control anyone or prevent anyone from being controlled.


We need to stand ready to work with what ever or whomever emerges;

Agreed.


we need to be prepared to use influence or even reasonable force where necessary to protect populaces from the government as well as from the insurgent; and we need to have an open offer of support on the table to help new groups organize and get their feet on the ground as they take on the overwhelming task of governance.

We also have to accept that populaces may not want us involved, and we have to be willing to refrain from intrusion where it's not welcome or appropriate.


But that does not mean latching onto new despots to replace old ones as we too often do; or forcing a made in America solution up the backside of these emerging populaces.

New despots can and often will replace the old ones without any help or encouragement from us. When that occurs we will, as you recommend above, "stand ready to work with what ever or whomever emerges".


I don't know how we do "neutral intervention" to facilitate the best possible self-determination (ass assessed from the perspective of the recipient populace). We've never done it before.

Very simply, we don't. All we can do is wait for people to act and then, to the extent compatible with our interests and limitations, act in support. We should not intervene unless asked to do so by parties with a credible claim to represent the popular will, we should not assume that any populace wants what we think they should, and we should not try to initiate "popular" action.

We also have to remember, always, that populaces are not uniform and what one sector of the populace is willing to fight for may be anathema to other sectors of the same populace.

Bob's World
03-04-2011, 11:42 PM
It becomes less debatable when one looks at all 47 assessed as "not free" rather than just the bottom 10. Any state on that list of 47 is ripe for insurgency. Many that make the top 10 are so bad that no insurgency has much chance to get going as any sign of subversion is quickly crushed.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fiw/FIW%202011%20Booklet_1_11_11.pdf


That main point is to not so totally freaked out by who shows up to help the populace gain freedom that we overract by committing ourselves to keeping despots in power. I hear it every day on the news and I see it everyday in our foreign policy. We need to evolve.

Dayuhan
03-05-2011, 01:44 AM
It becomes less debatable when one looks at all 47 assessed as "not free" rather than just the bottom 10. Any state on that list of 47 is ripe for insurgency. Many that make the top 10 are so bad that no insurgency has much chance to get going as any sign of subversion is quickly crushed.

You specifically referred to "states where the US implemented the control measures of a long containment strategy that has nurtured the rise of the majority of the states that top the "least free" list". That is demonstrably not true.

I won't take the time to break down the 47 but on a quick scan it does not at all seem to be dominated by US allies or regimes the US nurtured as part of a strategy of containment. I suspect that on a global basis you'd find that more of those "US-nurtured" despotisms have made the transition to democracy than those of the many despots we didn't nurture.


That main point is to not so totally freaked out by who shows up to help the populace gain freedom that we overract by committing ourselves to keeping despots in power.

Who exactly is showing up to "help the populace gain freedom"?

We should not be so naive as to think that anyone who fights a despot is fighting for freedom. Often they've simply spotted a weak regime that they think they can replace with their own despotism. Often the populace is quite aware of this: why do you think the populaces of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have shown so little interest in AQ's attempts to lead them into a new form of despotism? I doubt that it's because they love their rulers: they just see that AQ has nothing better to offer.

Ray
05-23-2011, 02:51 AM
Kuwait bans visas for Pakistan and four other countries


The ban, imposed on Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, includes suspending all tourism, visit and trade visas as well as visas sponsored by spouses, the media reported.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/173758/kuwait-bans-visa-issuance-to-pakistan-and-four-other-countries/

davidbfpo
08-31-2012, 11:21 AM
I think this is a suitable place for this article on the regional picture, even if the original title suggests a focus on Egypt.

The opening passage:
The downfall of Mubarak and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood might be a sign of democracy finally coming to Egypt, but above all it shows how tragically the west has failed to grasp what is going on in the Middle East.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/tim-parsons/egypt-new-dawn-and-lesson-for-west

AdamG
09-20-2012, 02:24 PM
This should probably be cross-posted in other threads, but I think it's relevant here.


Pushpin map of violence linked to the "Movie Protest"

https://maps.google.com/maps/ms?msid=201645180959880549419.0004c9a894dfb66defab 9&msa=0&ie=UTF8&t=m&source=embed&ll=32.10119%2c42.1875&spn=57.886601%2c96.503906&z=3

From -


Muslim Protests by John Hudson
Across the globe, a 14-minute YouTube clip of an anti-Muslim movie is sparking protests against U.S. Embassies and institutions. Visit The Atlantic Wire for the full article:

http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2012/09/map-muslim-protests-around-world/56865/

davidbfpo
09-26-2012, 01:26 PM
The Arab Spring makes for headline, not understanding and the linked article provides a review. We have a number of threads on the theme in the Middle East forum, each set in a national context, but none for a general discussion.

