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gute
06-05-2010, 04:01 AM
As we know the U.S. Army has structred armor and infantry into into modular BCTs. The Heavy Combat Team is comprised of two Combined Arms Battalions: two mech infantry companies and two armor companies. The mech platoons ride around in four M2 Brads that are suppose to hold seven guys each. The standard mech platoon is unable to move a regular size platoon with three rifle squads and a weapons squad. This gives the mech commander about 100 dismounts - 200 for the battalion.

The 3rd ACR squadron/troop is organized into 3 troops with two platoons of M3s (six M3 each) and two platoons of four tanks each. How about organzing the mech platoon/CAB the same way - instead of M3 use the M2, each troop has two full-size infantry platoons with eight tanks - thats approximately 84 dismounts per troop x three troops for approximately 250 dismounts for an additional 50 dismounts for the battalion. A fourth troop or company has 14 tanks.

Question: Would this organization be effective? Has it been tried before? Is there an advantage/disadvantage to using the ACR troop organzation for mech infantry?

I guess the army could achieve the increaded manpower by adding two additonal Brads to each mech platoon in the current CAB mech companies.

William F. Owen
06-05-2010, 06:43 AM
Question: Would this organization be effective?
Doing what? I don't understand the question.
...but I'm intrigued as I have always considered the M2/M3 to be very poor conceptually and doctrinally.

Fuchs
06-05-2010, 08:59 AM
Question: Would this organization be effective?

A general problem exists, and I'll try to illustrate this with a scenario.

A heavy brigade moves through a country such as let's say Belarus. The route has alternately agricultural areas and forests on the roadside.
The brigade approaches a forest that it's supposed to cross ASAP, the vanguard troops are being ambushed in the forest after the recce troops easily slipped through.
The first attempt to move through the forest with tanks fails, and the brigade commander suspects a well-equipped and competent enemy infantry company along the forest road.
His infantry dismounts; four companies, in theory 400 men, but in reality only a few more than 300.
Artillery, mortars and infantry attempt to break through, but the effort is slow because at most two tanks can support the infantry on the narrow road and it's indeed fighting against a strong infantry company.

Finally, the dismounts barely overwhelm the enemy company thanks to the expenditure of a good share of the artillery and mortar ammunition, but they're reduced to only a few more than 200 capable infantrymen. Several IFVs were lost as well.

Next forest the same, except that this time there's not enough infantry left to meet the challenge. The brigade commander is forced to report that he's unable to execute his mission because two infantry companies were enough to stop his heavy (mech or whatever) brigade.

In the end, the operational commander accepts that the infantry element of his heavy brigades is too weak and restricts their movement to open terrain where their routes are longer, their observation easier and their routes more predictable. 0:1 for the enemy.


No matter how the brigades are being organized - there won't be enough infantry for anything but desert or open plains warfare if all infantry rides in IFVs.

Ken White
06-05-2010, 01:19 PM
...but I'm intrigued as I have always considered the M2/M3 to be very poor conceptually and doctrinally.understatement...:wry:

Tukhachevskii
06-05-2010, 02:17 PM
A general problem exists, and I'll try to illustrate this with a scenario.

A heavy brigade moves through a country such as let's say Belarus. The route has alternately agricultural areas and forests on the roadside.
The brigade approaches a forest that it's supposed to cross ASAP, the vanguard troops are being ambushed in the forest after the recce troops easily slipped through.
The first attempt to move through the forest with tanks fails, and the brigade commander suspects a well-equipped and competent enemy infantry company along the forest road.
His infantry dismounts; four companies, in theory 400 men, but in reality only a few more than 300.
Artillery, mortars and infantry attempt to break through, but the effort is slow because at most two tanks can support the infantry on the narrow road and it's indeed fighting against a strong infantry company.

Finally, the dismounts barely overwhelm the enemy company thanks to the expenditure of a good share of the artillery and mortar ammunition, but they're reduced to only a few more than 200 capable infantrymen. Several IFVs were lost as well.

Next forest the same, except that this time there's not enough infantry left to meet the challenge. The brigade commander is forced to report that he's unable to execute his mission because two infantry companies were enough to stop his heavy (mech or whatever) brigade.

In the end, the operational commander accepts that the infantry element of his heavy brigades is too weak and restricts their movement to open terrain where their routes are longer, their observation easier and their routes more predictable. 0:1 for the enemy.


No matter how the brigades are being organized - there won't be enough infantry for anything but desert or open plains warfare if all infantry rides in IFVs.

Why would an armoured bde be moving through such terrian in the first place? What is their mission? Surely a proper IPB analysis would have flagged up mobility corridors, areas and routes that were potential mobility blocks to the maintenance of operational tempo. Higher up commnders shpould then have attached one-two infantry battalions to the bde to enable them to move through the abive terrain which would then be detached after their particualr contribution to the mission was accomplished.

Also, the problem with the BFV series was doctrinal. There were never meant to carry full infantry sctions but rather "close protection" squads (or "tank marines" in Fullers felicitous phrase). Their METL were restricted to local security for the mech unit, limited local area defensive tasks, assult on entrenched ATGM teams (which hadn't already been supressed by on board weapons - and the infantry firing through those terrible firing ports!!!) and other misions designed to augment and maintain mechanised tempos. They were simply not "true" infantry (in a METL sense) but resembled mounted escorts.

However, I have always admired the US Armoured Cavarly formations and think that six BFVs per platoon, each carrying a six man fireteam (organised into three sections of two vehicles each) would be an ideal set-up. It would also leave room for an attached FOO, or COLT, HUMINT operater, Medic, &c.

82redleg
06-05-2010, 03:18 PM
Under current MTOEs, the mech infantry platoon dismounts 3 x 9-man rifle squads. The only thing lacking from the light platoon is the weapons squad's 2 x M240 and 2 x Javelin, which, IMO, is more than made up for by the 4 x 25mm, 4 x M240 and 4 x TOW. The CO has 9 x 9-man rifle squads (81 pax), the BN has 18 x 9-man rifle squads (162 pax) and the BCT has 36 x 9-man rifle squads (324 pax)

The issue of seating for attachments is valid.

Having 6 x M2s in the mech platoon would be nice, but I think it would be more complicated to C2 (3 x 2-vehicle sections plus 3 x 9-man squads is 6 elements for the PL to C2, vice 5 currently, in what is already the most complicated platoon. The M3 scout platoon is fought as 3 x 2-vehicle sections, or 2 x 3-vehicle sections, the limited dismounts are part of the sections). AFAIK, the US has never tried the 3 x vehicle section platoon in the infantry. In the mid-90s, we tried having a squad dismount from each section (the 2 x 9 + 5 platoon), but decided that was too light on dismounts, so we went to the current 3 x 9 model.

As I've noted before on other threads, I think that the US Army has had a gap in the "middle" between mech and light since the introduction of the Bradley. BG was de Czege identified this in 1985 or 1986. The SBCTs begin to correct this gap, but the force is out of balance- most of the force should be organized along the SBCT lines, with a ratio of 27 / 9 / 12 ratio of infantry / "tank" (MGS) / recon platoons. A "heavier" variant of the SBCT, with 1:1 replacements of ICV with M2s and MGS with M1s, while retaining that balance, would be a better general purpose organization, IMO, with a few HBCTs retained as the breakthrough/counterattack force (much like the armored divisions in WW2, with a similar percentage of the force).

Fuchs
06-05-2010, 05:46 PM
@Tukhachevskii:

You have truly internalized the deficiencies as normal. Those deficiencies weren't normal pre-70's, though. There was a fabled time when armies had enough infantry (or at least no greater lack of infantry than of most other things).

There were even armour corps operations through forest areas (Ardennes anyone?) for the sake of surprise (you know, the opposite of limiting yourself to a handful of tactically acceptable corridors, which does essentially announce your route to the enemy!).
Look at a map; the utter inability to advance through slightly defended forests and settlements limits the manoeuvre options of a brigade to only 2-4 even on such open and relatively tank-friendly terrain as Belarus or the Ukraine. Armour brigades on rails.
Most if not all NATO brigades are fair weather brigades; good for only a few weeks on desert-like terrain or alternatively too light and therefore unable to defend themselves on open ground.

There was a time when it was perfectly self-evident that a first rate army is supposed to be able to fight offensively on all terrain, not only on open plains.



I agree that mechanized infantry was originally not meant to be true infantry, but tank-accompanying infantry. It was the same with German Panzergrenadiere and Soviet Desants; they were mostly meant to sweep trenches and suppress very short range AT weapons (Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck, Bazooka).
The armour divisions that had Panzergrenadiere on APCs or Desants on tanks had truck-mounted infantry as well, though.
Sadly, modern armour and even mechanized "infantry" brigades aren't combined arms formations any more; they lack a serious infantry component. "Combined arms" has long since become a mere slogan. There are even examples of armour and mech infantry brigades that lack organic indirect fire support, but that's another story.

WW2-experienced generals would likely attest that our force planners are incompetent (or worse) if they were able to look briefly on our TO&Es.

gute
06-05-2010, 05:59 PM
Thanks gentlemen.

Mr. Owen and Mr. White: Why is the M2/M3 poor conceptually and doctrinally?

82redleg: You answered my unclear question. Problems with C2 with a six vehicle platoon seem to make sense. Also, 4x25mm and TOW more then make up for the lack of a weapons squad - good point. General consenus on this forum recommends adding a third manuever battalion to the BCT - would adding a Stryker battalion to the HBCT (replace the MGS with the M1) fill the gap? A heavier SBCT is interesting - maybe a CV90 type ICV and the M1. The infantry divisions (1,2,3 and 4) would have the heavier SBCT while 1AD and 1CAV have the HBCT?

Fuchs: I take it you are not a fan of the HBCT Combined Arms Battalion?

Fuchs
06-05-2010, 06:02 PM
I'm rarely a fan of anything that didn't already prove its excellence and wasn't invented by myself.
I suggest to look at my arguments, not at what I (dis)like.

gute
06-05-2010, 06:02 PM
Fuchs: What would a true Combined Arms formation look like? If you were organizing the U.S. Army HBCT, IBCT and SBCT what would they look like in both armor and infantry?

William F. Owen
06-05-2010, 06:29 PM
Mr. Owen and Mr. White: Why is the M2/M3 poor conceptually and doctrinally?


In the briefest of terms, from a conceptual view confused about what it does. It's designed to fight along side MBTs' yet lacks MBTs protection, and firepower. It carries too few men and is far too big.
The problems with the concept provide the same problems with doctrine.

gute
06-05-2010, 06:38 PM
Israel must be on the right track with the Namer ICV - believe it is based on their MBT.

Fuchs
06-05-2010, 06:58 PM
I) No size fits it all

II) Not every formation needs to be combined arms, some can be meant as attachments or to get attachments.

III) I'd spend ~20% of everything on reconnaissance, cavalry, skirmish troops that are not bound to any formation, but answer to a Corps.
These skirmishers are the key to my idea of a corps structure and operational art. The decision is in the skirmishing, all else is either about delaying or about mopping up quickly broken forces.

IV) No divisions.

V) Heavy brigades would be meant to go into very unfair, advantageous battles mostly. Routine tasks would include almost no LOS combat.

VI) Expert and reserve infantry formations would be separate; expert infantry would be similar to the best marines, ranger and Jäger units while reserve infantry would offer the cheap, quick training, quantity element.


The heavy brigades structure would be about 2-3 rather large combined arms (mortars instead of arty) battlegroups (~ Kampfgruppe) and one support group (providing support in a large radius to the battlegroups, skirmishers and other forces + additional infantry bn on APCs).

The area support function of the support group is rather unorthodox while the battlegroups (or Kampfgruppen) would look like something from the 40's or 50's (1st Heeresstruktur, ~58-62).

Reserve infantry battlegroups and heavy skirmisher companies could work together with a heavy brigade in order to add certain capabilities and tricks.



This does certainly sound like a patchwork of strange stuff. I didn't mention all the reasoning in it, just the superficialities.
It makes a lot of sense in a 40+ pages draft (that's meant to be published as a 200 pp. book, not online).


In short: I('d) develop a corps concept, not a brigade concept.

Ken White
06-05-2010, 07:04 PM
overall size and the wasted space. For huge vehicle to carry only six dismounts -- five if you leave one to pass 25mm ammo up to the turret as is the norm is borderline criminal IMO. That goes to only three or four if you're short a man or two in the squad (which is typical). The height of the vehicle makes it a shot or missile magnet. It is over-armed for its role; the TOWs encourage tactical misuse. It's range limited...

It's supposed to be an infantry carrier -- it's not, it's a light tank. Too light...

The vehicle was a compromise in too many respects. Instead of the needed heavily armored, accompany the M1 vehicle (like a Namer) AND a battle taxi for volumes of Mech infantry (M-113 updates) AND a decent Cavalry Scout vehicle (M-113 would also work for that...) we got a compromise vehicle on a drug deal between the Chief of Infantry and the Chief of Armor. The former would support buy of the M1; the latter would support buying the M2 and its M3 variant. Both agreed to give up something, Armor the Future Scout Cavalry System and Infantry the XM-8 Protected Gun system. Bad deal all 'round...

It's perhaps noteworthy that the two Cavalry Regiments in Europe at the time of adoption called the M3 Cavalry BFV the 'burning fighting vehicle' contending there'd be a trail of hulks all over Europe if the USSR were to attack. They also sensibly lobbied to get rid of that humungous turret and replace it with a .50 cal overhead weapons station (thus allowing 7-8 dismounts...) to lower the profile.

Fuchs
06-05-2010, 07:18 PM
Some U.S. commanders removed the Bradley from the first line (2003) and let them move behind the MBTs because the threat of 60's RPGs became too intense.

HAPC + cheap APCs is the way to go.

82redleg
06-05-2010, 08:45 PM
Fuchs: What would a true Combined Arms formation look like? If you were organizing the U.S. Army HBCT, IBCT and SBCT what would they look like in both armor and infantry?

If I were organizing the US Army, I would retain the 3 tier system, but rebalance. Overall, I prefer big BCTs, when going modular, we should have used the assets of the old Force XXI division to produce 2 very large, very capable BCTs, instead of 4 minimally capable BCTs.

IBCTs: initial/immediate is 8 only (reduction from 20ish), all on ABN status and active duty; in addition to severely restricted terrain, the other are that truly "light" formations excel in is rapid deployment/forced entry; second step is get the third maneuver battalion back, if necessary trading the current recon SQDN down to a separate troop; sequentially, add a fourth maneuver battalion and convert the WPNS Cos to rifle companies, retaining a single TOW company in the BCT, preferably on something light and armored (Wiesal maybe, something in that class anyway) instead of HMMWV.

SBCTs: I like this organization, convert most BCTs to this model (29 of 45 active BCTs, 1/2 to 2/3s of the ARNG); retain identical organizations, while producing variety by modifying the vehicle systems used, M2s or even M113s, maybe a more modern ICV replacement; M1, M8 AGS or something like Centauro for an MGS replacement; not sure about the RV, but we could probably find some variant that shares parts in the modified organizations; organizationally, the AT CO should go into the infantry BNs (maybe as a platoon in HHC), and a fourth CO added to each BN; an STB to C2 all the current separate COs; some other minor organizational changes (HUMINT consolidation, probably need increased EN capability with sappers in the maneuver battalions and bridging in the STB, etc); the key is that all of these middle-weight BCTs are organized identically, just differing equipment

HBCTs: again, reduction from 17-20 (whatever we are at now) to 8 active, converting the rest to SBCTs (ARNG is 1/3 - 1/2 HBCT, remaining SBCT); logic on this reduction is that we executed OIF 1 with the equivalent of 4 HBCTs from 3ID, 8 allows us to maintain that capability- if we need more, we can activate the ARNG and accelerate the active forces in the ARFORGEN cycle; ultimately, build a third CAB, and return the sapper/gap crossing to the CABs with bridging/roadbuilding/construction engineers in the STB;

82redleg
06-05-2010, 08:47 PM
Some U.S. commanders removed the Bradley from the first line (2003) and let them move behind the MBTs because the threat of 60's RPGs became too intense.

Got a reference for this? First I've heard of it. My friends that took Bradley's on the Thunder Runs, and multiple rotations since all talk about how survivable they are.

Fuchs
06-05-2010, 10:03 PM
The most recent source I recall was a monograph on armoured recce (or cavalry). Maybe I'll find it.

Ken White
06-05-2010, 10:06 PM
Got a reference for this? First I've heard of it. My friends that took Bradley's on the Thunder Runs, and multiple rotations since all talk about how survivable they are.the various mods make a difference? IIRC, the base and A1 mods differed only in missile fit but the A2, A2(ODS) and A3 were all successive upgrades with increased survivability as a goal??? Dunno...:confused:

I do know that many guys from both the 2d and 11th ACRs at the time the Wall came down were not Bradley fans...

82redleg
06-05-2010, 11:18 PM
I've read of 2ACR in 1991 leading with M1s vs M3s (IIRC, at 73 Easting).

Never seen anything about it in 2003. By then, most or all should have been at least M2A2, right?

Ken White
06-06-2010, 03:36 AM
By then, most or all should have been at least M2A2, right?I was at Knox when that deal was made and was never a Bradley fan so I'm not sure who had what variant. I think 3 ID should've had A2 if not A2(ODS). Someone here will know -- Mike Few will for sure...

William F. Owen
06-06-2010, 05:25 AM
Israel must be on the right track with the Namer ICV - believe it is based on their MBT.
It's the way to go, if you've been trained like an Israeli. Yes, it has near identical mobility to their MBT, as it uses the same chassis and running gear, with similar power to weight. I've climbed all over one and visited a platoon of them that was bouncing around the Golan. They're impressive.

If you took almost any MICV, ditched the turret, added more armour in place of it, and increased the dismount seating to 8-10, then you'd be in business.

...but the application of the vehicle is as important as the vehicle itself. I think MICVs are just a dumb idea, but obviously has merit if skilfully employed, by good men, against an inferior opponent.

William F. Owen
06-06-2010, 05:30 AM
III) I'd spend ~20% of everything on reconnaissance, cavalry, skirmish troops that are not bound to any formation, but answer to a Corps.
These skirmishers are the key to my idea of a corps structure and operational art. The decision is in the skirmishing, all else is either about delaying or about mopping up quickly broken forces.
There's a 3-day conference or 50,000 word SAMS paper right there for anyone with stones to tackle it!

I can agree with the "~20% of everything on reconnaissance." Cavalry to me means horses. It just never translates to AFVs, MBTs or Helicopters in any sensible way I can see.

How many Formatoins/Brigades in a Fuchs Corps?
Is the Fuchs Corp really a very flat Divison?

Pete
06-06-2010, 06:17 AM
When I attended OCS at Fort Benning in 1977-78 the Vu-Graph slides of the future "Infantry Fighting Vehicle" the instructors showed us looked just like what the Bradley later turned out to be. Later in 1982 at Camp Roberts, California (where my dad had trained in WW II) a team from the Bradley manufacturer, FMC Corporation, would fire the automatic gun on a Bradley into the impact area all day long Monday through Friday. They must have been doing some sort of Mean Rounds Between Failure testing--that's the only plausible explanation I can think of for the amount of ammo they were expending. Some of my forward observers had to ask the FMC guys to stop driving their tracked vehicles so fast past our bivouac area because they were raising huge clouds of dust that settled all over the campsite. A year later I took a tour of the FMC factory in San Jose and asked why the M548 cargo carrier was so unreliable. The answer I got was that it must be Army maintenance because they were perfect when they left the factory!

Fuchs
06-06-2010, 07:11 AM
there's a 3-day conference or 50,000 word sams paper right there for anyone with stones to tackle it!

I can agree with the "~20% of everything on reconnaissance." cavalry to me means horses. It just never translates to afvs, mbts or helicopters in any sensible way i can see.

