Is the U.S. Military Affordable

[gute]

With the current economic situation in the U.S. as well as the rest of the word - the United States at some point is going to have to make cuts and the U.S. military will be subject to cuts. I am a proponent of a strong active and reserve military, but we are in a bit if a pickle with our national debt. Obviously cuts are not realistic until we are able to get out of Afghanistan and Iraq. I do propose that we only cut defense about across the board - there are many domestic programs in the U.S. that could either get the axe or cut significantly.

The question becomes, how big of a military do we need? What are our national security priorities?

Some argue that the united States spends more on defense then China, Russia and NATO combined, but I find the argument illogical. The U.S. should spend on national defense based on our priorities and not what other countries spend. What is logical are the threats posed by others. I for one would not go to war with China over Taiwan and I believe the South Koreans are more then capable of defending themselves against the North Koreans (the use of nuclear weapons by North Korea could change my position).

Do we need 10 active duty divisions, six independant brigadres and dozens of CS and CSS brigades? Do we need three active Marine Corps divisions (this is a hrad one to bring up since I am a former Marine)? Do we need 11 aircraft carriers and the large number of amphibious ships which are basically small carriers? Do we need so many fighter and attack aircraft in the USAF active duty inventory?

I have read much on this subject, but I am curious what others think.

[Adam L]

This could be a very long post. I dont' have the time for it right now, but here's the very short version.

Yes, we are going to have a very hard time affording our military in the future.

Proposoals:

1) Reintigrate AF into Army
2) Keep Army big and Marine Corp small
3) Put lots of research into making carbon fiber cheaper to make and build with

I'll get back to this later or tomorrow, but for now these should make some interesting discussion points.

Adam L

[William F. Owen]

Proposoals:

1) Reintigrate AF into Army
2) Keep Army big and Marine Corp small
3) Put lots of research into making carbon fiber cheaper to make and build with

With the aim of being deliberately provocative, but from an entirely objective view point...

1.) Move all aircraft to the Air Force. Air Power is about the military application of anything that flies, manned or un-manned.
2.) US Armed forces are expeditionary. Reduce the size the of Army and increase the Marine Corps!

....I don't know how big the US Armed Forces should be because it is near impossible to understand US Foreign Policy.
The debate about the size of the Armed Forces in the UK has an almost child like nature because no one wants to ask the exam question.

[SethB]

I tend to pontificate that we should recapitalize with an eye towards long term costs.

As it stands, things tend to get bloated during procurement. If that process could be better controlled, we might be able to procure equipment that costs less, and costs less to run.

For instance, the cost to maintain an aircraft escalates as that plane nears end of life. Replacing it with a new plane that uses a smaller crew, a smaller support crew, less fuel and fewer parts might save enough money to make up the difference.

Would a new engine for the Abrams make it more reliable while simultaneously reducing the need for fuelers and tankers?

Similarly, do we need to duplicate capabilities? Does Excalibur provide anything that GMLRS can't do for less?

At the same time, we could look at what we need and why. Do we need a division, a brigade and a regiment on jump status? Do we need all 11 CVNs?

[William F. Owen]

I tend to pontificate that we should recapitalize with an eye towards long term costs.

Eminently sensible, but the problem is that the defence industry (US and UK) is under pinned by what can be be described as "voodoo economics."

The UK MOD has fallen over itself with a concept of "through life costing" which is predicated on the art of telling the future, with absolute certainty, to a certain point and then guessing at it afterwards.

If you want to see the same in the US, look at F-35. What some clowns are trying to do is take what they know in 2010, and extrapolate that to what the aircraft will have cost in 2035. Could we have done that in 1910 for 1935?
Could the projections made for the F-15C in 1980, adequately predicted costs and capabilities for 2010 - when it is still the majority of the front line fighter fleet?

[Uboat509]

1.) Move all aircraft to the Air Force. Air Power is about the military application of anything that flies, manned or un-manned.


