Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all) [Archive]

Jedburgh

11-10-2005, 06:36 AM

We've seen a spate of articles this year about the "newness" and "sophistication" of certain classes of IEDs in Iraq, along with the continual frustrated opining about external sources of expertise in their construction.

Too many people who should really know better seem to have forgotten that Saddam's Mukhabarat and others in the former regime had plenty of training and experience with explosives and IEDs. This ain't something new, and they don't need external assistance or imported trainers to execute.

Back in the early '90s working up in Northern Iraq, I regularly saw examples of simple to sophisticated IEDs built into radios, hairdryers, cigarette cartons, etc. ad nauseum, and infiltrated into the Kurdish region by the Mukhabarat in a targeted destabilization effort. My first personal experience with a VBIED was a non-suicide device that initiated in the money-changers market in Zakho, Iraq in Feb 95. Over 100 killed and a similar number wounded. Of course, those incidents weren't happening on the scale of what is occurring now, but it gives a clear historical perspective on their use by the bad guys. The IED didn't suddenly appear as a weapon in Iraq after our invasion - Saddam's intel and security services had used and studied the potential of improvised explosive devices for a long time.

As regards the articles that have been appearing in the press for the past several months regarding the "newness" of IEDs capable of taking out armor - it just ain't true. Neither are IR triggers a "new" innovation. There was an increased use of improvised launchers for HEAT rounds, as well as crude platter and shaped charges specifically targeting armored vehicles well over a year ago. The threat continues to evolve naturally, as evidenced by new methods - and swapping back to older methods - of targeting and initiation in response to our countermeasures. It's a deadly learning curve for both sides. They may be getting better at their targeting, but they've had the basic elements of building IEDs capable of penetrating armor for quite a while.

Tom Odom

11-10-2005, 03:11 PM

Agree that IEDs are not new. I lost one friend and had another severley wounded in southern Lebanon in early 1988. Car bombs, roadside bombs, remote fired RPGs etc were all in the tool kit for the factional fighting there.

What I particularly like about your comments above was the point that old TTPs remain in the tool kit. New TTPs do not mean emptying the toolkit. But that is a hard lesson that many have to learn the hard way.

Reference your screen name, a close friend of mine Dr. SJ Lewis, and I were roomies for a couple of years in the mid-80s. Sam was working on a special study on the Jedburgs and a number of them (I should say a handful given their life expectancy as Jedburgs and their ages by the mid-80s) came by for interviews and chat. Let's just say they had large cojones.

Sam's study is at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Lewis/Lewis.asp if you have not seen it.

Best,
Tom

Jedburgh

11-11-2005, 05:52 AM

What I particularly like about your comments above was the point that old TTPs remain in the tool kit. New TTPs do not mean emptying the toolkit. But that is a hard lesson that many have to learn the hard way.
Yup. Yet again, it is something that too many who should know better fail to comprehend until it hits them in the face. Effective trend analysis requires that you maintain the full picture of the historical pattern - it is dangerous to discard anything in the mistaken belief that a "trend" is a linear development. As I stated earlier, threat TTPs evolve in the pressures of the the combat environment to meet our countermeasures. But it ain't a linear process - there are a variety of feedback loops involved.

Keeping to open sources, there was an article last month (in USA Today, of all places) that spoke to this topic. Titled Pressure-triggered bombs worry U.S. forces (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-10-24-roadside-bombs-inside_x.htm), it discussed the bad guys' return to pressure initiated systems when our countermeasures began to significantly impact their use of wireless initiation systems.

The quote by the MI officer at the end of the article says it all: There's a tendency to think of the insurgency as a bunch of guys running around the desert with Kalashnikovs. These are a group of dedicated professionals trying to improve their craft.

Jedburgh

11-29-2005, 03:55 AM

Published on-line by the Congressional Research Service:

IEDs in Iraq: Effects & Countermeasures (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57512.pdf)

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are responsible for many of the more than 2,000 deaths and numerous casualties suffered by U.S. and coalition forces since the invasion of Iraq.1 The bombs have been hidden behind signs and guardrails, under roadside debris, or inside animal carcasses, and encounters with IEDs are becoming more numerous and deadly. The threat has expanded to include vehicle-borne IEDs, where insurgents drive cars laden with explosives directly into a targeted group of service members. DOD efforts to counter IEDs have proven only marginally effective, and U.S. forces continue to be exposed to the threat at military checkpoints, or whenever riding in vehicles in Iraq. DOD reportedly expects that mines and IEDs will continue to be weapons of choice for insurgents for the near term in Iraq, and is also concerned that they might eventually become more widely used by other insurgents and terrorists worldwide. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Bill Moore

11-29-2005, 06:25 AM

We all agree that IEDs are an old method of waging guerrilla warfare.

If we reflect back to recent history, we'll also all agree that the Iraqi intelligence/military service had excellent IED making skills and other paramilitary skills, as demonstrated in numerous successful attacks overseas against selected expats and other targets. We also know the Lebanonese Hizbullah have long been masters in developing sophisticated IEDs, probably in large part due to training and assistance received by the Iranians and Syrians, who probably received their initial training from the USSR back in the day. It is probably a fair assessment to assume at least some of the foreign fighters coming into Iraq from Syria hail from Lebanon. None the less I wouldn't write off the possiblity, or even probability, that some states are also providing IED and other support to select insurgent groups. If we end up proving this, then we have a situation that we need to fix with appropriate response.

In the mid to long run the greatest danger is that their IED techniques, tactics, and procedures will migrate between the various terrorist/insurgent groups, and will eventually be exported elsewhere to support Jihad in say Indonesia or Nigeria. Anyone notice the rapid rise of IED attacks in Afghanistan lately?

I think the bottom line is we need to need to find, fix, and finish the IED facilitators wherever they are, and sooner rather than later. Everyday they survive, they improve their craft.

Jedburgh

11-29-2005, 03:35 PM

We also know the Lebanonese Hizbullah have long been masters in developing sophisticated IEDs, probably in large part due to training and assistance received by the Iranians and Syrians, who probably received their initial training from the USSR back in the day.
Hezbollah actually received quite a bit of their initial assistance regarding construction and use of roadside bombs from the ANC. A bit of a come-about, as Israel had very close mil-to-mil relations with Apartheid South Africa. Iran definitely provided most of the materials required, shipped through Syria. But Hezbollah provided plenty of local innovation in construction and targeting and was also the first to systematically video IED attacks for use in media propaganda.

In the mid to long run the greatest danger is that their IED techniques, tactics, and procedures will migrate between the various terrorist/insurgent groups, and will eventually be exported elsewhere to support Jihad in say Indonesia or Nigeria. Anyone notice the rapid rise of IED attacks in Afghanistan lately?
"Threat migration" of TTPs between Iraq and Afghanistan has been going on for a while - but its definitely increased in scale recently. The threat potential of such migration beyond the AOR to targets in the West - let alone places like Indonesia or Nigeria - is serious.

But keep in mind that threat migration doesn't necessarily mean physical transfer of bad guys to train and advise indig in other countries. The migration of the concept of IEDs as an effective, simple, and cheap method of attack is enough. The Maoists in Nepal, for example, have developed unique IED TTPs all their own, that owe nothing to what we've been seeing in Iraq.

I think the bottom line is we need to need to find, fix, and finish the IED facilitators wherever they are, and sooner rather than later. Everyday they survive, they improve their craft.
True enough. The intel problem in relation to that is another discussion altogether. But we've also got to accept that IEDs in some form are a threat that we may continue to face in the forseeable future. That is where the defense appropriations come in, as referenced in the CRS report. The counter-IED capability that we are developing in the force is something that will stand us in good stead over the long run.

aktarian

11-29-2005, 04:57 PM

And we shouldn't ignore simple fact of evolution both in material and use/placement. If something works use it. If something doesn't work (or doesn't work anymore) change it or stop using it.

I see tendency to draw conclusion: "IED are getting more sophisticated therefore they are receiving foreign help. IED are getting more effective therefore they are receiving foreign instructors." But it could be simple evolution. Wire detonated bombs are easy to spot so they change to command-detonated. Certain frequencies are getting jammed so they change it or use different source of command signal. Armored vehicles are hard to destroy so use more explosive. etc

It's not only the US that learns.

GorTex6

11-29-2005, 07:05 PM

The new sophistication is in the system and rapidly evolving tactics used to employ them. One guy gets paid to manufacture, another gets paid to dig the hole, another to lay the wire, and another to detonate the charge, ect... They videotaped almost every attack, post them on jihadist bulletin boards, and critique each video like a high school football coaching staff, discovering patterns in our battle drills. They are very patient and keen observers, learning everything about us.

Jedburgh

11-29-2005, 07:37 PM

The new sophistication is in the system and rapidly evolving tactics used to employ them. One guy gets paid to manufacture, another gets paid to dig the hole, another to lay the wire, and another to detonate the charge, etc...
That's a basic description of a step-by-step cell. That method of organization for support and ops is very common in a wide range of insurgent organizations. Not new at all. That type of cell was used very effectively by HAMAS during the Intifada for the distribution of propaganda and calls for strikes - the Israelis were never able to completely stop the distro, although they rolled up quite a few cells.

We've talked about natural evolution in the use of IEDs - the same thing occurs in operational cell structure. Organizational methods, means of clandestine communications, security cut-outs, etc. are learned the hard way by the bad guys. But in Iraq they had a head start, given the nature of the multi-layered police state that was Saddam's regime. I'm not just talking about the Mukhabarat; many elements within Iraqi society developed such networks for a variety of survival reasons during Saddam's rule. The same thing is true of political opposition and smuggling networks that exist in every repressive regime in the region.

SWJED

12-05-2005, 12:36 AM

5 Dec. Christian Science Monitor - A Makeshift Hunt for IEDs in Iraq (http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1205/p07s02-woiq.html).

... A 110-pound black German Shepard named Bingo works with Piacentini, sniffing suspicious holes in the ground, mounds of garbage, or debris placed a little too strategically.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams - equipped with signal-jamming radar, robots, and spacesuit-like protective gear - specialize in detecting and detonating IEDs. But most days there aren't enough Bingo's or EOD teams to go around. So, Marines on patrol tend to gently poke anything suspicious, and snip the wires of the bombs they discover themselves...

SWJED

12-06-2005, 08:17 AM

6 Dec. Reuters - U.S. Expands Effort to Counter Rebel Bombs (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/05/AR2005120501505.html).

The Pentagon, striving to blunt the deadliest threat posed by Iraqi insurgents, on Monday named a retired four-star general to head an expanded effort to defend against roadside bombs used to kill and maim U.S. troops.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld picked retired U.S. Army Gen. Montgomery Meigs, former commander of NATO's peacekeeping force in Bosnia, to replace the one-star general now heading a task force on so-called improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, often planted by insurgents on roads to attack U.S. vehicles...

GorTex6

12-13-2005, 06:51 AM

Not new at all.

Was the cell driven by money, exploiting unemployment? Was membership/employment solicited on internet message boards(like this one)? Did each group set their differences aside to collude with each other autonomously? This is not new?

Jedburgh

12-13-2005, 07:43 AM

Was the cell driven by money, exploiting unemployment? Was membership/employment solicited on internet message boards(like this one)? Did each group set their differences aside to collude with each other autonomously? This is not new?
My statement was regarding the operational concept of a step-by-step cell, in either an operations or support context. The basic organizational method of breaking down tasks for execution by different elements separated from each other for security purposes is as old as the hills. Simple and straightforward.

The economic aspect is also as old as the hills. It doesn't take much of study to learn how unemployment - fused with socio-political pressures and other economic factors - tends to have a significant effect upon recruiting for radical organizations.

Aspects of recruiting, elements of clandestine communications, degree of collaboration between disparate organizations, etc. are initially worked out according to the degree of experience and training possessed by the leadership - not to mention significantly influenced by the perceived threat to the organization(s) in question. Tactics, techniques and procedures are never static, always evolving, and are shaped by both culture and techology - but "old" methods that have worked well for a wide variety of other organizations throughout the history of clandestine terror and insurgency are to be ignored at one's peril. We have seen clearly the readiness of the bad guys to return to older TTPs if they believe they will be effective in a new context.

What is relatively "new" is the manner in which modern communications technology provides innovative methods for establishing and running such cells. Standing them up in a more dispersed manner than possible using more traditional methods of clandestine communications, and - if done in a truly professional manner - with a greater degree of security. But a cut-out is still a cut-out, a dead-drop is still a dead-drop - whether it is physical or digital, or a combination of the two. It shouldn't confuse a good analyst.

However, that has nothing to do with the basic organizational structure of a step-by-step cell. If any intel analyst has trouble recognizing that structure, or believes it is "new", then shame on him. Recognize the structure, learn how it functions in its current context - which is what you are really referring to - then roll up the cell. Hopefully, their security and discipline is poor enough that we can exploit that cell to attack higher up in the organization. Unfortunately, a step-by-step cell is designed (or is supposed to be...) expressly to defeat that sort of exploitation.

SWJED

12-18-2005, 08:16 AM

17 Dec. Associated Press - Florida Base Set to Open School on IEDs (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/17/AR2005121700532.html).

With more American soldiers dying in Iraq and Afghanistan from hidden bombs, the military hopes a new advanced explosives school will help troops to detect and disarm the deadly devices.

The military showed off X-ray cameras, chemical sensors and advanced robotics Friday, while the military's top bomb-disposal instructors demonstrated some of the latest techniques in combating deadly improvised explosive devices.

The new Advanced Explosives Device Disposal School at Eglin Air Force Base officially opens next month. Explosives experts from all military branches will attend the specialized training...

Jedburgh

12-21-2005, 03:30 PM

New Counter-IED Lanes Train Troops in Kuwait (http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=8354)

Soldiers arriving in Kuwait now receive a new situational training exercise to update them on enemy improvised explosive devices and other tactics before going into Iraq.

There are also new Counter-IED dismounted and mounted lanes for combat arms units, a route reconnaissance and recurrence lane for engineers and explosive ordinance disposal units, a C-IED fundamentals lane and multiple practice maneuver lanes.

SWJED

01-17-2006, 12:44 PM

16 Jan. Defense News reports - 'Aerial IEDs' Target U.S. Copters (not online).

Insurgents are attacking U.S. helicopters in Iraq with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that leap into the air and detonate when an aircraft passes nearby, said a U.S. Army aviation general.

Insurgents, who place these aerial IEDs along known flight paths, trigger them when American helicopters come along at the typical altitude of just above the rooftops. The devices shoot 50 feet into the air, and a proximity fuze touches off a warhead that sprays metal fragments, said Brig. Gen. Edward Sinclair, commander of the Army’s Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Ala.

The bomb-builders may be obtaining radio-guided proximity fuzes from old Iraqi anti-aircraft and artillery shells and mortar rounds.

Sinclair said these aerial IEDs have been used against multiple U.S. helicopters. He declined to say whether such IEDs had damaged any aircraft.

The new weapon is one way insurgents are taking on Army aircraft, which come under fire between 15 and 20 times a month, Sinclair said. Other methods include small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and advanced shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles...

SWJED

01-18-2006, 11:09 AM

18 Jan. - U.S. Helicopters Face Menace of 'Aerial Bombs' (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/01/18/wirq18.xml&sSheet=/news/2006/01/18/ixworld.html).

American helicopters in Iraq are facing a new threat from so-called aerial bombs, which are fired into the air from the ground and explode close to passing aircraft.

The new home-made weapons, known to the Americans as "aerial improvised explosive devices" have been used on numerous occasions.

"The enemy is adaptive. They makes changes in the way they fight, they respond to new flying tactics," Brig Edward Sinclair, a US army aviation commander, told Defense News, which first revealed the new threat.

He refused to say whether they had brought aircraft down. The aerial devices are placed along known flight paths and are triggered when insurgents see a low-flying helicopter approaching...

SWJED

01-20-2006, 01:04 PM

20 Jan. Stars and Stripes - Military Backs Off On Claim That Insurgents Are Using Aerial IEDs (http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?article=34433&section=104).

The military is backing away from an initial claim that insurgents are using aerial improvised explosive devices to attack U.S. helicopters.

Defense News first reported Monday that insurgents were setting off rooftop-planted devices that leap 50 feet into the air and spray shrapnel as U.S. helicopters pass by.

In the story, Brig. Gen. Edward Sinclair, commander of the Army’s Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Ala., said insurgents had used aerial IEDs against several U.S. helicopters, but an official later said this was not the case.

“At this time, we do not know of any incidences of insurgents employing aerial IEDs against U.S. helicopters. No aircraft have been lost to this type of device,” said a spokeswoman for the Defense Department task force working to defeat IEDs.

Multi-National Force-Iraq also has no information on reports of aerial IED attacks and would not release specific information on IED attacks due to security concerns, a spokesman said on Thursday.

Other officials spoke about aerial IEDs in general and hypothetical terms...

SWJED

02-24-2006, 01:03 PM

24 Feb. Inside Defense (http://www.insidedefense.com/)....

The Defense Department is considering a new, low-tech approach to countering roadside bombs that are the scourge of U.S. forces in Iraq -- construct new roads for supply convoys that simply bypass densely populated, high-threat areas.

The Army is seeking $167 million in military construction funds as part of the Pentagon’s soon-to-be detailed $65.3 billion supplemental spending request for fiscal year 2006 to pave roads capable of supporting two-way traffic, complete with shoulders, drainage structures and interchanges to connect with existing supply routes, according to a draft version of the request.

Rather than trying to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs) head-on with new technologies and tactics, the Defense Department is looking to reduce risk to convoys by charting routes around danger zones...

Strickland

02-24-2006, 02:32 PM

While maybe just a gut reaction, this sounds like one of the more idiotic and expensive courses of action that we have contemplated or attempted. During my time in Iraq, regardless of how many IEDs we recovered, how many hours we spent patrolling and clearing routes, movement along MSRs was controlled by individuals belonging to Movement Control, who themselves did not participate in clearing operations, nor understood anything other than trying to move things from point A to B. When an IED was discovered on one route, they would simply find another road, and abuse that with traffic until an IED attack, and then find a third route. This cedes routes and entire areas to the insurgents, and prevents freedom of movement and action for ground troops.

Based of this argument, we will build new roads that I assume only US and Iraqi forces can use, thus further alienating the population. The insurgency is the product of long standing grievances that need to be eliminated. By building new roads, we are admitting that we cannot control the current MSRs, and that the insurgents are stronger than we are.

I will continue to argue that they only way to effectively mitigate the IED threat is by persistent infantry patrols and a continued presence.

Jones_RE

02-24-2006, 04:59 PM

It sends a great message to the locals about our ability to provide them with security that we cannot even secure our own forces . . . . While there might be certain unique, tactical situations where a new road is the most appropriate solution I'd say that the driving concern should be the welfare of the local people and not the security of our (heavily armed, by comparison) truck drivers. While US public opinion is important in this war, Iraqi public opinion is more so.

Also note the somewhat schizophrenic nature of this action - all the scuttlebutt in the news says that we'll be drawing our forces down sharply in 2006 and yet they want to spend millions of dollars on a project that probably won't even be started this year . . . .

Hal Schyberg

02-24-2006, 06:35 PM

The biggest problem with the war in Iraq is American public opinion. We do live in a democracy with freedom of speech. We have to start telling the other story if we are to succeed in this Propaganda conflict. Our own media it seems is in support of the insurgency.
Still we must have more troops on the ground and they must over watch all the high traffic areas day and night. If we build new roads and fail to do this simple thing we will simply have the same problem on the new road
:cool:

Stratiotes

02-24-2006, 07:54 PM

It would be funny if it weren't so sad. I cannot believe there is anybody in favor of this even at the DoD.

Strickland

02-25-2006, 01:24 AM

Thompson, Kitson, and Callwell must be rolling in their graves.

I am quite familiar with the Small Wars Manual 1935 and 1940 editions, and I dont remember the section that says if you cant secure your AO find another one that you can.

Wasnt one of the main issues the British had in 1920 the inability to secure interior lines/lines of communications?

SWJED

02-26-2006, 05:03 PM

March Issue of National Defense - Insurgency Tactics Test Helicopters’ Staying Power (http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/march/insurgency.htm).

Technology so far has proven to be of little use in protecting Army helicopters from the ravages of small arms and rocket propelled grenades, military and civilian experts contend.

The Army has spent nearly $2 billion outfitting helicopters with high-tech sensors and flares that help foil shoulder-launched missiles, but none of these devices can prevent choppers from getting shot out of the sky by rocket-propelled grenades and automatic rifles, which are among the preferred weapons of Iraq’s insurgency.

“The longer we stay in this conflict, the greater the ability of the insurgents to counter our countermeasures with their technology,” says Steve Greer, a retired Army command sergeant major, and professor of unconventional warfare at American Military University...

While a number of technologies have been proven successful in deflecting shoulder-fired heat-seeking missiles, none exists today that can protect from RPGs or standard rifle rounds, Greer says. “There’s no way to defend from small-arms fire other than visual recognition and maneuvering away from the line of fire.”

RPGs and small-arms rounds fall under the category of “dumb munitions,” which are unguided and far more difficult to counter with technical solutions, says Kernan Chaisson, senior electronics analyst at Forecast International, a market intelligence firm.

“You have high-tech protective equipment, but sometimes it doesn’t do you any good,” he says. “It’s a real predicament for aviation. The threat they face, it’s hard to do anything about.”...

Merv Benson

02-26-2006, 11:10 PM

While the A-10 may have more armor than helicopters, it also is more difficult to hit with dumb munitions, because of the way it manuevers for attack. Helicopter pilots are probably going to have to adjust their tactics so that they are moving while attacking and not hovering as much. They also will need to attack from different altitudes making it harder for ground fire to get a bead on them. If the choppers can't find away to avoid the dumb ammo their usefulness in attack is going to be greatly restricted. If the Air Force is phasing out the A-10, the Marines should try to pick them up as a close air support weapon.

Stu-6

02-27-2006, 12:38 AM

Some one should get those A-10, they’ll be more useful than F-22s.

Helicopter pilots may need to adjust their tactics in urban areas or anywhere there are an excessive mount of weapons firing at them. Still I think the threat posed to aircraft by things like RPGs is over stated. Small tactical adjustments should be sufficient for them.

Jones_RE

02-27-2006, 06:04 PM

A-10's probably shouldn't see much use for attack missions in the Iraq theater of operations - too much collateral damage. In Afghanistan, on the other hand . . .

Traditionally, helicopters are most vulnerable on takeoff and landing - for those situations they'll simply have to exercise a certain degree of tactical caution, e.g. always flying in pairs so that one can cover the other one in case of a shoot down attempt, coordinating with ground forces to watch potential launch sites, consciously randomizing regular flight times and routes etc.

The question is how much effort do we put into helicopter protection? Every dollar we spend on keeping those birds in the air is a dollar that is not spent on reconstruction or training Iraqi soldiers. Both of those activities offer a far greater return in terms of our casualties then some gimmick.

Strickland

02-28-2006, 02:51 PM

While shoulder-fired missiles are surely a threat to rotary wing assets, and will be a congruent threat to tilt rotar aircraft; ground fire continues to be a major concern. Due to the method we employ rotary wing aircraft, and the fact that they only fly hundreds of feet off the ground, they are all still incredibly vulnerable to simple ground fire from small arms.

jcustis

05-29-2006, 07:48 PM

In the mid to long run the greatest danger is that their IED techniques, tactics, and procedures will migrate between the various terrorist/insurgent groups, and will eventually be exported elsewhere to support Jihad in say Indonesia or Nigeria. Anyone notice the rapid rise of IED attacks in Afghanistan lately?

"Threat migration" of TTPs between Iraq and Afghanistan has been going on for a while - but its definitely increased in scale recently. The threat potential of such migration beyond the AOR to targets in the West - let alone places like Indonesia or Nigeria - is serious.

The above quotes were pulled from other posts in this thread. From the perspective of military theory (despite the historical precedent), has the IED become a revolution in military affairs? Following the argument that RMAs can be the revolutionary technology itself (e.g. rifled musket, tank, etc.) I'm inclined to think we have a new RMA for a number of reasons:

- If employed properly, IEDs have an almost David-vs.-Goliath quality that facilitates a certain degree of freedom of maneuver, critical to insurgent ops.

- The powerful imagery of an IED's effects can move around the globe as soon as it is either broadcast on a major news network, or uploaded to a jihadist website. I think that even though the aftermath and ensuing casualties may tell a less dramatic story, the initial shock of the image at detonation is so powerful that it has reached virtually every insurgent/terrorist group around the world. As a result, the how-to of complex IEDs may not have reached other groups, but I believe the IED will become a "keeping up with the Joneses" concern for groups if they do not already possess it the capability.

- We should expect to see IEDs on any future battlefield (Conventional and UW). I firmly believe that if IEDs had been employed with the same tradecraft during the March Up as they are now, we might still be making that movement to Baghdad. The components of an effective IED are all around us in our daily lives, minus the explosive compound (and there are even recipes for that on the Internet).

Althought IEDs have been around for a long, long time, the technological and organizational recommendations for change that are coming out of the OIF/OEF experience, I believe we are witnessing such a revolution. I cannot recall which Marine General officer made the statement, but he spoke of Marines deploying in armored HMMWVs in the future, and that the soft-skin "highbacks" would be a thing of the past if we were to tread into other hostile environments. Any validity behind that statement?

Is the IED just one component of a larger RMA in the works?

slapout9

05-30-2006, 12:01 AM

Yes, there is alot of merit to your thinking. As I have said before the enemy is very good at EBO. We use PGM's they use IED's the EFFECT is the same except their's are more cost effective. We have B-2's to hit buildings they highjack airliners again the EFFECT is the same!! Both systems penetrate radar undetected. IED's are precision guided munitions aimed at specific targets. They are stealth people with their own stealth weapons. I would like to see more of your thinking about this because understanding the problem is the first step to solving it. It is sharp thinking that will help us not just technology.

Jedburgh

05-30-2006, 12:51 AM

JC, I'm going to reply to your post in pieces.

- If employed properly, IEDs have an almost David-vs.-Goliath quality that facilitates a certain degree of freedom of maneuver, critical to insurgent ops.
IEDs represent simply another aspect of partisan, guerrilla, insurgent, asymetric - call it what you will - warfare. "David-vs-Goliath" has always been the quality of such combat. IEDs exemplify the age-old hit-and-run tactic of the ambush, in that if you are going to categorize them in military terms, you'd have to say they are being effectively employed as a mechanical ambush. In and of themselves, despite the efforts we are directing towards countermeasures, their use does not constitute an RMA. However, that brings us to your next points...

- The powerful imagery of an IED's effects can move around the globe as soon as it is either broadcast on a major news network, or uploaded to a jihadist website. I think that even though the aftermath and ensuing casualties may tell a less dramatic story, the initial shock of the image at detonation is so powerful that it has reached virtually every insurgent/terrorist group around the world. As a result, the how-to of complex IEDs may not have reached other groups, but I believe the IED will become a "keeping up with the Joneses" concern for groups if they do not already possess it the capability.
I think the key to the quote above is the statement you made at the end of your post: "Is the IED just one component of a larger RMA in the works?". Yes, and that larger RMA is the Information Revolution. There has already been a great deal posted on SWC regarding how the bad guys exploit the internet and other new communications technologies to facilitate their ops, spread their ideology, and distribute TTPs.

Years ago, Hizbollah began exploiting media with regards to IED attacks by having a cameraman with the individual initiating the device film the incident to show on local TV the same day. Now, that propaganda effect is multiplied exponentially by the bad guys' ability to post the vid on the 'net for viewing worldwide just as soon as they can upload it.

But that's just the propaganda piece - it goes well beyond that. I already discussed how modern communications tech facilitates dispersed, compartmented cellular ops in the post above yours. But, as you're already aware, it also facilitates sharing of TTPs with non-related groups to a degree not seen before. Insurgents, terrorists and revolutionaries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa - as long as they have 'net access - can exploit lessons learned in Iraq fighting against the world's superpower and put it into even greater effect in their own AO. This has the potential to provide a qualitative evolutionary leap in ops to a nascent or struggling group. As you stated, the material requirements are not great (and IEDs do not need to be "complex" to be effective). But the only thing in favor of regimes facing such a potential threat is that it requires a certain degree of intelligence and previous operational experience in order to effectively apply those TTPs in a new context. Thus far, we've only seen relatively limited threat migration. But I don't expect that situation to last.

Finally, as an aside:

- We should expect to see IEDs on any future battlefield (Conventional and UW). I firmly believe that if IEDs had been employed with the same tradecraft during the March Up as they are now, we might still be making that movement to Baghdad.
I concur in that we must take IEDs into consideration in the planning stages for any future op. However, I disagree with you on the point about the March Up to Baghdad. IEDs are not very effective against a rapidly advancing combined arms maneuver force on a conventional battlefield (even if they have to deal with unconventional attacks en-route to the objective). Once that force occupies the objective, and has established patrol routes and static areas of responsibility in the effort to establish post-conflict stability and security, then it becomes vulnerable to IEDs.

aktarian

05-30-2006, 05:15 AM

The above quotes were pulled from other posts in this thread. From the perspective of military theory (despite the historical precedent), has the IED become a revolution in military affairs? Following the argument that RMAs can be the revolutionary technology itself (e.g. rifled musket, tank, etc.) I'm inclined to think we have a new RMA for a number of reasons:

/.../

Is the IED just one component of a larger RMA in the works?

I wouldn't go as far as that. IED itself isn't that new concept. During WW2 Japanese used burried arty shells to destroy US tanks. Soviets put explosives on dogs and trained them to run under enemy tanks. In Vietnam Vietnamese used unexploded munitions to make mines. And IED is just a more complex mine.

Jedburgs mentioned Hezbollah. I think that if you would study Hezbollah's evolution of IED use and compare it with Iraq you'd see same trends, from simple to complex, starting at similar position and taking similar stps. Only that Hezbollah's IEDs don't evolve as much (at least not under battlefield conditions) while in Iraq they do because there are constantantly developing counter-measures.

Are IED new RMA or part of it? IMO no. I see thm as next step in evolution of perticular weapons system. Same way as longbow (the one with arrows, not Hellfire missiles ;) ) wasn't RMA but simply next step in evolution of a bow.

SWJED

06-25-2006, 03:09 AM

25 June London Daily Telegraph - Precision-Made Mine That Has Killed 17 British Troops (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/06/25/wirq225.xml&sSheet=/news/2006/06/25/ixnews.html).

http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/images/iraqmine.jpg

London Daily Telegraph Graphic

The first picture of an Iraqi insurgent mine, believed to have been responsible for the deaths of 17 British soldiers, has been obtained by The Sunday Telegraph.

The device, which has been used by insurgents throughout Iraq since May last year, fires an armour-piercing "explosively formed projectile" or EFP, also known as a shaped charge, directly into an armoured vehicle, inflicting death or terrible injuries on troops inside.

The weapon can penetrate the armour of British and American tanks and armoured personnel carriers and completely destroy armoured Land Rovers, which are used by the majority of British troops on operations in Iraq.

The device, described as an "off-route mine", was seized by British troops in Iraq earlier this year and brought back to Britain where it underwent detailed examination by scientists at Fort Halstead, the Government's forensic explosive laboratory in Kent.

The Ministry of Defence has attempted to play down the effectiveness of the weapons, suggesting that they are "crude" or "improvised" explosive devices which have killed British troops more out of luck than judgement.

However, this newspaper understands that Government scientists have established that the mines are precision-made weapons which have been turned on a lathe by craftsmen trained in the manufacture of munitions.

A source from the American military, who has been working closely with British scientists, said that the insurgents have perfected the design of the weapon and know exactly where to place it to ensure maximum damage to coalition vehicles...

SWJED

07-12-2006, 06:17 AM

12 July New York Times - A Platoon’s Mission: Seeking and Destroying Explosives in Disguise (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/12/world/middleeast/12military.html) by Michael Gordon.

When American soldiers take to the road they pray they avoid the roadside bombs that seem to explode every day in Iraq. Sgt. First Class Timothy Faust has a very different goal: he hopes to find them.

Sergeant Faust’s Demon Platoon has the “route clearing” mission for Company A, Task Force 1-36. That is the somewhat understated description of an operation that involves driving into a veritable no man’s land in hostile Anbar Province to uncover mines, buried artillery shells and all manner of explosive devices, often under sniper fire.

The Pentagon has spent millions of dollars on technology to counter the bombs, which the insurgents have continued to install at a furious rate. But as a recent trip with Demon Platoon showed, detecting the bombs — improvised explosive devices, or I.E.D.’s, as the soldiers call them — is often a matter of memorizing the location of trash heaps, bomb craters, dirt mounds and construction sites in Hit, a garbage-strewn city of 40,000...

SWJED

07-29-2006, 06:39 AM

29 July Washington Post - Fighting Roadside Bombs: Low-Tech, High-Tech, Toy Box (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/28/AR2006072801462.html) by Renae Merle.

Robert Pervere's fight against insurgents in Iraq started with an Emaxx monster truck from Debbie's RC World Inc. in Chesapeake, Va., a $335 toy that he turned into a weapon for U.S. troops against roadside bombs. The 24-year-old engineer replaced about 80 percent of the toy's plastic parts with aluminum, fastened two small surveillance cameras to the top and made room for an explosive that could blow up suspicious objects from hundreds of feet away.

"I get paid to play with [radio control] cars," said Pervere, who helped build the prototype for Applied Marine Technology Inc., a Virginia-based defense contractor that has said it expects to begin receiving military orders in September. "This has been a very rewarding project, working on a tool that's going to be out the door saving lives shortly."

After more than three years of war in Iraq, roadside bombs remain the deadliest single threat to U.S. troops, and countering them has emerged as one of the chief technological problems of the conflict. The Pentagon has spent tens of millions of dollars on the most obvious fixes -- adding armor to vehicles and deploying jammers to block radio signals used to explode the devices -- only to see the insurgents develop larger, better-concealed and more complicated explosives triggered by cellphones, garage-door openers, pressure hoses and other methods. Soldiers have even developed solutions of their own: Many Humvees in Iraq are outfitted with metal devices the size of a hockey stick that can catch tripwires or detect heat-sensitive triggers on roadside bombs.