How many formatoins/brigades in a fuchs corps?
Is the fuchs corp really a very flat divison?

pm

Tukhachevskii
06-06-2010, 11:20 AM
@Tukhachevskii:

You have truly internalized the deficiencies as normal. Those deficiencies weren't normal pre-70's, though. There was a fabled time when armies had enough infantry (or at least no greater lack of infantry than of most other things).

There were even armour corps operations through forest areas (Ardennes anyone?) for the sake of surprise (you know, the opposite of limiting yourself to a handful of tactically acceptable corridors, which does essentially announce your route to the enemy!).
Look at a map; the utter inability to advance through slightly defended forests and settlements limits the manoeuvre options of a brigade to only 2-4 even on such open and relatively tank-friendly terrain as Belarus or the Ukraine. Armour brigades on rails.
Most if not all NATO brigades are fair weather brigades; good for only a few weeks on desert-like terrain or alternatively too light and therefore unable to defend themselves on open ground.

There was a time when it was perfectly self-evident that a first rate army is supposed to be able to fight offensively on all terrain, not only on open plains.



I agree that mechanized infantry was originally not meant to be true infantry, but tank-accompanying infantry. It was the same with German Panzergrenadiere and Soviet Desants; they were mostly meant to sweep trenches and suppress very short range AT weapons (Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck, Bazooka).
The armour divisions that had Panzergrenadiere on APCs or Desants on tanks had truck-mounted infantry as well, though.
Sadly, modern armour and even mechanized "infantry" brigades aren't combined arms formations any more; they lack a serious infantry component. "Combined arms" has long since become a mere slogan. There are even examples of armour and mech infantry brigades that lack organic indirect fire support, but that's another story.

WW2-experienced generals would likely attest that our force planners are incompetent (or worse) if they were able to look briefly on our TO&Es.

Ok. A bit of the ceteris paribus fallacy there. You can't compare the ACR or DIV 86 with a WWII era German division which had infantry battalions (truck borne) attached to them and, as you point out, had half-tracks which could caryy half decent numbers of infantry. Even Soviet tank bdes had at least a battalion of truck borne (more often than not foot mobile) infantry attached for break in ops) The question asked concerned the Armoured Cavalry Regiment company team organisation. Sure, if you want to frame the discussion in temporal terms (WWI vs post/Cold War) diametirically opposed to those in question then I concede your point but it would be nice to compare like for like. It is also true that a proper apc as opposed to an IFV would be preferable but in today's cash-strapped economies you have to work with what you've got.

Fuchs
06-06-2010, 12:42 PM
I think I can compare them as long as they are supposed to fight on the same planet.
It's pointless to define the need for more infantry away. It persists, and no matter how you call a formation or what you assign as mission; you need a lot of infantry in closed and mixed terrain.

Modern mechanized/motorized ground forces are the equivalent of the 10% of the German WW2 army that were not foot- and horse carriage-mobile.
We removed the 90% infantry divisions and removed most of the infantry from the already infantry-weak mechanized forces as well.
That's not combined arms any more. It's a desert and prairie wars TO&E.

Look at the historical roots and you'll see that the conventional brigade structures of today were meant for a three-week mobile war in a country with much territorial security and infantry forces.
The dominant TOE philosophy was tested and found successful against 3rd rate forces in mostly open terrains. It was useless once settlements, hilly or mountainous terrain or forests became the focus.

gute
06-06-2010, 03:26 PM
Why was the Bradley designed to only carry 6 troops - force the U.S. Army to have buy more of them?

What is the best APC/IFV out there? Which modern army seems to get it right when it comes to combined arms warfare?

Tukhachevskii
06-07-2010, 09:45 AM
Why was the Bradley designed to only carry 6 troops - force the U.S. Army to have buy more of them?

What is the best APC/IFV out there? Which modern army seems to get it right when it comes to combined arms warfare?

As for the first question the following book is a useful place to start:

W. Blair Haworth, Jr., The Bradley and How It Got That Way:Technology, Institutions and the Problem of Mechanised Infantry in the United States Army (http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KAk9d2GCFOwC&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&dq=Bradley+IFV+development+doctrine&ots)(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999)

William F. Owen
06-07-2010, 10:20 AM
Another good reference is "Why Johnny Can't Dismount (http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=1050&filename=1051.pdf):"

I do not buy all of the ideas and conclusions but it makes some good point. Why it has to keep quoting old Richard Simpkin, I just don't know. I keep reading him looking for insight and am almost never rewarded.

Tukhachevskii
06-07-2010, 03:07 PM
I wonder if the better informed know how many M113A3's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M113_armored_personnel_carrier) the US Army has left. Surely, if there's a proven APC out there that has to be it? 2+11pax can't be wrong and the IDF's Zelda (www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/vehicles/armored_personnel_carriers/m-113/L-Vas.htm) variant has to be the best version armour protection wise (nice optional suppresive weapons mounts too). I know the FCS was cancelled but the IFV requirement is still active, albeit having been rolled into a different programme. The Ground Combat Vehicle IFV (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GCV_Infantry_Fighting_Vehicle) "looks" impressive (rather reminds me of the KIFV (www.army-technology.com/projects/k21-fighting-vehicle/)), got all the bells and whistles, and slightly better than the Bradley with 3+9 pax but as I see it its an awefully(sp?) expensive vehicle for an ill-thought out doctrinal/real world requirement. I understand too that the US defence industry needs to be retooled with newer contracts (and don't forget congressional/industrial pork) but ultimately is this really necessary? Would it not be better to re-fabricate and even re-open the M113 production line (amazingly the FAS sight claims that troops "unofficially" call it the "Gavin" (www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m113.htm); Sparky strikes again!!!:eek:) for vehicles with less complexity (thus easier maintenance and a vastly reduced log tail). I can just see in my minds eye a GCV infantry platoon/coy being rendered combat ineffective because some ideeeeiot (said in my best County Cork accent) gave the onboard Vetronics a virus or accidentially sat on a control screen....:rolleyes:

William F. Owen
06-08-2010, 05:15 AM
Please not the M-113. It really has reached it's sell by date, though you can still get a lot out of it.
Personally, I'd go for a "turretless" CV-90 2+8, with a STANAG 4569 level 5 in the horizontal and a level 3a and b in the vertical. Blast resistant seating and a belly plate might mean level 4 is possible.
1 x 12.7mm OWS should be sufficient for self-protection.
Hopefully the power to weight ration would stay within limits.

Fuchs
06-08-2010, 11:51 AM
A reduced CV90 would still weigh twice as much as a M113-class vehicle. A M113-class vehicle (such as SEP/tracked) could get away with half the fuel consumption /100 km.

Ken White
06-08-2010, 02:38 PM
until you cross the threshold of basic load cube x caliber/capability to enter the realm of diminishing returns and you'll accomplish little; they can still be easily killed and will not be able to kill everything they may meet. We got it wrong with the Brad. The CV 90, while the best of breed currently available still, IMO, is of the wrong breed. For success in combat and survivability of your troops, there are only four critical factors to consider :

Agility, speed, unrefueled range and employment.

Tukhachevskii
06-08-2010, 03:02 PM
until you cross the threshold of basic load cube x caliber/capability to enter the realm of diminishing returns and you'll accomplish little; (1)they can still be easily killed and will not be able to kill everything they may meet. We got it wrong with the Brad. The CV 90, while the best of breed currently available still, IMO, is of the wrong breed. For success in combat and survivability of your troops, there are only four critical factors to consider :

(2)Agility, speed, unrefueled range and (3)employment.

... I'd thought I'd give it a go anyway. The comment I have labelled (1) above piqued my interest. So am I right in assuming that you find the concept (if not the practice) of mechanised infantry eesentially sound and ruined only by a sub-standard vehicle (BFV/CFV)? Which leads to my second query about employment (3). BFV and IFV TTPs in general haven't really been well thought out IMO (though FIBUA/MOUT may be the exception thanks to the recent troubles). Generally, the IFV/MICVs tend to follow MBTs and provide some sort of anti-infantry/ATGM protection. They aren't doctrinally or materially equipped for much else. How does one remedy (if that is the case) the situation? Obviously, if you intend your IFVs to cross the line of departure then you really need something the equivalent of a MBT in terms of protection. Firepower is a whole different issue altogether.

This impacts on (2). The power to weight ratio is also going to be a factor in terms of armour protection (active armour may help but you still need a baseline of physical armour) and add to the "diminishing returns" you speak of in your post (of course thats probably what you meant, and if so, I apologise for mis-understanding your statement:o). As does the issue of whether tracks or wheels (http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf) are best which, again depends, I suppose, on whether or not you intend your vehicles to leave the assembly area and accompany/carry troops into combat; for the former case (troops debus in the assembly area) then I quite fancy the GPV Captain (www.military-today.com/apc/gpv_captain.htm) (2+14pax) whereas for the latter I'd convert however many old Challenger 1 hulls we have lying around, install a europack compact engine (at the front).

I only asked because I was always enamoured with mech units while denigrating line inf as "archaic" until I really tried to get my head around them; the pendulum has now swung firmly the other way:o

William F. Owen
06-08-2010, 03:28 PM
until you cross the threshold of basic load cube x caliber/capability to enter the realm of diminishing returns and you'll accomplish little; they can still be easily killed and will not be able to kill everything they may meet.
Agree, but there has to be some level/standard of protection applied the problem. The idea of being "invulnerable" is patently stupid. It's what you can get for the Power-to-weight.

The CV 90, while the best of breed currently available still, IMO, is of the wrong breed.
Which is why I want a CV-90 chassis based APC only, not a CV-90 MICV.

For success in combat and survivability of your troops, there are only four critical factors to consider :

Agility, speed, unrefueled range and employment.
My wording would be "a high degree of reliable mobility," but I think if we talked around those points we'd be in basic agreement.
Employment is by for the most critical. Employed well, almost any vehicle will do - within reason.

Ken White
06-08-2010, 05:44 PM
wording is better. "A high degree of reliable mobility." I like that... ;)

gute
06-08-2010, 11:00 PM
until you cross the threshold of basic load cube x caliber/capability to enter the realm of diminishing returns and you'll accomplish little; they can still be easily killed and will not be able to kill everything they may meet. We got it wrong with the Brad. The CV 90, while the best of breed currently available still, IMO, is of the wrong breed. For success in combat and survivability of your troops, there are only four critical factors to consider :

Agility, speed, unrefueled range and employment.

What is the right breed? Is there a vehicle/country out there that got it right? What would it llok like, what would it do, specifications?

Ken White
06-09-2010, 03:45 AM
a new MTU 890 series pack @ 1,750hp would be the tank (not least because it can engage Helicopters, carry wounded and has a back door :D ), the Namer with 9 Infantrymen, a full squad, plus a crew of three and a .50 cal Overhead Weapons Station would be the best available Armored Infantry carrier IMO. In action, the Squad dismounts with ALL its people and the SL or PL fight the dismounts while the PSG (or, better, the senior track commander) controls the track(s) in supporting the dismounts. Obviously, they operate in conjunction with tanks and there should be couple of those nearby should more firepower be needed than the '50s provide.

For a Utility track and a Scout Vehicle, an upgraded M 113A3 with 6 composite roadwheels, hydropneumatic suspension and possibly Soucy tracks if they continue to improve -- Diehl instead of US tracks otherwise. A .50 OWS is all that's required. Overgunned tracked carriers are not tanks but invite misuse because of the weapon capability -- misuse because the vehicle is simply not adequate for the job.

Wilf's CV-90 minus the MICV turret and plus a .50 OWS would do for those who wrongly think the 113 is too old... ;)

My big objection to the CV-90 variant is the weight. It may be slightly more survivable than the 113 but I don't think the added weight is adequately offset by that. The key to any light track is that you are buying mobility, not protection -- so you have to avoid placing them in bad situations. That's not difficult.

Though it is entirely too often forgotten... :mad:

In all cases, more range is desirable, best obtained by reducing powerpack size and replacing that cube and weight with fuel or in add-on side armor blister packs (which should be accompanied by a track width change to maintain agility). Powerpacks should be optimized for power and response curve, not fuel economy or mileage. It should be possible to engineer a variable horsepower / fuel demand engine which could be the best of both.

The 113 Scout track is for mobility in terrain or climates where tracks are necessary; for most purposes, a light unarmored but powerful and agile 4x4 wheeled vehicle is an excellent scout vehicle. The lack of armor has the advantage of keeping both the Scouts and more importantly their commanders honest -- they will be careful...

Armor has a flaw, a dangerous flaw -- it cocoons. People are then reluctant to leave their cocoon or to tell others to leave their cocoons and thus a lot of harsh, necessary combat stuff does not get done or isn't done right due to that syndrome. Today, it's easy to forget the guys below are Armored Infantrymen. Fighting dismounted but they weren't called 'dismounts.' I think there's a message in that...

Uboat509
06-09-2010, 10:52 AM
When I was in 2 ACR at Ft. Polk, many years ago, the cav guys used to talk about how the M114 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M114_armored_fighting_vehicle) would be a better scout vehicle than the M113. The problem with either of these though, that I can see is that while both may be better suited for scouting than the Bradleys, I don't see how either would be particularly suited for screening or guarding or other missions where direct contact with the enemy is expected.


and a .50 cal Overhead Weapons Station would be the best available Armored Infantry carrier IMO.

Call me old fashioned but I dislike these things immensely. There were a number of these on HMMWVs in Iraq that I saw. I sincerely believe that these things encourage the loss of SA. The operator gets focused on just the screen and loses everything else. Even with regular turrets, I saw this in Iraq because gunners were allowed or even required to be so low in the turret that they couldn't see much anyway. I liked gunning and when I was on the gun my turret was always moving. I was always heads up and looking for threats. I saw guys, though, that would get the turret into a comfortable position, sit on the strap and zone out. I never could understand that. I always remembered reading the German tank commanders stressing the importance of being "heads up" in the turret and maintaining SA. Now we seem to be headed back the other way.

William F. Owen
06-09-2010, 11:18 AM
Call me old fashioned but I dislike these things immensely. There were a number of these on HMMWVs in Iraq that I saw. I sincerely believe that these things encourage the loss of SA.
I keep hearing this. Surely it's just a matter of sensible application?
They were never and should never be used for anything other than making the weapon they employ more effective, by virtue of control, sensors and in some cases stabilisation.
They are a weapons stations. Used sensibly they have proven immensely useful.

Ken White
06-09-2010, 01:37 PM
and of the deterrent effect of certain opponents or would-be opponents actually seeing a pair of human eyeballs on them as well as a restriction of weapon choice (i.e. can't use your M4 to fire a warning shot or just point at a minor menace as opposed to firing a round or few of .50 cal -- which some ROE might preclude) is real and is a serious concern.

Most of that however is offset by the sensors and stabe on the OWS. Proper training will solve some of the problems, so on balance, they're IMO a net plus. The down side is the cost but even that is less than some of the turreted solutions used today.

The SA and other issues that are concerns are not totally restricted to FID and similar ops but loom far larger there than they do in MCO. The larger advantage in a shooting war as opposed to FID is the lower and smaller silhouette and the under armor protection offered. That's my main reason for believing they're the way to go.

I'm not a COIN fan -- and I believe in special purpose equipment for special uses. Thus SO vehicles should have the simplest and best equipment tailored for the use they're likely to put those vehicles to -- and that will change from time to time, place to place and war to war. An Infantry combat vehicle OTOH should be designed to survive in close combat and therefor must meet different considerations and detectability and protection are more important.

Bullmoose Bailey
06-09-2010, 08:59 PM
Why was the Bradley designed to only carry 6 troops - force the U.S. Army to have buy more of them?

What is the best APC/IFV out there? Which modern army seems to get it right when it comes to combined arms warfare?

G: Great question. Most of the professional & technical media runs from the answer because it's surprisingly simple & old-fashioned.

My humble answer is, in my own opinion, the M-113.

This Track has delivered us over a half century of Dominance in Land Warfare & we're utilizing them now more than ever. I find the M-113 Gavin very well suited for HIC, CD, MSCA, LIC, SASO, SOSRA, SORO MOUT, FIBUA, MOOTW, MARAATAPOOC, COIN, FSO, RSTA, RCO, or any other scenario in which we must move protected in an excellent track.

The M-113 Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle (informally known as the M-113 "Gavin" according to the Federation of American Scientists & others) is by far Superior. Again that's just my opinion. Some of my friends might prefer to crawl, walk, run, truck, fly, drop, rope or teleport into battle & I say God bless them. The M-113 is just my own personal favorite & I love how many of our allies have them. Yes, that's saved our own collective butts when we lacked the foresight to bring our own.

The lesson learned for me is to "not leave home without it" in diplomacy or war-fighting.


http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m113-iav.htm

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m113.htm

http://www.rense.com/general26/gavin.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M113_armored_personnel_carrier

SethB
06-09-2010, 10:50 PM
I looked up composite road wheels. The set that I found from Lancer was 422 pounds lighter than aluminum. I don't know how much lighter the Soucy track is, but the Economist pointed out that M113s using a Soucy track were getting about 4 MPG, and the Soucy can use a lighter suspension design as well.

The key question left is how much engine you need. These lighter parts could mean using a smaller engine for the same speed or the same size engine with a greater top speed.

As for optimizing a vehicle for efficiency verses power, there are some companies that are working on camless valvetrains. Basically, they can shut themselves off instead of idle, purr along quite efficiently, and then put down a lot of power, because they have no limitations from the grind of the cam lobes and no parasitic loss from having to turn two or four cams, especially in DOHC configuration.

The downsides are that they are loud, can't go over 5,000 RPM, are expensive and require a 48V electrical system.

One last point on the rubber tracks... There was a newspaper article around a few years ago stating that TARDEC was looking at putting fiber optics in an Abrams, along with the gun from FCS and a rubber track. They anticipated being able to save something like 3,000 pounds in copper wire alone.

Perhaps we may reach a point where things start to get lighter instead of heavier.

Cavguy
06-10-2010, 05:09 AM
I've read of 2ACR in 1991 leading with M1s vs M3s (IIRC, at 73 Easting).

Never seen anything about it in 2003. By then, most or all should have been at least M2A2, right?

All active units had M2A2's (ODS) by 2001. I know b/c I was in the last priority "legacy/AOE" division and we even had them then. 4ID/1 CAV had the A3 version by the late 90's,IIRC. They also had the M1A2's.

Cavguy
06-10-2010, 05:21 AM
WTF with the "Gavin". No one but Sparky has ever called it that. Never heard it once in 13 years of active duty.

My M113 experience and argument here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=39114&postcount=19). It's simply a vehicle beyond its time. I haven't heard a single serving soldier advocate for more of them over our newer vehicles.

Bullmoose Bailey
06-10-2010, 02:14 PM
:)
WTF with the "Gavin". No one but Sparky has ever called it that. Never heard it once in 13 years of active duty.

My M113 experience and argument here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=39114&postcount=19). It's simply a vehicle beyond its time. I haven't heard a single serving soldier advocate for more of them over our newer vehicles.

you have now

Steve Blair
06-10-2010, 02:23 PM
The 113 was good in Vietnam, once they got the diesel versions in-country, but it tended to be used more as an armored scout vehicle and fire support platform (ACAV configuration, anyone?) than it was as a transport. And they had the same reliability problems there that CavGuy mentions in his linked thread. Was it effective in its day? No question. Could we do better today? I'd say so.

And it was never officially tagged the Gavin.

William F. Owen
06-10-2010, 02:45 PM
here amongst the Ptarch, the M113 is called the Zelda - cool chicks name, not some old Generals name! - It's a culture thing.

For me, what the M113 shows is the art of the possible. It certainly crushes the idea that coming up with an effective APC is the dark art that so many make it out to be.

