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SWJED
05-23-2010, 09:00 PM
By Starbuck at Small Wars Journal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/pointcounterpoint-are-the-serv/):

This week, two instructors at the US Naval Academy discussed some of the challenges, strengths, and shortcomings of America’s service academies. The first is Dr. Bruce Fleming, a professor of English who is set to release his book Bridging the Military-Civilian Divide (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1597974285?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=1597974285) in August. Dr. Fleming penned an op-ed in Thursday’s New York Times entitled, The Academies’ March Toward Mediocrity (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/opinion/21fleming.html).


Instead of better officers, the academies produce burned-out midshipmen and cadets. They come to us thinking they’ve entered a military Camelot, and find a maze of petty rules with no visible future application. These rules are applied inconsistently by the administration, and tend to change when a new superintendent is appointed every few years. The students quickly see through assurances that “people die if you do X” (like, “leave mold on your shower curtain,” a favorite claim of one recent administrator). We’re a military Disneyland, beloved by tourists but disillusioning to the young people who came hoping to make a difference.


In my experience, the students who find this most demoralizing are those who have already served as Marines and sailors (usually more than 5 percent of each incoming class), who know how the fleet works and realize that what we do on the military-training side of things is largely make-work. Academics, too, are compromised by the huge time commitment these exercises require. Yes, we still produce some Rhodes, Marshall and Truman Scholars. But mediocrity is the norm.


Meanwhile, the academy’s former pursuit of excellence seems to have been pushed aside by the all-consuming desire to beat Notre Dame at football (as Navy did last year). To keep our teams in the top divisions of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, we fill officer-candidate slots with students who have been recruited primarily for their skills at big-time sports. That means we reject candidates with much higher predictors of military success (and, yes, athletic skills that are more pertinent to military service) in favor of players who, according to many midshipmen who speak candidly to me, often have little commitment to the military itself.

Dr. Shaun Baker, a professor of philosophy, provides an excellent counterpoint to Dr. Fleming in an entry on his blog at Themistocles’ Shade (http://sonofneocles.blogspot.com/2010/05/it-is-commissioning-week-at-usna-so.html). Dr. Baker received his PhD from Wayne State University, and is the Assistant Director of the James B. Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership at the US Naval Academy. He teaches philosophy, coaches the Academy's Ethics Bowl team, and is the Stockdale Center's webmaster.


In the Naval Academy, there is a very strong tradition of exhortation to moral excellence, honesty, integrity, ideals taken very seriously, and as more than one mid on more than one occasion has put it, "pounded" into their heads from day one Plebe Summer. Yes, this exhortation may heighten the sort of sensitivity to inconsistency that gives rise to cynicism, but I believe it also has a pronounced effect on the day-to-day thinking of a majority of the mids.


They do take these values seriously, even as they recognize their own shortcomings, those of other midshipmen and the faculty and staff. In general, I would say that this does not diminish the fact that they do take these values seriously, and think about them, have them in the forefront of their minds much more so than would people that did not go through four years of such rigorous exhortation to ethical thinking and exemplary character.


Not only do all midshipmen go through a rigorous 4 year cycle of classes intended to drive home the importance of ethical thought, and ethical leadership, classes that explicitly take up and rationally discuss cynicism, among other germane topics (just war theory, international law, military justice, principles of servant leadership, followership, constitutional principles, and etc..) but the very nature of the institution they live in for four years puts them in a good position to understand the position of the enlisted people they will eventually work with. In many ways the academy does two things at the same time. It prepares for leadership at various ranks, in various ways intellectual, moral and emotional, but it also drives home how it is to be a lower level "cog" in a big quite hierarchical command-structured institution, and teaches one how to deal with that reality, and the cynicism that naturally results.

sapperfitz82
05-23-2010, 09:24 PM
I am unfamiliar with the history of the Academies' woes, however is there any precedent in making them six year institutions, awarding Masters Degrees and requiring six years of service? If the problem is one of commitment perhaps upping the ante would help. On the other hand, perhaps the problem is who selects/retains the staff as well.

Also, forgive my heretical bent, but is there any truth to the decline coinciding with the coed student body and more liberal leaning in the institutions?

This ties into another thread that pointed out that USMA officers tend to do their four years and split. Perhaps they were not as prepared for the demands of military life as they thought the institution would prepare them? (Not relative to other sources of commission but to their expectations mind you.)

GI Zhou
05-23-2010, 10:03 PM
This is based on a rather jaundiced view of officer training in the Australian Defence Force. I agree with Starbuck that we produce good quality junior officers in spite of the system. People with high academic scores as a rule do not join the military. They beocme doctors, dentists, lawyers, or do business degrees in top tier universities. Other than in engineering, and the chance to fly which is the biggest incentive of all, high quality students avoid the Australian Defence Force. If they decide to continue in the service after their initial term of service, unless they get a good position they invariably leave ,JUST as they are at the peak of their training. Our navy prefers people that can play rugby I am unrelaibly told.:wry:

My son at 20 earned more as a trainee accountant than an academy graduate with three years, (not including flying pay/sea going allowance, etc), already had property and shares, and a secure future with international travel prosects. The view of this ex-training specialist is that by the time they are ready to go into the world as a junior officer with all their initial courses under their belt they are at least 22 if not 23. In many cases they have fallen behind their peers money wise, it won't get better for at least four years, and most of their time if not operating a ship, plane, platoon, orderly room etc, is doing at least two SLJs (shirty little jobs) as OIC basketweaving etc. Heaven forbid if they want a social life, or increase their academic skills.

It was best summed up by two quotes admittedly from ten years ago, but I don't think it has changed. From a senior instructor: The aim of the academy is to produce officers not academics when commenting about a quote I was told by a student; if you get 51% it means you wasted time getting that extra 1% . Due to all the extra commitments at the academy, near enough is good enough becomes the norm in the academic side. I was doing a PhD at the Academy but they run out of supervisors with the appropraite skill set, so I transferred universities.

The quality of middle and senior officer training has been commented and written about by people far better qualified than me to judge. Mine might be considered libelous.:eek:

Knapp
05-24-2010, 11:28 AM
From someone who IS a USMA grad (class of 94) and still on active duty, would like to address some of the sweeping generalizations that are just plain wrong.

First, that the academies are becoming academically mediocre (I guess I can really only speak about West Point: all cadets are required to take a foundation of math and science courses (calculus, physics, chemistry, statistics, plus an engineering track) that no other major universities require of all students regardless of their major of study. Secondly, please note the number of Rhodes scholars, etc that graduate each year and West Point is in the top 10 in the nation. Thirdly, of the military faculty, several do have PhDs AND have also served in post-9/11 deployments which can provide a fuller understanding of how academic subjects relate to the cadets' future.

Next, I'd like to point out that West Point was America....recognized by Forbes magazine in 2009 as the best college in the US. This is pretty impressive since the competition includes Ivy Leagues et. al.

Last, I can say from the curriculum and experience I had to what is currently being taught to cadets now, the academy is evolving with the times. The foundational courses remain, but the elective keep changing and especially the summer training programs have improved radically since my time. West Point now has a Counter-Terrorism Center of Excellence which produces scholarly writings as well as a monthly bulletin. More examples are possible, but am running out of time.

Sorry this is so long, have more thoughts but gotta head out now.

Knapp

Entropy
05-24-2010, 01:30 PM
I have no doubt the Academies are fine schools. The point, however, is do to ask if they produce better officers? In my personal experience, they do not.

Coindanasty
05-24-2010, 01:51 PM
Entropy - what defines a "better officer?" Is that really the point? Or is "the point" yet another in an endless and long-running trend of attacks on the service academies?

I'm a grad, and years ago I wrote an ill-advised and ill-researched paper on Academy grads vs. OTS vs. ROTC, out of which I concluded (mostly off a superior officer satisfaction study conducted sometime in either the 70s or 80s) that the academies did not do so and ought to be abolished based on this fact. You can probably guess my grade...

Really, this isn't about the counterpoint, which wouldn't exist without the original point in the first place, which is that the service academies are hurting. Whether or not the author's points are valid seems moot to me, as it reads more like the rant I wrote as a cadet than a well-informed and supported argument. But I can get behind the concept...

I think the institutions deserve some pretty hard looks and transformation. As other discussions on this board illuminate, easier said than done when dealing with a military bureaucracy.I have some ideas where to start, but I would like to hear some logically presented arguments on why service academies don't produce better officers, why they're in trouble, etc...

Entropy
05-24-2010, 02:02 PM
Coindanasty,

Personally, I'm indifferent to the service academies. I have no bone to pick with them and I have no desire to see them go away or be seriously defenestrated. At the same time, however, I do not buy into the myth that academy officers are better officers, nor do I think the formal and informal career benefits Academy grads receive are warranted.

Schmedlap
05-24-2010, 02:48 PM
Are the service academies going downhill? I don't know. But the issues raised are important ones - and they apply to all military schools and ROTC programs, in my opinion.

The emphasis upon idiotic rules, blind adherence to rules that nobody can explain the purpose for, and absurd claims that [insert minor oversight] will kill your men, do nothing to help prepare cadets for their future professional careers. It trains cadets to focus exclusively on identifying a rule and adhering to it, rather than thinking through a situation and determining whether the rule makes sense. I knew "leaders" who went into combat armed only with what templates they were taught from FM 7-8. They did not understand the general principles - they only understood that an ambush should resemble the one in the picture or that a traveling overwatch formation should resemble the one in the picture. They treated streets in an urban area like linear danger areas in the same way that one would treat a road encountered in the woods. Stupid. Those leaders lacked the ability to think creatively and improvise to unexpected changes in the situation or to think through situations that did not clearly fit the template they were hoping for.

It seems evident to me that this inability to think was fostered by years of blind adherence to idiotic rules that were never to be questioned or explained.

sapperfitz82
05-24-2010, 04:27 PM
Thinking creatively in some situations kills one sooner than blind obedience. Think incoming (What's that sound, which direction is it coming from, is it ours or their's, which of my counter-battery options are best suited to returning fire?) instead of just getting in the ditch as a muscle-reflex. Over-simplified but to the point - much of our tradition is based on the thought that a civilian must be broken of that innovative spirit that causes hesitation. This is not to be scoffed at and thrown away or "transformed" lightly.