I've heard the author Olivier Roy speak @ Oxford University and was impressed, so thanks to Twitter a pointer to this long academic article:http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Roy-23-3.pdf

It opens with:
The “Arab Spring” at first had nothing about it that was specifically “Arab” or “Muslim.” The demonstrators were calling for dignity, elections, democracy, good governance, and human rights. Unlike any Arab revolutionary movements of the past sixty years, they were concerned with individual citizenship and not with some holistic entity such as “the people,” the Muslim umma, or the Arab nation. The demonstrators referred to no Middle Eastern geopolitical conflicts, burned no U.S. or Israeli flags, offered no chants in favor of the main (that is to say, Islamist) opposition parties, and expressed no wish for the establishment of an Islamic state or the implementation of shari‘a

He is rather optimistic and some would disagree that AQ in Iraq has been defeated. On AQ:
Al-Qaeda, in short, is yesterday’s news, part and parcel of the old anti-imperialist political culture that the Arab Middle East is now leaving behind.

Lots of examples are given of how the 'Arab Spring' has twisted to adjust to local conditions and popular, sometimes democratic demands upon Islamism.

He ends with:
Instead of the secularization of society, we might do better to speak of the “autonomization” of politics from religion and of religion from politics, due to the diversification of the religious field and the inability to reconstruct religion as a political ideology. When religion is everywhere, it is nowhere. That was the underlying meaning that I took away from what Egyptian parliament speaker and Muslim Brother Saad al-Katatni said to a Salafist deputy who wanted to perform the Muslim prayer call while the house was in session: “We are all Muslims; if you want to pray there is a mosque in parliament, but parliament is not a mosque.”

The paradox of re-Islamization is that it leads to political secularization and opens the door to debate about what Islam means. This could lead to the reopening of theological debate, but that would be a consequence and not a cause of the democratization of Muslim societies.

davidbfpo
11-19-2012, 11:20 PM
A long article to absorb at first sight 'Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement' by Aaron Y. Zelin:http://jihadology.net/2012/11/19/guest-post-perceptions-of-the-arab-spring-within-the-salafi-jihadi-movement/

So economy of effort or a teaser:
Al Qaeda and other salafi jihadis do not see the upheaval of the Arab Spring as the death knell for their movement. Rather, they believe that they will be able to capitalize on the chaos in definable ways, and that their enemies have suffered significant geopolitical setbacks. As previously stated, one cannot take jihadi perceptions of the Arab Spring at face value as representing the true reality. These perceptions are laced with hubris, and frequently conflate the movement’s aspirations with on-the-ground reality. Yet the same can be said of Western analysts who definitively declare the jihadi movement dead: their own proclamations are likewise frequently hubristic, and project their own aspirations upon the events in question.

As McCants has noted, the Arab Spring presents “both promise and peril for the global jihadist movement.” Some of this peril is related to factors that McCants has noted, such as the emergence of Islamist parliamentarians. Other perils may relate to justifications for the use of violence. If extreme salafis embrace strategies of electoral politics and persuasion, does the raison d’être of jihadi groups recede? Although these challenges may be looming, jihadis were less concerned about them during the first year of statements on the Arab Spring, and far more interested in the perceived opportunities presented to the movement.

Our analysis of 101 significant documents produced by jihadi thinkers highlights a rather complex and detailed understanding of the ramifications of the uprisings. This understanding includes a developed outlook regarding the geopolitics of regime change; an assessment of specific advantages that the jihadi movement might enjoy; and a developing doctrine regarding the movement’s goals, and strategy to attain those goals, in the post-revolution world. Without understanding how jihadis view the uprisings, we will be at a great disadvantage in attempting to predict the future of the salafi jihadi movement.

ICSR have a short article 'At the Crossroads: The Arab Spring and the Future of Al Qaeda', with another as yet un-read report:http://icsr.info/2012/10/icsr-insight-at-the-crossroads-the-arab-spring-and-the-future-of-al-qaeda/

They conclude:
....Al Qaeda’s responses to the Arab Spring are of an organization that is losing momentum, while – at the same time – also presenting new opportunities. Al Qaeda, therefore, is at a crossroads: whether or not it survives will be decided by how well it adapts to events that are beyond its control.

davidbfpo
12-17-2012, 10:50 AM
An article in Perspectives on Terrorism, an e-journal and the Abstract says:
The Arab revolutions, often referred to collectively as the ‘Arab Spring’, posed, and continue to present, a considerable challenge for Al-Qaeda. This article assesses how Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, as well as affiliates and associates, have responded to the Arab Spring, by analysing media material and public communiqués issued in the aftermath of the uprisings. The first section discusses the impact of the Arab Spring on Al-Qaeda. The second section explores the Al-Qaeda core leadership response to the revolutions, especially the ways in which Ayman Al-Zawahiri has chosen to frame the events. The third section examines the way Al-Qaeda’s affiliates and associates have responded to the revolutions, including contributions to the English-language Inspire magazine. Overall, The article describes how Al-Qaeda has sought to interpret the events in its favour and how it hopes to exploit the current turmoil in the wake of the Arab revolutions.

Link:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/228/html

davidbfpo
06-08-2013, 09:13 PM
IMHO an update on the original 2008 theme, an article in The Guardian 'Is the Middle East heading for a full-blown religious war?':http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/08/middle-east-full-blown-religious-war?CMP=twt_gu

Vali Nasr is cited too and near the end:
Nasr, who is more optimistic than most, suggests, too, that the current tensions can be seen as marking the final unravelling of the shape of the region first conceived in the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot agreement that foresaw the dismemberment of the Ottoman Turkish empire.