Tukhachevskii
06-10-2010, 02:54 PM
...IMO the Soviet/Russian MTLB (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MT-LB) is probably the eastern bloc's...sorry, I mean eastern europe's equivalent (at least re: 2+11 pax). It's light ground pressure footprint is truely phenomenal. If the Russian's could get half decent crew ergonomics going it might even best the venerable M113 "Gavin" (tongue-FIRMLY-in-cheek:rolleyes:).

Ken White
06-10-2010, 03:10 PM
It is in fact 1950 technology and it is in fact out of date, no question. It suffered in all versions from various shortfalls.

All of which were and are identified. All of which were corrected / are being corrected OR could easily have been -- but to do so would have killed the need for the Bradley in its time or the FCS more recently.

Thus the US Army deliberately did not consistently upgrade the 113 as they could have and arguably should have and as many other nations with less money very effectively did and still do. That's Army politics at work.

Produce the 113 with todays technology and you have a vehicle that would be reliable, have great range, is quiet, has a low silhouette and is adequately survivable when properly employed. It would also be cheap...

Steve Blair's comment on Viet Nam reliability is correct and most of the problems were due to (1) the flawed US tracks (we don't do them that well...); (2) the electrical system; the voltage regulator spec was wrong and all the early versions overcharged and thus over heated the batteries' (3) poor maintenance. Armor did a reasonable job in that latter, Infantry did not.

There may be a better all round utility track out there but I haven't seen or heard of it. It is not a good combat vehicle due to the aluminum armor -- though IIRC, some composite hull trial versions have been built. -- and Steve's right, no one ever called that a Gavin except Sparky and his readers... :D

Fuchs
06-10-2010, 05:42 PM
Produce the 113 with todays technology and you have a vehicle that would be reliable, have great range, is quiet, has a low silhouette and is adequately survivable when properly employed. It would also be cheap...

Hmm, maybe if you think one million or two was cheap.

The modern equivalent is the tracked SEP version, and the project starved (almost) because the 8x8 fashion and MRAP fashion stripped it off cash.
Its 6x6 version (there was one 6x6 and one band track version) was turned into a 8x8 version.

http://media.defenseindustrydaily.com/images/LAND_SEP_Wheeled_Tracked_Summer_lg.jpg

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/sep/

http://www.baesystems.com/BAEProd/groups/public/documents/bae_publication/bae_pdf_hagg_sep_4s.pdf

Ken White
06-10-2010, 09:54 PM
Hmm, maybe if you think one million or two was cheap.it is... :wry:

Ken White
06-14-2010, 06:39 PM
"Personally, I'd go for a "turretless" CV-90 2+8, with a STANAG 4569 level 5 in the horizontal and a level 3a and b in the vertical. Blast resistant seating and a belly plate might mean level 4 is possible."LINK (http://www.janes.com/events/exhibitions/eurosatory2010/sections/daily/day1/armadillo-the-hard-cv90.shtml).

William F. Owen
06-15-2010, 05:14 AM
LINK (http://www.janes.com/events/exhibitions/eurosatory2010/sections/daily/day1/armadillo-the-hard-cv90.shtml).

Funny dat! - actually, the "AFV-rats" have been discussing this for a while. Nice to see it happen though.

Kiwigrunt
06-15-2010, 05:25 AM
Funny dat! - actually, the "AFV-rats" have been discussing this for a while. Nice to see it happen though.

And they are already looking into putting a 25 mm gun on it….won’t be long and they’ll put a turret on it.:p:eek:

Chris jM
06-15-2010, 10:46 AM
And they are already looking into putting a 25 mm gun on it….won’t be long and they’ll put a turret on it.:p:eek:

Serious question, from someone with little AFV knowledge:

If you can put a 25mm M242 cannon with a co-ax MG on a RWS (at least, that's how I read the article - correct me if I'm wrong) why have a turret at all? Have I missed something, or is technology replacing the need to have a self-contained platform mated to the primary weapon system for small calibre weapons?

William F. Owen
06-15-2010, 12:02 PM
If you can put a 25mm M242 cannon with a co-ax MG on a RWS (at least, that's how I read the article - correct me if I'm wrong) why have a turret at all?
You can put a fair few 30mm cannons on an RWS, and yes, good question, but the issue resides in application. What are you using the vehicle for and why? Strapping weapons on hulls usually is not a challenge, within reason. Why do it is the real question.

Example: the UK could have fitted 2x TOW missiles to every Warrior MICV (Delco Turret). Would that have been a good idea? Technically possible. So what?

Chris jM
06-16-2010, 09:24 AM
Why do it is the real question.

Example: the UK could have fitted 2x TOW missiles to every Warrior MICV (Delco Turret). Would that have been a good idea? Technically possible. So what?

Self-defence? Allow the Warrior the ability to engage enemy AFVs as it moves to the assault to drop off it's infantry component?

Having 30mm/25mm is an easier argument - you then have the ability for the vehicle to provide both self-defence out to 2km+ and provide rather potent fire support to the dismounted element.

I'm guessing your point will be that such a weapon system enables the vehicles to be used in roles they were not intended for. If that is the answer, surely good doctrine, very good training and knowledgeable leadership would allow for the vehicles to be used properly without forcing them to forego a huge capability?

On the same topic but different strand, what is the benefit to a turreted vehicle as opposed to a RWS? I imagine a turreted wpn has a far greater ammunition capacity and can reload/ cycle through different ammunition types quicker - but other than that?

William F. Owen
06-16-2010, 01:58 PM
Picture I took of a Namer on a live firing exercise, in the Negev, today. The more I study it, the more I like it.
Note the .50, RWS beside the Commanders hatch and the manual FN-MAG. The commander can also mount a 60mm mortar, next to his hatch.
Sorry it's a small picture,
1116

William F. Owen
06-16-2010, 02:15 PM
I'm guessing your point will be that such a weapon system enables the vehicles to be used in roles they were not intended for. If that is the answer, surely good doctrine, very good training and knowledgeable leadership would allow for the vehicles to be used properly without forcing them to forego a huge capability?
It's a discussion. I am not sure you can say it is right or wrong, but if I have 56 vehicles in a Battle Group, I do need to store about 50-100 TOW re-loads somewhere and have them available, so 6-12 Pallets.
I also need a training budget, and another line item to maintain, etc etc.
Once the boys have a weapon, they will use it! - for whatever they want or need given the condition.
Will a commander with Coy of TOW equipped Warriors not commit them as an AT -Reserve, just because "doctrine" says, it's not its job,- they're just for self defence!

Ken White
06-16-2010, 02:46 PM
Having 30mm/25mm is an easier argument - you then have the ability for the vehicle to provide both self-defence out to 2km+ and provide rather potent fire support to the dismounted element.Possibly of use in a desert environment where ranges over 2km are possible but elsewhere? Advantage over .50 cal is minimal for cost and complexity needed?
I'm guessing your point will be that such a weapon system enables the vehicles to be used in roles they were not intended for. If that is the answer, surely good doctrine, very good training and knowledgeable leadership would allow for the vehicles to be used properly without forcing them to forego a huge capability?I will refrain from comment on commanders and usage... :D

However, very good doctrine is very much METT-TC dependent -- lacking that, it is just doctrine, ignored as often as it is followed. Troops in contact will use whatever weapons are available, even well trained troops succumb to availability. They must be provided with the proper tools for the job, for sure -- but excessive tools will be misused. A case in point is the TOW missile and the Bradley. The temptation to use the Brad with its 25mm and TOWs as a light tank is quite strong.
...what is the benefit to a turreted vehicle as opposed to a RWS? I imagine a turreted wpn has a far greater ammunition capacity and can reload/ cycle through different ammunition types quicker - but other than that?Actually, the turret limits ready ammunition due to volume and more is invariably stored in the hull (which often means leaving a dismount behind to pass more ammunition up to the turret...). Add the price of higher silhouette, lighter armor (mostly) and using a turret, you really have acquired a vulnerability for small if any benefit

Chris jM
06-17-2010, 05:58 AM
William F. Owen: Once the boys have a weapon, they will use it! - for whatever they want or need given the condition.

Ken White: They must be provided with the proper tools for the job, for sure -- but excessive tools will be misused. A case in point is the TOW missile and the Bradley. The temptation to use the Brad with its 25mm and TOWs as a light tank is quite strong.

Acknowledge your points. Is the answer, though, to withdraw or deny the weapon platforms (say, 25mm/50cal and AArmd missiles on veh)?

I'm thinking that, if the Bradley couldn't be used as a light tank if METT-TC disallowed it, would it be such a big deal to throw the TOW onto it? Is it possible that we are using the Bradley as a light tank as, relative to enemy capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has all the characteristics required of protected armour?

It mightn't be perfect, but it may be better to have superfluous weapon platforms on a AFV, accept the potential for inevitable misuse and live with it than not have them altogether. When the situation is such that to use them as light armour is suicidal, could we rely on the gods of necessity correcting our ways?


William F. Owen: I also need a training budget, and another line item to maintain, etc etc.

True, very true. Then again, tell your crew commander and gunner that he doesn't have to worry about being anti-harassment qualified and you might be able to fit in some gunnery time. Sorry, my cynicism is getting the better of me...


Ken WhiteAdvantage over .50 cal is minimal for cost and complexity needed?

Excluding range, the sheer fact that a 25/30mm offers HE with correspondingly increased penetration would sell the cannons to me - admitting that I'm relatively ignorant in the maintenance/ logistic requirements.


I will refrain from comment on commanders and usage... :D

Much obliged! :)

William F. Owen
06-17-2010, 06:18 AM
Acknowledge your points. Is the answer, though, to withdraw or deny the weapon platforms (say, 25mm/50cal and AArmd missiles on veh)?
The reason infantry have AFVs is to get them to the point where they dismount to fight, and then to support them S1/S4 wise. Tanks, do the fighting. - in a perfect world. It's certainly how the IDF currently thinks. See - my post yesterday.

Excluding range, the sheer fact that a 25/30mm offers HE with correspondingly increased penetration would sell the cannons to me - admitting that I'm relatively ignorant in the maintenance/ logistic requirements.
This is actually a good point. There is an extremely good senior military analyst at Rand, who is a friend of mine, and we go back and forth on this a lot. To me, 40mm HV and 12.7mm is all I want - but he makes your points and they are good points.

Ken White
06-17-2010, 02:37 PM
Acknowledge your points. Is the answer, though, to withdraw or deny the weapon platforms (say, 25mm/50cal and AArmd missiles on veh)?Depends on the state of training IMO. If our army were better trained, I'd agree. Given the current -- and likely future -- state of training, I'd say no. With mediocre training, arms that can be misused will be misused and all too often that provides concomitant unnecessary own casualties and can lead to tactical errors with potentially dangerous consequences.


I'm thinking that, if the Bradley couldn't be used as a light tank if METT-TC disallowed it...If everyone did a good METT-TC analysis before committing. If even most commanders did one...:wry:

In my observation, the temptation to use a perceived power or capability over rides common sense all to often. I also believe Armor is seductive, the cocoon effect takes hold and people are reluctant to leave their vehicles for a harsh world where unfriendly types are about (there's also often a reluctance by Cdrs to order such dismounting for the same reason -- he doesn't want to get out either so he in fairness refuses to order his men to do so). That drives a desire to use the maximum vehicle power and protective capability available even if the tactical situation says no. Most carriers are not adequately armored for such employment. The IFV concept was and is seductive but it isn't very smart. :rolleyes:
... When the situation is such that to use them as light armour is suicidal, could we rely on the gods of necessity correcting our ways?Yes, for those who survive and gain experience. No for those killed by the error -- or their inexperienced replacements. All Armies gain combat experience and improve but poor equipment choices that lend themselves to misuse in the initial stages of a war and have to be corrected by harsh combat experience amount to killing off some of your best and best trained Soldiers hoping that their replacements will learn and do better -- and better equipment will appear. The US Army has long experience at doing just that. :(

I don't believe that's smart and I know it isn't necessary.
Sorry, my cynicism is getting the better of me...Cynical perhaps but a very apt point. Democracies will not really train the bulk of their Armies well for a number of reasons, not least the intrusion of politically correct stuff. Add the fact that most politicians really do not want their Armies to be too effective and competent...
Excluding range, the sheer fact that a 25/30mm offers HE with correspondingly increased penetration would sell the cannons to me - admitting that I'm relatively ignorant in the maintenance/ logistic requirements.The issue is what you want or require your vehicles to do, the type of terrain over which you may have to fight -- and to a lesser extent, the type enemy you will encounter.

On balance IMO, 120mm trumps 25 / 30mm or even 50mm. Assume a turret with such a weapon costs $1M (no Missiles a bit less, with Missiles a bit more) while a .50 cal RWS costs $150K. If one replaces the four turrets in a Platoon's vehicles with RWS, one could about buy another Tank thus a company's worth of turrets displaced would purchase another Tank platoon -- which option produces the most combat power?

That's one consideration, my concern is the tactical misuse potential that is offered and the thought of lightly armored vehicles being confronted by a well concealed tank platoon is troublesome. Friend of mine was a 1st Cav Div Bn Cdr in Desert Storm. He went into Kuwait with two Cos of M1s leading and two of Bradleys trailing behind. He lost no vehicles. His sister Bn reversed that and they lost three Bradleys against less opposition.

As Wilf said, infantry carriers SHOULD exist solely to get the Infantry to a point where they can dismount and fight (my emphasis) in support of and supported by Tanks. Sending medium caliber cannon armed infantry carriers into a fight where Tanks or anti-tank elements are enemy possibilities is an invitation to destruction and history proves that if a capability is present, it will be employed -- no matter how dumb the employment may be.

Scout vehicles are a different batch of issues and general METT-TC anticipations dependent, I agree they might advantageously have medium caliber cannon -- though in a great many situations, a lightly (.50 cal) armed light vehicle accompanied by Tanks could well be a better choice.

Tukhachevskii
06-17-2010, 03:09 PM
..but what about bringing back the infantry support tank? Rather than spend large sums of money on APC's with IFV level firepower- and which according to SODs law- will be used as "fancy-dress" tanks (and more than likely get their arses kicked) wouldn't it be better to get a run-of-the-mill APC with appropriate armour (active and passive) and get as many troops as possible into it (i.e., 2+12?). Their infantry could debuss at the assembly area after which the APCs would be deployed as logistics resupply vehicles (ammo, food, etc. and mobile medical "taxis"). To escort dismounted troops over the departure line and onto the objective one could deploy a platoon (say per coy) of BMPT (http://www.military-today.com/tanks/bmpt.htm) type vehicles (IMO, the badder-arse/ass version of the US MGS). They've got the armour protection needed, are armed to (and beyond:D) the teeth and would be easier to manage than an entire coy (13+) APCs/IFVs (+ attachments). One BMPT could be attached per platoon with one at HQ or together or whatever, METT-TC dependant. Their Attaka-T missles have HE and FAE variants. Never been too sure about the utility of sponson mounted 30mm GMGs, but why not? You've got a vehicle that can do FIBUA, desert warfare, light/infantry support and could even act as a strongpoint defensive position all by its lonesome!:cool: Sure, it's tactical height is a minor drawback (it also easily qualifies as a HVT) but then again so do most IFVS/AVs, deployment, well trained (and crafty) troops and doctrine should prevent any mishaps barring an enemy armed with standoff smart missiles (then again, I'm sure there's room on the BMPT for a local area anti-missile turret like that twin 7.62mm MMW guided TAMS thingy Marconi developed back in the late 90s). Must... stop....am .....drooling...

Ken White
06-17-2010, 04:11 PM
However, the trend at the end of WW II was to avoid light tanks and go for what today are sometimes called main battle tanks. The Infantry Support Tank is effectively a light tank...

Like the Begleitpanzer with a 57mm gun and missiles of the mid-70s shown below. Last time I checked, 120mm trumped 57mm...

Your well trained and crafty troops are the problem -- those are rare commodities. Most Armies field a few such plus a large number of marginally capable elements. One should buy equipment predicated on misuse and worst case; military purchases or planning based on best case will put you in Afghanistan with little possibility of succeeding in many announced goals. :D

I never cease to be amazed at the amount of equipment and the number of weapons dreamed up by fertile if inexperienced minds in the Engineering and Marketing worlds that end up being a system looking for a role or conversely that are really unsuited to fulfill the role for which they were nominally designed (generally as a result of poor doctrine or specifications; often both). Most Armies are terribly naive about buying such stuff.

William F. Owen
06-17-2010, 04:55 PM
However, the trend at the end of WW II was to avoid light tanks and go for what today are sometimes called main battle tanks. The Infantry Support Tank is effectively a light tank...

Like the Begleitpanzer with a 57mm gun and missiles of the mid-70s shown below. Last time I checked, 1200mm trumped 57mm...


Oooh! Any more info on the Begleitpanzer before I Google it? Nice piccy. Makes me quite embarrassed about the one I posted!

Ken White
06-17-2010, 06:18 PM
Oooh! Any more info on the Begleitpanzer before I Google it?This LINK (http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://s48.radikal.ru/i122/0910/d9/4649cf23d882.jpg&imgrefurl=http://strangernn.livejournal.com/82259.html&usg=__5P0afcJ0TbzrmjG_hbybcwKdo0M=&h=279&w=569&sz=46&hl=en&start=1&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=pDT42GvV3i7oFM:&tbnh=66&tbnw=134&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dbegleitpanzer%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26cl ient%3Dfirefox-a%26sa%3DN%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26tbs%3Disch:1) goes to the picture. Not terribly informative write up. ;)

Then there's this LINK (http://www.pmulcahy.com/best_stuff_that_never_was/best_lcv_that_never_were.htm)(scroll down). IDR (pre-Jane's) did a full write-up with multiple graphics if you can access their archives.

Fuchs
06-17-2010, 08:17 PM
Germany had many tank prototypes in the 70's/80's period.

The Begleitpanzer idea was revived in theoretical studies for Neue Gepanzerte Plattformen (NGP) in the early/mid 90's. The computer-based OR study in NGP had supposedly the result that a normal IFV is better.

We need to look at this assertion in the light of the peace dividend; the army wasn't even able to buy one new combat AFV type in the 90's, much less a whole family (although the industry had a mediocre family concept ("Puma") ready for production!)

Ken White
06-17-2010, 10:01 PM
I don't think given the cost of equipping today anyone's going to be able to afford to go to war... :wry:

In Viet Nam, the cost to equip an infantryman was about $500.00 -- today, it's approaching almost 100 times that. Ten thousand dollar rifle sights, thousand dollar individual radios for everyone and six plus million dollar tanks are just a bit on the heavy side... :rolleyes:

Rex Brynen
06-17-2010, 11:21 PM
I don't think given the cost of equipping today anyone's going to be able to afford to go to war... :wry:

In Viet Nam, the cost to equip an infantryman was about $500.00 -- today, it's approaching almost 100 times that. Ten thousand dollar rifle sights, thousand dollar individual radios for everyone and six plus million dollar tanks are just a bit on the heavy side... :rolleyes:

Perhaps then we could resolve these things gladiatorial-style in future, with one fully- and expensively-equipped combatant per side? It would sure cut down on all that dying... :D

Cole
06-18-2010, 12:09 AM
Although I did attend junior college for 18 months before enlisting believing I would be an architect. Still live in the smallish house I designed and had built in '86. But I'm admittedly that guy with lots of ideas that are not always realistic or experience-based. Nevertheless:

COA 1: Design a 4-man armored pod that is hydraulically lifted onto the back of both GCV and Abrams. That exploits the multitude of current infantry system designs that don't carry 3+9 troops. More importantly, it reduces weight of the partially armored GCV to below 80,000 lbs to get 2 on each C-17. The pod and GCV would be V-shaped with troops facing the middle. With an elevated V-hull, part of the GCV floor could be a trap door allowing troop dismount under the vehicle during direct fire or artillery airbursts or when the pod is still attached...or pass through into the pod and exit its rear.