Now, a Pentagon agency with a $3.3 billion budget and a staff of 300 has a mandate to focus the defense industry on the problem. The undertaking has attracted not only the country's top weapons makers but also dozens of small businesses like AMTI, all pitching a science-fiction gallery of possible solutions...

bismark17

07-29-2006, 09:22 PM

That's outstanding!!! Kudos to that young engineer!!! I recently saw an interesting documentary on the Navy EOD training on the Military channel. It's worth watching.

Ray

08-01-2006, 07:23 AM

Mtngoat

08-02-2006, 01:02 AM

What is the cost effectiveness of this "equipment"?

Are the surveillance cameras also included in the $335 toy?

If I have understood correctly, then this whole equipment blows up with each IED it blows up.
Ray

Understand where your going with this.

I don't think that the Camera is included in that 335 price tag. I too use RC Clog/ Rock Crawer Trucks. But I'll use a extra Servo to add a Dump Truck body to it or for a "Trailer" to be pulled behind the RC Truck.

Where your at working will drive which still to use. Just like a Bot that can be used. I like RC becuase I can Pack them in on my back and a TALLON is just to heavy in the Mtns.

Good Job for that ENG, make your own RC IEDD Trucks. SO that $$$ Goes to your house not someone else's.

Just my .02

Ray

08-02-2006, 02:01 AM

I was trying to look at it in our Indian Army context as you have rightly guessed.

It is quite a novel idea nonetheless.

nichols

08-05-2006, 11:16 PM

I've seen alot of investment into technology solutions for IEDs; any thoughts on cognitive situational awareness for the Marine/Soldier?

Ray

08-06-2006, 05:28 PM

Rubble
Unattended Vehicles
Scanty street or tracks
Bushes next to the roads
Walls that make a hollow noise (when searching; they can be hidden rooms/ holes behind the wall used as storage or used to hide)
Hollows in the trees
Extra friendly locals wanting to help and guide
A fracas

Etc etc

nichols

08-07-2006, 11:41 AM

@ Ray,

All good points.....so how would you teach situational awareness? I'm thinking about using an end user modifiable simulation.

slapout9

08-07-2006, 11:02 PM

I have been to several LE courses on IED searching and detection. One technique the instructors used was this. Every time we left the classroom on break or lunch they would lock up the classroom. When we came back you had to tell what had been moved or added or taken away, they had several simulated devices they would place around the room, also outside in a field situation around cars sidewalks,etc.

Another technique is to establish what a normal situation looks like by taking a picture!! if it is blown up 8x11 the detail is very good and you can spot something that has been moved or added. I don't know how this would work in a large patrol area, but buildings,room,etc. work well. It was amazing how fast you will learn. Works best if several pictures are taken over time periods.

If this helps there are some other things you can do. Let me know.

Ray

08-08-2006, 06:05 PM

@ Ray,

All good points.....so how would you teach situational awareness? I'm thinking about using an end user modifiable simulation.

Train on mock ups of the type of situations that they troops are to face.

Well, you got to go back to the basics, since everyone thinks he know it all.

Why are things seen? Shape, shadow, shine, silhouette etc etc. The troops must be trained to observe these practically on mock ups of the type pf area they are to operate in. They must also learn how to avoid them.

(one of the things I have seen in the videos of Iraq is that quite a few soldiers cross the road/ open spaces in an ostrich type of huddle. This is dangerous. While they run and cross, they should be looking rapidly all around, while his buddy covers the move. Any movement, glint etc, the man hits the dust by running, crawling, observe and then fire back).

I am not aware of the problems in Iraq, but the problems that they face could be got from the troops there and such type of situation reproduced for troops to be inducted.

Situational awareness will evolve with such practical training.

The more the training, the better the responses.

We have such training facilities and troops are put through their paces before being inducted.

We have dummy bombs, grenades and the works and the person who is slow is "dead"!

To be frank, even it if sound silly, I have observed that repeating the actions sort of drills into the man/ officer a sort of reflex action in the person and the casualties become less. And our body armour is immensely crude and cumbersome compared to yours and yet the reflexes become good!

SWJED

01-01-2007, 07:33 AM

2 January edition of the Christian Science Monitor - Relentless Toll to U.S. Troops of Roadside Bombs (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0102/p01s03-usmi.html) by Brad Knickerbocker.

... Of the 3,000 American GIs lost in Iraq as of midday Sunday, more have been killed by roadside bombs - improvised explosive devices (IEDs) - than any other cause. More than by rifle fire, mortar attack, or car bomb.

It's a danger that has bedeviled Pentagon war planners for months, one to which they've responded with a high-level task force headed by a retired four-star general, $6.7 billion in research and development, new high-tech equipment and vehicles, and - perhaps most important - intelligence efforts to get inside the decisionmaking of an insurgency that is sophisticated, if largely low-tech.

If anything, the danger is increasing despite efforts to counter it.

IEDs are "the enemy's most effective weapon," Army Gen. John Abizaid, commander of all US forces in the Middle East, told the Senate Armed Services committee last March. "They are the perfect asymmetric weapon - cheap, effective, and anonymous."

Improvised bomb attacks on US troops now top 1,000 a month, four times the rate in 2004. Insurgents have become more sophisticated in their bombmaking, placement, and means of detonation. The British military has determined that there are enough stocks of illegal explosives to continue the same level of attack for years without resupply, reports DefenseNews.com...

Jedburgh

04-12-2007, 12:03 AM

AKO Log-in Required

TC 2-91.701 Intelligence Analytical Support to Counter IED Operations (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/7469157), March 2007

SWJED

04-28-2007, 05:19 AM

By Herschel Smith at his The Captain's Journal blog - The Ebb and Flow of IED Warfare: U.S. Lives are at Stake (http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/04/27/the-ebb-and-flow-of-ied-warfare-us-lives-are-at-stake/).

Due in part to a failure to listen adequately to Eric Shinseki and Anthony Zinni regarding Iraq war planning, along with premature cessation of conventional operations (bypassing large urban areas leading to costly MOUT later in the war) and halting invocation or implementation of counterinsurgency TTPs, the Iraq campaign has been problematic. In Concerning the Failure of Counterinsurgency in Iraq, I said “we were utterly unprepared for the toll that IEDs would take on U.S. troops, and even after it became obvious that this was a leading tactic of the enemy, we reacted with lethargy.” IEDs became one of the two most effective weapons of the insurgents, specifically because of two reasons: their cheap and ready availability, and the fact that they are a stand-off weapon, something unthinkable for the insurgents 40 or 50 years ago...

For a period of time the U.S. has enjoyed some degree of success in countering the effect of IEDs by jamming the signals from the insurgents to detonate them (sometimes from cell phones). Electronics has been put to good use in Iraq, but in case the reader hasn’t noticed, this enjoyment has diminished recently, and there is an increasing trend again in successful IED attacks apparently because the insurgents are employing electronics against us...

Stan

04-28-2007, 12:10 PM

An interesting opinion or view, but little back-up at this final link (http://www.debka.com/article.php?aid=1266)

Anyone with a $200 oscilloscope can measure 'visible wave forms' or fluctuating electrical 'quantity'. Any good EOD or LE can figure out what's going on with limited equipment. CI elements should be 'searching' for this 'signal'.

The first and easiest method:

Once the signal strength and 'wave form' are obtained, it's just a question of more power along the same freqs. Most EOD jamming devices run well over 100 grand, and need a lot of power and cooling. This system will unlikely work with camels :wry: So, we're looking for vehicles within 500 meters, an antenna or two on the roof, etc. The trouble with this (for both us and them) is, using such high tech jamming equipment requires a huge power source soaking up a lot of juice in order to perform. Worse (for them), they need to be real close, even with 10,000 watts of power.

What does all this Bravo Sierra mean ?
The signal cannot make contact, and when it can’t make contact, it doesn’t detonate...much like a cellular phone call that does not connect. No connection, but the enemy thinks the call went through.

The second method, although a more expensive approach is our current Warlock system, available almost anywhere except K-mart.

It doesn't do anything dramatic, it basically works by intercepting the signal sent from a remote location to the IED instructing it to detonate. Again, override the source and ....boom.

Find it and delete it.

SWCAdmin

05-16-2007, 02:52 PM

Viral Targeting of the IED Social Network System (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v8/swanson-swjvol8-excerpt.pdf)
by Scott Swanson

Open thread....

Armchairguy

08-12-2007, 11:26 PM

It seems most IED solutions are after the fact detection and/or increasing armor. When I hear about a road called "IED alley", it seems to me that we should be putting as many hidden surveillance resources as possible all over this road. This way we can see the bad guy place his IED follow him and take out his whole network. I realize it would be expensive and not something you could do everywhere all the time, but I have to believe there aren't going to be that many people capable of making IEDs and that we could move on to the next "IED alley" eventually. Let's take the fight to the enemy rather than be pushed by his moves.

Jedburgh

08-25-2007, 08:28 PM

AKO Log-In Required

Subject: Defeating IEDs - THE critical Soldier life and death issue of this war!

Defeating improvised explosive devices (IED) is THE critical Soldier life and death issue of this war and is responsible for the vast majority of our casualties.

DA and DOD formed some time ago a coalition consisting of many partners all working toward the same goal of defeating this major threat to our forces. The Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) is one of the primary coalition partners and provides the NIPR level (unclassified FOUO or below) online knowledge sharing and collaboration component of the coalition through its IED Defeat Community of Practice.

The mission of the BCKS IED Defeat Community of Practice is to provide an online NIPR level community of practice for the collaborative transfer of experiential knowledge on defeating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from those who have it, to those who need it.

How can participating in BCKS IED Defeat Community of Practice (CoP) benefit Soldiers, DA Civilians and leaders?

1. Reduce the time needed to resolve specific IED defeat related technical or leadership problems and challenges.
2. Considerably shorten the learning curve for a job, function or profession working on IED defeat by providing access to relevant online subject matter experts and mentors.
3. By sharing NIPR level IED defeat experiences and knowledge collectively innovative/breakthrough ideas and tools will result to the benefit of all in that job, function or profession.
4. Transfer IED defeat best practices from one Soldier or leader to another in near real-time.
5. Decrease IED defeat negative outcomes for first time real world contact experiences.
6. Avoid costly, life threatening IED defeat situations on the battlefield due to lack of knowledge and experience.
7. Reduce the cost of IED defeat mission accomplishment through superior knowledge transfer.
8. Fill the IED defeat knowledge gap between doctrine and TTPs learned at TRADOC schools and the practical application in a fast changing combat environment.
9. Efficiently support our war fighters by generating IED defeat knowledge "on the fly" as needed by harnessing the collective minds of a particular profession. Precious time is not wasted collecting extraneous information.

To become a member of BCKS IED Defeat Community of Practice go to this link: https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=131710

Once at this site click the "Become a Member". Until you do that you will not have access to the many content items (over 200!) and the many discussions. Membership approval is both automatic and immediate.

Link to our downloadable Introduction to BCKS IED Defeat Community of Practice" PowerPoint briefing and overview (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=418962).

Sample content item TC 2-22.601 Radio-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare Handbook - Aug 07 (Final Draft)(FOUO) (https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=377374).

Links to other coalition partners can also be found at the BCKS IED Defeat Community of Practice.

Share - Collaborate - Survive - Defend

Sarajevo071

09-07-2007, 04:37 AM

CBS report on (what they call) "Deadly New Weapon In Iraq", on LiveLeak... I heaved that sucker in my hand. Always made me laugh that can be used in modern war theater. Seams, I was wrong.

"Armor-piercing hand grenades have become a favorite al Qeueda weapon in Iraq. There's virtually no defense against them. Lara Logan reports."

link:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=ada_1189106198

davidbfpo

09-07-2007, 07:26 AM

Some of this footage has appeared before and was subject of a thread months ago.

Incidentally similar grenades, drogue grenades I think we called them, appeared in Northern Ireland, used by the Provisional IRA in an urban setting. Used against police and army vehicles.

davidbfpo

Jedburgh

09-24-2007, 10:28 PM

Danger Room, 17 Sep 07: CSI vs IEDs: Inside Baghdad's Forensic Bomb Squad (http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/09/post.html)

They can dig up all the roadside bombs they want, and jam every radio-controlled killer out there. To get ahead of insurgents, coalition forces have to figure out who's really building and planting the bombs.

That's why tens of thousands of improvised explosive devices and their components wind up every month at this nondescript collection of trailers, in the middle of a U.S. military base near Baghdad. Here, troops and geeks from England, Australia and America pore over the weapons 24 hours a day, piecing together forensic evidence about the bombs -- and the bombers. It's CSI meets IEDs. And it's called "Sexy."

Captain Scottie Morris, a lanky, black-haired Aussie, takes me for a tour around the Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell -- CEXC, or "Sexy," for short. To the best of my knowledge, I'm the first journalist they've allowed inside....

Jedburgh

09-29-2007, 01:01 PM

Fires Bulletin, Jul-Aug 07: A Different Approach to the Counter-IED Fight in Iraq (http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2007/Jul_Aug_2007/Jul_Aug_2007_pages_34_35.pdf)

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are the preferred weapons employed by insurgent forces in Iraq today. This form of warfare is not easy to counter. Often techniques for countering IEDs are passive in nature, thus allowing the insurgents to have the upper hand. However, as the old saying goes, “There is more than one way ‘to skin a cat.’”

Tasked with the maneuver enhancement mission for the 101st Airborne Division’s area of operations (AO), the 555th Combat Support Brigade (CSB) (http://www.lewis.army.mil/555/) aggressively attacked the counter-IED fight in Iraq by applying combined arms techniques to the mission. By combining engineer patrols to clear routes with brigade combat team (BCT) intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and division-level lethal assets, the 555th CSB took a proactive approach to countering IEDs and forced the insurgents to react to Coalition efforts, denying the insurgents freedom of action.....

SWJED

09-30-2007, 04:53 AM

30 Sep Washington Post - 'The single most effective weapon against our deployed forces' (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/29/AR2007092900750.html?hpid=topnews) by Rick Atkinson.

It began with a bang and "a huge white blast," in the description of one witness who outlived that Saturday morning, March 29, 2003. At a U.S. Army checkpoint straddling Highway 9, just north of Najaf, four soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division, part of the initial invasion of Iraq, had started to search an orange-and-white taxicab at 11:30 a.m. when more than 100 pounds of C-4 plastic explosive detonated in the trunk.

The explosion tossed the sedan 15 feet down the road, killing the soldiers, the cabdriver -- an apparent suicide bomber -- and a passerby on a bicycle. Lt. Col. Scott E. Rutter, a battalion commander who rushed to the scene from his command post half a mile away, saw in the smoking crater and broken bodies on Highway 9 "a recognition that now we were entering into an area of warfare that's going to be completely different."

Since that first fatal detonation of what is now known as an improvised explosive device, more than 81,000 IED attacks have occurred in Iraq, including 25,000 so far this year, according to U.S. military sources. The war has indeed metastasized into something "completely different," a conflict in which the roadside bomb in its many variants -- including "suicide, vehicle-borne" -- has become the signature weapon in Iraq and Afghanistan, as iconic as the machine gun in World War I or the laser-guided "smart bomb" in the Persian Gulf War of 1991...

SWJED

09-30-2007, 07:10 AM

I indexed the Washington Post series on IEDs at the SWJ Blog here ---> Weapon of Choice (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/09/weapon-of-choice/). The series includes articles, video interviews and graphics.

mmx1

10-03-2007, 01:16 AM

Free registration required...

Timeline (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/leftofboom/index.html)

Intro 'The single most effective weapon against our deployed forces' (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/29/AR2007092900750.html)

Part 1 'The IED problem is getting out of control. We've got to stop the bleeding.' (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/29/AR2007092900751.html)

Part 2 'There was a two-year learning curve... and a lot of people died in those two years' (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/30/AR2007093001675.html)

Part 3 'You can't armor your way out of this problem'
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/01/AR2007100101760.html)
Part 4 (coming) Left of Boom

via Naval Open Source Intelligence (http://www.nosi.org/)

Snagged this off another forum.

SabreXray

10-29-2007, 03:10 PM

Rex Brynen

10-29-2007, 04:54 PM

I believe somebody with a sense of humor purposely manipulated the acronym CEXC for the name. Got to admit I thought it was a joke when I first heard of the staff section called "Sexy" when I was on the Vth Corps (MNC-I) staff for OIF IV.

JP

Try going through all those long marches and cadence calls in basic training when you're the only one in the unit whose name rhymes with "sex" ... :eek:

(and now back to our regularly-scheduled thread)

SteveMetz

11-10-2007, 12:14 PM

How to stop IEDs (http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/11/09/EDPTT8UQ7.DTL)

Gian P. Gentile

Friday, November 9, 2007

Want to stop Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs, from going off in Iraq and killing American soldiers and Marines? Then end the war.

This is not a political or policy statement on my part but a simple matter of fact based on my personal experience as a tactical battalion commander in west Baghdad in 2006 and on history. How did the warring sides in World War I stop the deadly artillery barrages that became endemic to that war? When the states involved agreed politically to end the war and the deadly artillery stopped...

Jedburgh

11-10-2007, 02:17 PM

....For a combat soldier to be on a WWI battlefield, meant to be hit and killed by artillery. To be in Iraq, sadly, means American combat soldiers and Marines will be hit and killed by IEDs....
Wow, talk about lack of context and false analogies manipulated for effect. And this guy teaches history at the academy (http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/faculty/html/faculty%20g01.htm#dgentilefaculty%20g01.htm#dgenti le). Sad.

Rob Thornton

11-10-2007, 04:07 PM

Even the best counter-insurgency tactics applied by competent military units have limits to what they can accomplish in a civil war. That's when I concluded that IEDs in Iraq were a condition of the battlefield that I could not completely stop.

I think he raises an important question here - when we treat everything as a problem with a solution we sometimes miss the bigger issues. I also think IEDs (of all flavors) will continue to figure prominently when we consider METT-TC from here on out. The types of insurgencies and civil wars we may find ourselves involved in will mean greater involvement of combatants equipped and fighting not as uniformed combatants, but as combatants seeking the advantages of fighting in a culture and environment where they can blend in and neutralize our strengths. IEDs generally play to their strengths and even if not employed directly against U.S. forces, still have effects against providing security and helping a host government work toward stability. Information technology and the media have made both the technical skills required to design, build and employ IEDs available to those who would use them, and the media has shown how their use effects us and the domestic will to achieve a political purpose. IT and media are also conditions in this regard.

This does not mean we should not work where possible to stay out in front in terms of mitigating the conditions in which we will operate given the political purpose. Technology can mitigate it some, TTP & Doctrine can mitigate it some, winning at the tactical and operational levels can mitigate it some. Consider that IEDs were not first encountered in Iraq - VBIEDs of various flavors have been employed for awhile - The Oklahoma City bombing, Khobar Towers were VBIEDs, the attack on the USS Cole was a type of Suicide IED and the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and the WTC were also a type of IED. Also woth noting that many a Vietnam veteran mad the early analogy to booby traps. While we have done our best and had some successes at mitigating and denying opportunities to employ IEDs of such large scale - we have not eliminated them - they are not a problem with a final solution because they fall under means and ways of achieving a purpose.

It does seem our ability to mitigate the IED as a condition corresponds to the environment in which takes place. The more unstable the environment - like a war zone, the less control we have over the conditions, and the less success we have in mitigating them. Because IEDs are employed where people live and because the fighting takes place in and amongst the population, our purpose for being there puts us at odds with avoiding IEDs. In the same ways insurgents are able to blend in with the population, so IEDs blend in with the environment around the population.

We've generated some success in distinguishing what belongs and what does not in Iraq - but when IED craters on the road start to look normal it creates problems in distinguishing what truly is a threat - and that is just one example. So - I agree - IEDs are here to stay - where ever the population will become the prize, and wherever the enemy can not stand up to us in a conventional sense we will see IEDs employed against us and our allies. TT and Frank Hoffman have done some good thinking on hybrid wars or what Terry referred to as complex Irregular Warfare where the enemy capabilities are blended and designed to be complimentary leaving us few choices but to be full spectrum - a hard thing to pull off, which may work counter to our achieving a given political purpose in a time period that makes the object in view worth the blood and treasure in the first place.

Our enemies have the luxury of only having to consider how to defeat us - and they are well versed in our strategic culture of how we address problems, and what lines we will not cross, and what happens to our political support when we do. This makes fielding a force capable of serving a political purpose a hard thing to accomplish, it may make it more expensive then we are willing to pay because either we choose not to acknowledge what a full spectrum force really is and what recruiting, retaining, training, educating and equipping really requires, or because we choose to not acknowledge that the enemy has the luxury of time, the advantage of home court, and the benefit of facing an enemy (us) who cannot agree on what are vital interests, and what is the cost benefit of securing them. No easy answers here, often just the best of some hard choices.

Eventually, it became clear that the only sure way to eliminate the IED threat in Iraq would be to end the civil war. The chances of that happening seemed remote, however, because the many warring sides had plenty of fight left in them.

Civil wars are the most uncivil of human activities; they take time to work themselves out through fighting and killing.

I also think he makes a valid point here. A question I heard once and stuck with me is why some wars take longer to resolve. Consider our own Civil War - Lee fought to the very end - there were several times where looking backwards through time, it appears obvious to us that he should have surrendered - but not to him, and often not to the men he led, the Confederate political leadership, or the people who lived there. Even when Sherman was demonstrating he was operating in the Confederate interior - away from the Union Navy, many in the South refused to believe he was imposing his will where he wanted. The political object in view to the South was so attractive (or the alternative so unbearable), and some of the events that had occurred in the first years of the war so convincing that the idea of defeat had to be demonstrated to the hilt, in order to show the outcome was inevitable.

There were no forgone conclusions for Grant and Lincoln either, hope yes, but right up to the end Grant thought Lee might make a run South, link up with Johnston and fight on - even when Lee's Army appeared broken and starving. The reason I bring up the Union point of view is to offer the possibility that even when one side appears to have sealed the conclusion, their mindset may be one of still doing everything possible to ensure it. Its one thing to discuss opponents who had religion and common experiences that might inhibit them from imposing a peace that would be unbearable, but maybe its another where the conditions that lead up to the war stem from distinct differences in religion & politics that have been heightened by favoritism or deprivation, violence, hatred, fears and sorrows that have have taken a life of their own.

These are also the conditions we will likely face in the future where we operate - we are not likely to find ourselves violently engaged in places where peace exists unless it is because a state belligerent has invaded or threatened a neighbor - these are not where insurgencies and civil wars occur. It seems more likely that we will either find ourselves involved in multi-ethnic/religious/tribal disputes that are destabilized from within, by a non-state actor, or by a state actor who has managed to dominate its own population while supporting/exerting a destabilizing influence on its neighbor. We may at times find ourselves facing more then one component of this description to include making a choice to employ violence against a subversive neighbor.

I appreciate the article - we need those who make major policy decisions to think about the environment that war takes place in. Its complex and enduring, and there are consequences. If we decide to employ military power to achieve our political ends, then we need to think about what we want to accomplish and what the enemy wants to accomplish, strengths and weaknesses (ours and theirs), and we need to recognize that the more populations are involved the messier it will be, and the greater the role chance and probability will play in the out come when our goals depend on the people who live in a given state or region sustaining a peace - since our strategic culture reflects our own values of free will and choice.

Gian P Gentile

11-10-2007, 04:40 PM

...we need those who make major policy decisions to think about the environment that war takes place in. Its complex and enduring, and there are consequences.

Thanks Rob for the most thoughtful reply. The words you write above summarize the implicit point of the article perfectly which was the fundamental reason i wrote it. The piece started out at around 1200 words where i gave examples of World War 1 leaders devising very effective tactical innovations like German small group tactics and even the use of poison gas by the British and Germans but the editor for space constraints cut most of that out.

I remember sharing my views of IEDs as a condition of the baghdad battlefield with other battalion and brigade commanders when i was there and they agreed that it was that way.

As far as Jedburg's statement that i made a "false analogy;" ok, if that is how he sees it fine. However, when i was reeling from the effects of lethal ieds on my outfit and was trying to figure out how to deal with them in baghdad in 2006 accepting that they were a condition, by drawing on my sense of history and my understanding of World War I trench warfare, that i could never make them go away i think helped me to come up with realistic plans of action to deal with them.

Again Rob, thanks for taking the time to pen this response and thanks too to Steve Metz for posting this piece as a thread.

gian

Jedburgh

11-10-2007, 04:51 PM

Rob, your exegesis of what he wrote was far more cogent and thoughtful than the original article. Your final point that we need those who make major policy decisions to think about the environment that war takes place in is well taken. Strategic IPB is absolutely necessary to drive effective planning for conflict; conventional or unconventional. Take a read of Ceasar's The Gallic Wars (http://classics.mit.edu/Caesar/gallic.html) for a good historical example, or review Knowing One's Enemies (http://www.amazon.com/Knowing-Ones-Enemies-Intelligence-Assessment/dp/0691006016/ref=sr_1_1/002-5911412-6918445?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1194713296&sr=1-1), which I've linked to before. The administration that led us into Iraq failed miserably on multiple counts.

However, the original piece Steven linked to was written in a tone of frustration and defeatism, using multiple false analogies to reinforce points not put in an operational context and ultimately offered no recommendations or solutions, or than to leave Iraq. A simple opinion piece; yes, it made points, but it lacks substance.

Rank amateur

11-10-2007, 05:37 PM

and ultimately offered no recommendations or solutions, or than to leave Iraq.

Mr. Gentile can speak for himself, but I didn't see any inference that the US needs to leave Iraq.

Eventually, it became clear that the only sure way to eliminate the IED threat in Iraq would be to end the civil war.

If you believe we have a role to play in ending the civil war - and I don't see anywhere in the article where it says we don't - then we can stay.

I also agree with Rob that IEDs are here to stay and we'll see more if them; they're too effective, and too cheap for them to go away.

Gian P Gentile

11-10-2007, 05:47 PM

A simple opinion piece; yes, it made points, but it lacks substance.

I don't want to appear arrogant and aloof here but do you think, Jedburg, you could do better with a 650 word limit? Right i certainly could have given more detail in a 6000 word piece, but then no oped page in the world would run it. With 6000 words maybe i could have changed Jedburg's mind of claiming that i used a "false analogy."

I am not a defeatist Jedburg, but a realist who has sadly had to talk on satellite phones with moms, dads, and wives after memorial services for soldiers in my squadron who had been killed by ieds and try to explain to them why it happened. Perhaps you should look into the mirror yourself and what you might see is an idealist who refuses to accept the fundamental cost of doing business in Iraq; dead American soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors from IEDs that are a condition of the battlefield. I am not at all saying that the cost is not worth it, but rather trying to point out what the cost actually means in blood and treasure for our continued presence in the land between the two rivers.

gentile

11-10-2007, 05:55 PM

However, the original piece Steven linked to was written in a tone of frustration and defeatism, using multiple false analogies to reinforce points not put in an operational context and ultimately offered no recommendations or solutions, or than to leave Iraq. A simple opinion piece; yes, it made points, but it lacks substance.

I am not as clear as to the author's ultimate intent in writing the piece. LTC Gentile has since given us a little more insight in his response to Rob's post. But what his intention was really matters little anymore, for at least two reasons.

First, the piece is no longer what the author submitted. As LTC Gentile noted, the editors of the SF Chronicle chose to evoke editorial privilege and gut his 1200 word article. (I have my suspicions about their reasons, and they have nothing to do with an interest by the Chronicle's editors in saving ink and newsprint.)

Second, I think it is very important to recognize that the written word, once released to the public, is freed completely of its author's intentions. I viewed the op-ed as an expression of the author's struggle to come to grips with the "mission-welfare of the force" dilemma. We see another intrepretation in the quotation from Jedburgh above. I suspect many other readers will take it as an argument for not continuing the fight and for avoidiing involvement in future conflicts that devolve into COIN battles.

I hope that those who choose to publish, particularly in the mainstream meadia, carefully weigh the possibilities of their words and intentions being greatly misconstrued. When we mistake the effects of what we do or say on others, we can end up with some horrendous results. By most accounts, WWI resulted from a gross miscalculatiuon on the part of the Austro-Hungarians to the reaction to their crossing into Serbia in 1914. In a much less horrible example, we have recently been witness to a range of reactions to the Countererpunch piece in which Price mistook the intention of the authors of FM3-24.

Ken White

11-10-2007, 06:19 PM

and there is little question that the ending of the war would be in the best interests the Armed Forces elements now deployed in Iraq and probably of the Armed Forces as a whole. What is not addressed in that OpEd is whether that action would be in the national interest.

I believe that action would be far more detrimental to the US than it would be beneficial.

By extrapolation one can say that the killing of Soldiers and Marines by IED would not exist in Iraq were we not there. However, we are there. Whether we should be or not, whether all the ramifications were considered or not prior to commitment is really broadly immaterial at this point. One can also say with some justification that had several elements of the US government from the President through the SecDef and to include a number of agencies and the Armed Forces done their jobs a little better we might well not have an IED problem in Iraq at this time. Also immaterial. The issue is not how to stop IEDs, the issue is what actions best serve the national interest at this time.

While the recommended action would please many around the world on several levels and a large number of Americans would be quite happy, that action would leave a vacuum in the ME with even more uncertain effects than would our continued presence. It would also tacitly fulfill the expectations of many who would see it as a vindication of their belief that America has no staying power and is not to be trusted. That potential effect deserves even more thought that did the original intent to commit.

Rob eloquently makes many excellent points on the issue but I submit his final paragraph is the most critical in his comment:
"I appreciate the article - we need those who make major policy decisions to think about the environment that war takes place in. Its complex and enduring, and there are consequences. If we decide to employ military power to achieve our political ends, then we need to think about what we want to accomplish and what the enemy wants to accomplish, strengths and weaknesses (ours and theirs), and we need to recognize that the more populations are involved the messier it will be, and the greater the role chance and probability will play in the out come when our goals depend on the people who live in a given state or region sustaining a peace - since our strategic culture reflects our own values of free will and choice."Arguably that analysis was not applied by many to the attack on Iraq and, regrettably, in the first couple of years to our actions and efforts there. That is history. The history of World War I is really analogous in the areas of bad decisions, bad tactics and death -- it is not all analogous politically and in the context of today's ease, visual effects and rapidity of communication or of todays battlefield where effects are not local but international in ways World War I could never have been.

Given the thrust of the OpEd as it appeared, one can pretty much be assured that the "end the war" desired is our withdrawal. If the rest of the piece is considered and further comments on this board are considered, one is left with the thought that we are intruding in a civil war and can only continue to provide targets, thus removal of the targets is desired.

I agree strongly with WM and Jedburgh. I'm not sure that the OpEd serves anyone well. Gian says his is not a political or policy statement -- that will be ignored and it will be widely used as a de facto political and policy condemnation.

No sane human wants the death and destruction that exists in Iraq, we all want it to end -- but to end it on the wrong note will only lead to more and possibly greater death and destruction. History tells us that. World War I emphatically tells us that; that is the true analogy between then and now...

Danny

11-10-2007, 06:45 PM

I appreciate Lt. Col. Gentile's article. I also appreciate Rob's elucidation of the thoughts behind it and of his own. Allow me to weigh in.

I think Iraq is more complex than to call it a civil war, and leave it at that. There are aspects of that, indeed, just as there are aspects of Islamic jihad, and aspects of inteference by Iranian and Syrian elements (regional conflict), sectarian strife, indigenous insurgency, terrorism, etc. It is a complex affair. I believe these things not simply because of what I read in the MSM or even blogs written from the front. I have also extensively talked with Marines who have recently returned.

Rob and Jedburgh are right. I count myself as a conservative, but this administration failed us in too many ways to count. Rumsfeld's idea of fighting a war in Afghanistan with a few special forces operators, satellite uplinks for airmen as they guided bombs in on target, and indigenous fighters has been a failure. We needed force projection, and we got gizmos. He and Wolfowitz bullied Shinseki out of a job, and we got Iraq on the cheap. We needed force projection, we got gizmos.

The intelligence was poor. I was never impressed with the whole WMD argument (chemical weapons aren't as effective as conventional ordnance), and was in fact opposed to the whole idea of OIF to begin with, excepting the possibility of the nuclear option (which again, was poor intelligence). But I am in that category who believes that once started, losing is the worst of options (unless we intend to lose it - discussed below). Michael Ledeen and Victor Davis Hanson, both of whom have been incorrectly criticized over this forum, are also in that same category. Neither one supported the idea to begin with, but once started, found no option except success to be acceptable.

If my view is correct, many tens of thousands of foreign fighters who would have otherwise fought us elsewhere (Afghanistan, or even U.S. soil) have died in Iraq. My son has killed some of them. The unintended consequences of OIF is that it has become a killing field for al Qaeda, Ansar al Sunna, and other anti-American fighters. This is positive, along with the possibility that if we take the region seriously, Iran might be couched between what can become two stable states with U.S. presence as a deterent for their aspirations.

As to IEDs, I see the problem as tactical and local, but not simply as local. Rumsfeld's bold new vision for the region and our naive belief in the healing powers of democracy caused us to ignore the advice from Israel who had already encounted the IED and created V-Hull technology. Hence, we were surprised on a tactical level when, upon stupidly running an AAV down a desert road in Iraq with 14 recon Marines, it exploded into a pile of rubble and twisted metal in August of 2005, losing every Marine aboard.

http://www.cnn.com/interactive/us/0508/gallery.marines.aav/frameset.exclude.html

We could have done better, and our leadership is to blame. And it IS THAT SIMPLE. I have advocated dismounted patrols as better for COIN at my little blog, but in the end, Lt. Col. Gentile is right. IEDs are here to stay, and will become part of the landscape into the future.

My own view is that we have made advances, but there are more necessary before we can call this finished. The JAM must be taken on and finished, and Syria and Iran must be dealt with. If Syria and Iran are dealt with (and I am not talking about talky-talk and "negotiations" with them), my opinion is that this will get a WHOLE . HELL . OF . A . LOT . EASIER.

If we are not goint to take all of this seriously, if we are engaged in order to keep this from appearing as a loss, or if things start to deteriorate towards a high level civil war where we refuse to take on Sadr and the Badr forces directly, then it is time to withdraw.