"Those structures are now coming undone: first under the boots of US soldiers in Iraq and more recently under the heels of the democracy protesters of the Arab spring."

davidbfpo
11-17-2013, 06:18 PM
A succinct analysis, The Arab world to 2020 by Shashank Joshi, of RUSI, one of the few analysts I follow. He starts with:
It would be trivial to observe that the Arab world is changing fast. But to grasp the pace and scale of the transformation, consider the following intellectual exercise: compare the post-war change in the political landscape of Europe on the one hand, and the Middle East on the other.

(His last sentence). The Arab spring was neither teleological nor uniform, and navigating its waves will be the central task of the next decade.

Worth reading IMHO, it is UK-centric though, caveat aside it will make sense to SWC readers:http://shashankjoshi.files.wordpress.com/2009/12/influencing-tomorrow-the-arab-world-to-20201.pdf

davidbfpo
08-21-2014, 11:15 PM
Two book reviews:
A new wave of political science is now digging deep into that remarkable moment, even as its history threatens to be swept away by the new demands of chaos, war and autocratic restoration. I am delighted to highlight two new publications: My edited book “The Arab Uprisings Explained (http://www.amazon.com/The-Arab-Uprisings-Explained-Contentious/dp/0231158858/ref=tmm_pap_title_0?ie=UTF8&qid=1408458939&sr=1-3)” and “Explaining the Unexpected (http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9297237&fulltextType=MR&fileId=S1537592714000899),” a symposium in the American Political Science Association journal Perspectives on Politics (which Cambridge University Press has kindly un-gated) debating whether and why political scientists failed to predict the uprisings.

Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/08/19/explaining-the-arab-uprisings/

AmericanPride
09-24-2014, 04:00 PM
David,

In hindsight, did the Arab Spring fail? It seems like as of this moment in time, Tunisia is the only country to make the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The movement was crushed in the Gulf kingdoms. Syria is in civil war and Libya is in a low-level one, while Egypt has cemented the domination of the military. The discourse of revolution and resistance in the region is almost exclusively defined by Islamism - it's a question of degree. What happened to the liberal and secular movements? And was the Arab Spring at least successful in disseminating the language of democracy and human rights?

omarali50
09-24-2014, 04:09 PM
Not focused on "deep analysis" but worth a read

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/the-barbarians-within-our-gates-111116.html#.VCLZIvldVPw

davidbfpo
09-24-2014, 06:38 PM
AP asked:
In hindsight, did the Arab Spring fail?I agree today it looks as if it did - Tunisia is the only real gain. Like most popular uprisings, whether they are no-violent or violent, the 'Arab Spring' awakened many, even the majority, that change was possible and the people could achieve change.

It may take a long time for the 'Spring' to really have success. I read this week that population growth across MENA vastly exceeds the ability to generate work and other pressures exist - such as Yemen's lack of potable water.

So like Chou En Lai's comment IIRC on the French Revolution "It is too early to judge its effect".

davidbfpo
09-25-2014, 02:52 PM
A critical article on the choices of allies and friends in the region, referring to President Obama's UN speech:http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpbs


Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpuf Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpuf Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpuf Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpuf



Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpufObama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpuf

Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpufObama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpuf

Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpufObama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpufObama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpuf




Another, academic article asks - rightly - what do these allies now gain from supporting the USA? Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/lars-berger/what-arab-partners-will-get-in-return-for-strikes-on-syria


.. the endurance of authoritarian rule is a major root cause of the Middle East’s chronic instability.

This is the nub of the issue. While "thinking globally and acting cooperatively", Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpufThis is the nub of the issue. While "thinking globally and acting cooperatively", Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpufThis is the nub of the issue. While "thinking globally and acting cooperatively", Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpufThis is the nub of the issue. While "thinking globally and acting cooperatively", Obama is trying to combat religious extremism – aided by some of the countries most responsible for creating it. He is right to say that no counterterrorism strategy can succeed where the only choice for young people is "between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground", but that is exactly the choice that most of the Arab countries provide. - See more at: http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2014/september/obama-unholy-alliance.htm#sthash.X5nDqQq3.lJpdBrd4.dpuf

davidbfpo
10-02-2014, 02:33 PM
Congratulations to WaPo for '9 attempts to explain the crazy complexity of the Middle East' with a variety of graphics:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/10/01/9-attempts-to-explain-the-crazy-complexity-of-the-middle-east/?

The last graphic from The Economist is possibly the clearest and focusses on ISIS:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/imrs.php?src=http://img.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/files/2014/09/20140920_gdc901.png&w=1484

AmericanPride
10-02-2014, 06:48 PM
David,

I saw these graphics the other day and I think they're well done. But I'm curious - (1) is the Middle East any more complex than other regions of the world and (2) what explains the West's generalization of the complexity of non-Western regions?

I suspect this perception, and the subsequent 'surprise' in U.S. media about the 'complexity' of the Middle East, is less about the region's actual complexity and more about the Western narrative and access to information.

davidbfpo
10-02-2014, 07:13 PM
David,

I saw these graphics the other day and I think they're well done. But I'm curious - (1) is the Middle East any more complex than other regions of the world and (2) what explains the West's generalization of the complexity of non-Western regions?

