Storming the Beach

[William F. Owen]

Starting this as I think this worthy of our collective attention rather than resting in the Blog.

See here. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/06/have-we-stormed-our-last-beach/)

IMO, I think EFV and V-22 are just bad ideas for a non-existent problem, created from an imagined reality. Yes amphibious Operations will be a necessary part of future warfare, but I have doubts that current ideas actually deliver that in a useful way.

...BTW, I have a lot of time for the Corps (USMC). Slightly odd chaps, but I actually believe the rest of the world can learn some useful things from the USMC if it is in any way serious about expeditionary operations.

[Fuchs]

Both are over-engineered for sure.

A modern marine corps would be an ideal choice for the airborne, swamp operations and river/lake crossing niches.
Too bad, the USMC is redundant with army formations (101st, 82nd, and army in general as demonstrated in WW2 amphibious operations in the European theatre).

It makes sense to give a marine corps an amphibious AFV, but that doesn't need to be a high seas or high speed design. A winch and good climbing ability are more important (many rivers are between rather steep hills).

[slapout9]

This was scheduled to go into actual production but Vietnam budget priorities intervened. Not the idea ducted fan version but still pretty good IMO.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=buh7_xLG4ZE

[Infanteer]

I remember reading how amphibious warfare had suffered due to Iraq and Afghanistan as the Marine Corps had to pay its toll for wanting 3 full up divisions with tanks - the toll being taking a share in sustaining deployments on counter-insurgency operations. As Iraq/Afghanistan reach their nadir, it shall be interesting to see how the USMC chooses to oriet itself.

There were a few articles written in the Australian Army Journal on Amphibious Warfare and such that were really good and layed the concept out well. The topic is one that has always interested me as it is probably one of the most effective ways of sustainable force projection.

However, Wilf raises a good point with "storming the beach". I had the oppurtunity to work with the USMC, including an amphibious exercise aboard an LHD. Amazing in the capabilities they provide. In the exercise, we tried for two days to execute and amphibious assault out of the well deck. Once we got the well deck and broken landing craft sorted out, the seas were simply too rough to deploy. Eventually, we just hopped on helicopters and assaulted the objective (6 CH-53s lifted an entire Rifle Company at once from the ship).

Enemy air defence can be dealt with, Mother Nature can't. Other than that, the Gators were impressive. Between LCACs, landing craft and helos, there was a good mix of insertion ability. The C2, logistical and medical support that the ship contained makes these abilities.

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.

[slapout9]

I remember reading how amphibious warfare had suffered due to Iraq and Afghanistan as the Marine Corps had to pay its toll for wanting 3 full up divisions with tanks - the toll being taking a share in sustaining deployments on counter-insurgency operations. As Iraq/Afghanistan reach their nadir, it shall be interesting to see how the USMC chooses to oriet itself.

There were a few articles written in the Australian Army Journal on Amphibious Warfare and such that were really good and layed the concept out well. The topic is one that has always interested me as it is probably one of the most effective ways of sustainable force projection.

However, Wilf raises a good point with "storming the beach". I had the oppurtunity to work with the USMC, including an amphibious exercise aboard an LHD. Amazing in the capabilities they provide. In the exercise, we tried for two days to execute and amphibious assault out of the well deck. Once we got the well deck and broken landing craft sorted out, the seas were simply too rough to deploy. Eventually, we just hopped on helicopters and assaulted the objective (6 CH-53s lifted an entire Rifle Company at once from the ship).

Enemy air defence can be dealt with, Mother Nature can't. Other than that, the Gators were impressive. Between LCACs, landing craft and helos, there was a good mix of insertion ability. The C2, logistical and medical support that the ship contained makes these abilities.

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.


General Gavin thought and wrote that the mission of the Marine Corps should be to "Attack Across The Shore" not to just focus on beach landings.

[Pete]

The 6th of June is an auspicious day for starting this "Storming the Beach" thread. Today is the 66th anniversary of the Normandy landings. "Allies Driving Into France" is the headline for the lead story on the front page of my London edition of The Stars and Stripes for June 7, 1944, price 1D.

[Granite_State]

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.

I had the same thought after spending just one night aboard one during our quick Amphibious Familiarization Exercise at TBS two months ago.

[Chris jM]

Enemy air defence can be dealt with, Mother Nature can't.

Amphibious/ ship-to-shore ops are very difficult, agreed. The thing to remember in the larger context of marine-type ops is that it's one thing getting ashore, it's another thing sustaining yourself once ashore.

Beach-heads and even established ports are a huge bottle-neck in the logistic support that needs to flow through, and tying up all your aviation assets in supply isn't an ideal solution if at all possible.

Further, as you stated, beach-heads are hugely vulnerable to both enemy action and mother nature. I've only had one experience of operating ship-to-shore and the fragility of the beach-head in anything other than near-perfect conditions is hard to believe. We had to have mass engineer recce and preparation of matting and berms so our vehicles could roll ashore - and this was in a completely uncontested, take-your-time environment. Once chance and friction comes into effect, I shudder to think of the difficulties.

[COMMAR]

Its important to keep in mind in all points of this discussion that Amphibious Ops are not relegated to loading troops on a AAV/EFV/LCAC & landing on a beach.

The Amphibious Assault is the most complex of military maneuver & involves alot of moving parts in a very fluid environment. It can flow from reconnaissance & sabotage to company sized clandestine raid for further sabotage/softening to vertical assault to beach head landing. In no particular order or necessity.

The flow from Beach Head to Build Up to Break Out is more Art than Science & is taught to the level of understanding to all from Colonel to Squad Leader. This is one of the major reasons the USMC stresses training for it.

Why is this Important?

Take the studies done on the Operation in Grenada. Subsequent studies showed that although all forces suffered serious set backs to initial assault plans, all forces eventually landed & began to build forces.