I have no bone to pick with the academies, I have known good, bad, and great graduates. Most problems they face are writ large in other institutions of higher learning. We have as a society scrapped discipline for relativity. Our services now are trying to find a way of turning that social dogma into good military theory, particularly when it comes to current conflicts where creative thinking seems to be a yet unharnessed wave to victory.

I am unconvinced. I submit the wholly inadequate single source of Custer's "Life on the Plains" as evidence of a counter-tribal-insurgent fighter who probably didn't pick up any Lean Six Sigma or synergistic-cooperative-think-meeting courses in his time at Hudson High, but some how managed to transition from a totally conventional war to a totally unconventional war quite well (final battle aside):eek:. And he certainly had to do plenty of inexplicable make-work in school. I submit he learned more about human nature in that four year experience than current studs do and that is really what victory in any kind of battle hinges on.

Cadets suffer from social isolation that makes them auto-mans in regular society. So what. We don't really care how they perform in regular society and they have the rest of their life to figure it out anyway. My question is "is there any significant decline in the quality officer (given current social phenomena) and can we do something about it?"

My previous post brings up two of the most recent "transformations" in those institutions in particular, less so in regular society(being recent transformations), and I would start there in trying to find if anything and what has changed. They are namely, the inclusion of the fairer sex in cadet ranks and a distinct leftward leaning in the faculty (I am relying on anecdotal evidence for the later claim, mostly from cadets I have known, but also from friends who have taught there and are so persuaded.)

I don't have a dog in the fight really. But some times its fun to poke and prod the fighting dogs:D.

Schmedlap
05-24-2010, 05:07 PM
Thinking creatively in some situations kills one sooner than blind obedience.

I thought I covered that.


... rules that nobody can explain the purpose for... rather than thinking through a situation and determining whether the rule makes sense... They did not understand the general principles...



Think incoming (What's that sound, which direction is it coming from, is it ours or their's, which of my counter-battery options are best suited to returning fire?) instead of just getting in the ditch as a muscle-reflex.

It's actually funny that you use that as an example because I witnessed a 2LT in a unit that was temporarily attached to us respond to a 60mm mortar round by shouting "incoming, get down!" and then "this way! 200 meters!" That was in the middle of a city. Fortunately, most of his NCOs weren't quite as clueless as he was. Those of us with a little more experience realized that the proximity of the impacting mortar rounds was coincidental, at best, that the amount of time between rounds was more than sufficient to duck into an adjacent concrete building, that running down the street was an invitation to be ambushed, and that the greatest defense we had was not running away but simply using the cover provided by the urban terrain.

Yes, some things certainly should be motor memory, such as individual skills that are highly repetitive and applicable to all or nearly all situations.

Leaders need to be given a professional education, not programming. Leaders need to be able to identify those situations where blind adherence to rules do not make sense. The only way to do that is to understand the purpose for those rules. Military schools/academies/ROTC programs/OCS have a tendency not only fail to convey those purposes, but they sometimes adamantly refuse to convey those purposes even when prompted. That is not professional education. That is mass production.

sapperfitz82
05-24-2010, 05:26 PM
That is not professional education. That is mass production.

Our professional education has its most immediate roots in the mass production of leaders for the previous two world wars. A great deal of thought and effort was put into how our nation will mass produce "good enough" leaders to accomplish their job in the next similar war. The threshold of pain required for a massive change simply hasn't been reached. And if Korea and Vietnam didn't do it, I wouldn't expect our current conflicts to come close.

I wholly agree that we need to improve our officer producing schools. Across the board. I am not as adverse to creating stress through meaningless chores, attention to detail (particularly insignificant ones), or properly executed hazing. Hallmarks of any good military academy. If it is all well done, it can be quite a good professional education.

I think you are advocating a modernization of the tactics taught. I agree to that to an extent. I think you are also saying that the focus should be on adaptive leadership instead of conformational leadership. That I have an issue with since the trend in our society is counter-conformational and I believe that will create a monster. What is needed is more discipline, not less. It is a hierarchical Army after all.

And that LT might not have looked so foolish had an observer adjusted rounds on top of that position. Situation dependent of course. He didn't do nothing, and I'd say that is a sign of good training. Also of training that puts a great deal off on the institutional side of the house (wrong in my book). Lucky he had good NCO's, but he would not have been wrong to move his men 200m either. Just very cautious.

Personally, I would like to see a year's "internship" for PL's between their Jr and Sr year regardless of source.

Schmedlap
05-24-2010, 05:48 PM
Our professional education has its most immediate roots in the mass production of leaders for the previous two world wars.

And that didn't churn out as many high quality leaders as our sepia-toned historical goggles would lead many to believe. There were some great leaders in WWII and a lot of very poor ones. It is unlikely that the system was wholly responsible for creating the former or blameless in permitting the latter.


I am not as adverse to creating stress through meaningless chores, attention to detail (particularly insignificant ones), or properly executed hazing. Hallmarks of any good military academy. If it is all well done, it can be quite a good professional education.

I'd love to hear an explanation to support that.


I think you are advocating a modernization of the tactics taught...

No.


... I think you are also saying that the focus should be on adaptive leadership instead of conformational leadership.

No. The focus should be on creating professional military officers.


And that LT might not have looked so foolish had an observer adjusted rounds on top of that position. Situation dependent of course. He didn't do nothing, and I'd say that is a sign of good training. Also of training that puts a great deal off on the institutional side of the house (wrong in my book). Lucky he had good NCO's, but he would not have been wrong to move his men 200m either. Just very cautious.

Yes, he would have looked foolish; no, there was no sign whatsoever of "good training"; and yes he most certainly would have been wrong to move his men - but I probably haven't adequately "painted the picture" for the anecdote, so I'll leave it at that.

Infanteer
05-24-2010, 06:15 PM
In my opinion, Service Academies suffer from trying to be universities rather than professional institutions - in they end, West Point, like the University of Washington, turns out bright young folks with a piece of paper and, if they did things right, some critical thinking skills. Service Academies are usually a leg up on larger civilian universities in that they get to be a bit more selective.

However, service academies do little to in the way of developing military professionals. The training houses put out good field technicians, versed in decision making and the estimate, but that's about it. I'd argue that the officer corps as a whole (in many Western armies) is sadly lacking in the foundations of the profession. Most of my peers are unable to discuss military history, doctrinal concepts, and art and science of tactics and the operational level - and I don't mean being able to spout dates and factoids, I mean knowing the relevance of all this to the conduct of operations. Guys who pursue their professional growth through writing, mess room debate (and online discussion forums - the new militarische gesellschaft) are generally exceptions.

This is borne out in the doctrine we see published today; alot of it is simply junk and the rest of it is simply ignored. Can you imagine psychologists not knowing the DSM-IV? A good percentage of the officers today are not versed in the doctrine we state underpins how (and why) we do things. "Maneuver warfare" highlights this - an interesting phase that the anglo militaries went through, full of debate by a small percentage of the profession, and then - to varying extents - put into doctrine; all this goes largely unnoticed by large amounts of officers who are oblivious to the significant arguments and changes it was making.

Bottom line, we like our doctors to be good with the scalpal and know human anatomy. We want our lawyers to be good in the courtroom and versed in case-law and precedence. We should expect the same out of the officer corps. If I could wave a wand, I'd have all 3 streams of officer production (commissioned from the ranks, direct entry, and service academy) spend some development time in the field Army and then all move through the service academy which would include a professional military syllabus (this of course, must be multi-disciplinary, looking at all social and science fields) and courses must move away from the standard "degree-producing" university courses which generally demand one piece of writing, an exam and may require to actually do your readings.

My 2 Cents.

marct
05-24-2010, 06:22 PM
That I have an issue with since the trend in our society is counter-conformational and I believe that will create a monster. What is needed is more discipline, not less. It is a hierarchical Army after all.

Well, I couldn't resist jumping in on this one :D!

I think there are two different meanings to the word "discipline" that we would do well to keep in mind. The first is the concept of obedience often associated with training, i.e. he is well disciplined, while the second refers to a professional "discipline", which is a set of principles that have been internalized and from which solutions to professional problems are generated.

Discipline in both of these senses is necessary to create good officers and, also, good citizens.

jmm99
05-24-2010, 07:37 PM
from marct
I think there are two different meanings to the word "discipline" that we would do well to keep in mind. The first is the concept of obedience often associated with training, i.e. he is well disciplined, while the second refers to a professional "discipline", which is a set of principles that have been internalized and from which solutions to professional problems are generated.

An internalized set of principles to generate solutions to problems is scarcely restricted to "professionals" - since, what you have defined, is really "self-discipline" (available to anyone who bothers to develop an internalized set of principles).

Our "professional disciplines" (whether doctor, lawyer or military chief) do provide a generalized framework (e.g., as in the professional codes of ethics, too seldom read - at least by lawyers) that can aid in developing an internalized set of principles. But all professionals do not take that path.

The concept is similar to my dichotomy between "rule by law" (principles imposed by a third party, which may be perfectly OK because they are accepted) and "rule of law" which is the self-expression of the ruled population group.

Moving away from theory - Have there been any responses by That Place on the Chesapeake grads (especially those who have elected the Marines) to the two articles linked in the OP ?

Regards

Mike

MikeF
05-24-2010, 07:38 PM
Both Tom Ricks and Dr. Fleming are correct. USMA floundered starting June 1, 2000 after we graduated. The class of 2000 was the last "real" class. Everything softened after that leading to this debacle.

sapperfitz82
05-24-2010, 07:43 PM
Not as many good leaders, more bad leaders than we would have wanted.

My point exactly. The reaction to that is what I was speaking of, that is we suffered unnecessarily high casualties because we had an inadequate officer Corps, and tried hard to meet that need with our current system. Still broke you say, I agree but feel that it is more in the application of the process than the process itself.

What has usually been identified as being deficient in those who join our military is a sense of team, sacrifice, privation - call it what you will. A great deal of this comes from an adolescent sense of rebellion that our society fosters. Before we inculcate any kind of military values - which will form the bounds and framework of the conceptual thought you are looking for (I think) - all of that must be stripped away. For me, that process came when one of my peers made it plain to me that I had to obey him. For this reason, hazing and meaningless rules are important. It offers the opportunity for new leadership to exercise their influence where it can do no harm (tactical etc.)

This is entirely necessary in teaching leadership. I am sure there are other tools for reaching this end, perhaps you could share some that you feel would replace this process.

Obedience is a great place to start learning discipline.

The simple honor code that is supposed to be reinforced there is absolutely in high demand in our Army and I can't think of many ways to replicate that in a different setting, again I would sincerely enjoy you suggestions.

I believe that these are the foundation of a professional officer (discipline, honor, and intelligence) and all of the processes are in place at that institution (USMA) but I contend that recent shifts in the tides at the academy that are a severe distraction to those beliefs have made them very hard to pass on.

The military academy I went to experienced a similar shift and I saw similar results, this may not hold true for USMA, I only put it out there as a "maybe."

Umar Al-Mokhtār
05-24-2010, 08:54 PM
USMA floundered starting June 1, 2000 after we graduated.

parochial ring knocker. ;)

I'll bet your company was the toughest in the Corps as well. :D

Tun Tavern, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, November 11th 1775

Captains Nicholas and Mullens, having been tasked by the 2nd Continental Congress to form two battalions of Marines, set up the Corps' first recruiting station in the tavern.

The first likely prospect was, in typical recruiter's fashion, promised a "life of high adventure in service to Country and Corps". And, as an extra bonus: If enlisted now he would receive a free tankard of ale...

The recruit gladly accepted the challenge and, receiving his free tankard of ale, was told to wait at the corner table for orders.

The first Marine sat quietly at the table sipping the ale when he was joined by another young man, who had two tankards of ale.

The first Marine looked at the lad and asked where he had gotten the two tankards of ale?

The lad replied that he had just joined this new outfit called the Continental Marines, and as an enlistment bonus was given two tankards of ale.

The first Marine took a long hard look at the second Marine and said: "Damn boot, it was nothing like that in the old Corps!"

MikeF
05-24-2010, 09:18 PM
Spoken like a true parochial ring knocker. ;)

As much as should be expected :D.


I'll bet your company was the toughest in the Corps as well. :D

Well, the football team sucked, the rugby team placed second in Div One finals, and my cadet company had the least amount of first picks to infantry ever...So, a mixed bag I suppose.


The first likely prospect was, in typical recruiter's fashion, promised a "life of high adventure in service to Country and Corps". And, as an extra bonus: If enlisted now he would receive a free tankard of ale...

If only...I've had the high adventure, but a free tankard of ale sometimes slips my grasps ;).

On a more serious note, I would suggest that as a measure of reform, USMA should attempt to undo the social awkwardness of cadet isolation. Back in the day, cadets were NOT isolated despite their strict displinary standards. The world came to them. Outside of football games, it is not so much so.

v/r

Mike

Coindanasty
05-25-2010, 12:18 AM
MikeF, hear hear on your point regarding social awkwardness. I think USNA has a little easier time with that being right smack dab in the middle of Annapolis, USMA and USAFA not so much. I can honestly say that after four years of isolation and a bad distance running habit, I graduated at the social skill level of a 14 year old.

I've seen a some good points come out about teaching leaders...and I couldn't agree more. I can honestly look back at my 11 years of service and not look at one time when I applied a leadership lesson culled from my time at the Academy. Beyond the basic military history (which, let's face it; is not the issue) what was taught to me there was so far removed from what I faced either inside or outside the wire. Granted, I may have just been a crappy cadet, but I'd have to think that somewhere along the way I learned something while getting smoked as a four-degree or in yet another pointless M-hour.

MikeF
05-25-2010, 12:49 AM
I may have just been a crappy cadet, but I'd have to think that somewhere along the way I learned something while getting smoked as a four-degree or in yet another pointless M-hour.

or maybe more pointedly, the "crappy" cadets seem to be the only ones still in service. I was one. I was a rugby player- dirty, nasty, scum of the earth.

If you look at an old corps photo of my boys, the ones that were shiny and glossy and compelled to a lifetime of service in the Army left a long time ago to corporate America.

Those of us that were less than stellar (in appearance mind you not grades or perfomance) still remain. From that category, one is a doctor, one is a fullbright scholar finishing up his degree in Shanghai, and another is a test pilot currently drinking (correction studying) in Atlanta at Georgia Tech with a photographic memory. Others deploy and redeploy to Iraq/A'stan as commanders then advisors.

I'm the blogger.

In my small world, we encompass Anbar, Diyala, Baghdad, Nuristan, and Helmand.

Knapp
05-25-2010, 01:20 AM
Agree with MikeF and others that perhaps the best cadets don't always translate into the best officers, but I know some that certainly have.

As far as the question of does what is learned at USMA prepare you to be an officer, I can say the foundational knowledge of what 'officership' truly means is the largest lesson I extracted.

On a side note, I recently completed a survey on Officer Basic Education (am sure many of you did as well) and 'officership' was one of the components the survey covered.

And by the way....the Corps HAS since 1995! :wry:

John T. Fishel
05-25-2010, 01:53 AM
but a long time observer of graduates, I am reminded of the characterization of West Point as an academic institution with a first rate student body and a second rate faculty. I can almost buy into that except when I look at faculty like Mike Meese, among others. Seriously, what I have seen over the years is an officer corps made up of Academy grads, ROTC pukes, OCS types, and ocxcasional direct commissions that blends them all together and spits out a rather good and adaptive group of officers. That said, IMO the academies are an essential part of the mix.

Cheers

JohnT

PS if the characterization of West Point is correct, then it is interesting that the president of the university of Oklahoma's strategy to achieve excellence is to build the University based on the quality of its undergrads by recruiting National Merit scholars.

MikeF
05-25-2010, 02:23 AM
Like any institution, it has it's flaws...However, I will stake my ground...


. I can almost buy into that except when I look at faculty like Mike Meese, among others.

Let me reiterate that. I'm a product of Mike Meese's Econ department (now head of social sciences). I'm a product of Dr. Gordon McCormick's DA dept at NPS. I will defend either to the bloody end. I am but a measure of what they taught me coupled with my own lessons in leadership and small wars.

One of my soldiers from Wildbunch, A/1-64 AR, from the Thunder Runs just emailed me. At the time, I was an XO, and he was a SPC, the CDR's driver.


Hey remember the time you and I went and bought pizza's for the guys who had to stay over the weekend when the rest of the soldiers were in from the field actually you bought them i just picked them up and then we delivered them out to check on them

no one else ever did that stuff in all my time I never had an ex even come and check on my ass out in the field haha


It is what it is...Every man is but the same. Each one has a choice on how he will act.

Schmedlap
05-25-2010, 02:29 AM
I out-XO'd you Mike. I brought them pizza and a tent because I thought it was BS that the 1SG didn't inform the Soldiers that they were pulling ASP guard until 30 minutes before the rest of the company went back to garrison.

MikeF
05-25-2010, 02:40 AM
I out-XO'd you Mike. I brought them pizza and a tent because I thought it was BS that the 1SG didn't inform the Soldiers that they were pulling ASP guard until 30 minutes before the rest of the company went back to garrison.

Get back on your game and out CO me then we'll talk :cool:

You know that i love ya...

Peacedog
05-25-2010, 09:18 AM
I think this may be more relevant when it comes to which service academy you are talking about.

USMA, for example, has made changes in response to real events that result in added value from it as an institution. The COIN center being most notable.

As a USAFA grad I am hard pressed to come up with anything that has been done to improve the utility of graduating members in our post-Cold War world.

selil
05-25-2010, 09:52 AM
I'd take the opinion and lumps to go with it that the entirety of the argument against the relevancy and capability of the military academies could be applied to the entirety of the higher education system of the world. Applicability and relevancy are often at odds with society as the institutions of higher education attempting to approach the edge of now are often still decades behind. That is the nature of a system that needs a decade to turn on a dime. You have to graduate often two classes of undergraduates to change an entire curriculum and that is an 8 to 10 year process. Never mind national mandated accreditation requirements, degree and program requirements, curricula changes, and a host of other issues and problems. So, there is more in this game than the service academies. My question is do you want well rounded graduates who can take on many tasks and problems with creativity or do you want specialists who are tool monkeys with no sense of the wider world? I can give you the former decade after decade forever. The second is only possible in very tiny amounts and missing is a possibility if not probability.

Schmedlap
05-25-2010, 01:02 PM
As a USAFA grad I am hard pressed to come up with anything that has been done to improve the utility of graduating members in our post-Cold War world.

Don't be so hard on the USAFA. (http://www3.whdh.com/news/articles/national/BO53789/)

Hacksaw
05-25-2010, 01:09 PM
Lets see class of 2000, Rugby Player... Must know Nick B... I was his sponsor... small world

Hacksaw
05-25-2010, 01:25 PM
Lets see class of 2000, Rugby Player... Must know Nick B... I was his sponsor... small world

Long Live Sosh...

On a more serious note... I think our department in particular tried to make our curriculum as relevant as possible (might have been easier given the nature of AP/IR/ECON...

Personally I added a constraints based MGMT/ACCT culminating event to my course in order to get cadets to think about/apply the principles of MR/MC and how a balanced system is one of the least efficient of all (counter-intuitive to most) when you dependent events and random variation - which is at the core of just about every military problem. A former student, IN FLT LDR in 3-101... came up to me at the weigh-house while we were deploying to Iraq and finds me and says, "I get it... this is the Herbie (chokepoint), that's why you're here isn't it"... probably the best confirmation I got out of my time spent at USMA...

As a side note, when tasked with writing the plan for the Reconstruction & Stabilization of Northern Iraq (MAR -APR 2003)... I staffed the plan with SOSH (COL Meese - my mentor as well)... the point being that all the components that I wanted a read on resided in those floors in Lincoln Hall... While I might resemble the 2nd rate faculty comment, my contemporaries did not... and well to be brutally honest, I'd challenge just about any junior faculty member at an IVY league school to build the plan that we put together back then...

Humani Nihil Alienum

John T. Fishel
05-25-2010, 04:20 PM
I agree.:D I sort of had 2 points - the first was that the competitive nature of the student body at the academies is a strong point. Cadets and Midshipmen may not all be as acadeically qualified as their Ivy League counterparts but many of them give those guys and gals a run for their money. They also,as a group, tend to be better rounded. Comapred to ROTC grads, it's a mixed bag (BTW I was an Ivy League ROTC puke myself). It is, I think along with OU Pres David Boren, the quality of undergrad students sets the quality of the institution far more than grad students or faculty. My second point was that the faculty I know (mostly sosh and dormer sosh as well as history) have been as good or better than any I've seen in universities. I would add that our fellow contributor Gian Gentile is nowat USMA challenging cadets and faculty alike.

Cheers

JohnT

Old Eagle
05-25-2010, 05:55 PM
Each commissioning source makes unique contributions to the officer corps as a whole. I would submit that we would be weaker without every one of them and the resulting blend of competencies.

MikeF
05-26-2010, 11:27 AM
Hacksaw makes some strong points about the academics. I'll offer one serious post on the honor code.

The cadet honor code is very strict- all black and white. For instance, if a cadet has his roommate help him with homework and he fails to footnote the help, then he is cheating.

I only served on one honor board (jury not the defendant ;)). It was about four months before we graduated. The defendant was ranked third or fourth academically out of our class. He was one of the super over-achievers. He was accused of copying his roommate's work for one minor project. He was found guilty and kicked out of school.

That's the standard the we had to uphold at school. Integrity, honor, and duty remain on the forefront of a graduate's mind. Now, transitioning that into the real world of gray can take some time, but that's why God made NCO's.

Mike

William F. Owen
05-26-2010, 11:53 AM
Can someone explain to me what is actually good about the system in places like West Point? - I mean good in an objective sense.

From an outsider view point it is not entirely clear how or if any of this produces better combat commanders. It certainly seems to take a vast amount of time and cost, for what seems not an obvious advantage.

As I say, just curious. From what I seen and read they seem far more rule-based, rigid, and absolutist than the anything the British or even German Armies had in their hay day!

Schmedlap
05-26-2010, 01:30 PM
From an outsider view point it is not entirely clear how or if any of this produces better combat commanders. It certainly seems to take a vast amount of time and cost, for what seems not an obvious advantage.

As I say, just curious. From what I seen and read they seem far more rule-based, rigid, and absolutist than the anything the British or even German Armies had in their hay day!

Depends upon who the outsider is. I went to a private military school. We looked upon the academies in much the same way that Soldiers in a patrol base look at the FOB.

Uboat509
05-26-2010, 03:08 PM
Depends upon who the outsider is. I went to a private military school. We looked upon the academies in much the same way that Soldiers in a patrol base look at the FOB.

The service academies have Burger King and Rip-Its? :D

Schmedlap
05-26-2010, 04:20 PM
The service academies have Burger King and Rip-Its? :D

Well, kind of. During my freshman year I considered transferring to West Point, but it seemed over the top to me. Their chow hall made ours look like a soup kitchen. Their athletic facilities/gym/etc made ours look like a small town high school. Their barracks rooms made ours look like a homeless shelter. In hindsight, perhaps my school was more austere than necessary. But, being a 19-year-old who had willingly been brainwashed by Drill Instructors and a handful of grizzled Vietnam War vets who worked at my school, I thought that anything was too soft if it didn't involve crawling through mud and broken glass.

MikeF
05-26-2010, 06:30 PM
During my freshman year I considered transferring to West Point, but it seemed over the top to me.

Why is the Junior Varsity always so damn jealous of the Varsity team :D?

Did you have to walk uphill both ways to class too? Sounds like you went to school in a northwestern mountainous part of a state where they dig banjos, sleeping with cousins, and the legal age for marraige is 16.

John T. Fishel
05-26-2010, 08:36 PM
Wilf, it's hey day - just kidding. You have a serious question there. Back in 1802 when WP was founded it was THE engineering school in the US. For 50 years +/- it has been a highly selective undergraduate university that produces a significant minority of army officers. Generally, those officers collectively are promoted at a higher rate than their peers from other commissioning sources making up about half the generals the army promotes. Historically, the leaders on both sides of the Am Civil War were from WP. The leaders of the US army in WWII were mostly from WP and many key leaders were from the WP class of 1915. One exception was G. C. Marshall who graduated from VMI.
The modern US military requires all its officers to have an undergraduate degree. Some National Guard officers can still be commissioned without it but they can't be promoted with Federal recognition until they have a degree. So, the question is how WP stacks up against other universities. Academically (based on selection test scores - the SAT) WP is not as good as Harvard or other Ivy League schools but it is near the top of the second tier and better than most state universities and a lot of private ones. It is also more selective in looking for leadership skills, some athletic ability and other attributes that are deemed desirable in a military leader.
While a majority of Academy grads leave service after their obligation is over, many of those made mistakes as LTs that other LTs receive forgiveness for. Many of those who leave active service do stay in the reserve or National Guard and tend to do very well assuming real leadership positions. And many assume leadership roles in civilian life.
So, the bottom line is that WP and the other service academies serve the nation in many ways and provide more than their fair share of leaders both military and civilian. Is it the best way? the most efficient way? Who knows. It is consistent with American culture and does produce some of our best combat leaders (also some not so good).
Don't know if that answers your question. But also think about some of the folk who contribute to this forum. Some of the most thoughtful - more than what we have any reason to expect - are academy grads.
(Not me, of course!:eek:)

Cheers

JohnT

William F. Owen
05-27-2010, 05:13 AM
John T. Fischel - many thanks for that.

I have to say I have pretty utilitarian views of Officer training.
The Royal Marines train their own officers, with none of the Sandhurst type performance and produce a pretty high standard. They also do it at minute cost compared to others. Their system fails badly in terms of Command Experience, because they produce too many officers, but raw product is generally good.
The IDF produce generally very competent officers, with a great deal of command experience, if you get slated for the Command stream. I know one guys who has commanded 3 Battalions and 2 Brigades - all for 3 years!
All Majors are now expected to go and get a Masters Degree - why I do not know!
The German Army of the 1930's - 50's 60' and into the 1980's produced above average combat officers, by the accounts of the men who have studied them.

My point, and nothing to do with US Service Academies, is that there is a good body of evidence that says you can produce very good officers without too much cost, time or process. Surely that is the requirement?

slapout9
05-27-2010, 09:03 AM
Why is the Junior Varsity always so damn jealous of the Varsity team :D?

Did you have to walk uphill both ways to class too? Sounds like you went to school in a northwestern mountainous part of a state where they dig banjos, sleeping with cousins, and the legal age for marraige is 16.

It's 14 not 16:D

John T. Fishel
05-27-2010, 11:34 AM
that you can produce good officers by other systems. there is much to be said in favor of the IDF's every officer has previously served in the ranks approach.
The American system as I suggested is driven by history and culture and its multiple commissioniing sources produces good officers for a very large military as OE and I argued. Most of the criticism I heard in the 70s and 80s was that our advanced officer education - CGSC (now ILE) and war college was of the MacDonalds variety. However, it looks a lot like its civilian counterpart Masters programs.

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
05-27-2010, 11:15 PM
It's 14 not 16:DDurn, I am sure missing a lotta changes... :(

Infanteer
05-28-2010, 02:56 AM
John T. Fischel - many thanks for that.

I have to say I have pretty utilitarian views of Officer training.
The Royal Marines train their own officers, with none of the Sandhurst type performance and produce a pretty high standard. They also do it at minute cost compared to others. Their system fails badly in terms of Command Experience, because they produce too many officers, but raw product is generally good.
The IDF produce generally very competent officers, with a great deal of command experience, if you get slated for the Command stream. I know one guys who has commanded 3 Battalions and 2 Brigades - all for 3 years!
All Majors are now expected to go and get a Masters Degree - why I do not know!
The German Army of the 1930's - 50's 60' and into the 1980's produced above average combat officers, by the accounts of the men who have studied them.

My point, and nothing to do with US Service Academies, is that there is a good body of evidence that says you can produce very good officers without too much cost, time or process. Surely that is the requirement?

There are obviously two factors here with an officer's development:
1. Professional Development - Professional knowledge base, critical thought; and
2. Technical Development - Fieldcraft, Command, Troop leading SOPs/TTPs.

Is one more important then the other? Can the first factor be "pushed off" or "spread out"?

Wilf speaks to lack of command time and too many officers - something we're seeing in Canada as the recruiting system opened up to try and fill a gap in the Senior Captain/Major rank levels (a gap that comes, in large part, from a creation of a plethora of new strategic-level HQs). Problem is too many officers for too little command billets.

I'd venture that a hard cap, based off available commands at each rank level, should be put on the size of a Corps to avoid creating a bunch of commissioned bureaucrats.

Schmedlap
05-28-2010, 03:15 AM
I'd venture that a hard cap, based off available commands at each rank level, should be put on the size of a Corps to avoid creating a bunch of commissioned bureaucrats.

If the US Army had done that, a lot more of us would have stayed in.

Infanteer
05-28-2010, 03:23 AM
If the US Army had done that, a lot more of us would have stayed in.

We are seeing this up here, where many officers can expect, at most, 6 months of Command time for their entire career.

JMA
05-28-2010, 07:23 AM
that you can produce good officers by other systems. there is much to be said in favor of the IDF's every officer has previously served in the ranks approach.

Served in the ranks for how long and doing what?

William F. Owen
05-28-2010, 08:07 AM
Served in the ranks for how long and doing what?
Depends on the unit, and branch. Reuven Gal's "Portrait of an Israeli Soldier" (http://www.amazon.com/Portrait-Israeli-Soldier-ebook/dp/B001ATNMRS) describes the whole process in detail. - (and book recommended to me by General Sir John Kiszely)

Essentially, you have to pass out of basic training with a good score, be selected to do the JNCO course, and the best of those go on to be officers, while having served as JNCOs in the unit, to the satisfaction of the Commanding officer. It's very much about character, and ability.

The current COS, Gabi Askenazi comes from an very impoverished and disadvantaged back ground. It is said, his introduction to combat and vigilance, was guarding the family's one chicken! Maybe an apocryphal story.

Red Rat
05-28-2010, 09:02 AM
Just for information I have copied below the Training Objectives (TO) for the Commissioning Course at Sandhurst. Sandhurst remains different from other military academies in that it is a one year course focused on producing leaders to fill platoon command slots; it is not academically orientated.

TO1 Demonstrate combat fitness
TO2 Handle and fire platoon weapon systems
TO3 Navigate across country
TO4 Apply battlefield first aid
TO5 Carry out basic fieldcraft
TO6 Operate in a CBRN environment (Chem, bio and nuclear)
TO7 Officership Ethics, integrity, values and standards
TO8 Command
TO9 Perform Military Duties (including drill)
TO10 Communicate Effectively
TO11 Spare
TO12 Lead Individual and Team Training (adventure training, cadet platoon projects, sports et al)
TO13 Spare
TO14 Operate IT/IM Equipment
TO15 Lead a Platoon
TO16 Operate Tactical Communications Systems
TO17 Apply knowledge of Tactics
TO18 Analyse British Military Doctrine
TO19 Analyse Military performance in Current Conflicts
TO20 Analyse the Current Political and Strategic Context
TO21 Describe Structure and Roles of the British Armed Forces
TO22 Explain the Capabilities And Operating Environment of a Battle Group


Exercises take up 43% of programmed time. Exercises are the vital tool as vehicles both to support lessons taught under the majority of the TOs , for cadets to display the skills of leadership and command and for the DS to assess those skills and the cadets’ suitability for a commission.

It is accepted wisdom that it is only by placing cadets in conditions of physical and mental stress that their endurance and resilience can be properly tested. Whilst the exercise programme is heavy and resource intensive it should be remembered that for the majority the realities of operations are imminent on completion of Course.

The cadets also do a staff ride in Normandy which gives the cadets the chance to practise estimate and decision making against the backdrop of a past campaign. This is a challenging exercise which sees the integration of civilian and military staff at its best.

William F. Owen
05-28-2010, 09:18 AM
Just for information I have copied below the Training Objectives (TO) for the Commissioning Course at Sandhurst. Sandhurst remains different from other military academies in that it is a one year course focused on producing leaders to fill platoon command slots; it is not academically orientated.
Thanks for that. Strange how Sandhurst focusses on producing Infantry Platoon Commander out of civilians, and yet the Infantry officers then have to go and do PCBC at Brecon to learn to be Platoon Commanders.

I have never understood why we do not require all male officers to graduate from Infantry basic training, with the ranks and then do a short 4-month "Officer School/Selection" followed by special to arm training. What "Officer School" consists of is open to discussion, but looking at Sandhurst and the current system challenges my objectivity. I see no merit versus alternatives.

I recently asked one of the Sandhurst Staff how many got failed out of the course and he told me, that it wasn't their job to fail people, but develop them. - This is fundamentally disagree with.

Red Rat
05-28-2010, 09:44 AM
Thanks for that. Strange how Sandhurst focusses on producing Infantry Platoon Commander out of civilians, and yet the Infantry officers then have to go and do PCBC at Brecon to learn to be Platoon Commanders.

I never understood that either when I went through. :D Platoon commanders' course has now changed considerably with overseas exercises and real soldiers to command. They still do not have the full range of operational weapon systems to train with though....:rolleyes:



I have never understood why we do not require all male officers to graduate from Infantry basic training, with the ranks and then do a short 4-month "Officer School/Selection" followed by special to arm training. What "Officer School" consists of is open to discussion, but looking at Sandhurst and the current system challenges my objectivity. I see no merit versus alternatives.
I think it is a cultural thing. The system works well enough and therefore there is no over-riding reason to change. I went through the old 'O' type system of Potential Officer Development Course which used to be compulsory for Scottish Division Officers. Basic training at Glencorse, no more then 4 hours sleep a night and a 'blind' programme where we did not know what was going to happen more then 2 hours in advance - those were the days :D There was some Treasury inspired talk some years ago of a common officer training academy for all 3 services but I think comon sense prevailed. None of the Services thought it would be a good thing. Our experience of joint training establishments is that the lowest common denominator (inevitably 'Light Blue'...) is adopted.


I recently asked one of the Sandhurst Staff how many got failed out of the course and he told me, that it wasn't their job to fail people, but develop them. - This is fundamentally disagree with. Concur. Much depends on the attitude of the company commander, the laddie beside me sacked 5 of his cadets when he was company commanding at Sandhurst. Combat arm DS tend to be more demanding at Sandhurst, especially of those who aspire to join the combat arms.

John T. Fishel
05-28-2010, 11:32 AM
Sandhurst is a training program, not an education program. However, a couple of TOs do have education (v training) content. Of course, all education has a training component while all training has an education component - think of the difference as between critical thinking and acquisition of skills. As Wilf and others have pointed out, there are many roads to officership. I would add that the American Officer Candidate School source of commissioning is as important as ROTC or the academies. I would also note that two of my students at OU this year are former enlisted who will be commissioing shortly through ROTC - one USAF and one US Army. In the Army this used to be known as Green to Gold.

Cheers

JohnT

Red Rat
05-28-2010, 12:03 PM
Sandhurst is a training program, not an education program. However, a couple of TOs do have education (v training) content.

Concur. To elaborate further:

TO 18/19 These 2 subjects take up 2% of programmed time. They are inextricably linked. Considerable time in the WS syllabus is however spent on aspects of military leadership. the programme is delivered by a mixture of military and academic staff, as are the operations of war lectures

TO 20 This takes up 2% of programmed time and includes elements of TO7, specifically LOAC. The programme deals with themes rather than a chronological recounting of world events and influences on the present. Case studies are the key tool and the inclusion and integration of the academics into the military package complements and provides practical input.

As an Army we are not intellectually minded at all :rolleyes: and several senior officers I have spoken to have sataed that they would like to see more thinking happen, perhaps the opportunity for more officers at field officer grade to spend time in full time academic institutions.

At junior grade there is common consensus that our training of junior staff officers (captains) is not fit for purpose.

William F. Owen
05-28-2010, 12:46 PM
TO9 Perform Military Duties (including drill)

....and how much time does "drill" take up? Why we still do this to the extent we do, leaves me cold. And I did "Light Division Drill!"

JMA
05-28-2010, 01:02 PM
Depends on the unit, and branch. Reuven Gal's "Portrait of an Israeli Soldier" (http://www.amazon.com/Portrait-Israeli-Soldier-ebook/dp/B001ATNMRS) describes the whole process in detail. - (and book recommended to me by General Sir John Kiszely)

Essentially, you have to pass out of basic training with a good score, be selected to do the JNCO course, and the best of those go on to be officers, while having served as JNCOs in the unit, to the satisfaction of the Commanding officer. It's very much about character, and ability.

The current COS, Gabi Askenazi comes from an very impoverished and disadvantaged back ground. It is said, his introduction to combat and vigilance, was guarding the family's one chicken! Maybe an apocryphal story.

Thanks, amazing what can be found in google books.

It seems as follows (depending on what arm you are in):

Basic training 3-4 months
Service approx 13-14 months
Officer training 4-6 months

Then this:

“Those who complete the officer courses will be commissioned as 2nd lieutenants and will return to their units (generally the same units where they served as regular soldiers and NCOs) and will be assigned to the position of platoon commander. The IDF officer is thus commissioned after twenty to twenty-four months military service, and with his acceptance of his commission, he acquires an additional twelve months of active duty time beyond the usual three years mandatory service. Accordingly the IDF can count on having these new officers for approximately two years of active duty after commissioning…”

JMA
05-28-2010, 01:19 PM
Just for information I have copied below the Training Objectives (TO) for the Commissioning Course at Sandhurst. Sandhurst remains different from other military academies in that it is a one year course focused on producing leaders to fill platoon command slots; it is not academically orientated.

TO1 Demonstrate combat fitness
TO2 Handle and fire platoon weapon systems
TO3 Navigate across country
TO4 Apply battlefield first aid
TO5 Carry out basic fieldcraft
TO6 Operate in a CBRN environment (Chem, bio and nuclear)
TO7 Officership Ethics, integrity, values and standards
TO8 Command
TO9 Perform Military Duties (including drill)
TO10 Communicate Effectively
TO11 Spare
TO12 Lead Individual and Team Training (adventure training, cadet platoon projects, sports et al)
TO13 Spare
TO14 Operate IT/IM Equipment
TO15 Lead a Platoon
TO16 Operate Tactical Communications Systems
TO17 Apply knowledge of Tactics
TO18 Analyse British Military Doctrine
TO19 Analyse Military performance in Current Conflicts
TO20 Analyse the Current Political and Strategic Context
TO21 Describe Structure and Roles of the British Armed Forces
TO22 Explain the Capabilities And Operating Environment of a Battle Group


Exercises take up 43% of programmed time. Exercises are the vital tool as vehicles both to support lessons taught under the majority of the TOs , for cadets to display the skills of leadership and command and for the DS to assess those skills and the cadets’ suitability for a commission.

It is accepted wisdom that it is only by placing cadets in conditions of physical and mental stress that their endurance and resilience can be properly tested. Whilst the exercise programme is heavy and resource intensive it should be remembered that for the majority the realities of operations are imminent on completion of Course.

The cadets also do a staff ride in Normandy which gives the cadets the chance to practise estimate and decision making against the backdrop of a past campaign. This is a challenging exercise which sees the integration of civilian and military staff at its best.

One needs to sit and work through this in greater detail to make comment but I would say TO18-21 maybe inserted as a nice to have rather than serve any real purpose. I sometimes think it unfair on the youngsters to give them a taste of critical thinking only to see their initiative and enthusiasm dashed by the "system" later. At the School of Infantry I took both a National Service Officer course and a Regular Cadet Course (1 year). I agree with the one year highly practical approach but not sure of the Normandy bit though (maybe more of a jolly for the DS ;) What about 3-4 weeks in Afghanistan? Take them on an op get them into a contact or two? (seriously)

Red Rat
05-28-2010, 01:24 PM
TO9
....and how much time does "drill" take up?

Quoting the party line:

Drill takes up 4% of the programmed time, which includes rehearsals for and the Sovereign’s Parade (SP).
Drill is an essential, quick and easy part of team building, instilling martial spirit. It accustoms cadets to taking and reacting to orders.
Despite the programmed time the standard is deemed only just good enough for a high profile parade such as SP.

When I was at Sandhurst I seem to remember that Drill featured heavily in Term 1 and then tailed off significantly thereafter.

No Light Division drill (for the uninitiated a cross between jogging and Monty Python's Ministry of Funny Walks... ;)) and Slow Marching is likely to finish soon as well.

RR

baboon6
05-28-2010, 01:35 PM
The IDF produce generally very competent officers, with a great deal of command experience, if you get slated for the Command stream. I know one guys who has commanded 3 Battalions and 2 Brigades - all for 3 years!
All Majors are now expected to go and get a Masters Degree - why I do not know!
The German Army of the 1930's - 50's 60' and into the 1980's produced above average combat officers, by the accounts of the men who have studied them.

My point, and nothing to do with US Service Academies, is that there is a good body of evidence that says you can produce very good officers without too much cost, time or process. Surely that is the requirement?

The German officer training system of those eras (it has I believe changed a bit now) and that of the Israelis is quite similar in some ways, requiring short service in the ranks, passing junior NCO courses etc. Do you know if the Israelis consciously modeled their system on the German one (seems unlikely but you never know) or if it just developed that way?

baboon6
05-28-2010, 02:12 PM
I have never understood why we do not require all male officers to graduate from Infantry basic training, with the ranks and then do a short 4-month "Officer School/Selection" followed by special to arm training. What "Officer School" consists of is open to discussion, but looking at Sandhurst and the current system challenges my objectivity. I see no merit versus alternatives.



That would be a lot like the system used by the British Army in WW2 which by 1942 went something like this:

6 weeks basic training at a Primary Training Centre
War Office Selection Board, usually for those coming straight from a PTC followed by a pre-OCTU course of a few weeks. Some went through 3 months or so at an Infantry Training Centre/RAC or RA Training Regt etc before WOSB.
4-6 months at an Officer Cadet Training Unit, depending on the type of establishment and time of the war. There were several OCTUs for each arm or service.

Serving private soldiers and NCOs could also be recommended for officer training provided they passed the WOSB.

William F. Owen
05-28-2010, 02:15 PM
Do you know if the Israelis consciously modeled their system on the German one (seems unlikely but you never know) or if it just developed that way?

From my own enquiries, it appears that the idea that officers have to prove themselves in the ranks comes from Palmach.
Because the Israelis lacked the British "class" and private education system, you had to prove yourself to be a leader. They were also strongly socialist in ideology, so merit was strongly emphasised. All that conspired into the modern system you see today.

JMA
05-28-2010, 02:30 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
I recently asked one of the Sandhurst Staff how many got failed out of the course and he told me, that it wasn't their job to fail people, but develop them. - This is fundamentally disagree with.


Concur. Much depends on the attitude of the company commander, the laddie beside me sacked 5 of his cadets when he was company commanding at Sandhurst. Combat arm DS tend to be more demanding at Sandhurst, especially of those who aspire to join the combat arms.

Yes and no. My opinion is that it is up to the initial selection process (OSB) to get it mostly right so that the course staff could concentrate on taking the students to their potential (as much as you can do in such a short period.) I got intensely irritated when presented with obvious hopeless cases from the outset.

Better to have half the size of the course and have a better pass rate of better trained and exercised young officers than to carry passengers along for the ride for no purpose.

I liked the idea the Selous Scouts had when they trained some National Servicemen (yes believe it or not even they needed to top up with 18 year olds). They took them directly on a physical selection course where they were placed under constant stress for a period of a month where they learned bushcraft and the like. A great test of character. 99% of those who made the first month passed out I understand.

Now (at last) here is a good use for Kenya. Take the cadets out there for a month where they will do just enough drill to get from A to B, do all the field craft/bushcraft stuff, do the basic personal weapon training stuff, mix in a lot of endurance and team work issues, cover the map reading etc etc

So effectively you cover:

TO1 Demonstrate combat fitness
TO2 Handle and fire platoon weapon systems (rifle and LMG)
TO3 Navigate across country
TO4 Apply battlefield first aid
TO5 Carry out basic fieldcraft
TO12 Lead Individual and Team Training (adventure training, cadet platoon projects, sports et al)
add Intro to tracking.
Plus many of the leadership aspects.

After one month they will have had the best/most interesting/most enjoyable training they will ever have and you will have sorted the men from the boys.

I say its a bargain. (I'll be available for the hot season say November ;)

JMA
05-29-2010, 12:03 AM
I think it is a cultural thing. The system works well enough and therefore there is no over-riding reason to change. I went through the old 'O' type system of Potential Officer Development Course which used to be compulsory for Scottish Division Officers. Basic training at Glencorse, no more then 4 hours sleep a night and a 'blind' programme where we did not know what was going to happen more then 2 hours in advance - those were the days :D

If you look at the IDF system it appears to be built around their 2 year National Service with the requirement for officers to sign on for another year before being posted to the reserve (this as I read it from the exert from the quoted book). This may be the limitation of the system as it effectively screens out any potential officers who for whatever reason do not want to extend their time on active service another year. It also appears that NCO promotions take place within the first year after recruit training. That is very much a national service thing and would be exceptional within a regular army structure.

It works for them just as it can probably be said by most countries that their system works for them also.

This idea of the need of service before commissioning seems only valid if it is built upon time served as a trained soldier and not merely some sort of egalitarian approach to basic training.

From my personal experience I did 6 months "basic" training in the South Africa as a national servicemen then went on to Rhodesia where i did the whole basic training thing again for 20 weeks. And did First Phase on officers course (was it 12 weeks? out of the 12 month course - can't quite remember) which culminated with "Passing off the square".

There were differences. Important differences. My instructors on recruit course were sgts and cpls while on officers course only c/sgts and WOIIs. Big difference. The recruit training was pitched at preparing one to be a "bayonet" in a rifle platoon while clearly the officers course was all about leadership and even during section battle drills we were involved with the demonstration company (that's all we had) as troops to command.

So quite honestly the basic training itself came nowhere close to the quality of the first phase of the officers training.

It was the time served in an operational subunit which was valuable. The 5 contacts I had as a troopie were valuable. It is this aspect that needs attention. The Sword of Honour on my officers course had attended university first so had a head start yet speaking to him 30 years on he believes that he too would have benefited had he spent some time in the ranks before officers course or being commissioned.

So it really appears that there is a need for practical experience of soldiering prior to taking command of a platoon on active service and not necessarily to be trained with and soldier with basic recruits.

We played with the idea of understudies where new officers would spend time working with a platoon commander who was coming to the end of his 3 year stint as a platoon commander. Not satisfactory. We had op attachments where officer cadets were attached to operational companies (a variation on the understudy theme). Worked quite well except was never long enough.

So if a person was to first do basic training and then a year as a trained soldier how much could you reduce the 12 month officer course by? If the recruit course was 20 weeks then you could probably offset about half of that and bring it down to 9 and a half months. IMHO

abraszkoa
07-04-2010, 08:24 PM
I'm Major Alex Braszko, currently a student at Intermediate Level Education at Fort Belvoir, Command and General Staff College. I'm replying to an earlier posting that commented on the frustrations with service academies.

The views expressed in this blog are my own and do not reflect official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

When I graduated West Point in 1997, I attended MI OBC at Fort Huachuca, AZ. Our graduating class had some of the top students, as well as bottom students, from our class branch MI. Literally, our #3 ranked academic student, I believe, as well as another that was down in the 800s both made it into MI. I was somewhere closer to the middle top. My understanding from ROTC peers was that MI was much more selective in their respective colleges and universities, but I don't know the actual stats.

It appeared, at that time, from talking to my West Point classmates at OBC, that we were somewhat more prepared than our ROTC peers when we attended MI OBC, especially from a discipline perspective. We West Point grads seemed much more content to be "free" and didn't mind the requirements of early morning PT, long academic days, etc. However, the slight advantages we may have initially had changed rapidly after our first 12 months. From then on it seemed like USMA and ROTC grads were in the same boat.

William F. Owen
07-05-2010, 06:01 AM
If you look at the IDF system it appears to be built around their 2 year National Service with the requirement for officers to sign on for another year before being posted to the reserve (this as I read it from the exert from the quoted book). This may be the limitation of the system as it effectively screens out any potential officers who for whatever reason do not want to extend their time on active service another year. It also appears that NCO promotions take place within the first year after recruit training. That is very much a national service thing and would be exceptional within a regular army structure.
The system is built around a 3 year period of service. The officer selection is based on something called Kaba (quality) scores, that is based on your life before the army from school work, family history and psychological examinations on joining. It is notable that almost all successful IDF officers have very high Kaba scores. This is the bit everyone misses.

You are selected as a potential officer before you get into uniform. If you want to be an officer, you have to serve longer, be more committed and smarter than everyone else - and prove it constantly. Only the highest scoring candidates from the NCO school, make it to Officer School. The IDF system is essentially based on selecting officers, not just training them.
By all accounts things are less brutal than they used to be, but it's still very tough.

Red Rat
07-05-2010, 08:12 AM
The system is built around a 3 year period of service. The officer selection is based on something called Kaba (quality) scores, that is based on your life before the army from school work, family history and psychological examinations on joining. It is notable that almost all successful IDF officers have very high Kaba scores. This is the bit everyone misses.

Is there any literature on the kaba methodology? While at university a friend of mine did his thesis on the Army Officer Selection process. The Army Officer Selection Board (AOSB) is surprisingly sophisticated (most of us just remember command tasks with 3 barrels, 6 toggle ropes, 2 planks and a hangover; as well as the dreaded 6ft wall :eek:) with lots of psychometric testing. I forget what the statistics are, but AOSB reckoned it identified most General Staff officers (bird colonel and above) at AOSB.

Replying to JMAs point on officer training syllabus, the first term at Sandhurst is the trained soldier syllabus, so if officer candidates had to come having completed time in the ranks then you ould in theory cut the course by approx 1/3.

Sandhurst has recently been given a bit of a new broom and I was there a couple of weeks ago trying to ascertain how they had changed in the light of operational experiences. I will see if I can write up my notes this week and publish. I know that they have trialled Ex Caractacus, a complex COIN TEWT set in Wales circa AD 100.

William F. Owen
07-05-2010, 08:59 AM
Is there any literature on the kaba methodology?
Portrait of an Israeli Soldier is on Google Books. That's the best English version I know.

I forget what the statistics are, but AOSB reckoned it identified most General Staff officers (bird colonel and above) at AOSB.
Wow. AOSB assessed themselves as successful. What about the actual performance of those officers?
Even if that were true, all that tells you is that AOSB can identity those who can be successful within that system. It fails to tell you if the men selected were actually good officers, compared to other methods.

IMO the UK could do a better job of selecting and training officers, if the need became more apparent and pressing.

Red Rat
07-05-2010, 10:41 AM
Even if that were true, all that tells you is that AOSB can identity those who can be successful within that system. It fails to tell you if the men selected were actually good officers, compared to other methods.

I quite agree, but the point I was making is that in the same way that the kaba methodology appears to show a correlation between high score and high performance in the IDF, so does the AOSB scoring and performance in the UK Army. What works for the IDF will not work for the UK Army as both organisations are reflective of different societies, but there will be crossover based on expected professional competencies.



IMO the UK could do a better job of selecting and training officers, if the need became more apparent and pressing.

Undoubtedly, but the system works sufficiently as it is. AOSB takes in a very large number of candidates and passes a declining percentage of them, a reflection perhaps on the changes in society when viewed against the perceived requirements of the army. Those that pass selection and then training are (in the army's opinion) performing well on ops.

I think there is more of an issue with the through training and education of the officer corps then there is with initial selection, training and performance on operations. Our challenge is how to encourage robust, professionally competent and flexible thinking officers within an organisation that is inherently conservative and hierarchical. Perhaps we do not want to encourage flexibility and (mental) agility across the officer corps but nurture not penalise what we have, recognising that it is a necessary talent pool?

JMA
07-05-2010, 01:56 PM
Is there any literature on the kaba methodology? While at university a friend of mine did his thesis on the Army Officer Selection process. The Army Officer Selection Board (AOSB) is surprisingly sophisticated (most of us just remember command tasks with 3 barrels, 6 toggle ropes, 2 planks and a hangover; as well as the dreaded 6ft wall :eek:) with lots of psychometric testing. I forget what the statistics are, but AOSB reckoned it identified most General Staff officers (bird colonel and above) at AOSB.

Actually if you go to page 118/9 of the referred to book.

(Go here (http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=y_s6_k8ngccC&dq=Portrait+of+an+Israeli+Soldier&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=pq4xTOnmMMKMnQeGv_isDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CDYQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=Gibush&f=false) to start. Then select the page 119 option. Then scroll up to the last paragraph of page 118.

It says: " Far more important (than the Kaba assessment), however, are the addition means of selection. They list some and then say again that despite all this stuff they still have to undergo "3 to 4 days of situation screening procedures, called Gibush..."

Now any bets that the planks, the wall, the barrels and the toggle ropes (probably without hangover) will be found during the Gibush phase?

It appears the Kaba is a intelligence test.


Replying to JMAs point on officer training syllabus, the first term at Sandhurst is the trained soldier syllabus, so if officer candidates had to come having completed time in the ranks then you ould in theory cut the course by approx 1/3.

As I said I found the whole training of recruits and then officers were approached from a totally different angles. In the nine years since UDI I don't think things could have changed that dramatically in the UK. We we probably still working off the same script.

For the record then the recruit training aimed to produce "bayonets" (riflemen) and had corporals and sgts as instructors. While the whole emphasis on the officers course was to give the officer an understanding of minor tactics so as to know exactly what his sgt, his corporals, his support weapons and his riflemen were supposed to be doing and where the training was carried out by colour/staff sgts and WOII's. So my position was that one could not just deduct the time spent on recruit training from the officers course as there was a need to cover what I stated above and also supplement the personal weapon handling skill of all platoon weapons with specific training on the tactical employment of these platoon weapons. You copy?


Sandhurst has recently been given a bit of a new broom and I was there a couple of weeks ago trying to ascertain how they had changed in the light of operational experiences. I will see if I can write up my notes this week and publish. I know that they have trialled Ex Caractacus, a complex COIN TEWT set in Wales circa AD 100.

Good to see there is some effort being made. I don't know what the Officer Instructor / cadet ratio is nowadays at Sandhurst but I seem to remember that it was higher than the one : ten/twelve ratio which I believe is preferred.

I would be interested in how that TEWT has been drafted.

I would say that all current courses should read the following two books and discuss and study them in detail. These should be essential reading for all serving officers and senior NCOs:

Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (http://www.amazon.com/Bear-Went-over-Mountain-Afghanistan/dp/0788146653)

and

The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (http://www.amazon.com/Other-Side-Mountain-Mujahideen-Soviet-Afghan/dp/1907521054/ref=pd_sim_b_3)

PS: I wonder if the author Lester W. Grau, a Vietnam War veteran and retired lt col in the U.S. Army is still with us. Shouldn't he be an essential speaker to every Staff Course, officers course and senior NCOs course?

Red Rat
07-05-2010, 03:03 PM
For the record then the recruit training aimed to produce "bayonets" (riflemen) and had corporals and sgts as instructors. While the whole emphasis on the officers course was to give the officer an understanding of minor tactics so as to know exactly what his sgt, his corporals, his support weapons and his riflemen were supposed to be doing and where the training was carried out by colour/staff sgts and WOII's. So my position was that one could not just deduct the time spent on recruit training from the officers course as there was a need to cover what I stated above and also supplement the personal weapon handling skill of all platoon weapons with specific training on the tactical employment of these platoon weapons. You copy? I think I copy! :D
The first term at Sandhurst is the Common Military Syllabus (Recruit) (CMS(R)) at heart, as it assumes no prior military knowledge of the officer cadets; walk before run. Once the cadets are trained soldiers (have completed CMS(R)) then they can go on to learn tactics.

The previous ethos of Sandhurst was to use infantry tactics as a vehicle to teach leadership. Recognising that for most officers Sandhurst is going to be their ownly exposure to light role infantry tactics there is now much more emphasis on not just tactics as a vehicle for leadership training, but to ensure tactical profiency by all officers regardless of branch or arm.




Good to see there is some effort being made. I don't know what the Officer Instructor / cadet ratio is nowadays at Sandhurst but I seem to remember that it was higher than the one : ten/twelve ratio which I believe is preferred.

Each platoon has a Captain instructor and a CSgt or WO2 intructor, so 2:30 ratio. For some specialist lessons (skill at arms, signals et al) they will go to specialist wings and the ratio of instructors to students is increased.


I would be interested in how that TEWT has been drafted. So would I!



I would say that all current courses should read the following two books and discuss and study them in detail. These should be essential reading for all serving officers and senior NCOs:

Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (http://www.amazon.com/Bear-Went-over-Mountain-Afghanistan/dp/0788146653)

and

The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (http://www.amazon.com/Other-Side-Mountain-Mujahideen-Soviet-Afghan/dp/1907521054/ref=pd_sim_b_3)


Both books are very well known in the army, being on the mandatory reading lists.

William F. Owen
07-06-2010, 04:47 AM
They list some and then say again that despite all this stuff they still have to undergo "3 to 4 days of situation screening procedures, called Gibush..."

Now any bets that the planks, the wall, the barrels and the toggle ropes (probably without hangover) will be found during the Gibush phase?

It appears the Kaba is a intelligence test.
The Kaba "Score" refers to an overall assessment, not just how smart you are. The Gibush is nothing like the RCB with planks and barrels. Its essentially about putting people under psychological and physical pressure. It is used as the practical confirmation of the what the Kaba has indicated.

William F. Owen
07-06-2010, 04:56 AM
What works for the IDF will not work for the UK Army as both organisations are reflective of different societies, but there will be crossover based on expected professional competencies.
Possibly. A lot of IDF stuff does not translate due to the gulf in cultures, but both armies claim to be looking for the same basic things in officers.
I would not recommend using an Israeli (or German) approach, but I think there is amble evidence to support a move to a "Sans-Sandhurst" approach that may prove more effective.

Those that pass selection and then training are (in the army's opinion) performing well on ops.
Concur. Nothing I have ever seen tells me that the UK has a problem with junior officers. Most I have met in recent years seem to be a bit more switched on than those I served with.

I think there is more of an issue with the through training and education of the officer corps then there is with initial selection, training and performance on operations.
Again concur. There is a problem with professional education. I don't buy into the "complex adaptive" thinker BS. Someone grounded in professional knowledge and experience is all you need. What that professional knowledge and experience is, is very up for grabs.

JMA
07-06-2010, 05:50 AM
The Kaba "Score" refers to an overall assessment, not just how smart you are. The Gibush is nothing like the RCB with planks and barrels. Its essentially about putting people under psychological and physical pressure. It is used as the practical confirmation of the what the Kaba has indicated.

That's not what the book says.

William F. Owen
07-06-2010, 07:14 AM
That's not what the book says.
Well the edition I have on my desk, gives a pretty explicit statement on page 85 - "In search of Quality" - and if you talk to IDF officers, they most readily translate the Kaba score as "quality score." "Dapa" is the intelligence component of the Kaba. There are four Kaba components.
Experiments with armour crews showed that placing "high Kaba" scorers together lead to significantly better performance, that "low Kaba" crews.
To describe the Kaba system as an "intelligence test," is inaccurate and misleading. It is far more.
"Ha Gibush" is practical testing aimed at placing candidates under stress, because a Kaba score will not indicate a candidates necessary level of aggression and determination, plus his ability to keep thinking while holding a 20kg Jerry can over his head.

JMA
07-06-2010, 07:28 AM
What works for the IDF will not work for the UK Army as both organisations are reflective of different societies, but there will be crossover based on expected professional competencies.

I would not rush to that conclusion and apply it either way or from other countries as well.

There is always something to learn from others, a little bit here, a fundamental bit there. But what is not in the culture of most modern armies is to accept that they can learn from other armies thereby implying that others are "better" in some respects than they.

If one understands the underlying principle or concept then one can apply it to ones own setting.

Rhodesia was very much like the Brit army in that it was based on a professional army while the SADF (South Africa) was very much built around its National Service system (much like the Israelis) of two years but obviously less effective than the Israelis as national service was a year shorter.

Now having been in both camps as it were the 'old' Brit system (as I understood it) is far superior than the Israeli system.

Goto Chapter 6 and follow the explanation of "Induction and Basic Training" and see what you glean from that. NCOs of two years service as instructors and 2nd Lt as training Platoon Cmdrs. Appalling. The same weakness as the SADF.

But from what you say (that the first phase of officer training is from a syllabus common all recruits) the 14 week first phase seems to fit in with the egalitarian approach of "everyone gets a common basic training". This all sounds good in the name of standardisation ans streamlining but it translates, I submit, into 14 weeks of lost time in officer preparation in a context where a brand new 2nd Lt for the first 'x' number of months is of dubious value anyway. At least in the Brit army there are 7-10 year service sgts who can nurse the youngster along while he "finds his feet" but in the Israeli army after nine months of training and some service in between he is expected hit the ground running.

Then onto the instructor ratio. I thought the ideal squad size for weapon training and fieldcraft was 12? We even had 12 per barrack room. So on the RLI recruit course I/we had a corporal per 12 recruits and a sgt per 24. But I was talking about the officer ratio (as I thought the NCO ratio was a given). The Training Troop was commanded by a Capt (ex- RSM/CSM commissioned) and supported by a CSM. Lived in terror of the CSM and saw the Training Officer regularly but he seemed to be more interested in what and how the instructors were doing their stuff than us.

On officers course we started with 24 or 25 and 12 passed-out. Two colour sgts gave us their undivided attention under the eye of the Wing SM for all that stuff while we had an OC Regular Cadets (Maj) and a Course Officer (snr Capt) and they were under the eye of the OC Cadet Wing.

Years later when I was the Course Officer on a Regular Cadet Course the system remained the same.

Not over the last 30 years has anything led me to believe that the ratios I mentioned above could be diluted without a significant negative effect.

I am hoping that your response will be that most changes are forced through budget reviews rather than because it is a better training solution.

William F. Owen
07-06-2010, 10:19 AM
Goto Chapter 6 and follow the explanation of "Induction and Basic Training" and see what you glean from that. NCOs of two years service as instructors and 2nd Lt as training Platoon Cmdrs. Appalling. The same weakness as the SADF.
Why appalling? Why a weakness? What you actually mean, if "different to what you are comfortable with."
The IDF starts giving potential NCOs command positions during basic training. The whole system is geared to streaming out, testing and selecting leaders during their conscription service. The right man is the right man. Waiting for him to get older makes no actual difference.
Israeli platoons have platoon commanders and section commanders. It's that simple and it works well.
Most Israeli unit and formation commanders are 10-12 years younger than their British or American counter-parts and very often have had multiple unit and formation commands.

JMA
07-07-2010, 07:35 AM
Why appalling? Why a weakness? What you actually mean, if "different to what you are comfortable with."
The IDF starts giving potential NCOs command positions during basic training. The whole system is geared to streaming out, testing and selecting leaders during their conscription service. The right man is the right man. Waiting for him to get older makes no actual difference.
Israeli platoons have platoon commanders and section commanders. It's that simple and it works well.
Most Israeli unit and formation commanders are 10-12 years younger than their British or American counter-parts and very often have had multiple unit and formation commands.

Yes I can see that the Israelis have built their system around their 3 year national service cycle. Given that fixed parameter they have to make the most of it and other than insist on an extra year for officers its three years active serve then into the Reserve after that.

They probably do the best they can under the circumstances.

Purely in terms of instructor experience, maturity and training the Brit system (as I understand it) is way ahead of the Israelis (as I understand theirs).

Instructor corporals involved with basic recruit training would have 5-7 years service? Sgts involved with recruit training would have 7-10 years service? Add to that they would have done a drill and weapons course and/or a minor tactics course (maybe these courses have nes names now). Certainly the course officer would not be a 2Lt with what 18 mths-2 years service.

I'm talking quality of training given. No comparison.

One understands the Israeli need to get the most out of the 3 year national service, train them quickly, identify and train leaders quickly, get these conscripts into active service units quickly... because the next big war may be just around the corner.

Given the limitations of operating within the 3 year national service system the Israelis have done exceptionally well.

As to my comment about "appalling". I stand by my comment that an NCO with 2 years or less total military service being used for recruit instruction is an appalling thought.

William F. Owen
07-07-2010, 07:59 AM
Purely in terms of instructor experience, maturity and training the Brit system (as I understand it) is way ahead of the Israelis (as I understand theirs).

Actually you do have a point, but it has to be asked how much of a problem it really is. For example, a lot of the gunnery instructors at the armour school are 19-year-old girls. The same is true of the Sniper instructors at the sniper School, and the parachute instructors at the airborne school. 19-year-old girls!!

OK, so how good or experienced do you have to be to teach either of those subjects, if the instructors have been selected from their ability to instruct them? In the IDF, the girls, pass on the basics, just as well as anyone can, and the men they are teaching then go off and gain the experience. None of the guys have a hang-up about women instructors, so it's simply not an issue.
Senior instructors, who train the instructors, tend to be long-service NCOs.

Tactical/operational training is done by officers.

I have known a good few very experienced soldiers who were very bad instructors. Experience generally informs practice, not teaching. "Them that can does. Them that can't, teach."

JMA
07-07-2010, 08:05 AM
Why appalling? Why a weakness? What you actually mean, if "different to what you are comfortable with."
The IDF starts giving potential NCOs command positions during basic training. The whole system is geared to streaming out, testing and selecting leaders during their conscription service. The right man is the right man. Waiting for him to get older makes no actual difference.
Israeli platoons have platoon commanders and section commanders. It's that simple and it works well.
Most Israeli unit and formation commanders are 10-12 years younger than their British or American counter-parts and very often have had multiple unit and formation commands.

My comments re the Brit and Israeli systems stand.

The 2 year National Service in Rhodesia had a different training solution. Again the aim was to get as much active service time out of the conscripts as possible.

The National Service cadet courses at the School of Infantry would last 4 and a half months. Out of that one could get 2 Lts, sgts and corporals who would then be posted out mainly to the National Service "Independent Companies" and also to Signals, Engineers, Armoured Cars, Artillery etc.

Hardly ideal... but it worked for Rhodesia.

The course I took passed-out 16 of which 9 were 2 Lts. Seven members of the course were graduates (mainly BSc types) all of whom were commissioned. Two were sadly later KIA and for the rest we remain in contact through a closed Facebook group. I have received good feedback from them looking back 30 years ago.

Again this approach to the training of National Service leaders was the best idea Rhodesia had under their circumstances and within their 2 year National Service.

JMA
07-07-2010, 08:25 AM
Actually you do have a point, but it has to be asked how much of a problem it really is. For example, a lot of the gunnery instructors at the armour school are 19-year-old girls. The same is true of the Sniper instructors at the sniper School, and the parachute instructors at the airborne school. 19-year-old girls!!

OK, so how good or experienced do you have to be to teach either of those subjects, if the instructors have been selected from their ability to instruct them? In the IDF, the girls, pass on the basics, just as well as anyone can, and the men they are teaching then go off and gain the experience. None of the guys have a hang-up about women instructors, so it's simply not an issue.
Senior instructors, who train the instructors, tend to be long-service NCOs.

Tactical/operational training is done by officers.

I have known a good few very experienced soldiers who were very bad instructors. Experience generally informs practice, not teaching. "Them that can does. Them that can't, teach."

In a second follow up reply I covered the Rhodesian approach to nation Service "leader" training.

I accept if there is a system whereby careful selection (like the Israeli Kaba for example) and an low instructor student ratio are achieved there is a lot you can do with talented people in a relatively short period of time.

I think it is intelligent to analyse each specific training subject and assess exactly who really needs to provide that instruction. Back then I would have loved to have a 19 year girl give me training on my personal weapon and I don't see it matters with para training or even dispatching. The thing is you don't necessarily free up "men" for active service by doing this as I noted a tendency for those maybe not best suited to active service tended to gravitate to training and peripheral jobs.

I do think that the student / instructor ratio is a critical success factor in just about all training.

JMA
07-07-2010, 08:45 AM
Tactical/operational training is done by officers.

One needs to consider that.

Certainly tactical training for officers should be done by officers as it would relate to a unit and formation context. I would add officer courses to this.

I accept that on a Senior NCOs tactics course there should be a course officer who has a personal involvement in the training together with a core team of warrant officer instructors.

All other tactical training, being the "junior" tac course and all recruit training should IMHO be done by NCOs.