Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

[Schmedlap]

The Taliban has discovered Diet Coke and Mentos (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VWS0FZEqdJA). All is lost.

[Stan]

In addition to WWII's wooden mines, the use of similar so-called "Omar" IEDs by drug cartels has been in Colombia for almost 30 years !

We've got mechanical mine clearance equipment all over the world, but yet can get a few vehicles to Afghanistan ?

It's proven that these vehicles improve agriculture too - turning 25 inches of soil with each pass :cool:

[Fuchs]

The working speed of flail systems is a walking pace, the working speed of most other mechanical mineclearing systems is a slow bicycle pace.

Neither is a good convoy protection answer to under-road mines + neither provides protection against off-route mines.


These offence-defence spirals at low war intensity* won't yield any decision and thus deserve little attention. The key problem is the problem of IFF.



*: Most forms of possible combat are impossible because of an incapable enemy, after all.

[Stan]

The working speed of flail systems is a walking pace, the working speed of most other mechanical mineclearing systems is a slow bicycle pace.

Neither is a good convoy protection answer to under-road mines + neither provides protection against off-route mines.

These offence-defence spirals at low war intensity* won't yield any decision and thus deserve little attention. The key problem is the problem of IFF.

*: Most forms of possible combat are impossible because of an incapable enemy, after all.

Hey Fuchs,
Interesting your choice of the stone-age flail system but yet none of the military's heavy armor or even the latest German system. Both cover a square click in one hour. They are not designed to protect convoys (you know that already), and they do a good job of destroying anything with frequent chain replacements.

Regards, Stan

[Fuchs]

Roller, rake, dozer & flail.

The double extruder idea didn't work properly afaik and magnetic solutions don't work against mechanical mines either. Simple pushing devices (that bend feeling antennas early) are uninteresting in this context as well.

Rake and dozer don't work satisfactorily in hard ground against buried mines. Rollers rarely if ever work satisfactorily.
Flail is terribly slow.

Did I miss one?


Anyway; the point is that mineclearing equipment is a sideshow even though the enemy is extremely weak and thus limited to little else but a mine campaign due to his lack of survivability in combat.

[Stan]

Roller, rake, dozer & flail.

The double extruder idea didn't work properly afaik and magnetic solutions don't work against mechanical mines either. Simple pushing devices (that bend feeling antennas early) are uninteresting in this context as well.

Rake and dozer don't work satisfactorily in hard ground against buried mines. Rollers rarely if ever work satisfactorily.
Flail is terribly slow.

Did I miss one?


Anyway; the point is that mineclearing equipment is a sideshow even though the enemy is extremely weak and thus limited to little else but a mine campaign due to his lack of survivability in combat.

I realize your latest argument with robots didn't go over well, but never thought of you inside an armored vehicle performing mechanical demining :eek: Something in the recent past ?

Anyway, the point in this particular thread is some magic set of bags with liquid contents being combined to initiate an explosion (although I have some serious doubts much like the recent Nigerian as to some explosive force being contained in sandwich bags :rolleyes: ).

I'm not sure about your point regarding mechanical demining being a sideshow. So quick to eliminate something that has been around for decades and performs its mission without fatalities (even among the most novice of operators in Africa).

I'll bite: You first argued over speed which was way off and now contend nothing works. You got me Fuchs !

[Fuchs]

This sounds like a pile of misunderstandings.

Mechanical mineclearing works - although not every system on all soils.

It's way too slow. It's too slow for patrols, way too slow for convoys and it's also too slow for breakthrough battles. It was used in the latter with relatively good success under special circumstances, though.

The simple "minebreaker vehicle at the head of convoy" concept (as with that South African-inspired vehicle with the trailers) can be used for road sweeps, but it's useless for small unit movements/patrols.


Mechanical mineclearing is a sideshow in part because it doesn't help patrols or convoys much.
It's furthermore a sideshow because 100%, god-like mineclearing would not even come close to winning the war. It would merely take away another tool fromt he enemy, liit him to less options, probably further reducing the intensity fo warfare and thus the likeliness that we run out of steam before they do because it lasts too long and isn't worth the huge costs in comparison even to the best-case victory scenario.