But also envision the squad leader directing GCV commanders to drop pods with one fire team in one location and the remaining fire team 50 meters further forward or laterally. Also use the pod as an OP, vehicle checkpoint, or guard station with cover. The split squad would ensure that either an RPG, sabot, or IED explosion did not kill/wound the entire squad. The ability for Abrams to carry the same pod would be ideal for urban and complex terrain environments. Engine heat would need to be ducted away from the pod and insulation added, obviously, but sure beats slat armor to protect the engine...and troops.

Perhaps the pod would also have an APU and extra water (could cool off Abrams exhaust heat transfer)/storage space under the V-hull to keep in stable on the ground. A small optionally-manned ATV or Class I UAS could be stored in back when no pod was attached. The same hydraulic platform or forklift arms that lifted the fire team pod, also could lift 120mm rounds and elevate the pod when crossing a gap where it otherwise might bottom out behind the tank/GCV. Abrams pods without troops inside could carry additional fuel. The same hydraulic platform could lift dirt to fill HESCO bastion or support a line-charge pod for minefield breaching.

COA 2: Design a diamond-shaped GCV to exploit angled-armor advantages and allow a CROW or manned cupola in the center with troops still having room to sit around it in a hexagon shaped interior. The driver, vehicle commander, and engine would face the front in the hexagon with fire teams along the hexagon side next to them, and dual side-opening doors (for cover) exiting out the rearish angled side with a second engine and more troops seated against the rear of the hexagon interior. Add large wide wheels on the front and rear with tracks in the middle to allow tires to be inflated to lift tracks off the ground on roads. Dual engines and tracks or wheels would be a back-up drive systems in the event an IED knocked out either.

COA 3: Keep and improve the Bradley's armor. Add the same armored pod to the rear of it, or use an M-ATV to carry the additional fire team. An M-ATV can be made optionally manned and lead Bradleys/Abrams when mines or IED are suspected. Plus theirs that COIN and stability ops thing.;)

Pete
06-18-2010, 02:25 AM
If everyone did a good METT-TC analysis before committing. If even most commanders did one...:wry:
I don't mean to sidetrack the discussion, but the first time I heard the acronym METT was when I was at the advanced course in '81 or '82, about the time the Bradley was being fielded, too late for it to be applied to the vehicle's basic concept. If METT had been in use in '78 when I attended OCS and the basic course I probably would have heard it then. When I learned it the letters stood for mission, enemy, terrain and troops, with weather and time also being considerations; TC must have been added to it after my time in service. I'm only saying this because in many threads here I see the acronym being applied retroactively to situations that existed before it came into general use. Of course the principles it stands for have always been there.

GI Zhou
06-18-2010, 03:30 AM
Ken, the old Ground Defence International did a wonderful write up about the Begleitpanzer.

Cole, You sound like the embodiment of the late Richard Simpkin, which is not a bad thing. I have always had the belief that the PLA followed some of his work when designing some of their formations and equipment, but I am have told those who shall not be named that he was heavily influenced by Soviet tank designers.

Ken White
06-18-2010, 04:04 AM
I don't mean to sidetrack the discussion, but the first time I heard the acronym METT was when I was at the advanced course in '81 or '82.Us dumb Grunts were using it before Viet Nam and heavily while in that lovely country. I was teaching it to Armor Officer Basiec Course Students in 1976.
...about the time the Bradley was being fielded, too late for it to be applied to the vehicle's basic concept.My recall differs, as I said but even if the mnemonic had not been in common use, all those principles were studied and used by Soldiers for centuries before Omar Bradley was born, much less development of a vehicle bearing his name began -- as you said. ;)
If METT had been in use in '78 when I attended OCS and the basic course I probably would have heard it then.One would think... :confused:
When I learned it the letters stood for mission, enemy, terrain and troops, with weather and time also being considerations; TC must have been added to it after my time in service.The original was METT, as you say. The third 'T' was added after you went to the Advanced Course, IIRC. The 'C' was added after 2001 as far as I know.
I'm only saying this because in many threads here I see the acronym being applied retroactively to situations that existed before it came into general use.It's just shorthand for this---> " ...Of course the principles it stands for have always been there."

William F. Owen
06-18-2010, 04:31 AM
Cole, You sound like the embodiment of the late Richard Simpkin, which is not a bad thing. I have always had the belief that the PLA followed some of his work when designing some of their formations and equipment, but I am have told those who shall not be named that he was heavily influenced by Soviet tank designers.

AHHHHH Simpkin!!! Seriously?? I have 4 of his books and comb them for insight, on anything above the blindingly obvious. How on earth a guy could make life so complicated and then get so many things wrong (Tank carrying submarines - the design of the T-90?) I just cannot understand.
If the PLA did follow his ideas, we're home and dry!

Infanteer
06-18-2010, 06:35 AM
Interesting thread. To me, the idea of a heavy track and light wheeled vehicle makes the most sense. I love the LAV III and think it is the perfect all around mix but we must never forget that the first letter stands for LIGHT. I've done armoured combat breaches in 'em (with Armoured Engineers and Tanks out front, of course), but that's against a poor enemy. Light Armour and Wheels to me speaks to operational mobility (punching through the breach) rather than tactical mobility (slogging through defences).

Pete
06-18-2010, 07:31 AM
Originally Posted by Ken White: You must've led a sheltered life, Pete...
Indeed I did. Blame it on my II-S student deferment ... If I recall correctly, the tactics instructor at my Field Artillery Advanced Course who I first heard the term from said something to the effect of, "The Infantry uses the term METT to describe ... "

Ken White
06-18-2010, 02:19 PM
to remind us to eat. Now, if we had the superior intellects of all you Kings, we wouldn't need such artifices... :D

We're still wrestling with OCOKA / COKOA, corridors vs. compartments, topographic vs. military crests and dead space vs. terrain masking -- and with Pigs... :eek:

Pete
06-25-2010, 06:44 AM
Er, Ken, today Great Satan's Girlfriend discusses the Queen of Battle, which can be read by clicking here (http://greatsatansgirlfriend.blogspot.com/2010/06/queen-of-battle.html).

Tukhachevskii
06-25-2010, 02:48 PM
To return to gute's original query how would the members improve or organise the mech inf platoon/coy? (obviously getting doctrine right would be a start)

TAH
06-28-2010, 02:31 PM
Grabbed the title from an old car commerial. But I think it fits.

What your mounted infantry (mechanized, motorized or whatever) are carried by should derive from the planned role of said infantry on the battlefield.

Are they there to provide close-in protection for an armor/tank force? With a limited ability to perform "classic" infantry tasks/roles/missions (attack-defend in "close" terrain).

Another tag line I heard years ago was something like: Effective Infantry operations are like good parties, the more the merrier.

There in lies the issue with most/all IFVs, don't carry enough dismounted infantry. Adding more carriers only makes the issue worse in most cases. Adds to the overall log/sustainment requirement of the higher organization.

Think that 3 types of infantry makes sense: Light/dismounted for rapid strat movement and employment in close/very close terrainsets, medium, the general purpose infantry (APC mounted with HMGs/AGLs for fire support). and heavy infantry (IFV mounted and there for the offensive/counter strike roles).

Like the current SBCT company as a base. Would add another mortar to allow fire missions of 2X1 (smkXHE or HE/SMK etc) and would add anothe MGS to ease the doctrinal issue at the MGS/tank platoon level.

TAH

William F. Owen
06-28-2010, 02:43 PM
To return to gute's original query how would the members improve or organise the mech inf platoon/coy? (obviously getting doctrine right would be a start)

OK, I'd take my 130 man Coy, (4 x Platoons of 30 + 10 in HQ) and have them mount up in 17 x something like this
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=1116&d=1276696469
These would arrive fully crewed from a carrier BN. Once the mission is over, the infantry would go back to their trucks or buses. :)

Tukhachevskii
06-28-2010, 02:44 PM
and would add another MGS to ease the doctrinal issue at the MGS/tank platoon level.TAH

I didn't think the MGS platoon was meant to be deployed like a tank plt (direct fire inf spt is what I had assumed; 1 per plt or as per Mett-t). Having three of them always did confound me . Never did comprehend the cancellation of the M8 Buford (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M8_Armored_Gun_System) either:confused: IMO that was an excellent system.

Tukhachevskii
06-28-2010, 02:55 PM
OK, I'd take my 130 man Coy, (4 x Platoons of 30 + 10 in HQ) and have them mount up in 17 x something like this
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=1116&d=1276696469
These would arrive fully crewed from a carrier BN. Once the mission is over, the infantry would go back to their trucks or buses. :)

So how would command and control work with this arrangement (i.e., who owns and directs the tracks whilst the infantry are mounted)? Would the infantry debuss at an assembly area or would the APC drop them just shy of their objective? Would the "carrier Bn" be something like the USMC AAV Bn? Would the "carrier Bn" be attached to a Bde or a Div (in which case you are looking at, what, a Bn's worth of lift per Bde? or a Bde per Div?) Excuse the questions but mech doctrine befuddles me at the best of times... it was the worst of times...:D


p.s. IIRC your platoons are organised into fireteam groups, right? So you're not looking at a pure 8 man section per APC either? (or, are you?). How would you manage C2 with your fireteams split up in various tracks or would you just wait for them to debus, reorganise/consolidate and more on to the objective once reorg was completed?

P.PS. Have you seen the Namera's Arab cousin? The Temsah (www.military-today.com/apc/temsah.htm)

William F. Owen
06-28-2010, 03:35 PM
So how would command and control work with this arrangement (i.e., who owns and directs the tracks whilst the infantry are mounted)?
The Infantry Company Commander is in Command. He directs the Mech Commander as to where he wants to be, to dismount. The Mech commander is then to make best use of ground to achieve that.

Would the infantry debuss at an assembly area or would the APC drop them just shy of their objective? Depends on ground, threat and light conditions. The idea is to drop the infantry into terrain that affords them some ability to manoeuvre.

Would the "carrier Bn" be something like the USMC AAV Bn? Would the "carrier Bn" be attached to a Bde or a Div (in which case you are looking at, what, a Bn's worth of lift per Bde? or a Bde per Div?)
Don't know.

p.s. IIRC your platoons are organised into fireteam groups, right? So you're not looking at a pure 8 man section per APC either? (or, are you?). How would you manage C2 with your fireteams split up in various tracks or would you just wait for them to debus, reorganise/consolidate and more on to the objective once reorg was completed?
Depends on the mission and the weapons set. The default on drop would be 8 man teams, but then shake out into multiples or other groups as needed. Regardless the object would be to fight as a platoon, not as sections.

P.PS. Have you seen the Namera's Arab cousin? The Temsah (www.military-today.com/apc/temsah.htm)
Indeed I have.

Tukhachevskii
06-29-2010, 09:36 AM
The Infantry Company Commander is in Command. He directs the Mech Commander as to where he wants to be, to dismount. The Mech commander is then to make best use of ground to achieve that.
Depends on ground, threat and light conditions. The idea is to drop the infantry into terrain that affords them some ability to manoeuvre.

So the APCs are simply a means of conveyance rather than an element in the combined arms mix; i.e., they would not, I presume, provide any kind of intimate fire support with on board weapons which would be for self-protection only? If true what happens to the APC's ionce the infantry has debussed and begun assulting or moving to assult the objective; i.e., would they retire to a harbour/laegar(sp?) until the Inf needed a lift back to friendly lines? If the opposite is true how would the dismounted coy cdr co-ordinate with the APC coy cdr with regards to fire support; who's the chief, chief?

In Afghanistan I know of Royal Marine and para units being supported by BV tracked APCs which carry them to the assembly area and provide fire support under command of the sub-unit commander they have been attached to; rather like the old WWII bonnegruppa concept. Come to think of it. that's probably what you're suggesting too.

p.s. Can anyone tell me why the Temsah mortar variant (see site listed above) seems to have two mortars located in the rear? (Maybe I'm seeing things).

William F. Owen
06-29-2010, 11:31 AM
So the APCs are simply a means of conveyance rather than an element in the combined arms mix; i.e., they would not, I presume, provide any kind of intimate fire support with on board weapons which would be for self-protection only?
Well I'd assume you'd be supported by a Tank Coy at the very least, so the Tanks would do the close support

If the opposite is true how would the dismounted coy cdr co-ordinate with the APC coy cdr with regards to fire support; who's the chief, chief?
The OC APC's job is to support the dismounted commander to the best of his ability. - CASEVAC, resupply, extraction etc etc.

Come to think of it. that's probably what you're suggesting too. It is. The former CO of the that unit is a mate of mine.

baboon6
06-29-2010, 12:45 PM
In Afghanistan I know of Royal Marine and para units being supported by BV tracked APCs which carry them to the assembly area and provide fire support under command of the sub-unit commander they have been attached to; rather like the old WWII bonnegruppa concept. Come to think of it. that's probably what you're suggesting too.



The Vikings are used to support other units too; Mastiff wheeled vehicles are used in the same way.

Tukhachevskii
07-05-2010, 09:11 AM
I've been mulling over your Carrier Bn suggestion and I find my self wondering about how CS elements would be handled, for instance, mortars. Would you have them carreid by APCs for dismounted us only of have dedicated mortar vehicles able either carrying mortars (so the coy doesn't have to) or, like the Stryker mortar vehicle, mounting two mortars one of which is dismountable.

What of anti-tank units? would they be Javelin type units who would mount and then dismount a la inf? If a tank coy is providing intimate support am I correct in understanding that there would be no specialed APC variants for AT or indirect/direct fire support? What if not tank coy in intimate support? Rely on AH/CAS/UAV?

In terms of fire support for the coy would the APC's weapons- 40mm GMG for instance- be dismountable for use in static or SBF positions? And if so, do the APC crews man them/own? I assume, but require clarification, that they would given you have the APCs attached for the duration of the mission.

I wonder also what happens to the carrier Bn say in an operational march conducted by an Inf Bn or Bde (say a follow on and support or follow tasking) where they are carried in trucks for the most part. Where would the carrier Bn be? To whom is it attached? Would it follow the Bde (perhaps carrying supplies or some such) or would there be a Bn attached to the Bde in which case a Bn would be mounted for immediate deployment with two more in trucks for reinforcement? (But then the APCs would be a bit knackered after the march). Really, I suppose I'm asking is what is the Bn doing when it isn't moving Inf? Presumably it's moving other infantry elsewhere? (But does it travel with a Bde as permamnet attachment or not? If not then I think I get that the assets wiill be attached where and when needed according to the operational plan.

Tukhachevskii
07-05-2010, 02:50 PM
Can anyone explain the reason for the US army fielding an APC with a 8 pax capacity(M39 (www.olive-drab.com/idphoto/id_photos_m39auv.php)) to one, albeit eventually never put into production, which carried 24 (M44 (http://afvdb.50megs.com/usa/auvm44.html))? It's reminiscent of the USMC AAV7A1 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amphibious_Assault_Vehicle). Was it a viable idea to have a vehicle capable of carrying a platoon under armour? Can/should it be an idea that would find currency today given our advancements in passive and active armour? Or, is it just a big ol' elephant which deserved to die?



M44 picture (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:AUV_M44.png)

jtan163
07-05-2010, 03:17 PM
The Infantry Company Commander is in Command. He directs the Mech Commander as to where he wants to be, to dismount. The Mech commander is then to make best use of ground to achieve that.
Depends on ground, threat and light conditions. The idea is to drop the infantry into terrain that affords them some ability to manoeuvre.

Don't know.

Depends on the mission and the weapons set. The default on drop would be 8 man teams, but then shake out into multiples or other groups as needed. Regardless the object would be to fight as a platoon, not as sections.

Indeed I have.

The Australian Army had/has a an organisation like this, Royal Australian Armoured Corps APC regiments/squadrons.

The RAAC APC squadron was capable of carrying an infantry battalion.
Each APC troop could carry a coy of infantry, each APC section could carry a platoon of infantry (i.e. 3 M113s). The squadron also had mortar tracks for the battalion's mortar platoon, and at least one spare APC section for an engineer troop/assault pioneer platoon etc.
There were some other odds and sods too, (e.g. I think there were some APCs at the sqn level for use as the inf battallion commanders rover, some extra M548s over and above what the APC squadron required for its own resup to assist in resup for the infantry battallion, maybe some extra M577s for inf HQ use etc).
I can't recall the exact TOE, as I was in a cavalry (recon not APC) roled unit and we never carried infantry and it's been 20 years since I did the RAAC indoctrination course.

As described by Wilf above, the APCs were under command of the infantry commander, the individual vehciles were under control of their RAAC crew commanders with the APC unit/sub unit commanders providing advice to the infantry commanders as to best employment of the vehicles. That is to say the infantry commander where he wanted to be an when and the armored commander would suggest routes etc within the capability of his vehicles.
The APC commander would also advice on tactics/co-ordination/control technique and appropriate drills (e.g. debuss drills) to make best use of the APCs capabilities, especially to relatively junior inf commanders who had not previously worked with APCs.

APCs would drop the infantry either short or onto the objective depending on the tactical situation. APCs would also provide fire support to the infantry, again depending on the tactical situation.

It should be noted here that the relationship between the APC squadrons and the battallions were fairly close. When I was serving there were 2 light inf brigades, each with 2 battalions of light inf and an APC squadron, engineers squadron, arty regt etc, so the same squadron worked with the same 2 battalions, and they'd typically work with them for years.

I believe this was roughly how APCs were employed by Australian forces from Vietnam through to the present, including Somalia and I believe Timor Leste. i.e. dedicated RAAC APC units carrying infantry units, with the same command/control arrangements described above.

I believe this type of organisation was effective for us then and I see no reason why it could not be now, assuming that it fits the needs of your force.
I.e. I don't see any inherent command and control issues, or any problems combining the two apparently disparate units, but if your battallions are going to always be mechanised/mounted, then maybe you're better off just issuing them vehicles, incrementing their manpower and training crews.

Ken White
07-05-2010, 03:19 PM
Namer -- but the thinking at the time was (and still is) a squad carrier. The Marines for a variety of reasons have opted for more troops / fewer vehicles (or aircraft), the Army for Squad carrying vehicles (and aircraft...). Doctrine...:wry:

Here's a little background: LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M75_%28APC%29), LINK (http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/1949/NOV_DEC_1949/NOV_DEC_1949_PAGES_254_257.pdf).

William F. Owen
07-06-2010, 05:02 AM
The Australian Army had/has a an organisation like this, Royal Australian Armoured Corps APC regiments/squadrons.
I know. I don't do "original ideas." :D

Having said that the Israelis are currently opting to equip their 11-man squad with a Namer. If they get an operation, not requiring the Namer, they park it and "everyone" goes on foot. They intend for there to be no differentiation from vehicle crew and squad.

SethB
07-06-2010, 05:23 AM
How do they protect the vehicle?

William F. Owen
07-06-2010, 07:16 AM
How do they protect the vehicle?
You mean when it's parked back at base out on the hard? Not their problem. Someone else does it.

Tukhachevskii
07-06-2010, 09:17 AM
The squadron also had mortar tracks for the battalion's mortar platoon,

Sir,

thanks muchly(;)) for your detailed reply! But.....:D.....you mention there were mortar tracks. Were those tracks set aside for the carriage of mortars (which were used dismounted and thereby originated with/were owned by the infantry) or were they dedicated mortar tracks (ie., the baseplate was part and parcel of the vehicle). If the latter were those mortar tracks only ever for infantry usage when the APC sqn was attached? Did this mean that the Inf bn/coy had no integral mortar sub-units or did they combine (a la the US Strykers) and deploy dismounted and mounted (or self-propelled) mortars?