I think that the frustration with a large portion of the public has more to do with the lack of will to win than it does anything else. I see the public every day, I work with them, I talk with them, unlike many in the professional military. Releasing Sadr, supporting a regime in Iraq (Maliki) which is secretive and completely inept (and beholden to Sadr, Sistani and Iran), the refusal to take on the JAM, and all of the things that lead to the continuing violence, contribute to the perception that we are simply there being blown up, in the middle of a fight we didn't start and cannot control.

Not that anyone in a position of authority listens to me, but I don't want my son to go for a second combat tour under these conditions. If we continue to argue for more troops in Europe and continue to deploy forces along the DMZ to allow South Korea to pursue its childish "sunshine diplomacy" while troops in Iraq are doing 15 month deployments, and ignore the EFP factories in Iran while Carriers with aircraft and ordnance sit in the Persian Gulf unused, then bring all of our boys home, and immediately.

Yes, IEDs are effective, and cause the public to see the campaign in a negative light. But who is to blame for this, when we ignore the counsel of Israel years back on V-Hull vehicles, we won't shut down the factories in Iran, we allow Sadr to remain unmolested, and troops train with German and South Korean forces rather than Iraqi forces?

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/11/05/a-call-for-global-strategic-thinking/

Point? The failure is at the HIGHEST LEVELS OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP, and always have been.

Rob Thornton

11-10-2007, 06:48 PM

Balance and Consistency awhile back (I can't remember the thread) got me over a hump (Ken is good at planting seeds that way). Terry telling me about what he and Frank Hoffman discussed (and then Frank's piece on the blog recently) speak to our evolving thinking on current and future threats, how they will structure themselves and what tactics they might use against us.

With all the discussion on organizational structure and doctrine in terms of our perspective, I lost sight of what I'm always saying people should not lose sight of - war is a social phenomena and as such we eventually fight where we live and live where we fight. I'm not trying to be confusing, but that helps me remember that people are involved and always have been. Perhaps because military history is not taught in the context of an engine of social change, it often is reduced to binary content where we only examine civilians in minor roles and concentrate instead on those things clearly identifiable with the combatants - until we started conducting counter-insurgency, then it became undeniable. I'm not saying that military history is devoid of such work, only that in our desire to examine military historical significance we tend to isolate it from its social roots. This is why I like reflections done where the author or theorist considers war within the context of society. I think this is important given the probabilities and possibilities of war, our political objectives given our perspective on why what happens in other places matters to us domestically, and our evolving understanding of what constitutes a threat and the social environments which create those threats (from the horrific events of 9/11 to the possibilities of pandemics and beyond).

I think this is important in considering IEDs - not only because they reflect the tactics and organizational structure of those employing them, but because they are telling of the enemy's political objectives and their will to continue its pursuit.

One side must decide that its no longer worth the effort to continue the pursuit of the original objective - either because new objectives have replaced the old ones, the original objectives have been met to some degree, or because the conditions and assumptions which gave rise to the original objectives are no longer valid.

IEDs I think offer a range of options commensurate with their type and effects. SVBIED types where 2 x dump trucks and an assault element designed to destroy a fortification, inflict mass casualties, gain public attention through the media, challenge resolve on different levels and deny the public a sense of security are high risk, high yield operations. As such they are planned out more, and if possible the enemy mitigates his own risk by conducting near simultaneous operations with his available means to diffuse our attention and create opportunities at the target. One of the best ways to target this operation I've seen is to disrupt it by desynchronizing his effort and increase his risk- and while there are ways to accomplish this, its not a given - you can do everything right, and sooner or later if they are committed enough they are going to get through to a target - unless the object in view no longer secures the commitment of the people required to carry it off, or those still committed are no longer available or no longer have the means to execute it.

As means become easier to come by and alternative ways offer similar effects at less risk, the level of commitment across the broader spectrum is easier to come by. So maybe the SVBIED into the IP station is no longer doable, but a directional EFP type IED with a high probability command detonation system in terrain that offers high yield/low risk is still a doable means of achieving the political goal even if the enemy lacks larger scale public support.

Its also important in considering how what has for sometime been one of our strengths, our ability to develop and field technological solutions to tactical problems, have been challenged by greater lethality in small packages that are hard to keep pace with, and further strain our ability to operate in the "away games". The evolution of the IED challenges the physics of deploying and sustaining a force big enough to meet the demands of securing a populace at price tag that is hard to beat. I'm a fan of the MRAP because I have no choice but to be - I want the best tech available to mitigate the easier to come by/easier to employ IEDs that result in MTBI and the BB in the beer can effect - I've seen guys in Buffaloes, Cougars, and RGs walk away from big VBIEDs and SVBIEDs where I've seen whole 1114/1151 five person crews killed and/or severely wounded.

We should absolutely do everything actively and passively technologically possible to provide the means by which our soldiers and marines can gain tactical and operational advantages. This is a long chain of stuff that includes ISR assets, force protection and Command & Control technologies - but these technological advantages are not silver bullets - they are only as good as the people who employ them, communicate through them, and analyze the information made available by them.

Technology quickly becomes dated, and because it is produced by people, its advantages are quickly identified by the enemy who will take the required steps to mitigate it. Only through agility and adaptiveness can we extend its shelf life. The shelf life might be sufficient if the objective is more military and less political, but if the objective requires greater political solvency as in the case with civil wars and popular insurgencies, then the longer the enemy will have to counter our technologies and increase both the physical and political strain on us - physical in the sense of fiscal means, R&D, production throughput on logistical burdens - political in the domestic strains which change the value of our original objectives. This is how I interpret the impact of IEDs and like technologies and tactics on the wars of today and tomorrow.

As if that were not bad enough, Frank and Terry have taken it to the next level - a smart state with sufficient resources is going to take advantage of the full curve either by developing the organic capability or through proxy and alliances. They will have a significant conventional capability while at the same time laying the ground work for a speedy transition to an Insurgency with all the middle ground covered - this all the while we question the value of our object in view (fear/honor/interest rationale) and the greater body politic exerts its own pressures. It should be understandable by the discussions we've had here how difficult it is for us to develop a force with military capabilities that counter that without a 3-5 year learning curve and strains that force us into other undesirable choices at home elsewhere around the globe.

With so much at stake I don't believe we can roll over, or become apathetic, but we must start looking at the problems differently, and making choices that provide the best long term flexibility and offer us the opportunity to be consistent in our goals through a balance we can sustain. It ain't easy, and I think we have a ways to go (maybe it never stops).

Best, Rob

Rank amateur

11-10-2007, 08:28 PM

I am not at all saying that the cost is not worth it,

It's interested that if someone mentions the cost of the war, many assume that the individual must be opposed to the war.

I lost sight of what I'm always saying people should not lose sight of - war is a social phenomena

If I've learned anything in my brief time here, it's that war is a very human endeavor.

Schmedlap

11-10-2007, 09:02 PM

I don't want to appear arrogant and aloof here but do you think, Jedburg, you could do better with a 650 word limit? Right i certainly could have given more detail in a 6000 word piece, but then no oped page in the world would run it."
There is no disrespect or other uncivil motive intended in asking this question, but what message in this oped was so important to convey that it was worth the highly likely risk that the article will have unintended or incorrect interpretations trumpeted by the likes of moveon.org and other fringe groups? While the disclaimer at the end of the article makes it clear that the views presented are only those of the author, it nonetheless seems obvious that the authority of the author's view (by virtue of being an LTC with command experience in Iraq) will give the interpretations of this article greater credibility to be exploited by groups that have a purely political agenda.

Ken White

11-10-2007, 09:05 PM

I appreciate Lt. Col. Gentile's article. I also appreciate Rob's elucidation of the thoughts behind it and of his own. Allow me to weigh in.

At the risk of getting even further off thread, while I disagree with you on several points, most of them like Afghanistan and the admittedly inexcusable treatment of Shinseki are not at all germane to this thread. Let me address one factor you emphasize that is slightly less off thread.

"Point? The failure is at the HIGHEST LEVELS OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP, and always have been.

That is, IMO generally correct. I suggest there have also been failures at intermediate levels as well. However, those at lower levels have several reasons that led to many of their failures (they also recovered far more rapidly). You cited one, very poor intelligence at the national level and both Langley and Bolling are to blame. Another is that which Rob mentioned, a failure prior to commitment to address the potential battlefield and problems realistically. The latter is indeed directly attributable to poor performance by the senior leadership. So is the possible greater failing by earlier senior leaders -- poor training.

Let me provide some boring background. The US army was sent to Viet Nam. For seven long years under the command of Paul Harkins and William Westmoreland, the Army tried to fight a land war in Europe. Those two commanders had such a war as their formative war and they tried unsuccessfully to emulate it. Fortunately, another WW II in Europe graduate was smarter and Creighton Abrams turned Viet Nam around. Too late; the politicians, more concerned about their reelection than the nation pulled the plug. Many of today's politicians would cheerfully do the same thing for the same reason -- reelection over national aims -- they do not need to be encouraged

Contrary to much common wisdom, the politicians were not the cause of the loss in Viet Nam (other than in their hubris and failure to understand what they were doing prior to commitment) -- nor were the Media (who like to credit themselves with that...). The Army blew it. The politicians do what they will always do, take the easy way out. The Media do what they will always do, credit themselves with far more clout than they really have.

The point of all that -- the Army allowed the pols and the media to share the blame and set themselves to the task of rebuilding the army to fight a land war in Europe. They did that in spite of all evidence that such a war was unlikely. Thus, the Army got to skate because their failings were obscured.

That's important because some will try do the same thing again if they can. You correctly point out that the senior leadership failed. What you do not point out is that the mid level leadership compensated and pulled us back from the so-called brink. What you do not point out is that most -- not all (and that is important and germane to this point and the entire thread) of the senior leadership has done a course correction and is trying to repair the damaged legacy their predecessors bequeathed. That is unfair on your part.

No question the flaws in intelligence and leadership need to be cited so that those errors are corrected. We failed to learn the lessons of Viet Nam -- we better not fail to learn the lessons of this one because it's far more important. There should also be no question that stating the problems as knowledgeably, accurately, concisely and fairly as possible is important.

Back to the thread. You say:

"Not that anyone in a position of authority listens to me, but I don't want my son to go for a second combat tour under these conditions. If we continue to argue for more troops in Europe and continue to deploy forces along the DMZ to allow South Korea to pursue its childish "sunshine diplomacy" while troops in Iraq are doing 15 month deployments, and ignore the EFP factories in Iran while Carriers with aircraft and ordnance sit in the Persian Gulf unused, then bring all of our boys home, and immediately."

To use your term, I am not "professional military" though I once was; I've been a civilian, disregarding my first 17 years, since 1977, thirty years and I too interface with civilians from all walks of life on a daily basis. Like you, I have a serving son though mine has three tours and is more than ready (not eager, but ready) to go back again and again if necessary.

Unlike Gian and unlike you, that son and I are quite convinced that the all sentiments you express in that last quote I provided and in particular the "...bring our boys home, and immediately" sound bite is badly misguided. It's in the interest of the serving and it's in the interest of the institution(s) which will try to protect itself (or themselves) at any cost -- it is not in the national interest. That trumps.

As an aside, I'm over 75, so a lot of people are boys to me -- the men and women in Iraq and all over the world in the Armed forces are not. :cool:

Schmedlap

11-10-2007, 09:15 PM

There is another way to stop IEDs - used successfully in OIF III: make the cost of emplacing them prohibitively high. I'll err on the side of OPSEC and omit the city and nitty-gritty details, but the basic gist of it is that we flooded the city with small teams whose sole purpose in life was to observe, report, and kill anyone emplacing an IED. The going rate for digging in an IED went from $25 to over $500 because the imminent threat of death resulting from IED emplacement become so apparent to the populace. Now, this is not a strategy to defeat our enemies, but it was an approach that stopped IEDs and enabled us to get the IA and IP into the city with their unarmored vehicles with a greatly diminished threat of them incurring mass casualties.

Also, I take issue with one assertion in the article:

"But it seems clear that the necessary condition that has lowered IED attacks was a political agreement between the tribal sheikhs in Anbar and the Americans to stop fighting each other."
I think this is an incorrect assessment of what occurred - or at least a significantly incomplete assessment. The violence in Anbar was much more than simply US forces fighting against Anbar tribes. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorist groups were killing US troops and intimidating the Anbar tribes. The necessary condition was not for the US forces and Anbar tribes to stop fighting one another. The necessary condition was to convince the Anbar tribes to drive al-Qaeda in Iraq out of the province.

Danny

11-10-2007, 09:33 PM

Gian P Gentile

11-10-2007, 10:52 PM

I am not as clear as to the author's ultimate intent in writing the piece...First, the piece is no longer what the author submitted. As LTC Gentile noted, the editors of the SF Chronicle chose to evoke editorial privilege and gut his 1200 word article. (I have my suspicions about their reasons, and they have nothing to do with an interest by the Chronicle's editors in saving ink and newsprint.)

Simply put my intent for writing the piece was to state my observation that IEDs in Iraq are like artillery in World War I: conditions of those two battlefields that tactical or technological innovations could not completely do away with save a political agreement to end the fighting.

Next I take full responsibility for what i said in that piece. The editor of the paper sent me a revised version with parts taken out and she allowed me to review it make any other changes i wanted as long as i could keep it close to the word limit she had given me. The portions that were taken out to save space did in no way compromise the thrust of the piece. There was no left leaning "moveon.org" motive behind the paper's editor to shorten the piece but only to do just that, shorten it.

Finally, i do believe Iraq is in Civil War and it is more than just an insurgency. I believe it is important to make this point so that we can see the war for what it actually is and devise policy and operational approaches to suit it.

Rob Thornton

11-10-2007, 11:46 PM

it allows us to consider how IEDs (and other like conditions) effect all 3 levels of war. It also allows us to consider that the enemy must also overcome chaos and friction, often suffering directly and indirectly from actions occurring elsewhere as well as creating conditions which afford us opportunities provided we can recognize their significance and capitalize on them. This is not to say that this was a coordinated effort where task and purpose nested nicely with operational objectives and strategic ends - few planned things ever work out so well because the future is unpredictable and the attraction of linearizing things after they happen is strong; however the effort to make the linkages and take full advantage of them should not be understated - it is the art of recognizing potential, arranging resources and exploiting possibilities. It provides a model that military CDRs and planners along with policy makers and their advisers should consider when contemplating complex problems.

There is another way to stop IEDs - used successfully in OIF III: make the cost of emplacing them prohibitively high. I'll err on the side of OPSEC and omit the city and nitty-gritty details, but the basic gist of it is that we flooded the city with small teams whose sole purpose in life was to observe, report, and kill anyone emplacing an IED.

Overwatches/Ambushes along with patrolling and a QRF built on an understanding of the enemy through good reporting, debriefs and small unit AARs are good tactics - the enemy is more vulnerable here and for him to have an effect he must come to where he will find his enemy. This hits the enemy at the tactical level, but can also disrupt his operational goals - an example would be his attempting to increase OPTEMPO in an outlying city in order to get us to shift forces out of the capital or to try and operationally fix forces required in the capital.

The going rate for digging in an IED went from $25 to over $500 because the imminent threat of death resulting from IED emplacement become so apparent to the populace.

Depending on the flexibility of funding ascribed to a group or cell - raising the price of IED emplacement or the activity which supports it (dropping of supplies, recon, digging a hole, etc.) drains operational funds which might go to other activities such as material procurement, paying of government officials and informants, recruiting new members, training, movement, housing and food, etc. If this is a small group it may force them into criminal activity or some other activity which de-legitmizes them, slows their OPTEMPO, causes cell friction, or causes them to get sloppy and killed for example. If it is a part of a larger group it may drain funds from elsewhere disrupting those operations, force communications which allow us to understand and target them, and sew discord which exacerbates existing problems. Combined with other Lines of Effort which offer choices to those who supported IED networks - could be becoming an informant, could be a new line of work - the cost/value equation takes on a new perspective. For the politically committed this may be something to be waited out, but their network requires a certain amount of environmental facilitation - as that dries up, its harder for them to operate.

Now, this is not a strategy to defeat our enemies, but it was an approach that stopped IEDs and enabled us to get the IA and IP into the city with their unarmored vehicles with a greatly diminished threat of them incurring mass casualties.

Enabling the Host Nation security forces to operate in an environment where the enemy has been deprived of a tactic and weapon which afforded him an advantage has multiple benefits - it increases the amount of forces available to secure the populace and deny the enemy physical and moral freedom of movement, maximizes the natural advantages obtained by being a security force that is representative of the culture it operates in, and its often the first physical representation of the government which can lead to establishing legitimacy. Once the HN SecFor has established itself, US/CF assets/resources/units can be redistributed or redeployed -This is an exponential increase - and is a solid linkage to the operational and strategic levels of war through tactical operations.

The necessary condition was not for the US forces and Anbar tribes to stop fighting one another. The necessary condition was to convince the Anbar tribes to drive al-Qaeda in Iraq out of the province.

This is changing the nature of the political objectives/conversation by some of the belligerents through recognition of shift in conditions. In the captured letter between AQ leadership and AQIZ leadership great concern was expressed about the wanton carnage and tactics employed by AQIZ against Iraqis - it was recognized by AQ as jeopardizing the political objectives they were after - in fact the letter recommended that AQ expend more effort in its political operations then its military ones. There have been documented horrors as well as violations of familial and tribal honors which may have occurred partly as a result of impatience, frustration and stresses as AQIZ's vision of the battlefield failed to be realized - partly through tactical and operation successes by US, CF and ISF - which were partly enabled through freedom of movement - which means mitigating the effects of IEDs along MSRs and ASRs. This probably had some effect on how the Anbar Sheiks viewed the evolution of their political objectives from one where they were more aligned with the interests of AQIZ, to one where they were more aligned with us (and the HN).

All of these things combined create and compound operational problems for insurgents that flow in both directions, gain momentum at various points and can create new opportunities for us and the HN to be exploited.

Danger - this is not to say that the lines are clearly drawn - I don't think we can do that given the infinite variables that may have been introduced - but I do believe them related enough to use for considering the complex social conditions that occur in war and which IEDs represent.

Even though events unfolded as they did, there was no guarantee that they would -its more like we assembled the various pieces with some common frame of reference (and we're not done yet) - so policies which might create the conditions cannot guarantee the desired outcome - just because we'd like to imagine it as a linear series of events between the start point and the end point - doesn't make it that way (its more akin to guessing how the cards will land and which cards are under the others in 52 pick up then lining up dominoes). What we can do I think to maximize our chances of coming relatively close to the desired strategic outcome is attune ourselves to changes and opportunities and have the resources available to make the most of them while remaining flexible and adaptive at the tactical and operational levels.

We are not done in Iraq, not done in Afghanistan and the odds are that in some places they are designing and/or cranking out and caching Insurgent capabilities such IEDs that are far better then the ones we've seen so far, and training cadre and training documents that allow them to mix types of warfare and transition from different types of operations and retain the initiative. These UW capabilities will probably not be used solely for Internal defense but as in the past, used to foment insurgency, terrify and destabilize, possibly combined and coordinated with conventional GPF to achieve broader regional political objectives.

Best, Rob

Rank amateur

11-11-2007, 01:51 AM

what message in this oped was so important to convey that it was worth the highly likely risk that the article will have unintended or incorrect interpretations trumpeted by the likes of moveon.org and other fringe groups?

Finally, i do believe Iraq is in Civil War and it is more than just an insurgency. I believe it is important to make this point so that we can see the war for what it actually is and devise policy and operational approaches to suit it.

Another thing I've learned is that when the truth about Iraq is distorted, no matter what the reason, it is the trigger puller who suffers the most.

Ken White

11-11-2007, 02:59 AM

Ken, the sound bite you cited is just that in the way you cited it. It needs context to understand it. It's context is the question whether we are committed to supplying the resources to do the job right. Without context, it is a mischaracterization and mere (to use your words) "sound bite."

That may be the question but I don't think you posed it in your first comment on this thread. Thus, lacking that context, you reaped. I'd also submit that whether we are committed to supplying the resources to do the job right is possibly not a good question. Within reason, all the services have for several years gotten pretty much what they asked for. Thus if the resources are not right, the requests from the field weren't right. Perhaps a better question is 'are we as a nation adequately committed to doing this job.' I suspect the answer to that question is very much perspective dependent and I suggest there is no correct answer.

I am certain that your position isn't that "regardless of whether we are nationally committed to the mission let's leave our forces deployed." This would be an irrational position to take.

I believe the current Administration and the bulk of those who might form the next administration are in fact committed to the mission; thus the nation is both de facto and de jure committed to the mission. I realize there are those in the adminsitration, in Congress, in the Armed Forces and across the nation who wish to not be committed to the mission but my guess is they will not have their wish granted because that would be inimical to the national interest and most people realize that. The politics of the issue are more appropriate elsewhere. This is a practices and methods, not a political board.

I am supposing that you are arguing simply for garnering the national commitment for doing it right. That said, it isn't clear how you would intend to do this since you don't say.

That would be the second incorrect supposition on your part. No 'national commitment' is required, merely the government's intention to continue the mission. I'll note that having been around since the very early '30s, I have yet to see a war in which we have been engaged that had a true 'national commitment.' WW II came very close but even it required a degree of State single-mindedness and coercion that has not existed since and is unlikely to lacking a war of national survival. Each subsequent war has had decidedly less -- and increasingly less -- 'national commitment.' That has generally been political and not necessarily practical. :mad:

Finally, my somewhat rambling prose is related to the subject in that IEDs must be seen in the larger context of the commitments we have across the globe. With a different strategy from the beginning, listening to the Israelis who had already dealt with IEDs, and force projection, the IED problem would not have been what it is today and has been for four years.

Being vaguely aware of those global commitments I believe I can see the broader context, certainly glimmers of it...

You say with a different strategy the IED problem would not be what it is. That means we would not be in Iraq as that is the only relevant strategic decision. Obviously true.

If you perhaps meant a different thrust operationally, that's possible. if you meant with different tactics, it is also possible. Note the latter two levels only provide a possibility of a lesser problem.

I believe that listening to the Israelis early on (late '03 and '04) at the behest of the then DepSecDef was done at some length. Doesn't seem to have helped much. You do know, I suppose, that the 'V' hull technology is South African, that we had been aware of it for years before the Israelis found out Hezbollah was just as smart as they were?

I'll also note that the US Army has dealt with IEDs for many years; from the Schu mines and off-route Panzerfausts of WW II and Korea through 105 and 155 shells and 500 and even 1,000 pound bombs buried in Viet Nam all cunningly emplaced and detonated by various means. They even did a few EFPs, a technique that also dates from WW II. We know how to deal with many things -- we just let egos get in the way and refuse to use our experience and apply lessons we learned with difficulty and unnecessary casualties. It's the American way. :o

Point? I am blaming the magnitude of the problem on senior leadership.

Magnitude of what problem? IEDs? If so, by magnitude do you mean the size, capability or quantity?

nichols

11-12-2007, 04:11 AM

Part 1

This is a classic look at my right hand while I hit you with my left. This war isn't about a civil war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon or any other country. It is a clash between two different cultures. IEDs have been the method of employment for centuries. Historically we have tried isolationism multiple times, every time we have paid dearly for our Fortress America, Monroe Doctrine attitude. Let's do a quick look at what we have been dealing with from 1970 until 9/11:

S/A, this info is from the Jewish Virtual Library, politically driven but facts are facts.

February 23, 1970, Halhoul, West Bank. PLO fires on a busload of pilgrims killing one and wounding two Americans.

March 28-29, 1970, Beirut, Lebanon. The PFLP fired seven rockets at the U.S. Embassy.

September 14, 1970, The PFLP hijacked a TWA flight from Zurich, four Americans were injured.

May 30, 1972, Ben Gurion Airport, Israel. Three members of the Japanese Red Army, acting on the PFLP's bbehalf, carried out a machine-gun and grenade attack at Israel's main airport, killing 26 and wounding 78 people. Many of the casualties were American citizens, mostly from Puerto Rico.

September 5, 1972, Munich, Germany. During the Olympic Games in Munich, Black September, a front for Fatah, took hostage 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team. Nine athletes were killed including weightlifter David Berger, an American-Israeli from Cleveland, Ohio.

March 2, 1973, Khartoum, Sudan. Cleo A. Noel, Jr., U.S. ambassador to Sudan, and George C. Moore, also a U.S. diplomat, were held hostage and then killed by terrorists at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum. It seems likely that Fatah was responsible for the attack.

September 8, 1974, Athens, Greece. TWA Flight 841, flying from Tel Aviv to New York, made a scheduled stop in Athens. Shortly after takeoff, it crashed into the Ionian Sea and all 88 passengers were killed.

June 29, 1975, Beirut, Lebanon. The PFLP kidnapped the U.S. military attaché to Lebanon, Ernest Morgan, and demanded food, clothing and building materials for indigent residents living near Beirut harbor. The American diplomat was released after an anonymous benefactor provided food to the neighborhood.

November 14, 1975, Jerusalem, Israel. Lola Nunberg, 53, of New York, was injured during a bombing attack in downtown Jerusalem. Fatah claimed responsibility for the bombing, which killed six people and wounded 38.

November 21, 1975, Ramat Hamagshimim, Israel. Michael Nadler, an American-Israeli from Miami Beach, Florida, was killed when axe-wielding terrorists from the Democrat Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a PLO faction, attacked students in the Golan Heights.

August 11, 1976, Istanbul, Turkey. The PFLP launched an attack on the terminal of Israel's major airline, El Al, at the Istanbul airport. Four civilians, including Harold Rosenthal of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were killed and 20 injured.

January 1, 1977, Beirut, Lebanon. Frances E. Meloy, U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, and Robert O.Waring, the U.S. economic counselor, were kidnapped by PFLP members as they crossed a militia checkpoint separating the Christian from the Muslim parts of Beirut. They were later shot to death.

March 11, 1978, Tel Aviv, Israel. Gail Rubin, niece of U.S. Senator Abraham Ribicoff, was among 38 people shot to death by PLO terrorists on an Israeli beach.

June 2, 1978, Jerusalem, Israel. Richard Fishman, a medical student from Maryland, was among six killed in a PLO bus bombing in Jerusalem. Chava Sprecher, another American citizen from Seattle, Washington, was injured.

May 4, 1979, Tiberias, Israel. Haim Mark and his wife, Haya, of New Haven, Connecticut were injured in a PLO bombing attack in northern Israel.

November 4, 1979, Teheran, Iran. After President Carter agreed to admit the Shah of Iran into the U.S., Iranian radicals seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 66 American diplomats hostage. Thirteen hostages were soon freed, but the remaining 53 were held until their release on January 20, 1981.

May 2, 1980, Hebron, West Bank. Eli Haze'ev, an American-Israeli from Alexandria, Virginia, was killed in a PLO attack on Jewish worshippers walking home from a synagogue in Hebron.

July 19, 1982, Beirut, Lebanon. Hizballah members kidnapped David Dodge, acting president of the American University in Beirut. After a year in captivity, Dodge was released. Rifat Assad, head of Syrian Intelligence, helped in the negotiation with the terrorists.

August 19, 1982, Paris, France. Two American citizens, Anne Van Zanten and Grace Cutler, were killed when the PLO bombed a Jewish restaurant in Paris.

March 16, 1983, Beirut, Lebanon. Five American Marines were wounded in a hand grenade attack while on patrol north of Beirut International Airport. The Islamic Jihad and Al-Amal, a Shi'ite militia, claimed responsibility for the attack.

April 18, 1983, Beirut, Lebanon. A truck-bomb detonated by a remote control exploded in front of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 employees, including the CIA's Middle East director, and wounding 120. Hizballah, with financial backing from Iran, was responsible for the attack.

July 1, 1983, Hebron, Israel. Aharon Gross, 19, an American-Israeli from New York, was stabbed to death by PLO terrorists in the Hebron marketplace.

September 29, 1983, Beirut, Lebanon. Two American marines were kidnapped by Amal members. They were released after intervention by a Lebanese army officer.

October 23, 1983, Beirut, Lebanon. A truck loaded with a bomb crashed into the lobby of the U.S. Marines headquarters in Beirut, killing 241 soldiers and wounding 81. The attack was carried out by Hizballah with the help of Syrian intelligence and financed by Iran.

December 19, 1983, Jerusalem, Israel. Serena Sussman, a 60-year-old tourist from Anderson, South Carolina, died from injuries from the PLO bombing of a bus in Jerusalem 13 days earlier.

January 18, 1984, Beirut, Lebanon. Malcolm Kerr, a Lebanese born American who was president of the American University of Beirut, was killed by two gunmen outside his office. Hizballah said the assassination was part of the organization's plan to "drive all Americans out from Lebanon."

March 7, 1984, Beirut, Lebanon. Hizballah members kidnapped Jeremy Levin, Beirut bureau chief of Cable News Network (CNN). Levin managed to escape and reach Syrian army barracks. He was later transferred to American hands.

March 8, 1984, Beirut, Lebanon. Three Hizballah members kidnapped Reverend Benjamin T. Weir, while he was walking with his wife in Beirut's Manara neighborhood. Weir was released after 16 months of captivity with Syrian and Iranian assistance.

March 16, 1984, Beirut, Lebanon. Hizballah kidnapped William Buckley, a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Buckley was supposed to be exchanged for prisoners. However when the transaction failed to take place, he was reportedly transported to Iran. Although his body was never found, the U.S. administration declared the American diplomat dead.

April 12, 1984, Torrejon, Spain. Hizballah bombed a restaurant near an U.S. Air Force base in Torrejon, Spain, wounding 83 people.

September 20, 1984, Beirut, Lebanon. A suicide bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in East Beirut killed 23 people and injured 21. The American and British ambassadors were slightly injured in the attack, attributed to the Iranian backed Hizballah group.

September 20, 1984, Aukar, Lebanon. Islamic Jihad detonate a van full of explosives 30 feet in front of the U.S. Embassy annex severely damaging the building, killing two U.S. servicemen and seven Lebanese employees, as well as 5 to 15 non-employees. Twenty Americans were injured, including U.S. Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew and visiting British Ambassador David Miers. An estimated 40 to 50 Lebanese were hurt. The attack came in response to the U.S. veto September 6 of a U.N. Security Council resolution.

December 4, 1984, Tehran, Iran. Hizballah terrorists hijacked a Kuwait Airlines plane en route from Dubai, United Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan. They demanded the release from Kuwaiti jails of members of Da'Wa, a group of Shiite extremists serving sentences for attacks on French and American targets on Kuwaiti territory. The terrorists forced the pilot to fly to Tehran where the terrorists murdered two passengers--American Agency for International Development employees, Charles Hegna and William Stanford. Although an Iranian special unit ended the incident by storming the plane and arresting the terrorists, the Iranian government might also have been involved in the hijacking.

June 14, 1985, Between Athens and Rome. Two Hizballah members hijacked a TWA flight en route to Rome from Athens and forced the pilot to fly to Beirut. The terrorists, believed to belong to Hizballah, asked for the release of members of the group Kuwait 17 and 700 Shi'ite prisoners held in Israeli and South Lebanese prisons. The eight crewmembers and 145 passengers were held for 17 days during which one of the hostages, Robert Stethem, a U.S. Navy diver, was murdered. After being flown twice to Algiers, the aircraft returned to Beirut and the hostages were released. Later on, four Hizballah members were secretly indicted. One of them, the Hizballah senior officer Imad Mughniyah, was indicted in absentia.

nichols

11-12-2007, 04:14 AM

Part 2

October 7, 1985, Between Alexandria, Egypt and Haifa, Israel. A four-member PFLP squad took over the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, as it was sailing from Alexandria, Egypt, to Israel. The squad murdered a disabled U.S. citizen, Leon Klinghoffer, by throwing him in the ocean. The rest of the passengers were held hostage for two days and later released after the terrorists turned themselves in to Egyptian authorities in return for safe passage. But U.S. Navy fighters intercepted the Egyptian aircraft flying the terrorists to Tunis and forced it to land at the NATO airbase in Italy, where the terrorists were arrested. Two of the terrorists were tried in Italy and sentenced to prison. The Italian authorities however let the two others escape on diplomatic passports. Abu Abbas, who masterminded the hijacking, was later convicted to life imprisonment in absentia.

December 27, 1985, Rome, Italy. Four terrorists from Abu Nidal's organization attacked El Al offices at the Leonardo di Vinci Airport in Rome. Thirteen people, including five Americans, were killed and 74 wounded, among them two Americans. The terrorists had come from Damascus and were supported by the Syrian regime.

March 30, 1986, Athens, Greece. A bomb exploded on a TWA flight from Rome as it approached Athens airport. The attack killed four U.S. citizens who were sucked through a hole made by the blast, although the plane safely landed. The bombing was attributed to the Fatah Special Operations Group's intelligence and security apparatus, headed by Abdullah Abd al-Hamid Labib, alias Colonel Hawari.

April 5, 1986, West Berlin, Germany. An explosion at the "La Belle" nightclub in Berlin, frequented by American soldiers, killed three--2 U.S. soldiers and a Turkish woman-and wounded 191 including 41 U.S. soldiers. Given evidence of Libyan involvement, the U.S. Air Force made a retaliatory attack against Libyan targets on April 17. Libya refused to hand over to Germany five suspects believed to be there. Others, however, were tried including Yassir Shraidi and Musbah Eter, arrested in Rome in August 1997 and extradited; and also Ali Chanaa, his wife, Verena Chanaa, and her sister, Andrea Haeusler. Shraidi, accused of masterminding the attack, was sentenced to 14 years in jail. The Libyan diplomat Musbah Eter and Ali Chanaa were both sentenced to 12 years in jail. Verena Chanaa was sentenced to 14 years in prison. Andrea Haeusler was acquitted.

September 5, 1986, Karachi, Pakistan. Abu Nidal members hijacked a Pan Am flight leaving Karachi, Pakistan bound for Frankfurt, Germany and New York with 379 passengers, including 89 Americans. The terrorists forced the plane to land in Larnaca, Cyprus, where they demanded the release of two Palestinians and a Briton jailed for the murder of three Israelis there in 1985. The terrorists killed 22 of the passengers, including two American citizens and wounded many others. They were caught and indicted by a Washington grand jury in 1991.

