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Bob's World
05-23-2010, 10:01 AM
“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” Sun Tzu


Is much of our current engagement merely the noise before defeat?

With so many talented providers swarming into places like Afghanistan, and with so much funding currently available to resource such engagement one would expect that if "effectiveness" (security, development, government) is indeed the road to victory, that victory will soon be ours.

But what if "effectiveness" is far more the output of a stable, insurgency-free state, rather than being the input that will ultimately produce such a state??

In other words, is the conventional wisdom attempting to back its way into stability by importing the products of good governance rather than going in the front door by targeting the perceptions of good governance among the disaffected populace?

I have produced COG-based engagement tools in the past, and shared them with the SWJ community on other threads. My recent work the Jones Insurgency Model caused me to go back and readdress that work. In the past I came to the position that there are two COGs; "The Populace" for COIN; and "The Network" for CT. Once I completed my work on my Insurgency Model I realized that I needed to reassesses my COG for COIN. Many had challenged the rather broad category of "The Populace" previously, but I had nothing better to offer to describe what I was getting at, and frankly, neither did any of these challengers. I wasn't fully satisfied, but I couldn't "get no satisfaction" either.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/the-jones-insurgency-model/

So this morning I dusted off my old COG targeting model and reframed it in the context of the Jones Insurgency Model. I offer that product here for your collective consideration and comment. In the example below let us assume that a variety of HN, interagency, military, and NGO teams are all working independently to conduct COIN in a specific community. For currency sake, let us say that community is the Arghandab valley on the northern outskirts of Kandahar City. Each of the teams has its own mission, chain of command, authorities, funding, priorities, etc. In other words, they are systemically prevented from being able to agree on virtually anything. In this (hypothetical) case, they all have read about the Jones Insurgency Model, and decide to conduct an assessment of the perceptions of Poor Governance among the populace of the Arghandab. Upon completion of that assessment they determine that the number one concern of the populace that was also a causal factor of insurgency under the Jones Model was the lack of Justice. (Thus elevating "Justice" from being a CR to also being a CV in this community). Continuing to drill down on this CV they derive a series of HVTs and HVIs and a scheme to work within their respective lanes to mutually produce this critical line of operation aimed directly at the heart of the center of gravity, and to make it each of their number one priority project.

Armed with this new focus each is able to tailor their overall schemes of engagement by minimizing or cancelling ineffective engagement that they had been working on (with the greatest of intentions) previously; and also many discovered that they had more in common with each other than they had thought prior to this new effort.

Equally important, the shared assessment and collective plan for achieving it was sitting the desk's of all of their respective bosses, creating enhanced synergy at the highest levels, as well as down at the operator level.


(Note, I do not employ the COG process as described in the Joint Pub, as I find it illogical and as likely to produce arguments and confusion on a staff as it is to produce focus and synergy. CvC didn't prescribe any particular rules, so I feel free to think about this concept in a manner that makes sense to me.)

MikeF
05-23-2010, 10:50 AM
Here's some quick editing recommendations for your argument.


With so many talented providers swarming into places like Afghanistan, and with so much funding currently available to resource such engagement one would expect that if "effectiveness" (security, development, government) is indeed the road to victory, that victory will soon be ours.

Another analogy is Ayn Rand's character Dagny Taggart in Atlas Shrugged. She saw her world and society collapsing around her, and she felt that she could change it through her own sheer will and determination. She was over-confident in her own abilities and over-optimistic in the potential of others and the state of human nature.


But what if "effectiveness" is far more the output of a stable, insurgency-free state, rather than being the input that will ultimately produce such a state??


Change output to outcome. You're speaking in technical systems terms. Outputs in a governance system would be in terms of the stable, insurgency-free metrics (low levels of violence, free/fair elections, mutual respect towards differing cultures/religions, women's rights, etc...). The outcome is good governance.

For the slide, the picture is confusing. It looks like a systems slide, but the items on the left are critical requirements not inputs.

Mike

Bob's World
05-23-2010, 11:28 AM
Mike,

You're missing my point, so I'll try to be clearer.

Perhaps from the bottom up:

The COG is "Good Governance." What I propose here is that if you have good governance you have peace, at least internally to your state.

Critical Requirements ARE the inputs. They are what are required to produce Good Governance. If one sees the COG as the factory; CCs are what the Factory produces; and CRs are the materials the factory requires to produce it.

I see our current development-focused COIN as essentially importing parking lots full of final products in the hope that somehow the "factory" that produces such products will miraculously appear.

So what I propose is that if in fact Good Governance is the COG; and that if in fact these four causal perceptions are what determines if Good Governance exists; then one must logically determine in any given community what the perceptions are on these four factors (giving you your CVs) and focusing on the ones that are negative but also shapeable. HVTs and HVIs are then merely refining ones targeting down to specific families of action and specific projects within those families.

So, yes, it is a "systems" slide in that it takes a fuzzy concept like COG and frames it in a predictive, logical format that allows COG to more than just a slide in the Command Brief that drives nothing; or a topic for strategy geeks to debate at the club.

If you are confused by the slide start at one end and work your way to the other. It is a simple reduction/refining process.

I contend that currently we focus on those things that exist in a state that has no insurgency, and believe that if we produce those things in a state that has insurgency, the insurgency will go away. I offer that that logic is flawed and is not likely to work. It is based on observation of the symptoms of insurgency rather than being based on the root causes of insurgency.

MikeF
05-23-2010, 11:47 AM
Hi Sir,


The COG is "Good Governance." What I propose here is that if you have good governance you have peace, at least internally to your state.

Critical Requirements ARE the inputs. They are what are required to produce Good Governance. If one sees the COG as the factory; CCs are what the Factory produces; and CRs are the materials the factory requires to produce it.

What I propose is that if in fact Good Governance is the COG; and that if in fact these four causal perceptions are what determines if Good Governance exists; then one must logically determine in any given community what the perceptions are on these four factors (giving you your CVs) and focusing on the ones that are negative but also shapeable. HVTs and HVIs are then merely refining ones targeting down to specific families of action and specific projects within those families.

Thanks for the clarification. Can the above be considered your BLUF?


I see our current development-focused COIN as essentially importing parking lots full of final products in the hope that somehow the "factory" that produces such products will miraculously appear.

Here's one example, as I see it, of our attempt to bring in the final products without first building the factory.

Marjah- Marines clear Taliban gov't and assume control; however, there is no ready-made alternative government structure to fill the political, security, and economic vacuum. Without an existing security force to police, a judicial system to resolve disputes, and an economic system to encourage growth, the local populace perceives bad governance.

OTOH,


So what I propose is that if in fact Good Governance is the COG; and that if in fact these four causal perceptions are what determines if Good Governance exists; then one must logically determine in any given community what the perceptions are on these four factors (giving you your CVs) and focusing on the ones that are negative but also shapeable. HVTs and HVIs are then merely refining ones targeting down to specific families of action and specific projects within those families.

This reminds me more of the Phillipines or Colombian model. The task organization would be 80/20 state to mil. Instead of clearing and holding areas, advisors would work to assist and encourage the existing gov't towards better governance.

Am I tracking?

William F. Owen
05-23-2010, 11:55 AM
Sorry but CvC is the only valid provider of what a COG is.

He is quite clear. The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", - and which can be harmed (against which the blow should be focussed)! If a COG is "destroyed", then the enemy cannot exist or even re-generate as an effective force.

We can make up new words and new definitions to alter the fact and truths to fit the opinion, but as concerns the only precise meaning of "COG" in military thought, that is it!

Bob's World
05-23-2010, 12:42 PM
Sorry but CvC is the only valid provider of what a COG is.

He is quite clear. The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", - and which can be harmed (against which the blow should be focussed)! If a COG is "destroyed", then the enemy cannot exist or even re-generate as an effective force.

We can make up new words and new definitions to alter the fact and truths to fit the opinion, but as concerns the only precise meaning of "COG" in military thought, that is it!

In war each opponent has a COG; he must defend his own and seek to destroy the other's.

In COIN the COG is shared. Both insurgent and Counterinsurgent compete for the support of the populace, both compete to be perceived as the provider of Good Governance. A COG is something to be earned, not protected or destroyed.

Carl is the master of warfare, and his theories can be applied to Insurgency, but they must be adapted in full recognition that Warfare and Insurgency are two different things.

Those who believe COIN to be extremely difficult and likely to be a long drawnout affair believe so because they fight it like a war; or because they think they can develop their way out of it. One can fight a long war and ultimately suppress the symptoms of insurgency; one can perhaps give a populace so much "stuff" that they stop resisting your poor governance. Or, one can produce Good Governance and make the insurgency go away. I'd love to have this conversation with CvC. While most of his deciples will fight me to the mat, like Peter slicing the Roman soldiers ear from his head with his sword to protect his master; I think CvC would immediatlely grasp the nuance I put before him.

William F. Owen
05-23-2010, 12:58 PM
In COIN the COG is shared. Both insurgent and Counterinsurgent compete for the support of the populace, both compete to be perceived as the provider of Good Governance. A COG is something to be earned, not protected or destroyed.
Then it's not a COG! It's something completely different. You need to call it something else, and not muddy the existing proven and good theory by using the same term in an imprecise and confusing way.

Carl is the master of warfare, and his theories can be applied to Insurgency, but they must be adapted in full recognition that Warfare and Insurgency are two different things.
I strongly disagree. Insurgencies use violence for a a political purpose, therefore War, thus is conducted using warfare - as were many countless rebellions and revolts throughout history.

One can fight a long war and ultimately suppress the symptoms of insurgency; one can perhaps give a populace so much "stuff" that they stop resisting your poor governance.
Yes anyone can do stupid stuff, by ignoring the fundamentals of warfare. Your job, as a soldier is to break the military means used to oppose the policy. The policy is none of your business unless you are an Army not accountable to it's civilian leaders.

This is nothing to do with suppressing symptoms. Ends Ways and Means!! Your sole job is to prevent the "enemy" attaining his policy via violence. If he does it using song, art or ballet, good for him. Your job is to ensure he does not use violence and opts for peaceful means.

Fuchs
05-23-2010, 01:23 PM
Sorry but CvC is the only valid provider of what a COG is.

He is quite clear. The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", - and which can be harmed (against which the blow should be focussed)! If a COG is "destroyed", then the enemy cannot exist or even re-generate as an effective force.

We can make up new words and new definitions to alter the fact and truths to fit the opinion, but as concerns the only precise meaning of "COG" in military thought, that is it!

I think you should read CvC again, or maybe choose a better translation. You're dangerously close to the American idea of a "Center of gravity" that's quite unlike the original "Schwerpunkt".

I do especially object to

The/A COG is that from which the enemy draws his "strength and cohesion", (...)


Let me quote myself:


Ever since I've been irritated by the use of the term "center of gravity" (Schwerpunkt) in (American) English military theory writings. It's being used with the meaning of "critical vulnerability" instead of as "great accumulation of power for the best chance to win an important battle".

It's OK to invent a new concept, but please name it accordingly - and don't misuse an old, famous and established term for it. Most importantly, don't link your concept to a respected theorist because that's an illegitimate move that exploits that author's crediility.

Again and again I discussed these points with little effect. The new meaning of the term was long since established in English-language literature and people stubbornly kept linking it to von Clausewitz.


Well, it turned out to be a double surprise because my position was long since official doctrine - in the U.S.! The USMC acknowledged this in its FMFM-1 "Warfighting" field manual (1989):

"(...) Sometimes known as the center of gravity. However, there is a danger in using this term. Introducing the term into the theory of war Clausewitz wrote (p.485): "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated the most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity." Clearly, Clausewitz was advocating a climatic test of strength against strength "by daring all to will all" (p. 596). This approach is consistent with Clausewitz' historical perspective. But we have since come to prefer pitting strength against weakness. Applying the term to modern warfare, we must make it clear that by the enemy's center of gravity we do not mean a source of strength, but rather a critical vulnerability."

in a footnote that was in reference to

"Therefore, we should focus our efforts against a critical enemy vulnerability. Obviously, the more critical and vulnerable, the better."

The American CoG concept seeks an easy lever for victory, while CvC's "Schwerpunkt" was primarily about how to arrange the own forces without wasting potential.

slapout9
05-23-2010, 01:37 PM
If he does it using song, art or ballet, good for him. Your job is to ensure he does not use violence and opts for peaceful means.

So subversion,espionage,sabotage,blackmail are OK and are not Acts of War?

William F. Owen
05-23-2010, 01:39 PM
I think you should read CvC again, or maybe choose a better translation. You're dangerously close to the American idea of a "Center of gravity" that's quite unlike the original "Schwerpunkt".


OK, using the Howard and Paret translation - page 485-6 ; "The fighting forces of each belligerent- whether a single state or an alliance of states- have a certain unity and therefore certain cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the centre of gravity can be applied."

Point being:
a.) It is a source of strength - on which the enemy's power relies
b.) It can have force applied against it.

Am I missing something?

William F. Owen
05-23-2010, 01:46 PM
So subversion,espionage,sabotage,blackmail are OK and are not Acts of War?
Not OK and depends on the context. By act of war, do you mean "warfare?" None of those things are warfare in and of themselves.
None of the things you cite, are in of themselves military task to counter.
They may well be criminal. Do they involve killing? All those things are far more likely to fall towards police/state security, than the army.

An Army can only be used against armed force.

Bob's World
05-23-2010, 02:06 PM
Am I missing something?

In a word? Yes.


First, COG as applied to warfare: While I largely consider the Wilf vs. Fuchs debate in the category of "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin," it really does not apply to the positions I am forwarding here. In warfare though, I would suggest that accurately understanding the enemy's COG is critical in knowing what must be defeated; but is probably not something that one wants to attack. Best to pit one's strength against their opponents weakness; thus why it is a very helpful construct to understand what are the requriements that are critical to the functioning of the COG; and then of those, which are also vulnerable to defeat. Attack the CVs; not the COG.

But for Insurgency all of that is rather moot. I do not want to defeat the COG, I want to outcompete the insurgent in the race to be perceived by the populace as the producer of the COG. He who provides Good Governance wins.

Now, if I am simply focused on counter insurgent operations, to go out and counter violence with violence and to wage a physical dual with the insurgent, using the warfare approach to COG could be helpful in winning that battle. Problem is that I have probably made the conditions of insurgency worse in the process.

But I don't write any of this to convince Wilf to change his "war is war" approach, nor to disabuse Fuchs of his notions that only Germans can understand CvC; I just want to toss out an alternative position for the SWJ community to consider as they wrestle with how to best deal insurgency.

William F. Owen
05-23-2010, 02:16 PM
I just want to toss out an alternative position for the SWJ community to consider as they wrestle with how to best deal insurgency.

....a form of insurgency that does not use violence to redistribute political power?


Problem is that I have probably made the conditions of insurgency worse in the process.
Only if you are stupid, unskilled and not practised in warfare.

Fuchs
05-23-2010, 02:40 PM
OK, using the Howard and Paret translation - page 485-6 ; "The fighting forces of each belligerent- whether a single state or an alliance of states- have a certain unity and therefore certain cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the analogy of the centre of gravity can be applied."

Point being:
a.) It is a source of strength - on which the enemy's power relies
b.) It can have force applied against it.

Am I missing something?

"source of strength" is way too prone for misinterpretation.

The Schwerpunkt is mostly about concentrating your power (and leave only token, "economy of force" units elsewhere) in order to have the maximum probability of success in battle. Only militarily weak powers can have a different Schwerpunkt (and this is then a political/strategic concept, nto a military one anymore), such as a capital or something related to allies (more about that later).
"source of strength" and "from which the enemy draws his strength ..." push a reader into a wrong direction.

The industry or the population or culture and such are never a Schwerpunkt in the CvC sense.
A Heer that moved in separate corps and unites for a battle like Sedan or Königgratz forms a Schwerpunkt in order to be strong enough for a monumental battle.
A Heer than focuses almost all its armor divisions at the decisive location of the Camaping and adds maximum CAS once the surprise is lost - such a Heer forms a Schwerpunkt in order to succeed with its most critical task of a campaign.



CvC IV/11
"Die Hauptschlacht ist daher als der konzentrierte Krieg, als der Schwerpunkt des ganzen Krieges oder Feldzuges anzusehen."

my translation:
"The main battle is therefore to be seen as the concentrated war, as the Schwerpunkt of the whole war of campaign."

CvC IV/11
"Darum ist eine beabsichtigte Hauptschlacht nach ihren Verhältnissen mehr oder weniger, in gewissen Graden aber immer als der vorläufige Mittel- und Schwerpunkt des ganzen Systems zu betrachten."

My translation:
"Therefore is an intentional main battle by its conditions more or less, in a certain degree always to be considered as the preliminary central point or Schwerpunkt of the whole system."

CvC VI/25:
"Der Wirkungskreis eines Sieges wird natürlich abhängen von der Größe des Sieges und diese von der Masse der besiegten Truppen. Also gegen den Teil, wo die meisten feindlichen Streitkräfte beisammen sind, wird derjenige Stoß geschehen können, dessen glückliche Wirkungen am weitesten reichen; und wir werden dieses Erfolges am meisten gewiß sein, je größer die Masse der eigenen Streitkräfte ist, die wir zu diesem Stoß verwenden. (...)

So wie sich der Schwerpunkt immer da findet, wo die meiste Masse beisammen ist, und wie jeder Stoß gegen den Schwerpunkt der Last am wirksamsten ist, wie ferner der stärkste Stoß mit dem Schwerpunkt der Kraft erhalten wird, so ist es auch im Kriege. "

This is the most important part, so I'll translate it despite the length. The grammar is terrible because his grammar was complicated and I'll stick close to the original.

"The range or the effect of a victory will naturally depend on the size of the victory and this one on the quantity of defeated troops. Therefore against that part where the most enemy forces are united will be the thrust possible whose advantageous effects will have the greatest consequences (or: longest range); and we will be most sure about this success, the greater the mass of the own forces, that we employ for this thrust. (...)

Just as the Schwerpunkt (physics' center of gravity) is to be found where the most mass is close to each other, and just as every thrust against the Schwerpunkt of a load the most effective, and as furthermore the strongest thrust with the Schwerpunkt of a force is being maintained, so is it as well in war."

CVC VII/4 (a book that was especially unfinished)
"Alexander, Gustav Adolf, Karl XII., Friedrich der Große hatten ihren Schwerpunkt in ihrem Heer, wäre dies zertrümmert worden, so würden sie ihre Rolle schlecht ausgespielt haben; bei Staaten, die durch innere Parteiungen zerrissen sind, liegt er meistens in der Hauptstadt; bei kleinen Staaten, die sich an mächtige stützen, liegt er im Heer dieser Bundesgenossen; bei Bündnissen liegt er in der Einheit des Interesses; bei Volksbewaffnung in der Person der Hauptführer und in der öffentlichen Meinung."

"Alexander, Gustav Adolf, Karl VII, Frederick the great had their Schwerpunkt in their army, would this have been shattered, so they would have played their role poorly; with states that are disunited by internal partisanship, lies it most often in the capital; with small states that rest on powerful ones, does it lie in the army of their ally; in alliances does it lie in the unity of interests, in (improvised militias) in the person of the main leader and in the public opinion."

The extension of the Schwerpunkt idea into the realm of policy seems to have been a later idea than the original thought about campaigning (operational art). He also struggled a bit with wars against multiple enemies that had not one big army, bur several ones.
It's probably the root for the re-interpretation in American literature.

Ironically, his understanding of Newtonian physics was very crappy.
And yes, his original writing is this complicated and chaotic.

Entropy
05-23-2010, 02:51 PM
Col. Jones,

I will need to mull this over for a while (I'm a slow thinker), but here are some initial impressions:

As a generic model, it makes sense. However, the example used to demonstrate the model is problematic and rests on a few questionable assumptions, so "operationalizing" the model is where I see problems:

The biggest flaw begins with this: "In other words, they are systemically prevented from being able to agree on virtually anything." That condition is the completely normal result of independent bureaucracies with independent resources and independent agendas. Your example first assumes they are all working on "COIN" and further assumes they can be brought together in the context of that COIN work towards a common objective. Then there is the assumption that this can be accomplished simply by "showing them the light" on what the principle concern in the area is.

That is wishful thinking IMO. First of all, it's not obvious that they are actually working toward "COIN" despite what they main believe/claim. Secondly, independent organizations cannot be made to reliably work together without some kind of unified command with the authority to force competing bureaucracies and interests to play nice. Third, independent organizations are not going to work together based on a survey, no matter how comprehensive and rigorous. In short, you can't assume that those organizations will see things your way and rearrange their priorities toward the goal you've identified as central in priority.



Equally important, the shared assessment and collective plan for achieving it was sitting the desk's of all of their respective bosses, creating enhanced synergy at the highest levels, as well as down at the operator level.

To summarize my argument, how are you going to keep those bosses from putting the plan in the circular file?

I like the model, but, like any model, one must consider if can be reasonably implemented in a given set of circumstances.

Bob's World
05-23-2010, 03:03 PM
....a form of insurgency that does not use violence to redistribute political power?


Only if you are stupid, unskilled and not practised in warfare.


Point one: Not all violence to redistribue political power is warfare. If a bunch of thugs in 1870s NYC prevents certain segments of the popualce from voting through intimidation and violence it is not warfare, though it meets your definition.

Similarly when a segment of a populace within a state employs intimidation and violence to shape politics I do not believe it is helpful to resolving the problem to classify that as warfare either.

Again, not to change your mind, only to be clear that my point is valid. Though I suspect that the Colin Powell leadership principle of "Never get so close to your position that when your position falls, your ego falls with it." is applicable here. :)

Point two is that most counterinsurgencies have unfolded this way. I don't believe those officers were stupid for thinking of insurgency as warfare, that is what they were trained to think and do. I just don't think it was the fast track to success, and most COIN "victories" won in such fashion of re-emerged over and over and over and over.. as the underlying causation was never addressed.

William F. Owen
05-23-2010, 04:14 PM
"source of strength" is way too prone for misinterpretation.
So the Howard Paret translation is wrong?

The industry or the population or culture and such are never a Schwerpunkt in the CvC sense.

Concur. I subscribe to the CvC view, because it is clear and I understand it.