Now if you think that my speeds are off then feel free to tell which system is faster in practical use.


"Both cover a square click in one hour. They are not designed to protect convoys (you know that already), and they do a good job of destroying anything with frequent chain replacements."

I don't know anything short of a nuclear bomb with this kind of capability.

"square click", that would be a square kilometer as far as I know.

A system of great 10m width (way too optimistic) would need to drive 100x1000 m per hour = 100 km/h (62 mph) plus instant turns to achieve that kind of performance.
An armoured combat engineer battalion may be able to clear mines that quickly.

[Stan]

This sounds like a pile of misunderstandings.

Mechanical mineclearing works - although not every system on all soils.

It's way too slow. It's too slow for patrols, way too slow for convoys and it's also too slow for breakthrough battles. It was used in the latter with relatively good success under special circumstances, though.

Precisely my point – mechanical clearing devices were designed for specific tasks and conditions. Operating them out of their intended environment merely reduces their effectiveness and leads some to believe they are useless. A lot more goes into leading a mechanical demining team than just driving or operating robots. The same can be said for choosing the right detector for the soil and target.


The simple "minebreaker vehicle at the head of convoy" concept (as with that South African-inspired vehicle with the trailers) can be used for road sweeps, but it's useless for small unit movements/patrols.

I guess that would depend on the vehicle’s application. I would not pretend to keep up with a convoy. I would however employ the vehicle sufficiently ahead of the convoy in a suspect area. I’m not advocating mechanical demining as a convoy protection vehicle, just another tool in the kit bag that has some proven advantages. Instead of riding around in an MRAP awaiting detonation, I suggest destroying an element that the enemy can no longer use.


Mechanical mineclearing is a sideshow in part because it doesn't help patrols or convoys much.
It's furthermore a sideshow because 100%, god-like mineclearing would not even come close to winning the war. It would merely take away another tool fromt he enemy, liit him to less options, probably further reducing the intensity fo warfare and thus the likeliness that we run out of steam before they do because it lasts too long and isn't worth the huge costs in comparison even to the best-case victory scenario.

Exactly – reduce the enemy’s options and save lives. You then have anecdotal evidence of mechanical demining not helping a patrol or convoy ? I'm unaware of this tactic ever being employed.



Now if you think that my speeds are off then feel free to tell which system is faster in practical use.

As the fastest system is made in Germany and you contend these machines are all slow, I’ll let you do your own homework :)


"square click", that would be a square kilometer as far as I know.

I don't know anything short of a nuclear bomb with this kind of capability.

"square click", that would be a square kilometer as far as I know.

A system of great 10m width (way too optimistic) would need to drive 100x1000 m per hour = 100 km/h (62 mph) plus instant turns to achieve that kind of performance.
An armoured combat engineer battalion may be able to clear mines that quickly.

Yep, one square kilometer or 1,000 square meters.


It works at a maximum rate of nine meters per minute... at a rate of up to 1,000 square meters per hour under optimum conditions

... destroys mines faster than they can detonate

As you may have feared, it can be remotely operated and, it's been around since 2001.

[Fuchs]

A square click is a square kilometre - and that's 1,000 x 1,000 metres = a million square metres.


There's Keiler. Its operating speed is 1.5 to 4.5 km/h - mediocre walking pace at best. The width is 6.35 m

4.5 km/h * 6.36 m = 4,500 m /h * 6.35 m = 28,575 sq m/h
That's 1/35th of a square klick. That's of course total theory, the upper end of the imaginable given its tech specs. The real performance is more like creating two or three gaps in minefields (few hundred metres deep) during the course of a combat day.

Minebreaker is an even more rare vehicle and its producer claims a performance of 1.5 to 2 ha (Hektar) per day. That's up to 2 x 100 x 100m = 20,000 sq m.
Its width is approx 4m, and a day of work has most likely about 8-10 working hours.