No. No. No. Go ahead and give the AF all the air supperiority aircraft and all the strategic bombers but do not give them anymore control over ground attack aircraft or UAVs than they already have. No good can come from that.

[William F. Owen]

No. No. No. Go ahead and give the AF all the air supperiority aircraft and all the strategic bombers but do not give them anymore control over ground attack aircraft or UAVs than they already have. No good can come from that.
OK, but what's a "strategic bomber?" :eek:
Do the Air Force still operate the transport aircraft?

If you're arguing for the status-quo, then OK, but I was seeking not to default to the "Air Force is too stupid to operate aircraft for the Army."
If that is the case, it has to be explained, as the reason you're not doing it.

[Uboat509]

OK, but what's a "strategic bomber?" :eek:
Do the Air Force still operate the transport aircraft?

I was simply refering to anything that is not a ground attack aircraft.


If you're arguing for the status-quo, then OK, but I was seeking not to default to the "Air Force is too stupid to operate aircraft for the Army."
If that is the case, it has to be explained, as the reason you're not doing it.

Too stupid? Not at all, but they do tend to have different priorities. What is important to the Army is not necessarily important to the AF and vice versa. We are culturally very different organizations with different mindsets. I honestly believe that parochialism has more to do with the air force desire to control all air assets, than does any overriding belief that they can do a better job. The AF would rather spend money on the next generation of air superiority fighter than a new ground attack aircraft. The Army makes up for that with attack helicopters but if we send "everything that flies" over to the AF then you create additional levels of coordination and command to further complicate any operations requiring air support, which these days means pretty much any operation since, at the very least you would have to coordinate for MEDEVAC support if nothing else. The bottom line is that at a time when we are creating (recreating) combined arms formations that have all support, or at least most of it, organic to the unit, it doesn't make much sense to take all of the air assets away and give them to another service.

[Uboat509]

On another note, I have often wondered if it might not make sense to create a logistics service branch. None of the services like to spend money on transport or other logistics requirements and things get left out. Perhaps a service branch that was only logistics could mitigate that.

[Fuchs]

On another note, I have often wondered if it might not make sense to create a logistics service branch. None of the services like to spend money on transport or other logistics requirements and things get left out. Perhaps a service branch that was only logistics could mitigate that.

Germany did something like this (albeit not exactly the same).
It could make sense to make the army independent of USAF air-lift (which competes with fighters for funds) and of Navy sea-lift (which competes with fancy combat ships, carriers and fighters for funds).
You could also add the intelligence aircraft (RC-135? E-8) that support more than one service.
I proposed something like this for Europe, on a similar model as the "Luxembourg-registered" NATO AWACS.

[William F. Owen]

The bottom line is that at a time when we are creating (recreating) combined arms formations that have all support, or at least most of it, organic to the unit, it doesn't make much sense to take all of the air assets away and give them to another service.
....and I agree, but the reasons for that have to be made explicit.

The reason the Air Force cannot do the mission is because the Air Force has failed in its responsibility to properly employ "air power".
In Israel, the Air Force operates everything that flies, including the UAVs. No one blinks. For example, the Air Force see casualty evacuation as an extremely important role. It saves lives. They see close air support the same way. To quote: "Why would you choose to fail your nation's Army?"
Why does the USMC have an Air Wing? It could be said because, the US Navy failed in it's responsibility to provide cover to the Marines.

[Entropy]

I honestly believe that parochialism has more to do with the air force desire to control all air assets, than does any overriding belief that they can do a better job.

That seems to be a common perception. There's another common perception that the desire by some to make the Air Force subordinate to the Army is driven by parochial considerations as well.


I was simply refering to anything that is not a ground attack aircraft.

Ok, so the Air Force will only have some recon and transport aircraft? With the exception of the B-2, the Air Force doesn't have dedicated "strategic bombers" anymore and hasn't for almost two decades. Who provided CAS during the opening stages of OEF? It wasn't the A-10 or any of the fighters. The point being is that such distinctions no longer exist in reality. The Air Force gave up on "strategic bombing" long ago and only maintains a minimal capability in that area.