September 9, 1986, Beirut, Lebanon. Continuing its anti-American attacks, Hizballah kidnapped Frank Reed, director of the American University in Beirut, whom they accused of being "a CIA agent." He was released 44 months later. September 12, 1986, Beirut, Lebanon. Hizballah kidnapped Joseph Cicippio, the acting comptroller at the American University in Beirut. Cicippio was released five years later on December 1991.

October 15, 1986, Jerusalem, Israel. Gali Klein, an American citizen, was killed in a grenade attack by Fatah at the Western Wall in Jerusalem.

October 21, 1986, Beirut, Lebanon. Hizballah kidnapped Edward A. Tracy, an American citizen in Beirut. He was released five years later, on August 1991.

February 17, 1988, Ras-Al-Ein Tyre, Lebanon. Col. William Higgins, the American chief of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, was abducted by Hizballah while driving from Tyre to Nakura. The hostages demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the release of all Palestinian and Lebanese held prisoners in Israel. The U.S. government refused to answer the request. Hizballah later claimed they killed Higgins.

December 21, 1988, Lockerbie, Scotland. Pan Am Flight 103 departing from Frankfurt to New York was blown up in midair, killing all 259 passengers and another 11 people on the ground in Scotland. Two Libyan agents were found responsible for planting a sophisticated suitcase bomb onboard the plane. On 14 November 1991, arrest warrants were issued for Al-Amin Khalifa Fahima and Abdel Baset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi. After Libya refused to extradite the suspects to stand trial, the United Nations leveled sanctions against the country in April 1992, including the freezing of Libyan assets abroad. In 1999, Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi agreed to hand over the two suspects, but only if their trial was held in a neutral country and presided over by a Scottish judge. With the help of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah, Al-Megrahi and Fahima were finally extradited and tried in Camp Zeist in the Netherlands. Megrahi was found guilty and jailed for life, while Fahima was acquitted due to a "lack of evidence" of his involvement. After the extradition, UN sanctions against Libya were automatically lifted.

nichols

11-12-2007, 04:15 AM

Part 3

January 27, 1989, Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey. Three simultaneous bombings were carried out against U.S. business targets--the Turkish American Businessmen Association and the Economic Development Foundation in Istanbul, and the Metal Employees Union in Ankara. The Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left) was held responsible for the attacks.

March 6, 1989, Cairo, Egypt. Two explosive devices were safely removed from the grounds of the American and British Cultural centers in Cairo. Three organizations were believed to be responsible for the attack: The January 15 organization, which had sent a letter bomb to the Israeli ambassador to London in January; the Egyptian Revolutionary Organization that from out 1984-1986 carried out attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets; and the Nasserite Organization, which had attacked British and American targets in 1988.

June 12, 1989, Bosphorus Straits, Turkey. A bomb exploded aboard an unoccupied boat used by U.S. consular staff. The explosion caused extensive damage but no casualties. An organization previously unknown, the Warriors of the June 16th Movement, claimed responsibility for the attack.

October 11, 1989, Izmir, Turkey. An explosive charge went off outside a U.S. military PX. Dev Sol was held responsible for the attack.

February 7, 1991, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. Dev Sol members shot and killed a U.S. civilian contractor as he was getting into his car at the Incirlik Air Base in Adana, Turkey.

February 28, 1991, Izmir, Turkey. Two Dev Sol gunmen shot and wounded a U.S. Air Force officer as he entered his residence in Izmir.

March 28, 1991, Jubial, Saudi Arabia. Three U.S. marines were shot at and injured by an unknown terrorist while driving near Camp Three, Jubial. No organization claimed responsibility for the attack.

October 28, 1991, Ankara, Turkey. Victor Marwick, an American soldier serving at the Turkish-American base, Tuslog, was killed and his wife wounded in a car bomb attack. The Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.

October 28, 1991, Istanbul, Turkey. Two car bombings killed a U.S. Air Force sergeant and severely wounded an Egyptian diplomat in Istanbul. Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

November 8, 1991, Beirut, Lebanon. A 100-kg car bomb destroyed the administration building of the American University in Beirut, killing one person and wounding at least a dozen.

October 12, 1992, Umm Qasr, Iraq. A U.S. soldier serving with the United Nations was stabbed and wounded near the port of Umm Qasr. No organization claimed responsibility for the attack.

January 25, 1993, Virginia, United States. A Pakistani gunman opened fire on Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees standing outside of the building. Two agents, Frank Darling and Bennett Lansing, were killed and three others wounded. The assailant was never caught and reportedly fled to Pakistan.

February 26, 1993, Cairo, Egypt. A bomb exploded inside a café in downtown Cairo killing three. Among the 18 wounded were two U.S. citizens. No one claimed responsibility for the attack.

February 26, 1993, New York, United States. A massive van bomb exploded in an underground parking garage below the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six and wounding 1,042. Four Islamist activists were responsible for the attack. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the operation's alleged mastermind, escaped but was later arrested in Pakistan and extradited to the United States. Abd al-Hakim Murad, another suspected conspirator, was arrested by local authorities in the Philippines and handed over to the United States. The two, along with two other terrorists, were tried in the U.S. and sentenced to 240 years.

nichols

11-12-2007, 04:16 AM

Part 4

April 14, 1993, Kuwait. The Iraqi intelligence service attempted to assassinate former U.S. President George Bush during a visit to Kuwait. In retaliation, the U.S. launched a cruise missile attack two months later on the Iraqi capital, Baghdad.

July 5, 1993, Southeast Turkey. In eight separate incidents, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) kidnapped a total of 19 Western tourists traveling in southeastern Turkey. The hostages, including U.S. citizen Colin Patrick Starger, were released unharmed after spending several weeks in captivity.

December 1, 1993, north of Jerusalem, West Bank. Yitzhak Weinstock, 19, whose family came from Los Angeles, CA, was killed in a drive-by shooting. Hamas took responsibility for the attack

Sometime in 1994: near Atzmona, Gaza. U.S. citizen Mrs. Sheila Deutsch of Brooklyn, NY injured in a shooting attack.

October 9, 1994. Nachshon Wachsman, 19, whose family came from New York, was kidnapped and then murdered by Hamas.

October 9, 1994: Jerusalem, Israel. Shooting attack on cafe-goers in Jerusalem. U.S. citizens Scot Doberstein and Eric Goldberg were injured.

March 8, 1995, Karachi, Pakistan. Two unidentified gunmen armed with AK-47 assault rifles opened fire on a U.S. Consulate van in Karachi, killing two U.S. diplomats, Jacqueline Keys Van Landingham and Gary C. Durell, and wounding a third, Mark McCloy.

April 9, 1995, Kfar Darom and Netzarim, Gaza Strip. Two suicide attacks were carried out within a few hours of each other in Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip. In the first attack a suicide bomber crashed an explosive-rigged van into an Israeli bus in Netzarim, killing eight including U.S. citizen Alisa Flatow, 20, of West Orange, NJ. More than 30 others were injured. In the second attack, a suicide bomber detonated a car bomb in the midst of a convoy of cars in Kfar Darom, injuring 12. The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Shaqaqi Faction claimed responsibility for the attacks. U.S. citizens Chava Levine and Seth Klein were injured.

June 15, 1995: Jerusalem, Israel. U.S. citizen Howard Tavens of Cleveland, OH was injured in a stabbing attack.

July 4, 1995, Kashmir, India. In Kashmir, a previously unknown militant group, Al-Faran, with suspected links to a Kashmiri separatist group in Pakistan, took hostage six tourists, including two U.S. citizens. They demanded the release of Muslim militants held in Indian prisons. One of the U.S. citizens escaped on July 8, while on August 13 the decapitated body of the Norwegian hostage was found along with a note stating that the other hostages also would be killed if the group's demands were not met. The Indian Government refused. Both Indian and American authorities believe the rest of the hostages were most likely killed in 1996 by their jailers.

August 1995, Istanbul, Turkey. A bombing of Istanbul's popular Taksim Square injured two U.S. citizens. This attack was part of a three-year-old attempt by the PKK to drive foreign tourists away from Turkey by striking at tourist sites.

August 21, 1995, Jerusalem, Israel. A bus bombing in Jerusalem by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) killed four, including American Joan Davenny of New Haven, CT, and wounded more than 100. U.S. citizens injured: Chanoch Bleier, Judith Shulewitz, Bernard Batta.

September 9, 1995. Ma'ale Michmash. American killed: Unborn child of Mrs. Mara Frey of Chicago. Mara Frey was injured.

November 9, 1995, Algiers, Algeria. Islamic extremists set fire to a warehouse belonging to the U.S. Embassy, threatened the Algerian security guard because he was working for the United States, and demanded to know whether any U.S. citizens were present. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) probably carried out the attacks. The group had threatened to strike other foreign targets and especially U.S. objectives in Algeria, and the attack's style was similar to past GIA operations against foreign facilities.

November 13, 1995, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. A car bomb exploded in the parking lot outside of the Riyadh headquarters of the Office of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National Guard, killing seven persons, five of them U.S. citizens, and wounding 42. The blast severely damaged the three-story building, which houses a U.S. military advisory group, and several neighboring office buildings. Three groups -- the Islamic Movement for Change, the Tigers of the Gulf, and the Combatant Partisans of God -- claimed responsibility for the attack.

February 25, 1996, Jerusalem, Israel. A suicide bomber blew up a commuter bus in Jerusalem, killing 26, including three U.S. citizens, and injuring 80 others, among them three other U.S. citizens. Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing. U. S. citizens killed: Sara Duker, of Teaneck, NJ, Matthew Eisenfeld of West Hartford, CT, Ira Weinstein of Bronx, NY. U.S. citizens injured: Beatrice Kramer, Steven Lapides, and Leah Stein Mousa.

March 4, 1996, Tel Aviv, Israel. A suicide bomber detonated an explosive device outside the Dizengoff Center, Tel Aviv's largest shopping mall, killing 20 persons and injuring 75 others, including two U.S. citizens. Both Hamas and the Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombing. U.S. citizens injured included Julie K. Negrin of Seattle, WA.

May 13, 1996, Beit-El, West Bank. Arab gunmen opened fire on a hitchhiking stand near Beit El, wounding three Israelis and killing David Boim, 17, an American-Israeli from New York. No one claimed responsibility for the attack, although either the Islamic Jihad or Hamas are suspected. U.S. citizens injured: Moshe Greenbaum, 17.

June 9, 1996, outside Zekharya. Yaron Ungar, an American-Israeli, and his Israeli wife were killed in a drive-by shooting near their West Bank home. The PFLP is suspected.

June 25, 1996, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. A fuel truck carrying a bomb exploded outside the U.S. military's Khobar Towers housing facility in Dhahran, killing 19 U.S. military personnel and wounding 515 persons, including 240 U.S. personnel. Several groups claimed responsibility for the attack. In June 2001, a U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Virginia, identified Saudi Hizballah as the party responsible for the attack. The court indicated that the members of the organization, banned from Saudi Arabia, "frequently met and were trained in Lebanon, Syria, or Iran" with Libyan help.

August 17, 1996, Mapourdit, Sudan. Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels kidnapped six missionaries in Mapourdit, including a U.S citizen. The SPLA released the hostages on August 28.

November 1, 1996, Sudan. A breakaway group of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) kidnapped three workers of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), including one U.S citizen. The rebels released the hostages on December 9 in exchange for ICRC supplies and a health survey of their camp.

December 3, 1996, Paris, France. A bomb exploded aboard a Paris subway train, killing four and injuring 86 persons, including a U.S. citizen. No one claimed responsibility for the attack, but Algerian extremists are suspected.

January 2, 1997, Major cities worldwide, United States. A series of letter bombs with Alexandria, Egypt postmarks were discovered at Al-Hayat newspaper bureaus in Washington, DC, New York, London, and Riyadh. Three similar devices, also postmarked in Egypt, were found at a prison facility in Leavenworth, Kansas. Bomb disposal experts defused all the devices, but one detonated at the Al-Hayat newspaper office in London, injuring two security guards and causing minor damage.

nichols

11-12-2007, 04:17 AM

Part 5

February 23, 1997, New York, United States. A Palestinian gunman opened fire on tourists at an observation deck atop the Empire State building in New York, killing a Danish national and wounding visitors from the United States, Argentina, Switzerland and France before turning the gun on himself. A handwritten note carried by the gunman claimed this was a punishment attack against the "enemies of Palestine."

July 30, 1997, Jerusalem, Israel. Two bombs detonated in Jerusalem's Mahane Yehuda market, killing 15 persons, including a U.S. citizen and wounding 168 others, among them two U.S. citizens. The Izz-el-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' military wing, claimed responsibility for the attack. U.S. citizens killed: Mrs. Leah Stern of Passaic, NJ. U.S. citizens injured: Dov Dalin.

September 4, 1997: Jerusalem, Israel. Bombing on Ben-Yehuda Street, Jerusalem. U.S. citizens killed: Yael Botwin, 14, of Los Angeles and Jerusalem. U.S. citizens injured: Diana Campuzano of New York, Abraham Mendelson of Los Angeles, CA, Greg Salzman of New Jersey, Stuart E. Hersh of Kiryat Arba, Israel, Michael Alzer, Abraham Elias, David Keinan, Daniel Miller of Boca Raton, FL, Noam Rozenman of Jerusalem, Jenny (Yocheved) Rubin of Los Angeles, CA. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

October 30, 1997, Sanaa, Yemen. Al-Sha'if tribesmen kidnapped a U.S. businessman near Sanaa. The tribesmen sought the release of two fellow tribesmen who were arrested on smuggling charges and several public works projects they claim the government promised them. The hostage was released on November 27.

November 12, 1997, Karachi, Pakistan. Two unidentified gunmen shot to death four U.S. auditors from Union Texas Petroleum and their Pakistani driver as they drove away from the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi. Two groups claimed responsibility -- the Islamic Inqilabi Council, or Islamic Revolutionary Council and the Aimal Secret Committee, also known as the Aimal Khufia Action Committee.

November 25, 1997, Aden, Yemen. Yemenite tribesmen kidnapped a U.S citizen, two Italians, and two unspecified Westerners near Aden to protest the eviction of a tribe member from his home. The kidnappers released the five hostages on November 27.

February 6, 1998, Jerusalem, Israel. Stabbing in Jerusalem. U.S. Citizen Yosef Lepon, 17 injured.

April 19, 1998, Maon, Israel. Dov Driben, a 28-year-old American-Israeli farmer was killed by terrorists near the West Bank town of Maon. One of his assailants, Issa Debavseh, a member of Fatah Tanzim, was killed on November 7, 2001, by the IDF after being on their wanted list for the murder.

June 21, 1998, Beirut, Lebanon. Two hand-grenades were thrown at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. No casualties were reported.

June 21, 1998, Beirut, Lebanon. Three rocket-propelled grenades attached to a crude detonator exploded near the U.S. Embassy compound in Beirut, causing no casualties and little damage. August 7, 1998, Nairobi, Kenya. A car bomb exploded at the rear entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. The attack killed a total of 292, including 12 U.S. citizens, and injured over 5,000, among them six Americans. The perpetrators belonged to al-Qaida, Usama bin Ladin's network.

August 7, 1998, Dar es Sala'am, Tanzania. A car bomb exploded outside the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Sala'am, killing 11 and injuring 86. Osama bin Laden's organization al-Qaida claimed responsibility for the attack. Two suspects were arrested.

November 21, 1998, Teheran, Iran. Members of Fedayeen Islam, shouting anti-American slogans and wielding stones and iron rods, attacked a group of American tourists in Tehran. Some of the tourists suffered minor injuries from flying glass.

December 28, 1998, Mawdiyah, Yemen. Sixteen tourists--12 Britons, two Americans and two Australians--were taken hostage in the largest kidnapping in Yemen's recent history. The tourists were seized in the Abyan province (some 175 miles south of Sanaa the capital). One Briton and a Yemeni guide escaped, while the rest were taken to city of Mawdiyah. Four hostages were killed when troops closed in and two were wounded, including an American woman. The kidnappers, members of the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan, an offshoot of Al-Jihad, had demanded the release from jail of their leader, Saleh Haidara al-Atwi.

October 31, 1999, Nantucket, Massachusetts, United States. EgyptAir Flight 990 crashed off the U.S. coast killing all 217 people on board, including 100 Americans. Although it is not precisely clear what happened, evidence indicated that an Egyptian pilot crashed the plane for personal or political reasons.

November 4, 1999, Athens, Greece. A group protesting President Clinton's visit to Greece hid a gas bomb at an American car dealership in Athens. Two cars were destroyed and several others damaged. Anti-State Action claimed responsibility for the attack, but the November 17 group was also suspected.

November 12, 1999, Islamabad, Pakistan. Six rockets were fired at the U.S. Information Services cultural center and United Nations offices in Islamabad, injuring a Pakistani guard.

September 29, 2000. near Jerusalem Israel. Attack on motorists. U.S. citizens injured: Avi Herman of Teaneck, NJ, Naomi Herman of Teaneck, NJ.

September 29, 2000, Jerusalem, Israel. Attack on taxi passengers. U.S. citizens injured: Tuvia Grossman of Chicago, Todd Pollack of Norfolk, VA, Andrew Feibusch of New York.

October 4, 2000, near Bethlehem, West Bank. U.S. citizens injured: An unidentified American tourist.

October 5, 2000: near Jerusalem, Israel. Attack on a motorist. U.S. citizens injured: Rabbi Chaim Brovender of Brooklyn.

October 8, 2000, Nablus, West Bank. The bullet-ridden body of Rabbi Hillel Lieberman, a U.S. citizen from Brooklyn living in the Jewish settlement of Elon Moreh, was found at the entrance to the West Bank town of Nablus. Lieberman had headed there after hearing that Palestinians had desecrated the religious site, Joseph's Tomb. No organization claimed responsibility for the murder.

nichols

11-12-2007, 04:18 AM

Part 6

October 12, 2000, Aden Harbor, Yemen. A suicide squad rammed the warship the U.S.S. Cole with an explosives-laden boat killing 13 American sailors and injuring 33. The attack was likely by Osama bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization.

October 30, 2000, Jerusalem, Israel. Gunmen killed Eish Kodesh Gilmor, a 25-year-old American-Israeli on duty as a security guard at the National Insurance Institute in Jerusalem. The "Martyrs of the Al-Aqsa Intifada," a group linked to Fatah, claimed responsibility for the attack. Gilmor's family filed a suit in the U.S. District Court in Washington against the Palestinian Authority, the PLO, Chairman Yasser Arafat and members of Force 17, as being responsible for the attack.

December 31, 2000, Ofra, Israel. Rabbi Binyamin Kahane, 34, and his wife, Talia Hertzlich Kahane, both formerly of Brooklyn, NY were killed in a drive-by shooting. Their children, Yehudit Leah Kahane, Bitya Kahane, Tzivya Kahane, Rivka Kahane, and Shlomtsion Kahane, were injured in the attack.

March 28, 2001, Neve Yamin. Bombing at bus stop. U.S. citizens injured: Netanel Herskovitz, 15, formerly of Hempstead, NY.

May 9, 2001, Tekoa, West Bank. Kobi Mandell, 13, of Silver Spring, MD, an American-Israeli, was found stoned to death along with a friend in a cave near the Jewish settlement of Tekoa. Two organizations, the Islamic Jihad and Hizballah-Palestine, claimed responsibility for the attack.

May 29, 2001, Gush Etzion, West Bank. The Fatah Tanzim claimed responsibility for a drive-by shooting of six in the West Bank that killed two American-Israeli citizens, Samuel Berg, and his mother, Sarah Blaustein. U.S. citizens injured: Norman Blaustein of Lawrence, NY.

July 19, 2001, Hebron, West Bank. Shooting attack. U.S. citizens injured: An unidentified woman from Brooklyn, NY.

August 9, 2001, Jerusalem, Israel. A suicide bombing at Sbarro's, a pizzeria situated in one of the busiest areas of downtown Jerusalem, killed 15 people and wounded more than 90. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. U.S. citizens killed: Judith L. Greenbaum, 31, of New Jersey and California, Malka Roth, 15, whose family was from New York. U.S. citizens injured: David Danzig, 21, of Wynnewood, PA, Matthew P. Gordon, 25, of New York, Joanne (Chana) Nachenberg, 31, Sara Shifra Nachenberg, 2.

August 18, 2001, Jerusalem, Israel. Shooting at a bus. U.S. citizen injured: Andrew Feibusch of New York.

August 27, 2001, near Roglit, Israel. Shooting attack. U.S. citizen injured: Ben Dansker.

We are now actively taking the fight, no longer are we building ships, launching air strikes, or sending in the cruise missles. The AO is GWOT, the current battleground is Iraq. This is not about a civil war, it is about how we want the world to be for our children's children.

Rex Brynen

11-12-2007, 05:35 AM

Leaving aside the mistakes in the list, you've got some very different fights in there, over very different issues, ranging from hardcore Islamists, to secular Palestinian Marxists (led by a Christian, in the case of the PFLP), through to the forerunner to the present US-supported government of Iraq. All that seems to link them is a use of violence, especially terrorism, at some point in time.

One could equally provide a list of all terrorist attacks conducted by Westerners, lumping together the far left (Red Army Faction, Red Brigades), radical nationalists (the IRA, ETA, FLNC), neofascists (the NAR, responsible for the 1980 Bologna massacre), radical environmentalists, and perhaps even the French government for good measure (anyone else remember the DGSE bombing of theRainbow Warrior?)

It would be just about as meaningful.

nichols

11-12-2007, 06:00 AM

Rex,

I completely agree with you, the list was a quick google, that's why I put the S/A in the first post. My intent was to show that this is a clash of cultures.

The clash is terrorism plan and simple, if we subscribe and believe in the rule of law over extremism whichever form it manifests itself in then we have no choice to fight or expose our bellies.

Mark O'Neill

11-12-2007, 09:36 AM

My intent was to show that this is a clash of cultures.

I am not sure how the shopping list of violence you provided proves any such thing. It does suggest to me that someone's IO campaign is getting a free helping hand.

I am increasingly tired of the essentially puerile 'arguments' made about 'clashs of culture / civilisation' etc that are patently no such thing.

If these 'theories' were adequate summations of the problem one would expect them to provide an insight that could be operationalised. I can't recall one 'useful' operational concept to arise from this 'insight' since 9/11 - feel free to jump onboard and correct me if I have missed something.

(Note: I am making distinction here between the need to 'appreciate' culture in the COIN sense and the idea of 'culture' as the root cause of terrorism).

It is my opinion that much of the guff about 'clash of culture' is:

1) in some circumstances addressing a religious prejudice (or ignorance) on 'our side' ;
2) a cover for ignorance of the true nature of the source(s) of conflicts;and
3) an artifice created by some 'experts' in order to fashion a lexicon that empowers them in some way.

Cheers

Mark

Rob Thornton

11-12-2007, 01:49 PM

In the five or six years after 9/11 it seemed correct to lump together together the current and potential conflicts on the horizon together into a single GWOT or a Long War - maybe it was needed to get our arms around it - maybe it was a way to consider how our perception of the world had changed - although arguably the conditions were there, they'd just not come to our shores in so violent a way.

I'm not sure its a good way to look at the world anymore. By creating a conglomerate problem we potentially mask both the real causes and potential opportunities.

I'm going to the long way around this explanation - but I think it relevant.

Like IEDs, the ability and opportunity and perceived rational for those both inside the U.S. and outside the U.S. to inflict harm on us (physically, fiscally, morally and spiritually) has increased over the years - it is a condition. Its also I think a by-product of who we are. Others see us as diverse, pluralistic, secular, capitalistic, expansive, invasive, accepting, free, vulnerable, strong, weak, and a host of other adjectives that have both positive and negative connotations - we are an enigma to some because we are often the only ones there with aid and offering hope amidst great crises, but we are also faulted with ulterior motives and being the greatest of manipulators.

Its interesting to me that we are attributed a degree of control of events that is beyond us (even among our own citizens we look for conspiracy and contrivances). If we as Americans have a difficult time reconciling how the most powerful state in history can exhibit so vast a duplicity without knowing it, imagine how that must appear from the outside - at the micro level one of the hardest things to explain to was why we could not whistle up a solution to this problem or that problem. With all the satellite media beaming in images of seemingly infinite wealth and opulence, images that rarely reflect the realities most average Americans face in day to day life your average non-American has a perception of us as elite and privileged and as such the reason we do not do something is because we choose not to. Amongst those with access to such images and influence, the more deprived and uneducated a person and their families are, the greater seems the animosity attributed to us.

I am not saying that such attacks are justified, or that they are invited, are anything like that - however, I am saying that perception matters at both the local and international level, and that as Thucydides remarked - we go to war out of fear, honor and interest. This is a condition of a world that is shrinking due to IT/mass media and other aspects of accelerated globalization through technology, curiosity and growth requiring resources and markets. There are qualities to what Friedman, Barnett, Huntington and other recent authors have described in trying to articulate the problems and possibilities they see. I think they all have a piece of it in their main thesis, but these thinkers all came to different primary cause and effect relationships - why? I think depending on how you look at it (the natural bias we carry with us) the problem will appear differently. Because we are dealing with people with diverse problems, diverse motivations, living in diverse conditions, etc - there is no singular way to describe it. This is disconcerting to us as people (I believe this is a universal human characteristic not a cultural) because we seek answers that we can accept, we seek solutions - and that leads us to identifying problems - we do this because we want to move on and find more answers -etc.

I do believe we are going to see more wars - I'm not sure I like the word "persistent" because it leads to the idea of a continuation of the same thing - a longer problem. I think its likely to be greater frequency brought on by unstable conditions where "more" peaceful political discourse has come to an impasse and one or more sides in a conversation where multiple speakers wish to have their say, perceive themselves as stifled and stagnant and as such must make choices that range from accepting their lot until new opportunities arise, or to take up arms and use violence to give an edge to their voice - there is a wide range of "in-betweens". Within the party of those who feel they have been silenced - there may be varying degrees of cooperation or contention as groups evolve and gravitate, break off, reform etc. Some may feel their grievances have been sufficiently addressed for the time being, others may simply see an opportunity to attach themselves to a more powerful group with like enough objectives to live with.

Some of our current policy problems stem from exhibiting a natural tendency to see things as we'd like them to be - problems with solutions that offer long term stability - a fire and forget solution so we can move on, be left alone and get back to business - this is often derided as being "myopic", but I think its natural - although that does not make it right - we expect more from those in whom we invest so much power.

This may be one of the reasons we seem to turn to the military decision so quickly - it seems on the surface to offer an unambiguous decision - however, our culture and values require us to fix things and make them better - its who we are - and I can't imagine wanting to be anything else - in the past when we have had to resort to military force we have been the most gracious of victors and the world has recognized us for it.

The best we may be able to do is to look at each war we make or involve ourselves in differently. Even if on the surface they exhibit similar characteristics, the peoples who take part in the war(s) will see themselves differently - even we change - continuous war does something to populations - again Thucydides makes some worthy observations about how Athenians and the greater Greek world changed over the course of the Peloponnesian War - not just the general population of Athens- but also the way the political leadership changed, and the way in which smaller city-states within the Greek world were altered.

We should refrain from distilling and generalization of the wars we must contemplate - each should be seen in its uniqueness. Each should be considered in political context of all the participants. While we must have grand strategy that husbands ends, ways and means toward a political purpose with balance and consistency - we must also preserve unforeseen opportunities, and the capability to take advantage of them, which might only come into being as a result of inter-action. I'm not sure we can do that if we lump everything together under a banner where we are predisposed to see what we expect, rather then what is.

Best Regards, Rob

Pragmatic Thinker

11-12-2007, 02:48 PM

I believe the current Administration and the bulk of those who might form the next administration are in fact committed to the mission; thus the nation is both de facto and de jure committed to the mission. I realize there are those in the adminsitration, in Congress, in the Armed Forces and across the nation who wish to not be committed to the mission but my guess is they will not have their wish granted because that would be inimical to the national interest and most people realize that. The politics of the issue are more appropriate elsewhere. This is a practices and methods, not a political board.

Ken,

Could you expand on this a little? I am confused to what you're trying to say here? Are you saying the current administration is committed to finding an end to the war by creating a national-level strategy that ensures our troops are given focus and direction, thus doing those things that will bring the conflict in Iraq to an eventual end? If so, could you cite some examples of this strategy and how that is playing out in Iraq? Could you cite some examples of where GEN Patreaus and LTG Odierno have clearly articulated the "road to victory"?

Thanks, PT

Global Scout

11-12-2007, 03:18 PM

IEDs have been around a long time and I won't bore anyone with another google search, but simple state I recall studying a booby trap/IED manual that was dated in the 1950s and it wasn't the first edition. Most of know that our opponent will resort to asymmetric warfare when their conventional forces are ineffective. None of what we're experiencing should be a surprise, nor should it be the major issue we're making it out to be (serious yes, but significant no).

You don't defeat IEDs, you defeat the enemy who is emplacing the IEDs. Yet we have a task force dedicated to defeating IEDs. I have mixed feelings about this, of course my humane side loves the added armor, jammers, and new vehicles being fielded, but my practical side wonders if our focus on force protection (which is what this is all about) has somehow made us more vulnerable to losing the support of the population, which in this conflict means losing. Some thoughts:

1. The U.S. norm and expectation is low casualties today. One of the biggest casualty producers in this war is IEDs, so we developed a task force designed to protect us against IEDs. This is far from unethical, but the focus on force protection over winning the war is unethical (at least in my opinion). IEDs are the biggest casualty producer based on the way we fight (or don't fight), but if we actually conducted more dismounted patrols, saturated areas with combat troops in effort to control the population (this is being done now in parts of Iraq), I think we would see the casualty producers shift, where small arms fire would surpass IEDs. If that happens do we produce a new task force to counter AK47s? Again you defeat the IEDs by defeating/neutralizing the enemy, whether through a political settlement or controlling the population. As one contributer mentioned, if you saturate a trouble with IED hunter-killer teams you make a dent in the problem, and in addition to protecting the force you actually kill the enemy, instead of just moving from point A to point B in increasingly more effective uparmored vehicles. In other words we fight harder and smarter, not just hide behind our technology.

2. Perhaps a continuation of point one, but when we invest so heavily in IED defense and make such an issue of it in the media, and we still continue to lose Soldiers to IEDs we create the impression that the enemy is defeating us. The IED attacks have very little to do with whether or not we're actually winning (I don't like this term, but it will suffice for now) or not, other than the fact that the entire world seems to be watching the conflict as though it is a cat and mouse game between the IED employers and our force protection measures, while the real issues are obscured.

3. 24 hour news services make the trivial important as we all can see with local crime cases becoming sensational national news where each witness or friend of a witness getting interviewed excessively to fill the time, and this approach transfers to war coverage also, where a tactical weapon now has strategic impact. This results in calls to further mitigate casualties giving the enemy additional freedom of maneuver. Who are we dancing with the press or the enemy? The press isn't the enemy, but our response to the press hurts us.

nichols

11-12-2007, 03:33 PM

I am increasingly tired of the essentially puerile 'arguments' made about 'clashs of culture / civilisation' etc that are patently no such thing.

Mark,

I'm not taking the religious line on my thoughts. This could be an example of reading the post and assuming that it's "the same old story."

If as a society or culture we accept that IEDs or any other type of terrorist activities is acceptable, then there is no problem, it all becomes a tactical manuever against the opposing forces.

If we as a society or culture do not accept this method of employment then it is a clear cut clash of cultures. As I posted, the cut and paste was from a source that even if it isn't politically driven, politics is seen behind it. Time is my most valuable asset right now, I didn't have much time to do a better presentation.

IMO, this isn't about religion, by slamming it into that neat little box we put blinders on our ability to see the whole picture. This also isn't about baseball, hotdogs, and mom's apple pie.

Do we accept Mad Max mentality for our future?

Ken White

11-12-2007, 06:28 PM

Ken,
Could you expand on this a little? I am confused to what you're trying to say here?...

Well, very little. (but I can state that little at great length :) ). It sort of says it all. I think perhaps you're trying to read things into the statement. Sorry for the confusion.

...Are you saying the current administration is committed to finding an end to the war by creating a national-level strategy that ensures our troops are given focus and direction, thus doing those things that will bring the conflict in Iraq to an eventual end?...

No. Tackling those thoughts in reverse order; there is little we can do to bring the conflict in Iraq to an eventual end. Such end will be mostly up to the Iraqis and to a lesser extent up to us and in varying still lesser amounts (and in no particular order) to the Turks, the Syrians, the Saudis, the Iranians and various Islamist factions. All have a vote of varying clout. Giving the troops focus and direction in Iraq is not a strategic issue, it is an operational issue and thus the province of DoD and the Armed Forces.

I believe this Administration has committed to a strategy wherein the "end" of war in Iraq is only one part of an extensive global strategy that envisions a lengthy worldwide effort to reduce the threat of international terrorism to an acceptable level; Iraq thus is only one of many ongoing efforts -- it is merely the most visible. I further believe this Administration has done that in such a way as to preclude successors from easily disabling or diverting that strategy and I also believe that this strategy in in the national interest. I could quibble about a lot of the techniques and the direction of some efforts but it doesn't have to be my way to work... :wry:

If so, could you cite some examples of this strategy and how that is playing out in Iraq?...

The strategy IMO (obviously I have no clue to the content of discussions or to the decisions, just my inferences from open sources) is what put us in Iraq and it broad based, flexible and, with respect to Iraq in particular, is aimed at accelerating to emergence of the ME into the world mainstream among other things. That strategy generally does not dictate operational or tactical methodology but relies on the government agencies (to include DoD, the Intel Community, Treasury and others) to develop and employ proper and effective methods to conduct rather broad based missions world wide (and that is important). That is, also IMO, as it should be. :cool:

What is "playing out" in Iraq are the operational decisions of those agencies with respect to that particular operation as a part of that strategy. Properly, the Administration is not dictating operational parameters but is relying on the Agencies to do it right.

I think thus far in Iraq we have seen three distinct phases that have changed the character of our efforts. The first phase lasted about 18 months and was characterized by excessive concern with force protection and a great lack of knowledge of what to do and how to do it. In essence, the operators did not do it right and thus, they did not aid the overall strategy but instead introduced an inadvertent wrinkle.