But it was the Marines understanding of Build Up to Break Out; Break Out-stresses sucking the Enemy/Attackers in during the Build Up phase to swell forces at their weakest point using that momentum to "Break Out" & fuel your Counter-Assault, that led to 400 Marines taking 80% of the Island.--Fluid.. Art not Science.

The 2 Coys fr/the 22nd MEU's role was initially very small; lead a Helo Raid to seize Port Pearl for potential Civ Evac to ARG. But were ordered to seize the rest of Island when the Main assault force was pinned down at Port Salinas.

Although this was not a classic Amphibious Assault all elements trained for proved essential in this & all other assault/raid type Operations. Its like training for the Decathlon b/c you don't which event you may be asked to run, training for Amphib Ops is nearly all encompassing.

[slapout9]

The Amphibious Assault is the most complex of military maneuver & involves alot of moving parts in a very fluid environment. It can flow from reconnaissance & sabotage to company sized clandestine raid for further sabotage/softening to vertical assault to beach head landing. In no particular order or necessity.


OUTSTANDING! need to send that to Uncle Bob (SECDEF) cause I don't think he gets it. That is also what AIRBORNE warfare is all about, as JCUSTIS said a while back there is no difference. As the future becomes more unpredictable we MOST likely to need more Amphibious capabilities not less.

Also, remember Haiti!!!

[Entropy]

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.

Since you ask and since I've done both (the benefit, I suppose, of being in two services), I'd say afloat is better. Keep in mind that I was a fobbit (though not by choice) so your mileage may vary. The reason I give the advantage to an afloat deployment is the port calls. I got to see Australia several times, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Dubai, etc. You get to drink in port. You get to interact with women. That makes up for a lot of tin-can induced craziness which is, admittedly, pretty bad. But as I guy who loves to travel I thought the Navy was a pretty sweet deal.

[Entropy]

I'm reminded of something. When I was in the Navy during the 1990's we and the Marines had an expeditionary raiding mindest. We didn't do campaign-level planning - that was something left to the Army and Air Force. I've been out of the Navy for a while now and wonder if raiding is still a part of the culture and skill-set.

[Ken White]

I'm reminded of something. When I was in the Navy during the 1990's we and the Marines had an expeditionary raiding mindest. We didn't do campaign-level planning - that was something left to the Army and Air Force. I've been out of the Navy for a while now and wonder if raiding is still a part of the culture and skill-set.and was convinced it was wise and an excellent strategy. I've heard, read or seen nothing in the past 60 years to suggest different. My sensing it is that it is not part of the skill set and I believe that is highly regrettable as well as a major shortfall in capability. In the Army, Airborne units also once had that as viable skill set and I know it's lost there. That technique is apparently not looked upon favorably by many today. Fortunately, not all agree...:wry:

We lost the bubble due to political games in DC IMO. Political games, political correctness and lack of political will... :mad:

[Fuchs]

Funnily, that's exactly what I expected to happen after 9-11: A few raids (I thought of rangers, though), a few snatch ops, but staying out of the civil war.

Simply taking on the responsible individuals directly and making any overt infrastructure ("terror camps") unfeasible.

I was quite surprised about the invasion (although afaik the invasion was an effort with marginal own personnel permanently on the ground until the Marines took Kandahar airport).

And then imagine my surprise when it became clear that the Westerns were there to stay...*insert board-incompatible language here*.

[COMMAR]

OUTSTANDING! need to send that to Uncle Bob (SECDEF) cause I don't think he gets it. That is also what AIRBORNE warfare is all about, as JCUSTIS said a while back there is no difference. As the future becomes more unpredictable we MOST likely to need more Amphibious capabilities not less.

Also, remember Haiti!!!

Now we're back to chiding what we don't understand for the sake of a pissing contest.

Its not on my word that calls Amphibious Warfare the most complex of all modern military maneuvers, just everything that's written on the subject. And its not that Gates doesn't know or understand this.

He's not saying, How is Amphibious Warfare relevant..?, but convince me how YOUR vision of (future) Amphibious Operations is relevant to MY vision of where I want to take the DOD.




But... this is not the 1st time Gates & the Corps have been at odds over the way Gates envisioned something & he challenged the Corps to change his mind; and they did.

3yrs ago CMC Gen Conway said Anbar is pacified, my Marines are bored, & within a year I would like to begin shifting Our Marines from Iraq to Afghanistan.

Gates publicly chided Conway & said there NO plans to shift the Marines to A'stan & that the Marines will stay in Anbar until the end of our involvement in Iraq.

Gates & Conway tactfully went back & forth in the media for months w/Gates finally laying down the Gauntlet in Dec '07 saying the Marines have presented no viable plan for shifting forces to A'stan.

The opportunity came in Jan '08 when NATO fell 5,000 troops short of the goal set by Gates. The Marines presented a plan to insert 3500 Marines in 3mths along with a new strategy for their area.

1yr later Gates was convinced & there were 10,000 more Marines in A'stan & 10,000 less in Iraq.


Gates is simply telling HQMC, We don't see eye to eye on whats relevant (in both Strategy & Procurement). He's challenging them to convince me.

[Valin]

I had the same thought after spending just one night aboard one during our quick Amphibious Familiarization Exercise at TBS two months ago.