Tukhachevskii
07-06-2010, 09:18 AM
LINK (http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/1949/NOV_DEC_1949/NOV_DEC_1949_PAGES_254_257.pdf).

Thank you for the above link!

So why, speaking rhetorically to stimulate discussion, do we focus on squad/section carriiers? Why not plt carriers? Or at least half plt carriers; would ease reorg & C2 at the debuss point wouldn't it especially if used as per APC deployment as described above by Wilf and jtan163 rather than IFVs? Also fewer log requirements, etc.?

William F. Owen
07-06-2010, 10:23 AM
So why, speaking rhetorically to stimulate discussion, do we focus on squad/section carriiers? Why not plt carriers? Or at least half plt carriers; would ease reorg & C2 at the debuss point wouldn't it ...
Loose one carrier and you loose a lot of folks.

jtan163
07-06-2010, 11:35 AM
Loose one carrier and you loose a lot of folks.


Thank you for the above link!

So why, speaking rhetorically to stimulate discussion, do we focus on squad/section carriiers? Why not plt carriers? Or at least half plt carriers; would ease reorg & C2 at the debuss point wouldn't it especially if used as per APC deployment as described above by Wilf and jtan163 rather than IFVs? Also fewer log requirements, etc.?


In addition to Wilf's point re concentrating your troops into one big fat target, you lose flexibility.

I.e. you end up with one manoeuvre element instead of say 3 or 4.

If you want to debuss your troops simultneously you have to debuss them in a bit platoon gaggle, instead of in a formation more like what they would normally deploy in.

No bounding overwatch in less than coy size movements, you can cover less frontage while mounted, you can cover/advance on fewer axis, you have fewer mounted weapons/sensors, less redundancy in both mobility and other areas (weapons, sensors, comms).

All of this I think would make deploying a platoon as a semi independent element fairly unattractive. Just too many eggs in one basket - any problems and your whole platoon is stranded/neutralised and you suddenly have a big hole in your coy.

And such a platoon/half platoon sized vehicle would be a big, heavy, probably less agile target, especially if up armoured/built to namer type levels of protection. Imagine an LVTP7 with 6" steel RHA....

I personally think that the gains of fewer, larger vehicles would be few, and the downsides many.
If it weren't for the various costs I think more smaller vehicles (especially if organic to the inf) might be interesting, especially with the patrol based infantry discussed elsewhere (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2675&highlight=pbi).

Tukhachevskii
07-06-2010, 07:32 PM
In addition to Wilf's point re concentrating your troops into one big fat target, you lose flexibility.

I.e. you end up with one manoeuvre element instead of say 3 or 4.

If you want to debuss your troops simultneously you have to debuss them in a bit platoon gaggle, instead of in a formation more like what they would normally deploy in.

No bounding overwatch in less than coy size movements, you can cover less frontage while mounted, you can cover/advance on fewer axis, you have fewer mounted weapons/sensors, less redundancy in both mobility and other areas (weapons, sensors, comms).

All of this I think would make deploying a platoon as a semi independent element fairly unattractive. Just too many eggs in one basket - any problems and your whole platoon is stranded/neutralised and you suddenly have a big hole in your coy.

And such a platoon/half platoon sized vehicle would be a big, heavy, probably less agile target, especially if up armoured/built to namer type levels of protection. Imagine an LVTP7 with 6" steel RHA....

I personally think that the gains of fewer, larger vehicles would be few, and the downsides many.
If it weren't for the various costs I think more smaller vehicles (especially if organic to the inf) might be interesting, especially with the patrol based infantry discussed elsewhere (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2675&highlight=pbi).

Thought as much; no advantages whatsoever. Really makes one wonder what the hell was going through the minds of the M44 designers:confused: Makes it's cancellation all the more understandable though:D. Wonder what happens to the EFV?:rolleyes: That's a big ol' vehicle/target by anyone's standards.

reed11b
07-06-2010, 08:15 PM
The OC APC's job is to support the dismounted commander to the best of his ability. - CASEVAC, resupply, extraction etc etc.

And by freeing the APC or even IFV from the INF fireteam/platoon, you actually facilitate, not hamper, these exact missions. Fire support can still be an option if needed, just on the PLT or CO level, not the fireteam level. Might mean you don't get to have a private "truck" with your own cooler and pouge bait however.:rolleyes:
Reed

jtan163
07-07-2010, 05:18 AM
Sir,

thanks muchly(;)) for your detailed reply! But.....:D.....you mention there were mortar tracks. Were those tracks set aside for the carriage of mortars (which were used dismounted and thereby originated with/were owned by the infantry) or were they dedicated mortar tracks (ie., the baseplate was part and parcel of the vehicle). If the latter were those mortar tracks only ever for infantry usage when the APC sqn was attached? Did this mean that the Inf bn/coy had no integral mortar sub-units or did they combine (a la the US Strykers) and deploy dismounted and mounted (or self-propelled) mortars?

The mortar tracks were dedicated mortar tracks with built in basplates (M125s I think - equivilants in any case).

The APC squadron owned the M125s, but the infantry owned the mortars (i.e. the mortars were from the mortar of the infantry's support coy) and could fire them mounted or dismounted.

jtan163
07-07-2010, 02:02 PM
Thought as much; no advantages whatsoever. Really makes one wonder what the hell was going through the minds of the M44 designers:confused: Makes it's cancellation all the more understandable though:D. Wonder what happens to the EFV?:rolleyes: That's a big ol' vehicle/target by anyone's standards.

I'm not 100% sure about what I am saying - I'm an ex baggy arsed digger not a naval architect - but I suspect that in the case of seriously amphibious vehicles, i.e. those that are intended to cover considerable distances over the sea from offshore, as opposed to those that are just intended to cross rivers/creeks etc, that their sea keeping qualities may be improved with size and the speed may be increased with greater hull length.

So there maybe good, non-tactical/non-doctrinal reasons for the EFV and the LVTPs etc to be bigger than your average squad carrier.

Tukhachevskii
07-07-2010, 02:50 PM
I'm not 100% sure about what I am saying - I'm an ex baggy arsed digger not a naval architect - but I suspect that in the case of seriously amphibious vehicles, i.e. those that are intended to cover considerable distances over the sea from offshore, as opposed to those that are just intended to cross rivers/creeks etc, that their sea keeping qualities may be improved with size and the speed may be increased with greater hull length.

So there maybe good, non-tactical/non-doctrinal reasons for the EFV and the LVTPs etc to be bigger than your average squad carrier.

Sir, I have been following the EFV programme for a while and, though it inititially showed promise I think the doctrinal and technical specifications clashed. IMO you can swim or you can crawl- you cannot do both well. The EFV is a technical compromise masquarading as technological cutting edge. IMO the USMC would have been better served getting an upgraded/modernised or new build (i.e., new design) LAAPVT type vehicle without all the technical gremlins that ensure that you'll have to have ideal conditions to use the damn thing in the first place or will invite trouble with all that could go wrong (i.e., the under nose planning chine thingy, the waterjets and retractable suspension/tracks, et al) and instead develop an AIST type hovercraft (www.hovercraft-museum.org/russaist.html) for the Ship to Shore over-the-horizon (OTH) assault phase; its size and speed mean that it could be fitted with proper CIWS to defeat SSM/AShM whilst being fast enough to weave and swerve over the water to avoid DPICM type cheapo anti-ship/area denial weapons fired from MRLs, MANPATS, etc., its capability vis-avis-sea states would also be vastly better meaning troops have a slightly better chance of actually getting ashore without fear of their track capsizing. Given that the EFV was designed at a time when OTH assaults were envisaged at a distance of 52miles nautical but US naval specialists are now concerned that, in fact, that distance is much more likely to be in excess of 100nm then the EFV seems like an inefficient solution to an ill-thought out doctrinal and operation requirement (same could be said of the V-22). But then again, thats part and parcel of the STOM concept. Personally, I think you'll always need a beachhead in order to secure your LOC. I personally wouldn't want to rely on a purely airborne or OTH based log/resupply chain. But that's purely based upon my reading of past amphibious ops.

Ken White
07-07-2010, 07:52 PM
They’re based on the more modern LHD Wasp Class design, but initial ships will remove the LHD’s landing craft and well deck. LINK (http://militarydailynews.com/2010/04/the-usa%E2%80%99s-new-lha-r-ships-carrier-air-amphibious-assault/).

There's a a tmie and place for many things, even EFVs. METT-TC... ;)

Fuchs
07-07-2010, 08:38 PM
The core problem of the EFV - besides the long development - is that they mated the open sea cruise capability with the AFV itself.

It would have been much more versatile and simple to create a powered sled for AFV & container transport over open seas. They could then have used as normal AFV (normal short range/slow amphibiousness) such as a common Marines/Army M3 replacement.

Kiwigrunt
07-07-2010, 11:35 PM
The core problem of the EFV - besides the long development - is that they mated the open sea cruise capability with the AFV itself.

It would have been much more versatile and simple to create a powered sled for AFV & container transport over open seas. They could then have used as normal AFV (normal short range/slow amphibiousness) such as a common Marines/Army M3 replacement.

I would be inclined to agree. But if you wanted that sled to be versatile and multipurpose, what would you call it? A landing craft? Full circle me thinks.

Fuchs
07-08-2010, 08:24 AM
I would be inclined to agree. But if you wanted that sled to be versatile and multipurpose, what would you call it? A landing craft? Full circle me thinks.

A flat, stackable and unsinkable (foamed cells) landing craft with remote piloting option.

The AFV does only need some amphibiousness for the final few metres to the beach, as safety precaution and for a marine specialisation on supporting the army at river crossings and in swampy regions.

jtan163
07-09-2010, 08:07 AM
The core problem of the EFV - besides the long development - is that they mated the open sea cruise capability with the AFV itself.

It would have been much more versatile and simple to create a powered sled for AFV & container transport over open seas. They could then have used as normal AFV (normal short range/slow amphibiousness) such as a common Marines/Army M3 replacement.

I think the EFV is intended to fill a fairly specialised niche, and as such I don't think it is a good example as to the arguments for or against the amphibious qualities of APCs generally or the most desirable size for a general APC.

B.Smitty
07-09-2010, 12:29 PM
The AFV does only need some amphibiousness for the final few metres to the beach, as safety precaution and for a marine specialisation on supporting the army at river crossings and in swampy regions.

What if they have to crawl over a reef? Aren't the last few meters of the surf zone some of the most treacherous? How do you embark the force once a raid is complete? Do the APCs need to mate up with the sleds in the middle of the surf?

Personally, if we're going to dump the EFV, i'd rather see a new vehicle more like the existing AAV, only with modern bells and whistles. Then modify the JHSV to allow launch and recovery. It would act as a fast shuttle back and forth from the Sea Base. Unfortunately, this would place it within range of land defenses, but better it than a multi-billion dollar LHD/LPD.

Fuchs
07-09-2010, 01:34 PM
What if they have to crawl over a reef? Aren't the last few meters of the surf zone some of the most treacherous? How do you embark the force once a raid is complete? Do the APCs need to mate up with the sleds in the middle of the surf?

What's the problem? The common AFV could still be amphibious in the MC version - short range ambphibious. Not high seas, not high speed, possibly no bilge pump.
Embarkation is simple, as is leaving such a sled. You simply drive over the edge. An empty sled can navigate even through the shallowest waters to the beach. The AFV would simply drive over the bow of the sledge if it doesn't make it with its load to the beach.

I'm sure that this is much more simple than a gold-plated-everything-in-one-beast option.

B.Smitty
07-09-2010, 08:17 PM
What's the problem? The common AFV could still be amphibious in the MC version - short range ambphibious. Not high seas, not high speed, possibly no bilge pump.
Embarkation is simple, as is leaving such a sled. You simply drive over the edge. An empty sled can navigate even through the shallowest waters to the beach. The AFV would simply drive over the bow of the sledge if it doesn't make it with its load to the beach.

I'm sure that this is much more simple than a gold-plated-everything-in-one-beast option.

If the AFV is "AAV-level" amphibious, then it might work. AAVs are designed to go through rough surf zones. A garden variety amphibious M113s aren't. They're meant to cross a fairly calm rivers.

The sled is going to have some degree of draft even empty, so it can still get hung up on a very shallow reef or sand bar. The AFV will have to be amphibious enough to handle this situation as well.

How do you get the AFVs on the sled in the first place? Will this happen on the amphibious ship? Or will you launch the sleds first, then the AFVs, then mate them up at sea? Where will you store the sleds when they're not in use? Sounds like you'll need a bigger amphib to carry sleds and AFVs.

How will you recover the AFVs and sleds back to the amphib after an operation? The AFVs will have to mate up with the sleds at sea again somewhere. Past the surf zone and any reefs, presumably. Then onboard the amphib they would have to be separated somehow for stowage.

Fuchs
07-10-2010, 10:33 AM
Mating in ship: Stacked sled lowered onto water in welldeck, fixed with two ropes, AFV drives onto it, clamps engage.

Mating on land: Sled is pulled close to beach or onto beach with winch, AFV drives onto it, clamps engage, combo is being pushed into deep enough water by an APC or pulled by something that already swims.

And seriously, there are almost no places on earth with problematic reefs. There's not going t be another island-hopping campaign.

Tukhachevskii
07-10-2010, 10:46 AM
Mating in ship: Stacked sled lowered onto water in welldeck, fixed with two ropes, AFV drives onto it, clamps engage.

Mating on land: Sled is pulled close to beach or onto beach with winch, AFV drives onto it, clamps engage, combo is being pushed into deep enough water by an APC or pulled by something that already swims.

And seriously, there are almost no places on earth with problematic reefs. There's not going t be another island-hopping campaign.

Maybe its just me but what you ptropose sounds awfully like an LCM to me (albeit with provision for an autopilot/remote control UAV style)?

Tukhachevskii
07-10-2010, 10:57 AM
New Heavy hovercraft in the offing (http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/kit-eaton/technomix/l-3s-giant-military-hovercraft-reminds-us-other-big-military-stuff)

Fuchs
07-10-2010, 05:27 PM
Maybe its just me but what you ptropose sounds awfully like an LCM to me (albeit with provision for an autopilot/remote control UAV style)?

It is, but with "unsinkable" foam-filled module for floatation instead of the huge freeboard. That allows stacking in the ship.

jtan163
07-11-2010, 10:16 AM
It is, but with "unsinkable" foam-filled module for floatation instead of the huge freeboard. That allows stacking in the ship.

Freeboard is sort of useful. It offers protection from the sea/wind as well as potentially some protection from at least small arms fire.

To me (and Im not a sailor) freeboard means you can carry stuff other than AFVs. E.g. you could carry a landrover or unimog and expect it to start, because it's engine compartment would be more protected from being swamped by waves. I.e. you don't need a container.

Furthermore I can't really see these open sleds as being all that useful for carrying troops, casualties, being used as command posts, aid stations, ship to shore cargo and the like. With an LCM or LCU you can just load the troops, medics, commanders and radios on and you have a troop carrier/aid post/CP.
Same with 'B' (non AFV) vehicles, and general cargo e.g. pallets, bulk stores.

As BSmitty suggests, these sleds don't sound like they'd do well with difficult coasts either. Granted there may not be another island hopping campaign with the need to navigate coral reefs, but sandbars, rocks and shoals are still plentiful. So are rivers. And while I reckon it is pretty easy to use an AAV/EFV in a river I think it might be a lot more difficult to use a powered sled, especially if the river has locks/barrages and the like.

Whilst I can certainly see where Tukhachevskii is coming from with his argument for Aist or bigger sized hovercraft I don't think he was denying the need for AAV type vehicles, merely the wisdom in an EFV type vehicle that is supposed to be all singing and dancing, i.e. incredibly complex by the need to aquaplane at high speed.

It seems to me your sled idea adding additional cost and complexity but instead of adding it to the EFV you are moving the extra cost and complexity into these powered remote controlled sleds and in the process losing flexibility. In fact I'd suggest you are adding extra cost and complexity. Instead of a single powerplant in your APC you have the APC powerplant and another powerplant for the sled, as well as he sled's control/nav system.

What is your objection to fairly specialised sea capable vehicles like the EFV/AAV? Especially for marine/naval infantry units.

What does the sled concept offer over the traditional EFV/AAV and landing craft combination (including LCACs or other hovercraft, large or small or even Ekranoplans)? How is your idea more versatile?

Tukhachevskii
07-11-2010, 11:01 AM
#1 Whilst I can certainly see where Tukhachevskii is coming from with his argument for Aist or bigger sized hovercraft I don't think he was denying the need for AAV type vehicles, merely the wisdom in an EFV type vehicle that is supposed to be all singing and dancing, i.e. incredibly complex by the need to aquaplane at high speed.


#2 What does the sled concept offer over the traditional EFV/AAV and landing craft combination (including LCACs or other hovercraft, large or small or even Ekranoplans)? How is your idea more versatile?

Re: #1 your summation of my position is correct.

#2 Now you're talking. I've always loved those gigantic Soviet era WiG/Ekranoplan's like the Caspian Sea monster (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MD7sEbhh1sQ). Their potential for amphibious operations (as well as strategic and operational mobiltiy in general) remains a, er, um, potential:o that is unfortunately underexplored. However, I think the US (as per usual:D) has gone slightly over the top with the Pelican (http://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/archive/2002/september/i_pw.html). The following papers may be of interest to the interested...

Wing in Ground Effact Craft Review (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA361836&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Airlift 2025 (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA392682&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Strategic Mobility Innovation (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32887.pdf)

Wing in Ground Effect Aircraft (http://seaeagle.sendforprint.com/images/GetTRDoc100.pdf)

Fuchs
07-11-2010, 11:32 AM
What is your objection to fairly specialised sea capable vehicles like the EFV/AAV? Especially for marine/naval infantry units

* large volume, surface + thin armour

* high cost

* carries "amphibiousness" component weight and volume along even in protracted land campaigns

* commonality with army vehicles limited to components

Infanteer
07-13-2010, 05:01 AM
Caught up on this one.

I recall reading an article in the Gazette which spoke to the problems of meshing Rifle Companies with separate AAV organizations and advocated moving to a different model (what, I can't remember).

As I stated elsewhere, I used to think we should split until I was a Rifle Platoon Comd. The LAV is a tool - albeit a big tool - but a tool none the less. A good commander should view it along the same lines as vector binos or a ATGM system - use the tool to give you the best advantage. Crew tasks were interchangeable within the section. Just because a guy was the "Driver" did not mean he was always driving. I frequently rotated my drivers (and gunners and, at times, crew commanders) throughout the tour. For most operations, drivers/gunners were out on dismounted OP/ambushes and conducting patrols. Driving and gunning isn't rocket science and the troops build up pretty good collective expertise in living and fighting with the vehicle. No point in separating that. To those who'd argue that it is a millstone that interferes with more traditional "bayonet" training I say BS - both in garrison and on operations, properly instituted maintenance routines take relatively little time from the section to ensure the vehicle is good to go.

I'm liking the Heavy IFV on logic alone (been stuck too many times in a LAV trying to keep up with tanks), but I'd argue that it should be integral to the guys driving it (as per the Israeli example provided by Wilf).

William F. Owen
07-13-2010, 05:22 AM
I'm liking the Heavy IFV on logic alone (been stuck too many times in a LAV trying to keep up with tanks), but I'd argue that it should be integral to the guys driving it (as per the Israeli example provided by Wilf).

While spiritually and emotionally I am in total agreement, there is a very good counter argument that suggests that manoeuvring/fighting/sustaining vehicles and doing the same on foot are two very different forms.