I suspect this perception, and the subsequent 'surprise' in U.S. media about the 'complexity' of the Middle East, is less about the region's actual complexity and more about the Western narrative and access to information.

No, the Middle East is no more complex than Africa or Europe, even the USA, if you are watching from another place. The graphics try to reduce complexity to diagrams, we are the visual generation, no longer the written generation and reflects the amount of time those who wish to learn have. The number involved is variable and often unpredictable in the West.

(More later time for dinner):)

davidbfpo
10-02-2014, 11:08 PM
The vast majority of the public in the USA simply do not watch matters overseas beyond very limited sooundbites and short film clips. So when a crisis or a newsworthy item appears - go simple folks.

I expect in Western Europe each country watches different parts of the world more closely and public policy themes too. The French public may watch North Africa for example.

Another factor I think is that with a few exceptions the MENA diaspora has little impact politically - reverse kith & kin. So few can ask someone from MENA themselves. Clearly there are a good number of expats working across MENA, although I'd venture the numbers have declined in the last twentty years - except in the Gulf (200k Brits work there).

davidbfpo
01-03-2015, 11:13 PM
A thoughtful, reflective commentary by Professor Marc Lynch, in WaPo 'Reflections on the Arab uprisings' and self-critical of how analysts handled events: too many optimistic assumptions for one:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/17/reflections-on-the-arab-uprisings/

davidbfpo
01-03-2015, 11:15 PM
I have merged four threads into this, each covers the Arab World generally and there are many threads on individual nations, only a few on transnational and regional factors. The thread was accordingly renamed.

Bill Moore
01-17-2015, 01:28 PM
This 1964 Defense Department film is a history of the Middle East, with an emphasis on the Israel-Egypt conflict, Arab nationalism, Cold War issues, and the plight of Palestinian refugees.

http://www.c-span.org/video/?323588-1/1964-film-middle-east

A 1964 DOD documentary that we would now call a "strategic appreciation" documentary. Although this was made 50 years ago, I think you'll be surprised how much of this remains relevant today. I also wonder why we don't produce films like this anymore?

If you like history, this film will be 18 minutes well invested.

davidbfpo
01-31-2015, 09:57 PM
A controversial FP article 'Obama's pivot to Iran' and sub-titled 'Forget the Asia rebalancing. The president’s big legacy is likely to be seen as empowering Tehran':https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/29/obamas-pivot-to-iran/

I have read elsewhere, maybe here long ago, that Iran has consistently outplayed its many opponents diplomatically for years.

Here is a taster:
It is quite possible that, by the time Obama leaves office, no other country on Earth will have gained quite so much as Iran. Not all of this will be the doing of the United States, of course, and in fact some of it may prove to be the undoing of our interests in the long run.

davidbfpo
02-05-2015, 08:40 AM
From Mosaic, a hithero unknown source, which announces its Jewish character and this long historical analysis is by:
Michael Doran, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense and a former senior director of the National Security Council.

The sub-title:
The president has long been criticized for his lack of strategic vision. But what if a strategy, centered on Iran, has been in place from the start and consistently followed to this day?
Link:http://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/2015/02/obamas-secret-iran-strategy/

davidbfpo
07-10-2015, 09:29 PM
Abdel Bari Atwan, is a Arab newspaper editor based in London, has a short article and is pungent in his criticism:https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/abdel-bari-atwan/when-it-comes-to-%E2%80%98islamic-state%E2%80%99-west-just-doesn%E2%80%99t-get-it

Here is an early sample:
It is obvious to me that IS is a very different—and infinitely more dangerous—creature than any of its predecessors, al-Qaeda included.....IS has not sprung from nowhere. It is the latest evolutionary step in the Salafi-jihadi movement, specifically the global jihadi, anti-American tendency introduced by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 1996.

He is very pessimistic:
The best hope lies in the most powerful jihadi entities—al-Qaeda, the Taliban and IS—fighting and destroying each other.

Alas there is little sign that this will happen:
Failing violent implosion, only a long term, carefully thought out, and region-wide strategy could work. A concerted effort by the region’s policy-makers and influencers to introduce and nurture values of tolerance, unity, mutual co-operation and peace would have a good chance of ousting IS... because hatred, anger and resentment are the oxygen it needs to flourish.

Compost
07-11-2015, 02:53 AM
Abdel Bari Atwan's article reads like a real Arab nationalist. And he seems to have good reasons for pessimism.

Entering any contest without a guiding purpose is an indulgence, diletantism or whatever almost anyone bothers to call it. Going early is a tactic but at least it is a concept of operation with some prospect of success. Going strong demonstrates real sense of purpose and sometimes a form of evangelism. Possessing an order of battle without exercising it is exhibitionism. Holding back massive resources can be a problem because once committed momentum becomes a form of inertia.

US strategies as expressed in its OOB are generally well understood but its current concept of operation seems to be maintaining the OOB because the US has forgotten – or perhaps has never understood - how to exercise a graduated response. One concept for special forces in FID and FMA is base camp warfare and identifying civilians from protagonists with limited support from main force units. The parallel concept in FMA and FMA-plus is that main force units – most of whose financial and social interaction should be kept well away from foreign civilians – are committed to continuous and intensive harrying of the opponent with little recuperation time spent off-line or behind some wire.