That's why I joined the Air Force. Although there were times when the cooks served red wine with fowl....yet somehow we managed to survive. :D

[Ken White]

Funnily, that's exactly what I expected to happen after 9-11: A few raids (I thought of rangers, though), a few snatch ops, but staying out of the civil war.capabilities in the 80s, the then senior leadership in DoD fought it to a standstill due to risk aversion. USSOCOM grabbed the ball when the Pentagon wasn't looking and convinced a lot of folks that such missions should be theirs and they developed minimal capabilities (not large or robust enough in my view -- plus large raids shouldn't be their job) but every attempt to employ those capabilities (and there were some) was stymied by DoD or the NSC. :mad:

Thus the 'invasion' occurred more due to a lack of other capability than for other reasons.
And then imagine my surprise when it became clear that the Westerns were there to stay...*insert board-incompatible language here*.Heh. You were not alone... :D

Hopefully, we'll get smarter in the future and develop both the capabilities for strategic raids and the political will to employ them. :cool:

[William F. Owen]

He's not saying, How is Amphibious Warfare relevant..?, but convince me how YOUR vision of (future) Amphibious Operations is relevant to MY vision of where I want to take the DOD.
It is the USMC vision that concerns me - thus my reference to EFV & V22.
The justification for these platforms always comes back to some very contestable assumptions.

In fact, it's not just the USMC vision, but ideas about the capabilities of future regular threats in general that always seem to default to "this is how we would like them to be, to justify our equipment program."

[Tukhachevskii]

It is the USMC vision that concerns me - thus my reference to EFV & V22.
The justification for these platforms always comes back to some very contestable assumptions.

In fact, it's not just the USMC vision, but ideas about the capabilities of future regular threats in general that always seem to default to "this is how we would like them to be, to justify our equipment program."

Building a better mousetrap: The Unnecessary Capability of the EFV (http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA505294) from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (link may be fernickity)

Yet the overwhelming impetus driving the development of the EFV is operational maneuver from the sea [OMFTS]. The vision behind the EFV is one in which a group of vehicles move from apmphibious shipping twenty-five nautical miles from the shoreline and then travel at a high speed to a littoral penetration point to come ashore and seamlessly complete some tactical mission.
The layout and construction of the EFV have been optimised for that high speed movement over water. but this is not a reasonable focus. The mission profile guidance originally given to the EFV (then the AAAV) team was for a 20% operational time in the water and 80% on land. Since then, the mean operational time in the water for all envisioned EFV missions has been revised to 8.2%[!]. Thus the Marine Corps predicts the EFV to operate eight out of every one hundred hours of vehicle operation in water.
If the Marine Corps had fielded the EFV in January of 2001, the high water speed capability would not have been used in either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation IIraqi Freedom both expeditionary operations by any standard. (p.9-10)

Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq (www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/08/marine_equipment.pdf) from the Centre for American Progress (www.americanprogress.org/).

It [the EFV] is significantly faster on water, slighty faster on land, and has betetr armor and firepower than the AAV. On land, the EFV is also larger, more powerful, and has betetr communications than other armored personnel carriers, including the Army's Bradley. It only lacks increased armor protection, which the Marines have readily sacrificed for greater mobility. Even though the cost of the EFV has jumped to more than $12 million per vehicle....(p.14)
That last statistic made my eyes water, was a time when you could buy a JAS 39 Gripen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JAS_39_Gripen) fighter for that much (c. 1995-ish). Talk about inflation. If I'm not mistaken an M1A1 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M1_Abrams) costs about $5million?


The Marines' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): Background and Issues for Congress (http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22947.pdf) from the ever informative Congressional Research Service

Twenty years ago when the EFV was conceived, some defense officials suggested that the fleet could operate 20 to 30 miles from the shore, debarking EFVs for amphibious operations, but with the advent of these new weapons [anti-ship missiles, mines, small fast attack craft, etc.] and tactics, this is no longer possible. Instead in order to sufficiently protect the large amphibious ships that transport Marines and EFVs, it has been suggested that the fleet might need to operate at least 100 miles from shore - beyond the EFV's range.(p.7)

[slapout9]

Gates is simply telling HQMC, We don't see eye to eye on whats relevant (in both Strategy & Procurement). He's challenging them to convince me.

So, is he questioning the ideas and equipment or just the cost? Meaning you can do what want to do but you have to find a cheaper way?

[COMMAR]

It is the USMC vision that concerns me - thus my reference to EFV & V22. The justification for these platforms always comes back to some very contestable assumptions.

Kind of.. But in the back & forth that I've read and fr/the Marines I know on the outer fringes of this at Quantico, its not concern being voiced by Gates.

He's in the process of setting the tone for the future of the DOD.. Drawing the lines of who's doing what & when those lines are crossed. At the end of the day, as far as the overall direction each service takes, the decision is his.

He hears the Marines stubbornly standing their ground & railing for what they see as necessary & has basically said this:
[paraphrased] In the priority of threats both present & near future, & the Budgets & structure that I'm setting to address them we don't agree & I don't see you getting what you want.



But its helpful to start at the beginning where Gates & HQMC disagree, not in the middle w/the programs.

Gates sees the USMC taking a prominent role in future Irregular Conflicts.

HQMC has said yes, we agree.. but we're a Two-Fisted Fighter so we're going to need XY&Z to remain Predominant across all boards we touch.

Gates counters; for the foreseeable future (threat wise), those items in the #s you've projected, are unlikely & impractical b/c your primary role & most likely mission in the structure & vision I have set will be IW.

HQMC counters, these items are Dual suited & will revolutionize how we conduct both IW & HIC.

Gates says while these items will be an advancement.. they will not be as significant as to offset my overall (across all services) plans & projected budgets.. your current load out will suffice for any near threats.



And thats where it currently stands. Its not that this Marine Program is bad or that, they just don't fit. But in all fairness by comparison to Multi-billion $ FAILURES like:
-Future Combat Systems (FCS) or Land Warrior
-The Air Force's Tanker deal
-or the Navy's numerous ship debacles

The USMC's programs are well ahead of the curve & a drop in the bucket monetarily.

But what seems to be totally left out of this Debate is that SECDEF Gates has AGAIN left the "gate" open for the Marines to convince him to adjust his plans.