The next 18 months or so consisted of a learning phase and a realization of the need (if not well executed efforts) to install a viable government and develop Iraqi internal defense capability. The most recent 18 months or so have seen a pretty good refinement of that and implementation of more effective tactic and techniques. Things there are going fairly well as nearly as I can determine. We'll see.

... Could you cite some examples of where GEN Patreaus and LTG Odierno have clearly articulated the "road to victory"?

Thanks, PT

No, I pay little to no attention to what the Generals (all of them, now and then, here and there) or politicians say. IMO, one can put little stock in the words of either and what they say is pretty predictable. I have, however, closely watched what they do. I do not think there is any such thing as a "road to victory" in Iraq and after our initial missteps in the spring of 2003, there never was...

I have complained here that the use of words like "win," "lose," "defeat" and "victory" in relation to any counterinsurgency effort is a terrible idea. "Shock and awe" was one of the most stupid phrases ever applied anywhere in any war. Words are important and the wrong words can send a message of unachievable goals or results and can build false expectations in all the actors -- and observers -- involved.

One cannot "win" a counterinsurgency war unless one kills all the insurgents and that obviously is not an option. The best one can do is achieve an acceptable outcome. That's the best anyone has achieved in the post WW II era (to include the Brits in Malaya and East Africa). My belief is that is probable in Iraq and fairly soon.

Having said all that, recall my original comment you quoted, "I believe the current Administration and the bulk of those who might form the next administration are in fact committed to the mission; thus the nation is both de facto and de jure committed to the mission. I realize there are those in the administration, in Congress, in the Armed Forces and across the nation who wish to not be committed to the mission but my guess is they will not have their wish granted because that would be inimical to the national interest and most people realize that...."

That simply meant that I think most people -- not all -- realize that precipitous withdrawal from Iraq would confirm what the opposition has long said in many of their tapes and videos they've released; confirmation of the fact that the US is the proverbial toothless tiger, has no staying power and is totally untrustworthy. It would also lend credence to their claim that we are assaulting Islam and have no altruistic motive and would almost certainly adversely impact other equally important elements of the strategy. In the very pragmatic ME, inability to perform leads to rejection in all aspects.

Most Americans realize on a visceral level that such a message is not wise and not in our national interest. I think that is a correct sensing on the part of most Americans.

Ken White

11-12-2007, 06:33 PM

... None of what we're experiencing should be a surprise, nor should it be the major issue we're making it out to be (serious yes, but significant no).

You don't defeat IEDs, you defeat the enemy who is emplacing the IEDs. Yet we have a task force dedicated to defeating IEDs. I have mixed feelings about this, of course my humane side loves the added armor, jammers, and new vehicles being fielded, but my practical side wonders if our focus on force protection (which is what this is all about) has somehow made us more vulnerable to losing the support of the population, which in this conflict means losing...

Target! BZ on the whole comment. Everyone should read it and digest it.

Ken White

11-12-2007, 09:01 PM

Pragmatic Thinker

11-12-2007, 09:07 PM

Target! BZ on the whole comment. Everyone should read it and digest it.

Ken,

I guess I will let you off the hook with your previous answer, but I would argue that having a strategy and focus tends to allow the commanders (PLT and above) in theater the ability to better focus their resources with some sort of endstate in mind. I think if you looked at some open source information you would see that our senior leadership (President on down to MNF-I/MNC-I Commanders) have failed to provide a clear strategy for our forces operating in Iraq. I am not so convinced that our strategy has a "bigger Middle East" theme and more of a "making it up as we go along" theme. I would be more convinced if the State Department could get its own foreign service corps to serve in Iraq and help implement this yet revealed Middle East strategy you refer to because I have scoured the internet looking for the POTUS and SECSTATE strategic vision for the Middle East, and how the forces currently in harms way are contributing to it.

The current calm in Iraq (if you listen to the pundits) is all due to the successful surge of U.S. forces, but I would argue (from my sources) that it is more to do with the MAS initiated cease-fire from late August then U.S. forces taking it to the enemy across Baghdad. My sources tell me the Shia's are buying time and waiting for the U.S. forces to finally withdrawal so they can finish standing up the latest Shia Islamic Republic in the Middle East. They also tell me that MAS could turn the violence back on with the snap of his finger, which is why we're doing the slow dance with Maliki and the other Shia sympathizers within the "sovereign" government. Now I am not trying to be a smart ass but was this part of the greater Middle East plan our administration had envisioned when invading Iraq? I find it peculiar that our senior leaders had a plan to overthrow Saddam but after that they didn't have a clue and when their assessments (Pearle, Wolfowitz, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and crew claimed the Iraqi's would welcome as liberators and quickly assume their own security and governing) failed to materialize they fell back and called it an insurgency. I would argue what we see in Iraq is less of an insurgency and more of a failed invasion with no real vision on how to correct it. We will see an invetiable civil war fought inside Iraq within the next 36-48 months with the victors most likely being the Shia's, and how this will play out in the greater Middle East has yet to be seen. Anyway, I am not buying the overall greater Middle East plan that is supposedly the answer for this protracted war...

In regards to IED's there is something like four major task forces within theater, and according to my sources neither of them is synched or coordinated but yet their overall annual budgets run into the billions!!

PT

Rank amateur

11-12-2007, 10:00 PM

it is a clear cut clash of cultures.

there is little we can do to bring the conflict in Iraq to an eventual end. Such end will be mostly up to the Iraqis and to a lesser extent up to us and in varying still lesser amounts (and in no particular order) to the Turks, the Syrians, the Saudis, the Iranians and various Islamist factions.

If both these statements are true, then the only way we can win is by changing the culture of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and various Islamic factions.

Ken White

11-12-2007, 10:01 PM

Ken,

I guess I will let you off the hook with your previous answer, but I would argue that having a strategy and focus tends to allow the commanders (PLT and above) in theater the ability to better focus their resources with some sort of endstate in mind...

Is what you argue for a strategic or an operational decision?

Do you want a strategy or coherent commanders guidance and intent? Not a smart aleck question, really. I'm using the book definition of strategy (LINK) (http://m-w.com/dictionary/strategy). Not trying to be pedantic or a smart aleck. Just using the definition I'm familiar with.

How finitely do you want this end state defined? IMO, it pretty well has been defined as minimal violence in all aspects and a reasonably functional Iraqi government, thus allowing a significant drawdown in the numbers of US forces committed.

I'd also suggest that our failure to provide unity of command is a big disruptor of any effort toward coherence. The Prez says what he wants, that's strategy. DoD says do what the boss wants, the Army and the Corps generate forces and then CentCom sits in Tampa and decides who goes where with apparently little rhyme or reason and MNF-I gets to implement the resultant mess. For that kettle of worms, you can blame Goldwater-Nichols and the Congress. The Admin, DoD, CentCom and MNF-I can't really change that (well CentCom could -- but they won't) :(

... I think if you looked at some open source information you would see that our senior leadership (President on down to MNF-I/MNC-I Commanders) have failed to provide a clear strategy for our forces operating in Iraq.

I've been a pretty voracious consumer of the open source material plus I still have a few friends and acquaintances who been there since Day 1 -- two there now -- and a serving son with three tours so I get a tad more than many do. IMO, it is not the President's job to tell DoD how to suck eggs (nor was it DoD's job to tell the Army how to do that - but that's another thread; as is the Army's failure to forcefully tell DoD of all the pitfalls...). That said, I would broadly agree with your assessment, pointing out that our one size fits all personnel 'system' placed LTG Ricardo Sanchez in initial command of MNF-I, a classic case of the wrong man for the job. In his defense, he grew up in an Army that never thought about or trained for an occupation or for an insurgency. Still, he and his successor were, IMO, more concerned about the Army than they were about the mission. That obviously led to major problems. Thus we agree on the practical effect but differ on who was at fault.

...I am not so convinced that our strategy has a "bigger Middle East" theme and more of a "making it up as we go along" theme. I would be more convinced if the State Department could get its own foreign service corps to serve in Iraq and help implement this yet revealed Middle East strategy you refer to because I have scoured the internet looking for the POTUS and SECSTATE strategic vision for the Middle East, and how the forces currently in harms way are contributing to it.

You may be correct but indications are that you are not. My assessment -- informed guess, really -- is that the 'strategy' was loose and open ended and the implementation is having to be made up as we go because no one involved had ever done anything like this before. I do know for a fact that senior career people at State have bureaucratically resisted Iraq from the get go and are doing as little as they can get away with.

The current calm in Iraq (if you listen to the pundits) is all due to the successful surge of U.S. forces, but I would argue (from my sources) that it is more to do with the MAS initiated cease-fire from late August then U.S. forces taking it to the enemy across Baghdad. My sources tell me the Shia's are buying time and waiting for the U.S. forces to finally withdrawal so they can finish standing up the latest Shia Islamic Republic in the Middle East. They also tell me that MAS could turn the violence back on with the snap of his finger, which is why we're doing the slow dance with Maliki and the other Shia sympathizers within the "sovereign" government...

I agree with all that. The surge was of marginal military value. FWIW, I didn't think it would make much difference and did not think the cost in several paramenters justified it.

... Now I am not trying to be a smart ass but was this part of the greater Middle East plan our administration had envisioned when invading Iraq? I find it peculiar that our senior leaders had a plan to overthrow Saddam but after that they didn't have a clue and when their assessments (Pearle, Wolfowitz, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and crew claimed the Iraqi's would welcome as liberators and quickly assume their own security and governing) failed to materialize they fell back and called it an insurgency. I would argue what we see in Iraq is less of an insurgency and more of a failed invasion with no real vision on how to correct it...

I agree with most of that. No question they had a short sighted and very unrealistic view of what would happen in Iraq. I think the initial plan involved a rapid withdrawal in the Aug-Sep 03 period and that something happened in early May to change that, thus the rapid (and bad) replacement of Garner by Bremer. Don't know what it was; it'll come out some day.

The insurgency in Iraq did not need to happen. The Intel community totally missed the planned insurgency even though Saddam announced his intentions. The Troops had no clue what to do after they got to Baghdad and some precipitate action by the troops and the absolutely stupid disbandment of the Iraqi Army and Police set in motion an escalation that need not have occurred.

We will see an invetiable civil war fought inside Iraq within the next 36-48 months with the victors most likely being the Shia's, and how this will play out in the greater Middle East has yet to be seen...

Perhaps. I'm no ME expert but I know enough about the pragmatism and behind the scenes maneuvering to know that little is as it seems and things can shift in unexpected directions. We'll see

... Anyway, I am not buying the overall greater Middle East plan that is supposedly the answer for this protracted war...

I'm not selling. You asked for my opinion and you got it, you don't have to take it or even like it.

It by the way is not the answer for this particular war -- it is the reason this particular war was started; the answer for this protracted war is for the Army, Marines (who bear significant responsibility for it being as protracted as it is) and other agencies to get their act together and fix it. The good news is that they have -- belatedly -- started doing that. And they all deserve Attaboys for doing that. Took 'em seven years to do that in Viet Nam, it's only taken three plus here. :wry:

In regards to IED's there is something like four major task forces within theater, and according to my sources neither of them is synched or coordinated but yet their overall annual budgets run into the billions!!

True and another's on the way -- That's not a strategy effect; has nothing what so ever to do with strategy. That's a DoD typical reaction to a problem; throw money at it and try for a technological fix instead of training people and just getting on with the job. I spent 45 years in and around DoD, it was that way the whole time and in the 12 years I've been retired, nothing has changed. :mad:

Pragmatic Thinker

11-12-2007, 10:57 PM

I'd also suggest that our failure to provide unity of command is a big disruptor of any effort toward coherence. The Prez says what he wants, that's strategy. DoD says do what the boss wants, the Army and the Corps generate forces and then CentCom sits in Tampa and decides who goes where with apparently little rhyme or reason and MNF-I gets to implement the resultant mess. For that kettle of worms, you can blame Goldwater-Nichols and the Congress. The Admin, DoD, CentCom and MNF-I can't really change that (well CentCom could -- but they won't)

I am in violent agreement with you regarding CENTCOM, history will not speak well of it's post-invasion management of this conflict. I can't go into too many details due to my proximity to the problem but the lack of doctrinal structure (look at the joint doctrine and then compare it to how the C2 is structured in theater) and some of the bafoonery that goes into the decisions of force disposition are absolutely criminal. The Army will also not fair well in the Iraqi rearview mirror. Modularity and the piece-mealing of units together without consideration of cohesion and unity of command is also to blame for the confusing picture on the ground. When a BCT enters into its 12 month pre-deployment train-up with its organic battalions this should be the force it fights with for 15 months. Also, with the BCT's having numerous rotations into theater you would assume it makes sense to return them to the same AOR to maximize unit familiarity with the populace, enemy, and terrain but that doesn't happen either. All too often you see a BCT train-up to go to area X, only to be told while in Kuwait waiting to enter the box that they are going somewhere else, and that two of their organic battalions will go somewhere else and they will inherit two battalions from a different BCT... I am no Patton or McArthur but that doesn't make sense to me. I am miffed as to how we justify this and expect effectiveness not to suffer?!?

True and another's on the way -- That's not a strategy effect; has nothing what so ever to do with strategy. That's a DoD typical reaction to a problem; throw money at it and try for a technological fix instead of training people and just getting on with the job. I spent 45 years in and around DoD, it was that way the whole time and in the 12 years I've been retired, nothing has changed. I agree with you sir...very sad indeed... Thanks for your response and candor.

PT

Ken White

11-12-2007, 11:48 PM

...
I am in violent agreement with you regarding CENTCOM, history will not speak well of it's post-invasion management of this conflict.... The Army will also not fair well in the Iraqi rearview mirror...

Edit: Uh, that would be protraCtion contRibutors. Hey. lee me loan, I'm old :)

Both true. Good news is the Army knows it and is working on fixing at least part of it. Bad news is that CentCom knows it and they and DoD don't care due to the 'joint' factor, the aforementioned B-N act and the rotation of round pegs into the square hole that is CinCCent every two or three years....

Poor way to do business.

Modularity and the piece-mealing of units together without consideration of cohesion and unity of command is also to blame for the confusing picture on the ground. When a BCT enters into its 12 month pre-deployment train-up with its organic battalions this should be the force it fights with for 15 months. Also, with the BCT's having numerous rotations into theater you would assume it makes sense to return them to the same AOR to maximize unit familiarity with the populace, enemy, and terrain but that doesn't happen either. All too often you see a BCT train-up to go to area X, only to be told while in Kuwait waiting to enter the box that they are going somewhere else, and that two of their organic battalions will go somewhere else and they will inherit two battalions from a different BCT... I am no Patton or McArthur but that doesn't make sense to me. I am miffed as to how we justify this and expect effectiveness not to suffer?!?

Thee, me and a couple of commanders I know. I cannot understand why DA tolerates it, I cannot understand why CentCom and the MNF-I do it (both, as I understand it have a hand in it) nor do I understand why Commanders are not raising the roof about it.

It also affects Afghanistan.

Rotation of units for seven months or a year (or more) is far, far better than individual rotation -- but just 'cause it's better, is no reason to try to undo the good effect it can have. Sad.

goesh

11-13-2007, 04:27 PM

I'm reminded of the movie the "Horse Whisperer" starring Robert Redford in which he demonstrates the unique ability to salvage a damaged horse so it can become a beloved family member again and ridden once more. We can't embrace the nightware of what we are doing nor can we make it go away nor will learn from it nor can we separate the personal from the collective, the subjective from the objective. Mr. Gentile brings to bear the pain of a Commander and the anguish of presenting dead sons to their parents, a pawn caught up in the higher powers of economics and politics. We have no war whisperer and never have had one. Copper replaced flint, bronze over copper, iron over bronze, the long bow the pike, the rimfire over cap and ball, the machine gun over the bolt action. We have gone from the sling to the JDAM in a blink of the evolutionary eye and real-time, high technology makes us only more painfully aware of our inability to stop killing, nothing more. It offers no solution, it offers no alternative, only saltation which the collective psyche that is filled with so much love cannot keep abreast of. We are left with the only consolation we have ever had, what is best for the tribe, and that mandates we stand our ground in Iraq. The walking wounded have no choice but to return to the lines and bunkers and streets and attempt to save what lives they can on both sides and gain a spate of peace before the next one starts up. As an old coot who's had his war, it is extremely rare to encounter combat Vets who say they wouldn't be in Iraq if they were young enough to do so.

Rob Thornton

11-13-2007, 10:15 PM

I saw some photos today of the MRAP series - its allot bigger then I thought it'd be - I think there is a photo of one being unwrapped to go to a unit responsible for running logistics on the MNF-I site. I originally hoped they'd just get RG-31s, or something of about the same size- the RG is not too much bigger then an 1151 - sits a little higher given its hull design, but its fairly narrow. The MRAPs I saw photos of today might work well on MSRs that are large, wide, stronger and free in power wires, accommodate a large turning radius, etc., but I'm not sure how much mobility they will have in some of the side streets, neighborhoods, and places where the infrastructure cannot accommodate something as big as a COUGAR or BUFFALO.

My concern now having seen at least a few photos of what we went with is that in the interest of maximum force protection, we've compromised mobility to a point where our hardware will at least in part limit our preferred tactics. I hope this is not the case, but its hard to say without climbing in one and driving it around in the environment - this may be one of those cases where we've over-engineered something to the point where its utility is very limited without testing it in the environment it will be used in - not EOD doing route clearance, but IN & AR (and MPs, and TTs, etc.) units doing urban mounted and dismounted patrols inside neighborhoods of cities and remote towns. There are always going to be trades in speed, mobility, protection and firepower when designing vehicles, but I hope this is not a case where we have over-emphasized one at the expense of the others - especially not when there was a good example of what right looked like in the RG.

If the initial buy of the big ones were to go to CSS and some CS units, that might not be too bad - but those units doing patrols might benefit from technology that suited the tactics they prefer to use in the places they need to go - otherwise we might be better off with 1151s/1114s.

It may well be that I just saw one of several variants to which at least one I did not see suits the requirements for the tactics we want to employ - I hope that is true.

Best, Rob

Here is a photo of an RG

redbullets

12-14-2007, 03:24 AM

There's an RFI at the end of this post. Moderator, please let me know if I should shift this over to the RFI section.

I have been exploring the humanitarian impact of IEDs upon civlian populations for the last year and a half. The humanitarian community has, by and large, been avoiding this issue. This is primarily a result of the principles of nuetrality that mainstream NGOs opeate under, and the lack of technical intervention capacity possessed by even the more advanced members of the Humanitarian Mine Action community.

I'm dropping a proposal tomorrow with a USG donor to conduct a study of IED victimilzation in three countries and craft an approrirate version of Mine Risk Education (MRE, what used to be called Mine Awareness) aimed at translating behavior modification strategies from the Humanitarian Mine Action community (and others, such as HIV Awareness) to threat reduction for civlian populations with significant IED exposure. Call it IED Risk Education (IEDRE).

My outfit has developed IED Awareness curricula in the past, and will include in this effort an exploration of strategies to protect aid workers in addition to the beneficiaries they serve. Seemed rather tragically timelly to have been writing this proposal when news of the Algiers bombing arrived.

Given our landmine survey work over the years, I started fooling around with some comparisons between our survey data and open source IED attack reports. A small example:

During the two-year period between 2004 and 2006 (our Landmine Impact Surveys examine the 24 month period prior to arrival of the data collectors), there were 12 landmine/UXO victims in Ta’meem (Kirkuk) Governorate. Of these victims, three were killed and nine wounded. On a single day during that same period, 15 June 2005, a suicide bomber struck in the city of Kirkuk. In this attack, 23 civilians were killed and nearly 100 wounded.

I'm raising this disparity within my own community largely because of the substantial amount of resorces directly toward Humanitarian Mine Action during the past 15 years. Not to say that this response shouldn't be happening, but that a similarly vigorous effort should be directed toward reducing the exposure of at-risk populations to IED attack, and toward public health response for victims.

I'm kicking out an OP/ED next week aimed at galvanizing a bit of interest and action within the relief and development arena, donors included, and will introduce four principles of humanitarian response to IEDs.

I'm interested in hearing folks' thoughts on this, and very interested in data sources (unclassified, or able to be declassified) that we might use as we drive this effort forward.

Cheers,

Chris Albon

12-14-2007, 05:07 AM

A little suggestion: Don't limit yourself to the direct health impacts of IEDs. Expand your research to include the indirect negative health consequences. Some examples off the top of my head: the halt of vaccination programs, flight of health professionals from the region, closure of medical clinics, halt of sanitation services (garage removal) etc.. etc.. When you include the indirect health consequences, the effect of IEDs on morbidity and mortality is going be to be orders of magnitude greater.

I know for a fact that after those chlorine truck IEDs the US started holding chlorine trucks at the border. This in turn led to a cholera epidemic (chlorine is used in some way to prevent cholera).

Rex Brynen

12-14-2007, 07:34 AM

Stan

12-14-2007, 08:13 AM

redbullets

12-14-2007, 01:31 PM

It seems to me that the challenge here is the limited options that civilian populations have, especially when those IEDs are deliberately targeted against locations where civilians must necessarily be as part of the fabric of their daily lives (markets, mosques, busy roads, etc). In contrast to mine casualties--where a significant proportion of casualties may come from ignoring warning signs, children failing to recognize mines and UXO, use of ad hoc, inadequate clearance methods, etc.--there is much less that civilians can do to reduce IED risks. Moreover, the IED risk is neither fixed in time or space, whereas the mine and UXO challenge may be much more so (leaving aside displacement due to weather or construction/clearance, or fresh mine laying due to continued hostilities).

What kinds and components of IED awareness education were you thinking might be effective, that aren't included in current mine awareness programmes (which typically include trip-wire type IEds and any suspicious ordnance)?

Thanks. The purpose of the study is to actually examine this and figure out what, if anything can be added to/extracted from MRE and other types of awareness campaigns to reduce exposure, in addition to pushing the increased public health impacts of victimization. I'm not aware of anyone in the humanitarian community who's done a serious study of the targeting around civilians in high-threat countries to illuminate trends such as target locations, time(s) of day, groups being singled out, etc. We do that in our own way in the Humanitarian Mine Action arena, but tools such as IMSMA do not support this in an IED context for reasons that include what you said above - landmines/UXO are static, and IEDs are active. That's a major theme and discussion I've included in the proposal I'm finishing.

Based on experience in Afghanistan and Iraq during the past six years, we've developed an analysis tool for the humanitarian community that does trend analysis of safety and security incidents, among a host of other things, and we're going to use this in our study to try and gel some targeting trends, and from those extract behavior modification that is doable.

I guess the whole point is that the humanitarian community is leaving this issue alone because its perceived as too hard. That conclusion appears to me to be drawn from anecdotal as opposed to empirical evidence. If you can advise housewives in Baghdad to do their shopping in little shops on side streets instead of high-traffic common markets, or advise fathers that they're better off praying at home this month due to trend X, there may be a victim reduction outcome. However, no one knows because to date this is all based on assumptions, or data that's been looked at from a primarily tactical/military perspective. We realize that any successful future risk education effort around IEDs would need to be very nimble and fluid as trends shift, and bad guys start monitoring campaign efforts.

Besides, why does more money go into Humanitarian Mine Action efforts in some places than into preventable disease? Few would argue that landmines/UXO claim more lives than a range of preventable maladies. Never been able to quite figure that out myself, but I suspect one reason is that its a lot simpler and easier to quantify landmines removed/destroyed than it is to quantify people who didn't get sick.

Cheers,

Tom Odom

12-14-2007, 01:36 PM

redbullets

12-14-2007, 01:58 PM

I agree with Rex; the majority of our most recent IED awareness program was very similar to our current UXO campaigns. Only the target audience changed to include adults over 50. We had a 10-year long mad bomber indiscriminately placing IEDs in residential areas and without any apparent motive (even now after a year of hearings he has yet to fully disclose his reasons).

The only commonalities were the general area where he liked to place his VOIEDs and the materials he used (thanks in part to our awareness campaign, one IED was rendered safe and recovered for forensics).

There was little hope in changing 100,000 people’s daily routine in a 10 square-kilometer residential area, so we concentrated on making people more aware and set up CCTVs. We counted on the folks that live in the general vicinity to review the recordings for what they conclude ‘doesn’t fit in my neighborhood’.

I’d be very interested in your four principles of humanitarian response to IEDs.

Thanks, Stan. My response is similar in vein to what I said to Rex - in a humanitarian context, with such high victimization reported to be occcuring in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the humanitarian community is currently clueless. All we know data-wise at the moment is that "its really bad" and we don't know if we can do anything about it, never mind what to do.

A lone mad-bomber (I'm not familier with the situation in Estonia, so pardon my ignorance) can be tracked/monitored, I suspect, by using commonly available GIS-based crime tracking systems. There are ready-to-use application extensions available from ESRI and a range of other compaines that allow that. And, as you pointed out, that was a much smaller population at-risk in a much smaller geographic area. The situation in countries where the IED threat is very high is a bit different than scattered whack jobs, I reckon. Hell, it might be harder, too hard, in those high-threat countries, but our community doesn't actually know much at the moment.

Our own IED Safety Training over the past few years has focused on what it sounds like yours did - signs to look for, things to avoid, who to report to, etc. Our organization has been somehow or another involved, victimized if you will, in five IED incidents in Afghanistan and Iraq, with serious injuries reulting from two of the incidents, so we take our safety and precautions very seriously. But, what I'm interested in learning with this effort is, if trends are able to be monitored and clarified, can large-scale behavior modification have some kind of positive impact.

I'm not suggesting that this somehow falls outside the Humanitarian Mine Action community - they're the only ones who will be initially willing to take this on if there's more that can be done to reduce victimization than is currently the case.

I'll send you my principles off line - I've tweaked them as much as I'm probably going to, but I'm reserving them to hopefully have a bit of impact among the relief/development folks.

Cheers,

redbullets

12-14-2007, 02:04 PM

Stan

what is the pull today between demining and UXO disposal? I know that when setting up the demining op in Rwanda, I could get US monies for demining. I could not get them for UXOs--which were in fact the greater problem. has that tug of war changed?

seems to me it would play in this idea as well. the lines between an IED, a UXO, and a "mine" are very semantic, distinguished by targeting or lack or targeting to a large degree.

best

Tom

The major US office that funds this sort of thing, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at State has been taking a comprehensive approach to this for some years. They fund landmine/UXO mitigation efforts based upon reality on the ground, instead of focusing on landmines. They also have added Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) and MANPADS to their portfolio, and from the most recent donor workshop I attended with them a month and a half ago, are really taking this holistic approach seriously.

Here's the link to their site - http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/

Stan

12-14-2007, 02:17 PM

Hey Joe !

Thanks. The purpose of the study is to actually examine this and figure out what, if anything can be added to/extracted from MRE and other types of awareness campaigns to reduce exposure, in addition to pushing the increased public health impacts of victimization. I'm not aware of anyone in the humanitarian community who's done a serious study of the targeting around civilians in high-threat countries to illuminate trends such as target locations, time(s) of day, groups being singled out, etc. We do that in our own way in the Humanitarian Mine Action arena, but tools such as IMSMA do not support this in an IED context for reasons that include what you said above - landmines/UXO are static, and IEDs are active. That's a major theme and discussion I've included in the proposal I'm finishing.

Glad you brought up IMSMA’s applications and inherent shortcomings when dealing with what Estonia considers ‘other aspects of Demining and UXO clearance’. More often than not, UXO are the lifeblood of our IED builders (our criminals scoop out the HE and sell the metal – a bit more refined and business savvy than their Iraqi brethren).

Because Estonia’s structure here includes typical law enforcement duties (sweeps and post blast to name a few), we deal with both UXO and IED threats. We decided long ago to tailor the IMSMA platform to meet our needs in both arenas. That is, the trends you mention above. We have yet to ‘master’ the system, but what we do have in our DB helped us catch our last mad bomber. Granted, Estonia is far smaller than Iraq and Afghanistan, and the criminals far fewer.

Regards, Stan

Stan

12-14-2007, 02:25 PM

Tom, Joe was much faster on the keyboard :mad:

Stan

what is the pull today between demining and UXO disposal? I know that when setting up the demining op in Rwanda, I could get US monies for demining. I could not get them for UXOs--which were in fact the greater problem. has that tug of war changed?

seems to me it would play in this idea as well. the lines between an IED, a UXO, and a "mine" are very semantic, distinguished by targeting or lack or targeting to a large degree.

best

Tom

Basically, and just about the time you left Rwanda, State figured out Mines weren't the only problems, especially in the former east bloc.

We, for example, just got in on the waterborne issue along with Vietnam (prior to that, rarely could we get funding for clearance of lakes and rivers). Sitting on Estonia's eastern border with one of (then) HDO's kingpins, DH was taking happy snaps when our divers surfaced with AT mines :D The Gods were watching over me that day ! :eek:

I ended up with funding for boats, motors, diving gear...you name it.

WRA (http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/)

The Office develops, implements and monitors policy, programs and public engagement efforts that contribute to the prevention and mitigation of conflict, as well as post-conflict social and economic recovery. The focus is three-fold: to curb the illicit trafficking, availability and indiscriminate use of conventional weapons of war that fuel regional and internal instability; to pursue and help manage post-conflict cleanup of such weapons in areas needed for civilian use; and to engage civil society to broaden support for our efforts and enhance U.S. influence.

The Office furthers U.S. foreign policy goals through the development and implementation of comprehensive solutions to the security challenges and harmful humanitarian effects caused by the illicit proliferation of conventional weapons of war, and the existence of public hazards from such weapons following cessation of armed conflict. Conventional weapons and munitions addressed by the Office include but are not limited to landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and other small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). The office strives to limit the access of terrorist or criminal groups to such weapons and munitions. At the same time, by addressing acute humanitarian needs, this office demonstrates the United States commitment to a set of values that respects human life. The Office works closely with other U.S. Government agencies as well as non-governmental organizations, international organizations and private enterprises. Innovation, strategic vision, responsible stewardship and cooperative team effort are all qualities that are encouraged by this office.

The Office incorporates the functions and responsibilities of the Bureau's former Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs (PM/HDP), to include management of the multi-agency U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program, the former Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships (PM/MAIP), to include encouraging public-private partnerships to reinforce the gamut of threats addressed by the Office, and the small arms/light weapons and MANPADS duties of the Bureau's Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis (PM/PPA).

Regards, Stan

redbullets

12-14-2007, 03:15 PM

Hey Joe !

Glad you brought up IMSMA’s applications and inherent shortcomings when dealing with what Estonia considers ‘other aspects of Demining and UXO clearance’. More often than not, UXO are the lifeblood of our IED builders (our criminals scoop out the HE and sell the metal – a bit more refined and business savvy than their Iraqi brethren).

Because Estonia’s structure here includes typical law enforcement duties (sweeps and post blast to name a few), we deal with both UXO and IED threats. We decided long ago to tailor the IMSMA platform to meet our needs in both arenas. That is, the trends you mention above. We have yet to ‘master’ the system, but what we do have in our DB helped us catch our last mad bomber. Granted, Estonia is far smaller than Iraq and Afghanistan, and the criminals far fewer.

Regards, Stan

Stan:

Its funny, its been so many years since I've thought of landmines and UXO seperately in the macro sense that I forget that was how it used to be.

I think we should show you the toy our uber-geeks came up with. We can do it over Skype, with a bolt-on application that allows live demonstrations kind of like WebX or Oracle.

The Operational Activity Security Information System (OASIS) that we developed does a whole lot of things, but one of the most important is that it takes the geeks out of the loop - all of the analyses and queries are doable by the average operator. That was a direct result of our many years working with IMSMA and hearing the concerns of field operators.

Cheers,

Stan

12-14-2007, 03:45 PM

Stan:

Its funny, its been so many years since I've thought of landmines and UXO seperately in the macro sense that I forget that was how it used to be.

I think we should show you the toy our uber-geeks came up with. We can do it over Skype, with a bolt-on application that allows live demonstrations kind of like WebX or Oracle.

The Operational Activity Security Information System (OASIS) that we developed does a whole lot of things, but one of the most important is that it takes the geeks out of the loop - all of the analyses and queries are doable by the average operator. That was a direct result of our many years working with IMSMA and hearing the concerns of field operators.

Cheers,

Careful Joe, people could figure out just how old you really are :D

Although we're supposed to be the heart of Skype here, most steer clear of using it (and the MOI server tends to block it).

We also needed to take the geek factor out of using our DB, especially in the field. Unfortunately, I can't share or even access our server outside the intranet...we're working on that firewall issue though. We simplified IMSMA's system using our existing data base and then added Google Earth. We had to deal with Estonian laws and try to remain transparent too. 5 years later, I think we have a good product, but still can't share it with partners.

We're looking at a visit from WRA early next year and more funding :) Maybe, this time, DH will attempt to visit when it's warm :D

Regards, Stan

Rex Brynen

12-14-2007, 09:32 PM

Besides, why does more money go into Humanitarian Mine Action efforts in some places than into preventable disease?

Oh, I have no presumptions about the macro-rationality of donor assistance!

It does seem to me there are some aspects in which demining may have a certain "strategic" significance. Given the frequency with which transport routes, abandoned housing, economic infrastructure, etc. is mined, demining becomes essential for a range of related imperatives (refugee return, agricultural production, economic growth). Moreover, mines and UXO can be a major source of explosives, and so there is a military/counterterrorism implication here too.

None of which invalidates looking at IEDs as posing different sorts of challenges, as you propose to do.

redbullets

12-17-2007, 01:16 PM

Oh, I have no presumptions about the macro-rationality of donor assistance!

It does seem to me there are some aspects in which demining may have a certain "strategic" significance. Given the frequency with which transport routes, abandoned housing, economic infrastructure, etc. is mined, demining becomes essential for a range of related imperatives (refugee return, agricultural production, economic growth). Moreover, mines and UXO can be a major source of explosives, and so there is a military/counterterrorism implication here too.

None of which invalidates looking at IEDs as posing different sorts of challenges, as you propose to do.

My organization has conducted something called Landmine Impact Surveys for several years - these efforts werre actually the original reason our team was brought together in late-1998. Our last serious one was in 13 of Iraq's 18 governorates. For the most part, the major contaminated countries with real need for these expensive, time-consuming projects have been completed or are underway. I think there's a rathional tendency now to exampine the same kind of infratructure blockages/impacts that these surveys specifically look at, and that you mention above, but cull the data from a wider variety (read: cheaper) range of alternate sources, and there are more and more tools out there that allow this.