FMA-plus is when an opponent competing by proxy provides a convenient sanctuary that is then subjected to rigorous blockade if not destruction. Modern warfare is when an opponent has not managed to employ a foreign proxy and has not managed to stir up much dissent in your home.

The Middle East cannot make up its collective mind. NATO and the UN are something else again. So who else can the Arabs turn to ? And there the US will eventually go again because at least it can agree on one thing. Going is almost always worth doing even if the US always manages to make some basic mistakes such as disbanding the defeated Iraqi army in already conquered Iraq.

Compost
07-17-2015, 05:12 AM
This is a second effort. But have looked up the US Department of State and been told by Wiki that the term metonym preceded State’s move to Foggy Bottom. So this partial recap of lessons experienced by various parties might be of some use there.

The current disruption in the Middle East is in part due to the poorly planned, inadequately pursued and now discontinued voluntary ground work of the US particularly in 2001, 1990/91 and to lesser extent 1956. And before those ineptitudes the sloppy work of the British and French in their organization of what was called the Middle-East. It is unsurprising that a variety of ratbags and malcontents have finally managed to concatenate all those and their own stupidities together into a troublesome mess.

It is past time for show and tell and now time to iron things out before more countries contract what can only be described as a form of rabies. Several out-of-area countries have already contributed small military forces to demonstrate belief that things have become serious. And many do not want to send more because colonials are always called on to send troops when the sophists give up in disgust or incompetence. But if/when the current bunch of crazies start digging up war dead, then affairs in the Middle East will further accelerate and the next crusade will make the last look like the proverbial picnic in a park. Even in our part of the world the mullahs and the fence sitters are working to ensure there will not be a need to pack lunch.

Realistically the prompt commitment of a co-opted but forceful coalition is a job for the leviathan US, the stolid Brits and Turks and the energized French who have recently been doing more and better in Africa than anyone else. In the arranging one thing should be kept central because in some cultures the principal function of the army is in-country policing with civilian police doing window dressing. So it is essential to select current army generals to become the new political leaders. Just make sure this time that such are industrious rather than venal and if fortunate get several halfway as sensible as Ataturk.

Also and as more than window dressing have as coalition force and deputy force commanders two generals from outside those four main countries and from outside the region. For example Scandinavia could be suitable as one source and particularly Norway because it is most distant and has its own offshore oil. And one reminder, if either commander is American we lose.

Many inhabitants of that sweeping region which includes South Central Europe through into Western Asia, Arabia and along two coasts of Africa might agree with much of the above. But do not expect them to say so because few including sophisticates seem prepared to be secular or humanist.

Compost
07-21-2015, 05:28 AM
The reason the US is a popular study is that it is large enough and tolerant enough to permit many forms of useful and also eccentric behaviour. So the world can look on and learn and choose bits and pieces to try. Of course not all good things were developed in the US. The Brits apparently developed canned laughter and an Aussie developed the flight data recorder. The US just boosted the use of both. However a lot of its home-developed behavioural stuff is hyper specialised and some would say crazed. The US possibly has a higher per capita rate of uniformed and armed security personnel than any other nation. It has as a favouredl sport a concessional game in which only one person is permitted to think before short start-stop intervals and only one specialist kicks the ball. If any social activity is declared a belief then the rest leave it do whatever it wants. Outside the US few inhabitants of modern societies would consider concealed carry, American football or Jonesville eligible for any kind of support. But the US fought a civil war in part for human right to free choice and a future predicated upon something more than a charter that maintained in part the ‘birthright of kings and their ignoble courtiers’.

What is often unadmitted is that the US employs its concept of human rights as a strategy in international afairs and also as a lever in pseudo-revolutionary warfare. What happened to an elected government in western Ukraine and how was it that its quickly endorsed successor permitted civilian flights to continue over eastern Ukraine ? Is there any difference except ourselves and them between an action-packed US Navy cruiser shooting down an Iranian airliner over international waters in the Persian Gulf and an action-packed separatist or Russian missile post shooting down a Malaysian airliner over eastern Ukraine ?

Every amateur psychologist and sociologist knows what the Greeks said simply and long before they went off to treat themselves on other people’s money. It is possible to believe Voltaire was using more words to say much the same. Even then he left out two groups of predictable words at the end, such as ‘and mine also’ followed by ‘provided I do not forget’. It is allowable and useful to have many but hopefully small groups of enthusiasts and crazies provided society also has forensic psychiatrists able to distinguish eccentrics from psychopaths and sociopaths. Society also needs to provide those psychiatrists with every form of legal support and sanction. And there are two aspects to US exceptionalism which are highly dangerous. Many have possibly heard it being described as “The US believes in its own exceptional omnipotence and that belief is shared by others.”