[Granite_State]

The Marine Corps Gazette, for subscribers, had an article in February by a retired AAV Gunny, "Do We Really Need the EFV?" He seemed to think its electronics would be too sophisticated and fragile to stand up to heavy copmbat.

[slapout9]

Gates sees the USMC taking a prominent role in future Irregular Conflicts.




Well, in his (Gates) mind how does he see the USMC doing IW without some newer systems added to inventory? Especially since IW in the future may include the Hy-Brid warfare scenario where you have civilians operating fairly Hi-tech weapons systems as opposed to guerrillas with just small arms.

[COMMAR]

Well, in his (Gates) mind how does he see the USMC doing IW without some newer systems added to inventory?

What is the point of this thread?? Gates has shot down HQMC's justifications for their big ticket items, that's been clearly discussed. So what is the point of your question?

If your asking a legitimate question lets expand on it. If your going to be the little kid that asks why after every statement then that's stupid.

[slapout9]

What is the point of this thread?? Gates has shot down HQMC's justifications for their big ticket items, that's been clearly discussed. So what is the point of your question?

If your asking a legitimate question lets expand on it. If your going to be the little kid that asks why after every statement then that's stupid.

In another post you said Gates had a certain veiwpoint of what the Marines should be/do? I raised the question to try and get a clearer understanding of what he (Gates) is after/wants.

[William F. Owen]

Kind of.. But in the back & forth that I've read and fr/the Marines I know on the outer fringes of this at Quantico, its not concern being voiced by Gates.

OK, but the issues with EFV and V-22 are part of the problem. Neither should exist, because while technically possible, neither are a required capability.

The idea that they are needed keeps flowing back to a very doubtful set of assumptions, which almost never seem to challenged. The idea that the EFV skims in from over the horizon, just to be totalled by 20kg bar mine lying 1m above the high water mark seems to be a product of focussing on the wrong problem.

[Tukhachevskii]

The Marine Corps Gazette, for subscribers, had an article in February by a retired AAV Gunny, "Do We Really Need the EFV?"

GySgt. J. C. Oster,Do we really need the EFV? (http://www.marinecorpsgazette-digital.com/marinecorpsgazette-share/201002?pg=3#pg18), Marine Corps Gazette, Feb, 2010

[Entropy]

Of course Gate's opinion is only one opinion and while he's the executive over the DoD, he actually has comparitively little say about force structure and equipment when compared to Congress. Gates may have a vision but it won't amount to a hill of beans unless he can get convince Congress to go along...it's usually Congress that "wins" these disputes.

[Rex Brynen]

OK, but the issues with EFV and V-22 are part of the problem. Neither should exist, because while technically possible, neither are a required capability.

What then are the required capabilities regarding a new Marine APC or IFV? I do think the ability to deploy vehicles to shore without the use of LCs is a useful capability, not just in the very unlikely context of "storming the beach" but in the case of a whole range of potential low-intensity conflict settings.

That being said, the EFV may well be over-engineered with capabilities that it doesn't need.

[COMMAR]

In another post you said Gates had a certain veiwpoint of what the Marines should be/do? I raised the question to try and get a clearer understanding of what he (Gates) is after/wants.

Sure, I understand your point.

A point of clarity.. I've watched this back & forth for awhile now, watched nearly every speech or interview Gates has given on the subject & watched Conway or MCCDC counter and until Gates' speech @ the Navy League & maybe 1 before that its all been very subtle, point/counter-point.

I respect & read every opinion on here but the fact is it was losing focus of what Gates was actually saying. He never said this Marine Acquisition or that was garbage or a P.O.S. but that he agrees with NO scenario, so far presented, that justified the expenditure.

My point was to bring the conversation back to what he & the Marine Corps are actually debating.

He doesn't see a likely(keyword) scenario where we'll be Hydroplaning APCs fr/over the horizon, & etc. down the line of issues. HQMC has counter pointed, but he's still unconvinced... but yet still open.

Go back & listen to the speeches, reread the articles. He's obviously against continuing the programs but hasn't yet, why...? That's the real story.

He has canceled many other programs both large & small thru-out the DOD, yet he has still left the door open to the Marines.

[slapout9]

He doesn't see a likely(keyword) scenario where we'll be Hydroplaning APCs fr/over the horizon, & etc. down the line of issues. HQMC has counter pointed, but he's still unconvinced... but yet still open.



That was what I was looking for or what I was missing. I understand it better from the stand point of he (Gates)is not against storming the beach so much as he is against the concept of what they used to call Forced Entry Operations.

How ever I think the expense is still justified from the standpoint of and if we ever pursue a Raiding type Strategy as opposed to invade,occupy,nation build Strategy we are using now. And SPEED is the essence of raiding IMO. If you can simply do something faster than the other guy can react to it you are likely to win. That is a scenario that I think justifies the expense, if anything they should get more money to make EFV faster than what is . And to build on that further we need a jet powered Tilt-something that can go super sonic.

[COMMAR]

OK, but the issues with EFV and V-22 are part of the problem. Neither should exist, because while technically possible, neither are a required capability.


The EFV maybe.. maybe not. But the V-22 I can't agree with.

If your basing this assessment by looking at the USMC's present mission, land lock in a static conflict, then its easy to say X-Helo would be a much better choice.

In a Static Conflict the Helo is King, however the USMC is not a static force. Expeditionary is more than just a title, every decision, every acquisition, everything is designed around being expeditionary.. b/c thats the Primary mission.

In an Expeditionary environment the Helo is limited.. Fixed wing is limited. A platform the merges the two is King.

In the 1st 6mths or so of Afghanistan the V-22 would've been god. No staging in neighboring countries, making unfavorable treaties to launch small scale missions & raids. No flying in troops as close as possible fixed wing to transfer to helos for the rest of the way.

No.. there could've been multiple Beach Heads like the 1 the Marines built overnight at Rhino, run a weeks worth of missions & move on, while simultaneously collapsing the time & distance of the Battle Space, enveloping the enemy on a much larger scale w/its speed.

But that's the past. In the near-future.. No matter if their called SCMAGTFs or ECOs or EMOs the Expeditionary Corps will move to a MEU & up to 4 virtually mini-MEUs ringing each Theater Command. Not nearly as equipped like MEUs they'll be Light Reinforced Rifle Coys w/Support & C2, sending out reinforced Plt-sized Dets regionally for a variety of short-duration missions; HA, Bi-Lats, FID, Piracy, etc.

The value the V-22 brings across a T-Comm in speed & efficiency is not additive or in multiples but Exponential. Pick them up where ever you want, travel as far as you want, & put them down where ever you want, repeat continuously for a full 6mth Deployment.

The Corps has & will run 100s of missions outside of Iraq & A'stan that more fit the traditional Expeditionary Nature of the Corps & the V-22 is 100% necessary.

[COMMAR]

That was what I was looking for or what I was missing. I understand it better from the stand point of he (Gates)is not against storming the beach so much as he is against the concept of what they used to call Forced Entry Operations.

I basically agree w/everything you said, but

I wouldn't say he's against FE-Ops.... What I really think is maybe he is challenging the Corps to innovate & give him something more.. to maybe do it in a potentially more efficient way.

I'm not sure if he really doesn't agree or if in his time he's learned that Marines work best under pressure. But he is subtly sparring w/them over Ideas in public.

Maybe the Corps vision & the equipment needed is the Round wheel & he just hasn't grasped it yet...

Maybe if he forces them to Brainstorm they might fit a tire on it...

What is clear is he's not yet convinced but the debate is still open.

[slapout9]

I wouldn't say he's against FE-Ops.... What I really think is maybe he is challenging the Corps to innovate & give him something more.. to maybe do it in a potentially more efficient way.




Maybe thats an opportunity. The Assault Seaplane idea has always intrigued me, seems strait up the Marine Corps alley to. I don't know how feasible it really is but the CL-130 is basically an adaption of existing equipment that could bring a real punch to such Forced Entry operations. General Gavin was intrigued by this for future Airborne operations but the idea never went beyond a concept stage as far as I know.

http://www.g2mil.com/c130seaplane.htm

[Ken White]

this worked:

LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R3Y_Tradewind)

[slapout9]

Ken,yea that would work or modify the nose of the CL-130. Standard platform with many new apps as my granddaughter would say. She has been trying to update me because she thinks I am growing obsolete...actually she thinks my cell phone is. She calls it a single purpose platform with few apps(I think that is new speak for applications), what I need is a standard Multi-purpose platform with many apps. She swears there are even some that old people would like. So the USMC needs some type of standard platform to attack across the shore, very fast with the capability to add new apps as they come out.

[Cole]

COMMAR, I'm a MV-22 fan, but also a believer in helicopters. A mix of both might be more mission and cost effective for the Marines.

A UH-60M costs around $3,000 per hour of flight time. A MV-22 around $10,000.

A little back-of-the-envelope calculation leads to these estimates:

• MV-22: $72 million upfront flyaway cost and $10,000 per flight hour x 60 hours/month in theater = $600,000 per aircraft per month

• UH-60M: $18 million upfront flyaway cost and $3,000 per flight hour x 60 hours/month in theater = $180,000 per aircraft per month

Multiply these figures by each MV-22 squadron yields $7.2 million monthly cost for 12 MV-22, and $2.16 million for 12 UH-60M PER MONTH.

Sure, Marines need speed and unrefueled range to go ship-to-shore and for some distant area of responsibility flights. But for shorter flights, why wouldn’t Marines be better off using more capable than UH-1N helicopters already in use by Navy brothers?

Similarly, a Marine Expeditionary unit might need just 12 MV-22s to get to shore repeatedly for any assault whereas 12 UH-60s would make the ship-to-shore trip once and then support locally at a fraction of the cost/logistics (360 gals per fill-up for a UH-60 vs. over 1200 gals top-off per V-22).

The UH-60M would have:
• greater high/hot HOGE and similar payload capability
• similar external load speeds
• less brown-out risk
• more small LZ capability
• more aircraft in larger LZs (no 250’ separation between)
• easier and more dispersed shore maintenance
• closer proximity to forward Marines for aerial QRFs and MEDEVAC…not CASEVAC without onboard care

At current flyaway costs a notional pair of Marine Squadron with 12 MV-22, and 12 UH-60Ms w/ folding rotors would cost around $1.08 billion to procure. Two squadrons with a total of 24 MV-22s would cost $1.728 billion for procurement. Savings: $648 million for just 24 a/c.

Similar savings result from the difference in monthly flight hour costs for 1440 hours of $14.4 million for 24 MV-22 vs. $9.36 million for a mix of 12 MV-22, and 12 UH-60M. The savings in recurring monthly cost per hour of flight is over $5 million, or over $60 million saved annually for just 24 aircraft. In a decade you equal the procurement savings.

In reality, you probably would discover that you could shift more flight hour burden to the helicopter fleet for most shore missions thus saving even more money. Let's say you plan on using 35% of flight hours in the MV-22, and 65%flying the cheaper UH-60M. That ratio would result in a cost per month for 1440 hours equaling about $5.04 million for the 12 MV-22 (504 hrs), and $2.808 million for 12 UH-60M (936 hrs) or about $7.848 million a month vs. $14.4 million for 24 MV-22s flying the same 1440 hours. That is $78.6 million in annual O&M savings.

And because a mix of 12 MV-22 and 12 UH-60M would use less deck/hangar space aboard Marine ships, several CH-53Ks could fit in the remaining space.

Sure the UH-60M would carry fewer Marines. But a few more CH-53K per boat would make up for it:
• 24 MV-22 carrying 20 Marines (heavier body armor/center belly gun/ hot/high) = 480 Marines in one lift.
• One squadron of 12 MV-22 and another with 12 UH-60M, and just four CH-53K carry 240 Marines in the MV-22, 120 in 12 UH-60M, and 120+ in just four CH-53K for a greater lift of 480+ Marines the first lift.

Add a 60% MV-22 mission capable rate to the equation and 80% rate for the UH-60M, and 75% for the CH-53K, and suspect the lift per mixed-squadrons-alternative is more than a little in favor of the 12/12/4 mix…with ample taxpayer money not spent, initially and annually. In fact the savings would purchase all the CH-53K fleet and its flying hour costs.

Just my personal views.

[William F. Owen]

The EFV maybe.. maybe not. But the V-22 I can't agree with..... the V-22 is 100% necessary.
Beg to differ. It is criminally expensive and ridiculously complex.
For all that, all you actually get is speed. For the same given payload, helicopters can go just as far, by merely trading payload for fuel.
It's deck foot print is huge, and IIRC there is no manual reversion on the folding sequence.
Yes, cost versus relevant capability is not an exact science, but the cost here was squandered on a set of capabilities that are of dubious relevance compared to the operationally proven ones we can get from platforms like EH-101 for example.

[Tukhachevskii]

I've also thought that the MV-22's RCS (or radar cross section in case RCS also stands for something else) would be huge during conventional flight ops. Sure it can hover like a helicopter but can it fly NOE when tactically necessary. It's use presumes "totally" effective SEAD; obviously, this is always going to be an operational requirement with any and all air assault operations but we are not always going to be facing kurta wearing Taliban. Is it really worth the cost for a bird with what looks like an awfully limited load area (volume wise) and only carries AFAIK, what, 24 pax comfortably compared to something like the CH-53 (obviously a different class, I know) or even the CH-47?

On a different note this monograph from the World Security Institute (www.worldsecurityinstitute.org/) is pretty critical of the entire programme...

V-22 Osprey: Wonder Weapon or Widow Maker (They warned us. But no one is listening) (www.cdi.org/pdfs/gailliard%20on%20v-22.pdf)

[William F. Owen]

This article in RUSI Defence Systems (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Leishman_0207_RDS.pdf)bases most of it's criticism on the aerodynamic arguments. Interesting none the less.

Why on earth the CH-53K wasn't in service 10 years ago, I don't know. It easily could have been.

[Tukhachevskii]

...the following two papers examine OMFTS from logistics perspectives and contain many interesting observations.

An Analysis of STOM (Ship to Objective Maneuver) in Sea Based Logistics (www.informs-sim.org/wsc02papers/118.pdf). Unfortunately, the paper's obervations are marred by an unfounded (and rather cheeky) methodological slieght-of-hand that assumes the MV-22's will not face any attrition. Nonetheless, it models the logistical problems quite well.


Operational Art and Amphibious Assault: Will OMFTS break the US amphibious assault sword? (www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415403&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf). This paper criticises some of the key conceptual assumptions behind the OMFTS concept from a logistical viewpoint and supplements the above rather nicely, especially with its focus on doctrine/theoria vs practice/praxis.

Logistics vulnerability is a key factor of incurring culmination; two accelerators of logistic culminiation are an untenable distance from base to objective and a lack of operational pause to regenerate combat power. the OMFTS-STOM construct runs dangerously afoul of these operational art by-laws. A significant piece of the OMFTS contruct is sea-basing, a logistic concept that places supply ships/mobile off-shore bases over the horizon, far away from the littoral threat. those supplies would then be airlifted directly to forces ashore, eliminating the need for a lodgement; however, the elimination of the lodgement has two potential negative effects: it increases the distance between base and objective, thus threatening overextension, and eliminates operational pause and with it the ability to regenerate combat power. A logistic construct that exhibits one of these traits should give the operational planner pause; a construct that exhibits both, as does OMFTS-STOM, should cause serious concern for the integrity of operational sustainment.(p.5)


And, another take on the V-22 Albatross, sorry, Osprey...
V-22: Osprey or Albatross (www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb72.pdf)

Instead of admitting that the V-22 progam has failed and using the money to buy proven helicopters for the same missions, the Marine Corps, with considerable help from Congress, has kept the program alive-continually try to fix various problems. But at least one problem-the vortex ring state (VRS)- can never be fixed or eliminated. And "flying around" the VRS problem by slowing the descent rate of the V-22 makes the Osprey more vulnerable that helicopters (despite claims that it is more survivable)(p.1)

[Rifleman]

I think tilt rotor technology has promise. Remember Operation Rhino? The raid force from 3d Ranger Battalion was inserted by parachute and withdrawn by helicopter. That works but it's an extra link in the plan.

With tilt rotors the drop aircraft could also be the extraction aircraft for parachute raids. At least sometimes. I know it's not the answer for every situation but it has application for some.

[slapout9]

I think tilt rotor technology has promise. Remember Operation Rhino? The raid force from 3d Ranger Battalion was inserted by parachute and withdrawn by helicopter. That works but it's an extra link in the plan.

With tilt rotors the drop aircraft could also be the extraction aircraft for parachute raids. At least sometimes. I know it's not the answer for every situation but it has application for some.

The Air Force version appears to be alot more robust and less complex than the Marine version because the wings and propellers don't have to fold up. The Rangers may like or already have access to that version.

[GI Zhou]

That's why I joined the Air Force. Although there were times when the cooks served red wine with fowl....yet somehow we managed to survive. :D

The catering officer at RAAF Base Tindal (Think Nellis without Las Vegas or an Alaska town in the desert) used to hold back a little of the daily mess budget for a once a month big lunchtime spread. It worked out to more than one lobster be person, not counting prawns, oysters, balmain bugs, hot scallops etc per person. The army engineers who had just spent two months in the bush eating ration packs were speechless, when they came in for lunch before flying back 'down south'. We just told them this was the normal spread for lunch. Best base I ever ate at followed by Darwin. Memories......

[slapout9]

I'm not sure if he really doesn't agree or if in his time he's learned that Marines work best under pressure. But he is subtly sparring w/them over Ideas in public.



Been thinking about this for awhile. Sometimes it makes more sense to just look at the person and see what his primary values/motivations are before you begin an interview/negotiation with that person. Because in the end it is a negotiation more than anything else.

Gates spent 30 years at CIA, he rose from Trainee to the top slot inside the Agency, that has never happened before. In his heart and soul he is CIA not military.

Your real problem may not be on how to debate him point/counter-point or to provide him with a better scenario. Your real problem may be to find out Who is giving him the information that is causing him to form his opinions to question equipment/concepts of the Marine Corps. Rest assured he is getting the information from somewhere and someone.

When you find that out, you may find yourself in a much better position to deal with him. Just my LE viewpoint on how I see it.

[COMMAR]

Beg to differ. It is criminally expensive and ridiculously complex.
For all that, all you actually get is speed. For the same given payload, helicopters can go just as far, by merely trading payload for fuel.
It's deck foot print is huge, and IIRC there is no manual reversion on the folding sequence.
Yes, cost versus relevant capability is not an exact science, but the cost here was squandered on a set of capabilities that are of dubious relevance compared to the operationally proven ones we can get from platforms like EH-101 for example.

Your still limiting the role of the V-22 to the confines of a static theater. That's not where the USMC has traditionally focused the bulk its attention & it won't be in future.

The USMC is involved in a Static Conflict once in a generation but Expeditionary Operations are a DAILY reality.

HQMC's plans stated publicly have them involved in A'stan, in any significant #s, for maybe another 5yrs. Fr/there its back to Exped. Ops & Crisis Response.

In ExOp/CR any Helo you'd suggest would be ADDITIVE atmost where the V-22 is TRANSFORMATIVE. To understand this you have to understand 1st the role the USMC plays in NatSec Globally & 2nd how it plans to Expand that capability in the coming years. Just 1 example:
There will be multiple Company-based MAGTFs spread thru-out each theater with 1000s of miles of dispersion between them. Each Coy will dispatched Plt & even Squad-sized Dets w/various missions.

With 1 overarching mission.. to stay engaged acting as human sensor nodes, gathering real-time HumInt for Crisis Response, with the ability to Consolidate to react quickly w/an appropriate response.


The USMC has a Vertical-Lift package that utilizes the V-22 not only as a Medium Lift Asset but as a intra-theater High Speed Connector, the CH-53 for Heavy Lift, & a Light/Medium Lift Cargo UAS, Greatly Reducing the Foot Print at the Coy-MAGTF Level.

What Helo only Package allows the USMC to act in their Expeditionary Role as efficiently?

[Cole]

A primary tilt rotor weakness, aside from cost/complexity, is lack of hover maneuverability and lift. Wilf’s RUSI reference at the bottom of page 2 has a footnote showing:

“A UH-60L helicopter can lift (fuel and useful load) over 5,600lbs at a takeoff altitude of 10,000 feet versus only some 2800lbs of equivalent load for the V-22 Osprey. The UH-60L can also carry 3000lbs of useful load at this altitude to some 250 nautical miles, a feat unmatched by the V-22.”

In addition, the hover-out-of-ground-effect ceiling (required for sling loads and hover maneuver well off the ground) is just 5400’ for MV-22 which isn’t particularly helpful in places like Afghanistan. For a UH-60M at ¼ the cost, it is a higher 6,000’. I'm also wondering why the 82nd CAB Army helicopters were used to air assault Marines into low altitude Marjah instead of MV-22. LZ size? Night LZ brown-out concerns? Are MV-22s well suited for desert landings at night given their tremendous downforce in a small disc-loading area?

The other point about the MV-22 is that most Army and Marine AOs are not so large that tilt rotor speed and range are essential. This is especially true when all you can carry with an MV-22 is foot infantry and a few growlers. There is little difference in times between a helicopter and tilt rotor flying from airfields to Now Zad or Marjah LZs. While tilt rotor advocates like to talk nautical miles, fighting AOs often involve lesser kilometer distances.


I think tilt rotor technology has promise. Remember Operation Rhino? The raid force from 3d Ranger Battalion was inserted by parachute and withdrawn by helicopter. That works but it's an extra link in the plan.

With tilt rotors the drop aircraft could also be the extraction aircraft for parachute raids. At least sometimes. I know it's not the answer for every situation but it has application for some.

Good point. There are contingencies where ship-to-AOR distance is extensive, as COMMAR points out. But if Wikipedia is correct, at Rhino, 200 Rangers parachuted from 4 MC-130s. Not sure room exists in a MV-22 for 20 paratroopers. Even if so, 10 tilt rotors would be required to match 4 MC-130 that have better jammers, terrain-following radar, etc.

Wikipedia also mentions that CH-53Es moved Marines to Rhino 372nm through Pakistan using aerial refueling. That, too, could have been a good MV-22 mission accomplished in only 1.5 hours. But MV-22s did not exist then, so the cited four CH-53E must have carried the Marines in around 3 hours, and other Cobras, Hueys, and CH-46 from several different landing ships used an en route FARP probably requiring 4 hours. However, C-17s and KC-130 moved the rest and tilt rotors would never substitute for that kind of extensive continuous lift.



The USMC has a Vertical-Lift package that utilizes the V-22 not only as a Medium Lift Asset but as a intra-theater High Speed Connector, the CH-53 for Heavy Lift, & a Light/Medium Lift Cargo UAS, Greatly Reducing the Foot Print at the Coy-MAGTF Level.

What Helo only Package allows the USMC to act in their Expeditionary Role as efficiently?

But as pointed out in my last sentence (above your quote) about the Rhino Marine expeditionary assault, intratheater high speed lift will always be primarily a large USAF C-17 and C-130/KC-130 function.

Plus, I've read that a San Antonio Class LPD can launch four helicopters or just two MV-22 from its open deck area...meaning an equal 40 Marines get to shore initially, and with H-60s another three aircraft could be moved out from inside the hangar area...which I believe holds just one MV-22.

So that suggests the Marines would be better off to station more numerous helicopters on LPDs and fly MV-22s in from centralized land locations in CENTCOM, PACOM, etc. rather than putting them on boats where maintenance for the few carried is still complex, time-consuming, and underresourced. That way a smaller total procured quantity of MV-22s could be maintained together at primary theater land bases while still able to support intratheater contingencies due to their speed/range. Helicopters would commence the air assault from on board LPDs, with MV-22 linking up just in time to pick up and move troops off now empty decks. Best of both worlds.

[William F. Owen]

Your still limiting the role of the V-22 to the confines of a static theater. That's not where the USMC has traditionally focused the bulk its attention & it won't be in future.

You can tell the future? OK, should have said that in the begining.

In ExOp/CR any Helo you'd suggest would be ADDITIVE atmost where the V-22 is TRANSFORMATIVE. To understand this you have to understand 1st the role the USMC plays in NatSec Globally & 2nd how it plans to Expand that capability in the coming years. Just 1 example:
Sorry but the idea that the "speed" of the V22 makes in TRANSFORMATIVE - is without evidence. Speed is all it has, and that comes at dubious operational relevance and huge cost.
It is actually EXPENSIVE, for little proven benefit, other than cherry picking items to fit. What is about the future that actually demands this?

What I do understand is the USMC had to secure lots of money to make the V22 case, and IMO, the arguments used are not to the credit of the USMC.

[COMMAR]

But if Wikipedia is correct, at Rhino, 200 Rangers parachuted from 4 MC-130s. Not sure room exists in a MV-22 for 20 paratroopers. Even if so, 10 tilt rotors would be required to match 4 MC-130 that have better jammers, terrain-following radar, etc.

Wikipedia also mentions that CH-53Es moved Marines to Rhino 372nm through Pakistan using aerial refueling. That, too, could have been a good MV-22 mission accomplished in only 1.5 hours. But MV-22s did not exist then, so the cited four CH-53E must have carried the Marines in around 3 hours, and other Cobras, Hueys, and CH-46 from several different landing ships used an en route FARP probably requiring 4 hours.


Well your talking about 2 different missions on the same patch of dirt a few weeks apart. The 1st was an in&out Intelligence gathering mission lead by an SMU supported by Rangers.

The Marine mission was a seizure to turn Rhino into a Beach Head, it was the 1st US held piece of A'stan. Launched fr/sea in CH-53's but due to distance they had to get permission to stage in Pakistan & make it a 2 stage raid.

The V-22 would have allowed for a direct raid, bypassing the need for the permission of the costly staging in P'stan.


However, C-17s and KC-130 moved the rest and tilt rotors would never substitute for that kind of extensive continuous lift.

I don't think you understand the concept of Expeditionary. It literally means there is nothing, you either bring it or build it.

There was nowhere for the C-130's & C-17s to land in A'stan. That was the purpose of the Marines' Mission, so they had to helo in to seize then build an Expeditionary Airfield.

Its here that the Blended Platform shines, you ARE a fixed wing EA for the initial force, & you can then build an EA for the larger follow on fixed wing.


But as pointed out in my last sentence (above your quote) about the Rhino Marine expeditionary assault, intratheater high speed lift will always be primarily a large USAF C-17 and C-130/KC-130 function.


Understanding various viewpoint starts w/not making leaps in what ppl are saying. I never said the V-22 would replace the C-130/C-17.

Companies of US Marines will be dispersed thru-out a Theater Command, linked by a single HQ. The V-22 will be used as "A" In-Theater High Speed Connector.

The Unit Commander will use the most efficient means, & mix, to transport troops.

In a time of Crisis, in a Expeditionary environment, & over great distances is what the V-22 was designed for.. That's also happens to be the mainstay of USMC missions both inbetween & during wars.





To keep giving Scenarios to ppl is pointless. Everything has its drawbacks, the key is have you found the most efficient use of it.

History shows the USMC is usually well ahead of its critics. It looked at Galipolli & saw a way to beat the Japanese, looked at the Plane & saw Tactical Bombing (CAS), looked at the Helo & saw Vertical Envelopment, the list goes on.

All of which were HEAVILY criticized in their day b/c ppl just didn't understand, now the best military minds couldn't imagine doing it any differently. Only time will tell.

[William F. Owen]

To keep giving Scenarios to ppl is pointless. Everything has its drawbacks, the key is have you found the most efficient use of it.
I would submit the question is to effectiveness, not efficiency. The V-22 is not effective, given the expenditure of resources.


History shows the USMC is usually well ahead of its critics. It looked at Galipolli & saw a way to beat the Japanese, looked at the Plane & saw Tactical Bombing (CAS), looked at the Helo & saw Vertical Envelopment, the list goes on.

All of which were HEAVILY criticized in their day b/c ppl just didn't understand, now the best military minds couldn't imagine doing it any differently. Only time will tell.
That's a very wide wave at the actual operational history. based on the examples provided, very many folks looked at the same thing and came to the same conclusions
The issue with V-22 is not the need for VTOL. Everyone knows that is useful. The issue is that it is a bad design of aircraft. It's bad helicopter! Concept wise it's a helicopter - just not a very good one.
Just going faster for slightly improved flight characteristics is not the leap forward supposed.