Now, I don't buy this totally because training is training - but, something like a Namer of an LAV is a complicated bit of kit. More so than a mortar. Manoeuvring 4 x LAV/APC in any type of broken terrain is not really a something that can be taken for granted. You need to keep current to be good at it, so having the training time and funds available, is an issue.

I don't think you could really prove that one way is better than the other. The test would be how well each way could be done given the same training time and money - and yes, sadly time and money count in the real world.

Ken White
07-13-2010, 06:08 AM
The Infantry Carrier thing, that is (he leered...). ;)

Was in an Infantry Div when the Carriers (M-75s later replaced by M59s) were assigned to a Carrier Bn and tabbed to a unit that needed them on an as required basis. It worked fairly well in peacetime with only occasional arguments between the Carrier Platoon Leader or Co Cdr and the Infantry unit. Some minor problems with tactical employment, .50 cal support and such. Can't say how it would work in combat -- that tends to magnify those minor peacetime problems... :wry:

Also later worked with assigned carriers (M113 series). Almost no problems with employment. Maintenance wasn't overwhelming.

Thus I'm agnostic on where the carriers are but I'm inclined to lean toward owning one's own solely on the basis that everyone doesn't take care of their equipment at the same level AND there is a distinct advantage to knowing the peculiarities of the machinery you use -- and ALL machinery has individual quirks. Bad as a buncha females... :D

Then there are Helicopters -- in most cases always owned by someone else. I have seen a few combat assaults that were coordination glitch free and I've seen slightly fewer that were nightmares. Mostly they went fairly well with everyone trying to make it work. The level of difficulty was most often dependent on the personalities involved. The key difference in the Choppers is that there's no tactical employment in the action as there is with carriers so they are purely transportation whereas the carriers will have to be integrated in the tactical plan. I know most people realize that and I mention it only to highlight the necessity of that integration which makes a vehicular mounted force a different thing, tactically and psychologically for those involved, to a helicopter transported or walking force.

That said, there is IMO a distinct difference in mindset between mounted and dismounted Infantry units. Neither is wrong but they are different and that difference affects methods of employment and capabilities (mentally as well as the obvious support and sustainment issues). Experience is great but the law of averages says that an Infantryman will acquire the bulk of his experience in one form or the other and my observation has been that most develop a preference for one form and do not want to deal with the other. This can affect their performance.

As an aside, I also rode in what were then LVTs (today's AAVs) in the Marine Corps, always owned by someone else and rarely did the same units work together in those days (deliberately to foster interoperability and deter pattern establsihment). That was strictly transportation then and there were no tactical employment issues. The advantage of hauling 25 plus people meant fewer Tracks could move large quantities of people fairly quickly.

All that leads me to suggest that the idea of multi skilled Infantry is nice but I've seen enough problems in implementation that I believe that specialties and specialization exist and should be accepted. The issue is not training, that's not difficult to manage. It is experience related bias and preferences on the part of the Troops -- and many of their leaders... :wry:

Infanteer
07-13-2010, 11:00 PM
While spiritually and emotionally I am in total agreement, there is a very good counter argument that suggests that manoeuvring/fighting/sustaining vehicles and doing the same on foot are two very different forms.

Out of interest - source?


I don't think you could really prove that one way is better than the other. The test would be how well each way could be done given the same training time and money - and yes, sadly time and money count in the real world.

Probably true.


Thus I'm agnostic on where the carriers are but I'm inclined to lean toward owning one's own solely on the basis that everyone doesn't take care of their equipment at the same level AND there is a distinct advantage to knowing the peculiarities of the machinery you use -- and ALL machinery has individual quirks. Bad as a buncha females... :D

YES! Our Army practices whole fleet management due to reduced availability of certain vehicles combined with increased number of users combined with stupid procurement policies (I'll take one of these, one of those....). Anyways, getting crap from the previous "renter" seems to be an accepted truth. My LAV Sgt had fun trying to sort out maintenance documentation for our LAVs in theater that hadn't been updated since 2007....


Then there are Helicopters -- in most cases always owned by someone else. I have seen a few combat assaults that were coordination glitch free and I've seen slightly fewer that were nightmares. Mostly they went fairly well with everyone trying to make it work. The level of difficulty was most often dependent on the personalities involved. The key difference in the Choppers is that there's no tactical employment in the action as there is with carriers so they are purely transportation whereas the carriers will have to be integrated in the tactical plan. I know most people realize that and I mention it only to highlight the necessity of that integration which makes a vehicular mounted force a different thing, tactically and psychologically for those involved, to a helicopter transported or walking force.

Agreed.


That said, there is IMO a distinct difference in mindset between mounted and dismounted Infantry units. Neither is wrong but they are different and that difference affects methods of employment and capabilities (mentally as well as the obvious support and sustainment issues). Experience is great but the law of averages says that an Infantryman will acquire the bulk of his experience in one form or the other and my observation has been that most develop a preference for one form and do not want to deal with the other. This can affect their performance.

All that leads me to suggest that the idea of multi skilled Infantry is nice but I've seen enough problems in implementation that I believe that specialties and specialization exist and should be accepted. The issue is not training, that's not difficult to manage. It is experience related bias and preferences on the part of the Troops -- and many of their leaders... :wry:

My experience, and I may be a prisoner of my own experience, is that with a good, professional Army this "Light/Mech" dichotomy is negligable. I've often asked for someone to explain the "Light Infantry Missions", "Light Infantry Skillsets" and "Light Infantry Doctrine" to me, because after 9 years in the Army, I still can't really identify them. While deployed (as a mech platoon commander), my platoon conducted over 130 patrols, with the lions share being without any vehicle support. My battalion conducted, at various levels, numerous airmobile operations both training and live. We operated in built up agricultural areas, complex urbanized terrain, and extremely "hilly" areas (although I wouldn't say it was quite mountain ops - but a few of our NCOs were qualified in this aspect), which included laying up for extended periods in traditional patrol bases. We also conducted armoured breaches when we had to. We're running out of "Light Infantry Missions" here. If parachute operations is the only aspect left, I believe all serious studies point out that most advantages of airborne operations have been supplanted by the helicopter in the last 40 years. The object is - as someone pointed out here - to make yourself asymmetric to the enemy, not enshrine certain equipment or tactics - and only good leadership at all levels is going to do that. Remember, all these COIN guys in the US Army are largely Armoured/Cavalry officers and the British Army's one success in Basrah was by a tank commander with a creative flair.

Ken White
07-14-2010, 01:12 AM
My experience, and I may be a prisoner of my own experience, is that with a good, professional Army this "Light/Mech" dichotomy is negligable.I can believe that. The US army is not as good at the basics as are the Australian and Canadian Armies and we have the 'advantage' of size and funding (mixed blessing, that) to enable more -- perhaps excessive -- specialization. That can imprint over time. It has advantages and disadvantages; the world has yet to develop the perfect Army.
I've often asked for someone to explain the "Light Infantry Missions", "Light Infantry Skillsets" and "Light Infantry Doctrine" to me, because after 9 years in the Army, I still can't really identify them.Easy, 25-30 miles a day on foot with everything you need on your back, capable of 24-72 hour patrols with no resupply, all climate, all terrain, one hot meal every third day if lucky... :D

Those are all serious, even more serious is ability -- even desire (give that some thought...) -- to operate without and away from vehicles routinely and, most importantly, not being tied (in all senses of the word...) to a vehicle. Can be tedious in the field but when the Platoon gets back to base, it's a lot easier to clean and maintain two VS-17 Panels than it is four vehicles. ;)

The flip side of that is that there is little that is less cost effective than a light infantry company in peacetime. ;)
If parachute operations is the only aspect left, I believe all serious studies point out that most advantages of airborne operations have been supplanted by the helicopter in the last 40 years.Virtually all such 'studies' have indeed said that -- though the authors of said studies still haven't figured out how to get a heliborne force on the ground and capable of doing damage at an objective several hundred or more miles away in those rare cases where that can be worth the costs. :cool:
The object is - as someone pointed out here - to make yourself asymmetric to the enemy, not enshrine certain equipment or tactics - and only good leadership at all levels is going to do that. Remember, all these COIN guys in the US Army are largely Armoured/Cavalry officers and the British Army's one success in Basrah was by a tank commander with a creative flair.All true. I'm not a fan of Branches myself but we have them. Armor and Cavalry are important and they're okay, they're certainly generally less hidebound in the US Army than is the Infantry. There are jobs for everyone and the ability to swap roles and missions certainly exists and is to be encouraged. My question is simply whether or not that provides the most effective use (that METT-TC thing intrudes, I suspect). Everything you say is correct but, as you pointed out, we're all captives of our own experience. My point was and is that so too are units...

William F. Owen
07-14-2010, 05:37 AM
Out of interest - source?

Any Armour Corps Officer in any Army, anyone has ever spoken to! :D
I've even met Royal Thai Army tankers who believed that commanding tank units was black art!!

davidbfpo
07-14-2010, 09:45 AM
Infanteer,

You cited:
Remember, all these COIN guys in the US Army are largely Armoured/Cavalry officers and the British Army's one success in Basrah was by a tank commander with a creative flair.

Can you provide a source for the UK success?

Fuchs
07-14-2010, 01:20 PM
I suspect he means the UK officer who created a kind of LRDG with long land rover-mounted patrols along the (Iranian?) border.
The officer got relatively good press.

I don't recall where I read about him, though.

Infanteer
07-14-2010, 01:33 PM
Any Armour Corps Officer in any Army, anyone has ever spoken to! :D
I've even met Royal Thai Army tankers who believed that commanding tank units was black art!!

Oh - those guys. They look at a vehicle as the raison d'etre (man the arms) whereas the infantry merely see it as a tool (arm the man). An IFV is a gun/big rucksack/rest from walking, nothing more. So I'm not to concerned about what they think! ;)


Infanteer,

You cited:

Can you provide a source for the UK success?

I can't for the life of me find it now - it was some Armoured LCol who abandoned his FOBs and was hailed as "Lawrence of Arabia". Bit of a misnomer, as all he was doing is living in the desert in laagers, but it was a creative interdiction effort.

MK
07-14-2010, 07:28 PM
This should be the article/LCol in question:

http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/mh/dti1106/index.php?startpage=26

davidbfpo
07-14-2010, 10:20 PM
MK,

Thanks for the link. I do wonder whether the "maverick" Lt. Col. David Labouchere, of the Queen's Royal Hussars, is still serving? A quick website check failed to find an answer.

I like the snippet that if a fisherman is caught smuggling a weapon, he'll destroy the weapons, sink the boat, take the fisherman home and ransack his home. No detention.

Tukhachevskii
07-15-2010, 09:59 AM
A flat, stackable and unsinkable (foamed cells) landing craft with remote piloting option.

For the life of me I couldn't remember what this statement reminded me of until...now. Essentially what you have are Mexeflote (www.army.mod.uk/rlc/equipment/763.aspx) rafts/ military "uber" surfboards:D. I suppose that you could collect them all after the initial assault elements have taken the beach and then build a mulburry harbour out of them for follow on exploitation forces!:cool:

Fuchs
07-15-2010, 12:45 PM
I'd rather think of stacked surf boards or rigid engineer boats for river crossings.

William F. Owen
07-15-2010, 12:55 PM
For the life of me I couldn't remember what this statement reminded me of until...now. Essentially what you have are Mexeflote (www.army.mod.uk/rlc/equipment/763.aspx) rafts/ military "uber" surfboards:D.
Seriously excellent piece of equipment. Much underrated, except by anyone who has used it.

Tukhachevskii
07-19-2010, 10:01 AM
The Regimental Rogue makes some interesting statements regarding the 21st Century Infantry Company (http://regimentalrogue.com/papers/21st.htm) which cover the doctrinal and practical aspects of LAV command, seating arrangements for dismounts as well as the composition of said beasties. His ideas seem to be a via media between the separate carrier Bn advocates and the US style embedded/infantry crewed APC concept.


(#1) Our officiers can speak volumes on the theory of tactical employment of IFVs at the combat team and higher, but we've never seriously figured out how we're going to tactically integrate these vehicles within the infantry compan y.

#2 The crewed vehicle concept ... requires the establishment, training and maintaining of dedicated crews for each vehicle. [...]

#3 One of the most awkward moments in the operations of an M113 or GRIZZLY company was the dismount. The delay and loss of continuity (of fire, observation and control) as the commander switched with the gunner was always simply "accepted" as part of the cost of doing business. [T]he [LAV] turret basket requires that the gun be traversed centre before the crew commander can dismount through the hull. this means every vehicle dismounting its creww commander will surrender the tactical advantage of a 25mm stabilised chain gun firing on the objective.

#4 At all levels, the infantry commander is the leader of the dismounted force and its supporting LAV component. The LAV APC is a firepower, mobility and protection asset supporting the ground battle waged by the dismounted infantry - but it must be crewed and directed with as much consideration as any other component of the battalion's combat power.

William F. Owen
07-19-2010, 10:23 AM
#3 One of the most awkward moments in the operations of an M113 or GRIZZLY company was the dismount. The delay and loss of continuity (of fire, observation and control) as the commander switched with the gunner was always simply "accepted" as part of the cost of doing business. [T]he [LAV] turret basket requires that the gun be traversed centre before the crew commander can dismount through the hull. this means every vehicle dismounting its creww commander will surrender the tactical advantage of a 25mm stabilised chain gun firing on the objective.
So why dismount the man manning the gun? That's just moronic and bad training. Doing stupid stuff is always stupid.

Infanteer
07-19-2010, 01:18 PM
So why dismount the man manning the gun? That's just moronic and bad training. Doing stupid stuff is always stupid.

It was an old drill when we had the M113/Grizzleys - the article was written before we brought the LAV in and codified our IFV doctrine. We've since moved away from that silliness with dedicated crew commanders. The big debate in the Infantry for us is where the Platoon Commander rides - in the turret for max command and control, in the back to dismount as soon as the troops do or switching up during the fight through (which leads to the debate of popping out of a turret in the middle of an assault and break-in).

William F. Owen
07-20-2010, 05:20 AM
The big debate in the Infantry for us is where the Platoon Commander rides - in the turret for max command and control, in the back to dismount as soon as the troops do or switching up during the fight through (which leads to the debate of popping out of a turret in the middle of an assault and break-in).
For me there is no debate. He dismounts. The Plt Sgt looks after the vehicles. They are "fire support."
The Platoon Commander has got to lead by personal example. The vehicles follow the troops, and the troops follow the officer.

Fuchs
07-20-2010, 06:53 AM
The Plt Sgt would become systematically ill-trained in the dismount action, lieutenants die like fleas on battlefields - and where's your effective no.2 dismount leader?

William F. Owen
07-20-2010, 10:51 AM
The Plt Sgt would become systematically ill-trained in the dismount action, lieutenants die like fleas on battlefields - and where's your effective no.2 dismount leader?
Luckily none of that reflects reality. What do you do if both parachutes fail? What do you do if everyone dies?
a.) The Plt Sgt is a former Section Commander and has done the same training as the Platoon Commander.
b.) You can have reserve dismount commander.
If someone is "systematically ill-trained" then your training is very poor indeed.

Fuchs
07-20-2010, 11:36 AM
Sometime ago I have apparently lost some confidence. Hence, since then I've always wished that plans and organisations are robust, keep going well after losing high quality components.


And next time, you should really exclude "lieutenants die like fleas on battlefields" from "Luckily none of that reflects reality." or I'll slap you with a load of statistics about the remaining life expectation of mechanised infantry lieutenants in war. :(

Infanteer
07-21-2010, 02:01 AM
For me there is no debate. He dismounts. The Plt Sgt looks after the vehicles. They are "fire support."
The Platoon Commander has got to lead by personal example. The vehicles follow the troops, and the troops follow the officer.


The Plt Sgt would become systematically ill-trained in the dismount action, lieutenants die like fleas on battlefields - and where's your effective no.2 dismount leader?

Don't get me wrong; there is no question that the Platoon Commander eventually dismounts. In Canada, we have the "LAV Sgt", who is the third senior guy in the Platoon (usually). The Platoon 2IC will always be in another car (separate from the Pl Comd) while the Platoon Comd and the LAV Sgt may ride in his car with him. There are a few variations:
1. Pl Comd comds one car (to be replaced by a Jnr NCO when he dismounts), LAV Sgt comds another car (take control of the "Zulu" vehicles when the Comd dismounts) and the Pl 2IC rides in the back of a third car.
2. Pl Comd comds HQ car and his LAV Sgt rides in the back. They swap on the dismount.
3. LAV Sgt comds HQ car and Pl Comd rides in the back, ready to dismount when required.

I personally used all three, dependant on the mission. I would utilize the first configuration when commanding a "mech heavy" operation, usually at the combat team level, due to the amount of movement and the command and control required. I would use 2 or 3 when using vehicles to insert for dismounted missions. My replacement always used 3 and felt odd in the turret while my boss was a big believer in 1 - the difference in C2 between the turret (with its optics) and the air sentry hatch in the back are, in my opinion, substantial. I was bit in the ass a few times (luckily in training) while in the back lacking C2; my LAV Sgt was good, but sometimes time and space mean the comd needs to call the audible fast.

The other debate for us is when to do the "switch" in the HQ car. The LAV does not allow a swapping of commanders internally under armour (I think one can do this in a Bradley) so it involves getting up on the turret and jumping down in the back hatch. Obviously one doesn't want to do this in the middle of a fire fight, but using the other LAVs/tanks for cover allows it to be done in a relatively safe manner. This is alright as it allows the Sgts to dismount with the sections and get into the fight without having the officer running all over the place right away. Although a Pl Comd could theoretically comd an assault from the turret, he wouldn't want to for fear of not sharing the pain with his men. Some Pl Comds prefer to swap over on the Line of Departure while some do it on the Objective. Preference I guess (although I prefer the latter for the reasons listed above).

Of course, having a vehicle without a turret would largely eliminate this whole concept, but I'd be hardpressed to willingly give up 4 M242s....

William F. Owen
07-21-2010, 05:00 AM
Sometime ago I have apparently lost some confidence. Hence, since then I've always wished that plans and organisations are robust, keep going well after losing high quality components.
I 100% agree with the sentiment, but you should not plan to be "badly trained."
Simplicity is the key, but doing very simple things well requires great skill. That is why war isn't engineering.

And next time, you should really exclude "lieutenants die like fleas on battlefields" from "Luckily none of that reflects reality." or I'll slap you with a load of statistics about the remaining life expectation of mechanised infantry lieutenants in war. :(
As resident of Israel and the product of a British Public School, I am extremely aware of the disproportionately high casualties among junior officers.
The reality I was challenging the idea that if that happens life grinds to a halt because the Platoon Sergeant is "systematically ill-trained."

Tukhachevskii
08-03-2010, 04:47 PM
and would add anothe MGS to ease the doctrinal issue at the MGS/tank platoon level.

TAH

Sir,

It would seem I must beg your forgiveness for so out of hand dismissing your statement HERE (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=101690&postcount=85). It does seem that, according to FM 3-20.96 / FM 17-96, The RSTA Squadron (http://www.militarynewbie.com/pubs/FM%203-20.96%20The%20RSTA%20Squadron%20DRAFT.pdf) (p. 6-145) at least (in its initial draft format that is), the MGS platoon was to have four vehicles. Somewhere along the way it lost one! I don’t know why but I surmise one or a combination of the following reasons;

1) Weight. Losing three MGS (one from each platoon of each company) per battalion reduced the overall airlift requirements of the SBCT.

2) Cost. (self-explanatory)

3) Delay in fielding the said beasty led to manning requirements having to be tweaked once the vehicle came online.

4) I also suspect the true tankers (!) didn’t like the vehicle and, still bitter over the cancellation of the M8 AGS- for which they even wrote a new FM no less (FM 17-18 Light Armour Operations ( http://www.militarynewbie.com/pubs/FM%2017-18%20LIGHT%20ARMOR%20OPERATIONS.pdf))- refused to allow them to be used as ersatz tank(ette)s.