1) Reintigrate AF into Army
2) Keep Army big and Marine Corp small

Not sure how combining the AF and Army will save money. If it does save money, why not combine the Army and the USMC or combine all the services?

One suggestion I've mentioned before, especially since we all work closely together now, is to better integrate our personnel systems. Why can't we have a common form and evaluation system for all the services for example?


The bottom line is that at a time when we are creating (recreating) combined arms formations that have all support, or at least most of it, organic to the unit, it doesn't make much sense to take all of the air assets away and give them to another service.

Except that we don't fight as distinct services anymore. As designed, the services provide capabilities for the combatant commanders. For example, I currently work with armed Predators and Reapers and our aircraft are under that tactical control of whatever unit we are supporting (Marines, Army, UK Sof, whatever). We go where they want us to go. We look at what they want us to look at. We shoot at what they want us to shoot at. Manned aircraft operate similarly. Your organic Army units will have (and do have) UAV's, but there are limits to what you can make "organic" and there are tradeoffs as well since there aren't enough assets to go around.

On the subject of the original post, I think things will definitely have to change. I think there will be cuts all around. A lot depends on when/if we change our foreign policy, which WILF correctly notes often isn't coherent. If we want to keep intervening in third-world sh*t-holes and doing COIN/stabilization ops around the world for another decade or two, then we will need a bigger Army. If we don't and if we reduce our alliance commitments overseas, then we can move most of the Army and Air Force to the reserve. This nation has always needed a significant Navy and I think that will continue regardless, but probably with a much different fleet of ships. The USMC? Who knows.

[Uboat509]

Ok, so the Air Force will only have some recon and transport aircraft? With the exception of the B-2, the Air Force doesn't have dedicated "strategic bombers" anymore and hasn't for almost two decades. Who provided CAS during the opening stages of OEF? It wasn't the A-10 or any of the fighters. The point being is that such distinctions no longer exist in reality. The Air Force gave up on "strategic bombing" long ago and only maintains a minimal capability in that area.


That isn't what I said. I was responding to Wilf's suggestion that everything that flies be transfered to the AF. That would include, presumably, all the attack helicopters that the Army now has. Don't focus on the strategic bombing part of the comment I was simply saying that the AF should keep all of the missions that it does now but that it should not be the sole or even primary provider of ground attack capability, ie Army aviation should not be transfered to the AF.

[gute]

I would not combine the branches of the U.S. military - we don't need group think.

Placing a certains number of A-10 squadrons under U.S. Army command seems reasonable.

The USAF would be our primary transport, space, bomber and fighter service.

The USMC would downsize (this hurts!) to three active MEBs which are organized more like 3 Commando Brigade and the quality training of those U.S. Marines would be more like the Royal Marines. The 4th MEB would the reserve brigade (rein) with three infantry regiments instead of one in the active brigades. The USMC would get rid of its tanks and attach Army armor if needed. I have not decided if the USMC should retain its air assets. If it does then a MAG per active MEB is reasonable. With USMC helos aging, assigning an Army CAB with UH60, CH47, AH64 aircraft to the MAG (under USMC command) might be the way to go.

I have a lot of ideas and will get to the other services later.

[William F. Owen]

Placing a certains number of A-10 squadrons under U.S. Army command seems reasonable.
That's purely an operational decision. Who's budget do they come out of and who buys the replacement? Army or Air Force?


The USMC would downsize (this hurts!) to three active MEBs which are organized more like 3 Commando Brigade and the quality training of those U.S. Marines would be more like the Royal Marines.
So a barely viable light infantry brigade, which is under constant threat of being cut and only survives because it's on the Navy's budget?