Finally there is the R/C MAK Rhino. A report from Croatia tells about 150,000 sq m cleared in 14 days. That's 15% of a square click in two weeks.
The average was apparently about 10,700 sq m per day of work.


There's a reason for the use of explosives in battlefield demining; mechanical demining is terribly slow.

[Bob's World]

These are not wooden box mines, they probably come in a variety of sizes, but can be a coffee cup sized hollowed out wooden initiator, with a hole in the top that the lid is (gently) set in. flat wooden "pressure plate" with a small pointy stick that goes down into the hole to where the chemicals are (picture a round drink coaster with a sharpened dowel rod in the center). Stepping on this mixes the chemcials triggering the initiating blast. Attached to this are as many jugs of home made explosive as they care to apply buried beneath it.

Something "The Professor" would make to defend Gilligan's Island.

[Firn]

These are not wooden box mines, they probably come in a variety of sizes, but can be a coffee cup sized hollowed out wooden initiator, with a hole in the top that the lid is (gently) set in. flat wooden "pressure plate" with a small pointy stick that goes down into the hole to where the chemicals are (picture a round drink coaster with a sharpened dowel rod in the center). Stepping on this mixes the chemcials triggering the initiating blast. Attached to this are as many jugs of home made explosive as they care to apply buried beneath it.

Something "The Professor" would make to defend Gilligan's Island.

Sounds pretty much like a non-metallic twist on the old pressure plate. It is not particulary new, as far as I understand, but still the human mind at war seems never be still when it comes to harming the enemy.

Firn

[Stan]

A square click is a square kilometre - and that's 1,000 x 1,000 metres = a million square metres.

Ooops - my bad Fuchs. Darn metric system and my Yankee ingenuity these days :o

Actually the mine breaker 2000 claims 1,000 square meters per hour. No matter, they are much faster than their predecessors and this also brings us back to clearing a "path" wide and long enough that the likelihood of a mine or IED getting a convoy has been substantially reduced.


There's a reason for the use of explosives in battlefield demining; mechanical demining is terribly slow.

Not sure I follow you here. Since we're talking about speed, manual demining or signal sweeping takes hours to cover ground and using explosives for demining "mines" died years ago with the advent of burn out flares. Discovering an IED doesn't always mean it is destroyed using explosives. Most are rendered safe rather than the risk of high order detonations. We also need to perform forensics and post blast forensics are more time consuming. Shooting "it" with frangible ammo or a water cannon retains most of the IED. Got to start somewhere.

Bob's detailed description supports the need for a heavy, purpose-intended vehicle to render such devices safe. Setting off a pressure sensitive IED with a 7-ton roller 3 meters in front of a heavily armored vehicle still translates into survivability.

[Fuchs]

Real minefields (military ones) can be cleared with fuel-air explosives and other explosive means (like line charges). The variety of systems in this area is according to my impression larger (and growing faster) than with mechanical mineclearing.

[Stan]

Real minefields (military ones) can be cleared with fuel-air explosives and other explosive means (like line charges). The variety of systems in this area is according to my impression larger (and growing faster) than with mechanical mineclearing.

The Chinese gave us a demonstration of their so-called surface launched explosive mixture. Quite impressive triggering all the AP mines, but failed to detonate 3 out of 4 AT mines. The idea however was to reduce the time conventional mine clearance currently requires.

If you and I were permitted to test our ideas (which will probably never happen), I'd bet a "C" note that my idea would work out better, but my vehicles would consume mucho diesel doing so :cool:

Regards, Stan

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

I was referring to private discussions I had in Zimbabwe in 1985, with some ex-Rhodesian Army officers (notes not to hand, will update by PM). IIRC the Cilliers book, yes written by a South African, was critical and a Rhodesian academic who wrote about COIN.

[JMA]

JMA,

I was referring to private discussions I had in Zimbabwe in 1985, with some ex-Rhodesian Army officers (notes not to hand, will update by PM). IIRC the Cilliers book, yes written by a South African, was critical and a Rhodesian academic who wrote about COIN.