Here is the first of the four principles of humanitarian response to IEDs that I developed, and that I think addresses your point about explosives supply:

1. In most, if not all countries where IEDs are employed, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) on former or current battlefields are a foundational component of the IED assembly line. Humanitarian efforts to eliminate landmines, UXO and Abandoned and Hazardous Ordnance (AO/HO) should include the impacts of IEDs upon civilians when prioritizing ERW mitigation. IEDs that are “fed” by abandoned caches, depots and other ERW sources are NOT a threat distinct from currently accepted HMA parameters.

Cheers,

Stan

12-17-2007, 03:00 PM

Hi Joe !

Here is the first of the four principles of humanitarian response to IEDs that I developed, and that I think addresses your point about explosives supply:

1. In most, if not all countries where IEDs are employed, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) on former or current battlefields are a foundational component of the IED assembly line. Humanitarian efforts to eliminate landmines, UXO and Abandoned and Hazardous Ordnance (AO/HO) should include the impacts of IEDs upon civilians when prioritizing ERW mitigation. IEDs that are “fed” by abandoned caches, depots and other ERW sources are NOT a threat distinct from currently accepted HMA parameters.

Cheers,

Well put ! Oddly enough, we've known this for some time, but never seemed to get the HDO community to address and recognize the direct correlation between UXO and IEDs. Although our IED incidences have decreased over the last 10 years, I had hoped to address IEDs in my future country plans for funding considerations instead of finding injured or maimed children’s pictures :wry:

Hmmm, are you still working on the other 3 points or do you intend to feed those to us once per day :D

redbullets

12-18-2007, 02:33 PM

Thanks, Stan. I'll e-mail the others to you - still a bit protective of them as I want to get in a good position with them to tweak the humanitarian community for having failed to address the issue.

I'm sure if we can cull the data around targets even partially, we can begin to make assessments concerning infrastructure impacts/damage in addition to the victimization trends, rates, and public health system impacts and needs. Anyway, if we can get the data in some viable form beyond the daily media hyperbole, maybe we can make something happen.

There's a very practical element to this that the Humanitarian Mine Action community should consider. Funding specifically aimed at demining/EOD is on the decline, and increasingly focus is being placed on mainstreaming (linking demining to overarching relief/development/infrasructure programs) and the holistic, all-conventional-weapons approach. That ordnance sources feed IED production, and subsequent IED use produces civlian casualties, should add some impetus toward keeping humanitarian demining/EOD capacities a bit more vibrant than might have been the future outcome.

Cheers,

Jedburgh

06-12-2008, 02:24 PM

The Daily Item, 10 Jun 08: Swampscott PD to Speak to Students on Dangers of IEDs (http://www.itemlive.com/articles/2008/06/10/news/news16.txt)

In an effort to curb the rising number of incidents involving improvised explosive devices, the Swampscott Police Department and the Massachuessetts State Police Hazadrous Devices Unit will speak to students Wednesday at Swampscott Middle School about the dangers associated with making IEDs.

Several Middle School students have been involved in incidents involving IEDs in the last couple of years. The most recent was in May, when a student was disfigured when an IED he was making blew up.....
http://home.eol.ca/~dord/cal_bomb02.jpg

Tom Odom

06-12-2008, 02:43 PM

The Daily Item, 10 Jun 08: Swampscott PD to Speak to Students on Dangers of IEDs (http://www.itemlive.com/articles/2008/06/10/news/news16.txt)

http://home.eol.ca/~dord/cal_bomb02.jpg

We use to make "IEDs" when I was a kid with gunpowder from dud firecrackers and other fireworks. Of course M-80s wrapped together with a single fuse were just dandy. :cool:

And my older cousins in Oklahoma were all in the Nat Guard and used to bring home hand grenade and artillery simulators as well as .30 cal blanks that were great in my 03 Springfield--much better than going bang bang when you played army. :D

I remember Mom coming out rather indignant when Dad was trying to get a nap one afternoon at the family homestead in east Texas, "Tommy do you have to throw those bombs while your father is trying to sleep!?!"

Tom

selil

06-12-2008, 08:03 PM

In high school metal shop I made a completely accurate 1/8th scale Army Cannon based on blue prints I found from the 1870s. My instructor was none to happy when he found out that it was fully functional. In wood shop I made the cart for it. It'd shoot a tennis ball a long freaking ways. Or not very far at all if you loaded to much smokeless behind it. Estes rocket motor igniters are how we fired it off.

Jedburgh

06-12-2008, 08:33 PM

I grew up in an area right next to a RR switching yard. We'd often hang out there and just slap various stuff together to see what kind of bang or flame it would make. There were some really good ones, along with a few dud experiments....

Some kids just don't have any sense, though, and go beyond the normal boyhood exuberance in doing the pipe bomb thing - and with black powder it always seems to go wrong when screwing down the metal end-caps. I have a picture somewhere of a high school kid who was doing exactly that in his garage (for a school science project - approved by the teacher!) and blew himself across the hood of dad's car. That was a few years ago - but it was only three months ago that a Mom in Oklahoma was charged with "explosives manufacturing" for buying her teenage son supplies to build pipe bombs.

Stan

06-12-2008, 08:50 PM

Among my current favorites are Polish made M40s (approx. 1/4 stick of TNT equivalent) and the good old days of mixing powdered aluminum, salt peter and sugar.

Sam, sounds like a sweet canon ! Portions of my misspent youth in DC was making tennis ball canons outta real coke cans, mucho duct tape, and a little bit of Zippo fluid :D

Back to reality - Seems the more ghastly the posters and commercials are, the more likely children will continue to play with ordnance and explosives to their very detriment. We have a 1997 clip of an incident involving 6th graders who placed a 155 round into a campfire. Although the round detonated low order, a large portion of the projectile killed a young girl and the blast effect and debris injured seven others. One would think that such footage would suffice and preclude future incidences. Sadly, not.

I hope the current popularity of IEDs (especially in films) doesn't end up producing more idiots and casualties among our youth :mad:

Jedburgh

06-12-2008, 09:01 PM

I hope the current popularity of IEDs (especially in films) doesn't end up producing more idiots and casualties among our youth :mad:
Stan, it already has, to a certain extent - no epidemic certainly (despite the concerns in Swampscot), but enough to ping stats up a bit nationwide. Combine the instigation/motivation of IEDs in films, in the news and the availability of directions (often dangerously inaccurate) on the 'net and off they go.

Of course, for some it is merely another form of self-accelerated natural selection.

selil

06-12-2008, 09:20 PM

Back to reality - Seems the more ghastly the posters and commercials are, the more likely children will continue to play with ordnance and explosives to their very detriment.

It doesn't have to be ordinance. Between my Junior and Senior year of high school I did boot camp and Armor School at good ol' Fort Knox, Ky (National Guard split option training program). In the course of my three months there I watched a guy get run over by a tank on the ramp, another guy squished between two tanks, and another guy rip off three fingers when a turret traversed unexpectedly. All things we had seen grisly nasty examples of, and all things we had been told billions upon billions of times not to do. In fact the guy directing the tanks that got squished was one of the training cadre.

Months of high quality training can not overcome moments of idiocy a public relations campaign has no hopes.

J Wolfsberger

06-13-2008, 02:22 AM

You guys had way more fun. I got shut down when I was trying to make nitroglycerin in high school chem lab. (Hell, I was only going to make a few ounces ... :()

Adam L

06-13-2008, 04:37 AM

I agree, the PR campaign isn't going to do anything. These kids need something a little more graphic and realistic. Unfortunately, the only ideas I can come up with for this would probably end in law suits. :(

If you do not mind foul language and want a laugh, I would suggest you see what Denis Leary has to say about this. (Click Here (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2EGCwPXDR-0)) (I know this is a little of topic, but I think it's along the same lines.)

Adam L

Stan

06-13-2008, 07:20 AM

Stan, it already has, to a certain extent - no epidemic certainly (despite the concerns in Swampscot), but enough to ping stats up a bit nationwide. Combine the instigation/motivation of IEDs in films, in the news and the availability of directions (often dangerously inaccurate) on the 'net and off they go.

Ted, had to wait til morning to log onto LEO/EOD. Jeez, the nationwide stats make Swamscot look safe (with only 3 filed incidences). It appears that post 9/11 legislative changes have turned some of our childhood experiments into jail time. Glad I got most of it out of my system and now get paid to do it :p

Of course, for some it is merely another form of self-accelerated natural selection.

Adam's work safe video (except for 'virgin ears' Ken) fits this to a tee :D

... In the course of my three months there I watched a guy get run over by a tank on the ramp, another guy squished between two tanks, and another guy rip off three fingers when a turret traversed unexpectedly.

Glad I studied and later taught at Edgewood Area APG, Sam :cool:

Regards, Stan

Jedburgh

06-13-2008, 12:37 PM

....It appears that post 9/11 legislative changes have turned some of our childhood experiments into jail time. Glad I got most of it out of my system and now get paid to do it :p
You ain't kiddin'. Making homemade explosives in a RR switching yard? Would probably end up in Gitmo now. :eek:

Tom Odom

06-13-2008, 12:49 PM

You ain't kiddin'. Making homemade explosives in a RR switching yard? Would probably end up in Gitmo now. :eek:

I was watching TCM the other evening while having dinner and I caught the end of one movie and the beginning of another...

Both starred Robert Taylor and both were about knights. One was a very distorted Ivanhoe and the other was Knights of the Round Table. They came out in the early 50s and by the late 50s were showing on our then 3 channel TV sets in black and white.

Those 2 movies (and others of the same genre) inspired neighbohood jousting matches on bicycles with pointed lances and apple crate shields. Sword fights with the same shields and one by two swords suitablly pointed. Our aluminum foil and cardboard "helmets" did little to soften a blow that came over the top of the shield. Apple crate lids slowed but did not stop a lance touch when 2 kids were hurtling toward each other at top speeds.

Nobody got seriously hurt. Go figure.

Tom

06-13-2008, 01:00 PM

I was watching TCM the other evening while having dinner and I caught the end of one movie and the beginning of another...

Both starred Robert Taylor and both were about knights. One was a very distorted Ivanhoe and the other was Knights of the Round Table. They came out in the early 50s and by the late 50s were showing on our then 3 channel TV sets in black and white.

Those 2 movies (and others of the same genre) inspired neighbohood jousting matches on bicycles with pointed lances and apple crate shields. Sword fights with the same shields and one by two swords suitablly pointed. Our aluminum foil and cardboard "helmets" did little to soften a blow that came over the top of the shield. Apple crate lids slowed but did not stop a lance touch when 2 kids were hurtling toward each other at top speeds.

Nobody got seriously hurt. Go figure.

Tom

Akin to that was the "Posse chasing the Outlaws" game, using bikes. I still don't know why no bones were broken as the good guys swooped down and, while rolling along at top speed, leaped from one bike to the other to pull the outlaw off his "horse" (a la the Lone Ranger and a host of other defenders of frontier justice). We were never good enough ropers to be successful at lassoing anyone off his bike though.

Tom Odom

06-13-2008, 01:09 PM

Akin to that was the "Posse chasing the Outlaws" game, using bikes. I still don't know why no bones were broken as the good guys swooped down and, while rolling along at top speed, leaped from one bike to the other to pull the outlaw off his "horse" (a la the Lone Ranger and a host of other defenders of frontier justice). We were never good enough ropers to be successful at lassoing anyone off his bike though.

Yep we did that one too. We also had a small rail head behind my grandad's house where the highway department stored gravel and asphalt in 50 foot mounds that were 30-40 yards long. They were absolutely fantastic for downhill bicycle racing with superb crashes. No helmets. No pads. Just skinned knees, elbows, and faces if you did the headfirst pitch over. Later we added ramps at the bottom. Just got better and better...

06-13-2008, 01:35 PM

One of our craziest efforts along that line was a simulation of the rocket sled sequence that opened that TV show. We used several truck tire inner tubes tied between two trees to launch us on our bikes at high speed into the very large sandpile that a housing contractor had left behind. Great fun, and the sand caused your bike chain to make some really weird noises--better than the motorcycle sounds of baseball cards, clothes-pinned on the chain stays and fork, flapping in the spokes.

Jedburgh

06-13-2008, 01:38 PM

All of this plays back into something that many of us have mentioned in relation to a number of topics on the board. The current environment in which kids are growing up is way overregulated - safety restrictions intended to protect the dumbest, parents looked at askance by the general population if they encourage or allow children to do anything perceived as dangerous, and low-level altercations between kids treated as a major threat to life and security. Sure, extreme sports are popular - but only an extreme minority are actually involved - the majority watch them sitting on their behinds or get involved vicariously through computer gaming.

This is what ends up being our recruiting pool - young'uns who are risk averse, are unused to any sort of physical hardship, let alone having ever been involved in a fight or even a really heated argument. I live in what used to be a rural heartland, and is still huntin' and fishin' heaven for many. But the number of kids that are involved is steadily shrinking. And don't even get me started on the way school sports are run these days at Middle/Junior/High School levels.

Sure, there are plenty of exceptions to the Nancy-boy stereotype I just painted - but from where I sit, that's exactly what they are - exceptions.

Along these general lines, and for your entertainment: Fun Toy Banned Because Of Three Stupid Dead Kids (http://www.theonion.com/content/node/28331)

Jedburgh

06-17-2008, 01:12 PM

Moderator's Note

Thread closed as there is new, main thread 'IEDs: the home-made bombs that changed modern war': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16303

Canadian Army Journal, Spring 08: Ambush, IEDs and COIN: The French Experience (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_11/iss_1/CAJ_vol11.1_04_e.pdf)

....Some may think that because a technical or tactical solution to IEDs would eliminate their strategic threat, all our energies should be directed at finding such a solution. It is, without a doubt, imperative to do everything possible to protect our troops against ambushes and IEDs. However, it is equally imperative to avoid the dangerous illusion that anti-IED techniques constitute a strategic “silver bullet.” In insurgencies and other asymmetric conflicts, beyond the enemy’s resolve, imagination and cleverness are their greatest strength. New measures to defeat our countermeasures will be found, and the cycle of measure and countermeasure will continue.

This paper proposes to shed strategic light on the issues of ambushes and IEDs in the context of foreign interventions in counter-insurgency missions through a series of short case studies, showing how armed forces have dealt with ambushes, IEDs, mines and booby traps in various eras. The purpose of these case studies is not to conduct a systematic analysis of tactical or even operational level solutions or to provide a full description of the political events surrounding them. It is instead to illustrate that tactical and operational level solution to ambushes and IEDs have contributed to setting the conditions for strategic success in past conflicts, but unfortunately they have not been the determining factor. In other words, tactical and operational level solutions are crucial but not sufficient to deal with such threats.

Three cases studies are presented below: the 19th and 20th century French operations in Algeria, and the French Indochina War. These are followed by a discussion of the key elements that they have in common with respect to the strategic dimension of ambushes and IEDs. Some concluding remarks complete the study.....

patmc

06-20-2008, 01:26 AM

This article provides a short but effective study of France in Algeria, Indochina, then again in Algeria, and argues that without a solid strategic plan, operational and tactical victory in COIN are not enough.

Focuses on insurgents use of IEDs and ambushes as strategic weapons, and how tactical countermeasures are not enough for victory, as the counterinsurgent's home populace will likely eventually tire and lose popular will.

The last portion discusses the US in Iraq, and how again, tactical and operational countermeasures against IEDs and ambushes may achieve temporary success, without a grander strategic plan, US will ultimately fail.

Pretty reasonable argument.

cj.kirkpatrick

06-20-2008, 06:10 PM

This is an insightful article, and highlight's an American obsession with the "silver bullet" of the IED fight. I think that's b/c it is intellectually easy to find technological solutions to problems. Time and again, we look for the better vehicle, the better EW solution, the better ISR asset to protect routes and Soldiers who travel on those routes.

While it is critical to secure our Soldiers and our lines of communication with all the above force protection strategies, we cannot lose focus on the actual solution to the problem. That solution is found off the very roads we commit so much energy to seizing and securing. To maintain momentum and an offensive mindset, we have to consider security of LOCs and Soldiers as access to people, not an end-state. Constant presence and relationships among people prevents IED emplacement, not the latest and greatest magical tech tool.

redbullets

06-21-2008, 10:02 PM

Thanks for posting this. I'm finishing up a piece about IEDs that looks at both the fact that they're here to stay, the genie having been released from the bottle long ago, and then going into a discussion of how the humanitarian community should respond in areas where IEDs pose a much larger threat to civilian populations than landmines/UXO.

Funny how sexy "new" terms like IED suddenly get everyone oriented toward a new Manhattan project, despite all historical evidence to the contrary. I'm using incidents in my piece that include the attempted assassination of Sultan Abdul Hamid II by car bomb (1905, first recorded such incident), the horse-drawn wagon bomb at the JP Morgan Bank (1920), Bath MIchigan (1927), as well as BATF's own (2000-2003) web site to illustrate that IEDs are nothing new, given we have between 200 and 500 successfully detonated IEDs in the US per anum.

Cheers,

Rex Brynen

06-22-2008, 05:21 AM

I'm using incidents in my piece that include the attempted assassination of Sultan Abdul Hamid II by car bomb (1905, first recorded such incident)

What about the 24 December 1800 attempted assassination of Napoleon (http://www.answers.com/topic/napoleonic-wars-espionage-during)? Surely wagon-bombs count!

The First Consul Napoleon was required to be present at a performance in the Paris Grande Opera. When Napoleon's carriage rushed along Saint Nicolas Street, an explosion resounded. Napoleon did not suffer; his carriage was driving too quickly, but the power of the explosion was such that almost 50 people were killed or wounded and 46 neighboring houses were damaged. The source was a barrel of gunpowder laced with shrapnel that was hidden in a harnessed wagon at the roadside.

"Napoleonic Wars, Espionage During," Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security (2004)

redbullets

06-22-2008, 12:14 PM

Thanks, I'll use this one too. I guess I'm categorizing based on actual automobiles and wagons in what I'm writing, but an attempted hit on another major international historical figure is great fodder for what I'm working on. A bit of shock value is certainly the goal, mainly to try and let readers know that IEDs have been around since gun powder, and that the US has not been an exception.

Another section I'm including is on the Rains brothers during the American Civil War. In the interest of full disclosure, I've referred to writings about BG Gabriel and COL George Rains by Mike Wright and Peggy Robbins in presentations about landmines, but since Gabriel took friction fuses developed by George and put them on artilery shells, I reckon they will work as another early example of IEDs in the US. Gabriel even managed to kill a 'possum with one while chasing Seminoles in Florida in the 1840's.

Cheers,

Wagram

07-30-2008, 02:45 PM

Having spoken to many veterans of the war in Algeria, read articles as well as countless books written in french on the subject, I have to say I found the article too light on research and too heavy on assumptions.

In Algeria, IEDs aren't mentioned as a major threat in books written by veterans of that periods. The trail running along the "Morice line" (a barbed wire control zone separating Algeria from Tunisia) and patrolled day and night by protected vehicles (M3 half-tracks, Scout Cars, M8 Greyhounds and the like) was often mined by the ALN but IEDs as such were a rarity. The main threat was encountering an ALN katiba in transit from Tunisia before it had "bomb shelled" and while it still had all its fire power (including the dreaded MG-42 MGs that were far superior to what most french units used then, either the FM 24/29 or even the BAR LMGs, the AAT-52 LMG arriving only late in the conflict).

A good friend of mine was a FFL Pn Cdr at the time; he survived dozens of contacts in the Djebel but he never once mentioned to me IEDs.

The ALN units did not want to be surprized in the open planting complicated devices; mines were used but they were heavy and had to be manpacked all the way from Tunisia; their use was thus more widespread close to the Morice Line.

Jedburgh

09-17-2008, 03:23 PM

16 Sep 08 testimony before the HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on Defeating the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Other Asymmetric Threats: Today’s Efforts and Tomorrow’s Requirements:

LTG Thomas Metz (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI091608/Metz_Testimony091608.pdf), Director JIEDDO

.....in spite of our successes, IEDs remain the enemy’s weapon of choice in Iraq and Afghanistan. We currently see over 1,400 IED events in Iraq and Afghanistan and another 350 elsewhere in the world every month. These numbers have the capacity to go much higher, because the enemy will continue to exploit readily available commercial technology to rapidly produce IEDs in unending cycles of innovation. We must continue to apply pressure to make IEDs too costly to produce and too risky to employ. We will never run this weapon off the battlefield, but we must relentlessly attack the networks that finance, develop, and emplace IEDs. In this Long War, where global terrorism will continue to manifest itself as persistent conflict waged against human targets, we must also further diminish the strategic effects of IEDs, reducing their appeal for global employment by violent extremists. JIEDDO is the organization to combat this critical threat.

Through its focus on IEDs, JIEDDO has learned a great deal about other domains, such as human networks. In order to further leverage JIEDDO’s unique abilities to support the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, while meeting the global challenge of prevailing in the Long War, it may be appropriate at a future time to widen JIEDDO’s focus to include other asymmetric threats.....
William Beasley (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI091608/Beasley_Testimony091608.pdf), Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell

Tom Matthews (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI091608/Matthews_Testimony091608.pdf), Director, Warfighter Requirements and Evaluations

MG Jason Kamiya (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI091608/Kamiya_Testimony091608.pdf), Director, Joint Training Directorate (J7) USJFCOM

....USJFCOM (http://www.jfcom.mil) recognizes that the IED is but one of many asymmetric weapons that our enemies can employ. In response to DOD guidance on improving the ability of the joint force to counter irregular threats, USJFCOM is establishing (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/ann-roosevelt-reports-in-defen/) an Irregular Warfare Center (IWC). The IWC’s principle role is to make irregular warfare a core competency for US conventional forces. It will integrate efforts within USJFCOM and act as a bridge to USSOCOM and other organizations to identify the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facility, and policy implications in countering asymmetric threats.

Working with the Combatant Commands and the Services, USJFCOM continually examines how asymmetric threats should be integrated into the joint training environment. One of the major areas of concern is the joint force’s ability to counter cyberspace attacks on friendly networks and operate in a degraded state. This is an area that will see added emphasis in our training and exercise programs. KnIFE (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/wjtsc07_2rdhd_knife.doc) has also begun to widen its focus to other asymmetric threats besides IED’s. For example, they recently unveiled a site on their portal with information on countering enemy use of snipers. KnIFE intends to leverage the USJFCOM IWC as a source for demand signals from the field on other specific asymmetric threats that should be addressed by KnIFE’s information services.....
Bradley Berkson (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI091608/Berkson_Testimony091608.pdf), Director, Programs, Analysis and Evaluation

Unfortunately, the transcript for the Q&A isn't currently available.

Van

01-10-2009, 06:09 AM

Moderator's Note

Thread closed as there is new, main thread 'IEDs: the home-made bombs that changed modern war': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16303

Can anyone cite the use of a VBIED prior to 7 August 1588?

The oldest VBIED I've been able to track down is the "hell burners", the massive charges of gunpowder loaded on ships and pointed at the Spanish fleet by English Lord Admiral Charles Howard (and an effective weapon they were).

If someone's got an older example, I'd like to push this date further back. Candidly, I'm frustrated and annoyed by the folks who talk as if IEDs are innovative and new.

Thanks!

AmericanPride

01-10-2009, 06:45 AM

Van,

A possible candidate:

- 1363: Battle of Lake Poyang (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Lake_Poyang); Chinese used a similar technique to the one you described.

The main action of that day (31 August) would involve the creation and launching of fire ships by the Ming. Small rafts and fishing boats were loaded up with bales of straw and gunpowder, set aflame, and launched toward the enemy fleet. Dummies with armor and weapons were placed on the fireships as well, to aid in confusing and tricking the enemy. Due to a favorable wind, and the tight formation of the Han fleet, the fire ships were very successful, and many Han ships were either destroyed or suffered extensive damage.

There might be an earlier Chinese example because the Chinese introduced gunpowder to the battlefield in the 10th century. And though not 'explosive', there are of course many historical examples of setting fire to some kind of vehicle (wheels, wagons, ships, animals, etc) and employing them against the enemy.

Granite_State

01-10-2009, 07:08 AM

Can anyone cite the use of a VBIED prior to 7 August 1588?

The oldest VBIED I've been able to track down is the "hell burners", the massive charges of gunpowder loaded on ships and pointed at the Spanish fleet by English Lord Admiral Charles Howard (and an effective weapon they were).

If someone's got an older example, I'd like to push this date further back. Candidly, I'm frustrated and annoyed by the folks who talk as if IEDs are innovative and new.

Thanks!

I'm almost sure you've seen it, but on the off chance you haven't, I've got a book called Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb that came out about a year ago. Think he starts in the 19th century though, haven't gotten around to it yet.

Van

01-10-2009, 07:20 AM

AP - 1363? Sweet! That's another two centuries older!

Granite - Thanks for the book recommendation, I've heard of Buda's Wagon, and was in the process of checking it out.

I've looked at some of the old Roman and Chinese flame throwers and Greek fire, but despite the DoD definition I'm passing on incendiaries. Gunpowder, however, makes the cut.

[The DoD definition: Improvised Explosive Device. A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components.
(Department of Defense DIRECTIVE; NUMBER 2000.19E February 14, 2006, SUBJECT: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO))
I usually interpret this as any weapon not professionally purpose built as a weapon or any weapon used by someone other than a professional soldier, an insanely broad definition.]

Jedburgh

01-11-2009, 06:03 PM

If someone's got an older example, I'd like to push this date further back. Candidly, I'm frustrated and annoyed by the folks who talk as if IEDs are innovative and new.
No offense, Van, but I think you're just letting your frustration with simpletons set you off on a tangent. The tactic of one Navy sending flaming ships into their opponents certainly predates what you'll find in the historical record. The same goes for armies sending flaming carts into the wooden gates of fortresses. But both bear limited resemblence to the various permutations of the tactical use of IEDs today.

For educating the idiots who believe that the IED is a new innovation that arose post-9/11, I feel its best to keep rooted in relatively modern warfare. An easy example is simply to state how elements of various allied special operations units during WWII trained and advised partisan forces on the use of IEDs against the axis - both purely military and civil infrastructure targets. There is a tremendous amount of material from that period that is directly applicable to the COE. And, of course, during the Cold War there is a broad spectrum of conflicts to draw upon where IEDs of all types were used against a dazzling array of target sets.

(As an aside, its also usually surprising to some when they are informed that much of Hezbollah's skill in using roadside bombs was not gained from Iran, but from South Africa. For members of the ANC with a great depth of experience in IED tactics against the apartheid-era South African army, sharing that knowledge with Hezbollah was getting a little payback against Israel, which was heavily engaged in military collaboration with South Africa in the '70s & '80s.)

Dealing more specifically with VBIEDs, and just looking at post-WWII, the Stern Gang really was the first to use a VBIED - targeting a Brit police station in Haifa on 12 Jan 47. But despite occasional usage after that - including a few particularly nasty examples - VBIEDs didn't really gain traction among terrorists until March '72, when the PIRA initiated two ANFO VBIEDs in Belfast. From that point on, the history is pretty damn clear, and anyone who still believes that it is a unique development of the GWOT is an idiot, plain and simple.

Ultimately, I think you'd make your point better when you demonstrate what little understanding they have of relatively recent military history rather than catching them out on obscure historical examples.

....just another retiree's biased opinion... :wry:

Umar Al-Mokhtār

01-11-2009, 07:17 PM

Ken White

01-11-2009, 08:41 PM

in Vietnam both during the French war and ours. A particularly effective use of bicycles was made since they were everywhere and very easily just left in a crowded bistro or market.

A subset of VBIEDs would be to classify those used expressly as a suicide vehicle and those not.Vespas not so much; the Viet Namese were a thrifty lot. :D

Grenades in the Baskets atop the heads of little old ladies probably don't count as VBIEDs. Particularly as the White Mice thought most were not aware of their added cargo.

Then there's the question on today's suicide variations; those with the driver strapped in and those where he or she is not...

01-12-2009, 01:44 PM

As far as the oldest fire ship attack, I remember that a Roman Fleet was destroyed by fire ships and even Darius had a problem with the Greeks who attacked his vast armada with fire ships shortly after the Spartans were blocking a pass from the beach.

The IRA used bicycles to quickly move their tactical units from place to place. They referred to them as "Flying Columns"! Ah the Irish, always the ones with a flair for the enemys language.

Digging deep enough, I suppose that some young Irish bomb thrower could have used his bike to deliver a few Mills Grenades to British staff cars. I'm sure they thought of that delivery system and the English passed it on the the Marquis. :D

Stan

01-12-2009, 03:33 PM

Hey Van,

Can anyone cite the use of a VBIED prior to 7 August 1588?

The oldest VBIED I've been able to track down is the "hell burners", the massive charges of gunpowder loaded on ships and pointed at the Spanish fleet by English Lord Admiral Charles Howard (and an effective weapon they were).

If someone's got an older example, I'd like to push this date further back. Candidly, I'm frustrated and annoyed by the folks who talk as if IEDs are innovative and new.

Thanks!
I'll be attending a Bomb Data Center conference in February with more than 50 countries in attendance. This will definitely be something to generate bar-stool discussions :D

I'll take notes and get back to you.

Regards, Stan

davidbfpo

01-12-2009, 11:40 PM

The IRA used bicycles..... I'm sure they thought of that delivery system and the English passed it on the the Marquis. :D

RJ,

IIRC the IRA used bicycle bombs in a mainland UK campaign before 1939 and one went off in Coventry. THis is a summary: Nine days before the outbreak of World War II, on 25 August 1939, Coventry was the scene of an early mainland bicycle bomb attack by the IRA. At 2:30 in the afternoon, a bomb exploded inside the satchel of a tradesman's bicycle that had been left outside a shop on Broadgate. The explosion killed five people, injured 100 more and caused extensive damage to shops in the area. Five IRA members were put on trial for murder and two were hanged in February 1940, although the identity of the man who rode the bicycle to Broadgate and planted the bomb was never discovered. Taken from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Coventry

Yes, we probably handed the tactic, via SOE, to the French and other resistance movements in WW2.

davidbfpo

Umar Al-Mokhtār

01-14-2009, 01:53 AM

cried the distraught Viet Minh 'It's all the style we've got to pick up cute girls in áo dài down at the milk bar near by the Majestic...' :D

Ken White

01-14-2009, 02:46 AM

No, not the Vespa cried the distraught Viet Minh 'It's all the style we've got to pick up cute girls in áo dài down at the milk bar near by the Majestic...' :DPlus its use to haul fifteen stacked high and tottering crates of Chickens to market... :wry:

Umar Al-Mokhtār

01-15-2009, 03:31 AM

propensity to precariously stack several livestock, baskets of produce, and a family or two upon the most unlikely two wheeled conveyances has always been a sheer source of wonder to me. :D

Stan

01-16-2009, 02:07 PM

Can anyone cite the use of a VBIED prior to 7 August 1588?

The answer thus far is NO.
However, I lost patience waiting for my trip and decided to ask the Brits and Yanks involved with bomb data center research at both (locations withheld).

Of the 15 responses, 14 concluded and agreed with the following:

The earliest reference of a VBIED was the attempted assassination of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II by Armenian separatists on 21 JUL 1905! 80 keys of explosives were placed in a car and the explosives were timed to go off as the Sultan passed the vehicle during his regular visit to a mosque in Istanbul.

The first VBIED in the UK was on 22 FEB 72 at the Parachute Regiments Officers Mess at Aldershot Barracks. This device was attributed to the Official IRA (OIRA).

It should be noted (Ted pretty much made this clear already) that none of the respondents considered boats or bicycles as "vehicles" when utilizing the acronym VBIED :D

Steve Blair

01-16-2009, 03:22 PM

Jedburgh

01-16-2009, 04:37 PM

As something of an aside, you might also find examples from some of the Chicago gang wars in the 1920s. Not 100% sure on that, but I do have some recollection of such things taking place.

If you exclude fire ships and other such implements, I think you're more likely to find examples of VBIEDs in the terrorist and criminal sphere than you are the purely military one...at least prior to the 1960s.
Regarding the criminal sphere, the targeting tends to be different. A pipe bomb or some other type of explosive device emplaced in a vehicle with the intent to kill a specific occupant(s) is very different from a vehicle stuffed with explosives intended to inflict general death and destruction upon a proximity target, whether fixed, like an adjacent building (or the crowd in a marketplace, etc.) or mobile - i.e. remotely initiated to hit a passing convoy. Criminal emplacement of explosives in automobiles targeting a specific individual has been a tactic almost since the first days of automobile ownership - and continues to be common today. Just my personal bias, but I wouldn't count that as a true VBIED - Guido wasn't killed by a VBIED, he was killed by a pipe bomb placed under the seat of his car.

Stan

01-16-2009, 05:57 PM

Bill,
You raise some interesting versions that now (with Ted's clarification) make me wonder how we could actually classify the VBIED or predate it while wondering just exactly when the acronym actually came to be :o

If the acronym came out in say 75, and what occurred before and after that date (just happens to) meet the current criteria for a VBIED, then, it must be a VBIED by definition ?

:D

Steve Blair

01-16-2009, 06:24 PM

Regarding the criminal sphere, the targeting tends to be different. A pipe bomb or some other type of explosive device emplaced in a vehicle with the intent to kill a specific occupant(s) is very different from a vehicle stuffed with explosives intended to inflict general death and destruction upon a proximity target, whether fixed, like an adjacent building (or the crowd in a marketplace, etc.) or mobile - i.e. remotely initiated to hit a passing convoy. Criminal emplacement of explosives in automobiles targeting a specific individual has been a tactic almost since the first days of automobile ownership - and continues to be common today. Just my personal bias, but I wouldn't count that as a true VBIED - Guido wasn't killed by a VBIED, he was killed by a pipe bomb placed under the seat of his car.