The Bali bombings and the Twin Towers made it increasingly apparent that world affairs was extending to stages worse than serious. Dire was the appropriate word then and it is more-so today. The inability of the US State Department to get most current WMD powers on side in regard to any proliferation into Iran and North Korea is almost unbelievable but world affairs does attract strange competitors. So the US goes on as lead protagonist in its accustomed way. Many neurotics and others may view that as analagous to a book thumper or a groper from a psychedelic top-less bar often expounding and sometimes trying to impose views on a hapless onlooker. And on the other side is an assorted group of noisy neurotics and psychopaths offended by tolerances and unwanted initiatives they do not understand, plus sociopaths who want to become major vandals. And behind them are cliques of far more dangerous psychopaths and sociopaths. The latter are more clever than those out front and even more determined to build one absolutely conformal and misguided commune. The one thing that unites them all is that they really believe the US is trying to impose things such as classical ballet, nude statues, rock bands, Tammany Hall politicians and everything else when they themselves already have the use of possibly more hectoring speakers, hash, belly dancers and of course young boys and girls than are similarly available in the more populous and sometimes thoughtful US.

Everything about the US offends the psychopaths. The clever ones use simple messages such as the ‘great Satan’ and ‘smaller Satans’ which every primitive believer can readily understand and then use to both arouse and intimidate the bovines who would otherwise be content to just wander around. Frequent use of the word great shows their fear otherwise they would use a descriptor such as gross or monstrous. However many of the secular are intimidated and just leave and move on to distant societies different from wherever they came from. But when away from danger many of the alleged would-be integrees turn out to be fencesitters because they still want to support the less horrific bits of what they left behind. And that in effect makes them fifth columnists although of course they deny the nature of that and pretend it is just an eccentricity.

One way or another the psychopaths and sociopaths in the Middle East are currently managing to have enough supporters to keep their excesses going. A wealthy society can possibly afford to catch and keep its psychopaths and sociopaths for indefinite study by forensic psychiatrists. That luxury does not apply in international affairs however much anyone might hope so. Hence the use of drones which seems justifiable to keep numbers down in both ways. The problem is that drones cannot catch any for analysis and in current circumstances result in much collateral damage. One way to make psychopaths and sociopaths and their unwitting cronies stop and think might be – just might be - to demonstrate that more of the world is opposed to their views than seems possible. So the US with many resources has to be involved again but in a somewhat different way.

That is in effect being pro-American. It is to force the realisation in the Middle East and elsewhere that what is happening now is no longer between two forms of evangelism but rather rational versus maniacal.

It leads naturally to a forceful military ground campaign commanded by parties other than the ‘great Satan’. And a good reason to go hard now is that the psychopaths might become even crazier and the sociopaths might be unwilling or unable to restrain them. The US role should be entirely overhead especially supply of munitions for use by others, and next to nothing on the ground. On the ground should be as many others as practicable and hitting as hard as is reasonably permissable. So a ground force with out-of-area cool, calm and implacable leadership.

Going back to the beginning the main good thing that can be said about the US is that despite everything it is tolerant to an exceptional and admirable degree. What does not kill us makes us strong. And either or both ‘us’ can be alternatively written in capitals. However, many who admire the US prefer to live elsewhere to avoid the tumult and excess. Unreserved US evangelism and belief in exceptional permissiveness can be just as maniacal as the behaviour in some other places. But believe it or not most people are probably on the US side. Just give them something more than bulldust evangelism. Being more focused on underlying purpose and above all using adaptive strategy would be a good way to go on.

davidbfpo
07-25-2015, 09:01 PM
Ahmed Rashid had a wide ranging, pessimistic and provocative article in The Spectator last week:http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9584112/al-qaeda-has-become-the-middle-easts-moderate-option/


The Arab world, which has been anxiously watching all of this for years now, is coming to some hard conclusions. Assad is finished — this much is clear. So who’s next? If the answer is not the five-dozen moderates trained by the Pentagon, it will be one of the two extremist militias who control the most territory in Syria: Isis and al-Qa’eda (called by its local name Jabhat al-Nusra). A horrible choice, you might argue, but for many it’s the only choice. The Arab Gulf states and Turkey have already made up their mind. They are heavily arming, funding and talking to al-Qa’eda, regarding it as a safer bet than Isis. It might once have seemed unimaginable but Isis has surpassed even al-Qa’eda in the brutal horrors it inflicts on its victims.
So could al-Qa’eda, once considered the most deadly terrorist organisation in the world, end up with their own state; as masters of the caliphate, with the support of their neighbours? And if so, how on earth did we reach such a surreal and sorry state of affairs?


(Later)So, on the battlefields of Syria and Yemen, the Arab states are not only opposing American attacks on al-Qa’eda but actively offering support to its leader, al-Zawahiri. So two quite separate super-wars are now being fought. The first is the war waged by the US and its western allies in an attempt to defeat al-Qa’eda and Isis in Syria and Yemen. Significantly the Arab states are taking no part in this war and providing the Americans with no intelligence.
The second war is being fought by all the regional Arab states and Turkey — against Assad and other Iranian-backed forces in the region, as well as Isis. In this war, the Arab states openly avoid bombing or attacking al-Qa’eda in Syria and AQAP — and, indeed, provide both with logistical support. This is because both al-Qa’eda offshoots have now declared aims which are shared by the Arab states: they want to topple the Assad regime and oppose Iran.
There are a lot of assumptions here, for example the US & UK could have removed Bashir Assad four years ago. IMHO he is correct the impact on Western public opinion could be harsh; "So now our allies support AQ and you want us to do too".