Thanks David, but I am more interested in the argument than the names of individuals. After 1980 everyone developed a story based on 20/20 hindsight. The SAS opinion was that had more strategic actions been taken earlier it would have had a marked positive effect. From a military perspective it is nearly always better to take them on in their external bases before they even enter the country but then who knows what the political pressures at the top are.

[William F. Owen]

From a military perspective it is nearly always better to take them on in their external bases before they even enter the country but then who knows what the political pressures at the top are.
Concur. All Wars are 80% political! Externals were a very sound military policy, but also politically counter-productive. No mystery or anything new in that.

Moderator's Note

Thread closed as there is new, main thread 'IEDs: the home-made bombs that changed modern war': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16303 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16303)

[davidbfpo]

A detailed open source paper on IEDs in Afghanistan-Pakistan. from the New America Foundation:[quote]by Alec Barker entitled “Improvised Explosive Devices in Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, 2002-2009” (pdf).....The Internet, cash marketplaces, and informal alliances among insurgents seem to explain the extent to which bomb-making innovation crosses geographical and ideological lines much faster than it did previously.

Hat tip to:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/and the paper itself:http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/PRIVOXY-FORCE/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/barker3.pdf

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den, which has this ote]The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Afghan Taliban) website has published an interview with Qari Khairullah Muneeb, commander for IED Units in the Dand Area, south of Kandahar.[/quote] Link to the website item:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2010/09/interview-with-taliban-ied-commander.html

Some may not wish to visit the Taliban's reported PR website, so I have placed the interview on the attachment.

Lion'd Den story ends with:
No doubt the US Army's Joint IED Defeat Organisation will be reading this interview with interest. That organisation's budget has been increased from $2.28 billion in 2010 to 3.46 billion in 2011. Most IEDs cost less than $100 to assemble.

So SWC can too!

[davidbfpo]

Improvised Explosive Devices

This thread was prompted by an IISS Strategic Comment, longer than most and I have used their title as the thread's title.

It opens with:
Sometimes called ‘the artillery of the twenty-first century’, these home-made bombs have been responsible for the majority (nearly 70%) of foreign military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the same way that most battlefield casualties in the twentieth century were inflicted by artillery.

And ends with:
Countering IEDs will remain a core requirement for land forces. Any force – whether state or irregular – seeking to combat Western forces will have observed the advantages that IED have given to insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. As IED are often similar in capability and employment to conventional land mines, armies may merge counter-IED efforts with broader counter-mine capabilities. It will be important for them to institutionalise approaches to countering IEDs, keeping knowledge and expertise current even in the absence of major operations.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-18-2012/august/ieds-the-home-made-bombs-that-changed-modern-war/

I know SWC has discussed some of the issues around countering IEDs and SWJ has had articles too, most notably on the MRAP acquisition process. Oddly there are very few threads easy to identify as focussed on IEDs and all these will be closed - with a caption pointing to this main thread (Yes, the dreaded Moderator at work):

1) Wood box IEDS (re-titled The role of IEDs: Taliban interview):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=11322

2) Oldest Vehicle borne IED? RFI:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6538

These are both mainly historical and reflect members knowledge.

3) Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, a single post with 3.5k views: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6335

4) EFPs; the new AK-47?: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5414

5) Military Claims Victory with V-shaped Truck (more the response to IEDs):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2460
On 27th August 2012 merged into a new thread on MRAP.

6) MRAPs Can't Stop Newest Weapon (ditto above):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3055
On 27th August 2012 merged into a new thread on MRAP

6) Fighting Roadside Bombs (started in 2005, ended 2008): http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1055

7) Bombs in Iraq Getting More Sophisticated (mainly Iraq 2005-2007, a closed thread):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=131

8) Ambush, IEDs and COIN: The French Experience (not merged):http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5585

There are a number of relevant posts (found 27th August): The role of IEDs: Taliban interview; Vertical envelopment and the IED How To Stop IEDs.