My comments were based on the assumption that, doctrinally at least, the MGS was an infantry intimate support weapon meant to be attached directly to platoons rather than employed as a manoeuvre element in its own right. Personally, I think the minimum number of tanks should be four for a platoon (USMC tank platoons had five until recently IIRC) although I personally would prefer six, in two sections of three, thus allowing for three tubes providing overwatch while the other three manoeuvre. I would also have two platoons plus two more tanks in Co. HQ and a SPM section of 2 twin-barrelled 120mm AMOS (http://www.patriahagglunds.fi/pdf/amos.pdf) per company so there would still be 14 tanks in a UK tank squadron (but that’s for another thread!); I know NORFOLK may disagree (he has written a pretty good examination of the issue on the Sinodefence blog). The very concept of a three tank platoon conducting alternate overwatch makes my eyes water which see the picture below fromFM 3-20.151, The Mobile Gun System (MGS) Platoon (http://www.militarynewbie.com/pubs/FM%203-20.151%20The%20Mobile%20Gun%20System%20(MGS)%20Pla toon%20DRAFT.pdf) (p. 3-8). AFAIK the US is the only NATO country to have platoons of four tanks; UK platoons/troops have three although formation reconnaissance regiments have platoons of four Scimitars.

Fuchs
08-03-2010, 05:19 PM
This bounding overwatch thing always strikes me as odd when it's about movement from height to height such as in that graphic.
Tanks & AFVs are supposed to move like water flows - not over ridge lines.

gute
10-23-2010, 09:12 PM
As for the first question the following book is a useful place to start:

W. Blair Haworth, Jr., The Bradley and How It Got That Way:Technology, Institutions and the Problem of Mechanised Infantry in the United States Army (http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KAk9d2GCFOwC&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&dq=Bradley+IFV+development+doctrine&ots)(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999)

Just finished reading this good book. This book answered my question about the limited dismount capability - the 2-man turret. The Army decided not to pursue a one man turret for the M2 and two man turret for the M3 due to cost. Congress and the GAO were skeptical of the vehicle and its role. Former Senator Gary Hart asked the Army why they did not get an APC in the same weight range as a MBT.

Other interesting tidbits from the book:

a War College paper written in the early 70's proposed going away from armor and infantry specific battalions to combined arms battalions of two tank companies and two infantry companies.

Wass de Czege made the case that there are three distinct subgroups of infantry:

armored
regular
light

NCOs argued that the M3 was not suitable for cavalry reconnaissance missions because it is too big, too heavy, too heavely armed and the five man crew is too large. Most importantly, the cav scout should rely on stealth to obtain infomation. Midlevel officers countered and argued that the vehicle had to be heavy to counter the heavy armor threat in Europe. Also, an experienced NCO will not put his crew in a position to be outgunned.



I guess the next step is a Merkava like Combined Arms Tank. A 21st Century MBT-70 that also transports 4-6 troops.

Ken White
10-24-2010, 03:26 AM
This bounding overwatch thing always strikes me as odd when it's about movement from height to height such as in that graphic.
Tanks & AFVs are supposed to move like water flows - not over ridge lines.I fought a losing battle in the US Army for well over thirty years trying to convince people that flawed art work in manuals would get people killed. The reality should be and usually is what you say, not what the pictures always show -- however, those flawed pictures do lead some astray. The practice of stopping training for administrative lunches and then trying to resume tactically oriented thinking is the same sort of thing.

We as an Army do the big things well, however we are too frequently really pathetic at the little things. The flawed pictures and writing in our doctrinal publications are a big part of that. The problem is that most of the artists are civilians and opt for clear portrayals and 'clean graphics' as opposed to accurate representations of what should occur. We did better toward the end of WW II but that fell by the wayside as experience levels dropped and we moved to a system of mixed snowbird / blackbird and civilian authors instead of doctrine and experienced military training oriented writers ... :mad:

Gute:
a War College paper written in the early 70's proposed going away from armor and infantry specific battalions to combined arms battalions of two tank companies and two infantry companies.That push has been around since WW II -- it always got stalled by Branch parochialism more than anything else. My solution has always been to do away with Branches...;)
Wass de Czege made the case that there are three distinct subgroups of infantry: armored, regular, light.I don't agree with him on many things but he got that right. Solve the Branch problem by making the Armored dismount guys Dragoons...
NCOs argued that the M3 was not suitable for cavalry reconnaissance missions because it is too big, too heavy, too heavely armed and the five man crew is too large. Most importantly, the cav scout should rely on stealth to obtain infomation. Midlevel officers countered and argued that the vehicle had to be heavy to counter the heavy armor threat in Europe. Also, an experienced NCO will not put his crew in a position to be outgunned.The NCOs were right (and not putting your vehicle in a position to be outgunned is just sensible...). FWIW, as someone peripherally involved in the Bradley debacle, at the time, the LTs, CPTs and most MAJs agreed with the NCOs, the other MAJs and the LTCs were ambivalent but leaned toward the heavy solution mostly because the COLs were the ones who were Europe oriented and adamant about the Red threat -- actually, it was all about speed; those guys didn't want to wait for stealthy recon, they wanted to just slam out and get in fights. It is possibly noteworthy that the guys who would actually go out opted for light and stealthy while those on Staffs opted for somebody just to go out and get in a fight ... :rolleyes:

gute
10-24-2010, 05:57 PM
Gute:That push has been around since WW II -- it always got stalled by Branch parochialism more than anything else. My solution has always been to do away with Branches...;)I don't agree with him on many things but he got that right. Solve the Branch problem by making the Armored dismount guys Dragoons...The NCOs were right (and not putting your vehicle in a position to be outgunned is just sensible...). FWIW, as someone peripherally involved in the Bradley debacle, at the time, the LTs, CPTs and most MAJs agreed with the NCOs, the other MAJs and the LTCs were ambivalent but leaned toward the heavy solution mostly because the COLs were the ones who were Europe oriented and adamant about the Red threat -- actually, it was all about speed; those guys didn't want to wait for stealthy recon, they wanted to just slam out and get in fights. It is possibly noteworthy that the guys who would actually go out opted for light and stealthy while those on Staffs opted for somebody just to go out and get in a fight ... :rolleyes:[/QUOTE]

Ken,

I was hoping you would respond - thanks.

Something else I've found interesting. Some cav recon squadrons went two a 3/5 platoon organization - three tanks and five M3 vehicles. I believe the makeup of the ARS today is the same except the M3 has replaced the tank and the hummer has replaced the M3.

82redleg
10-24-2010, 08:55 PM
Something else I've found interesting. Some cav recon squadrons went two a 3/5 platoon organization - three tanks and five M3 vehicles. I believe the makeup of the ARS today is the same except the M3 has replaced the tank and the hummer has replaced the M3.

I, too, recall seeing something about 3 M1s and 5 M3s, but I don't know where.

On page 153 of http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/scouts_out.pdf
it shows a ROAD divisional cavalry squadron platoon of 3 M551 Sheridans, 4 M114s and 2 M113 (I think, it simply says "APC" for the mortar section).

On page 167, it shows a L-series cavalry troop of 2 platoons of 4 M1s and 2 platoons of 4 M3s- I never tracked that organization, only the 2 platoons of 6 M3s, but I was never a heavy guy.

Figure 77, on page 264 of http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/cameron_fight.pdf is a picture of a mixed M48/M114 platoon. On page 305-306, it describes tests of mixed M3/HMMWV platoons (6 HMMWV & 4 M3).

On page 319, it refers to a 3 M1/5 M3 platoon (in Europe, elswhere it was 2 M1/3 M3) as part of the transition of divisional cavalry squadrons from 2 pure M3 troops to the 3 mixed troops of 2 x 6 M3s and 2 x 4 M1s (as in the regimental squadrons).

On page 320, table 4 shows the different configurations of the Army scout platoons deployed in OPN Desert Storm. It addresses a 3 M1/5M3 platoon again on page 321, referencing Haworth's book, as an experimental design employed by one or two units (but not addressed in table 4).

gute
10-25-2010, 12:29 AM
I, too, recall seeing something about 3 M1s and 5 M3s, but I don't know where.

On page 153 of http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/scouts_out.pdf
it shows a ROAD divisional cavalry squadron platoon of 3 M551 Sheridans, 4 M114s and 2 M113 (I think, it simply says "APC" for the mortar section).

On page 167, it shows a L-series cavalry troop of 2 platoons of 4 M1s and 2 platoons of 4 M3s- I never tracked that organization, only the 2 platoons of 6 M3s, but I was never a heavy guy.

Figure 77, on page 264 of http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/cameron_fight.pdf is a picture of a mixed M48/M114 platoon. On page 305-306, it describes tests of mixed M3/HMMWV platoons (6 HMMWV & 4 M3).

On page 319, it refers to a 3 M1/5 M3 platoon (in Europe, elswhere it was 2 M1/3 M3) as part of the transition of divisional cavalry squadrons from 2 pure M3 troops to the 3 mixed troops of 2 x 6 M3s and 2 x 4 M1s (as in the regimental squadrons).

On page 320, table 4 shows the different configurations of the Army scout platoons deployed in OPN Desert Storm. It addresses a 3 M1/5M3 platoon again on page 321, referencing Haworth's book, as an experimental design employed by one or two units (but not addressed in table 4).

On page 141, paragraph two, of the book The Bradley and How It Got That Way, the author writes that the first unit to be equipped was the 3/4 Cav and the organization was reminiscent of the final H-series platoon mix of M60 and M113.

I also finished the book The Human Face of War by Jim Storr. I wished I would have read these books before I started askin all kinds of dumb questions (and I do believe there is such a thing as a dumb question).

In Chapter 6 of The Human Face of War, Storr goes into detail about corps, divison, and brigade organization. He based his conclusions mostly on actions in WWII, but also the six-day war to name a couple.

division - two brigades, 18-24 companies
brigades - two battalions
battalions - two companies
recon squadron at division
majority of fires at corps
small reserve force of maybe a battalion in the division
does recognize 3 battalion, 3 company structure popular and successful.
one engineer company per brigade with a reserve company
3-4 truck companies commanded by Lt. Colonel
about same number of maintenance and medical companies
too much info leads to bad decisions
HQS too large - takes too long to issue orders.
division HQS of 20 troops, Corps 30-40.
company level is the highest level where 1 man can C2 a large organization

A lot of what he describes looks like a current HBCT or SBCT.

He did not go into detail about companies, platoons and squads, but did write about span of control (2,3,5 subordinates, but usually two in combat).

This has been discussed before and I will search it later, but if two subordinates is max span of control for combat, then the infantry squad should be a squad leader with two fire teams of three. A platoon would be smaller or the PL would oversee two sections made up of two squads each. I guess the company would work the same way. Company CO commandes to sections of two platoons.

TAH
10-26-2010, 03:00 PM
I fought a losing battle in the US Army for well over thirty years trying to convince people that flawed art work in manuals would get people killed. The reality should be and usually is what you say, not what the pictures always show -- however, those flawed pictures do lead some astray. The practice of stopping training for administrative lunches and then trying to resume tactically oriented thinking is the same sort of thing.

We as an Army do the big things well, however we are too frequently really pathetic at the little things. The flawed pictures and writing in our doctrinal publications are a big part of that. The problem is that most of the artists are civilians and opt for clear portrayals and 'clean graphics' as opposed to accurate representations of what should occur. We did better toward the end of WW II but that fell by the wayside as experience levels dropped and we moved to a system of mixed snowbird / blackbird and civilian authors instead of doctrine and experienced military training oriented writers ... :mad:

Gute:That push has been around since WW II -- it always got stalled by Branch parochialism more than anything else. My solution has always been to do away with Branches...;)I don't agree with him on many things but he got that right. Solve the Branch problem by making the Armored dismount guys Dragoons...The NCOs were right (and not putting your vehicle in a position to be outgunned is just sensible...). FWIW, as someone peripherally involved in the Bradley debacle, at the time, the LTs, CPTs and most MAJs agreed with the NCOs, the other MAJs and the LTCs were ambivalent but leaned toward the heavy solution mostly because the COLs were the ones who were Europe oriented and adamant about the Red threat -- actually, it was all about speed; those guys didn't want to wait for stealthy recon, they wanted to just slam out and get in fights. It is possibly noteworthy that the guys who would actually go out opted for light and stealthy while those on Staffs opted for somebody just to go out and get in a fight ... :rolleyes:

An old cav guy once told me that the good thing about M2/M3 was that the enemy would not be able to easily tell if they had run into an element from an ACr, a DIV CAV sqdrn, a Bn/TF scout platoon or a Mech infantry Platoon buy just looking at the vehicle itself. A scout/recon specific vehicle will telegraph that.

TAH
10-26-2010, 03:03 PM
Just finished reading this good book. This book answered my question about the limited dismount capability - the 2-man turret. The Army decided not to pursue a one man turret for the M2 and two man turret for the M3 due to cost. Congress and the GAO were skeptical of the vehicle and its role. Former Senator Gary Hart asked the Army why they did not get an APC in the same weight range as a MBT.

Other interesting tidbits from the book:

a War College paper written in the early 70's proposed going away from armor and infantry specific battalions to combined arms battalions of two tank companies and two infantry companies.

Wass de Czege made the case that there are three distinct subgroups of infantry:

armored
regular
light

NCOs argued that the M3 was not suitable for cavalry reconnaissance missions because it is too big, too heavy, too heavely armed and the five man crew is too large. Most importantly, the cav scout should rely on stealth to obtain infomation. Midlevel officers countered and argued that the vehicle had to be heavy to counter the heavy armor threat in Europe. Also, an experienced NCO will not put his crew in a position to be outgunned.



I guess the next step is a Merkava like Combined Arms Tank. A 21st Century MBT-70 that also transports 4-6 troops.

Think there is a dis-connect between too big, 5-man crew and stealth. A 3-man crew like would have been on the XM800 would not have provided any dismount capability.

This discussion also over looks somewhat the role that Cavalry was/did play. That of the Security Force fight (Screen, guard, cover) and economy-of-force. Same unit was expecetd to be able to do both. And I think they could/did.:D

TAH
10-26-2010, 03:08 PM
division - two brigades, 18-24 companies
brigades - two battalions
battalions - two companies
recon squadron at division
majority of fires at corps
small reserve force of maybe a battalion in the division
does recognize 3 battalion, 3 company structure popular and successful.
one engineer company per brigade with a reserve company
3-4 truck companies commanded by Lt. Colonel
about same number of maintenance and medical companies
too much info leads to bad decisions
HQS too large - takes too long to issue orders.
division HQS of 20 troops, Corps 30-40.
company level is the highest level where 1 man can C2 a large organization

A lot of what he describes looks like a current HBCT or SBCT.

He did not go into detail about companies, platoons and squads, but did write about span of control (2,3,5 subordinates, but usually two in combat).

This has been discussed before and I will search it later, but if two subordinates is max span of control for combat, then the infantry squad should be a squad leader with two fire teams of three. A platoon would be smaller or the PL would oversee two sections made up of two squads each. I guess the company would work the same way. Company CO commandes to sections of two platoons.

An 18-24 company division is a big Brigade of 6 maneuver battalions.

A single engineer company per brigade (even of just two battalions) is not enough. Need a company per maneuver battalion. That's why US divisions went to an Engineer Regiment/Group back in the 90s. Moves uits from Corps down to division.

agree with the comments about too much info and staffs that are too big.

Ken White
10-26-2010, 06:52 PM
An old cav guy once told me that the good thing about M2/M3 was that the enemy would not be able to easily tell if they had run into an element from an ACr, a DIV CAV sqdrn, a Bn/TF scout platoon or a Mech infantry Platoon buy just looking at the vehicle itself. A scout/recon specific vehicle will telegraph that.It's not totally mythical but it's close. That misidentification will last for only seconds in any contact. The actions of the occupants of the vehicle will quickly tell the opponent who and what he's facing -- not that he's likely really concerned with that, his concern will be to react to it, who or what it really is can come later if at all... :rolleyes:
Think there is a dis-connect between too big, 5-man crew and stealth. A 3-man crew like would have been on the XM800 would not have provided any dismount capability.Depends on whether you waste a space on a Gunner or not. Having scouted for a number of years, in combat and out, with three man crews, Veh Cdrs man guns (or dismount) the third man, a Scout, dismounts (or mans the weapon). Which dismounts is METT-T dependent (the 'C' factor generally has nothing to do with it). Four is overkill, five is ridiculous. ;)

Part of the logic for three man scout crews was to keep the numbers up front down in a dangerous job to keep casualties lower...

The Cav 'problem' didn't exist from WWII until the stupid Bradley came along.

Scouts scouted (stealthy recon / economy of force efforts / screens), the Tanks and / or Infantry fought for info and did the delay, cover and guard msns supported by the Mortar and Scouts. It worked -- so we reinvented it so that it did not work. :mad:

gute
10-26-2010, 08:32 PM
An 18-24 company divisiion is a big Brigade of 6 maneuver battalions.

A single engineer company per brigade (even of just two battalions) is not enough. Need a company per maneuver battalion. That's why US divisions went to an Engineer Regiment/Group back in the 90s. Moves uits from Corps down to division.

agree with the comments about too much info and staffs that are too big.

I believe that would be two brigades with three battalions each - 18 companies (based on three company battalions).

One of the major complaints about the BCT in Iraq was the insufficient engineer forces, but the complaints about too few military police, engineers and arty all have to do with a design based on offensive operations, but used for stablity operations to increase the number units available for deployment.

So, taking recommendations from Storr and your opinion, how about a brigade with three maneuber battalions, each with one tank, one infantry and one engineer company, one fires battalion, signal company, small brigade HHC.

82redleg
10-27-2010, 01:30 AM
I believe that would be two brigades with three battalions each - 18 companies (based on three company battalions).

One of the major complaints about the BCT in Iraq was the insufficient engineer forces, but the complaints about too few military police, engineers and arty all have to do with a design based on offensive operations, but used for stablity operations to increase the number units available for deployment.

So, taking recommendations from Storr and your opinion, how about a brigade with three maneuber battalions, each with one tank, one infantry and one engineer company, one fires battalion, signal company, small brigade HHC.

I'll have to check out Storr's argument, but I'm inclined to disagree. I like big, robust units. It allows commanders to rotate units out and have a flexibility to keep a reserve, guard a base camp, a LOC, detach a unit for a special mission, etc, without breaking a sub unit. If you send a company from a 2 company BN, that BN is now broken. If you send a CO from a 4 company BN, that BN is simply slightly less flexible, especially if it has 4 + a weapons/CSC, not 4 including a weapons/CSC.

Large units also inhibit staffs from micromanaging- a BCT staff will be more involved with the operations of its subordinates if there are only 2 than if there are 4.

Tukhachevskii
10-27-2010, 09:24 AM
This bounding overwatch thing always strikes me as odd when it's about movement from height to height such as in that graphic.
Tanks & AFVs are supposed to move like water flows - not over ridge lines.

True, but flowing water taks predictable routes(mobility corridors/avenues of approach). Those will more than likely, assuming some degree of intelligence on the part of the enemy, be either mined, covered by abnti-tank missile sacks and be pre-ranged for artillery fires (or all three). When that happens, at some point, you'll need to move over ope terrains from cover to cover.

TAH
10-27-2010, 12:38 PM
[QUOTEThe Cav 'problem' didn't exist from WWII until the stupid Bradley came along.

[/QUOTE]

Ken, can you please expand on your definition of the "Cav Problem".

At the start of WWII, we had the same situation we had until recently, flawed doctrine that restricted Mechinized Cavalry units to recon only. Found in North Africa it didn't work. Open terrain, impoper training, out-gunned etc.