William F. Owen
05-23-2010, 04:23 PM
Point one: Not all violence to redistribue political power is warfare. If a bunch of thugs in 1870s NYC prevents certain segments of the popualce from voting through intimidation and violence it is not warfare, though it meets your definition.
Same was true in Northern Ireland, and the American Southern states. The point was the degree of violence falls below the threshold of War because it does not use military means and is not countered using military force. - see Pablo Escobar, once he moved into politics!

Similarly when a segment of a populace within a state employs intimidation and violence to shape politics I do not believe it is helpful to resolving the problem to classify that as warfare either.
I submit that if they use military means, then it is useful and necessary to term it warfare. Look at Southern Thailand. Once the violence is escalated beyond the capacities of the Police, you have warfare.

Again, not to change your mind, only to be clear that my point is valid.
Well at least we are clear what we are disagreeing about! :wry:

slapout9
05-23-2010, 05:34 PM
Is much of our current engagement merely the noise before defeat?



BW, I just watched a movie on HBO awhile back called "The Objective" It is about a CIA operative backed by an SF A-team who has to gain critical information about a secret WMD inside A'stan. The CIA guy goes to a local "holy man" for advice and this is what he said.
"America cannot free Afghanistan only Allah can free Afghanistan".:eek: The WMD turns out to a Spiritual WMD aka Bad Ass Ghost with extreme powers. I hope that is not the future!


Your recent posts has a lot to think about so I will answer in sections, since I have to cut the Grass here:mad:

CR's are inputs-Good Governance is a PROCESS not an output or an out come IMO. The system in focus is a "Territorial Stabilization System". Good Governance is the process used to achieve that. A'tan is a territory not a country or state IMO.... like Steve Blair's Arizona Territory.

Drop the COG stuff, just call it a critical process.
How to operationalize it example.
I-P-O- model


Input-------------Good Governance PROCESS ----------Output

__________________________________________________ __________


People...............voter registration/election .................Elected Official

Ken White
05-23-2010, 06:50 PM
Your COG usage muddies your water. Wilf and Fuchs challenge to it will be repeated by many others...

jmm99
05-23-2010, 07:17 PM
The Powers That Be seem to have problems settling on the name of what is going to happen in the Argandab valley and the other scenic Kandahar venues.

This from today's WP, Results of Kandahar offensive may affect future U.S. moves (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/22/AR2010052203486_pf.html):


Senior U.S. military officials briefing American reporters in Kabul early last month described extensive "clearing operations" planned in the outlying Kandahar districts of Zhari, Argandab and Panjwai, where the Taliban is entrenched.
....
The name of the offensive -- Hamkari Baraye Kandahar, or Cooperation for Kandahar -- was carefully chosen to avoid the word "operation," which suggests violence. The administration official described it benignly as a "military presence" and Karzai has defined it as a "process." Last week, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, called the offensive "a unique challenge."

So, Slap and Karzai are on the same page here (a "process") - probably the only time that will happen. :D

The vocabulary for the "good governance process" should be primarily political and less military - what it involves is the process of mobilizing the masses per Mao and John McCuen on various levels (security, opportunity and ideology, working from the base needs upwards), which has to be attempted by whatever side is interested in arriving at an acceptable outcome. That political effort will involve violence - sometimes narrators will have to kill and wolfhounds will have to narrate (not theoretically perfect, Wilf, but we live in a world of finite resources).

A "key point" (note I didn't say CoG, which to me was firstly a matter of physics, calculus, statics and dynamics - ill-spent youth at an engineering school), in this political effort, is the interface between the political types and the military types. That interface (strong or weak) applies to both insurgent and incumbant.

If that interface (boundary) is strong - unity of effort and unity of principles - we are likely to end up with a Malaya situation from the Brit-Malaysian viewpoint. If there are contradictions (which the opponent will exploit), we have a Malaya situation from the ComTerrs viewpoint. The CTs had a comparatively weak political-military interface. As Entropy correctly notes, developing a strong political-military interface is no easy given.

Regards

Mike

Fuchs
05-23-2010, 07:46 PM
So the Howard Paret translation is wrong?

Tell me book, chapter and a longer quote and I'll try to find it in the original to check.

Dayuhan
05-24-2010, 12:15 AM
I think the Jones model is an excellent tool for understanding what might be called "classic insurgency", where a populace or portion thereof rises up against its government. One limitation is that the term "insurgency" (and again I feel the discussion suffers for want of a definition) is widely used to describe other circumstances. For example, many here use the term "insurgency" to describe irregular resistance to foreign occupation, a circumstance in which the quality of governance is not the core issue driving the conflict.

A similar situation might arise in a diverse populace in which government is dominated by one subset (ethnic, religious, whatever), and another subset is resisting domination by that government. An observer working from the Jones model might be tempted to interpret the core narrative of the conflict as "they are governing us badly", when in fact it is "we refuse to be governed by them".

Another limitation is that no matter how often we repeat that it is the populace's perception of governance, not ours, that matters, we will always evaluate governance according to our own standards, and we will always project our own preferences onto our assumptions of what the populace is thinking. We are, after all, human.

That tendency is evident in our preference for central government, and in our assumption that effective governance is a desirable thing. In many cases it may not be. If a group of people is accustomed to governing themselves, with nominal allegiance to a distant and abstract national entity, the prospect of an effective government - of a government that actually proposes to govern them - might be regarded as a direct assault on a treasured autonomy. We might see a police force and a courthouse as "delivering justice", the populace might see it as an attempt to impose a foreign system of justice.

Models are useful, but they can also create assumptions that color and distort our ability to interpret core narratives. On the local level, a commander trained with the Jones model might be inclined to look to quality of governance as the core narrative of the local insurgent, and overlook issues with the source of governance.

On the macro strategy level there's a greater risk. The 1970s and 80s taught us that we can no longer go around installing dictators to run other countries for us. The current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan should be teaching us a similar lesson, and I'm concerned that the model in question might lead us to look past it. In short, we might be inclined to assume that it's ok for us to go around removing governments and installing new ones, as long as the governments we install are "good". If we make that assumption we end up asking ourselves how we can provide others with good governance, instead of asking the rather more important question of whether or not we should be trying to establish governments in other countries at all. Under certain interpretations the Jones model could be used to justify intervention in places where intervention can have serious unintended and undesirable consequences.

I also feel like the Jones model overlooks two key factors, one an important vulnerability in many insurgencies, the other an important weakness common among governments facing insurgents.

The common insurgent weakness revolves around the relationship between insurgent leaders and their followers, both the rank-and-file fighters and the supporting populace. It's not universal, but where it exists it provides a key strategic target. If we look at "the insurgency" as a monolithic entity driven solely by resistance to bad governance, we can overlook this vulnerability.

Insurgent leaders are typically ideologically driven, and fighting for a particular desired end state, generally one in which they take political power. Insurgent followers are more typically driven by local issues that threaten them: they fight against an unacceptable status quo. The ideology of the leader is frequently less that significant (and often less than comprehensible) to the follower. The key to success for the insurgent leadership is in understanding those local grievances (which will vary widely from one locale to the next) and in presenting themselves as a solution or as an ally.

That dynamic presents an interesting challenge. The leadership may be diffuse and difficult to target; even when some of them are killed or captured new leaders emerge from the ideological core. If we target the followers, we end up punishing people who see themselves fighting for their own rights or their own survival, often exacerbating the issues that the core insurgent propagandists exploit. For me, the key to resolving a situation like this is to understand the core narrative of the followers in any given locale, identify the divergences between the narratives of leader and follower, and act to address the issues that motivate the followers. The idea is to drive a wedge between leader and follower, less a question of decapitation than disembodiment. We will never persuade the core ideologues, but if we can isolate them from their followers we can render them irrelevant.

The key weakness I see in our COIN/FID efforts lies in our relationship with host governments, and in the reasons why bad governance exists in the first place. We don't fight insurgents in our own country, we haven't any. We fight them in other countries, often countries with traditions of governance that don't exactly appeal to us or to the populace being governed. In these cases we can talk all we want about good governance, but we have to recognize that the governing elites we're dealing with cannot implement our recommendations without compromising their own power and prerogatives, which they will not do. Bad governance exists because somebody finds it very profitable, generally somebody in power... and that somebody is going to do all in their power to resist changes to the status quo. Recommending change in such circumstances is like talking at a wall. Of course we have the option to withdraw support, but that can mean sacrificing the strategic objectives that brought us into the picture in the first place. A bit of a quandary, and there's no good solution, but to manage those situations we have to first acknowledge that they exist, and that in many of the cases we seek to influence our capacity to influence may be very limited.

All meant as constructive comment; this post is already way too long to be discussing areas of agreement.

Bob's World
05-24-2010, 03:16 AM
Agree, alway dangerous to swim in muddy water, and between the debates between the deciples of CvC over the few words he wrote about a simple concept of "COG"; and the (my personal opinion) jumbled mess of operationalizing it that the US Joint doctrine takes lately; it is muddy water indeed.

Personally I think I take a lean, clean, logical aproach to COG analysis; but for those who are used to mud in their water it does spark them to defend their pet points.

But this thread isn't about COG. This thread is about applying a logical methodology to get at the most important things that one must get at in order to prevail in an insurgency.

The fact that that is also "COG analysis" and that it differs from what the books say I am supposed to think and do, is just something that the COG Nazis will have to live with.
I can call a horse a pig, but it is still a horse.

Bob's World
05-24-2010, 03:22 AM
The Powers That Be seem to have problems settling on the name of what is going to happen in the Argandab valley and the other scenic Kandahar venues.

This from today's WP, Results of Kandahar offensive may affect future U.S. moves (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/22/AR2010052203486_pf.html):



So, Slap and Karzai are on the same page here (a "process") - probably the only time that will happen. :D

The vocabulary for the "good governance process" should be primarily political and less military - what it involves is the process of mobilizing the masses per Mao and John McCuen on various levels (security, opportunity and ideology, working from the base needs upwards), which has to be attempted by whatever side is interested in arriving at an acceptable outcome. That political effort will involve violence - sometimes narrators will have to kill and wolfhounds will have to narrate (not theoretically perfect, Wilf, but we live in a world of finite resources).

A "key point" (note I didn't say CoG, which to me was firstly a matter of physics, calculus, statics and dynamics - ill-spent youth at an engineering school), in this political effort, is the interface between the political types and the military types. That interface (strong or weak) applies to both insurgent and incumbant.

If that interface (boundary) is strong - unity of effort and unity of principles - we are likely to end up with a Malaya situation from the Brit-Malaysian viewpoint. If there are contradictions (which the opponent will exploit), we have a Malaya situation from the ComTerrs viewpoint. The CTs had a comparatively weak political-military interface. As Entropy correctly notes, developing a strong political-military interface is no easy given.

Regards

Mike

Two points:

A. Who ever wrote this piece is about 50% right 50% clueless, and 100% dangerous in the flawed perceptions he is creating.

B. I picked Arghandab for my eample to run one of the critical causal perceptions through the mill from CR down to HVI. Fact is it is immaterial to this thread, (and in the Arghandab, which is in fact the gateway to Kandahar; and Khakrez is the staging area to that gateway) as it is about the process, not an example. All CRs must be addressed in the Afghandab, not just "Justice"

Bob's World
05-24-2010, 03:27 AM
I think the Jones model is an excellent tool for understanding what might be called "classic insurgency", where a populace or portion thereof rises up against its government. One limitation is that the term "insurgency" (and again I feel the discussion suffers for want of a definition) is widely used to describe other circumstances. For example, many here use the term "insurgency" to describe irregular resistance to foreign occupation, a circumstance in which the quality of governance is not the core issue driving the conflict.

A similar situation might arise in a diverse populace in which government is dominated by one subset (ethnic, religious, whatever), and another subset is resisting domination by that government. An observer working from the Jones model might be tempted to interpret the core narrative of the conflict as "they are governing us badly", when in fact it is "we refuse to be governed by them".

Another limitation is that no matter how often we repeat that it is the populace's perception of governance, not ours, that matters, we will always evaluate governance according to our own standards, and we will always project our own preferences onto our assumptions of what the populace is thinking. We are, after all, human.

That tendency is evident in our preference for central government, and in our assumption that effective governance is a desirable thing. In many cases it may not be. If a group of people is accustomed to governing themselves, with nominal allegiance to a distant and abstract national entity, the prospect of an effective government - of a government that actually proposes to govern them - might be regarded as a direct assault on a treasured autonomy. We might see a police force and a courthouse as "delivering justice", the populace might see it as an attempt to impose a foreign system of justice.

Models are useful, but they can also create assumptions that color and distort our ability to interpret core narratives. On the local level, a commander trained with the Jones model might be inclined to look to quality of governance as the core narrative of the local insurgent, and overlook issues with the source of governance.

On the macro strategy level there's a greater risk. The 1970s and 80s taught us that we can no longer go around installing dictators to run other countries for us. The current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan should be teaching us a similar lesson, and I'm concerned that the model in question might lead us to look past it. In short, we might be inclined to assume that it's ok for us to go around removing governments and installing new ones, as long as the governments we install are "good". If we make that assumption we end up asking ourselves how we can provide others with good governance, instead of asking the rather more important question of whether or not we should be trying to establish governments in other countries at all. Under certain interpretations the Jones model could be used to justify intervention in places where intervention can have serious unintended and undesirable consequences.

I also feel like the Jones model overlooks two key factors, one an important vulnerability in many insurgencies, the other an important weakness common among governments facing insurgents.

The common insurgent weakness revolves around the relationship between insurgent leaders and their followers, both the rank-and-file fighters and the supporting populace. It's not universal, but where it exists it provides a key strategic target. If we look at "the insurgency" as a monolithic entity driven solely by resistance to bad governance, we can overlook this vulnerability.

Insurgent leaders are typically ideologically driven, and fighting for a particular desired end state, generally one in which they take political power. Insurgent followers are more typically driven by local issues that threaten them: they fight against an unacceptable status quo. The ideology of the leader is frequently less that significant (and often less than comprehensible) to the follower. The key to success for the insurgent leadership is in understanding those local grievances (which will vary widely from one locale to the next) and in presenting themselves as a solution or as an ally.

That dynamic presents an interesting challenge. The leadership may be diffuse and difficult to target; even when some of them are killed or captured new leaders emerge from the ideological core. If we target the followers, we end up punishing people who see themselves fighting for their own rights or their own survival, often exacerbating the issues that the core insurgent propagandists exploit. For me, the key to resolving a situation like this is to understand the core narrative of the followers in any given locale, identify the divergences between the narratives of leader and follower, and act to address the issues that motivate the followers. The idea is to drive a wedge between leader and follower, less a question of decapitation than disembodiment. We will never persuade the core ideologues, but if we can isolate them from their followers we can render them irrelevant.

The key weakness I see in our COIN/FID efforts lies in our relationship with host governments, and in the reasons why bad governance exists in the first place. We don't fight insurgents in our own country, we haven't any. We fight them in other countries, often countries with traditions of governance that don't exactly appeal to us or to the populace being governed. In these cases we can talk all we want about good governance, but we have to recognize that the governing elites we're dealing with cannot implement our recommendations without compromising their own power and prerogatives, which they will not do. Bad governance exists because somebody finds it very profitable, generally somebody in power... and that somebody is going to do all in their power to resist changes to the status quo. Recommending change in such circumstances is like talking at a wall. Of course we have the option to withdraw support, but that can mean sacrificing the strategic objectives that brought us into the picture in the first place. A bit of a quandary, and there's no good solution, but to manage those situations we have to first acknowledge that they exist, and that in many of the cases we seek to influence our capacity to influence may be very limited.

All meant as constructive comment; this post is already way too long to be discussing areas of agreement.

Point one is that "the source of governance" as well as how governance is sustained in power are the keys to the critical causal factor of "Legitimacy." If the populace does not recognize either one you are on the fast track to insurgency. When Regime change by a foreign power occurs their is a presumption of illegitimacy that is virtually possible to overcome.

Point two. Insurgent leaders are not "ideologically driven"; they are politically driven and use ideology to motivate and drive the masses to support their political goals. Not saying their ideology is not often very important to them, it just isn't what drives them.

Ken White
05-24-2010, 04:33 AM
Personally I think I take a lean, clean, logical aproach to COG analysisI'd suggest perhaps excessively lean, possibly overly logical in contrast to the human conflicts it discusses which are rarely logical and thus perhaps not as firmly cast as some might think.

I do sort of wonder how it can be clean if the water is muddied by pointless battles over terminology... ;)
...This thread is about applying a logical methodology to get at the most important things that one must get at in order to prevail in an insurgency.Some insurgencies? I agree. All? Arguable.
I can call a horse a pig, but it is still a horse.True. However, you might offend some pigs (or horses...); might attract undue attention of a sort that can adversely impact adoption of your hypothesis and possibly lose some supporters by imposing your will on a height difference or definition that adds to the confusion and proliferation of terms and which could even exacerbate "that jumbled mess of operationalizing it that the US Joint doctrine takes lately." You may be unnecessarily complifying. :wry:

All of course, your prerogative -- my thoughts are simply offered for your consideration only and I for one make no claims to having any solutions to the problems of mankind...:D

Infanteer
05-24-2010, 05:27 AM
A little bit of a change of pace, but this discussion of "good governance" and "perception" brought me back to the TCAF Survey and its applicability in "tacticalizing" the "Jones model".

I kind of balked at the surveys at first but after a while I started making these the primary form of intelligence gathering of patrols. Building up a good collection of these on a community (combined with some basic census info) will help define what the local perception is.

Problem was I filed these and never saw nor heard anything about them. Much information got plugged into an Excel ASCOPE spreadsheet and was lost forever to the network drive.

I know this isn't in the weeds of COG, but it came to mind as I went through this.

slapout9
05-24-2010, 05:36 AM
In other words, is the conventional wisdom attempting to back its way into stability by importing the products of good governance rather than going in the front door by targeting the perceptions of good governance among the disaffected populace?


Again that is solid gold. Good is in the eyes of the target populace not our US preconceived notions of what is.

Your 4 questions should be in a box by themselves at the top of your slide. The ANSWERS to the questions that the populace gives you will be your INPUT to the system, from there designing a process with appropriate outputs would be a lot easier. And more in line with Systems Thinking as opposed to building stuff that symbolizes good governance based upon the US vision of what it should be. I think you are going to have a tough sell on that......Americans think they know everything about good government so we are conditioned NOT to listen to others.....gets us into a lot of trouble.


I would be careful about the horse and the pig deal. Does Voodoo exists? If enough people believe it does and begin to ACT as if it does......then it does exists. Miami PD had some bad experiences with non-existent Voodoo in the 80's until they began to recognize that perceptual reality.;)

Chris jM
05-24-2010, 05:37 AM
So the Howard Paret translation is wrong?


Apologies to the last few posters, as this is a small (and hopefully quick and painless) divergence back to the CoG issue.

The following article contains some discussion of the H-Paget translation of CvC: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0735.pdf

The article makes some good points for the first few pages and then promptly descends into effects-based discussion, making my brain spin.

Noted that this thread isn't about CoG, so I'll be quiet now.

William F. Owen
05-24-2010, 05:45 AM
This thread is about applying a logical methodology to get at the most important things that one must get at in order to prevail in an insurgency.
Ends, Ways, Means?

The fact that that is also "COG analysis" and that it differs from what the books say I am supposed to think and do, is just something that the COG Nazis will have to live with.
I can call a horse a pig, but it is still a horse.

So you'll say "Shock" when what you are actually describing is "Surprise."
Sorry, but this is why modern Concepts and Doctrine can be so poor.
Use the words as they are used in English. There is 1 definition of a COG. It is well described. It is useful to those of us who understand it.

Based on the commonly used definition, the Population is not a COG. You are just arbitrarily assigning the word, based on your wish to use it. Do you mean that "securing the population is the objective?"

William F. Owen
05-24-2010, 05:49 AM
Noted that this thread isn't about CoG, so I'll be quiet now.

No it's not, but words matter. Now off to drink "molten steel"! - my new word for coffee, or tea, or orange juice. :rolleyes:

slapout9
05-24-2010, 05:50 AM
Not OK and depends on the context. By act of war, do you mean "warfare?" None of those things are warfare in and of themselves.
None of the things you cite, are in of themselves military task to counter.
They may well be criminal. Do they involve killing? All those things are far more likely to fall towards police/state security, than the army.

An Army can only be used against armed force.

OK so it is Special Warfare instead of all this UW,IW,COIN,FID,FAD,stuff.

William F. Owen
05-24-2010, 05:55 AM
OK so it is Special Warfare instead of all this UW,IW,COIN,FID,FAD,stuff.
Dunno. It's almost certainly "Irregular". May have something to do with "FID." At what point does a fire, merit the fire brigade? Context, context and context.

slapout9
05-24-2010, 06:11 AM
So, Slap and Karzai are on the same page here (a "process") - probably the only time that will happen. :D


Sorta, like all politcians Karzai is working a process to stay in power. Mine isn't.

Bob's World
05-24-2010, 07:03 AM
Ends, Ways, Means?


So you'll say "Shock" when what you are actually describing is "Surprise."
Sorry, but this is why modern Concepts and Doctrine can be so poor.
Use the words as they are used in English. There is 1 definition of a COG. It is well described. It is useful to those of us who understand it.

Based on the commonly used definition, the Population is not a COG. You are just arbitrarily assigning the word, based on your wish to use it. Do you mean that "securing the population is the objective?"

"COG" is in truth a broad concept given very brief coverage by its founder, Mr. CvC. Since then various military organizations have attempted often to codify it, with those codifications covering a broad range of meanings and degrees and types of process prescribed that continually evolve over time.

The concept is a sound one, but I believe it must be applied with an open mind. Conflict within a state, among a single populace is a VERY VERY different thing in terms of its nature (though on the surface it may look quite similar) to conflicts between distinct states or populaces. For those who believe rigidly that all political violence is war, and that all war is the same, and that every application of the military is solely to defeat the opponents capability and capacity to produce violence, will remain forever trapped in a box, and surrounded by high walls.

I merely offer you a window to peak through. I do not demand that you come out of your box, or that you tear down your walls. As I learned as a trial attorney, I can disagree without being disagreeable; object without being objectionable; and be outraged without being outrageous. (though sometimes I confess, I fail in all of those nicities...)