[Fuchs]

There's nothing new or modern about mine warfare on land. We've had that for a couple centuries, see 17th century mineur troops (demolitions engineers).

The "modern" thing about it all is rather that the rebels are so vastly inferior and so much in danger in most other forms of warfare than mine warfare that their theoretically wide repertoire has almost entirely been reduced to minelaying, thuggery and occasional harassing fires.

Earlier capability asymmetries had a different face, but looked similarly. An Amazon tribe's poison arrow ambush, Germanic small warband raids in woodland were essentially the same.
Very little of OPFOR's repertoire still worked that the remaining active repertoire (usually a very, very careful action) was perceived way out of proportion.


It's as complaining that you're getting itched badly by the stiff stitching ends of a double amputee. A double amputee whom you've amputated and who happened to be the best boxer in his town before he faced you.

Does this make stiff stitching the important face of modern martial arts?
Not really.

It rather shows that humans adapt to almost everything, get used to almost everything. Even a little itch is a major issue if there's no other irritation.


I bet you'd instantly forget about the itching once you get into a brawl with a really good kickboxer who breaks your arms.



OK, this was a bit more graphic, but I basically wrote the same thing here before (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9841&highlight=musings).

[davidbfpo]

Fuchs,

I agree that the use of mines or IEDs is not 'new' in warfare. As a civilian I think there is something in the military-bureaucratic world that needs to label the re-appearance of an 'old' method as 'new' and so gain funding for example.

On a quick scan of the linked threads it was interesting to see so many previous historical examples given, such as the local use of bicycle IEDs in a WW2 IRA bombing campaign.

I am not aware of any comparisons made of the damage incurred in previous campaigns and more contemporary ones, so will agree with the IISS author the proportion of casualties has changed.

[Johannes U]

I want to restart this thread by requoting from davidpfbo and the IISS article:
Countering IEDs will remain a core requirement for land forces. Any force – whether state or irregular – seeking to combat Western forces will have observed the advantages that IED have given to insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the Austrian Armed Forces we have for different reasons neglected the issue of C-IED battle drills for a long time.
For other reasons we now start with incorporationg them into our training.

I have the following questions to the Council:
How do you evaluate the IED-threat to the leading elements of an attacking InfBn when conducting a secured road march towards the line of depature during an attack?
Do you use the same battle drills (5/25, 4 C's, Isolation, VP or however you call them?
Who decides what is a danger and what not?
How far in advance can you plan those battle drills?
How do you deal with the expected delay when planing an offensive operation?

I hope that my inquiries are clear and understandable.

I do have some ideas and I want to share them with you as soon as I have formulated them into simpler sentences :D.

Thanks in advance

[Stan]

Guy Fawkes, AKA the mad bomber, is considered to be the very first to create an IED in 1605. Imagine had he done away with the entire British Parliament.... What would the UK be now ?

The IED has been around for centuries but yet only in the last 15 years have we spent so much time concerned with it.

Those that deal with these generally don't talk about it and those that end up dead don't have much to say.

Fact is, we only spend time on any issue when people start to die. Our Mine Risk Education Program begins to dwindle because there are insufficient deaths. How ironic !

Johannes,
The TTPs are adhoc and each scenario differs from the last. No cookie cutter to quickly adapt to. Who ultimately decides that the AO is dangerous depends on who's in charge and their priorities.

EOD elements are not offensive in nature... rather responsive. Delays are part of the job and they come often enough with little to no advance warning. The UNMAS plans on little more than the fact that a battle has taken place and there will be UXO.

Regards, Stan

[ganulv]

Stan,

Do you agree with the quote below from a post C.J. Chivers put up on his blog last summer (http://cjchivers.com/post/27621199997/syrias-army-and-the-i-e-d-a-report-on-the-new)?