[Entropy]

That isn't what I said. I was responding to Wilf's suggestion that everything that flies be transfered to the AF. That would include, presumably, all the attack helicopters that the Army now has. Don't focus on the strategic bombing part of the comment I was simply saying that the AF should keep all of the missions that it does now but that it should not be the sole or even primary provider of ground attack capability, ie Army aviation should not be transfered to the AF.

Ah, I see what you're saying now. I wouldn't advocate that either.


Placing a certains number of A-10 squadrons under U.S. Army command seems reasonable.

What do you mean by "under U.S. Army command?"

[gute]

That's purely an operational decision. Who's budget do they come out of and who buys the replacement? Army or Air Force?


So a barely viable light infantry brigade, which is under constant threat of being cut and only survives because it's on the Navy's budget?

How does 3 Commando survive?

Three regiments, not one.

[gute]

Ah, I see what you're saying now. I wouldn't advocate that either.



What do you mean by "under U.S. Army command?"

Squadron assigned to Army CAB which answers to division commander, etc.

Budget paid by the U.S. tax payer - USAF/USA can figure that out. Trust me a know it can be a cluster - I work for the G.

[gute]

How does 3 Commando survive?

Three regiments, not one.

Three brigades not one. My apology.

[Kiwigrunt]

It appears the issues are largely the way in which budgets are divided and controlled versus the actual command and control of the assets.

Our Navy SeaSprites are Navy ‘owned’ (?) and flown by Navy pilots, yet run and serviced by RNZAF. So there are air force crews on the frigates. Given the fact that we only have 5 or 6 of them, that seems to make sense and it seems to work.

The Dutch Apaches are an air force asset yet they are assigned (C&C) to 11 Airlanding Brigade (if they are still called that). I don’t know how well that is working.

I have often wondered about the sensibility of giving ‘fixed’ budgets to individual services as opposed to controlling the overall budged at the top. It always reminds me of how for instance councils use up their budgets (like roadworks) by the end of taxyear to make sure they get the same next year. Doesn’t come across as very efficient to me.

[slapout9]

OK, but what's a "strategic bomber?" :eek:


In the beginning, back when we new what we were doing, we had a National Policy of "Massive Retaliation at a time and place of our choosing". At the time the Air Force was the only one capable of creating a Strategy to support this Policy. And at that time no other had the atomic bomb and or the delivery method to hit the Continental USA. At that time only the USAF had a "vehicle" that could deliver an atomic weapon anywhere in the world, hence it was Strategic because it could implement our Strategy.

As more time went by and other services developed missiles Army,Navy(Polaris) and the USSR had the bomb and finally a missile to deliver it, the Air Force no longer had a monopoly on this Strategy so we moved to a National Policy of "Flexible Response" by any or all service(s). At which time we no longer had a Strategic Bomber but a more accurately described long range bomber. But the Air Force never got rid of the (SAC) Strategic Air Command structure for another what?? 40 years:eek:

[gute]

The USAF would shift more birds to the reserve and I would consolidate USAF reserve and air guard into the reserve. F-22 and F-15E would remain active while 15C and F-16C/D aircraft go to the reserve. Now, I have not mentioned numbers so if the numbers work out to be too few realistically, then keep an appropriate number of F-15C and F-16C/D aircraft on active duty. The B-2 remians in an active status while all B-52 are in the reserve on a rotational alert status. A-10 squadrons are split 1-2 active/reserve. C-17, C-27, and C-130J transports are active - C-5, C-141, and older C-130 aircraft are reserve (many are already). USAF Spec Ops would remain at the same level and the same distribution between active/reserve. Basically, older air frames go to the reserves.

I think the F-35 program should be terminated and more F-22's purchased along with an advanced F-15 (I believe McDonnell Douglas has talked to the zoomies about this aircraft). I understand the reasoning behind the F-35 and one plane for three services, but the cost overruns are ridiculus.

Navy coming next.

[Fuchs]

In the beginning, back when we new what we were doing, we had a National Policy of "Massive Retaliation at a time and place of our choosing". At the time the Air Force was the only one capable of creating a Strategy to support this Policy.

Hmm, I'm not sure which period you're thinking of exactly.

There was a time during the 50's when Navy and Air Force were competing for the strategic nuke bomber role. The USAF won with bombers and land-based missiles (USN got SLBMs and later cruise missiles instead).

see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P6M
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-3_Skywarrior
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_A-5_Vigilante

[slapout9]

Hmm, I'm not sure which period you're thinking of exactly.

There was a time during the 50's when Navy and Air Force were competing for the strategic nuke bomber role. The USAF won with bombers and land-based missiles (USN got SLBMs and later cruise missiles instead).

see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P6M
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-3_Skywarrior
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_A-5_Vigilante

From the late 1940's to the early 1960's..... Polaris came before SBLMs......my parents retired from the Martin company (Glenn L. Martin) now Lockheed Martin. I used to have all the "Artist Conceptions" on my bedroom wall. The USAF didn't win with land based missiles they stole them from the Army, this was key to them keeping their funding for big plane projects. The Army new how to shoot them down and keep them invulnerable by using the Strategic Interstate Highway System one of the main reasons it was built by the way. This is the same reason SCUDS were such a problem during Gulf War 1 mobile- erector- launchers are hard to hit and easy to hide. Shorter range Army missiles located in Orlando,Fl. had much more to do with us surviving the Cuban Missile Crisis than is generally known. Cuba could have been vaporized by Pershing 1 missiles in about 10 minutes.


Pershing decade of progress.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WOd87PO5ME8

[William F. Owen]

At that time only the USAF had a "vehicle" that could deliver an atomic weapon anywhere in the world, hence it was Strategic because it could implement our Strategy.

Yes, I know, but it's still a very poor/silly use of the word.

Mellinger tells people that "Air Power is inherently strategic" - when actually it can never be more than tactical. Air Power is applied via tactical actions, same as land and sea, and must always be applied in the context of the land and the sea.

[William F. Owen]

Basically, older air frames go to the reserves.
OK, but what does this achieve? How does it help?

[gute]

Now with the Navy:

11 carriers to six. The carrier is a power projection weapon, but do we really need 11? I'd move 2 of the 11 into a reserve status so three would be decommissioned.

12 cruisers. There are 2 cruisers for evry carrier so 12 for 6 carriers seems reasonable.

52 Arleigh Burke class frigates plus the three under construction and another planned. With pirates being a problem now and most likely into the future this seems a weapon well suited to dealing with this problem.

Move the 30 Oliver Perry class frigates to the Coast Guard.

Keep all subs.

Decommission the remaining two Tarawa class amphibs.

Move five of the eight Wasp to a reserve status.

Keep the one America class amphib and cancel the order for three more.

Move the four Austin class amphib dock to the reserve.

Maintain the four San Antonio class amphib dock ships, finishing building two and cancel the remaining four.

Move the eight Whidbey Island class dock landing ship to reserve.

Keep the four Harpers Ferry class dock landing ships on active duty.

All Navy aircraft squadrons would be reduced according to required carrier wings, fleet patrol, recon, surveillance and logistics needs. All newer model aircraft remain on active duty while the older models such as F-18C/D, E-6 go to the reserves.

SEAL Teams 1,2,3,4 and 5 along with SVDT 1 and 2 remain active. Deactive SEAL Teams 7, 8 and 10.

Keep DevGroup.

Keep SWCC.

[gute]

The Army:

Deactivate 2ACR, 3ACR, 11ACR, 170BCT, 171BCT, and 173BCT.

Combine division BCTs into two larger BCTs instead of four each. This will reduce the number of HQ positions.

The Army is moving away from divisions so I will lay out the numbers by Corps:

III Corps - six HBCTs, two IBCTs, four CABs, one Corps Engineer Brigade, one Corps Arty Brigade (all MLRS and HIMARS), one Corps MP brigade, one EOD group, plus 10 SFG.

I Corps & AK/HI - Transfer the HBCT from Korea to 3ID, eliminate 10th Mountain and 25ID HQS, 10th MTN becomes two IBCTs stationed in Alaska under I corps, the six SBCTs become four (if not sent to the NG - if sent to NG keep one IBCT in HI and three mechanized BCTs at Fort Lewis (CV90 vehicles organized like the SBCT). Keep one Corps Arty (HIMARS), one Corps Engineer, one Corps MP, etc. Keep two CABs. 1SFG.

XVIII Corps - Combine all airborne assets (82, 173, 4th IBCT AK and Rangers) into four BCTs with two CABs each assigned to 82 and 101. 3ID gets the HBCT from South Korea to form two HBCTs. Deactivate the one 3ID IBCT. Keep one Corps arty brigade (HIMARS + M777), one Engineer brigade (airborne), MP, etc. 3, 5, and 7 SFG.

V Corps - Deactivate.

All Corps arty, engineer, etc not on active duty go to the NG.

Keep CAG.

I've eliminated the 75th Ranger Regiment, but not Ranger school. I believe the airborne forces can fill the Ranger role.

1AD -

[William F. Owen]

The Army:

Deactivate 2ACR, 3ACR, 11ACR, 170BCT, 171BCT, and 173BCT.

Gute, OK, but you're not showing your working. How does any of this help? You're telling us stuff, with no indication of why this is supposed to be better or giving us anything to think about.

[Uboat509]

I have to ask, though, how much would the AF really complain if the Army got the ground attack aircraft assigned to them? I am talking specifically about the A-10s and perhaps some Harriers like the Marines have. From what I gather, the AF has never been overly fond of the A-10 and I have even heard that they tried to get rid of them.

[William F. Owen]

From what I gather, the AF has never been overly fond of the A-10 and I have even heard that they tried to get rid of them.
True, IIRC. They tried to make it an F-16 mission.
So basically the decision on who has what aircraft rests on what aircraft the air force like - not on the military utility of air power.

What ever the A-10 supporters say, historically the replacement for the Ju-87 Stuka was the FW-190F' and G's. There is very little logic in air power theory.

[slapout9]

Yes, I know, but it's still a very poor/silly use of the word.



Agree, but that was the reasoning behind it. Supposedly there is a quote from MacArthur about something similar when he was asked about Strategic Weapons and his response was that he thought The Army was a strategic weapon:wry:

[slapout9]

There is very little logic in air power theory.

Depends on which theory. The one I believe in, is the simple concept of gaining and maintain Air Superiority. Just because something moves through the Air does not make it an Air Force:confused: if that were true than the Air Force should be charge of bullets flying through the air.


Clear the skies, hold the skies and build an air bridge to the objective.

[William F. Owen]

Depends on which theory. The one I believe in, is the simple concept of gaining and maintain Air Superiority.
If by Superiority you mean "freedom of action to use the air," then that's a start. You personally have just made the top 5% of Air Power Theorists!!! :)

IMO, Air Power Theory - as in the employment of Aircraft, manned and un-manned - is basically "not good". It's either a set of opinions about targeting, or advocacy for independent air arms. To me, it seems that the actual Theory is almost non-existent. By Theory, I mean that which explains and informs practice.
There is plenty of "antiquarian/historic narrative" about the wonders of P-51 or the Sopwith Camel, and stories of daring do, but almost nothing, that I have found, that informs real theory.
If anyone can recommend a few books, I'm very open to suggestions!

[slapout9]

If anyone can recommend a few books, I'm very open to suggestions!

"The Air Campaign" by Colonel John Warden, hang on and I will find a link to free PDF.


Chapter 9 The Orchestration of War, simple and short and points out a lot things that are often misunderstood about Warden. One being that he is not Anti-Army he just believes that there are only certain times when it(ground forces) should be the "Key Force" or "Main Effort".

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/warden/wrdchp09.htm hit the back to contents button for the rest of the book.

[Fuchs]

If by Superiority you mean "freedom of action to use the air," then that's a start. You personally have just made the top 5% of Air Power Theorists!!! :)

IMO, Air Power Theory - as in the employment of Aircraft, manned and un-manned - is basically "not good". It's either a set of opinions about targeting, or advocacy for independent air arms. To me, it seems that the actual Theory is almost non-existent. By Theory, I mean that which explains and informs practice.
There is plenty of "antiquarian/historic narrative" about the wonders of P-51 or the Sopwith Camel, and stories of daring do, but almost nothing, that I have found, that informs real theory.
If anyone can recommend a few books, I'm very open to suggestions!

Warden wrote (EBO) air war theory, but I wasn't motivated enough to read it because of what I learned about it from secondary sources.

Both naval and air war lack the ability to really force an opponent to yield as a rifleman pointing his rifle at the enemy's chest can do. Air war theory is therefore much more about operations and tactics than about strategy.
The highly technical nature of air power (and as a consequence, the influence of technology on capability and the widespread misconceptions about air power) didn't help to push air power theory forward.


The thing I miss the most about air power theory is a good answer for the question of prioritization. Both the force structure and the operational emphasis (air combat first? SEAD first? attack airfields first? CAS from day one? interdiction from day one? race forward to intercept enemy AEW&C aircraft early on?) would profit a lot by a good theory on how to prioritize (depending on the situation, of course).

[William F. Owen]

The thing I miss the most about air power theory is a good answer for the question of prioritization. Both the force structure and the operational emphasis (air combat first? SEAD first? attack airfields first? CAS from day one? interdiction from day one? race forward to intercept enemy AEW&C aircraft early on?) would profit a lot by a good theory on how to prioritize (depending on the situation, of course).
Concur. I've never seen anything that seeks to address, "given X number of Aircraft on day one and this context, they do should do Y until A or B is reached." - that is is what I am missing.

[slapout9]

The thing I miss the most about air power theory is a good answer for the question of prioritization.

Read the whole book Warden talks a lot about that very subject.

[gute]

OK, but what does this achieve? How does it help?

older airframes will get less flight time (in theory. Sure, it would great replace all our USAF fighter aircraft with F-22s, but that's not economically possible. Moving older model aircraft to the reserves should extend the life of the aircraft. Now, if the F-22 is as a good as a squadron of legacy fighters then pull out the checkbook!

[gute]

Gute, OK, but you're not showing your working. How does any of this help? You're telling us stuff, with no indication of why this is supposed to be better or giving us anything to think about.

170th and 171st are stationed in Germany. IMO, bring em home and deactivate. The units are not needed. Combine the 173rd battalions with the 82 BCTs, then deactivate the BCT HQS. A separate HQS is not needed. I would shift the SBCTs to the NG. IMO this is a vehicle better suited for urban infantry operations, peace keeping, and disaster relief. With the shift to the NG the 2ACR is not needed. The 3rd ACR will not be required because the ARS in each HBCT will have its own ARS and the Corps will have its own RSTA Cav squadron(s).

Yes, this will cause a reduction in forces, but that's my point. It's not about having the military wewant, but what we can afford.

[SethB]

Military spending makes up such a small portion of government spending that suggesting we cut that amount by half and then not producing any cost estimates just doesn't make sense.

[Fuchs]

Military spending makes up such a small portion of government spending that suggesting we cut that amount by half and then not producing any cost estimates just doesn't make sense.

Small amount? *insert inappropriate language here*

Channeling half the U.S. Defence Budget into industrial investments would probably suffice tot run around the economy.

[SethB]

Defense spending is only about 20% of Federal spending. And that doesn't include local and state spending, either.