I would ask anyone interested in some of the roots of the CAV/Recon to read the following

ETO General Board Report #49 on Mechanized Cav

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/eto/eto-049.pdf

CSI Study Scouts Out

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/scouts_out.pdf

CSI Study Fight for Information

http://cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/cameron_fight.pdf

Lou Dimarco's Thesis on WWII Cavalry

http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/available/etd-03302004-164302/

While there are others, these give good background/backup info on how we got here.

TAH
10-27-2010, 12:44 PM
how about a brigade with three maneuber battalions, each with one tank, one infantry and one engineer company, one fires battalion, signal company, small brigade HHC.

For a total of:
1. Three tank Companies (one Bn) OK
2. Three Mech Inf Companies (One Bn) Not enough need at least three more companies.
3. Three Engineer Companies For two manuever Bns too much, up to another Mech Inf Bn of CAB (2X1) then OK.

Having served with both, prefer 4 (square) over 3 (triangular) units. Moer flexible, greater ability for sustained combat.

The addition of the four company under DIV86 was what made it "better" not the extra 4 tanks.:wry:

TAH
10-27-2010, 12:49 PM
I'll have to check out Storr's argument, but I'm inclined to disagree. I like big, robust units. It allows commanders to rotate units out and have a flexibility to keep a reserve, guard a base camp, a LOC, detach a unit for a special mission, etc, without breaking a sub unit. If you send a company from a 2 company BN, that BN is now broken. If you send a CO from a 4 company BN, that BN is simply slightly less flexible, especially if it has 4 + a weapons/CSC, not 4 including a weapons/CSC.

Large units also inhibit staffs from micromanaging- a BCT staff will be more involved with the operations of its subordinates if there are only 2 than if there are 4.

Maximinze platoons/companies, minimize HQs (numbers and size)

A unit of 16 Companies in 4 Bns of 4 companies (16 total) will most likely be more agile/effective then a unit of 6 Bns of 3 companies (18 total).

A briagde of 6 Bns of 4 companies (24 total) should out-perform the same number of companies spread across 8 Bns (3 companies each) in two Brigades.

Fuchs
10-27-2010, 01:25 PM
A briagde of 6 Bns of 4 companies (24 total) should out-perform the same number of companies spread across 8 Bns (3 companies each) in two Brigades.

Now this is strange.
I understand your assertion in the context of "blue 1x6 Bde moves east and two red 2x3 Bdes move west", as you've got unity of command advantage for blue in such a scenario.

Yet, modify this into a pincer scenario or let blue face some smarter red behaviour and you end up seeing an inferior blue unless it divides itself into dissimilarly behaving components. At that point, the advantage of blue is all but gone.


Now keep in mind the experience from WW2; namely that smaller formations are handy and practical, whereas large ones are clumsy until they fragment- and are very difficult to command when fragmented.


The practical experience seems to suggest that small is beautiful while theory cannot convince me that big is beautiful.

TAH
10-27-2010, 01:48 PM
Now this is strange.
I understand your assertion in the context of "blue 1x6 Bde moves east and two red 2x3 Bdes move west", as you've got unity of command advantage for blue in such a scenario.

Yet, modify this into a pincer scenario or let blue face some smarter red behaviour and you end up seeing an inferior blue unless it divides itself into dissimilarly behaving components. At that point, the advantage of blue is all but gone.


Now keep in mind the experience from WW2; namely that smaller formations are handy and practical, whereas large ones are clumsy until they fragment- and are very difficult to command when fragmented.


The practical experience seems to suggest that small is beautiful while theory cannot convince me that big is beautiful.

A disadvantage of the 2 brigades of 4 Bns of 3 companies is who/what Hqs coordinates the actions of both of the brigades. You will normally defalt to a DIV HQs.

So the Brigade of 6 has a single (probably overall smaller) HQs while the Brigades of 4 will have three (2 BDE & 1 DIV). More people to direct and conctrol the actions/activities of the same number of units.

Ken White
10-27-2010, 01:59 PM
Ken, can you please expand on your definition of the "Cav Problem".The problem is the excessively European focus based on 50 years of peace and misperceptions about the quality of the once potential cold war turning hot opponent and equipment procurement practices that are excessively bureaucratic, oriented toward pleasing various communities and NOT focused on combat realities. Short answer: Sixty plus years of mostly peace and no major requirement for reconnaissance or cavalry functions exacerbated by American impatience.
At the start of WWII, we had the same situation we had until recently, flawed doctrine that restricted Mechinized Cavalry units to recon only. Found in North Africa it didn't work. Open terrain, impoper training, out-gunned etc.Agreed, though I would say the situation that we still have to an extent... :wry:

The problem you cite and that the author of your last link notes well was simply a very conservative Army, unwilling to change and adapt and tootling off to war -- only to get the shock of their lives and then having to adapt -- which they did and did pretty well. By the end of that war, we had the principles down pretty well. The "problem" ensued when we abandoned those principles.
I would ask anyone interested in some of the roots of the CAV/Recon to read the following...I've read and digested the first three over the years. The first was the result of three hard years of combat experience and was the catalyst that effectively put Cav on the right track for the 50s and 60s. It was and is a good primer for what's needed in a European or similar terrain scenario. It does NOT well address desert, mountain or jungle operations -- a problem for an Army that theoretically has a worldwide deployment and operational focus.

The second illustrates the two major flaws in the use of Cavalry by the US Army. In order, those are excessive impatience with concomitant pressure for speed of movement and information acquisition; and poor training -- In a good many years and literally knowing or seeing hundreds of commanders operate in combat or on exercises, I can count on one hand the number of Commanders I met or saw who truly knew how to use their reconnaissance or cavalry. Most Infantry and many Armor commanders are not good at using those units... :mad:

I would also in fairness note that the pressure for speed often comes not from Commanders but from their Staffs...

From Fight for Information:
""In 2009, the Army Reconnaissance Course remained a work in progress. A pilot course in the early spring built on the lessons learned from work done the previous 2 years...after 6 years of combat operations in Iraq to an acknowledgment of the value of more robust reconnaissance organizations capable of fighting for information. Ironically, this acceptance did not prevent the abolition of armored cavalry, though it did generate efforts to create a more versatile BFSB. If the past is prologue, future operations by the US Army will require the capabilities of both stealthy and fighting reconnaissance organizations.""(emphasis added / kw)

Reconnaissance will always be a work in progress because the vagaries of METT-TC force rapid adaptation. EVERY war is different; to build based on any one war or theater is a major error (and that was the major shortfall and problem in the 1975-2005 period...). Cavalry or robust recon organizations that are reasonably decently equipped and moderately well trained can perform stealthy recon and / or fight for information -- they can always do that. They can do it quite successfully provided their employing command knows how to use them.

The Thesis is interesting but really adds little that is new.
While there are others, these give good background/backup info on how we got here.Yes -- provided they're read with a critical eye and given some thought... ;)

82redleg
10-27-2010, 02:49 PM
Now this is strange.
I understand your assertion in the context of "blue 1x6 Bde moves east and two red 2x3 Bdes move west", as you've got unity of command advantage for blue in such a scenario.

Yet, modify this into a pincer scenario or let blue face some smarter red behaviour and you end up seeing an inferior blue unless it divides itself into dissimilarly behaving components. At that point, the advantage of blue is all but gone.


Now keep in mind the experience from WW2; namely that smaller formations are handy and practical, whereas large ones are clumsy until they fragment- and are very difficult to command when fragmented.


The practical experience seems to suggest that small is beautiful while theory cannot convince me that big is beautiful.

The C2 capability of a WW2 division is less than what exists in a BN today. Simply put, a given staff today can exercise C2 across much larger footprint than their WW2 counterpart.

Current experience indicates that our current BCT staffs can supervise the operations of a much larger organization than they have organically.

Fuchs
10-27-2010, 04:05 PM
That's no argument, for you can simply adjust the HQ to an optimal size, no matter what's the Bde TO&E.


The previous "less staffs" argument has its limits as well, for otherwise we could concentrate on one HQ for an entire army. Pointing out a factor that's pro larger Bdes alone doesn't make the case for a larger Bde, for there are many other reasons.
Among these other reasons are the advantages of smaller, more agile Bdes.

A large Bde can also be agile, of course - IF the really relevant level is the battalion level, IF battalion (battlegroups) are the real manoeuvring forces.
The HQ argument loses relevance in this case because the Bde/Div HQs could be really tiny then.

TAH
10-27-2010, 05:35 PM
That's no argument, for you can simply adjust the HQ to an optimal size, no matter what's the Bde TO&E.


The previous "less staffs" argument has its limits as well, for otherwise we could concentrate on one HQ for an entire army. Pointing out a factor that's pro larger Bdes alone doesn't make the case for a larger Bde, for there are many other reasons.
Among these other reasons are the advantages of smaller, more agile Bdes.

A large Bde can also be agile, of course - IF the really relevant level is the battalion level, IF battalion (battlegroups) are the real manoeuvring forces.
The HQ argument loses relevance in this case because the Bde/Div HQs could be really tiny then.

My comments were intended to be for a force of 18 to 24 companies.

Within that, you could have a Brigade as "small" as 4 Bns of 4 companies (OK only 16 :wry:) or a division as "large" as 8 Bns of 3 companies each. A Bde Hqs and staff should be able to handle 16 or even 18 maneuver companies. Eight Bns would be too many for a single Bde to handle, six might be too many as well.

To me alot of its about how much HQs "overhead" do you want/need.

TAH

gute
10-27-2010, 11:18 PM
Now keep in mind the experience from WW2; namely that smaller formations are handy and practical, whereas large ones are clumsy until they fragment- and are very difficult to command when fragmented.



That was Storr's argument or justification for smaller divisions. I don't know if his book has been the subject of a thread on this site - if not, it should be because I am curious what you guys think after reading his well thought out arguments.

82redleg
10-27-2010, 11:24 PM
That's no argument, for you can simply adjust the HQ to an optimal size, no matter what's the Bde TO&E.


The previous "less staffs" argument has its limits as well, for otherwise we could concentrate on one HQ for an entire army. Pointing out a factor that's pro larger Bdes alone doesn't make the case for a larger Bde, for there are many other reasons.
Among these other reasons are the advantages of smaller, more agile Bdes.

A large Bde can also be agile, of course - IF the really relevant level is the battalion level, IF battalion (battlegroups) are the real manoeuvring forces.
The HQ argument loses relevance in this case because the Bde/Div HQs could be really tiny then.

Except that to do the job of a BDE (or whatever level) HQs entails a certain amount of overhead- I've seen no convincing argument (I've requested Storr's book inter-library) for failing to maximize that capability. Without maximizing the capability, you end up with micromanagement.

When drawing comparisons from WW2, you have to remember 3 things:
1- (already mentioned) is the exponential increase in C2 capabilities since then
2- the relatively unlimited nature of the force structure. In WW2, we had lots of separate BDEs, regiments, groups, battalions, etc, that could do all the little tasks that tend to come up. Now, we don't. So we take it out of hide, from subordinate units. The problem comes when we make these subordinates so small that detaching a subordinate effectively emasculates them. My BCT detached a IN BN shortly before our own deployment to Iraq- long story. A BCT of only one IN BN left us scrambling for combat power- we eventually made up for it, and ended up with 4 battalions attached in theater (total of 9 BNs in the BCT), but we were in-effective without the plus up, and effectively only a rump BCT.
3- in WW2, we were an amateur army. Most of the BN CDRs and even many RGT commanders had very little time in service, and those that did have time in service had little experience with large units. Our BCT commanders today have much more and better preparation to command at that level than their WW2 counterparts, and the difference at BN level is even greater. Most WW2 company commanders were shake and bakes with only a couple of years service and almost no professional education. This lead to a need to micromanage, from DIV CG on down, which effectively decreased the size of units that can be controlled.

Ken White
10-28-2010, 01:58 AM
Except that to do the job of a BDE (or whatever level) HQs entails a certain amount of overhead...Very much agree, been in big strong Bdes and small weak Bdes -- the larger always worked better. Not least because they're less personality dependent and more error tolerant -- and IMO, less inclined to facilitate micromanagement. Size is an impediment to that trait; redundancy and strong capabilities render it unnecessary.
When drawing comparisons from WW2, you have to remember 3 things:
1-...2- ... A BCT of only one IN BN left us scrambling for combat power- we eventually made up for it, and ended up with 4 battalions attached in theater (total of 9 BNs in the BCT), but we were in-effective without the plus up, and effectively only a rump BCT.Yep. Cautionary tale that -- ala TAH comment on the poor Cav performance early in WW II, inexperience causes people to attempt to 'economize' in all aspects. Doesn't work well, most warfare tends to be manpower intensive. In a given unit, I'd rather be understrength than overstrength (the latter allows, even encourages, slack habits at all levels) but I'd rather have too many units available than not enough, those not employed can always train. Hopefully we know that training is a constant, in combat and out...
3- in WW2, we were an amateur army...Most WW2 company commanders were shake and bakes with only a couple of years service and almost no professional education. This lead to a need to micromanage, from DIV CG on down, which effectively decreased the size of units that can be controlled.All true, however the counter to the first portion of number 3 is that the cream (generally ) rose to the top and slackers got summarily fired -- that does not happen today, therefor the increased education and training * are countered by the luck of the draw on competence and drive. Not to mention that IIRC, it's two years to CPT today???

My experience with a slew of WW II Commanders in the immediate postwar era and in Korea was that they did NOT micromanage. That began to change in 1952 when the line stabilized in Korea and suddenly Regimental Commanders, GOs and worse, their Staffs, had little to do and being aggressive take-charge guys, learned to micromanage which essentially forced CPTs who knew better too do the same thing. That trend was severely exacerbated by Viet Nam when again the COLS and Generals really had little to do (as is often the case today...).

That trend migrated down to Bn level after 1969 when the third and fourth string LTCs got in country and found they had no CPTs and few senior NCOs but a bunch of 2LTs and SGTs (NCOC Grads, six months of service...) who would do anything you asked but who knew little and thus almost had to be micromanaged -- thus a generation of Generals learned to over micromanage everything. They made it a way of life... :mad:

I would also suggest while the the WW II guys may not have been as (book wise) tactically and technically competent as todays crop, those guys knew people. I sometimes wonder if that is not a lost skill in today's Army. :wry:

Thus, they knew what to watch out for and what to ignore. Given the spate of aberrant and senseless behavior by NCOs and Troops about which Commands seem to be clueless and the number of horror tales about uniformtiy, haircuts and such, that too seems a lost skill. :wry:

ODB
10-28-2010, 09:07 PM
One cannot forget in today's technology driven warfare and over abundance of arm chair quarterbacks watching live feeds from the sky, of operations hundreds if not thousands of miles away; how many commanders will allow manned reconnaissance again? Knowing the military we will not increase the capabilities of manned reconnaissance, then we will end up in a jungle where unmanned reconnaissance cannot penetrate the canopy. Only then will someone wake and say "Hey we need to train reconnaissance elements." I know not necessarily the CAV's ideal terrain, but makes the point. Look at how commanders abuse unmanned reconnaissance currently, it will only get worse. Nothing worse than executing a target only to find out command put ISR on your target without your knowledge so the could see what was going on. The current operational environment has led to information overload and requirements than junior leaders have come to know as the norm and will expect it in the future. I miss the days of commo windows and short to the point SITREPS. Sorry, I digressed a bit from the subject at the end, but it needs to be taken into account. Especially, since all command has to do is look at the little blue dots on the screen and micro manage away. It will not matter the size of the element, one little blue dot wanders from where the commander thinks it should be and they will be calling that element direct wanting to know what is going on. Tactical patience has disappeared and become a lost art.

TAH
10-29-2010, 03:47 PM
One cannot forget in today's technology driven warfare and over abundance of arm chair quarterbacks watching live feeds from the sky, of operations hundreds if not thousands of miles away

Early in the fight in Afganistan I recall seeing a picture taken inside the the 10th Mountain Division HQs/TOC. It showed their CG (a two star) watching a live feed from a Predator UAV orbiting above a mission.

My thought is/was, excuse me sir, that's jot your job.:eek:

TAH

Sparapet
10-29-2010, 07:40 PM
Early in the fight in Afganistan I recall seeing a picture taken inside the the 10th Mountain Division HQs/TOC. It showed their CG (a two star) watching a live feed from a Predator UAV orbiting above a mission.

My thought is/was, excuse me sir, that's jot your job.:eek:

TAH

I can understand that if he was bored and wanted to relive his ground-pounder days. But the C2 micromanagement is truly becoming a problem. This seems especially true in occupation actions where going above the Company level is relatively rare, majority of work being done at the platoon level. As a scout platoon (+) in OIF I did maybe 90% of my missions unsupported by the rest of the troop or squadron. Net result is endless reporting to higher via FBCB2 of every turn or 5 minute stop I execute in a 10 hour patrol. I eventually had a TC dedicated to being the live feed to SQDN......even though technically they could see me move anywhere in country. The incessant ISR presence was also a bit annoying. Half the time I knew I was being watched, as I could hear the drone, but it wasn't my asset to task to support my mission. 2 to 3 echelons above are watching so mission wise it was only useful to me if the gods that be ordained to share real-time info.
Just some anecdotes. But more to the point, Auftragstaktik is not an approach readily valued in the maneuver force today. This may be due as much to the availability of information as patent paranoia for liability in certain operational environments.


Cav Cpt

Cavguy
11-02-2010, 01:38 AM
That trend migrated down to Bn level after 1969 when the third and fourth string LTCs got in country and found they had no CPTs and few senior NCOs but a bunch of 2LTs and SGTs (NCOC Grads, six months of service...) who would do anything you asked but who knew little and thus almost had to be micromanaged -- thus a generation of Generals learned to over micromanage everything. They made it a way of life... :mad:

Ken,

Never thought I'd say this, but the cycle is there and now I'm potentially part of the problem ...

Cav Squadron XO life is great, but different than when I last was in a troop unit - we could count on 3-5 Captain's Course graduates in the staff, now we're lucky to have one. For you non-army types, they teach staff work at the Captain's course, which makes having a good density of grads a multiplier. So I find myself having to explain/teach a lot of basic things (staff skills) to the motivated but untrained 1LTs that comprise a good deal of the staff. No crisis but certainly slows things down.

I can see where some might choose/be forced to micromanage IOT ensure success. Fortunately I have enough time to teach what I need before we deploy, and they're a sharp bunch. Makes the learning curve steeper though.

Ken White
11-02-2010, 01:57 AM
They've got a good teacher, they'll be okay. I know NOT micromanaging is far harder -- but IMO it's worth it.

Keep up the fire!

82redleg
11-02-2010, 10:46 AM
I can see where some might choose/be forced to micromanage IOT ensure success. Fortunately I have enough time to teach what I need before we deploy, and they're a sharp bunch. Makes the learning curve steeper though.

IMO, its not micromanaging to teach a subordinate the skills he needs to succeed in a position that he has not been trained for. Now, if you are still treating them the same way in a year, it might be a problem.

And enjoy your time in a BN- I've got another year and a half before I'll see a BN again.

Pete
11-22-2010, 12:14 AM
By chance, did any of the old-time cavalrymen here ever serve with one Captain Nathan Brittles? There are a few guys here who are old enough to have been the ground guide for the Trojan Horse.

1330

Pete
11-22-2010, 06:40 AM
Oh well, in 1898 it was too late for my great-grandfather to have known Captain Brittles when he was in the U.S. Cavalry. Great-grandpa never made it closer to the Spanish than Camp Lewis, Washington during the war, but according to the stories he told afterwards the Greasers would have surrendered immediately if they had to deal with him. Grandma said he'd drive her mother nuts when he'd get out his Army Colt .45 revolver and fiddle with it after he'd been drinking.