True. I was thinking more of attacks against fixed locations (breweries, warehouses, speakeasies) as opposed to single-target hits.

reload223

01-11-2010, 10:32 AM

Moderator's Note

Thread closed a sthere is new, main thread 'IEDs: the home-made bombs that changed modern war': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16303

TALIBAN MAKE UNDETECTABLE BOMBS OUT OF WOOD
By Andrew Johnson
Sunday, 10 January 2010

The Taliban's IEDs killed 48 British troops last year Taliban fighters have developed a deadly new generation of their most lethal weapon, the improvised explosive device, or IED, which is almost undetectable because it has no metal or electronic parts, military experts said last week.
IEDs have proved the Taliban's most deadly weapon: three out of five coalition troops killed last year in Afghanistan were victims of the bombs. At least 48 of the 108 British fatalities were caused by IEDs.

Chris Hunter, a former bomb disposal expert who served in Iraq and now runs his own consultancy said the new weapons were being manufactured from wood in Pakistan.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/taliban-make-undetectable-bombs-out-of-wood-1863353.html

Ken White

01-11-2010, 03:24 PM

LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schu-mine_42).
LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PMD_series_mines).

The idea has been around since WW I at least. In both Korea and Viet Nam, large 20-50 pound box mines appeared.

Stan

01-11-2010, 04:11 PM

Just to echo Ken's response, the means to clear ATs are the very same as they were in WWII.

Mechanical demining is nothing fast, but it is effective. It also turns a good 20 inches of top soil - great for agriculture ;)

zealot66

01-11-2010, 10:55 PM

Schmedlap

01-11-2010, 11:33 PM

It seems that one would be trading IED attacks for RPG and AA attacks, with the latter offering up juicier headlines (fewer incidents, but more killed per incident). It would also further remove Soldiers from the operating environment, as if sealing them off inside MRAPs had not done this already.

The focus on avoiding IED strikes seems similar to the debate over airport security. If the bomber is at the airport, then something is wrong, regardless of what he faces in the screening line. Likewise the focus on avoiding attacks during movement (whether IEDs against wheeled convoys, AA attacks against aircraft, or ambushes at LZs) should be shifted to stopping them from occurring.

Doofous

01-12-2010, 02:30 AM

Air Assault (or Airborne or Airmobile) isn't the solution to Iraq or Afghanistan. Vertical envelopment has its place, of course. But for all the tradeoffs of vulnerability, the decision isn't just about RPGs vs. IED. It has to come down to the purpose of the mission. To connect with IPs and win some old-fashioned hearts and minds, you need to really see people and come into contact with them, not just drop in and lift out of the neighborhood. Aircraft can't linger to form alliances...grunts have historically been the most successful at that, and IMHO, that is what we need to do to begin working with locals and gain their respect.

Close combat with clearly defined enemy forces demands and rewards speed, power and audacity. Unfortunately, our enemy today is like the VC two generations ago...extremely difficult to distinguish from the IPs.

jcustis

01-12-2010, 08:47 AM

I try to stay abreast of the operation tempo and tactics in afghanistan but its hard for a person out of the military loop to know exactly what empolyments troops use. It seems that so many of our troops are killed by IED, rolling around in humvees.

Is there a lack of heliborne resources in the stan to carry out our missions ? I realize COIN involves being among the people but Im wondering if more casualties could be avoided by more use of helo's. I read an article by a south african about defeating the land mine and the decision to forgo as much as possible the use of convoys and instead use helicopters.

This was precisely what we did during Operation KHANJAR in July of last year. So to answer your question, when you look at that operation, along with other ops like ANACONDA, we have the ability to project combat power through vertical envelopment, but the question comes up concerning why we would want to do so. The reasons are often very specific and attuned to the situation at hand.

This earlier thread highlights some details: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7694&highlight=strike+sword

Heliborne operations are difficult to sustain for a long duration, for a number of reasons. I wish I could post the photo of that mortarman carrying the baseplate and a load of other gear he shouldn't have. That highlights what happens when we try vertical envelopment but fail to fight light enough.

ETA: Just found it!

http://www.captainsjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/khanjar_ii.jpg

tankersteve

01-12-2010, 12:34 PM

150 pounds, easily, on that kid's back. Feeling the pain.

Tankersteve

Firn

01-12-2010, 01:51 PM

150 pounds, easily, on that kid's back. Feeling the pain.

Tankersteve

Very much so. And the heat. And the sweat. Light infantry indeed.

Most of the points have been already adressed. A well armored vehicle is a (very) important element but only the last line of defense against IEDs. The COIN operations in Rhodesia and current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that well designed armored vehicles play a very important part in troop survivability, but have also important drawbacks (greatly increased fuel consumption, reduced mobility, lesser situational awareness). Finding the right mix and balance as well as adjusting it in time and space is the great difficulty, as war is no science but art.

Firn

Eden

01-12-2010, 02:57 PM

Other reasons why we travel on the ground:

We are, in fact, short of helicopters in Afghanistan. More are being sent, or so I glean from open sources, but we lack the resources to move many troops around by air. Moreover, any heliborne insertion results in a continuing committment of aircraft to logistically support the inserted force. Our allies are especially short of helicopters - I know it is something of a national scandal in the UK.

Also, the environment in Afghanistan makes employment of helicopters problematical in many areas due to climate and elevation.

zealot66

01-12-2010, 10:33 PM

Thanks for the input. I know that COIN requires sustained presence on the battlefield. I was really curious on the supply of helo's in the area. Its just so frustrating to see a good many men die without confronting the enemy and just get whacked by a roadside bomb.

It does make sense that in being on the ground and clearing, holding and building will yield intelligence on who and where the ambushes take place. Gary Schroen in his book, first in in 2005 decried our resource allocation to Iraq and pretty much predicted what would happen in afghanistan. Little resources people and machines and believing the terrs have departed the region only to come back in droves. Again, thanks for clarifying some issues. I aint been there so its hard to understand some methods and why.

Steve Blair

01-12-2010, 11:31 PM

If you review some possible lessons from Vietnam, you find that potential LZs are also quite susceptible to IED-type activities (the NV/NVA used to booby-trap LZs with unexploded bombs or shells, Chinese claymore copies in trees, and so on). So it doesn't necessarily get you around the issue, and in fact it can make it more complicated (downed birds and all that).

Schmedlap

01-13-2010, 12:00 AM

Anecdotal experience...

In 2005, we avoided and countered the IED threat by emplacing fire teams in covert positions throughout the AO. They were inserted usually at night, by way of dismounted patrols from our patrol base. Once curfew was lifted, the IED emplacers would come out. Anyone seen emplacing an IED was killed on sight. Suddenly, people were less enthusiastic about emplacing IEDs. The psychological impact was significant upon potential adversaries (most said, "screw that") and upon the populace (when lots of IED emplacers are shot in the chest from a single gunshot that comes out of nowhere - at least once per day - there is a sense that the Americans are now in control of security and the insurgents are dead men walking). Fewer IEDs improved our mobility, which made it easier to emplace fire teams in a wider variety of positions and continue to spread paranoia among our adversaries and reassurance among the populace.

Doofous

01-14-2010, 05:26 AM

And there's a parallel with the value of vertical envelopment. In Vietnam, the shock value of airmobile tactics was compromised by two factors: telegraphing the arrival sites and times, and essentially utilizing the Hueys as aerial taxis to bring troops in and then have them simply walk around on random search-and-destroy missions that were based on a feeling that the enemy would be where we land -- classic military projection of your wishful thinking onto an enemy's likely decisions -- and a plausible explanation for why we were less effective than we could have been. We took a lot of casualties on LZs to booby traps (that's how I got mine) and snipers.

Infanteer

01-14-2010, 03:49 PM

Flying to work, like driving to work, is part of the "commuting" problem.

If you try to avoid getting IED'd in your vehicles and switch to moving on foot, the bad guy will simply target dismounts.

No form of technology is going to eliminate the IED threat - good TTPs and alert soldiers will mitigate it as best as possible....

Tracker275

01-19-2010, 04:19 AM

If you try to avoid getting IED'd in your vehicles and switch to moving on foot, the bad guy will simply target dismounts.

No form of technology is going to eliminate the IED threat - good TTPs and alert soldiers will mitigate it as best as possible....

Very accurate statement. What most folks seem to forget is that what may be the most technologically advanced military in the world is being bogged down by folks that operate more fluid and in an asymetrical descentralized operations strategy. The more we rely on technology, the more they will identify the weaknesses with far less money than it took for us to develop and defeat what they have thrown at us.

Every week, I arrive on a scene where a simple device was built to defeat either the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, or United States Forces (USF). I am never ceased to be amazed at how simple, yet complex the devices are, and most of the components could have been purchased at Walmart, Ace Hardware, and Radio Shack to produce what we are seeing.

The common theme I see in most of the posts found in this thread is that the concept, collectively, is that of a reactive measure vs. a proactive measure. Instead of focusing a majority of our efforts on how we defeat devices through defense, let us focus on finding out where they are being made and stopping that prior to them being placed somewhere. Obviously, defensive measures are essential, however in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the appearance is that of not going after the "bad guy", but getting hit and trying to find out how to survive a strike...Then limp away.

Rarely do I see efforts here in Iraq where the focus is on identifying where the devices are made, but more where they have been emplaced. I look at briefing after briefing that reflects hot spots of detonations, however I have yet to look at one that identifies where exactly the optimum location for them to be made is.

What it comes down to in a nutshell is that no matter how you cut it, the faster lighter, and more adaptable force has proven to never win the battle, but win the war. This has been proven against the United States since the 1960's. The concept of "Light Infantry" has been destroyed by the modern day rucksack and the technological gadgets that we are forced to take with us onto the battlefield. Why is it that the RTO has to carry a 40lbs radio with spare battery and kit only to maintain commo sometimes spotty at best, and the insurgent uses a satphone that fits in his pocket and gets common 100% of the time?

You can't fight an unconventional war with conventional tactics. That is a proven fact. As I have previously stated, you will win the battle, but you will never win the war. If our ultimate focus is on staying on the roads most of the time, then you have set yourself up for failure in that you now channeling your forces into a choke point that is miles long. The balance between armor and mobility are a very tricky balance, and if the focus is entirely on defensive postures, then we have lost the best defense, which is a good offense. TTP's change constantly, however the US military does not move as fast as the battlefield. What always remains a constant about an IED, is that someone has to place it somewhere and it has to wait for someone to go by it. Personally, I have yet to hear of a foot patrol in who knows how long get attacked by an IED (I'm not talking about a foot patrol being dismounts either) here in Iraq, but I regularly go to scenes where vehicles have been hit. The one thing that we all laugh about here is that the Iraqi insurgents can't shoot.

So, if that is the case, why do we place ourselves in situations that they really do know how to do, and that is setup an IED?

Granted, this is my first post here, but this is my $0.02 on this subject for what it is worth.

zealot66

01-21-2010, 10:19 PM

Thanks for that last post. It seems that light and mobile and good soldiering is the way to go. Any military that garrisons itself either thru heavy equipment or literal garrison without going outside the wire is outmanuevered by enemy. When contact occurs, the pursuit should ensue. I realize with IED's this isnt going to happen all the time but an idea of lightinfantry tactics to seek out and meet the enemy is better in the long run than riding around waiting.

Xenophon

01-21-2010, 10:35 PM

There are other ways to mitigate the IED threat. Probably the best one is the one Schmedlap posted. Another is to decrease the size of A.O.s so that mounted patrols are not so necessary, but this is not always feasible and requires a larger amount of troops. The other is to stay off the roads by conducting dismounted patrols or, conducting old school mounted patrols via horse/donkey/camel (the original All Terrain Vehicle). But the other problem is re-supply. Small-scale re-supply in the future should be conducted with some kind of supply drop-ship UAV (one of the few times you'll hear me advocate a technological solution) but for large scale logistics I think the loggies are still going to be provisional route clearance for a long time.

Rifleman

01-22-2010, 08:14 AM

But the other problem is re-supply. Small-scale re-supply in the future should be conducted with some kind of supply drop-ship UAV

In Vietnam, I believe the Mobile Guerilla Forces (Blackjack Projects) sometimes resupplied with fast movers dropping canisters. Basically like a bombing run. So I think your UAV idea for resupply has merit.

Xenophon

01-22-2010, 11:32 AM

William F. Owen

01-22-2010, 11:40 AM

Yeah, I'm thinking just a flying pallet. Troops at a rear base strap on some boxes of ammo, some MRE's, some medical supplies, a "pilot" flies it out to the COP, then the troops there unload it, maybe throw on some empty ammo cans, an EPW or two, then the "pilot" flies it back.

You're 100% right! - not surprisingly. Plus Medevac!
... and this is why Helicopters are extremely useful in both regular and irregular warfare. - so you need lots of them!

slapout9

01-22-2010, 04:25 PM

You're 100% right! - not surprisingly. Plus Medevac!
... and this is why Helicopters are extremely useful in both regular and irregular warfare. - so you need lots of them!

It was developed years ago for Vietnam. Actually for the original Air Cavalry.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOVh-vlUius

slapout9

01-22-2010, 04:57 PM

Original Hiller Flying Platform......made good Helicopters and VTOL Aircraft too.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MwhBWxc0SSM&feature=related

That's Ken White driving it.

Rex Brynen

01-22-2010, 05:20 PM

I'm rather surprised, Slap, that you missed the opportunity to mention this particular marvel of modern flight (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNWfqVWC2KI) :D

slapout9

01-22-2010, 06:33 PM

rex, I am not allowed to expose any secerts of the Redneck Air Force:D

Pete

01-22-2010, 11:10 PM

I wasn't in Vietnam, but I've heard that helicopter landing zones there could be extremely dangerous places. I'm sure our current adversaries would quickly figure that out and adjust their tactics accordingly. A guy I served with, now a retired lieutenant colonel who was in Vietnam, said he was amazed to see how slow soldiers were to exit helicopters during a training exercise he witnessed in the 1980s. He mentioned it as an example of how skills degrade when they are not frequently practiced.

William F. Owen

01-23-2010, 07:04 AM

It was developed years ago for Vietnam. Actually for the original Air Cavalry.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOVh-vlUius

Actually, I'm pretty against AIR CAV.
AIR SUPPLY, AIR MARCH and AIR SUSTAIN, all make sense to me, but using Helicopters as an APC or IFV doesn't really make sense to me.

OK SOF may have some applications, but I just don't see putting Support Helicopters in harms ways as something sensible folks should do.

Rifleman

01-23-2010, 07:17 AM

.....using Helicopters as an APC or IFV doesn't really make sense to me.

But what if we come in low out of the rising sun and about a mile out put on the music? :D

Sorry, I just couldn't resist! :p

John

01-23-2010, 07:31 AM

Having been attacked with IEDs, I am not an advocate of just driving down roads in hopes you are not blown up. However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.

Chief Bratton (Chief of Police) NY, Boston and most recently LA - used to have his officers ride public transportation to work periodically so they saw the streets as did the people. I submit Soldiers have to do the same thing.

John

01-23-2010, 07:33 AM

But what if we come in low out of the rising sun and about a mile out put on the music? :D

Don't surf!

William F. Owen

01-23-2010, 07:43 AM

However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.

All true, if done badly by stupid people. None of that is true, if done well, by a well-trained Army. All the negatives you cite had no impact on UK operations in South Armagh, or even the use of helicopters in other theatres, such as South Arabia, and Cyprus.

Pete

01-23-2010, 08:07 AM

The air assault division concept came about two years before the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The following is from American Military History, Volume II, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005:

Seeking to improve mobility, an Army board in 1962 [the Howze Board, named for its president, Lt. Gen. Hamilton Howze] had compared the cost and efficiency of air and ground vehicles. Concluding that air transportation had much to commend it, the group recommended that the service consider forming new air combat and transport units. The idea that an air assault division employing air-transportable weapons and aircraft-mounted rockets might replace artillery raised delicate questions about the Air Force and Army missions, but Secretary McNamara decided to give it a thorough test.

Organized in February 1963, the 11th Air Assault Division went through two years of testing. By the spring of 1965, the Army deemed it ready for a test in combat and decided to send it to Vietnam, where the war was heating up. To that end, the service inactivated the 11th and transferred its personnel and equipment to the 1st Cavalry Division, which relinquished its mission in Korea to the 2d Infantry Division and moved to Fort Benning, Georgia. Renamed the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the reorganized unit had an authorized strength of 15,787 men, 428 helicopters, and 1,600 road vehicles (half the number of an infantry division). Though the total of rifles and automatic weapons in the unit remained the same as in an infantry division, the force’s direct-support artillery moved by helicopter rather than truck or armored vehicle. In the same way, it employed an aerial rocket artillery battalion rather than the normal tube artillery. In all, the division’s total weight came to just 10,000 tons, less than a third of what a normal infantry division deployed.

TYR

01-23-2010, 06:16 PM

From my experience in Afghanistan I defiantly felt we needed more helicopters. The problem I see is that when helicopters are used they are not used properly. Most times a unit infiltrated right on top of their objective. All surprise and security was lost and usually the unit damaged the local’s private property in the process which isnt good if you want to make friends. I guess if you are going to plan for failure and land on top of your objective then yes you are taking a chance of getting RPG’d or shot down with a SAM. Sometimes I thought that some of those units who planned those operations wanted to replay “Blackhawk Down”. I was always a proponent for conducting an operation over a week or more, inserting far enough away from the objective area and walking in moving along the high ground to get to our objective area. After all, the enemy was using the high ground as well to move from village to village. In most cases the enemy wasn’t in the village anyway, but rather using Sheppard cabins further up the mountain or valley then coming down to do their business with in the village. Most village elders wouldn’t let the insurgents live within the village anyway. The village never wanted to risk getting extra attention from the coalition. Every time we walked in using the high ground the locals as well as the enemy were surprised and wondered where we came from. The further we were inserted from the Objective area the more success we had. The closer we inserted to the target area we always ran into a dry hole. If we inserted using vehicles we moved at night using non standard vehicles. The insurgents would never risk IEDing a Jinga truck for fear of turning the locals against them. After disembarking we moved on foot to high ground. When we got to the target area again we had success. It only takes one time driving down the restrictive roads in Afghanistan and getting IED’d to understand that whatever you are doing is probably not the preferred method. The problem I see is that we have thrown out the “decentralize” Light Infantry concept that was developed to fight “Brush Fire Wars” for a more motorized way of getting to the battle, becoming heavier in restricted terrain and becoming less mobile and more dependent on that vehicle as a support platform in the process. Not to say we shouldn’t move on the roads at all, but maybe employ a more balanced approach of getting to the objective. Airmobility defiantly can give you an advantage in Afghanistan. But it takes planning and resources. However, using the Rhodesian “Fire Force” technique as someone suggested wouldn’t have worked where I was operating just because the terrain was to extreme.

Ken White

01-23-2010, 08:35 PM

Who made the first helicopter borne assault on 21 Sep 1951 (LINK) (http://www.marines.com/main/index/winning_battles/history/innovations/operation_summit). They were far ahead of the Army in chopper use by 1960, much less by 1964. Still are, in many respects.

The Howze Board and the Air Assault test showed every flaw later to become apparent in actual Army helicopter operations. However, the Army wanted Birds so reality was not allowed to intrude. In the test, the rule was that if you could get the aircraft's full visibility tail number, you could consider it killed and the umpires would credit it. One little Airborne Infantry Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon, on that two week test exercise in North and South Carolina, accounted for 20 plus Chinooks and over 100 Hueys--plus three Mohawks.

All that said, the birds do have their place, TYR is right on setting down elsewhere and walking to the objective -- which, as Wilf notes, is the right way to do it and does not cause the isolation phenomenon. The down side is that it takes longer. That is bad for overly impatient and demanding US Commanders who try to operate on a peacetime schedule (the MTCs teach bad habits as well as good...). It also means the troops are exposed (which of course, they should be...) but that is apparently not done today. :eek:

Never enough time to do it right...Combat is dangerous... :wry:

Who knew...:cool:

The air assault division concept came about two years before the Tonkin Gulf Resolution...

Ken White

01-23-2010, 10:05 PM

shows that even though you were in the Army and now read a lot, you still don't really understand that Army...;)

I don't drop and give anyone 20, have not since jump school much less making SGT and that long before being a SGM. Nor did I ever 'drop' people, that's a stupid punishment or harassment that accomplishes nothing except antagonizing the troops needlessly. I have yet to see a few pushups make better Soldiers or clean a weapon or a latrine. All minor froth in any event as I'm not a SGM anymore, just an old retarded silly-villian who dang sure doesn't do pushups for anyone.

No. I'm not quibbling, now and only rarely otherwise. I'm merely expanding on your post. I'm also pointing out that your inference; the Army did this years ago, while correct apparently inadvertantly omits the fact that the Marines got there long before the Army did and refined the process perhaps more rapidly.

My post does refer back to the thread in the context of other recent posts and thus wasn't just another link or two posted with no real discussion. It also tried to add some context to your blind posted links and quote, thus I was trying to help, mot quibble. :wry:

You'll note I added mention of the Air Assault II Exercise and Test. It was conducted actually after that Resolution in October of '64 but it is, I think, relevant to this thread in the sense that said test showed all the flaws later operational experience with helicopters has revealed. As I've suggested before, if you want to flood the area with links, fine -- but we would hope you had some thoughts pertaining to them to add to the link.

In any event, I'm totally unsure what the relevance of the Howze Board being conducted before the Tonkin Resolution has to do with Vertical Envelopment and IED's as this thread has developed and I'd really appreciate knowing what that connection and point happen to be. :confused:

Pete

01-23-2010, 11:54 PM

Ken, the "drop and give me two-zero" post was made in jest. I deleted it about 15 minutes after posting it when I thought it might be misconstrued--if you were offended I apologize. I enjoy the perspective and institutional memory you add to this forum and a few of the published anecdotes on the '50s and '60s I've posted here have been deliberate attempts to draw you out.

I brought up the subject of the Howze Board because Slapout had said that air cavalry was implemented for Vietnam; Willf added his thoughts on air mobility. I was reluctant to directly contradict anyone but thought some background on how the air mobile division came to be would add to the discussion. Usually when the Army makes a ruling on a concept the basic idea has been under consideration for quite some time, often on an ad hoc basis. It's a bit like the Army R & D stuff I used to do as a contractor--there's no funding or official backing to do any work until there's a TRADOC-approved requirements document.

In March 2003 the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment, V Corps, took quite a beating in the vicinity of Karbala. I don't know what impact it may have had on air mobile doctrine and tactics.

reed11b

01-24-2010, 01:23 AM

I have some STOL UAV plans from an old school FAC that had some published articles on UAV concepts a while back. They kind of address what Xenophon is saying though they are longer range in concept. I'll have to see if the owner of the concepts is okay with me sharing. There was a double ducted fan VTOL UAV design a few years back by the same company that was trying to make backpack vtol that was meant for resupply type missions. My though is that they would have to be able opperate autonomously to be viable.
Reed

tankersteve

01-24-2010, 01:41 AM

They were conducting a deep attack against a brigade (I believe) of Iraqi armored forces. This was an AH-64 force. The attack was not coordinated well with any SEAD and the force got fired up quite a bit by small-arms fire, to the point that they couldn't continue the mission.

So what is the relevance? Well, the Army seems to be forgetting about deep attacks and is focusing on Apaches conducting direct support to ground forces - and are doing an excellent job of it. If reacting to a TIC, they show up overhead, and talk to the ground force commander, telling him what he has, and for how long, and asks for an update on the situation and what the ground force needs him to do. Simple, no JTAC/Anglico to work through, on regular FM nets. If it is a preplanned mission, a bit of coord can make sure that they have the same mission graphics that the ground force is using.

I am not an expert on Air Assault missions, I am just a big fan of the direction that attack aviation elements have gone. I would not be surprised if the deep attack has fallen completely out of favor, freeing up a lot more Apaches to work with the guys on the ground.

By far, the easiest and most responsive aviation asset available to the ground force maneuver commander.

Tankersteve

Ken White

01-24-2010, 02:29 AM

Not offended, just have a long term antipathy to dropping or 'smoking' people -- idle harassment IMO. I've never seen any benefit in it. None. The concept raises my hackles and being a curmudgeon, I tend to curmudge about it... :rolleyes:

Thanks for the expansion on the original post, that places it in context and makes sense. Might I suggest that wasn't apparent to an old slow Dude like me. The younger folks may have instantly gotten the connection but many of my synapses have synapped... :o

No need to try to draw me out, best bet is just to ask a question and I'll answer as best I can or admit I'm clueless (a frequent occurrence). Some folks post with a lot of links, I use very few. Everyone has their own techniques, which is fine but this is a discussion board where one can say what one thinks and ask questions, it isn't a forum where brevity is desired (good thing or I'd be in deep yogurt...). :D

As Tankersteve says, aviation doctrine is evolving and mostly for the better. Helicopters are great items of equipment but like anything else, they have to be used as designed and the limitations have to be respected. We misused them in Viet Nam (badly in some cases) and the Karbala attack was an exercise in bone stupidity. However, we are getting better.

Interestingly, Howze -- a former cavalryman and one of the better Generals of his era (he was the best XVIII Abn Corps Commander I've seen thus far, probably as good as was Ridgeway) was way back then adamant that attempting to directly attack ground elements with Armor and ADA using gun ships was excessively dangerous and that airmobile raids with carefully chosen LZs and the guns in support were the best use of airmobile assets...

He also said they'd be used for log support and overflying significantly dangerous terrain or routes subject to heavy attack -- and he pushed for more heavy birds (Chinooks) versus the lighter ones (UH1 / UH60). Unfortunately, he lost that one but the Marines listened and thus are replacing their Phrogs with Ospreys and the 53E with the K model...:cool:

Pete

01-24-2010, 02:32 AM

Thanks Steve. Perhaps "Aviation doctrine and tactics" were the words I should have used.

Edit:
Ken, I'm glad you weren't offended. For a moment there I thought you might have something against people who live in West Virginia!

82redleg

01-24-2010, 03:23 AM

In preparation for "WW3 (TM)" in Europe, Aviation (specifically, attack aviation) convinced the Army that they were a maneuver branch, vice a fire support element (witness the use of the Aerial Rocket Artillery Battalion in the Vietnam-era Air Cavalry Division, vice the normal GS 155/8in composite BN). I think that Karbala finally showed the fallacy of this, and since then, attack aviation has generally been employed as a fire support asset (witness TankerSteve, and the increased emphasis on CCA).

As a fire supporter, this is a good thing, IMHO. It emphasizes the necesity of integrating the aviation plan into the ground plan, which sometimes falls by the wayside when you treat your aviation as a separate maneuver element.

Ken White

01-24-2010, 03:53 AM

That move, IMO, was as bad as making SF a branch. Both fields originally were effectively branch immaterial and Officers from all branches got to fly and do SF things -- they then rotated back to the 'Big Army" and spread their wealth and knowledge and the two specialties reaped the benefit of a far larger pool of incoming folks which forestalled a lot of bureaucracy and inbreeding. It was beneficial for everyone. The Warrants in both branches (SF later) and the NCOs provided continuity and the system worked quite well. This from a guy who actually wore Branch Unassigned brass and had no beret even if he did have an 'S' suffix on his MOS in the days prior to the 18 series...:wry:

However, it was a pain to the Per community who cheerfully supported separate branches to lighten their workload -- great Guys, they're always giving...:rolleyes:

The few to many (it varied from time to time dependent upon the attitude of the Army leadership to the specialty in question) malcontents who argued for pure Branch status with the expectation that 'everything will be better, we'll be richer, we can write our own doctrine and we can control our own destiny...' have found out that it may be better in some respects but it's worse in others -- and it isn't much more wealth-showering, their doctrine is still shackled and they do not control their own destiny.

The Army, Aviation and SF all lost a bit...

Pete: How can anyone who reveres T.J. Jackson as one of his major Gods have anything against West by God... * :D

( * aka Byrdland ;))

slapout9

01-24-2010, 04:08 AM

I brought up the subject of the Howze Board because Slapout had said that air cavalry was implemented for Vietnam; Willf added his thoughts on air mobility.

I said implemented....It was invented in about 1947 by General James Gavin and was original to be called the "Sky Cavalry Division".
If you can fins a copy of Airborne Warfare by Gavin you will see a drawing of what looks like a Chinook Helicopter offloading what looks like a half track for WW2.

I will try and find some links laterbut they are out there.

slapout9

01-24-2010, 04:12 AM

Pete and all go to this thread that I started awhile back to find out what we really need to defeat IED's;)

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=49251#post49251

Also shows what the Army Air Cavalry should have for VTOL intead of Osprey thingy.

Pete

01-24-2010, 05:34 AM

I was under the impression that Special Forces became its own branch mainly so its personnel wouldn't be discriminated against by their primary branches--perhaps the Aviation branch was brought into being for the same reason. At a Hail and Farewell in Germany as a lieutenant I sat next to the father of one of our lieutenants. He was an unassuming guy and I asked him whether he'd been in the Army, and he said yes, he'd retired as a major. Callow youth that I was, I wondered what he had done to screw up and only go that far. It was several years later when I was out of the Army that I read that Major Clyde J. Sincere of Special Forces had been awarded the DSC for his performance in a firefight in Vietnam. :o

Before First Manassas Thomas Jackson fought his first engagement as a brigade commander not far from where I live in the vicinity of Martinsburg. My impression of the "foot cavalry" aspect of his operations is that it was something he had learned before the Civil War as a light artilleryman. The modern field artillery has the acronym RSOP for reconnaissance, selection, occupation of position. Jackson had his mapmaker Jed Hotchkiss and he also had his staff make him tables of distances between various points in the Valley. Thus he was planning the routes of march of his command with the same attention to detail that an artilleryman uses to plan the movements of his battery.

Ken White

01-24-2010, 06:26 AM

There was discrimination but much of it was simply that the guys were supposed to alternate SF or Flying tours and normal branch assignments and many (but not all) did not want to do normal branch assignments. This caused hair pulling by the Branch 'managers' and usually ended up antagonizing everyone involved...

Sincere was a Mike Force guy and later SOG, long time airborne head, When Creighton Abrams died and Fred Weyand became the Chief of Staff in 1974, the Army underwent a purge of the 'Airborne Mafia' -- a lot of old parachute hands were either told to retire or given really poor assignments from which the only escape was to retire -- many did. That purge went from LTGs down into the enlisted ranks; I was flatly told I had too much overseas time, too much airborne time, too much troop unit time and that I'd never again get an airborne Assignment, would go to TRADOC -- which I'd avoided for 25 plus years and that would be followed by a reserve component advisory job -- unless I wanted to go ahead and retire. So, a lot of good folks were retired too early. Abrams wasn't nearly as anti-airborne and SF as he's been painted; Weyand OTOH was really not a fan... :( :wry:

Ah, wonderful Martinsburg. Many fond memories from training at Camp Dawson a few times. Yep on TJJ -- Hotchkiss was a distant relative, mutual several Greats Grandparent was a Co Cdr in the Continental Line at Cowpens among other places and later got a land grant in Kentucky. TJJ got more brevet promotions for bravery in the Mexican War than anyone else and he was prone to put his guns where others would not... :cool:

Speaking of guns, best Arty thing I ever saw was two M110s firing simultaneous direct fire at 350m at an unsuspecting column of troops...:D

Tracker275

01-28-2010, 05:06 AM

William F. Owen

01-28-2010, 06:28 AM

Well, I was all into this thread and wanting to participate as far as the last post by TYR, however...immediately after he posted, this thread went to pieces.
Welcome to information age. The same happens in conversations.

Much of what he and I stated appears to be tied together real closely, and what I noticed is that although both Iraq and Afghanistan are pretty much two completely different war zones, there are many similarities.
Noted. Some more detail perhaps?

The problem I see is that we have thrown out the “decentralize” Light Infantry concept that was developed to fight “Brush Fire Wars” for a more motorized way of getting to the battle, becoming heavier in restricted terrain and becoming less mobile and more dependent on that vehicle as a support platform in the process.
What is a “decentralize” Light Infantry concept? In an age of good HF radios, digital comms and SAT phones I think we have to be pretty careful of our descriptions of C2, and support.
The real issue here lies with the force protection postures and an inability to assess the comparative risks in line with the force protection policy.

However, using the Rhodesian “Fire Force” technique as someone suggested wouldn’t have worked where I was operating just because the terrain was to extreme.
The RLI Fire Force concept was born of necessity in not having a not enough helicopters, and very small army in a huge country. The trick wasn't the jumping out of DC-3's but the cueing of the strike action based on surveillance and intelligence. - so the "jump" was the easy bit.
It did work well against a very low quality irregulars, but it would have had real problems had the Terrs got more MANPADs (- and they had them, but only used them on airliners) and been skilled enough to stand and fight in numbers - something they only seem to have done very rarely.

Ken White

01-28-2010, 05:43 PM

Well, I was all into this thread and wanting to participate as far as the last post by TYR, however...immediately after he posted, this thread went to pieces. I wasn't able to really see where anything was going very clearly after that, because there were a few posts that were more meant for PM conversation vs. open forum.That's one way to do it, others may have a different take. Best solution it seems would be to just ignore the digression and say what you think is important.
If this thread would like to continue in the direction that I believe the originator intended.I think he got his question answered and left... :D
I think that the time that TYR put into a response is well worth reading and restarting from that point...and what I noticed is that although both Iraq and Afghanistan are pretty much two completely different war zones, there are many similarities. However, I'm not seeing the lessons learned within both theaters being looked at very closely by senior leadership.I suspect the last point is due to their recognition that the real answer to the original query is very much dependent on the old METT-TC factors (and, in this case, ALL of those factors) and what else is going on in the theater or area. That is, there are so many variations that the question could be discussed for a great many years with continually evolving answers. That and the fact there is no best answer...

You and Tyr both had good points, so did several others who apparently digressed from the thread and some who did not digress also had good ideas and comments. Discussion boards are like that. The bad and the good all roil together. ;)

qp4

01-31-2010, 09:10 AM

Anecdotal experience...

In 2005, we avoided and countered the IED threat by emplacing fire teams in covert positions throughout the AO. They were inserted usually at night, by way of dismounted patrols from our patrol base....

Also in 2005 we did the exact same thing. We had a COP about 12km from our main FOB that had only three roads in, so naturally these chokepoints became one of the most contested areas in our OE. After three months of dedicated SKTs and observation by tanks, we were down to one road that stayed red and two roads that were black. The AO continued to deteriorate for the next three years (that COP was the home of both DUSTWUN events in Iraq).