The fact is that most insurgencies are handed to the military to deal with. The fact also is that most Empires that possess the military power to ward off all external state threats are also so confident and reliant on their military abilities that they apply them to internal struggles as well. Those Empires now all reside in a tremendous graveyard filled with those who have fallen to successful insurgency.

My position is that the one so often presented on these electronic pages by Mr. William F Owen is a very, very dangerous one indeed. It is a map to a well traveled path that many a failed empire has taken in good faith of their righteousness and full confidence in their military prowess.

Infanteer
05-24-2010, 07:28 AM
Sorry to deviate from the COG discussion again, but I still can't get this packaged up right:


Conflict within a state, among a single populace is a VERY VERY different thing in terms of its nature (though on the surface it may look quite similar) to conflicts between distinct states or populaces.

Do we consider Afghanistan a single populace? Do the Kandaharis consider Uzbeks from the north to be of the same people? Many discussions I had with the average southern Pashtun indicated that they had as much in common as me, Joe Canuck, and a Mexican. Americans and Canadians have more in common than certain ethnic divisions in Afghanistan.

What does this do to the model of warfare/insurgency that you have presented? Maybe bringing this back to the thread (so I am not a complete off-topic guy) what does this means that "perception of good governance" =/= "Afghanistan".

Bob's World
05-24-2010, 08:24 AM
Sorry to deviate from the COG discussion again, but I still can't get this packaged up right:



Do we consider Afghanistan a single populace? Do the Kandaharis consider Uzbeks from the north to be of the same people? Many discussions I had with the average southern Pashtun indicated that they had as much in common as me, Joe Canuck, and a Mexican. Americans and Canadians have more in common than certain ethnic divisions in Afghanistan.

What does this do to the model of warfare/insurgency that you have presented? Maybe bringing this back to the thread (so I am not a complete off-topic guy) what does this means that "perception of good governance" =/= "Afghanistan".

The intial test is this a conflict between peoples under two separate systems of govenrance, or is that conficts between a segment of a popualce the governance over them. The first is war, the second is insurgency.

As to how do the popopulaces perceive themselves, and this govenance over them? Ah, now you are getting to the Jones Model. There are many reasons why a popualce may not perceive the governance over them as legitimate.

The American Colonists felt that Government in England had become too removed, and too self-serving at their expense and exclusion from input.

The People of France in WWII felt that a government emplaced and supported by the German invaders lacked legitimacy.

The people of Afghanistan, and they are indeed goegraphically separated in diverse groupings, surely take a wide range of perspectives on ANY centralized governance in Afghanistan. Though there is probably greater agreement that when that centralized form is created and supported by an invading outsider that it drops to an even lower level of acceptance in terms of its legitimacy.

Things like borders and treaty-driven divisions of populaces and establishments of governments can confuse the issues as well as create conditions for insurgent violence. The creation of a a state of North Viet Nam, for example, did not suddenly turn the issues there into state vs state issues; the issues were still largely rooted in the popular challenge to such treaties and governments being imposed upon them by outsiders. These things are rarely black and white, and as Ken White loves to beat me about the head and shoulders with (hey, a guy his age needs the exercise) there are no pat answers. There are, however, some underlying fundamental "truths" that help shape an effective understanding of the suface conditions we observe.

Fuchs
05-24-2010, 08:53 AM
I think it's appropriate that we've got two definitions today; the CvC definition of a Schwerpunkt (a bit fuzzy becasue it varies between books) that's about the location of greatest might and the U.S. definition of a "Center of Gravity" (center with -er!) or "CoG" that's more a kind of weak spot lever analysis.

It's too late to force the world to accept the original one as the only one because the weak spot analysis needs a title as well - but it's not too late to deny people the right to assert that their differing concept goes back to CvC and his Schwerpunkt.

Dayuhan
05-24-2010, 08:58 AM
The intial test is this a conflict between peoples under two separate systems of govenrance, or is that conficts between a segment of a popualce the governance over them. The first is war, the second is insurgency.


I suspect that the key question in Afghanistan is how the populace perceives the conflict: is the core conflict between the GIROA and the Taliban, with the foreigners intervening in support of the GIROA, or is the core conflict between the foreigners and the Taliban, with the foreigners setting up the GIROA as a local agent of their own devising? If the former, then yes, this is insurgency and we're doing FID. If the latter, then it is war, regardless of how badly we'd like to call it something else.

William F. Owen
05-24-2010, 09:00 AM
"COG" is in truth a broad concept given very brief coverage by its founder, Mr. CvC.
Huh? How is it given "brief coverage?" He clearly and usefully explains what it is. What screws everything up is folks trying to change the inconvenient truth of what he states. A COG is something you strike. If you cannot strike it is not a COG! The whole concept is about harming the enemy.

Those Empires now all reside in a tremendous graveyard filled with those who have fallen to successful insurgency.
That is simply is not true. Empires have been sustained and created by crushing rebellions. If you say Rebellion or Revolt instead of insurgency, then I think this clarifies the issues in a historical context. It certainly gets puts all the new words and concepts in context.

It is a map to a well traveled path that many a failed empire has taken in good faith of their righteousness and full confidence in their military prowess.
It's a map well supported by 3,000 years of history of how to use armed force to set forth policy. It works if done by the skilled and fails when done by the un-skilled.

jcustis
05-24-2010, 09:40 AM
That tendency is evident in our preference for central government, and in our assumption that effective governance is a desirable thing. In many cases it may not be. If a group of people is accustomed to governing themselves, with nominal allegiance to a distant and abstract national entity, the prospect of an effective government - of a government that actually proposes to govern them - might be regarded as a direct assault on a treasured autonomy. We might see a police force and a courthouse as "delivering justice", the populace might see it as an attempt to impose a foreign system of justice.

Not all that unlike the brand of ultra-survivalists and anti-taxation folk in our own country, if you stop and think about it. Deep inside, a large cross-section of the population empathize with them. Maybe not so strongly as to provide aid and comfort in the wake of an attack against one of our institutions, but there is fertile ground that can be worked with a hoe if governance and its institutions are already weak or corrupt.


I suspect that the key question in Afghanistan is how the populace perceives the conflict: is the core conflict between the GIROA and the Taliban, with the foreigners intervening in support of the GIROA, or is the core conflict between the foreigners and the Taliban, with the foreigners setting up the GIROA as a local agent of their own devising? If the former, then yes, this is insurgency and we're doing FID. If the latter, then it is war, regardless of how badly we'd like to call it something else.

I don't see, after 9 years at this effort, where we are any closer to understanding the dynamic.


The common insurgent weakness revolves around the relationship between insurgent leaders and their followers, both the rank-and-file fighters and the supporting populace. It's not universal, but where it exists it provides a key strategic target. If we look at "the insurgency" as a monolithic entity driven solely by resistance to bad governance, we can overlook this vulnerability.

Insurgent leaders are typically ideologically driven, and fighting for a particular desired end state, generally one in which they take political power. Insurgent followers are more typically driven by local issues that threaten them: they fight against an unacceptable status quo. The ideology of the leader is frequently less that significant (and often less than comprehensible) to the follower. The key to success for the insurgent leadership is in understanding those local grievances (which will vary widely from one locale to the next) and in presenting themselves as a solution or as an ally.

That dynamic presents an interesting challenge. The leadership may be diffuse and difficult to target; even when some of them are killed or captured new leaders emerge from the ideological core. If we target the followers, we end up punishing people who see themselves fighting for their own rights or their own survival, often exacerbating the issues that the core insurgent propagandists exploit. For me, the key to resolving a situation like this is to understand the core narrative of the followers in any given locale, identify the divergences between the narratives of leader and follower, and act to address the issues that motivate the followers. The idea is to drive a wedge between leader and follower, less a question of decapitation than disembodiment. We will never persuade the core ideologues, but if we can isolate them from their followers we can render them irrelevant.


Great observations that play into my own struggle to define area denial. Reading your points brings home the fact that despite all the collections assets we have at our disposal, that harness military manpower, very few of them (at least that I can tell) are focused on identifying the root causes of why knuckleheads do what they do, and spend inordinant amounts of time and resources simply showing us the sypmtoms. I can't tell you how many times I have read reporting that does a great job making connections within the realm of Slap's four F's, and details what has or is about to happen, but simply canno fathom the reason why. It seems that assessment is often reserved for the human terrain folks, and that presents an inverse proportion of effort.

Perhaps that's because it will always be easier to be the counterinsurgent than to actually resolve the insurgency across the spectrum.

William F. Owen
05-24-2010, 10:00 AM
Perhaps that's because it will always be easier to be the counterinsurgent than to actually resolve the insurgency across the spectrum.

Correct, but so what? It is not "your' job to solve the problem. "Your" is to break their armed force, using armed force.

"You" apply military force, which kills and destroys and so deters as a result of doing so, or intending so.
The military contribution to crushing a revolt is to kill and capture the "revolting." - that's it! Military force can only destroy or deter.

ALL ELSE is done by politics and diplomacy - with only the alternative to kill and capture, if the rebels act out again.

Killing and capturing rebels requires skill. It does not create more rebels. This is fallacy, though it can and might, it is not a given, and this is not a reason not to do it.

jcustis
05-24-2010, 10:06 AM
Correct, but so what? It is not "your' job to solve the problem. "Your" is to break their armed force, using armed force.

"You" apply military force, which kills and destroys and so deters as a result of doing so, or intending so.
The military contribution to crushing a revolt is to kill and capture the "revolting." - that's it! Military force can only destroy or deter.

ALL ELSE is done by politics and diplomacy - with only the alternative to kill and capture, if the rebels act out again.

Killing and capturing rebels requires skill. It does not create more rebels. This is fallacy, though it can and might, it is not a given, and this is not a reason not to do it.

I'm sorry Wilf, but once again, your black and white lens shows you are divorced from really understanding what I do, and what we all (military) are doing over here. The only ones getting to what you describe are the special ops guys.

You are describing the objective, not the actual threshold of what is actually happening. Diplomacy, as well as politics, are practised by the .mil folks every day.

That's the so what.

William F. Owen
05-24-2010, 10:50 AM
I'm sorry Wilf, but once again, your black and white lens shows you are divorced from really understanding what I do, and what we all (military) are doing over here. The only ones getting to what you describe are the special ops guys.
You are missing my point. I am well aware of what "the Military" is trying to do.
I am well aware that the military is having to pick up the slack for other agencies failings and strategic dissonance.
I am merely stating the truism that if you apply military forces to problems that are not military in nature, then you will rarely get the outcome by the route you desire.
There are real limits to military power as a solution to non-military problems.
Thinking about the "problem in a different way," doesn't change that, unless someone wants to make all the same mistakes, all over again.

Bob's World
05-24-2010, 11:02 AM
Huh? How is it given "brief coverage?" He clearly and usefully explains what it is. What screws everything up is folks trying to change the inconvenient truth of what he states. A COG is something you strike. If you cannot strike it is not a COG! The whole concept is about harming the enemy.

That is simply is not true. Empires have been sustained and created by crushing rebellions. If you say Rebellion or Revolt instead of insurgency, then I think this clarifies the issues in a historical context. It certainly gets puts all the new words and concepts in context.

It's a map well supported by 3,000 years of history of how to use armed force to set forth policy. It works if done by the skilled and fails when done by the un-skilled.

I will not argue that empire after empire pitted their armies to suppress the insurgent will of the populaces they exercise dominion over. I will not argue that such efforts have sustained such emipires long after the populaces contained within them desired them to be gone. But I also will not argue with the facts that such efforts always ultimately fail.

This is why The USSR is but a blink in history, England is but an island; Rome is but a city, and Greece is in foreclosure. The list is as long as history to support my point; where is the history to support yours?

jcustis
05-24-2010, 11:06 AM
You are missing my point. I am well aware of what "the Military" is trying to do.
I am well aware that the military is having to pick up the slack for other agencies failings and strategic dissonance.
I am merely stating the truism that if you apply military forces to problems that are not military in nature, then you will rarely get the outcome by the route you desire.
There are real limits to military power as a solution to non-military problems.
Thinking about the "problem in a different way," doesn't change that, unless someone wants to make all the same mistakes, all over again.

I missed your point then, frankly, because you came across as talking down to me with regard to the point you were trying to make. Had you simply said what you wrote above, then I would have understood and moved on. Instead, you came across to me as that guy waving his arms and yelling, "why won't you fools listen to me?" That happens pretty often around your posts (at least for me), so if I snapped at a misunderstanding, my apologies.

William F. Owen
05-24-2010, 11:12 AM
Instead, you came across to me as that guy waving his arms and yelling, "why won't you fools listen to me?" That happens pretty often around your posts (at least for me), so if I snapped at a misunderstanding, my apologies.

Well in which case I owe you an equal apology if I came across like that. Not my intent.
- more over, if I come across as someone saying "listen to me" then I am equally screwed, - as what I am trying to say is "read CvC, Thucydides, and few others. They've said it all before".
I don't do original ideas. I just want to understand the ones that exist!

Bob's World
05-24-2010, 11:43 AM
Well in which case I owe you an equal apology if I came across like that. Not my intent.
- more over, if I come across as someone saying "listen to me" then I am equally screwed, - as what I am trying to say is "read CvC, Thucydides, and few others. They've said it all before".
I don't do original ideas. I just want to understand the ones that exist!

Good thing that "CvC, Thucydides, and a few others" didn't share that inclination!

All "Ideas" are by definition "new" at least to the person having them. Few things are truly new of course.

I've never been comfortable with the concept of simply hitting something with a hammer because that is "how its done" and if it doesn't work, just get a bigger hammer. Sometimes I think you need to reach for a different tool; or perhaps the thing you're whacking away at isn't even the problem at all upon a more careful analysis.

William F. Owen
05-24-2010, 12:09 PM
Good thing that "CvC, Thucydides, and a few others" didn't share that inclination!
What can I tell you. I recognise my limitations.


I've never been comfortable with the concept of simply hitting something with a hammer because that is "how its done" and if it doesn't work, just get a bigger hammer. Sometimes I think you need to reach for a different tool; or perhaps the thing you're whacking away at isn't even the problem at all upon a more careful analysis.
You cannot reach for a different tool IF you are the hammer! - that's my point. Military force is a set of hammers. You use them on nails.

...OK simplistic analogy, but I'm no Thucydides or CvC. :(

Entropy
05-24-2010, 12:53 PM
I suspect that the key question in Afghanistan is how the populace perceives the conflict: is the core conflict between the GIROA and the Taliban, with the foreigners intervening in support of the GIROA, or is the core conflict between the foreigners and the Taliban, with the foreigners setting up the GIROA as a local agent of their own devising? If the former, then yes, this is insurgency and we're doing FID. If the latter, then it is war, regardless of how badly we'd like to call it something else.

I'll note again that Afghanistan was in civil war when we invaded. The Quetta Shura Taliban not only want to defeat a foreign invader, but regaining what control of the country they previously had (tenuous though it was). On the other hand, for HiG expelling the foreign invader is arguably their primary goal. Point being is that motivations and goals vary from group to group. I think looking at Afghanistan solely from the perspective of "insurgency" misses the underlying and long-standing civil conflict that predates the US intervention.

slapout9
05-24-2010, 01:15 PM
I can't tell you how many times I have read reporting that does a great job making connections within the realm of Slap's four F's, and details what has or is about to happen, but simply canno fathom the reason why. It seems that assessment is often reserved for the human terrain folks, and that presents an inverse proportion of effort.

JC, that is why I say Motive, Method, and Opportunity should replace Ends, Ways and Means. CvC even talks about always going back to the Original Motive for the war! But here is what I think is the flaw in Wilf's argument, nobody ever ask soldiers/police officers how to prevent crime/war and if by some slim chance they do Politicos don't like the answers they get. Here is where I think Wilf is right......It's all politics.....politics causes war and crime. And that is the value in the Jones model....if it wakes some people up and gets them to pay attention to what the root cause/problem is....then that is a good governance thing. The fact that a soldier produces it or recommends it shouldn't really concern people IMO.

Plus, Wilf is really a nice guy he just can't stand it:D:D:D because that dead German guy had no since of humor whatsoever. Keep your head down.

Entropy
05-24-2010, 01:25 PM
I am well aware that the military is having to pick up the slack for other agencies failings and strategic dissonance.
I am merely stating the truism that if you apply military forces to problems that are not military in nature, then you will rarely get the outcome by the route you desire.
There are real limits to military power as a solution to non-military problems.

I think this is an important point which ties into my previous comment about the problem of competing organizations. The issue of the "militarization" of our effort has been brought up time-and-again over the last nine years yet nothing changes. That's one reason why, I fear, Col. Jone's model is irrelevant to Afghanistan no matter it's merits. We have proven incapable of synchronizing our efforts and have proven ourselves unable to bring the necessary non-military support to bear.

marct
05-24-2010, 02:19 PM
I have a feeling that there is a basic incompatibility between the Jones Model and the application of the CoG concept. Basically, i would suggest that they are based on different analogies: CoG (and Schwerpunkt) is based on a Newtonian understanding of physics, while the Jones Model is, implicitly, based on a more complex field model (sort of a la Kurt Lewin (http://www.amazon.com/Theory-Science-Selected-Theorical-Papers/dp/B000JF5JKC/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1274710000&sr=8-7)).

Getting back to Slap's point about Voodoo, then the factors / dimensions in the Jones model are not so much indicators as conduits / flow channels for the reification of perceptions / beliefs. "Governments" (and insurgent movements, religions and other groups of people) in and of themselves, do not exist outside the minds of those who believe in them and inasmuch as those people impose that belief, through their actions, on others. It is this belief when coupled with actions that helps to create the "mass" that CvC was referring to. In a military (conventional) context, think about "moral".

The creation / maintenance of this "mass" (and the means of continually re-producing it) is what a COIN fight is all about, and that means guarding and controlling the conduit channels of "belief" and consequent actions. It is not so much about applying your "will" to a group so much as it is about focusing your will to enforce a belief system about "reality".

Shessh, I think I need more coffee......

slapout9
05-24-2010, 02:37 PM
Getting back to Slap's point about Voodoo, then the factors / dimensions in the Jones model are not so much indicators as conduits / flow channels for the reification of perceptions / beliefs. "Governments" (and insurgent movements, religions and other groups of people) in and of themselves, do not exist outside the minds of those who believe in them and inasmuch as those people impose that belief, through their actions, on others. It is this belief when coupled with actions that helps to create the "mass" that CvC was referring to. In a military (conventional) context, think about "moral".

The creation / maintenance of this "mass" (and the means of continually re-producing it) is what a COIN fight is all about, and that means guarding and controlling the conduit channels of "belief" and consequent actions. It is not so much about applying your "will" to a group so much as it is about focusing your will to enforce a belief system about "reality".

Shessh, I think I need more coffee......

That is some really good coffee you are drinking, because that sums it up rather nicely IMO. in Systems Thinking it's the feedback loop(or lack of one) that will end up controlling the whole damn thing.

marct
05-24-2010, 02:52 PM
That is some really good coffee you are drinking, because that sums it up rather nicely IMO. in Systems Thinking it's the feedback loop(or lack of one) that will end up controlling the whole damn thing.

Mediocre at best (Folgers). I really need to get my self down to the store and get the good stuff ;).

Anyway, yes, some of it does come out of systems theory but via some very weird channels (i.e. ritual studies and New Religious Movements). One of the nice things about the Jones Model is that it doesn't require specific end points where the content is pre-defined.

slapout9
05-24-2010, 03:00 PM
Mediocre at best (Folgers). I really need to get my self down to the store and get the good stuff ;).



Mrs. Folgers was a master Propagandist.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slJebNp9fxw&NR=1

marct
05-24-2010, 03:05 PM
Mrs. Folgers was a master Propagandist.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slJebNp9fxw&NR=1

LOL - too true! Now if the message matched the reality.....:wry:

Bob's World
05-24-2010, 04:16 PM
Mediocre at best (Folgers). I really need to get my self down to the store and get the good stuff ;).

Anyway, yes, some of it does come out of systems theory but via some very weird channels (i.e. ritual studies and New Religious Movements). One of the nice things about the Jones Model is that it doesn't require specific end points where the content is pre-defined.

Recently MG Carter looked his commanders and staff in the eye and told them during a planning meeting for Kandahar: "The key to Hamkari is the creation of representative governance and representative opportunity."

Now, this is very much in line with what is proposed in the Jones Model, and I knew immediately what he was getting at, and more importantly, why it was so critical. To create these two conditions would strike at the heart of the causal perceptions of poor governance in Kandahar Provence.

Afterwords several of the commanders were discusing the meeting. One of them said: "I understand what the General wants, I just don't know what he wants me to do." This drew several nods and grunts of agreement.

This is complex stuff. Many well intentioned and very smart and experienced operators in the military, governance and development business are all doing their best to do what they think will bring stability to Afghanistan. All are operating within the guidance provided to them by their leadership. Many, however, know very little about insurgency.

Many military people want to simply defeat insurgent formations and disrupt their ability to generate decisive effects.

Many in the development business believe that if one brings electricty, paves roads, builds schools, etc stability will occur.

Many in the governance business believe that if they conduct elections and attack corruption stability will occur.

The Jones Model says that while all of those beliefs are reasonable, none are targeted directily at the perceptions of poor governance that give rise to the insurgency. They suppress the insurgent or artifically provide the things that good governance allows to occur, or they give semblences of legitimacy based on outsider perspectives.

The COG-based methodology provided here is for those who need a way to turn a fuzzy concept into specific things they can task, manage and execute. If it helps, use it. If it does not help, don't worry about it.

I have, however, made a few tweaks to the chart I provided to begin this thread, that I may post tomorrow.

William F. Owen
05-24-2010, 04:42 PM
The Jones Model says that while all of those beliefs are reasonable, none are targeted directily at the perceptions of poor governance that give rise to the insurgency. They suppress the insurgent or artifically provide the things that good governance allows to occur, or they give semblences of legitimacy based on outsider perspectives.
What if the Taliban does not care about good governance? What if wants political power, to gain power over the population. If the population doesn't like it, they will kill them... just like they did before.

There was a civil war going in A'Stan long before NATO got there. What's that got to do with "good governance?" No one is fighting to "bring justice and peace." They are fighting to gain power over the population, to enrich themselves, socially, politically and economically.

Bob's World
05-24-2010, 04:52 PM
What if the Taliban does not care about good governance? What if wants political power, to gain power over the population. If the population doesn't like it, they will kill them... just like they did before.

There was a civil war going in A'Stan long before NATO got there. What's that got to do with "good governance?" No one is fighting to "bring justice and peace." They are fighting to gain power over the population, to enrich themselves, socially, politically and economically.

COIN is not about defeating the insurgent, COIN is about out competing the insurgent for the support of the populace. If the populace believes that the insurgent is more likely to provide Good Governance, the insurgent is likely to ultimately prevail regardless of how much he is suppressed militarily, how much development is delivered, or how many elections one conducts.

If, however, the government can succeed in earning the support of the populace and address the perceptions of poor governance that the insurgent exploited, the insurgency will fade away, a death of natural causes.

This is the problem with military led COIN, it tends too often to be focused on defeating the threat. The insurgent is not what threatens the stability of the country, it is the failures of the governance to adequately provide good governance to some key segments of their populace that sowed the seeds of discontent that ultimately becomes insurgency.

marct
05-24-2010, 04:57 PM
Hey Wilf,


What if the Taliban does not care about good governance? What if wants political power, to gain power over the population. If the population doesn't like it, they will kill them... just like they did before.

There was a civil war going in A'Stan long before NATO got there. What's that got to do with "good governance?" No one is fighting to "bring justice and peace." They are fighting to gain power over the population, to enrich themselves, socially, politically and economically.

One of the things that bugs me about a lot of the discussion is the use of extremely fuzzy words - "Good" being a case in point. The Taliban do care about "good governance", but "good" means something totally different from what we would define as "good" (although both Torquemada and Savonarola would probably approve of their actions if not their symbology).

Bob's World
05-24-2010, 05:30 PM
Karazai, Mullah Omar and President Obama could all sit in a room and debate why they each think that they have the best answer for what good governance is for the people of Afghanistan; and of course none of their positions would matter. What matters is how the populace perceives its governance.

Currently, for example, surveys show that most Afghans perceive they receive greater justice from the Taliban than they receive from the GIROA. Score one for the Taliban. Do I kill more Taliban because he is out performing me? No, but I do need to understand what he is doing that is better than me, and then work to provide justice better than him. Not rule of law, as rule of law without justice will make the insurgency worse. Just one example.

My advice to Karzai would be to focus on fixing his perceptions of illegitimacy first, and then to address the perceptions of hopelessness second. I believe his Peace Jirga coming up is intended to do just that. Does he get it and will he succeed in that effort? I don't know. I hope so, as that is what will most likely take the head off of the insurgency. The revolutionary insurgency that drive this whole thing.

If that succeeds, then the Coalition can begin to reduce its military presence, which along with the Taliban leadership no longer funding fighters, will begin to make the resistance insurgency to fade as well. This will create maneuver room, so to speak, to be able to begin addressing the justice and repect aspects by spreading opportunity to all to be able to earn a good living regardless of tribal affiliation; or to resolve a land dispute and not lose simply because I am in the wrong tribe as well.

Focus on the right big things, and the rest will follow.

Fuchs
05-24-2010, 06:41 PM
Honestly, I have my doubts about the role of good governance as well. Too many states with terrible governance have no civil war and the non-idealistic motives are too strong in the human mind to buy into this "good governance" mantra any more.

You certainly need to stop the fuel supply of the civil war's fire, but many roads lead to Rome.

There are negative influences that can be a disincentive to the population (or merely their relevant decision-makers or multipliers) and there are many positive influences other than good governance that can turn them.


All this "legitimacy" and "good governance" talk assumes quite noble men and chooses a very tough road to success. Maybe we should look at the relevant men as greedy assholes instead.

You can hurt them badly if deemed necessary - without stepping beyond the limits of Western civilization*. Simply conscript their sons (or even the relevant man himself) into an vehicle-less army unit somewhere in a desert or confiscate vehicles or animals for the army and/or set up a temporary army camp on their crop field in order to compel a desired reaction. Keep in mind that there are enough unsympathetic officials available to do this.



*: Let's be honest; this is the critical limitation, for else "we" would have used or tolerated the Hama tactic long ago.

Ken White
05-24-2010, 07:39 PM
"These things are rarely black and white, and as Ken White loves to beat me about the head and shoulders with (hey, a guy his age needs the exercise) there are no pat answers. There are, however, some underlying fundamental "truths" that help shape an effective understanding of the suface conditions we observe.Yes I did, but I've sort of quit that except for an occasional stray round. He's too wedded to the dream to change. Much of what he advocates is worthwhile and it may do some good. Some is less worthwhile. Some is arguable.

One should take care to insure that ones desires do not become "truths."

I have long said that poor governance is not the only cause of insurgency and that good governance is not only solution. Others make the same points but Bob continues to see "truths." S'okay, everyone ought to have ideals and dreams. Maybe the good points will get some traction...

Dayuhan
05-25-2010, 01:53 AM
You cannot reach for a different tool IF you are the hammer! - that's my point. Military force is a set of hammers. You use them on nails.

Wilf, I understand your point here, and in a sense it’s valid. It’s also largely irrelevant. Look at it this way, continuing your analogy.

We send a bunch of hammers out into the field to drive nails. Fortunately these hammers are not completely dense, and they quickly notice that a lot of the nails are in fact screws. They report back to their Government that a lot of these nails are screws, and they need some screwdrivers. The Government’s reply is along the lines of “we haven’t any screwdrivers, do the best you can”.

You’re right, the functions under discussion are not really military functions and it’s not a great idea to be asking a military force to perform them. Unfortunately that is the position we’re in: the functions need to be performed and there’s nobody else available to perform them. So we have a bunch of hammers talking about how best to drive screws. Saying that they’re hammers and they shouldn’t be driving screws is probably accurate, but it isn’t very helpful: there are screws that need to be driven and there aren’t any screwdrivers. Maybe better to lighten up and try to help them work out how to do what needs to be done.


Great observations that play into my own struggle to define area denial. Reading your points brings home the fact that despite all the collections assets we have at our disposal, that harness military manpower, very few of them (at least that I can tell) are focused on identifying the root causes of why knuckleheads do what they do

One place to start might be to question the knucklehead assumption.

Of course some of them may be exactly that: testosterone-addled young men just looking for a fight. In some cultures young men are expected to prove themselves by fighting, and it’s possible that some of them are fighting us just because we’re there, and if we weren’t there they’d be fighting the tribe on the other side of the hill.

There may be other factors involved also. I’ve said this before, but I think failure of government to deliver services or development is overrated as a cause of insurgency, especially in areas where people have very low expectations of government. People are more likely to fight because of anger or fear: either something has been done to them that they didn’t like, or they expect something to be done that they won’t like.

There’s also the foreigner factor. What would happen if some vastly superior power sent an army to our country, removed our government, installed a new one, and told us that it was henceforth our duty to support that government, and if we failed in that duty we would be called “insurgents”? I may be wrong, but I kind of suspect that a few of the people on this forum might be tempted in such circumstances to do a bit of fighting.

In any event, if we want to get people to stop fighting without having to kill them all, figuring out why they are fighting is a reasonable first step, and it’s also worth looking for divergence between the local narrative of resistance and the insurgent ideology.


Recently MG Carter looked his commanders and staff in the eye and told them during a planning meeting for Kandahar: "The key to Hamkari is the creation of representative governance and representative opportunity."

Now, this is very much in line with what is proposed in the Jones Model, and I knew immediately what he was getting at, and more importantly, why it was so critical. To create these two conditions would strike at the heart of the causal perceptions of poor governance in Kandahar Provence.

Afterwords several of the commanders were discusing the meeting. One of them said: "I understand what the General wants, I just don't know what he wants me to do." This drew several nods and grunts of agreement.

This to me underscores one of the real problems we encounter when we identify governance as the core challenge.

At least MG Carter was proposing to create “representative governance and representative opportunity”, which is one step up from trying to take them out of a box. The problem, to put it bluntly, is that we can’t do that. We cannot create representative governance and representative opportunity in Afghanistan, or anywhere else. The Karzai Government can’t create them either. These things aren’t created, or installed. They grow, and they grow through a long process of adaptation and cultivation.

The belief that we can create or install governments for other people is a monument to hubris, and it’s already gotten us into a world of merde. We need to set that one aside forever, and quickly.

Bob's World
05-25-2010, 02:55 AM
Yes I did, but I've sort of quit that except for an occasional stray round. He's too wedded to the dream to change. Much of what he advocates is worthwhile and it may do some good. Some is less worthwhile. Some is arguable.

One should take care to insure that ones desires do not become "truths."

I have long said that poor governance is not the only cause of insurgency and that good governance is not only solution. Others make the same points but Bob continues to see "truths." S'okay, everyone ought to have ideals and dreams. Maybe the good points will get some traction...

Young Henry Ford was too wed to the idea that horseless carriages were better than the way we had always done it with horses;

Those darn Wright brothers and their fool contraption were way to wedded too the idea of powered flight as well.

As to the "fuzziness" of goodness. Read the paper. Insurgency IS fuzzy. That's why governments and militaries stuggle with it so mightily. They try to solve it by "defeating it." Kill the members of your populace who dare to challenge your failed ways. Or worse for the US, go help the failed governments of another country kill the members of their populace. It's not working.

I say again: It's not working.

So, like the Ranger instructor in your face: "Are you as F'd up as you want to be??" There's no good answer to that. Sure we know were F'd up, but we don't want to be, we just don't know what else to do.

Legitimacy is not a difficult concept. It comes from the people. Figure out how the people in a troubled area bestow legitimacy and simply empower that. Don't force them to do it your way (elections); don't pick their candidates for them (Hello, meet Mr. Karzai); and most importantly of all, don't try to shape the outcome in terms of form, nature or manning of said government and be willing to work with or abandon whatever emerges from the process. That is not complicated. But it does fly in the face of 60 years of control-based Cold War Strategy.

Hope is not a difficult concept either. Why are the teabaggers in America not an insurgency right now? They challenge the legitimacy of the President; They feel that they are not receiving Justice; and they sure as hell don't feel that they receive any respect. (A fellow SF Colonel who is extremely liberal told me with a straight face that "conservatives just aren't as smart as liberals." They believe that, it rationalizes their behavior and empowers them to ignore the express will of the ignorant masses and provide what they know is best for them). But in all of that, the Tea Party members have one thing that no current government can take from them. Its the same thing that the Bush administration could not take away from a equally frustrated liberal community: Hope. They know the system is strong, and that it will prevent any one approach to governance from enduring. Sure it disrupts the good a bit, but it is a showstopper for the bad. We have a system in America born of insurgency, and it is designed to prevent insurgency because of it.

Or we could just do capture kill on the Tea Party Leadership; Or perhaps try to buy them off with development projects; or maybe if we need help, bring in a couple hundred thousand Chinese military and aid workers to help provide security and development. We could have Chinese Captains and Majors advising our Cabinet members, Congressmen and Generals. We could have the Chinese show us how they pick leaders, and have them apply that process to picking and sustaining the leaders here that they think are best for us (when we know they really mean best for them) That should work. Right?? Good luck with that.

No, I'll keep banging my drum. I like the sound of it. I think some of the otherr members of the band are sounding a little flat though

William F. Owen
05-25-2010, 05:03 AM
COIN is not about defeating the insurgent, COIN is about out competing the insurgent for the support of the populace. If the populace believes that the insurgent is more likely to provide Good Governance, the insurgent is likely to ultimately prevail regardless of how much he is suppressed militarily, how much development is delivered, or how many elections one conducts.
...and this is our fundamental disagreement. Support flows from power. Not the other way around. The populace support who has the power. Power does not come from the populace. To get power over them, you just have to terrify them. Insurgents can and do do this. They do not need much if any support to wield this kind of power. Thus the Government should seek out and destroy them. Crushing revolts and rebellions is about killing the competition.

The Taliban do care about "good governance", but "good" means something totally different from what we would define as "good" (although both Torquemada and Savonarola would probably approve of their actions if not their symbology).
Sure. Even the Nazis thought they were doing something good. No one ever set forth a policy they believe to be immoral of bad. My point is that "the Talian" seek power - and will use all and any means to get it.

Dayuhan
05-25-2010, 05:08 AM
To get power over them, you just have to terrify them. Insurgents can and do do this.

Governments do it too. It doesn't always work, and when it does work it's often only in the short run.

William F. Owen
05-25-2010, 05:10 AM
. So we have a bunch of hammers talking about how best to drive screws. Saying that they’re hammers and they shouldn’t be driving screws is probably accurate, but it isn’t very helpful: there are screws that need to be driven and there aren’t any screwdrivers. Maybe better to lighten up and try to help them work out how to do what needs to be done.
I do understand this. Really I do. My constant emphasis is because some believe it is a job the military should do, rather than understanding that the "COIN approach" is deeply flawed - IMO. My point is use armed force against armed force - leave the population out of it!!

William F. Owen
05-25-2010, 05:11 AM
Governments do it too. It doesn't always work, and when it does work it's often only in the short run.
Concur. Governments should not. It's dumb. Not doing dumb things is a given.

Bob's World
05-25-2010, 09:33 AM
When the opposing armed force IS the populace, how do you leave them out of it at the same time you are merrily militarily crushing them?

I had an opportune discussion with Dr. Maria Stephan this morning, who's work is on nonviolent conflict. She has a book out on the topic, and handed me a short paper:

"Why Civil Resistance Works - The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3301_pp007-044_Stephan_Chenoweth.pdf)" International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008) pp.7-44.

We need to hope that AQ does not read her work. Her research shows how nonviolent campaigns achieve success 53% of the time, whereas violent movements only prevail26% of the time.

Key is that she recoginzes that violent tactics are a choice, and one that often harms the ability of the challenger to achieve legitimacy themselves, and that allows the despotic counterinsurgent to presume the moral highground and justify their violent crushing of their own populace.

When the resistance selects nonviolent means the roles reverse, and the despotic leadership loses credibility in responding with violence, and it is much more likely for governmental officals to go over to the other side.

I have often stated god help us if we merely crush AQ without also addressing the underlying causation for their movement; because if the organizaiton that comes behind them, and there will be one as sure as day follows night, and they adopt such nonviolent tactics such as Maria promotes; they will likely achieve all of their goals in short order.

At that point we will have to ask ourselves the wisdom of siding with the Despots over siding with the populaces of those same countries.

The Jones Model applies to both types of movements; and as Maria points out, those that chose the non-violent path are far more apt to prevail.

Jury is out as to what happens when the state choses the more non-violent path in the face of a resistance that has chosen violence.

jcustis
05-25-2010, 10:10 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis

Great observations that play into my own struggle to define area denial. Reading your points brings home the fact that despite all the collections assets we have at our disposal, that harness military manpower, very few of them (at least that I can tell) are focused on identifying the root causes of why knuckleheads do what they do.

One place to start might be to question the knucklehead assumption.

Of course some of them may be exactly that: testosterone-addled young men just looking for a fight. In some cultures young men are expected to prove themselves by fighting, and it’s possible that some of them are fighting us just because we’re there, and if we weren’t there they’d be fighting the tribe on the other side of the hill.

There may be other factors involved also. I’ve said this before, but I think failure of government to deliver services or development is overrated as a cause of insurgency, especially in areas where people have very low expectations of government. People are more likely to fight because of anger or fear: either something has been done to them that they didn’t like, or they expect something to be done that they won’t like.

There’s also the foreigner factor. What would happen if some vastly superior power sent an army to our country, removed our government, installed a new one, and told us that it was henceforth our duty to support that government, and if we failed in that duty we would be called “insurgents”? I may be wrong, but I kind of suspect that a few of the people on this forum might be tempted in such circumstances to do a bit of fighting.

In any event, if we want to get people to stop fighting without having to kill them all, figuring out why they are fighting is a reasonable first step, and it’s also worth looking for divergence between the local narrative of resistance and the insurgent ideology.


After cruising through this thread more than once, I sat down with our task force's intelligence officer and began to ping him on this issue of why. We began to go around and around in response to my questions of why certain actors in the battlespace were doing what they were doing, and he quickly grew tired of me telling him that he was defining the symptons of the environment and the behaviors themselves, but very little of the true reason why it was happening.

After that, I tool a look at the priority intelligence requirements that are laid out. Not surprisingly, not a single PIR asked the question "why?"

I am pretty much smacking myself on the forehead with the realization that the only way we can actually attack the system and problem, comes from understanding that simple three-letter word.

Chris jM
05-25-2010, 10:12 AM
Jury is out as to what happens when the state choses the more non-violent path in the face of a resistance that has chosen violence.

Doesn't the very identity, ideology and purpose of AQ demand violence, though? Establishing the caliphate is, from my limited readings, a necessarily violent process according to the fundamentalist Islamic view of the world.

Further, I would suggest that a non-violent fundamentalist Islamic movement would be exactly what we are after - in a war of ideas and words, we have nothing to fear. Fundamentalism will inevitably lose to modernity.


Jury is out as to what happens when the state choses the more non-violent path in the face of a resistance that has chosen violence.

Is this even possible? I can't think of any historical situations where the ruling power has the ability to choice non-violence to a violent opposition, probably for good reason. Your concept of 'good governance' specifically states that legitimacy is required. How can a government be legitimate if it allows violent opposition to it to go unchecked? Perhaps I'm being overly classical and old-fashioned in my views here, but a government that loses it's ability to protect it's own people and interests is on the brink if not the very definition of a failed government. Of course this term (good governance) is relative, as has been pointed out before, however failing to provide the accepted or expected level of security, both tangible (physical security from violence) and intangible (economic security, amongst others) loses crucial amounts of legitimacy with it's polis. I would argue that, by accepting non-violence in the face of violence, a government would surrender it's mandate to monopolise force in the interests of the people and thus lose any right to govern immediately.

Wilf, you no doubt agree that the vast majority of us/them out there have differing and incorrect views of both military employment and the meaning of the CoG. However, would you agree that an inefficient strategy pursued with great vigor and resolve immediately is better than constant strategic re-orientation and indecision?

I ask this as I agree with you in every point you make, but once I try and frame the course of action I would follow were I king I keep compromising the lofty visions of a military specialising in force-on-force solutions. Sure, pop-centric COIN may be horribly inefficient and ineffective, but if the US and her allies have a strong, developed pop-COIN capability inclusive of people, doctrine and equipment, is it not better to throw support onto this course than find as-of-now-elusive alternatives?

Also, have you considered the fact that pop-centric COIN is quite possible the most reliable method we have of finding insurgents in the Afghan environment? There is no point throwing a military capability against an enemy if they cannot complete the first core function of 'find'. Even though COIN-specific forces are horribly inefficient in the job of destroying and deterring, is it possible that the COIN focus is absolutely necessary to identify those we want to employ force against?

William F. Owen
05-25-2010, 10:30 AM
When the opposing armed force IS the populace, how do you leave them out of it at the same time you are merrily militarily crushing them?
Because they oppose your setting forth of policy, and the the opposing armed force is a minute percentage of the population in exactly the same way your army is. - it's called the armed force, not the population.


I had an opportune discussion with Dr. Maria Stephan this morning, who's work is on nonviolent conflict. She has a book out on the topic, and handed me a short paper:

"Why Civil Resistance Works - The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict" International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008) pp.7-44.

We need to hope that AQ does not read her work. Her research shows how nonviolent campaigns achieve success 53% of the time, whereas violent movements only prevail26% of the time.
So politics works 53% of the time... wow... I will read with interest.

Key is that she recoginzes that violent tactics are a choice, and one that often harms the ability of the challenger to achieve legitimacy themselves, and that allows the despotic counterinsurgent to presume the moral highground and justify their violent crushing of their own populace.
Ends, Ways and Means. This has been said many, many time before.
Non-violence does not stop the bad guys killing your family. Achieving policy goal by non-violence IS politics.

William F. Owen
05-25-2010, 10:40 AM
Wilf, you no doubt agree that the vast majority of us/them out there have differing and incorrect views of both military employment and the meaning of the CoG. However, would you agree that an inefficient strategy pursued with great vigor and resolve immediately is better than constant strategic re-orientation and indecision?
Strategy is not right or wrong. It's better or worse, and the cost can be more more than you are willing to pay. It's about judgement, and skill.
The military contribution to strategy is violence. Strategy, is this context, is using force to gain what you want. If you are not using violence, you are using politics and diplomacy. You may use both. The real point about strategy is having one.

I ask this as I agree with you in every point you make, but once I try and frame the course of action I would follow were I king I keep compromising the lofty visions of a military specialising in force-on-force solutions.
Well I can't guess at the context, but it all depends on the policy. Most people confuse policy with strategy. It doesn't matter how good your strategy is, if the policy cannot be implemented by the means employed, or the cost required.
Policy is politics.
If you believe that developing A'Stan into a stable nation is the right thing to do, then this is personal belief. It is not dependent on logic, evidence and least of all strategy.

Does this help?

Bob's World
05-25-2010, 11:40 AM
Because they oppose your setting forth of policy, and the the opposing armed force is a minute percentage of the population in exactly the same way your army is. - it's called the armed force, not the population.


So politics works 53% of the time... wow... I will read with interest.

Ends, Ways and Means. This has been said many, many time before.
Non-violence does not stop the bad guys killing your family. Achieving policy goal by non-violence IS politics.

I will instead refer you to page 9 of the document you felt you free to deride without the benefit of a quick scan first to see how it might measure up to your dogma:

"Nonviolent resistance is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, phychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence. It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both. Scholars have identified hundreds of nonviolent methods - including symbolic protests, economic boycotts, labor strikes, political and social non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention - that groups have used to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries' sources of power. Nonviolent struggle takes place outside traditional political channels, making it distinct from other nonviolent political processes such as lobbying, electioneering, and legislating.

Ken White
05-25-2010, 01:47 PM
...............:eek:

William F. Owen
05-25-2010, 01:50 PM
I will instead refer you to page 9 of the document you felt you free to deride without the benefit of a quick scan first to see how it might measure up to your dogma:
I did not deride the document. I merely expressed surprise at the conclusion as stated, because it did not seem insightful. Thus-

"Nonviolent resistance is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, phychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence.
No threat of violence - thus politics in the truest sense of the word.

It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both. Scholars have identified hundreds of nonviolent methods - including symbolic protests, economic boycotts, labor strikes, political and social non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention - that groups have used to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries' sources of power.
Again, all political instruments. None of this should be the concern of anyone in uniform - bar Policeman.

Nonviolent struggle takes place outside traditional political channels, making it distinct from other nonviolent political processes such as lobbying, electioneering, and legislating.
And? This statement attempts to draw a false distinction between formal political processes and real politics in the wider sense. Poll Tax Riots? Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament? Greenham Common? These are all well tracked and well understood aspects of politics since time began.

Sorry Bob, I full confess to not getting it. I grew up with Protests, Strikes and Boycotts. They pure politics in one of it's most unambiguous forms.

Bob's World
05-25-2010, 02:03 PM
I did not deride the document. I merely expressed surprise at the conclusion as stated, because it did not seem insightful. Thus-

No threat of violence - thus politics in the truest sense of the word.

Again, all political instruments. None of this should be the concern of anyone in uniform - bar Policeman.

And? This statement attempts to draw a false distinction between formal political processes and real politics in the wider sense. Poll Tax Riots? Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament? Greenham Common? These are all well tracked and well understood aspects of politics since time began.

Sorry Bob, I full confess to not getting it. I grew up with Protests, Strikes and Boycotts. They pure politics in one of it's most unambiguous forms.

There is a good chance your persistent posts consisting of "I disagree" or "I don't understand" don't lend much to the SWJ community. There are dozens of other threads on this site where your comments typically add very much indeed. Post where you please, obviously, but I for one am not benefiting from what you are posting here.

Ken White
05-25-2010, 02:27 PM
Disagreements occur on discussion boards and they should. Sometimes, we just need to take a beak and do something else for a bit. :cool:

Entropy
05-25-2010, 02:39 PM
Col. Jones,

This discussion brought up a couple of questions in my mind:

1. Based on all the discussion of "good governance," I get the impression that the responsibility for the condition of "good governance" rests solely on whomever is trying to govern. This suggests that a population's motivations for entering into insurgency are always reasonable and therefore should be accommodated. Is this the case? If not, then how exactly do populations fit into your theory, especially in cases where the goals for two populations are mutually exclusive or are unreasonable?

2. Where does a state's capacity to provide a credible monopoly on violence fit in? I would argue that a credible monopoly on violence is part and parcel of legitimacy for a number or reasons. Justice is a good example. It's not enough to simply provide justice for a population - one must also prevent competing systems of justice from forming (consider, for example, white supremacist "justice" against African-Americans in the south). The point being is that legitimacy isn't enough - it must be backed by a credible monopoly of force both for enforcement as well as deterrence. It seems to me that the deterrent effect from a government's credible monopoly of violence is likely to cause disaffected populations to more seriously consider non-violent means for change. Do you disagree? If so, how so?

JCustis,


After that, I tool a look at the priority intelligence requirements that are laid out. Not surprisingly, not a single PIR asked the question "why?"

I am pretty much smacking myself on the forehead with the realization that the only way we can actually attack the system and problem, comes from understanding that simple three-letter word.

Amen to that. I've been banging on PIR's for quite a long time now.

marct
05-25-2010, 03:01 PM
Hi Entropy,

Obviously, I'm not speaking for BW, but....


1. Based on all the discussion of "good governance," I get the impression that the responsibility for the condition of "good governance" rests solely on whomever is trying to govern. This suggests that a population's motivations for entering into insurgency are always reasonable and therefore should be accommodated. Is this the case? If not, then how exactly do populations fit into your theory, especially in cases where the goals for two populations are mutually exclusive or are unreasonable?

Well, populations are not singular; even in families :D! I think that they key would be to understand it along the lines of entering into an insurgency always appears reasonable to them (a part of the population) at that point in time. Think back to all the dickering and confusion during the American Revolution for a good example.


2. Where does a state's capacity to provide a credible monopoly on violence fit in?

No state actually has a monopoly on violence. In the US, for example, each individual state has its own armed forces, as do many municipalities (aka police). Private corporations also have the capability of violence, either from their own security forces or by hiring them or by manipulating local politicians to use theirs. The idea that the "state", which is an illusion anyway, has a monopoly on violence is just one of those myths that have been propagated since the development of modern states.

Cheers,

Marc

William F. Owen
05-25-2010, 03:05 PM
There is a good chance your persistent posts consisting of "I disagree" or "I don't understand" don't lend much to the SWJ community.
Fair one, but actually I do see this an important and useful discussion.

There are dozens of other threads on this site where your comments typically add very much indeed. Post where you please, obviously, but I for one am not benefiting from what you are posting here.
My issue is with your argument. Not you. I have the utmost respect for you, I just do not agree with your argument.

You state the issue in Rebellions/Insurgencies is with "poor governance." I understand that and in some cases it may even be correct, but surely this is the realm of policy?
If the US Government tells you to prop up a dictator, then that is the policy. Your job is to do it.

If you are telling me that it is sound policy to force "good governance" on folks, then OK, but my guess is that insurgents who resent your secular western democratic "governance" will use violence to oppose it. What then?

If they do NOT use violence, then they are using the political process (formal or informal, regular or irregular) - and thus should be immune from military action, in regards to supporting the policy (do not needlessly kill civilians)

Now if the above tells you that I do not understand something about the relationship of Policy to Strategy and Strategy to tactics, then I really want to know what I am missing.

slapout9
05-25-2010, 03:56 PM
As I was taught.

You have a guerrilla army that formed as a reaction to an oppressive government. The Guerrillas are recruited from the ingenious population.

You have a conventional army of the oppressive government.
The army of the oppressive government also recruits from the indigenous population.

The more guerrillas that are killed by the government army the more they are killing their own "kinfolks" and will do nothing but make the guerrilla army stronger. Hence you cannot kill your way out of it without murdering your whole population.

SF-can advise/train (they should not fight if possible)the legitimate guerrilla Army of the people and free them from their oppressive government. And we all live happily ever after.

Entropy
05-25-2010, 08:11 PM
Well, populations are not singular; even in families :D!

That's exactly what I'm driving at. Obviously each population considers its own grievances to be legitimate, but addressing those grievances can cause another population to turn to violence. For example, consider the institution of slavery in the US from before Civil War and through the Civil Rights Act. Was there, for example, some kind of "good governance" which we might have instituted sometime before the Civil War that would have avoided that conflict? Was there any possible kind of "good governance" that could have brought us to where we are today in the 19th century? Was rebellion in the south a failure of governance? I don't think so. In fact, I suspect that had the feds tried to impose something like the CRA immediately following the Civil War, then we likely would have faced a post-war insurgency. So the question is, what can governance do when populations have irreconcilable differences?

Applying this to Afghanistan, I really need to be convinced that good central governance in Afghanistan is even possible, much less the highly centralized government that currently exists. The best that could be hoped for, in my estimation, is something along the lines of how Pakistan is currently organized, but that isn't working out all that well either. The alternative is the devolution of central power altogether - if centralized good governance isn't possible, then perhaps a highly decentralized state is. Certainly there is precedence for that in Afghanistan, but we are limited by the political reality and the conditions today, which is a highly centralized Afghan government wholly dependent on foreign powers.

In short, I question that there is any kind of "good governance" under the existing system which can satisfy all the competing factions.

The alternative is for the populations to change. Such change occurs very slowly. This is, I think, what happened here in the US with slavery. Good governance did not solve the irreconcilable differences between the North and South, even after the Civil War. Ultimately, and over a long period of time, the populace changed. In Afghanistan I fear trying to bring misplaced notions of good governance through a highly centralized government will set the stage for more violence in Afghanistan and not less.

In the end what we think is "good governance" may, in reality, turn into quite the opposite. Jcustis' comments highlight our continuing collective ignorance on Afghanistan which impedes our ability to understand what good governance is in Afghanistan, much less our ability to foster it.


No state actually has a monopoly on violence. In the US, for example, each individual state has its own armed forces, as do many municipalities (aka police). Private corporations also have the capability of violence, either from their own security forces or by hiring them or by manipulating local politicians to use theirs. The idea that the "state", which is an illusion anyway, has a monopoly on violence is just one of those myths that have been propagated since the development of modern states.

That's true and I do understand there are various levels of government and/or authority depending on circumstances. "Monopoly" is the wrong word and I didn't mean a monolithic "state" so sorry for the confusion.

Let me put it this way - what is it that prevents me from taking justice into my own hands? In large part it is because I'm deterred from doing so because the "state" (ie. some authority with coercive power over me) will visit negative repercussions upon me that I cannot avoid. In short, one can't have a governmental authority without credible coercive power to include violence. If I tried to set up my own independent system of justice here in my neighborhood it wouldn't last long because the government has the coercive power to prevent it, even if my system of justice is superior and more legitimate in the eyes of my "population" (ie. my neighborhood). I would still fail because the government has the coercive power to prevent my system from being used.

Now suppose that the government had limited (or no) means to prevent me from forming my own independent system of justice. In that case my system has the chance to win based on its merits vs what the government can offer. I have the opportunity to supplant the government in delivering justice for my population. More likely, though, the government would have some coercive power and so would I. We are both, then, in the position of competing over the population as well as trying to reduce the other's coercive power. It may be the case that our justice systems are not that different, or are not sufficiently different that the population would not live under one or the other. In that case, legitimacy is not derived from who can provide the best system of justice, but who can exclusively provide any system of justice - in other words, competing over the justice system becomes a power struggle. This analogy isn't far removed from what's happening in parts of Afghanistan where people DO need a justice system to resolve disputes.

So legitimacy isn't just the ability to deliver a government service - it's the ability to deliver a service and prevent competitors from offering alternatives and that requires the credible ability to bring violence or coercion on those who would buck your system.

For years and years now we've read stories and reports where Afghan government and coalition efforts in any number of areas are stymied because once the government authority leaves, or the project is built, or whatever, a new authority moves in and either fills the vacuum or displaces what government authority there is. The population isn't going to accept your authority unless it is both perceived as legitimate and you posses the credible capability to enforce it. Afghans are notorious fence-sitters because they are so often caught in the middle of power struggles. So for any Afghan government or coalition project to succeed, it must have the durable and credible ability to keep the insurgent governance structure out. The ability to do that successfully is what will give you true legitimacy.

As I said, I think Col. Jone's model is useful and easy to understand, but I would like to know how his model accounts for these factors.

slapout9
05-25-2010, 09:01 PM
Obviously each population considers its own grievances to be legitimate, but addressing those grievances can cause another population to turn to violence. For example, consider the institution of slavery in the US from before Civil War and through the Civil Rights Act. Was there, for example, some kind of "good governance" which we might have instituted sometime before the Civil War that would have avoided that conflict? Was there any possible kind of "good governance" that could have brought us to where we are today in the 19th century? Was rebellion in the south a failure of governance? I don't think so. In fact, I suspect that had the feds tried to impose something like the CRA immediately following the Civil War, then we likely would have faced a post-war insurgency. So the question is, what can governance do when populations have irreconcilable differences?



I would say yes. Slavery gave the south a competitive advantage over the North. Before it's abolition if the Government would have arranged a fair compensation war could have been avoided. That wasn't done and war followed. Lincoln was assassinated before reconstruction could be completed and extended southern suffering for some time, during which the KKK was formed and prospered until finally MLK arrived and the civil rights act.


As it relates to countries with multiple oppressed populations inside loose borders, yes your actions can create violence between those groups while trying to do the right thing so to speak. But this goes back to Basic Green Beret Stuff, that type of population analysis should happen during step1-psychological preparation of the targeted population.

Finally there is nothing in the Jones model that says your are going to end up with some standard democratically/capitalist style government. Your survey of the population may indicate you should pursue a very different system of government.

We used the Special Warfare model twice in A'stan very successfully and then blew it by not finishing the mission.

Dayuhan
05-25-2010, 10:12 PM
We need to hope that AQ does not read her work. Her research shows how nonviolent campaigns achieve success 53% of the time, whereas violent movements only prevail26% of the time.

I'd be curious to see how those percentages were obtained, and what sort of "campaign" qualifies for consideration. Nonviolent tactics can be extremely effective if you have the support base to sustain them. Nonviolent campaigns that can't raise the necessary support to apply meaningful pressure don't generally achieve much beyond making noise.



I have often stated god help us if we merely crush AQ without also addressing the underlying causation for their movement; because if the organizaiton that comes behind them, and there will be one as sure as day follows night, and they adopt such nonviolent tactics such as Maria promotes; they will likely achieve all of their goals in short order.

At that point we will have to ask ourselves the wisdom of siding with the Despots over siding with the populaces of those same countries.

This assumption rests on a questionable assessment of AQ's causation. AQ is not an insurgency, has no populace, and did not arise as a reaction to despotism. It has never managed to raise sufficient popular support to threaten a government by nonviolent means. If we try to shoehorn AQ into a Cold War paradigm or resistance to oppressive despotism we do ourselves a disservice: it doesn't fit there.

It's worth noting that the "insurgencies" in Iraq and Afghanistan are not reactions to indigenous despotism, but reactions to a foreign power's misplaced confidence in its own ability to create acceptable governance for other countries. Insurgency certainly can be a response to despotism, but it is not always a response to despotism.

Certainly there are violent insurgencies in the world today that would be more effective if they worked through nonviolent tactics: I've long believed that the Palestinians need a Gandhi. Like all other tactics, though, nonviolent resistance requires certain conditions to succeed, and broad popular support is one of them. Calling a strike gets you nowhere if nobody heeds the call, a demonstration is ineffective if nobody shows up. Mass action won't work without mass. Groups turn to violence and terror precisely because they haven't the mass to operate any other way.

slapout9
05-25-2010, 10:56 PM
It's worth noting that the "insurgencies" in Iraq and Afghanistan are not reactions to indigenous despotism, but reactions to a foreign power's misplaced confidence in its own ability to create acceptable governance for other countries. Insurgency certainly can be a response to despotism, but it is not always a response to despotism.


That is some strategic stuff there.;)

Dayuhan
05-25-2010, 11:32 PM
The military contribution to strategy is violence.

What if the instruction given to the military force by its government is to solve the problem by any available means? Shouldn't that force be considering all means, both violent and non-violent, that might have a bearing on solving the problem?

Why should this discussion avoid political devices that might have a bearing on the problem. or be confined to the use of violence?

Dayuhan
05-25-2010, 11:35 PM
After that, I tool a look at the priority intelligence requirements that are laid out. Not surprisingly, not a single PIR asked the question "why?"

I am pretty much smacking myself on the forehead with the realization that the only way we can actually attack the system and problem, comes from understanding that simple three-letter word.

It's a tough question, especially since the answer can vary from place to place and person to person... that doesn't make it any less important!

Bob's World
05-26-2010, 03:18 AM
Col. Jones,

This discussion brought up a couple of questions in my mind:

1. Based on all the discussion of "good governance," I get the impression that the responsibility for the condition of "good governance" rests solely on whomever is trying to govern. This suggests that a population's motivations for entering into insurgency are always reasonable and therefore should be accommodated. Is this the case? If not, then how exactly do populations fit into your theory, especially in cases where the goals for two populations are mutually exclusive or are unreasonable?

2. Where does a state's capacity to provide a credible monopoly on violence fit in? I would argue that a credible monopoly on violence is part and parcel of legitimacy for a number or reasons. Justice is a good example. It's not enough to simply provide justice for a population - one must also prevent competing systems of justice from forming (consider, for example, white supremacist "justice" against African-Americans in the south). The point being is that legitimacy isn't enough - it must be backed by a credible monopoly of force both for enforcement as well as deterrence. It seems to me that the deterrent effect from a government's credible monopoly of violence is likely to cause disaffected populations to more seriously consider non-violent means for change. Do you disagree? If so, how so?

JCustis,



Amen to that. I've been banging on PIR's for quite a long time now.

The responsibility for Good Governance DOES rest solely on the government. That is why it is called "service" or "duty". When governmental leaders begin to think of the populace as existing to serve them you are on the slippery slope to Poor Governance, Subversion and Insurgency.

The population's rationale only have to be reasonable to them. As my wife is quick to tell me "don't tell me how I feel." Governments like to think that what they think is right, and what the populace thinks contrary to those offiicial positions is moot. This natural tendency is what allows subversion to grow among the people while the government rationalizes the danger away as being attributed to a few radicals.

As to the insurgent being right or wrong, I have to go with what was captured quite intentionally in our Declaration of Independence. It is both the Duty and the Right of a Populace to rise up in insurgency when faced with Despotism. As an attorney, I understand that a Duty is something that one must do, and a Right is something that cannot be taken away. As an SF officer I understand that insurgency can take many forms; that the formative causal factors that must be addressed are the same, regardless in what form the movement manifests. The natural tendency, when denied legal recourse, if for the populace to take illegal routes to change. As Maria lays out in her work, the non-violent ways are more apt to succeed than the violent ways.

To simply say violence is war, and war is a military matter, and the military's job is to crush said violence is the same supervicial analysis from the perspective of the Despot that has lead to many a long, drawnout struggle between a populace and its failed governance.

Better instead for Governance to see such movements as the clearest of metrics, the most accurate of polls, and to modify their behavior to the degree practicable to resolve their failures short of simply ramping up the oppression.



Dayuhan: Concur completely that AQ is not an insurgent organization. After all, they have no populace, and they have no state. They are a political club that employs the tools of the modern information age to conduct Unconventional Warfare to incite, leverage, and support the insurgencies of others to their ends.

This used to be the realm of states. Hitler needed a state to go from a Dissident in Munich to causing trouble on a global stage. Today, if AQ gained a state they would be crushed in days. By remaining in the "sanctuary" of their non-state status (no, Afghanistan is not their essential sanctuary, their status is), they remain outside the reach of the tools of statehood. What we need to focus on are the many unique, distinct troubled relationships between states across the Middle East and their populaces, and also assess our roles in those relationships as seen from the perspectives of the populaces.

The intel guys always cast this in friend-foe model that is wrong-headed and dangerous. It drives the F'd up PIRs that were mentioned. PIRs need to get to the critical questions that the boss must understand to focus his efforts to win. Those PIRs should be based in my four causal factors, not in what is the current manifestation of violence up to.

Oh, and final point. When one invades and displaces the governance of another, and replaces it with a government that has a higher duty to the foreign power than they do to their own populace; The despotism at work is that of the foreign power. To conduct such operations may sometimes well be necessary. But the aftermath must very much be rooted in allowing / enabling the populace to shape what comes next and for the foreigner to go home ASAP. He can always come back if need be, but to stay is to create conditions that are brutally hard to overcome.

William F. Owen
05-26-2010, 04:51 AM
To simply say violence is war, and war is a military matter, and the military's job is to crush said violence is the same supervicial analysis from the perspective of the Despot that has lead to many a long, drawnout struggle between a populace and its failed governance.
That is an over simplification of my position. Rebels seek to alter the distribution of power by violence - and other means. The job of the military is to counter that violence. How skilfully that is done pretty much defines how effective it is.

Better instead for Governance to see such movements as the clearest of metrics, the most accurate of polls, and to modify their behavior to the degree practicable to resolve their failures short of simply ramping up the oppression.
That view assumes that the Rebels always have a legitimate point that matches a position the government could take if it wished. That is almost never the case, nor is it ever likely to be.
Rebels rarely, if ever, have a legitimate cause in the eyes of the Government. That is the problem! - Moreover who is to judge legitimacy for the "Jones Model."
The primary purpose of Government is defence of the state. You have a Government so as people cannot set forth policy using violence against the state.
Rebels seek power via violence. You prevent them gaining it, via violence.

Concur completely that AQ is not an insurgent organization. After all, they have no populace, and they have no state.
Yet AQ seeks the re-distribution of power via violence. They have a policy, they aspire to a state, and they conform to a Clausewitian trinity - they do have a populace. People support them. People fund them.
They are clearly strategically inept, so I wonder why we worry so much about them.


What if the instruction given to the military force by its government is to solve the problem by any available means? Shouldn't that force be considering all means, both violent and non-violent, that might have a bearing on solving the problem?

Why should this discussion avoid political devices that might have a bearing on the problem. or be confined to the use of violence?
Well if anyone ever says "solve the problem by any available means" then they are an idiot, because that is not a setting forth of policy. That is the opposite of Strategy. You have to have a policy! That policy set conditions for the employment of force.

In Oman the Sultan, said "defeat the rebels, - so that development can begin."
In most UK insurgencies the basic guidance was "defeat the rebels - so as we can organise the peaceful transfer of power to a democratic political process."

Yes, all instrument of power should be used, but the primary aim should be ending the rebellion, by getting the rebels to give up. Then the politics can kick in.

William F. Owen
05-26-2010, 06:13 AM
Sorry, but another point I think worth considering.

Insurgencies and rebellions often see the insurgents/rebels killing a great many civilians to advance their cause. In fact I can only think of 3 insurgencies where this was not the predominately the case.

In all the Algerian insurgencies, Sierra Leone, the vast majority of dead were civilians killed by the rebels. I submit the same is most likely true in Iraq and A'Stan. It was certainly true in Malaya, Kenya, and Northern Ireland, and very many more. The NLF/VC is credited with killing vastly more Vietnamese civilians than they killed US or ARVN.

Bob's World
05-26-2010, 06:25 AM
In Oman the Sultan, said "defeat the rebels, - so that development can begin."
In most UK insurgencies the basic guidance was "defeat the rebels - so as we can organise the peaceful transfer of power to a democratic political process."

And in both of those cases, the populace's position was "throw out the Despot so that we can replace it with govnernace who's Legitimacy we recognize, who treats the populace with Respect; where the people can find Justice under the law; and where once again the people can have Hope."

I'm sorry, Great Britain is the best BAD example of COIN theory in the past 200 plus years. Their entire model is based upon sustaining in power forms of government over the populaces of others that recognizes its priority mission being to support the National interests of Great Britain. That, my friend, is not COIN. That is Colonial Oppression.