[L]ooked at coldly the Syrian army, which began the war as the biggest man in the bar, has been on a bloody and agonizing one-direction ride. You can make a social argument here, which should serve as a warning for other crackdown artists or champions of conventional military units’ roles in the irregular wars or our age: This is the modern-day outcome of using blunt force against a potentially large, determined and angry enemy on its own turf with a bulky and a doctrinally incoherent force that must make things up as it goes. That argument will probably stand. But then come the particulars that explain how an army, which set out pitted against an essentially unarmed foe, will lose. This is where the I.E.D. fits in. Once the armed opposition mastered the I.E.D. and spiked with bombs much of the very ground that any military seeking to control Syria must cover, and Syria’s army lacked a deep bench of well-trained explosive ordnance disposal teams and the suites of electronic and defensive equipment for its vehicles to survive, then the end was written. Because the Syrian army is ####ed. And its troop must know it.

[Fuchs]

This IED hyping is BS.
The Syrian army did not win quickly (or so far at all) because motivation (morale) is extremely important.

The army obviously lacked men who actually wanted to fight the rebels, and did/does so even in leadership positions.


It's astonishing how simplistic superficialities such as the hardware fashions can still cloud people's view on the real basics of warfare.

[Firn]

I think 3 basic trends are at work:

1) We humans can look back at a long evolution in which trapping played a considerable role. It needs little capital input, a generally relative small amount of labour and profits greatly from intelligence and knowledge. Overall it could provide much vital return on the investment.

2) The technological progress and economic development have vastly increased the potency , availability and variability of the toolkit.

3) Small, protracted wars, especially with a vastly stronger side provide a set of circumstances which lets the weaker side gravitate towards the `trapping` approach.

There are of course lots of other variables like topography etc involved but the basic trends should pretty much look like that.

[Stan]

Stan,

Do you agree with the quote below from a post C.J. Chivers put up on his blog last summer (http://cjchivers.com/post/27621199997/syrias-army-and-the-i-e-d-a-report-on-the-new)?

Hey Matt,
Yes and no. I lean more towards comments from Fuchs and Firn. C.J. makes some valid points regarding the capabilities of the Syrian Army as well as their equipment, but the IED in Syria is not the IEDs in Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan. The overall IED-related stats account for less than 5% of Syrian army deaths (although I should point out that our information is dated as the UN all but pulled out).

The background in C.J.'s picture vs the pictures from The Atlantic (http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2013/04/syria-in-ruins/100488/) indicate the Syrian Army is well on the way to total destruction. Morale among the Syrian troops as Fuchs points out must be at an all time low. That and the failure rate of Syrian and Russian ordnance, means a lot of UXO to utilize and clean up. That worries me more than the potential IED threat.

[Bill Moore]

Fuchs,

I agree that the use of mines or IEDs is not 'new' in warfare. As a civilian I think there is something in the military-bureaucratic world that needs to label the re-appearance of an 'old' method as 'new' and so gain funding for example.

On a quick scan of the linked threads it was interesting to see so many previous historical examples given, such as the local use of bicycle IEDs in a WW2 IRA bombing campaign.

I am not aware of any comparisons made of the damage incurred in previous campaigns and more contemporary ones, so will agree with the IISS author the proportion of casualties has changed.

It is disapointing, but there is a lot of truth in this assertion, especially when it comes to IEDs, but this is only part of the issue. Another key aspect is the media's focus and hype about IEDs, which the military in turn must dance to due to Congressional pressure (our want to be warfighters) to get after the IED problem.

The good news is that there have been some signifcant gains in the research and development world to help address the IED threat, and tactics in some cases have appropriately evolved. The bad news is despite our attack the network as one line of effort against IEDs, we have lost a lot by focusing on the trees instead of the forest. It is amazing how many man hours and analytical focus will get diverted to a relatively insignificant tactical capability of the enemy.

Get off the roads, control territory (can't do that from fire bases, you have to be out and about constantly), and defeat the adversary. We never would have defeated any adversary in history if we focused on defeating their rifles, their artillery, their planes, etc. We would have simply degraded their ability to fight until they adapted, unless we could have quickly pushed them to their culmination point (that isn't happening with most insurgencies). In some respects, as many have said, very little about warfare has changed over history, but our response to it has, often inappropriately.

[Bob's World]

Every schoolboy knows the story of how the British Regulars stuck to the road as the marched back to Boston following the battles of Lexington and Concord, and were torn apart by Rebel snipers along the way.

Now we are the road-bound regulars. Not so funny when the shoe is on the other foot. Weaker forces will always seek some asymmetric advantage, it is incumbent upon the regular to ignore doctrine and adapt. In Korea the Chinese ran the ridges while US forces clung to the roads. Now it is IEDs. If one makes themself a target, the enemy will use you as one.

[Johannes U]

OK gents, thanks so far for the feed-back.
Now some clarifications:
I am a firm believer in the idea, that only an offensive mindset brings you further toward success. Insofar i totally agree with Fuchs, Bill and Bob in your Statements, especially this one:

We never would have defeated any adversary in history if we focused on defeating their rifles, their artillery, their planes, etc.
I do not want to fight the IED, I want to fight its "user", its "financier", ... simply said: THE ENEMY.

Still, one fact remains: during the 1st world war, some armies still attacked an entrenched enemy using upright marching blocks of infantry ... and were cut down by the "new" machine gun. (When was the MG developed? ...)
My point is, that if your doctrine, tactics and battle drills are founded on a battlefield 60 years ago, they might not function any more on a modern battlefield (or at least without fault). So you have to adapt. Otherwise you will loose. And it's better to adapt before you fight than during or afterwards.

OK, so much for clarification. Now some ideas from my side:
When your forces conduct an offensive first-entry mission, the enemy might try to block your advance by using IEDs at choke points, culverts, bridges ...
If your advance guard conducts C-IED battle drills at each of those points, you might not get anywhere.
Thus your recce elements should cover, search and maybe observe most of those points in advance. But since those elements also have other missions and are (at least in Austria) in short supply, they will not be able to cover all.
My solution for this problem is the following:

responsibility for "clearing" those points is divided among the different recce elements on the different levels
the advance guard conducts C-IED drills only when its lead elements (the first vehicle) recognize an IED in front of it which cannot be bypassed or when ordered
if you still are hit by an IED (maybe in combination with a complex attack) you use the usual counter-ambush drills

Do you see the solution along the same lines?

One more thing:
In 2010 I attended a NATO-sponsored C-IED Train The Trainer Course in Croatia.
I realized that if you don't include those C-IED drills into your other battle drills, your mindset will become defensive and thus you begin to see the IED as the enemy.

[Fuchs]

Mines in small groups instead of used en masse are really only good for harassment and a little attrition.

You cannot defend anything with such means, but your can demoralise and it takes resolute leaders and some urgency to avoid a major mine-driven impact on operations.

Such mines aren't even serious obstacles, much less defended ones.


As an Austrian I would have a close look at a very, very different kind of mines; proper engineer demolition work for avalanches, collapsing bridges, closed-off tunnels and bursting dams. The isolated conspicuous object next to the road would be relatively insignificant and inefficient in your terrain.
Of course Austrians won't fight at home any time soon, but once the EU is under attack they would be expected to be among the few mountain warfare experts available to the EU.

(I'm the guy who thinks almost only about wars between great powers as scenarios because those are the problem; small wars are despicable games by politicians.)

[davidbfpo]

An excerpt from a forthcoming book, All the Ways We Kill and Die (http://arcadepub.com/arcadepub?catid=0&id=183), by Brian Castner tells the story of the hunt for the bomb-makers of Iraq and Afghanistan:http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-problem-with-using-biometrics-at-war

It ends with a telling point:
Because that’s the funny thing about using biometrics. The only way to find one person is to find everyone.

From the author's website:
This is the story of an American family at war, and the men and women who fight this new technology-heavy and intelligence-based conflict. I interviewed intel analysts, biometrics engineers, drone pilots, special operations aircrew, amputees who lost their legs, and the contractors hired to finish the job. They are all hunting a man known as al-Muhandis, The Engineer, the brains behind the devices that have killed so many soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[davidbfpo]

From WoTR and from a different angle:http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/tracking-refugees-with-biometrics-more-questions-than-answers/

The author's bio:
Sarah Soliman led U.S. Special Operations Command’s first Identity Operations team in Afghanistan, as chronicled in the book “All the Ways We Kill and Die (http://www.amazon.com/All-Ways-We-Kill-Die/dp/1628726547).” She is an Emerging Technology Trends Project Associate at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and is pursuing her doctorate through King’s College London’s Department of War Studies. She can be reached @BiometricsNerd.

[davidbfpo]

The previous two posts were copied here from the Biometrics thread, they refer to this book subject of a review of Brian Castner's new book All The Ways We Kill and Die (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B01B11TQN8/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?ie=UTF8&btkr=1)

See:http://taskandpurpose.com/ied-rocked-modern-battlefield/?

I am slightly puzzled this thread has had no updates since 2010, even if it was closed approx. a year ago. Anyway it is open for now!:wry:

[davidbfpo]

A comprehensive explanation of the use, construction and more of IS VBIEDs from an unheard blogsite, but recommended today via Twitter. The history and adaptability of the Islamic State car bomb. I say comprehensive from my "armchair".

Link: https://zaytunarjuwani.wordpress.com/2017/02/14/the-history-and-adaptability-of-the-islamic-state-car-bomb/

The author is Swedish. There are numerous photos and stats.

From the conclusion, the first paragraph:
The VBIED is not something that anyone is ever going to be able to eliminate from the battlefield, and IS have mastered the art of its usage. VBIEDs are the most central and core tenet in their philosophy of war, and has allowed them to project a military power far more sizable than their actual military force.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for this article by a veteran EOD officer, who seeks to review the challenges posed by IED use and the counter-response:https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/how-the-ied-won-dispelling-the-myth-of-tactical-success-and-innovation/

[Azor]

Hat tip to WoTR for this article by a veteran EOD officer, who seeks to review the challenges posed by IED use and the counter-response:https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/how-the-ied-won-dispelling-the-myth-of-tactical-success-and-innovation/

Just read the article David, thanks for posting.

My response would be that the lessons of Northern Ireland were overlooked. The Catholic population there resented the trappings of occupation and the seeming imposition of martial law, which benefited the adversary Protestant population and its paramilitaries. The sight of armored cars and helicopters would infuriate Catholics and draw the attention of the PIRA which sought to attrite British forces. The British were successful when they used a special forces/intelligence combination. Instead of a visibly heavy presence, plainclothes military and police intelligence officers would spy on the PIRA, whose members would find themselves suddenly arrested or ambushed.

Returning to Afghanistan, it would have been better for Coalition forces to traverse mined areas in helicopters, to barrack themselves securely and counter Taliban subversion with a network of plainclothes intelligence officers and special forces operators, backed by conventional reinforcements if necessary. Moreover, the Pashtuns were marginalized to a degree, with other ethnic and sectarian groups comprising the majority or disproportionately large shares of the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army.

[SWJ Blog]

Sustainable UN Peacekeeping Offensive Operations: UXOs, ERW and IEDs (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sustainable-un-peacekeeping-offensive-operations-uxos-erw-and-ieds)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sustainable-un-peacekeeping-offensive-operations-uxos-erw-and-ieds) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

A NYT report 'How ISIS Produced Its Cruel Arsenal on an Industrial Scale' is a must read and sits better here then elsewhere IMHO -as this technology will migrate. The content is very dependent on international NGO input.
Link:https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/10/world/middleeast/isis-bombs.html

[SWJ Blog]

Lessons to Be Learned: The Employment of Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devises in the Islamic State’s Defense of Mosul (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lessons-to-be-learned-the-employment-of-suicide-vehicle-borne-improvised-explosive-devises-)

Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lessons-to-be-learned-the-employment-of-suicide-vehicle-borne-improvised-explosive-devises-) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).