It got so bad that helicopters were being used as a transport rather than ride the roads. And as John points out:

Having been attacked with IEDs, I am not an advocate of just driving down roads in hopes you are not blown up. However, IMO completely avoiding roads, via helicopters, erodes credibility with the people, prevents Soldiers from developing intelligence, and seeing the ground from the people's perspective. Helicopters have viable missions, but not just as troop carriers.

And that AO that got so bad? It started to get better when we started walking everywhere.

v/r,
qp4

zealot66

01-31-2010, 06:04 PM

Im still here. You all have alot more experience in debating this issue that I do. My question came as a result of studying wars in southern africa and the measures they took to overcome the landmine issue. I think that terrain, strategy and even a landmine vs an IED demand differences in employment of troops. It is just a sick feeling to watch our casualties from IED's knowing that they werent even the result of a contact just some kid with a remote control. Keep going. I look at this board everyday and consider it an education.

I find the above posts about landing patrols away from the target and walking to a target very interesting and in though the terrain in afghanistan might prohibit some of this, The issue still remains are we using the choppers to their fullest and are there enough ?

Ken White

01-31-2010, 06:57 PM

The issue still remains are we using the choppers to their fullest and are there enough ?The factors of Mission, Enemy, Troops available, Terrain, Time and local Civilians will affect every operation and those factors are infinitely variable. That essentially means that we are sometimes, perhaps even often, using them to their fullest. As for enough; depends on your viewpoint. In all cases, they have to be purchased, equipped, supplied and refueled and rearmed -- it boils down to what can be afforded. I'm sure most ground commanders believe there are never enough, the aviators from all nations do the best they can with what they have and believe the ground guys do not use their air assets as well as they should. The truth as usual lies somewhere in between.

As for setting down away from the objective, terrain is generally not an obstacle to dismounted troops (and if it is an impediment, it affects the bad guys as much as own troops) -- weather is always a factor and time becomes the issue and the (often presumed...) prohibition...

Stan

01-31-2010, 07:38 PM

My question came as a result of studying wars in southern africa and the measures they took to overcome the landmine issue.

One of the minor setbacks we discovered in Afghanistan was many suspected hazardous areas were found not to be contaminated with land mines and the other side of that is the misconception that WE share the international community's goal of a mine-free end state. Just a tad un-realistic, as well as not in keeping with our current approach to mine clearance - we actually hope for a mine impact-free end state.

The assumption is that our plans are effectively designed and managed :rolleyes:.

davidbfpo

01-31-2010, 07:47 PM

Zealot66,

I know a few here will interested in the end product of:
My question came as a result of studying wars in southern africa and the measures they took to overcome the landmine issue.

I recall some Rhodesian annoyance - after 1980 - to find that the South Africans (SADF) had developed their anti-mining equipment and had not shared this with them. The SADF deployed their kit in Angola and SWAfrica - where I expect ex-Rhodesians, now in the SADF noticed. IIRC Peter Stiff authored a book on the Rhodesian counter-IED programme.

jcustis

01-31-2010, 08:33 PM

The objective area vs. Walk in issue was the exact issueI looked at in a MC Gazette article a ways back that analysed Fire Force. We can technically do it, BUT I don't think we are doctrinally organized to do it.

Pete

02-01-2010, 12:16 AM

Wait a minute, Mr. Custis, you wrote that article on the Rhodesian Fire Force concept in Marine Corps Gazette. Was the reluctance to walk to the objective mainly to enhance the speed of execution?

jcustis

02-01-2010, 01:43 AM

If by THAT article you mean the one circa 2000, yes, that was mine.

Was the reluctance to walk to the objective mainly to enhance the speed of execution?

With this question, are you asking about the Rhodesians? If you are, I think the actions of the various elements (RLI, RAR, etc.) that provided Fire Forces were founded on the mobility that the helicopters provided first and foremost, but you have to remember the factors someone else already described.

The Rhodesian Sec Forces were very small, considering the land mass they were responsible for. With that in mind, and considering the fact that multiple sightings of terrorist "gangs" could be made in a single day and in a single ops area, the Rhodesians generally could not afford to walk to the objective. It just took too much time. That's not to say that they never walked about...it's just that in order to reset the Fire Force, the techniques employed worked best when they were dropped straight in. Please note that the Selous Scouts and C Sqdrn SAS boys did plenty of long range inserts to gain observation over enemy infiltration routes, encampments, etc.

Of note is the fact that the terrorists would often split up into very small groups (either on purpose or plain lack of discipline) and "bombshell" out for some distance before trying to go to ground. In order to assess the avenues of escape that they might try to use, the command helicopter usually pulled right into an orbit over the target area, so it makes sense that the maneuver sticks that were dropped in followed the same route and went straight to the area. Fire Force was the classic employment of counter-terrorist techniques that we hear argued for by some with regard to Afghanistan. It was conducted in a COIN campaign for sure, but the techniques only solved a single problem set.

I disagree with Wilf that Fire Force was borne out of the lack of helicopters. The use of old CH-47 Dakotas for parachuting sticks in was a result of the lack of aircraft, but the Fire Force was born out of precisely the mobility that the Alouettes and later Bell Hueys (only dispatched for FF work infrequently if I remember correctly) provided.

I also disagree that the concept would have had problems if pitted up against a more determine foe that employed more MANPADS. Although they didn't employ active anti-SAM measures in the way of IR decoys, the flight profiles employed and exhaust manifolds bolted on did work to an effect. It's also important to remember that the FF did not just stumble into a target area based off of some fleeting spot report. An OP was typically in position with a view of the tgt area, and knew the terrorist composition, strength, and armament, and had fed the information via radio retransmission to the ops center responsible for the FF strike.

If the terrs had decided to stand and fight, all the better targets for the 20mm Hispano autocannon and the .303 quad guns. They would have had a success here and there for sure, but I'm not certain it would have been operationally significant unless they brought down more than 10 helicopters. I cannot remember the numbers of aircraft actually shot down, but I think there were more incidents of combat accidents than anything else. And if the SAMs had become an issue, I suspect that the Rhodesians would have simply started attaching snipers to the OP teams so that those threats could be addressed.

We could achieve similar effects for sure with unmanned aerial systems in overwatch of a terrorist encampment, but we just employ Hellfire and JDAM to resolve those matters if the collateral damage factors don't give cause for concern, but I am convinced that there is no better ISR sensor than the Mark I, Mod I eyeball. In the Afghanistan context, we have to remember that the bad guys over there have a background in baiting and setting traps for heliborne forces employed by the Soviets, and the terrain in much of the country supports that sort of defense. I don't have a crystal ball view on what they might do against a force organized and employed like a Fire Force, but that goes back to my earlier point about the doctrinal issue. We simply do not keep the ground force commander aloft anymore, like the FF commanders did, and that prevents us from being able to effectively assess just what is going on relative to the threat's actions.

ETA: I think a great resource for training to this standard would be to start with FF vets, and supplement that with time spent talking shop with police chopper pilots from the large metropolitan depts.

If we were to put heliborne forces into an area to go up against some knuckleheads laying over on their way to say, Kandahar, methinks that we would need lots of them, and about five times the size of Fire Force elements in order to cover the various ratlines involved. There is a certain mobility luxury that the enemy might enjoy in the way of a brace of mopeds and red racing stripe Toyota pickups.

Bob's World

02-01-2010, 04:46 AM

Probably the most effective LOO for reducing IEDs is to be much more aggressive in our IO campaigns, locally and globally, challenging the manhood of any Pashtun who would let an IED do his fighting for him. We cannot underestimate the power of the offensive warrior culture on these people. Sneaky defensive tactics are beneath them. We need to rub that in their faces.

Meanwhile there is no easy button cure to massive logistics packages that we must move daily. Those big diesel generators all over your FOB are sucking down fuel like rush hour traffic in LA. You won't fly that in with a UAV, or a C-130 for that matter.

Blowing up or sniping kids and night laborers hired to dig in IEDs is no solution either. Poppy money fuels this insurgency, and there are an endless supply of people who will work for cash; and the second order impact on creating anger and dissent among the populace by targeting these workers is far too significant to ignore.

I suspect going after IEDs is a lot like going after pirates, in that if you are looking on the roads and the high seas you are going after the symptoms and not the roots of your problem. There are key nodes to IED networks that must be ID'd and reduced or mitigated, and they are in the neighboring towns and extend into Pakistan and Iran. Similarly pirates are probably more effectively dealt with on land than at sea. We just need to step back from the problem far enough to see the solution.

Meanwhile, its a dangerous, high-stress world out there for a lot of our guys each and every day. Keep them in your thoughts and prayers.

Infanteer

02-01-2010, 04:59 AM

I suspect going after IEDs is a lot like going after pirates, in that if you are looking on the roads and the high seas you are going after the symptoms and not the roots of your problem. There are key nodes to IED networks that must be ID'd and reduced or mitigated, and they are in the neighboring towns and extend into Pakistan and Iran. Similarly pirates are probably more effectively dealt with on land than at sea. We just need to step back from the problem far enough to see the solution.

I agree with you. We could wack IED makers and emplacers until the cows come home. Getting rid of IEDs is essentially getting rid of "ambushes".

In a small town, small town people pay attention to strange people (local or not) doing strange things. Small town people talk lots. Think of your own neigbourhood. If something out of place was on your street or backyard, you'd have a good idea that something was up. Small town people also generally know what goes on around their village - especially on the areas they frequently traffic (which are also areas you usually frequently traffic). They just have to be convinced to come forward with that information.

davidbfpo

02-01-2010, 07:52 AM

From Bob's World above:
Probably the most effective LOO for reducing IEDs is to be much more aggressive in our IO campaigns, locally and globally, challenging the manhood of any Pashtun who would let an IED do his fighting for him. We cannot underestimate the power of the offensive warrior culture on these people. Sneaky defensive tactics are beneath them. We need to rub that in their faces.

Bob,

From this faraway armchair this LOO (method) is not effective. Frontier warfare in the Imperial era was rarely a "stand up" fight, ambushes were favoured, albeit with rifle fire, not IEDs (although I think they were used) and within the Pashtun culture is are such 'sneaky tactics' contrary to their culture? My reading is that they are not. Add in the Soviet experience and the apparent success in the use of IEDs - hardly a good starting point for an IO campaign.

I anticipate some of those with real experience may be restrained from comment.

Infanteer

02-01-2010, 08:29 AM

From this faraway armchair this LOO (method) is not effective.

Actually, you'd be surprised.

William F. Owen

02-01-2010, 01:42 PM

Rex Brynen

02-01-2010, 03:48 PM

Have I understood you correctly, Bob? Why? I cannot think of any circumstance where that would succeed. What's more is I think an assumption that this argument could sway them verges on painting them as stupid and irrational.

My thought too--and as earlier mentioned, ambushes are very much the traditional Afghan fighting style.

Ken White

02-01-2010, 03:57 PM

Not to mention promising to do things one has no intention of doing, being hospitable to one's guests while under the roof then killing them as soon as they cross the threshhold outbound -- or siccing the women and kids on the casualties of enemies. :wry:

More cultural wishful thinking, perhaps...

Bob's World

02-01-2010, 04:41 PM

I think I actually laid out an array of activities to employ...but thanks for focusing on the first one as if it were the only one!

And no one assumes these guys are smarter, or tougher than I do.

I just figure if what is doing isn't working, one should try another tact. We are under-employing the IO LOO on all fronts, this one included. It won't cure the problem, but it will help.

Firn

02-01-2010, 06:06 PM

My thought too--and as earlier mentioned, ambushes are very much the traditional Afghan fighting style.

Well ambushes are a favorite traditional welcome party for pretty much every tribe or folk living in the mountains. Oetzi the Iceman was killed by an arrow into the back by friendly people waiting hidden near the traditional resting place on this path running over the Similaun pass. A true Hunter's shot into the heart.

Dear Hannibal met a couple of other, initially very friendly people as he tried to cross the Alps:

"So long as the Carthaginians had remained in the plains the various chieftains of the Allobroges had left them alone because of their fear both of the Carthaginian cavalry and also of the barbarian troops who were escorting them. But as soon as the latter had set off for home and Hannibal's troops began to advance into difficult country, the Allobrogian chiefs gathered a large force and took up commanding positions alongside the road by which the Carthaginians would have to climb."

"In the narrow pass the marching column was rapidly losing cohesion; there was great confusion and excitement amongst the men, and still more amongst the terrified horses, so the tribesmen, in the hope that any hostile action by themselves would be enough to complete their discomfiture, came swarming down the rocky and precipitous slopes, sure-footed as they were from long familiarity with their wild and trackless terrain."

Another place, another ambush:

"The natives, springing from their places of concealment, fiercely assaulted front and rear, leaping into the fray, hurling missiles, rolling down rocks from the heights above."

This tradition continued happily:

Frederick's brother, Leopold of Austria, led an army of 3000 to 5000 men — about one third of them knights on horseback — to crush the rebellious confederates, planning a surprise attack from south via Lake Aegeri and the Morgarten pass and counting on a complete victory over the rebellious peasants.

The Confederates of Schwyz — supported by the Confederates of Uri, who feared for their autonomy, but not supported by the Confederates of Unterwalden — expected the army in the west near the village of Arth, where they had erected fortifications. A historically plausible legend tells of the Knight of Huenenberg who shot an arrow into the camp of the Confederates with the attached message "watch out on St. Otmar's day at the Morgarten".

The Confederates prepared a road-block and an ambush at a point between Lake Aegeri and Morgarten pass where the small path led between the steep slope and a swamp. When about 1500 men attacked from above with rocks, logs and halberds, the knights had no room to defend themselves and suffered a crushing defeat, while the foot soldiers in the rear fled back to the city of Zug. A chronicler described the Confederates, unfamiliar with the customs of battles between knights, as brutally butchering everything that moved and everyone unable to flee. This founded the reputation of the Confederates as barbaric, yet fierce and respectable fighters.

Note the great use of IRD (Improvised Rolling Devices), which were also greatly used during the Napoleonic wars and resurfaced as avalanches triggered purposefully by artillery fire. IRRC the Indians quickly rediscovered this specific method during the Kargil war. During all that time the simple stone powered by gravitation proved ever handy for the defender...

Considering history I'm pretty sure that human creativity in harming other humans knows little to no bounds and that the mountains make some designs more effective than in other places. Fighting smart can mean using those. This poses quite some challenge for the soldiers fighting there. The Helicopter can be part of the solution.

Firn

zealot66

02-01-2010, 10:14 PM

Im reminded of a story I read about the Australian SAS doing 7-10 day recce's on main trafficways. SOP for the aussies to focus on good eyeball recon before moving assets in. They used this to good effect in vietnam. Using a small reconnaisance force and then moving larger troop movements into an area. Well, because they were not in command and control, this specific area intell on the IED activity was disregarded by the US and sadly several Marines were killed on this roadway.

I dont know what the standard is for US troops being out in observation posts and staying put but it was insinuated that the US is impatient in their reconnaisance and intelligence gathering and just balling it down the road or into an AO. Drones are not going to pick up everything and there is no replacement for eyes on target or humint.

Hopefully, the winter will provide a time for a complete intelligence build up for the spring offensive where the taliban are apparently staying put and waiting for the fight in Helmand province.

Again, Im an amateur in this field and I have read each and every post and appreciate the input.

Ken White

02-01-2010, 10:48 PM

I just figure if what is doing isn't working, one should try another tact.I've often been assured I have no tact... :D

I do BTW, agree that what we're doing now is not working but I also don't think your suggestions will work either. The basic problem is that we are trying to do something that is just not going to be accomplished. IOW, the Goal is unachievable and should never have been undertaken. Therefor much of what anyone suggests is unlikely to 'work.' :(

Zealot66

The Troops of the 1st Bde, 82d Abn Div when in Kandahar during 2005 and before being relieved by the Canadian 1/PPCLI in 2005-06 were routinely pulling week plus dismounted and two week or more mounted patrols, all resupplied by helicopter. Those patrols were variously in Platoon or company strength and were quite successful. I have no idea why the technique is not used by others. :wry:

Or maybe a little bit of one... :rolleyes:

Bob's World

02-02-2010, 01:40 AM

I've often been assured I have no tact... :D

I do BTW, agree that what we're doing now is not working but I also don't think your suggestions will work either. The basic problem is that we are trying to do something that is just not going to be accomplished. IOW, the Goal is unachievable and should never have been undertaken. Therefor much of what anyone suggests is unlikely to 'work.' :(

Zealot66

The Troops of the 1st Bde, 82d Abn Div when in Kandahar during 2005 and before being relieved by the Canadian 1/PPCLI in 2005-06 were routinely pulling week plus dismounted and two week or more mounted patrols, all resupplied by helicopter. Those patrols were variously in Platoon or company strength and were quite successful. I have no idea why the technique is not used by others. :wry:

Or maybe a little bit of one... :rolleyes:

People talking tactics, then someone jumps in and drags the conversation to the strategic level! I guess I stepped on that one Ken, nicely played...

Certainly, IMO, the critical issue that must be addressed in order to reduce the number of landmines in Afghanistan is the perceived illegitimacy of the Karzai government. I believe an open, all stake holders invited, Loya Jirga is the best way to address that top strategic issue. This will have best impact on getting the TB leadership to stand down (or "reintegrate and reconcile")
TB leadership is largely waging a Revolutionary insurgency, so their incorporation, in a controlled, reasonable fashion, into governance makes sense.

As to the fighters themselves, they are largely fighting a resistance insurgency. Affairs in Kabul don't mean much them. They fight us because we are here, and because the TB leadership, flush with Poppy $$, can pay them a day’s wage for a day’s work, (which by the way most men find the preferred way to feed their families, not taking charity from some foreign NGOs). Even if that day's work is at night putting in IEDs or joining a team of fighters. We best address resistance insurgency by simply going home. Success with the Loya Jirga above allows us to VASTLY reduce our presence.

The fly in the ointment, is that no one can predict or control the results of a true Loya Jirga; thus why it is perceived as legitimate. Thus why the elections we enabled were NOT perceived as legitimate (did anyone wonder what the results would be??)

So, yes, I have strategic ideas as to reducing IEDs.

I also believe based on my training and experience that an IO campaign that hammers over the radio waves here (these people for large part do not read, so leave your flyers and billboards at home) the honor of Pashtunwali, the Pashtun people, and cowardly attributes of IEDs that kill local women and children as well as the foreign soldiers, is an important step that needs to be stepped up. Not a cure all, there will always be those that will rationalize it to be within the "rules."

Cole

02-02-2010, 01:58 AM

It's not related to aviation and IEDs but the Israelis used to drag fences behind their patrolling jeeps to leave a unique pattern in the ground so anyone crossing it would leave footprints. Same principle applies to detecting anyone digging IEDs. I also recall sitting on the beach at Tel Aviv and watching all different kinds of helicopters constantly fly by along the coast right after the Palestinian intifada attempted a rubber raft beach landing back in 1990. Use air routes paralleling key ground routes and have a constant stream of aircraft watching for trouble.

Liked the idea of using helicopters to drop off 2-man to fire team sized OPs with good optics at multiple high terrain OP locations each night along troubled routes to include false insertions. Then have the helicopter return to base and pick-up a second squad and go park somewhere nearby on secure terrain to prepare to respond to any problems detected. Or monitor the OPs using loitering UAS with an Apache/UH-60 QRF ready to respond.

Ken White

02-02-2010, 02:16 AM

People talking tactics, then someone jumps in and drags the conversation to the strategic level! I guess I stepped on that one Ken, nicely played...Just stating that it is my belief that we are pursuing the old impossible dream...

I don't disagree with what you suggest and I strongly agree that what we're doing now is not working, Yet, I really doubt your suggestions will make much difference if implemented. Unfortunately,we cannot leave just yet and are thus doomed to a holding action. Damned if we do, damned if we don't. Your oft stated advice to think about what we're trying to do before we implement is totally valid -- unfortunately, no one did that in 2001... :mad:

Rex Brynen

02-02-2010, 02:26 AM

so too is disappearing when confronted by superior force

There's an excellent example of this, and of the Taliban scout/picket/sentry/early warning system, in today's NYT:

As Marines Move In, Taliban Fight a Shadowy War (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/world/asia/02taliban.html?pagewanted=1&ref=global-home)

By C.J. CHIVERS
New York Times
Published: February 1, 2010

KARARDAR, Afghanistan — The Marine infantry company, accompanied by a squad of Afghan soldiers, set out long before dawn. It walked silently through the dark fields with plans of arriving at a group of mud-walled compounds in Helmand Province at sunrise.

The company had received intelligence reports that 40 to 50 Taliban fighters had moved into this village a few days before, and the battalion had set a cordon around it. The Marines hoped to surprise any insurgents within.

But as the company moved, shepherds whistled in the darkness, passing warning of the Americans’ approach. Dogs barked themselves hoarse. The din rose in every direction, enveloping the column in noise. And then, as the Marines became visible in the bluish twilight, a minivan rumbled out of one compound. Its driver steered ahead of the company, honking the van’s horn, spreading the alarm. Spotters appeared on roofs.

Marine operations like this one in mid-January, along with interviews with dozens of Marines, reveal the insurgents’ evolving means of waging an Afghan brand of war, even as more American troops arrive.

...

On the morning of the sweep, made by Weapons Company, Third Battalion, First Marines, a large communications antenna that rose from one compound vanished before the Marines could reach it. The man inside insisted that he had seen nothing. And when the Marines moved within the compounds’ walls, people in nearby houses released white pigeons, revealing the Americans’ locations to anyone watching from afar.

The Taliban and their supporters use other signals besides car horns and pigeons, including kites flown near American movements and dense puffs of smoke released from chimneys near where a unit patrols.

“You’ll go to one place, and for some reason there will be a big plume of smoke ahead of you,” said Capt. Paul D. Stubbs, the Weapons Company commander. “As you go to the next place, there will be another.”

motorfirebox

02-02-2010, 03:05 AM

Every week, I arrive on a scene where a simple device was built to defeat either the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, or United States Forces (USF). I am never ceased to be amazed at how simple, yet complex the devices are, and most of the components could have been purchased at Walmart, Ace Hardware, and Radio Shack to produce what we are seeing.

The common theme I see in most of the posts found in this thread is that the concept, collectively, is that of a reactive measure vs. a proactive measure. Instead of focusing a majority of our efforts on how we defeat devices through defense, let us focus on finding out where they are being made and stopping that prior to them being placed somewhere. Obviously, defensive measures are essential, however in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the appearance is that of not going after the "bad guy", but getting hit and trying to find out how to survive a strike...Then limp away.

Rarely do I see efforts here in Iraq where the focus is on identifying where the devices are made, but more where they have been emplaced. I look at briefing after briefing that reflects hot spots of detonations, however I have yet to look at one that identifies where exactly the optimum location for them to be made is.
How much does location matter? What sorts of tools/equipment are necessary for creating these devices? The reason I ask is, if the requirements for building these devices are low, then hunting for locations may not be the best way to go about it. If all you have to do is assembly and some spot welding, for instance, then trying to find the location will be almost as difficult as searching for the devices themselves.

reed11b

02-03-2010, 12:08 AM

Liked the idea of using helicopters to drop off 2-man to fire team sized OPs with good optics at multiple high terrain OP locations each night along troubled routes to include false insertions. Then have the helicopter return to base and pick-up a second squad and go park somewhere nearby on secure terrain to prepare to respond to any problems detected. Or monitor the OPs using loitering UAS with an Apache/UH-60 QRF ready to respond.

That is called a LRS team, and the Army has tried to neuter and eliminate us since our creation. Now we are in BfSBs were we do what? Who knows, not I, and I am in one.
Reed

Firn

02-03-2010, 04:43 PM

That is called a LRS team, and the Army has tried to neuter and eliminate us since our creation. Now we are in BfSBs were we do what? Who knows, not I, and I am in one.
Reed

Two generations ago pretty much every countryboy here was able to construct traps to poach rabbits and other small animals. Even deers were caught rather easily (and cruelly) by using a certain type of wire tied to a noose and a bit of knowledge about their tracks. Trapping is certainly one of the oldest and yet most efficient ways to capture animals that mankind has created. Given all that creative booby trapping in the last centruy I'm not surprised at all that it is used in ever shifting shapes in the current conflicts.

Large parts of Afghanistan should be almost ideal country for LRS. A good location and good spotting scopes should enable you to detect a human from as far as 20+ km. This is just to show the capability of a good glas. Some Israeli units use excellent Swarovski.

@Rex Brynen: An interesting article. Nothing new under the sun, but it reinforces the need to reach or observe the objective without raising the alarm. This topic has been already adressed both at the strategic and the tactical level.

@Cole: Without knowing the specific instances of the use of such dragging devices I highly suspect that they use it to create an additonal layer of defense along their patrol routes. IIRC similar ideas were used along the German-German border. I doubt that they are as useful on the roads in Afghanistan which are used by quite some people.

Firn

tankersteve

02-03-2010, 06:54 PM

"It's not related to aviation and IEDs but the Israelis used to drag fences behind their patrolling jeeps to leave a unique pattern in the ground so anyone crossing it would leave footprints. "

the Russians found that the Afghan fighters would bury mines in the road and then 're-print' the tracks of the vehicles that had previously passed, completely disguising the location of the mine.

Following in the tracks of the previous vehicle, if not immediately afterward, is not a sound technique. There are even mines that wait for the second vehicle to pass before exploding, IOT defeat overpressure mine clearing.

Unless we had a troop and sensor density that would preclude people from emplacing IEDs in anything other than a very hasty manner, we can always expect to find more of these weapons. And it still does nothing to defeat the individual from wanting to employ them.

Tankersteve

Ken White

02-03-2010, 07:27 PM

That is called a LRS team, and the Army has tried to neuter and eliminate us since our creation. Now we are in BfSBs were we do what?You're absolutely right and so is Firn:
Large parts of Afghanistan should be almost ideal country for LRS. A good location and good spotting scopes should enable you to detect a human from as far as 20+ km...Unfortunately, both your points are moot due to a combination of turf battles (Branch vs branch for the BfSB + USSF vs Big Army for the LRS mission), mediocre to poor training and extreme risk aversion.

Use of LRS has been severely constrained in the current operating environment by all three. There have been some notable successes but few Cdrs seem willing to take the nominal risk...

zealot66

02-03-2010, 09:35 PM

Suprised this novice started such a long thread. Im an armchair historian and I cant help but think that in 10-20 years, people are going to be studying the question of losses due to the IED and mistakes overzealous, hardcharging glory hounds ran their men into bombs instead of methodical painstaking recon and more ways to lower the body count.

Booby traps in vietnam caused a ton of casualties but I see that in a different light of the jungle vs more open terrain. Instead of trying more soldiering skills and intelligence, it seems that America just tries to build bigger more expensive vehicles. Like I said, it just aches to hear of another casualty due to IED. Didnt even get a chance to fire at the enemy. I know its a painful reality of controlling the AO to be mobile and presence on the ground but There has to be an answer.

Cole

02-04-2010, 12:41 AM

the Russians found that the Afghan fighters would bury mines in the road and then 're-print' the tracks of the vehicles that had previously passed, completely disguising the location of the mine.

Following in the tracks of the previous vehicle, if not immediately afterward, is not a sound technique. There are even mines that wait for the second vehicle to pass before exploding, IOT defeat overpressure mine clearing.

Unless we had a troop and sensor density that would preclude people from emplacing IEDs in anything other than a very hasty manner, we can always expect to find more of these weapons. And it still does nothing to defeat the individual from wanting to employ them.

TankerSteve, hear you on your last sentence, but while foreign fighters planting bombs in Iraq are no longer welcome, that isn’t true in Afghanistan. COIN techniques might persuade homegrown Taliban not to plant IEDs, but do little to deter non-local Taliban from Pakistan madrassas or the Chechnyan with a big bag of fertilizer.

As you point out, unpaved roads in Afghanistan simplify IED emplacement. But recalling the paved road leading from Barstow to Fort Irwin, just can’t imagine the need for many high ground OPs or COPs to watch the main road and prevent someone from setting up IEDs in the daytime. Night of course, is a different matter. And roads next to towns/compounds/trees/crops along the Helmand River valley and other flat areas make it hard to maintain constant surveillance of existing dirt roads, day or night.

Does that create opportunities for off-roading it away from civilians and chokepoints to safeguard both the populous and ourselves? It may not be the shortest route, but remote dirt roads observed from a few high terrain COPs/OPs, and easily targeted without collateral damage could reduce IEDs. Because primarily coalition supply vehicles would use these routes, anyone else on/near them on foot or in a vehicle is suspect and subject to search.

Engineers and the new Marine line-charge vehicle could clear or blow holes through suspected minefield areas, then cover it in clay or gravel and drag some sort of pattern producer (Firn it was near the border) behind the trail vehicle on the last patrol of the night. Shouldn’t be too many vehicles (or block off entries) on the new remote roads at night to make tracks and any IED planter still must cover footprints while replicating the unique ground pattern in the dark, not to mention get to and away from the remote road over miles of open terrain with no place to hide and a heavy load to bear.

Freshly dug dirt at night may well have a different IR signature, as well.
So augment that with higher flying UAS (TF ODIN down to Shadow) or aerostats/towers in each COP, and lower flying T-Hawks, and Ravens to maintain nightly surveillance. One COP could cover 10 kms on either side alternating between noisy, culvert-checking T-Hawks, and quieter Ravens to make the enemy believe the coast is clear. Use unmanned ground sensors near wadis.

Zealous66, you must admit the US flies in Afghanistan more than other allies and casualties are far less than Vietnam or the 14,000 the Soviets lost...and you should see some vehicles are coalition partners and the poor ANP use.

Ken White

02-04-2010, 01:28 AM

...I cant help but think that in 10-20 years, people are going to be studying the question of losses due to the IED and mistakes overzealous, hardcharging glory hounds ran their men into bombs instead of methodical painstaking recon and more ways to lower the body count.In fact, I'm quite sure it is incorrect. The painstaking recon you suggest is possible and might lower the casualty count a bit -- it equally as well might not lower it. However, that 'painstaking' equals 'time' -- and time is sometimes in short supply. Mission demands quite often require efforts that are inimical to security. The History books rarely address that factor well because most of the historians don't understand it . Not to mention that soldiers are more likely to be lost by hesitant over caution than they are by aggressive maneuver.
Booby traps in vietnam caused a ton of casualties...Booby traps? Weren't that many, particularly after 1965. There were some but there were also a far larger number of what we today call IEDs.
but I see that in a different light of the jungle vs more open terrain.Jungle versus open is more than countered by short distances versus significant distance. Afghanistan is four times the size of South Viet Nam with twice the population -- and there were over 1.5M allied troops in that country at the peak. Afghanistan has less than a fourth as many Coaliton troops to cover that four times larger nation. My math skills were never good and are now quite rusty but I believe that's an exponential difference. Exponential or not, it is quite significant.
Instead of trying more soldiering skills and intelligence, it seems that America just tries to build bigger more expensive vehicles.Thank an ignorant news media and a venal Congress for that. The terrible thing that is an MRAP was reluctantly purchased by the Armed Forces at Congress' insistence. You can also thank that Congress for underfunding training (big hardware projects mean more jobs and more votes than does training).
Like I said, it just aches to hear of another casualty due to IED. Didnt even get a chance to fire at the enemy.Cannot understand why that aches. Nor am I sure that those casualties would feel a bit better if they did have a chance to fire, I don't think that makes much difference. Look at the bright side, the good news is that far fewer are dying in these wars than was true in the past (LINK) (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/20100125.aspx)...
I know its a painful reality of controlling the AO to be mobile and presence on the ground but There has to be an answer.There is an answer and lacking that technique, you're doomed to have mines and IEDs planted -- kill everything that moves near your routes. I doubt you or most Americans will go for that. Even I think that's a bit far...

Ken White

02-04-2010, 11:27 PM

. I think we are trying to fight a gentlemans war with barbarians. They do not honor the geneva convention or care about collateral damage. I think the only time this country truly won a war was in ww 2 when we literally took care of the problem. You can never win a PC war. The enemy laughs and shrugs and sees weakness in what we call moral strength.You are of course correct in all aspects. Unfortunately, World War II was the last war we fought without adoptingng those kinds of 'civilized' constraints -- as if war could ever be civilized...

While you and I may agree on that and many others also agree, there are a number of people in this country who do not agree that Thomas Jonathan Jackson was correct as quoted by G.F.R. Henderson "War means fighting. The business of the soldier is to fight. Armies are not called out to dig trenches, to live in camps, but to find the enemy and strike him; to invade his country, and do him all possible damage in the shortest possible time. This will involve great destruction of life and property while it lasts; but such a war will of necessity be of brief continuance, and so would be an economy of life and property in the end (emphasis added / kw)."
... Well, the Seal got enraged one night and lit the village up. There was no more problem.Things like that happened very frequently in WW II, frequently in Korea and occasionally in Viet Nam. They are and will be exceedingly rare today.

That declining occurrence rate is a function of the type of war, increasing gentrification (word of choice for a Family Board...), sadly increasing lawyerly involvement and vastly improved communication and reportage, the so-called 'information warfare' factor. It will only continue to decrease in acceptance as an acceptable response -- until the next existential war; then the gloves will again come off. Moral of that is to avoid thses little wars, they cost more than they're worth.
...I think one of the chief errors of the bush administration was prostrating ourselves to an imaginary border in pakistan. Who the hell is pakistan ? Who the hell were the Cambodes or Pathet Lao? track your prey, follow its spoor and kill it.The Bush mistake was in staying to 'fix' Afghanistan and Iraq. We should've slammed in hard and rapidly, removed the problem children and left, throwing money at the UN ion the way out and yelling "Cleanup on Aisle three..."

As for borders, not that easy to ignore IF you're trying to wage 'legitimate' war -- and the Politicians who try to wage war on the cheap, ignoring Stonewall, have to use the legitimate ploy...
Hopefully the Taliban holds up in Helmand and wants to get their martyrdom in the spring. And we should disregard a two faced Pakistan and track down every insurgent in the valley and get rid of them. There should be no safe place. It sucked the blood from us in Vietnam and its doing it now too.In both cases, the tactical and operational environments suffer from achingly poor strategic choices. Sadly, we cannot now disregard Pakistan. Nor can we change the rules at this point. We just have to suck it up and hopefully, resolve not to try this foolishness -- stupidity, really -- again. :mad: