Future Small Wars and the USMC

[Strickland]

Would the US be better served if the USMC went "back to the future," and once again became "troops of the Department of State?" I am not simply suggesting a return in mission, but a wholesale transfer of authority from DoD to DoS over the USMC, similar to the DHS now having authority over the Coast Guard. Before every Marine reading this has a heart-attack and votes me off the island, think about the following: What would the implications be of institutionally combining USAID and the USMC? What would this mean for our abilities to use all elements of national power to manage and resolve conflict around the globe? Most Marines that have MEU experience are used to working closely with the embassy as a matter of routine, thus habitual relationships are present. Isnt the USMC's history all about Small Wars? Would this not enable our Small Wars efforts? Would this not put us on the cutting edge of not only the GWOT, but managing and resolving conflict globally?

This would further allow the Army and Navy to pursue efforts aimed at countering DPRK, PRC, etc. While some may immediately think of Thomas Barnett's books, I am not suggesting that the framework he proposes is optimal, only that the motive is sound.

Any thoughts?

[Steve Blair]

I don't really think this would be viable for a number of reasons. The first is, obviously, the close links between the USMC and the USN when it comes to logistics and transportation. DoS doesn't have the capability to handle this, and the USMC doesn't have the organic capability. Second, you run into the question of budget and funding. DoS doesn't have the clout DoD does.
Aside from that, there are other factors that would end up clouding the process. In the "old days" DoS was oriented more towards preserving and even expanding the position of the United States (most of the USMC's involvements while "troops of the Department of State" had at least veiled empire-building designs), whereas today I would argue that DoS is more political in nature and oriented towards objectives that may not be as conducive to USMC involvement as they were "back then." Putting the USMC under State might also, to foreign eyes, confirm their supposed role as America's Imperial Police.
The bonuses you mention are indeed compelling, and certainly the Marines are best suited both by experience and temperament to work with State, but I think that a wholesale move would be in no one's best interests. A system of fixed unit rotations might work better.
Another thing to consider is the impact that pulling the Marines out of DoD might have on DoD itself. No matter how much the other services posture and protest, it's still easier to get a MEU on scene if there's a crisis. They are the best structured, trained, and positioned to respond quickly to an emergency. Losing that capability would require the Army to venture into areas that they have had little recent experience with (with some exceptions, mostly within the light division community) and have historically shown little inclination to deal with. The Air Force certainly can't pick up the slack here; tribesmen and others don't tend to be impressed by F-22s and the massive use of airpower is often counterproductive.
Interesting idea, though. Maybe USAID should merge more with the USMC, or some sort of combined/joint task grouping could be developed along those lines.

[nichols]

IMHO....

I fear that we would end up living Smedley's nightmare all over again. DHS mission is more clear cut then the DOS. DOS ventures into political, military, and economic activities.

USAID is heavily into economic/commercial activities this in turn could link a perception that the USMC is an enforcer for big companies. It wouldn't matter if that was true or not, the locals perception would be the deciding factor for recruitment.

USAID from my perspective in Central Europe & Africa have little respect for Marines in general. In Prague they would go out of thier way to make life miserable until the Ambassador put a stop to it.

There are alot of decisions that get carried out in country without consulting Washington, the "Strategic Diplomat" :) . This is needed but also personalities play in this. ROE, escalation of force and so on are things that are not generally taught to DOS.

Now we pause for a sea story:

There was a USAID group coming in from Cameroon, daily riots occurred like clockwork at the university at 11:00. Against advise, the USAID rep decided to take this group there to observe. 3 Land Cruisers where attacked, radio requests for help were received, the only thing I could do was tell them to duck, sound the horn, rev the engine and drive slowly out of the crowd. Now run that scenario with a revised chain of command and you get the Marines doing riot control, causing an international incident because the USAID rep knew better then the Marine advising him.

Would the above happen? I would say the chances are pretty good. A clear cut separation between the Marines (administrative) and DOS (operational) gave a good check and balance between the organizations.

I would also add that the geo-political realities of the world back then were very different from today.

[Strickland]

Another thing to consider is the impact that pulling the Marines out of DoD might have on DoD itself. No matter how much the other services posture and protest, it's still easier to get a MEU on scene if there's a crisis. They are the best structured, trained, and positioned to respond quickly to an emergency. Losing that capability would require the Army to venture into areas that they have had little recent experience with (with some exceptions, mostly within the light division community) and have historically shown little inclination to deal with. The Air Force certainly can't pick up the slack here; tribesmen and others don't tend to be impressed by F-22s and the massive use of airpower is often counterproductive.
Interesting idea, though. Maybe USAID should merge more with the USMC, or some sort of combined/joint task grouping could be developed along those lines.

Thank you for the quick response. As for the USN Gator-Navy and the MEU capability, I was envisioning this remaining part and parcel of the USMC for all the reasons that you articulated. As for funding, this would surely necessitate a balancing of the checkbook between DHS, DoD, and DoS. I would imagine the Army would like this idea. The USMC by law is not a second land component, and according to statute was never meant to be a peer competitor to the army.

[Steve Blair]

There is no doubt that the Marines are not a peer competitor with the Army, but they do bring certain capabilities to the table (based on the MAGTF structure) that the Army would be hard-pressed to duplicate. This is especially true with the air component (the Air Force could be counted on to resist any attempt to expand or create Army fixed-wing assets). It may also be difficult to persuade the Navy to part with Gator assets, or convince State to fund them.

Nichols brings up some good points regarding public perception of such a force, as well as the interface difficulties that might occur from such an arrangement. There are also the cultural differences that exist between the two components. State, for example, may not fully comprehend the capabilities and limitations of Marines, and the USMC may have the same issues with State. Personally, I think it would create an unacceptable level of "blurring" between clear objectives and what might simply be a particular Ambassador's pet project or design that may not be totally understood or approved by Washington.