Bill Moore
07-26-2015, 02:31 AM
I only read your excerpt, but the potential outcomes for Syria surely involve more than the al-Nusra, ISIL, or U.S. trained surrogates (moderates) leading Syria in the future. It seems a couple of other potential options are:

1. Syria as a we know it no longer exists, it breaks down into a number of real or pseudo-states.

2. Assad is replaced, but the Assyrian regime remains in power.

3. The Syrian military conducts a coup, and with help from Iran establishes a harsh military dictatorship (not a major deviation from where they're at now, but Assad would be gone).

I suspect there are other possible outcomes, to include Assad staying in power, because it is the lesser of the evils.

OUTLAW 09
07-26-2015, 08:37 AM
I only read your excerpt, but the potential outcomes for Syria surely involve more than the al-Nusra, ISIL, or U.S. trained surrogates (moderates) leading Syria in the future. It seems a couple of other potential options are:

1. Syria as a we know it no longer exists, it breaks down into a number of real or pseudo-states.

2. Assad is replaced, but the Assyrian regime remains in power.

3. The Syrian military conducts a coup, and with help from Iran establishes a harsh military dictatorship (not a major deviation from where they're at now, but Assad would be gone).

I suspect there are other possible outcomes, to include Assad staying in power, because it is the lesser of the evils.

Now I will provoke as always--there is then the Obama version not mentioned here--of "we need Russia to get a solution approach".

My pushback is we get nothing from Russia--Russian GRU intel troops are on the ground there, Russia has naval port presence and Russia has been the single largest weapons suppliers to Syria thus in fact pushing the war along in order to sell more weapons and without Russian aircraft and technical support Assad would have not had the abilities to constantly bomb his own civilians AND Russia has blocked in the UNSC countless UN humanitarian moves.

So my question is why does this Administration "claim to need Russian diplomatic support" when they are part and parcel of the problem AND here is the kicker--regardless of what Obama does and or does not do the anti Assad forces regardless of political flavor are actually "winning" which was not the case one year ago. Russia also sees the handwriting on the wall as they are attempting to get some kind of non Assad solution before the ground reality kicks in and blocks them as well.

Another key question we miss in US media is "who in the heck has trained a large number of TOW hunter killer teams and WHO is supplying them to the so called Moderates???? I have seen in their TOW battle videos attacks and hits on targets that even a well trained US Army could not pull off. They are firing roughly 20-30 TOWs a week now all hits and are part and parcel of every major attack.

The TOW is winning the ground fight much as the stingers did in AFG --so who is behind them??--there is your answer for what the future will look like.

As the TOW has been successful we are seeing a more coordinated attack campaign forming among the top 10 groups of all political flavors ---so who is driving that unification?? Because surprise surprise it is working.

So if it is the CIA then why does Obama "claim" to need the Russians when the CIA is "winning" now on the ground?? --if KSA/Jordan and the UAE then after Obama's Iranian deal he has a serious credibility problem with them.

MAYBE that is the sudden interest by Obama to get a "Syrian solution" before facts on the ground tell him he has absolutely no influence.

That "influence" lies with the suppliers of the TOW.

JMO----

davidbfpo
07-26-2015, 10:04 AM
Cited in part:
Another key question we miss in US media is "who in the heck has trained a large number of TOW hunter killer teams and WHO is supplying them to the so called Moderates???? I have seen in their TOW battle videos attacks and hits on targets that even a well trained US Army could not pull off. They are firing roughly 20-30 TOWs a week now all hits and are part and parcel of every major attack.

The TOW is winning the ground fight much as the stingers did in AFG --so who is behind them??--there is your answer for what the future will look like.

As the TOW has been successful we are seeing a more coordinated attack campaign forming among the top 10 groups of all political flavors ---so who is driving that unification?? Because surprise surprise it is working.

So if it is the CIA then why does Obama "claim" to need the Russians when the CIA is "winning" now on the ground?? --if KSA/Jordan and the UAE then after Obama's Iranian deal he has a serious credibility problem with them.

MAYBE that is the sudden interest by Obama to get a "Syrian solution" before facts on the ground tell him he has absolutely no influence.

That "influence" lies with the suppliers of the TOW.

Well this article by a blogger assembles open source info, mainly from photos and points the finger at Iran. Note it is not the Iraqi military who have them, rather the PMU:http://aerohisto.blogspot.fr/2015/07/the-discreet-use-of-bgm-71-tow-atgm-in.html

Backed up by the anonymous posting of a 2009 video of an Iranian TOW production line:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2G5eBx_8aJ4

davidbfpo
08-03-2015, 08:52 PM
So on the 25th anniversary of that first Iraq conflict, how is it possible that the U.S. is still entangled in a messy, complicated war with no end on the horizon? Aside from an intermission from December 2011 until August 2014, the U.S. military has been rumbling through the sweltering sands or soaring over the desert skies for this entire quarter-century, a military engagement unparalleled in U.S. history.
Before the first Iraq battle, the U.S. had never fought a large-scale war in the Middle East. Yet freeing a tiny Gulf emirate from Saddam's clutches has morphed into a seemingly permanent state of war, metastasizing to so many countries it's tough to put a precise number on it.
Link:http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/08/02/425872296/25-years-in-iraq-with-no-end-in-sight?