A great political cartoon would show Uncle Sam staring into his bathroom mirror preparing for his morning shave, and seeing King George staring back at him. The caption would be along the lines of :

"Holy S..t, I have grown up and become my father."

William F. Owen
05-26-2010, 06:55 AM
And in both of those cases, the populace's position was "throw out the Despot so that we can replace it with govnernace who's Legitimacy we recognize, who treats the populace with Respect; where the people can find Justice under the law; and where once again the people can have Hope."
I submit that historical fact shows the opposite.
In Oman, the populace largely rejected the communist rebels and opted for the rule of the Sultan. - not everyone wants to be a democracy.
UK policy was to divest itself of the Empire. It cost too much money and it gained little strategic benefit. WW2 confirmed the need for the process. In all but 2 cases the planned transfer of power took place on UK terms.


I'm sorry, Great Britain is the best BAD example of COIN theory in the past 200 plus years. Their entire model is based upon sustaining in power forms of government over the populaces of others that recognizes its priority mission being to support the National interests of Great Britain. That, my friend, is not COIN. That is Colonial Oppression.
Again, I submit that is not an accurate version of history. UK Colonial policy varied greatly in time and place. For example, Ireland was offered Dominion status before WW1. The situation in Kenya was very different from Cyprus. The Kenyan insurgency was tribally based and thus not legitimate in the eyes of a lot of Kenyans 15-30,000 died at the hands of the rebels as a result. The Cyprus insurgency was tied to Greek Nationalism, and not legitimate in the eyes of Turkish, etc etc etc.

Now, I will agree with you that the mean used to defeat each particular rebel group, were extremely brutal, but no more so than the means common at the time. I am no advocating brutality. I am advocating the use of armed force to defeat armed force.

Bob's World
05-26-2010, 07:23 AM
And I am advocating that Great Britain (and all of Colonial Europe for that matter) are examples of Empires that crumbled under the very tactics you profess, and that we study so closely today.

That these European Empires were born of an information age powered by the Printing Press; and succumbed to a following information age born of Steam and Electricity. Revolutions in Information technology drive revolutions in Governance. What had worked (as you often profess) forever, is now as obsolete as so many tools that lay about our grandfather's garages and sheds.

Now comes the United States on the heels of these failed Empires, in the midst of this revolution of information technology. All of the tools handed to us by our predecessors were obsolete when we received them, but there was no way to know that, as they had always worked before. Silicon Chips, satellites, etc empowered the populaces of Eastern Europe to stand up to their Soviet masters, knowing the rest of the world backed their play. Now the Middle East seeks its opportunity as well. It is as natural as the rotation of the earth, or the movements of the tides. It is human nature, and it controls us, not the other way around.

We can resist this force of nature, or we can embrace it. I argue that success comes from embracing the emerging age; and that all powers seeking to emerge will do so. History tells us that empires seeking to hold onto their gains cling to the past, and to applying force to sustain the status quo.

Your model is obsolete Mr. Owen. Like Fred Flintstone, you are riding a dinosaur to work.

William F. Owen
05-26-2010, 07:55 AM
And I am advocating that Great Britain (and all of Colonial Europe for that matter) are examples of Empires that crumbled under the very tactics you profess, and that we study so closely today.
The British Empire did not "crumble." It either altered into dominions, or was was granted independence - in the vast majority of cases, peacefully - as was the policy. The Empire ceased to exist because of politics and economics. It was not vanquished by force. In fact the exact opposite is true.

I argue that success comes from embracing the emerging age; and that all powers seeking to emerge will do so. History tells us that empires seeking to hold onto their gains cling to the past, and to applying force to sustain the status quo.
Well that's very romantic, but it's not good history. Empires come and go as a result of politics, -which sometimes includes the use of armed force, but almost never as a result of rebellions alone - in fact I cannot think of one.


Your model is obsolete Mr. Owen. Like Fred Flintstone, you are riding a dinosaur to work.
...and immensely happy to be so! Not sure that forms an argument, but certainly an amusing image. My wife recently managed to persuade someone she rode a donkey to work every morning! :eek:

Bob's World
05-26-2010, 12:19 PM
I think my assessment of history is fine, but I am open minded.

When I was with the Egyptian Army, they all believed quite seriously that they had never lost a war with Israel.

When I talk to "Good Cold Warriors" they see America as bringing nothing but goodness, democracy, and rule of law to the people of the world.

It does not surprise me then, that one with a background in Great Britain would have a similarly biased view of their own history.

If 5 SWJ members, not of the empire, come up on the net and say "yeah, Bob, the Brits really rolled up the carpet as part of a master economic plan, and not due to the populaces of places like the US, India, or Iran throwing them out; then fine, I will hit the books and drill deeper. To say you have a strategy of reducing the empire because your strategy to hold the empire failed in the face of popular revolt, does not count.

Dayuhan
05-26-2010, 12:36 PM
Silicon Chips, satellites, etc empowered the populaces of Eastern Europe to stand up to their Soviet masters, knowing the rest of the world backed their play. Now the Middle East seeks its opportunity as well. It is as natural as the rotation of the earth, or the movements of the tides. It is human nature, and it controls us, not the other way around.

The Middle East seeks the opportunity… to do what? To stand up to its masters? The Middle East hasn’t any master to stand up to. Of course they will seek to develop, emerge, and take their place in the world, why should they not? Certainly the US has no reason to try to stop them… Osama and his ilk will certainly try to abort the process, but it’s not likely that they’ll succeed: their support is just not broad enough.

The challenge the Middle East faces isn’t foreign mastery, it’s reconciling the conflicting impulses of their own populaces: some want full-on modernity, some want to retreat to the Middle Ages, some want material progress while retaining cultural traditions. Some want to maintain strong central states, some want regional autonomy… and on, and on, and on. It’s a diverse place with a lot of populaces and a lot of disagreement on direction and desired end state.

A lot of Americans misread the situation by assuming that change, progress, and emergence must necessarily mean abandonment of traditional political structures. Many Americans simply can’t imagine a government run by a King, Sheik, Emir, or Sultan that isn’t faced by a popular insurgency. It’s not something we’d accept, so we assume others shouldn’t accept it either.

Of course reality is much more complicated. Some of the more progressive and most emergent states in the Middle East are under traditional royal structures: Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE... and these governments enjoy very high levels of popular support. Some of those closest to collapse have Western-style structures, (Yemen, for one). In many cases populaces seem quite content with traditional structures, and the objections seem to come primarily from Americans who find the idea of royalty aesthetically displeasing... I can't say I find it aesthetically pleasing myself, but it's not my problem or my affair.

In any event, meddling in the internal affairs of these countries, no matter what the motive, is going to win no points with government or populace. We need to be minding our own business wherever possible, not trying to decide what constitutes good or bad governance for anyone else.

Bob's World
05-26-2010, 01:59 PM
Dayuan,

My message is to stop meddling, not to meddle. To back out of roles where we are perceived as the source of legitimacy of governments that lack popular support. As you say, many of the small oil states have a wealth to populace ratio that makes the "no taxation, no representation" model function; others, like Saudi Arabia fall farther behind every day. Then there are the countries that lack the temporary wealth of oil.

It’s complicated. You always twist my message into one of "pro manipulation", and seem to think all is calm in the Middle East. You need to study the news coming out of there more closely. Suppressed insurgencies in states with controlled media don't necessarily scream in the headlines. You have to read the signs. The Saudis have been suppressing all of their Shiite populace and large portions of their Sunni populace since inception; and in the past 60 years they have manipulated our fear of oil disruption to suit their royal needs.

Follow the trails of foreign fighters back to where they come from and then research there first. Follow the trail of AQ "terrorists" back to where they come from and research there as well. Study how those populaces perceive the legitimacy of their governments. Study how they perceive the role of the US and the West in their countries. Study how they perceive their justice systems; or if they believe there is equal opportunity for all. Study how much control or influence they believe they have over their governance or even their personal fate. We've gotten into the middle of some messy situations. I'm saying we need to back out, not dig in. Not cut and run, but cut off the blank check of blind support and urge reforms be adopted if continued support is desired.

I've always said the only perception of good or bad governance is that of the governed populace. You always try to twist that, and I don't know why.

Governance is not Poor in the Middle East in many of our allied countries because I say so, but because the young men flocking to join AQ and local insurgent movements affiliated with AQ say so. And even larger cross sections of these same societies cutting checks and providing moral support say so as well. The people have no voice, but they are voting with their actions.

William F. Owen
05-26-2010, 03:30 PM
When I was with the Egyptian Army, they all believed quite seriously that they had never lost a war with Israel.
Welcome the Middle East. We have three versions of history. Yours, ours and theirs!

It does not surprise me then, that one with a background in Great Britain would have a similarly biased view of their own history.
Welcome to Middle East...... etc etc.

If 5 SWJ members, not of the empire, come up on the net and say "yeah, Bob, the Brits really rolled up the carpet as part of a master economic plan, and not due to the populaces of places like the US, India, or Iran throwing them out; then fine, I will hit the books and drill deeper. To say you have a strategy of reducing the empire because your strategy to hold the empire failed in the face of popular revolt, does not count.

WW1 Bankrupted the Empire. There was simply no chance of holding onto it, especially as the UK had been left with policing what was left of the Ottoman Empire _ Palestine, the Trans-Jordan and Iraq. While economically of some benefit between the Wars, the Empire became "A-Strategic" after WW2. It was simply unsustainable - politically and economically.

Now you do not have to read a lot of books to see that the vast majority of Colonial possessions were transferred peacefully, and voluntarily.
Now it may be a fine line between the UK dissolving the Empire because both Political and economic circumstances made it impossible, and the issue that the UK probably could not maintain the Empire in the face of any serious opposition, even if it wanted too.

Fact is the UK policy underlying all the major post 1945 insurgencies (except Ulster) was to set the conditions for a peaceful transfer of power - and even the IRA has given up the "Armed Struggle" - in line with the UK's stated policy.
There were failures. In Aden, the UK announced a departure date, which actually made the existing insurgency worse, and the Palestine mandate was vacated with no agreement in place. Rhodesia declared UDI! - and War followed.

Bob's World
05-27-2010, 05:36 AM
Today's Development-Focused Population Centric COIN is very focused on producing effects that I would categorize as "Critical Capabilities." These are capabilities that one would expect to see as outputs of a healthy Populace-Governance relationship. I believe the rationale is that because these things are missing, there is insurgency; so if these things are provided artificially, there will be no insurgency.

I see this as applying the same logic of if one imports thousands of Toyotas, and parks them in rows, that somehow a Toyota factory will appear. Maybe it will, but to me it appears that we focus on the wrong things, that these things cost way too much, and show little promise of producing enduring effects in terms of Good Governance and stability.

The counterinsurgent approach focuses on defeating the insurgent himself. Again, as this approach does not address the root causes, and increases governmental oppression of the populace in the process, it typically merely suppresses an insurgency for some number of days, months, or years.

The Jones Model directs attention to what are admittedly broad concepts, rooted in the top end of Maslow's hierarchy. The theory being that it is abuses of these fundamental, higher order human requirements that drive a populace to insurgency (at least the leadership, the heart and soul of the movement. The rank and file will recognize these causal perceptions, but may be driven by baser issues life, survival, and raising a family).

So under the Jones Model:
1. Security operations remain a critical supporting function. Always remembering that the insurgent is part of the populace, and tailoring violence accordingly. (As ADM Olson recently announced, there must be some counterinsurgent operations in counterinsurgency).

2. "Population-Centric COIN" is fine, but it must be operationalized with a clearer understanding of the nature of Insurgency. Afghanistan is filled with well intentioned professionals and experts in a wide range of disciplines; sadly while some are newly minted "experts" on COIN, few know much about INSURGENCY. One cannot counter what one does not understand.

3. This tool provides a methodology for going after those things the Jones Model identifies as most critical to removing the causal factors of insurgency.

a. The first step is to, by focused district or area, assess and attempt to understand what the populace of that specific area's perceptions are on the 4 causal factors.

b. Step two is to then determine your CVs or those CRs that are most important to that populace and that you are most likely to be able to positively affect.

c. Step three is to then break this down in more detail by determining, across the disciplines of you COIN force, what type of engagement/projects you could specifically do designed to get directly at the CVs. In the example provided, where "justice" is lacking it is assessed that a regular, professional, fair, and assessable court system is lacking. Elements of providing this are ID'd as HVTs.

d. Step four are your HVIs (Individual people or projects) that go toward building that missing capability or capacity that is deemed most likely to address the CV of concern in that community.

e. Step five is to execute all of this in a manner that empowers the HN governance and keeps them to the forefront.

f. Step six is to continue to assess and refine and minimize external influence (by both the FID forces AND the UW forces) at every opportunity.

Updated operationalizing tool:

William F. Owen
05-27-2010, 05:59 AM
In the example provided, where "justice" is lacking it is assessed that a regular, professional, fair, and assessable court system is lacking.

OK, question: Surely if you can provide "justice" you've won, regardless of everything else. Populations support those that have power over them - "the man with a gun at their door, at midnight"-
If you are the arbiter or what is right and what is wrong and you can demonstrate that, that is power. If no one can challenge that, you are in control. People will support who ever dispenses the justice they want. Is that not the case?

Question 2: What is justice is this Power Point Slide? My guess is you mean promoting a US style form of justice, which folks will probably fight against, because if patently is not "just" in their eyes.

Bob's World
05-27-2010, 06:12 AM
All critical causal factors are as viewed from the perspective of the populace in question.

What foreigners think matters not at all; and typically the HN counterinsurgent is blind to what the populace perceives as well, so there take will lead you astray as well.

Current efforts In Population Centric COIN are on promoting "Rule of Law" - my point is that greater enforcement of a legal system percieved by the populace as unjust is tyranny.

While Taliban justice is harsh, it is, by populace assessment, perceived as more "just" than that provided by the GIROA.

So, yes, it must be the pursuit of "justice" ie, how the populace FEELS about the legal system that is the goal.

William F. Owen
05-27-2010, 06:36 AM
All critical causal factors are as viewed from the perspective of the populace in question.

What foreigners think matters not at all; and typically the HN counterinsurgent is blind to what the populace perceives as well, so there take will lead you astray as well.
As a statement in isolation, I can agree with all of that.
However you may end up supporting the mutilation of women, death sentence for minors, and Shariah Law - so essentially support the policy the population wants - the Population sets the Policy, not your CoC?

Current efforts In Population Centric COIN are on promoting "Rule of Law" - my point is that greater enforcement of a legal system percieved by the populace as unjust is tyranny.
OK, but there is never one populace with one opinion. Insurgencies/rebellions are usually the product of a minority.

While Taliban justice is harsh, it is, by populace assessment, perceived as more "just" than that provided by the GIROA.
In most cases the Taliban are the ONLY form of justice because they are the only ones doing it - thus people support it.

So, yes, it must be the pursuit of "justice" ie, how the populace FEELS about the legal system that is the goal.
So, if I may, the objective is to force into place a level of control that the population will largely accept. - thus you need to destroy the other competing forms of control?

Bob's World
05-27-2010, 07:29 AM
So, if I may, the objective is to force into place a level of control that the population will largely accept. - thus you need to destroy the other competing forms of control?


No, the objective is for the Governance of a particular populace to gain a better understanding and empathy for the concerns of their own populace; and to rededicate themselves to meeting those needs.

The insurgency and the insurgent are merely symptoms that come in many flavors. As you say popualaces are diverse. One can see this in Afghanistan as there are actually multiple insurgencies going on. But they are all in response to the failures of ONE government.

One can chase down all of the many groups that sprout up in response to percptions of poor governance within the various segments of a society; or they can fix the one root cause, the failed government itself. The engagement to work those fixes would then be tailored by the perceptions of the many different communities and populaces involved.


this whole idea of "forcing" and "controlling" strikes to my problems with UK COIN. That last real COIN in the UK was the failed effort against Oliver Cromwell in the 1600s, resulting in the execution of King Charles in 1649.

All subequent "COIN" efforts have been all about maintaining control and legitimacy over the governments of others. That is a very different game altogether. True COIN can only be done by a governemnt within its own borders, with its own populace. Once you take it next door you are doing FID or UW. Current vogue of mixing and merging these concepts is not helpful. States often force controls on the populaces of others, working through governments that they have either placed in power, or at least taken on the role of sustaining in power. THAT IS NOT COIN.

The last US COIN campaign was the government's efforts to resolve the Civil Rights movement in the 1960's.

(Of note, our kinder, gentler approach; rooted in understanding and addressing the legitimate concerns of the insurgent segment of the populace, was much more effective that applied by King Charles in England's last insurgency.)

Steve the Planner
05-27-2010, 08:21 AM
I was reading a summary of a big pow-wow at Leavenworth. The summary indicated that they needed good census data on these places.

Sorry, folks, but as a planner/demographer, I simply don't buy into a lot of this stuff about how we can re-shape major themes and events in the non-Euro, non-US spaces by rearranging deck chairs and scattering trinkets around (schools, cash, health clinics).

So much of the world, and particularly Centcom and conflict zones are undergoing massive demographic, economic and social/political transformations on an unprecedented level (for them). Populations exploding (and mostly with youngsters unprepared and unable to engage positively), populations crowding to cities (mostly slums), and face-to-face conflicts between previously rural and isolated villages and cultures with the forces of change, conflict, challenge or oppression.

Last week, I read a WP story about "honor killings" in India, and a family that is in Indian courts now to challenge the practices, after their child was killed for marrying out of love, but against the village elders' "accepted" ancient wisdoms. Even India is decades away from coming to terms with all these issues, as populations press against each other, new versus old cultures collide, and ancient farming techniques come face to face with genetically altered seeds, high-growth production techniques, localized water catastrophies emerging because of the new practices, and old fashioned farmers being driven to suicide due to borrowing to stay competitive with the new techniques.

This is down-right tough stuff, being boiled down in the soup of these populations. Massive new challenges they are trying to sort out (some running for the cover of ancient ways, some deathly fearful of outside influences, and some marching to a new and different tune). Amongst it all, money lenders, schemers, and scammers of every kind are emerging. It only gets worse in immediate post-conflict phases where populations have been shattered by displacements and refugee flows, and "good governance" vanished when pre-existing village and tribal structures collapsed, giving way to gangsters and grafters.

These nasty, brutish conflicts are playing themselves out on a very large scale, and will continue to until, as Dayuhan suggests, they find their way through it. It has nothing to do with COIN, and COIN offers little or nothing to it. At best, in my opinion, the COINISTA thought leadership is just a bunch of ex-soldiers with little serious training in the relevant subject fields, trying to draw quickie inferences for highly complex problems being their grasp or appreciation.

Oh, that's right, Afghanistan is somewhere in there, but compounded by extensive foreign and extra-territorial factors.

Like WILFs comment, the British Empire gave way when the economics changed. They made a fortune for centuries, and ended it when it didn't work anymore. Is the UK really any worse off for having done so? In the big scheme, they have done pretty well for themselves in adapting to modern times, while still giving a nod to limited foreign exploits grounded in that old history (keeping the old folks happy). There is a lesson in that.

Iraq is a very different country, generally on the way to modernization, but in need of serious post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction. Like it or not, even as a post-conflict success story, Iraq, because of its history, culture and geography, will, like Iran, straddle an unique set of challenges that will always drive others a little crazy.

This is not the same problem set as Afghanistan and its comparable environments who are all in the midst of profound demographic, economic and social changes.

slapout9
05-27-2010, 08:44 AM
All subequent "COIN" efforts have been all about maintaining control and legitimacy over the governments of others. That is a very different game altogether. True COIN can only be done by a governemnt within its own borders, with its own populace. Once you take it next door you are doing FID or UW. Current vogue of mixing and merging these concepts is not helpful. States often force controls on the populaces of others, working through governments that they have either placed in power, or at least taken on the role of sustaining in power. THAT IS NOT COIN.



BW, so we (USA) are either doing FID or UW because it is literally impossible for a foreign power to do COIN?

Bob's World
05-27-2010, 10:39 AM
BW, so we (USA) are either doing FID or UW because it is literally impossible for a foreign power to do COIN?

"COIN" is just a fancy word for a government doing the best it can to support its own populace. As day to day governance grows more and more out of touch with its populace the populace discontent grows as well, manifesting in subversion and, if left unchecked, ultimately insurgency.

The role of the Government never changes, it is to govern. It is to provide Good Governance. We call that COIN when it is done in the face of growing insurgency. When someone comes in to help you govern, they are "helping with COIN" We call that FID, or IDAD or a variety of things. Too often of late we call it COIN, and push the primary provider aside, because A. we think we can do it better, or faster; and B. because if it’s the same mission, what does it matter who leads?

Because who leads is an essential factor of effective COIN!

Steve the Planner says "Hey England exploited the globe until it was no longer in there interest to do so, so they then just tossed those used and abused populaces aside of their own volition and look, it was all great for England." What about those populaces???? Was it great for them too??

Virtually all of the insurgencies of the past 100 years have been rooted in populaces risking everything to rid themselves of such benevolent European Colonial rule. Oh, sure, England brought them European technologies, and governance; and also exploitation, slavery and disease and the right to be treated as a second class citizen in your own land.

I hear Americans making the same arguments today, how American exploitation brings technology, governance, the rule of law. But it brings those same humiliating second order effects as well. Until we can walk in the shoes of those whose lands we work our national interests in, and treat them with the same respect we treat our own citizenry with, there will be movements to throw off the governments we put in place, or sustain in place over the will of the governed. More and more as the world becomes more globalized and connected those populaces will seek to travel to the homes of those who oppress them and strike them there.

Even now we call those states that dare to reject European forms of governance as "failed states". Read Foreign Policy. Read their definition of a "Failed State." Pure Western arrogance. We define failed as a rejection of doing it our way.

Until you can develop empathy, you cannot understand insurgency. Until you understand insurgency, you cannot understand counterinsurgency. Until you understand counterinsurgency, you cannot effectively travel to the land of another and help him effectively with his insurgency.

Most need to start at square one. Develop empathy.

Bob's World
05-27-2010, 10:58 AM
Go to the link below. Just look at the map for a while. As you look at the map, ask yourself, how many of these states that are deemed most troubled have "benefited" from Colonialism?

Look at the factors of "failure"
1. How many are capabilities that we see as critical aspects of Westphalian sovereignty? How many of those same factors were important to those populaces givern the forms of governance they have employed for centuries prior to Western intervention? Are they "failing" or are they evolving to find a form of governance better suited for the populaces being governned?

2. Of the remaining factors, how many are typical of insurgency? How many of these states have leaders that were either selected by foreign powers, or sustained by foreign powers?

3. Of those with "failure", how many have borders drawn by others, and populaces either separated or cobbled together by others?

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_ranki ngs


Q: What does "state failure" mean?

A: A state that is failing has several attributes. One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. The 12 indicators cover a wide range of elements of the risk of state failure, such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay. States can fail at varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion over different time periods.

William F. Owen
05-27-2010, 11:12 AM
"
Steve the Planner says "Hey England exploited the globe until it was no longer in there interest to do so, so they then just tossed those used and abused populaces aside of their own volition and look, it was all great for England." What about those populaces???? Was it great for them too??
No it was not great for them and in a few places they did not want the UK to leave. Generally things went downhill. So what? UK policy is for the furthering of UK interests.

Virtually all of the insurgencies of the past 100 years have been rooted in populaces risking everything to rid themselves of such benevolent European Colonial rule.
OK, let us just assume that might be correct. Does it include the Native Americans? but so what? What causes Revolts and Rebellions is a desire to alter the distribution of political power using violence. Same, same, 3,500 years or more. Policy usually demands that any attempt to do so be resisted, not accommodated or rewarded.

If I understand you correctly Bob, your thesis is rooted in the idea, that if someone takes up arms against a government, they have a good cause and it's the fault of the goverment?

Bob's World
05-27-2010, 12:08 PM
Close, but not just anyone.

If a significant distinct segment of a populace does, with the armed aspect being much like the above surface portion of an iceburg, yes. It is the duty and the right of such a populace to rise up in insurgency when the govenance is perceived as despotic by them.

If it's a handful of wingnuts without broad popular support, no.

Does the state have the legal right to suppress a populace exercising this moral right? Yes as well.

But if the state wants to resolve the problem in the best way possible they will recognize their own shortcomings and address them. Too often the state just hides behind it's legal rightness and simply suppresses those who dare to complain. This is the most common form of COIN, and it is bad COIN. It merely suppresses the inevitable, and promotes despotism and governmental arrogance.

We can be smarter, we can be better. In the emerging world where individuals are more impowered than every before we MUST be better and smarter. Before you could get away with it. Now you can't.

Steve Blair
05-27-2010, 02:22 PM
OK, let us just assume that might be correct. Does it include the Native Americans? but so what? What causes Revolts and Rebellions is a desire to alter the distribution of political power using violence. Same, same, 3,500 years or more. Policy usually demands that any attempt to do so be resisted, not accommodated or rewarded.

I honestly don't think you can include the Native Americans in an insurgency discussion, at least not in a blanket sense. You could make that argument in certain locations and during specific time frames, but that's about it. The Modoc War, many of the Apache excursions after about 1875, and the Crow Uprising would certainly qualify...but that's under my own interpretation of the Indian Wars (which considers something a possible insurgency after a tribe had been shifted to a reservation).

William F. Owen
05-27-2010, 02:47 PM
I honestly don't think you can include the Native Americans in an insurgency discussion, at least not in a blanket sense. You could make that argument in certain locations and during specific time frames, but that's about it. The Modoc War, many of the Apache excursions after about 1875, and the Crow Uprising would certainly qualify...but that's under my own interpretation of the Indian Wars (which considers something a possible insurgency after a tribe had been shifted to a reservation).
Steve, actually I do not necessarily disagree with your point. I try not to use the word "Insurgency". Rebellions and Revolts are far more accurate. Were there armed uprisings by Native Americans? If so, then I submit that they would be in that category.

The US did actually come into conflict with the Sioux Nation, as the UK did with the Zulu Nation. These were actually de-facto nation states, but the "warfare" was arguably Irregular in nature. Again and again, I am at a loss to understand why calling something an "Insurgency" or saying "COIN" brings any benefit.

Steve Blair
05-27-2010, 02:55 PM
Wilf,

The instances I mentioned could be considered rebellions in that the tribes in question had been settled on reservations prior to the conflicts. For me the precise line of demarcation is the establishment of a reservation (and that's also based on how the Army tended to approach the situation).

The Sioux were one of many tribes engaged by the U.S. military (and using the term "nation" for the Sioux is rather misleading...it could perhaps better be applied to the Kiowa or many of the Eastern tribes), and were not necessarily the most powerful.

I could ramble on and on about this stuff, but I'll stop now.

Bob's World
05-27-2010, 04:00 PM
For what it's worth on the indian stuff; our GWOT strategy is almost a direct lift from our strategy for subduing the Sioux. Pick a leader for them, expect them to govern and live like us, then label anyone who refuses to confrom to our wishes as a "terrorist" and conduct capture/kill operations on them.

Otherwise, I'm with Steve, an insurgency implies a rebellion by the populace of a state to challenge it's own governance. The Native Americans had their own Governance, and their own concepts of what their territories were. The fact that some white guys had drawn lines on a map and determined that they lay within the US was moot to them. Much more state on state warfare; though obviously the cultures had very different perspectives on what that meant, to the demise of the Indians.

Steve Blair
05-27-2010, 04:30 PM
For what it's worth on the indian stuff; our GWOT strategy is almost a direct lift from our strategy for subduing the Sioux. Pick a leader for them, expect them to govern and live like us, then label anyone who refuses to confrom to our wishes as a "terrorist" and conduct capture/kill operations on them.

We'd tried that with other tribes before and after the Sioux, with mixed success. FWIW, the technique worked best (and that's a relative term) with tribes like the Kiowa who had their own fairly developed political infrastructure (although it didn't work along our lines, it was close enough for early officers and agents to manipulate) and failed horribly when applied to tribes without that framework (the Apache peoples spring first to mind, although the Comanche had a similar loose clan-like structure). And even with the Kiowa, there was a lack of understanding of the social structure that underpinned the politics, which contributed in no small measure to the 1874 Red River War.

slapout9
05-27-2010, 04:32 PM
Point one is that "the source of governance" as well as how governance is sustained in power are the keys to the critical causal factor of "Legitimacy." If the populace does not recognize either one you are on the fast track to insurgency. When Regime change by a foreign power occurs their is a presumption of illegitimacy that is virtually possible to overcome.

Point two. Insurgent leaders are not "ideologically driven"; they are politically driven and use ideology to motivate and drive the masses to support their political goals. Not saying their ideology is not often very important to them, it just isn't what drives them.


BW, I think you meant to say virtually IM-possible did you not? Which is more in line with what I learned years ago. The cause(will of the populace) has to come from the indigenous population it cannot be manufactured or inserted by a foreign government, but it can be discovered by a foreign government and then supported to enable the establishment of good government based of the consent of the governed. But consent can not be based on force or fraud or the insurgency will flair up again.

Bob's World
05-27-2010, 04:41 PM
BW, I think you meant to say virtually IM-possible did you not? Which is more in line with what I learned years ago. The cause(will of the populace) has to come from the indigenous population it cannot be manufactured or inserted by a foreign government, but it can be discovered by a foreign government and then supported to enable the establishment of good government based of the consent of the governed. But consent can not be based on force or fraud or the insurgency will flair up again.

Yes, Impossible.

As an aside, during QDR one of the service reps (Brigadier) in the session I was in, tried to put "regime change" on the table as a future mission that we needed to resource and train to. Thankfully he was roundly shot down and told to purge the term from his vocabulary.

Infanteer
05-27-2010, 06:32 PM
Even now we call those states that dare to reject European forms of governance as "failed states". Read Foreign Policy. Read their definition of a "Failed State." Pure Western arrogance. We define failed as a rejection of doing it our way.

Would you regard Barnett's notion of "Core" and "Gap" states as a sign of this western arrogance?


Until you can develop empathy, you cannot understand insurgency. Until you understand insurgency, you cannot understand counterinsurgency. Until you understand counterinsurgency, you cannot effectively travel to the land of another and help him effectively with his insurgency.

Perhaps we're guilty of "Situating the Estimate" then? We've chosen to take Northern Afghan rejection of the Taliban as a sign that a Western-backed Karzai (and the warlord) coalition would be a suitable alternative and that if we just "do COIN properly" then it should work?

It's hard to empathise one's way out of "Whenever these strange Christian soldiers come around, I get s##t on by my neighbours because it'll either provoke the local yokals to fight or worse, everyone will think I'm on their side".

Entropy
05-27-2010, 07:33 PM
Col. Jones,


No, the objective is for the Governance of a particular populace to gain a better understanding and empathy for the concerns of their own populace; and to rededicate themselves to meeting those needs.

You can't have justice or governance without control. Justice, for instances, is about picking winners and losers and if you don't have power to enforce decisions (and prevent other justice systems from enforcing theirs) then it isn't justice or governance. As I said before, I think control/power is a necessary element of legitimacy. And while we do want government to be responsive to the needs of the populace, there are limits to this. Governments, for instance, rarely give up control of a population even if that would be in that population's best interest. This is not necessarily despotism since the government may genuinely believe that keeping that population under their control is for the best.

Similarly, what if the concern of the populace is for the governance to GTFO? What if the populace doesn't want your governance - what if they want someone elses or their own? Since your model places complete responsibility on the governance and not on the populace, how can better governance fill this kind of "need?"

This brings me back to a subject I keep raising: irreconcilable differences between two or more populations under a one system of governance. I don't think you've answered yet, but I am still wondering how you account for that.

Consider separatist insurgencies, which you've talked a bit about elsewhere. If minority ethnicity X does not want to live under a government controlled by majority ethnicity Y, then how can "better governance" solve that disconnect?


The insurgency and the insurgent are merely symptoms that come in many flavors. As you say popualaces are diverse. One can see this in Afghanistan as there are actually multiple insurgencies going on. But they are all in response to the failures of ONE government.

After some additional thought, I see a major flaw in your model in that it doesn't account for where governance takes place. In reality, there is rarely ONE government. Where governance occurs within a system of governance matters, so perhaps governance is best seen as a system.

Consider the US experience and the constant tension between local, state and federal power and authority. Additionally, what counts for "governance" for one population is, for a different population, handled through non-governmental means (such as religious institutions).

Your model appears to treat highly centralized and highly decentralized governance equally.

Also, I think your views expressed here on the relationship between governance and the populace has the effect of infantilizing the populace. You've explicitly stated that the governance is wholly responsible for the governance provided. However, in the absence of governance, a population will create its own system so how can the population hold no responsibility? Here's where I see a major internal disconnect in your arguments. On one hand, you've compellingly argued about self-determination and the centrality of the populace. On the other hand, you seem to argue that that the populace isn't responsible for their governance and that effective governance is best delivered through a technocratic top-down approach by determining what the populace wants and then providing that want.

Steve the Planner
05-28-2010, 12:52 AM
Entropy:

You are sticking your toe into the waters of the real Afghanistan---a decentralized amalgamation of numerous competing groups with long-standing conflicts, vendettas, and histories.

Back, of course, to the fact that we really don't know much about these places or the dynamics of the Country as a whole. A bunch of hillbillies wandering around thinking they are building a nation.

I find it more interesting, whenever possible through news sources, to follow the rest of Afghanistan---the places and people not paralyzed by conflict, and gradually capturing the lion's share of forward momentum---not the Pashtuns.

Granted, Pashtuns may be a majority, but if disabled by conflict, corruption, or whatever, their stock is in serious relative decline while the stock of others grows.

Look at the plight and condition of Kurds after the Anfal. Everything was destroyed, and tens of thousands of teachers, nurses and engineers were dead and buried in mass graves. But, by 2008, Kurdistan was on a roll, while the rest of Iraq was in turmoil. Now, the Kurds' relative position is greatly advanced compared to the rest of Iraq---creating a whole new level of potential instability.

Taking away the US payola gangs, and leaving the Pashtun areas to their own devices, they will very shortly be facing a very different "rest of Afghanistan" that is increasingly becoming educated, urbanized, and linked to international trade patterns. When does this inevitable fracture come to a head? After the Taliban game comes to rest.

A post-conflict Afghanistan simply won't waste operating and capital investments in places where things are unwanted, likely to be destroyed, or closed. The money will rapidly flow elsewhere.

These exercises have little to do with real government because they have little to do with actual economics, politics or culture. Development only becomes real when actual folks with skin in the game have to make choices and their own investments, for realistic expectations of profits (not just grafting an aid program).

The current civ-mil structure is focused on conflict, and conflict remediation in targeted conflict areas. Very different than a credible national engagement process.

Dayuhan
05-28-2010, 01:01 AM
My message is to stop meddling, not to meddle.


I refer to this:


First is to assess every nation with which the U.S. engages for how the major groupings within their populace perceive their own governance in terms of Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and Hope. Second is to ensure that the form of U.S. engagement is designed so as to be least likely to create perceptions of preemption of Legitimacy by the U.S. (remembering that this is as viewed through the eyes of those populaces; need only be perception and not fact; and that the perception of U.S. policy makers as to the intent and nature of said engagement is completely immaterial). Lastly is to encourage Hope; to tell the people of the world not to despair, while at the same time applying carrots and sticks as required to the governments of the same to engage their populaces and to make reasonable accommodations on terms acceptable within their unique cultures, to give the people a legal means to voice their concerns.


That, to me, is an open prescription for meddling. When we bring out the carrots and the sticks to get others to do what we think they ought to do, that's interference in the internal affairs of others. That's meddling.

I do believe that the Jones Model is an accurate description of many (not all) insurgencies, and that it can be a useful tool. It can also be a very dangerous tool, because it is so easy to interpret it as a justification to interfere: they need better governance, they don't seem able to deliver it themselves, we'd better go and help them, or do it for them. There's a very strong suggestion here that interference is acceptable - and even desirable - as long as it's "good" interference.



I've always said the only perception of good or bad governance is that of the governed populace. You always try to twist that, and I don't know why.


Why is very simple: the moment we speak of good or bad governance, we impose our own standards and our own values. When we assess we do it through our lens, with our prejudices and our assumptions. We can't do it any other way. We don't know what any other populace thinks or wants. We can't know, we're not them. Sure, there are people who claim to speak for the populace. Often there are lots of them, all saying something different. The guy with the loudest voice doesn't necessarily speak for the populace. The guy with a bomb doesn't necessarily speak for the populace.

Certainly in some circumstances we can deduce that a populace is upset, but the moment we set about trying to ascertain why they are upset or what needs to be done about it, we invariably bring our own perceptions and our own prejudices to the table.

What I see you recommending above is that we should assess another nation's internal politics, we should decide what we think is bothering the populace, and we should pressure that government to do what we think is needed to improve its relations with its own populace. There's a whole lot of "we" in that picture.



Follow the trails of foreign fighters back to where they come from and then research there first. Follow the trail of AQ "terrorists" back to where they come from and research there as well. Study how those populaces perceive the legitimacy of their governments. Study how they perceive the role of the US and the West in their countries. Study how they perceive their justice systems; or if they believe there is equal opportunity for all. Study how much control or influence they believe they have over their governance or even their personal fate. We've gotten into the middle of some messy situations.

I don't see the foreign fighter picture as being terribly relevant. You can't deduce an insurgent population from a few hundred angry young men, and if we assume that the foreign fighters speak for the populace, we push assumption beyond rational bounds.

The assumption that foreign fighters are fighting because of what they perceive to be malicious US influence in their own countries is not entirely compatible with evidence. For one thing, substantial numbers of foreign fighters come from countries (Libya and Syria) where the US has no significant presence and with which the US has had a generally antagonistic relationship. On top of that, we have already seen that AQ was able to successfully recruit foreign fighters for their jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which had nothing whatsoever to do with the US. In short, I think you're seeing a backlash against the US because that conclusion is compatible with your assumptions. All I can deduce from the foreign fighter issue is that the "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative still has sufficient legs to recruit a few hundred people across the Muslim world to fight, regardless of what specific infidel is involved. I see no reason at all to assume a US-specific cause. If we want to resolve the foreign fighter problem we don't have to make everyone in the Muslim world like us, we have to wind up our involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. They can't travel to join the fight if there's no fight for them to join.



I'm saying we need to back out, not dig in. Not cut and run, but cut off the blank check of blind support and urge reforms be adopted if continued support is desired.


Where does this "blank check of blind support" exist?

I think you drastically overrate the ability of the US to promote reform by threatening to withdraw support. As I said above, it won't work in Libya or Syria, because they don't get any US support. It won't work in Saudi Arabia either; they don't receive or require assistance from the US... if anything, we need assistance from them. Even where US assistance is substantial (Egypt, Yemen) the degree of reform that could be generated by a threat to withdraw aid is highly debatable. The use of aid conditionality as a tool to press for reform is nothing new, it's been tried many times, generally with mixed results, and it's been debated in the aid community for a long time. It's not necessarily a bad idea, but it's not a panacea either... and of course it can achieve nothing in states that don't get US aid.

I think overall you're assuming that the US has far more influence in these environments than it actually does. Overestimating one's own influence is often risky.

Dayuhan
05-28-2010, 01:02 AM
You always twist my message into one of "pro manipulation", and seem to think all is calm in the Middle East. You need to study the news coming out of there more closely. Suppressed insurgencies in states with controlled media don't necessarily scream in the headlines. You have to read the signs. The Saudis have been suppressing all of their Shiite populace and large portions of their Sunni populace since inception; and in the past 60 years they have manipulated our fear of oil disruption to suit their royal needs.


As I said before, I see a strong suggestion in your model, sometimes openly stated, that manipulation is desirable as long as we think that manipulation is in support of the populace... given our inability to know what the populace thinks or wants, that seems a very shaky idea to me.

I didn't say that all is calm in the Middle East. I do not see a broad pattern of resistance against (generally nonexistent) US influence, and I do not see a broad pattern of resistance to autocratic governance structures. I see a large number of countries, each trying to balance competing imperatives from various segments of its populace. Some do it well, some do it less well. It is rarely so simple as "unified populace rebels against despotic bad governance".

The whole issue of suppressed insurgency is I think debatable: an insurgency with real popular support is not so easy to suppress. I get the feeling that you're looking at governments that by your standards deserve an insurgency, and assuming that if there isn't one it must be suppressed.



Governance is not Poor in the Middle East in many of our allied countries because I say so, but because the young men flocking to join AQ and local insurgent movements affiliated with AQ say so. And even larger cross sections of these same societies cutting checks and providing moral support say so as well. The people have no voice, but they are voting with their actions.

Please note that AQ has only succeeded in generating substantial support in cases where resistance to foreign intervention is involved: against the Soviets in Afghanistan, against the US in Iraq and Afghanistan. AQ's efforts to generate insurgency against governments in Muslim states have generally fallen pretty flat: AQ does not speak for the populace of Saudi Arabia, or any other populace. This suggests that the narrative driving AQ's recruitment and fund-raising is not "overthrow the despotic governance of your country and replace it with our even more despotic governance" but rather "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful". Many in the ME are perfectly happy to support AQ when they are battling foreign invaders in distant lands. When there's a prospect of AQ imposing their own brand of despotism at home, the reaction is very different. You're right, they are voting with their actions. They're voting against foreign engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they are voting for themselves, not on behalf of a populace. Jumping from there to the idea that they are voting against bad governance in their own countries is an assumption with very shaky support.

I see the following weaknesses in the Jones Model:

1. There seems to be an assumption that all violence against a state is a backlash against despotic bad governance. That may be the case in some places, but it is not necessarily the case in all. In some cases violence against government can be a consequence of good governance: reforms or modernization that are desired by a majority can invoke a violent backlash from a disaffected minority.

We have to be very careful about assuming that terrorist violence is the outcome of popular resistance to despotic governance. Because terrorism lends itself to application by small groups of radicals with little popular support, it is often used by such groups. If Timothy McVeigh had the capacity to raise an insurgency or to draw a million supporters to march on Washington, he'd have done it. He didn't have that kind of support, so he blew up a building. That didn't make him a spokesperson for an insurgent populace, it made him a fringe nutter with a bomb.

We have to be very careful about assuming that violence is a popular backlash against bad governance. When we deal with a government that we are predisposed to dislike, we need to be triply careful about assuming that our prejudices are shared by the populace. We can't eliminate our prejudices, but if we're aware of them we can prevent them from controlling us.

2. You seem to use "bad governance" and "despotism" almost interchangeably. I don't see that bad governance is necessarily despotic: it may simply be inept or impotent. Insurgency can result from a popular backlash against a despotic government; it can just as easily result from conflict between different populaces with radically different ideas of what governance should be, and from government's inability to effectively manage divergent goals.

3. I see a tendency to assume that all governments can govern well if only they choose to, and thus that external pressure can force governments to choose to govern well. I think this fails to consider the process by which governance grows. When we see a government that governs well and suits the populaces it governs, it doesn't mean that this governance was well installed by some deus ex machina process, or that those who govern simply chose to govern well. It means that this government evolved to suit the conditions in which it governs. The process of this evolution often - in fact almost always - involves conflict and disagreement. It typically involves violence at some stage. It is not a process that can be jump-started or short-circuited by a foreign power telling the locals how to govern themselves or how to please their populace. They have to work it out themselves. The process is likely to be messy, just as it was for the US. What we see as an insurgency against a despotic government is likely one step along that evolutionary path. Messing with it, whether out of self-interest or imagined altruism, is generally going to make it worse.

Steve the Planner
05-28-2010, 01:37 AM
Dahuyan:

What I keep coming back to is the fact that, when you burn it down, our civilian-military foreign engagement tools, tactics and strategies, are, in my opinion, out of kilter with the real world they are trying to engage with.

Personally, I see lots of points of positive engagements in so many places and circumstances, but they all seem to be roads not taken because they don't fit the tools we brought to the assignment.

Where is the evidence for success in any of the paths we are taking?

Now, Bob raised the issue of good vs. bad COIN, with much of the bad COIN seeming to fit within your model of contention--piecemeal, external meddling in matters outside our capabilities and proper sphere of engagement.

Let's help the marble companies in Jalalabad to improve the quality, accessibility and market linkages to broader markets, and help get nuts to markets that want nuts by assisting in overcoming the constraints of conflict (express flights to India?), but what does this have to do with the US military?

More prosperity will promote better governance and the ability to extend the writ of government, but only secondarily, and based on local choices and practical, sustainable local economics.

It's just silly to hear the DoS vs. DoD arguments about light and power for Kandahar. Who is going to pay for this if there is no local, national structure to operate and charge for services that folks can afford?

How did mission creep, or mission creeps, divert the Kandahar problem definitions away from the big picture (AWK) to tangential trinkets light street lighting? When was the US military or NG ever called in to wire a city? What is all this crap about? If AWK still rules Kandahar, which has no effective judges or justice, what are we really hoping to accomplish? Support for AWK?

The sad part of this is watching Obama set his clock for withdrawal based on the failures of DoD to deliver what it promised in October. He was trying to give them enough rope to tie up the bad guys, but it increasingly looks like they are getting tangled in the rope.

Alexander's skill was in cutting the Gordian Knot (usually by effective targeted battles, diplomacy and marriage). Where is an Alexander?

Bob's comment about "backing out," is, by default, what is in the cards, but why couldn't we do more with the resources we were given to leave a slightly better place?

slapout9
05-28-2010, 02:09 AM
1. There seems to be an assumption that all violence against a state is a backlash against despotic bad governance. That may be the case in some places, but it is not necessarily the case in all. In some cases violence against government can be a consequence of good governance: reforms or modernization that are desired by a majority can invoke a violent backlash from a disaffected minority.



That is very true, when good governance takes hold the rich and powerful will loose some of their wealth and power in pursuit of justice for all. The rich elite are not interested in justice or legitimacy for anyone but themselves. And before they loose their power and wealth they may become very violent. And they have the capacity to disguise that it is actually them doing the violence. That doesn't mean you shouldn't go ahead and establish justice and legitimacy but you must be prepared for some nasty blow back.

Bob's World
05-28-2010, 02:27 AM
All of this is complex stuff. The Model I have worked up is intentionally designed to provide a simple, general framework to help sort through all of that complexity to focus on what is really important.

Also obvious, is that we all look at these problems through our own lenses, burdened by our own baggage. I certainly include myself in that assessment.

Take Wilf for example (please, god help me, somebody take Wilf!!:D ) We all know that he sees insurgency as war, and that popular discontent is only insurgency once it goes violent. At which point the military is sent in to defeat the violence. No more "insurgency." On the Jones mode I recognize that all of this happens on a continuum; and that there are, I believe, common factors, (as measured by the populaces perception, and yes, Dayuan, at some point one does have to make an assessment themselves of how it is they understand that popular perception to be).

So as governance gets more "Poor" the natural trend is for violence to rise. A leader of the dissident groups may opt for a non-violent approach, as Dr Maria Stephan advocates in her work. History shows that it is twice as likely to produce change where no legal means for change exists than violent approaches are. Or a governmental leader may have such charisma, like Mr. Obama, that the populace is temporarily satisfied with what would otherwise be assessed as poor; or greater external threats, like a WWII going on, may cause a populace to accept greater poorness; or the military may suppress violence and create a perception of goodness.

So, yes, the British Empire was very much an economic empire, of which the US Empire is derived. Cost/Benefit analysis and spread sheets driving decisions. Did the China or India become less productive? Did the Middle East begin to produce less oil or the Suez canal become less important? Did the American Colonies become less productive and show less potential? No on all counts. Sure, not all moved all the way up the Jones model into full blown, in your face classic insurgency. Some only moved so far as to make the Juice no longer worth the proverbial Squeeze. The Costs of occupation exceeded the Benefit of Occupation. Certainly factors at home, like the great costs and disruptions of WWI and II factor in, but if the colony could have contributed to digging out of the hole it would have been retained. Those major disruptions served to shift the equation adequately so as to allow the suppressed to make the cost exceed the benefit and prevail.

Now, Dayuhan says how can Saudi Arabia (The decisive point for GWOT IMO) be brought into such conversations, they receive no support from the US, the opposite is true he says. Really? The Saudis sell us discount oil in exchange for our commitment to defend them against all threats, foreign and domestic?? I know the Gulf War was a while ago, but I still remember. The Saudis have three great fears: 1. Iran. 2. Shia in general, but particularly the large oppressed Shia populace whose lands lay within Saudi Arabia atop half of their oil. 3 There entire oppressed populace as a whole. When it comes to countering insurgency, the Saudis never let the grass grow too tall. The should be pros at this, they have been doing it since their inception. Now they get to do it with the full blessing and sanction of the US because they call it "counterterrorism."


Now, entropy points out the importance of control. But I think you really need to assess just what you mean by control. Is control the ability of the state to prevent popular action, or is control the willingness of the populace to submit to government policy and rules????

Does a jockey "control" his horse? Yes, but the horse could turn and kill the jockey whenever it chose to do so.

Does a single police officer in an intersection "control" traffic? Yes, but again, only so long as the populace driving the cars consents to submit to his rules.

Bottom line is that control is a tenuous thing, and is really more of a misnomer than most of us probably think about when we use the word. I am sure I could plot another line on my model to show how much effort must be exerted by a government to "control" as governance moves from "Goodness" to "Badness."

Oh, and yes, I do use "Despotism" interchangeably with "Poor Governance." I am a huge fan of the American story, of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution and our Bill of Rights. These documents are ground zero for anyone who wants to study Insurgency and COIN. If they are not on your shelf next to your Galua and Kitson, you missing some critical links in your chain of knowledge.

The US was born of insurgency. We formally recognize the duty and right of a populace to rise up in insurgency when faced with Despotism. Powerful stuff. Then we added a Bill of Rights that when one reads with the eyes of an insurgent/counterinsurgent, one sees how it was designed to specifically prevent a government from doing things that were key to the causal perceptions of Poor Governance going into the revolt with England; and also in preserving key powers and rights in the populace to allow them to always be so informed, so strong, as to keep any government in check.

Good input guys.

Entropy
05-28-2010, 03:17 AM
Col. Jones,

By "control" I generally mean the ability to enforce your governance (whatever it is) and prevent competitors. In your example it's not enough, in my view, to simply provide a justice system - even one that's perceived as superior to the Taliban's - one must also have the capacity to enforce adherence to that system's decisions as well as to credibly prevent competition ranging from vigilantism to a full-blown shadow government.

In other words, building a system of justice is not the same thing as actually providing justice. For the latter you need much more than judicial institutions. "If you build it, they will come" does not apply.

We can build courthouses, we can train people to operate a judicial system and teach them the concepts of law, etc. All that is wasted if the Taliban can come in, post a bunch of night letters and assassinate a few judges as examples. If you can't prevent the Taliban from doing that, then what credibility do you have with the populace? Why should they trust your justice system if you can't even do that?

So I'm skeptical that it's possible to focus on one discrete part of government (ie. Justice) and work only on that. I'm skeptical that one government good can be singled out and improved or implemented without improving the governance system more generally. Governance is probably more interrelated that it initially appears.

slapout9
05-28-2010, 04:07 AM
We can build courthouses, we can train people to operate a judicial system and teach them the concepts of law, etc. All that is wasted if the Taliban can come in, post a bunch of night letters and assassinate a few judges as examples. If you can't prevent the Taliban from doing that, then what credibility do you have with the populace? Why should they trust your justice system if you can't even do that?



That is one point where the old Special Forces model would be superior to what is being done today. WE (USA) wouldn't being building, doing or fighting anybody or anyone except in immediate self defense. WE would be teaching the Afghans to do it through Guerrilla forces-CA units-and PSYOPS. If the Taliban showed up with a night letter they would get their throat cut by an.....Afghan village resistance fighter..... not a US soldier. In the old school the US wouldn't even use a term like "winning" because the mission is to teach the indigenous population to win not for us (USA) to win because if we did it would destroy the credibility of the local government. My 2 cents.

Bob's World
05-28-2010, 06:31 AM
Col. Jones,

By "control" I generally mean the ability to enforce your governance (whatever it is) and prevent competitors. In your example it's not enough, in my view, to simply provide a justice system - even one that's perceived as superior to the Taliban's - one must also have the capacity to enforce adherence to that system's decisions as well as to credibly prevent competition ranging from vigilantism to a full-blown shadow government.

In other words, building a system of justice is not the same thing as actually providing justice. For the latter you need much more than judicial institutions. "If you build it, they will come" does not apply.

We can build courthouses, we can train people to operate a judicial system and teach them the concepts of law, etc. All that is wasted if the Taliban can come in, post a bunch of night letters and assassinate a few judges as examples. If you can't prevent the Taliban from doing that, then what credibility do you have with the populace? Why should they trust your justice system if you can't even do that?

So I'm skeptical that it's possible to focus on one discrete part of government (ie. Justice) and work only on that. I'm skeptical that one government good can be singled out and improved or implemented without improving the governance system more generally. Governance is probably more interrelated that it initially appears.

Read the paper. There are 4 causal perceptions as assessed through the eyes of the populace. Does the populace perceive that the system of law as applied to them to be just. In the example the way determined to help build this perception is through providing quality justice workers, retaining them through good pay, keeping them safe in secure homes and offices, and putting them where the populace has access. It's just an example, not a universal cure for perceptions of injustice. You must assess all perceptions and strive to work all of them.

I would argue, however that you have "control" as a first order effect or even a task; whereas I see it as a second order effect. So you might put is in the CR box, I would have it in the CC box. IF one can produce Good Governance, then one will have "control" over their populace. One can have very Poor Governance indeed, and exert extreme control (task) over the populace to keep them in line. That is no state I want to live in. You just described a dictatorship. Oh, like the Saudis. They control the populace. No place I'd want to be a citizen of.

Here in Afghanistan we don't focus on building perceptions of Justice, in fact we are focusing on imposing "Rule of Law" instead. God how I hate that phrase, and I am a former Prosecutor. It smacks of the "control" you speak of. I for one do not want to live in a state that exists to control my behavior. Obviously they all do to some degree, or it is Anarchy, but it is all in the degree and the means applied. Good Governance is a nuance one must always be tuned into, or you can quickly find that what once worked is no longer producing the same effect and you are slipping in the wrong direction.

Dayuhan
05-28-2010, 09:07 AM
at some point one does have to make an assessment themselves of how it is they understand that popular perception to be).

Of course we make assessments. When we propose to act on those assessments, though, we do well to remind ourselves that we are acting on our own assessments, which are colored by our own prejudices and preconceptions. We are not acting on behalf of a foreign populace.


So as governance gets more "Poor" the natural trend is for violence to rise. A leader of the dissident groups may opt for a non-violent approach, as Dr Maria Stephan advocates in her work. History shows that it is twice as likely to produce change where no legal means for change exists than violent approaches are.

As I said before, non-violent political action is extremely effective if the cause in question has widespread public support. It wouldn’t have worked for Timothy McVeigh in the US, and it wouldn’t have worked for OBL in Saudi Arabia, for the same reason: they didn’t have the level of support required to make non-violent action effective. Most terrorist groups are in this position, that’s why they resort to terrorism. 300 people waving signs outside a capital is a joke. 300 people going on strike is barely noticed. 300 people setting off bombs in public places is a major event. So if 300 people want a major event, what do they do? Pretty obvious, really.


Now, Dayuhan says how can Saudi Arabia (The decisive point for GWOT IMO) be brought into such conversations, they receive no support from the US, the opposite is true he says. Really? The Saudis sell us discount oil in exchange for our commitment to defend them against all threats, foreign and domestic?? I know the Gulf War was a while ago, but I still remember. The Saudis have three great fears: 1. Iran. 2. Shia in general, but particularly the large oppressed Shia populace whose lands lay within Saudi Arabia atop half of their oil. 3 There entire oppressed populace as a whole. When it comes to countering insurgency, the Saudis never let the grass grow too tall. The should be pros at this, they have been doing it since their inception. Now they get to do it with the full blessing and sanction of the US because they call it "counterterrorism."

I don’t think there is a decisive point for GWOT, because I don’t think there is a GWOT: the term was invented because it made a good sound bite and has persisted with little question, but I don’t think any such thing really exists.

Do the Saudis sell us discount oil? Since when? As far as I know we pay market price for Saudi oil. Once upon a time they used to shave a few cents to keep the market share, which they found useful in diplomatic situations, but they don’t do that now.

Of course we protected the Saudis from external aggression, and of course we’d do it again in the unlikely event that they were threatened by the Iranians. That’s not defense of the Saudi regime, it’s defense of our own interests: letting the bulk of the Gulf oil reserves fall under the control of an overtly hostile power is not and would not be an acceptable outcome for the US, no matter how we feel about the Saudi government. We could threaten that we won’t come to the aid of the Saudis in the event of foreign aggression if they don’t do what we want, but the threat would be hollow, we and they both know it… and it’s not likely that such a threat would earn us any points with any segment of the Saudi populace. Rather the opposite.

Do we have a commitment to defend the Saudis against domestic threats? Not that I know of… and again, threatening to withhold such defense wouldn’t mean much, as the Saudis don’t face any internal threat that they can’t manage themselves. The only time I recall the Saudis asking for external help with an internal security issue was during the seizure of the Grand Mosque back in ’79… and they asked the French. Again, there’s no leverage here that’s going to force the Saudi regime to change their domestic policies.

Of course the Saudis buy arms from us, but those deals are as much to our advantage as theirs: we need the income and the jobs and if we stopped selling the Saudis could buy hardware elsewhere with the greatest of ease.

The Saudi regime’s relationship with its populace is in any event far better today than it was in the 90s, when the economic dislocation of the oil glut and the American military presence provided continuing irritants. The regime dealt with the problem in a most American way: they threw money at it. Lots of money, hundreds of billions. Since the oil price surge the Saudis have poured huge amounts into public sector salary increases, job-creating industries, infrastructure, schools, housing, health care, etc, etc. Of course it’s a straight buyout, but it’s been pretty successful at buying popular passivity. The royals seem to think that most of the populace is quite ok with being ruled by a medieval anachronism as long as the medieval anachronism delivers the goods. So far it looks like they’re right. Of course they haven’t pleased everyone, nobody ever does. Of course it’s not a permanent solution… but that’s not our problem, it’s theirs.

I very much doubt that any portion of the Saudi populace wants to see the US pressuring the Saudi government to do anything. No matter how well-intentioned such pressure actually was, it would be invariably interpreted as self-interested meddling and would provide a propaganda bonanza for anti-American forces. As in many other areas, foreign support for a reform agenda can actually discredit that agenda by making it seem like something that was initiated from the outside.

I’m curious, though… what exactly do you think we could do to force the Saudis to modify their domestic policies, and what specific modifications in Saudi domestic policy would you seek?



Oh, and yes, I do use "Despotism" interchangeably with "Poor Governance."

I'm not sure the equivalence is valid. Certainly by our standards all despotism is bad governance... though as you've said yourself, our standards don't matter, and if the populace is ok with what we think despotic, it's none of our business. But can you not imagine a circumstance in which governance is neither despotic nor good? What if governance is simply inept, or missing? That's not necessarily despotism, but it's not good governance either.

All despotism may be bad governance, but I don't see how that makes all bad governance despotism.



I am a huge fan of the American story, of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution and our Bill of Rights.


So am I. Brilliant documents, and they've done wonderful things for us. If you want to go on a mission to bring them to the rest of the world, though, please stop the train and let me off, because I see a monumental crash coming.

Bob's World
05-28-2010, 10:51 AM
My point was that the Saudis DO NOT sell us discount oil in exchange for commiting our national treasure, reputation and blood to their continued defense. They see it as their right.

The Saudis look at the American Military and Oil Industry Engineers, and perhaps even our leadership, in the same way they look at the thousands of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Philippino, etc workers they import to deal with other dirty work that is beneath them.

Most Saudi's want moderate reforms, such as a judiciary not controlled by the King (Justice, anyone?); Others would like to have some voice (Hope) in the system; others greater equality (Respect); many perceive (and this perception is targeted heavily by OBL, who is not a Saudi insurgent, he is conducting UW to incite and leverage the Saudi populace to rise up) that the King would not be such a bad guy but that he has lost his way in eroding his support to what the people want in favor of his relationship with the US, thereby calling his (legitimacy) into question.

I also would never promote pushing US Values onto others; principles that we buy into perhaps, but always urge that we resist the tendency to see how we do something as the way everyone else needs to do the same things (Democracy, womens rights, corruption, etc) We come across as judgmental A-holes when we do that. My point is that the documents I mention have powerfull COIN mechanism woven into them due to their origin in Insurgency. There are great lessons for those who look and think.

Every culture is different and needs to develop guiding documents and forms of govenrance that work for them. But there are principles that can be derived from American documents that are proven effective in the prevention of Governmental abuses and the resultant insurgency that comes from such abuses. (and no, the American Civil War was not insurgency; there are lessons there as well. But anytime an emotional, economic issue divides a country geographically, it is a red flag that all should take seriously).

Dayuhan
05-28-2010, 12:28 PM
My point was that the Saudis DO NOT sell us discount oil in exchange for commiting our national treasure, reputation and blood to their continued defense. They see it as their right.

Possibly they simply see it as a mutual interest, which it is. We defend the Saudis against external aggression because it is in our interest to do so. Why would we expect to be paid, or given concessions, for acting in our own interest?



Most Saudi's want moderate reforms, such as a judiciary not controlled by the King (Justice, anyone?); Others would like to have some voice (Hope) in the system; others greater equality (Respect); many perceive (and this perception is targeted heavily by OBL, who is not a Saudi insurgent, he is conducting UW to incite and leverage the Saudi populace to rise up) that the King would not be such a bad guy but that he has lost his way in eroding his support to what the people want in favor of his relationship with the US, thereby calling his (legitimacy) into question.

I wouldn't presume to know what most Saudis want.

I do know that in the 90s many Saudis believed (and stated) that there was a connection between the continued American military presence and the painfully low (for them) price of oil. That perception was inaccurate, but it was widespread and had an extremely negative impact on Saudi perceptions of the US. There was a widespread belief that the US troops would never leave, that the US would never allow Saudi Arabia to get what they saw as a fair price for oil, that the US would never allow Saudi Arabia the international position that they thought it deserved, that the US would ultimately begin converting Muslims and violating the holy places, etc. Those beliefs created a great deal of resentment and friction. They are also gone. The American troops are gone, the holy places are unviolated, no conversions happened. The price of oil soared, and the US just paid up, like everyone else. At the height of the oil price spike President Bush went to Riyadh to ask the king to pump more oil; the King told him that the problem was speculation, not supply, and refused. The regional implications of that visit, long forgotten by most Americans, are profound. The claim that the US controls the king is empty, and everyone knows it but the most blinded religious extremists.

I don't think any significant number of Saudis see any connection between US influence and their own complaints with the local justice system... or any other local issues. There's a great deal of internal conflict on these issues, generally between (relative) progressives and the religious traditionalists, but the US has no real influence on internal affairs. I've heard all kinds of accusations directed at the US by Saudis, many of them pretty wild, but I've never heard anyone claim that the US is obstructing reform in the Saudi justice system. I've heard a lot of complaint about US pressure to reform that justice system in accord with our view of human rights, but nobody saying that the US is preventing change or reform.

I repeat... what exactly do you think we could do to force the Saudis to modify their domestic policies, and what specific modifications in Saudi domestic policy would you seek?



Every culture is different and needs to develop guiding documents and forms of govenrance that work for them. But there are principles that can be derived from American documents that are proven effective in the prevention of Governmental abuses and the resultant insurgency that comes from such abuses.

Possibly so, and there are lessons as well in the founding principles and experiences of many other nations. If others choose to learn from these, or use them as models, all well and good. We can't force anyone to do that, and if we try to push anyone in that direction we're likely to end up driving them away from it. People don't like to be pushed, and it's not our role or responsibility to be telling others how to govern themselves. To help, perhaps, if we're asked to help... and even then we have to be very careful and very restrained. But to take the initiative in some sort of behaviour modification program aimed at other nations... nothing there but trouble, I'm afraid. If we go around telling people not to despair, we are coming to save them with our carrots and our sticks, I really don't anticipate a very positive reaction.

slapout9
05-28-2010, 03:56 PM
Possibly so, and there are lessons as well in the founding principles and experiences of many other nations. If others choose to learn from these, or use them as models, all well and good. We can't force anyone to do that, and if we try to push anyone in that direction we're likely to end up driving them away from it. People don't like to be pushed, and it's not our role or responsibility to be telling others how to govern themselves. To help, perhaps, if we're asked to help... and even then we have to be very careful and very restrained. But to take the initiative in some sort of behaviour modification program aimed at other nations... nothing there but trouble, I'm afraid. If we go around telling people not to despair, we are coming to save them with our carrots and our sticks, I really don't anticipate a very positive reaction.


Important points and I think you and Col. Jones are closer to the same concepts than you think. If you use the Jones model as I understand it, all you would be doing is helping that country establish the good government that it wants not what we (US) want. The real problem as I see it is if you ask a local population the 4 questions we (US) may get answers that we don't like. And because of that we may have to face the fact that sometimes we should just leave people (other countries) alone.

Bob's World
12-21-2010, 11:45 AM
A couple of minor, yet significant refinements:

I believe that an essential concept for understanding insurgency, and by correlation, being able to design and implement effective COIN campaigns, is that of "Conditions of Insurgency" that are present in every society, but that fluctuate based upon popular perceptions of governance.

My definition as I currently think of this concept:

"Conditions of Insurgency: A state of mind. The conditions of insurgency arguably exist to some degree within every populace. In most cases such conditions are benign in that they are not strong enough to support the rise of a significant insurgent organization, even if manipulated by outside actors conducting UW or by ideological themes designed for this audience. As perceptions of poor governance increase so does the degree of the conditions of insurgency. Left unchecked these conditions are apt to be exploited by internal and/or external parties for purposes of their own that may or may not have the welfare of the affected populace in mind. Conditions of insurgency are caused by the government and assessed through the perspective of the populace."

And an updated chart to show what this might look like:

slapout9
12-21-2010, 02:23 PM
Bob, so what would be an outline to counter these conditions?