An interesting reminder how long Iraq has been in the centre of attention.

davidbfpo
09-30-2015, 07:04 PM
A wide-ranging article in The New Statesman by Sir John Jenkins, a recently retired British diplomat and Arabist. He sets himself an immense task:
The unique threat posed by Isis has been analysed in depth. But how should the West respond in practice?
Link:http://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2015/09/islamist-zero-hour

His explanation for writing this (in part):
Just reading about all of this is bad enough. I do a lot of it for professional reasons. And I sometimes want to scream. It’s not because the quality of the commentary is low. Quite the contrary. There is an impressive debate out there....Yet none of this flood of commentary, it seems to me, has had any impact on real-world policy responses....

His potted biography:
John Jenkins is a former British ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, Syria and Burma. He also served as consul general in Jerusalem, as director for the Middle East and North Africa at the Foreign Office in London and with British diplomatic missions in Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Malaysia. He is now executive director (Middle East) for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and is based in Bahrain.

davidbfpo
02-01-2016, 11:59 AM
Thanks to a "lurker" for the pointer to this article which sets out to:
Five years since the Arab uprisings, a political, cultural and social battle is still raging across the Middle East. Tarek Osman (http://www.tarekosman.com/), the author of Islamism (http://yalebooks.co.uk/display.asp?K=9780300197723), explores‎ the challenges facing the Arab world, and reflects on the conflicting factors that will shape its future.Link:http://yalebooksblog.co.uk/2016/01/18/the-two-futures-of-the-arab-world-an-essay-by-tarek-osman/

He starts with:
The Arab world is undergoing its most transformative change for a century. There are factors in this transformation that could plunge the Arab world into more disintegration, violence and chaos than what we have been seeing in the last five years. Yet, also within this transformation, there are changes that could salvage the Arab world, and usher it on a new trajectory of regeneration. Aside from the uprisings, regime-change, and civil wars, the key development that the Arab world has witnessed in the last few years has been the fall of the Arab state system of the past seven decadesThere is no unified thread on the Arab Spring, although a number of threads refer to the Spring, either for individual nations or the region. One likely home is:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=17692

davidbfpo
04-30-2016, 09:10 PM
Anything with Will McCants directing IMHO is worth watching.

They explain at the start:
The rapid succession of events in the past four years—the Arab Spring, the Egyptian military coup, and the rise of ISIS—have challenged conventional wisdom on political Islam. After the democratic openings in 2011, mainstream Islamist groups—affiliates and descendants of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood—rose to newfound prominence after decades in opposition, but grappled with the challenges of governance and deeply polarized societies. The subsequent “twin shocks” of the coup in Egypt and the emergence of ISIS are forcing a rethinking of some of the basic assumptions of, and about, Islamist movements, including on: gradual versus revolutionary approaches to change; the use of tactical or situational violence; attitudes toward the state; and how ideology and political variables interact. Rethinking Political Islam is the first project of its kind to systematically assess the evolution of mainstream Islamist groups across 12 country cases....
Link:http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/08/rethinking-political-islam

davidbfpo
06-19-2016, 10:01 AM
A short article on the changes in the MENA that are unlikely to be on the political agenda: water shortages, climate change and jobs.

The end result:
...people will begin to move north in large numbers.A fourth factor could accelerate this:
..the decline in marriage across the region, which in the restrictive MENA societies means many young men have no hope of having normal sexual relations. Little more than a decade ago, about 60 percent of Middle Eastern men married by their late twenties. Today, the figure is just over 50 percent, and Iran it is 38 percent. There is a new generation of young men who cannot afford to marry, have no work, cannot leave home and are sexually frustrated. The traditional passage to adult life, its responsibilities and joys, is barred to them.Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/henry-porter/policy-desert?

davidbfpo
07-09-2016, 02:01 PM
A short commentary on the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia. When you are facing changing threat level and the oil price drops you have a big problem:
For the seven years prior to December 2014 the average price of a barrel of oil was around $89 whereas from January 2015 to May 2016 it fell over 50% to $46. This had profound effects around the region.Link:https://defenceindepth.co/2016/07/08/interesting-times-for-the-gulf-arab-monarchies/

There is a closed 2011-2014 thread A Gulf Sheikh down coming? which may help:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16968

davidbfpo
09-07-2016, 10:15 AM
Roger Hardy, a former BBC MENA analyst, has written a book 'The Poisoned Well: Empire and its Legacy in the Middle East', this was recently published by Hurst & Co:http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-poisoned-well/

In a very short article he gives a glimpse into his thoughts and this poem from Algeria is perfect for 'Small Wars':
They have sowed hatred in the villages. We store it under the ground where it remains,
The abundant yield of a harvested field.
Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/roger-hardy/sowing-seeds-of-conflict-in-middle-east? (https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/roger-hardy/sowing-seeds-of-conflict-in-middle-east?utm_source=Daily+Newsletter&utm_campaign=f6ffbc853b-DAILY_NEWSLETTER_MAILCHIMP&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_717bc5d86d-f6ffbc853b-407365113)