[Fuchs]

Only?
By that measure pretty much everything is "only".
We're talking here about an annual bill on the order of about USD 800 Bn (actually, more than 900 if you count the hidden positions in non-DoD budgets)!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:U.S._Federal_Spending_-_FY_2007.png

Halving the military expenditures (including some coast guard, nuclear "energy" budget and DHS budget positions) would in itself suffice to eliminate the deficit in a few years.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:2010_Budget_-_Deficit_and_Debt_Increases.png


"Foreign aid (reportedly the favourite target for fiscal conservative rhetoric) is "only" and "small" and unable to contribute significantly to any cost savings.
So-called "Defense" is a huge chunk and deserves to be called the reason for the federal budget deficit.

[Ken White]

...(actually, more than 900 if you count the hidden positions in non-DoD budgets) ... halving the military expenditures (including some coast guard, nuclear "energy" budget and DHS budget positions) would in itself suffice to eliminate the deficit in a few years.First, that "hidden position" bit is dearly beloved of the left but it's not totally correct; the $782B figure in your pie chart is fairly accurate, possibly even a bit high because some DoD money is spent on pensions, retiree health care, public school offsets and many more such esoteric items; more social welfare than defense related...

Regardless of the accuracy of your figures, your suggestion is one approach. There are others. One such is to balance intake and outlay. The Federal Government takes in over 60% of governmental revenue nationwide but it makes less than 40% of all government outlays and disbursements. The imbalance is redistributed by grants and transfers to State and local governments who really spend almost 70% of total government outlays in the US.

Aside from being inefficient and a source of political corruption, that system is expensive as a huge bureaucracy at all three levels of government is involved with requesting, approving and transferring those funds. Just redistributing tax intakes to more accurately reflect governmental level responsibilities would save billions.

That doesn't even get into the national programs that are not the business of the Federal government and which probably should not exist in their current form, many of these so-called entitlements started small and logically but exist in their current forms solely to buy votes for Federal politicians.
"Foreign aid (reportedly the favourite target for fiscal conservative rhetoric) is "only" and "small" and unable to contribute significantly to any cost savings...So-called "Defense" is a huge chunk and deserves to be called the reason for the federal budget deficit.I agree in part -- our Foreign Aid budget needs to be larger and I have no problem with that increase coming from the Defense budget which I believe is excessively large and itself contributes to fraud, waste, abuse and corruption simply because its too big to be managed sensibly. Moving some funds from DoD to foreign aid and intel would lessen the need for military deployments and thus achieve synergistic savings.

However, while I agree that some reduction of the defense budget is logical, proper and overdue, the entire US Taxing and Budget process, profligate Federal politicians and runaway 'entitlements' are also in dire need of scrutiny. It is not nearly as simple as you seem to think and write.

[SethB]

Well, if we can't afford to protect the world, then enjoy it while it lasts.

Great power politics are not a lot of fun...

As it stands, just under 60% of Federal spending is mandatory; it is some form of entitlement.

I just don't see the pressing need to make such drastic cuts.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Is the US Military Affordable? In a word, yes.

I do not, in totality, consider the so named Military-Industrial Complex to be
overly expensive on the grand scale, given the scope of the present "Garrison Earth".

Geostrategic policy is the most necessary requirement for continued global stability.For his part Secretary Gates should be investing in his legacy by crafting the successor policy to Containment, which should serve to fill the present vacuum about the Eurasian Earth Island.

Additionally; another premise I would not accept is that of the necessity of a
profession of arms to the defence of any nation-state. Were such the case the US would have lost every war before WWII, to include the Revolution. I am convinced of the moral snd strategic benefits of the Cincinnatican system of warfare in which great men set down their civil careers as planters, scholars, business leaders for a period of conflict sufficient to defeating an enemy, but not so lengthy as to defeat themselves through a backward minded militarism which over-rides the economic & social order of a healthy culture (ex: Imperial Japan).

Yes, such men are still to be found about the US & The West & the Cincinnatican system of warfare is still being successfully applied (ex: Guardsmen/Reservists who meet the same standards as Professionals/Regulars & execute the same wartime Missions).


I see recommendations you've made here, some with which I wholeheartedly agree. I would further recommend the follwing cost saving techniques at the policy level:

-disestablishment of the DOD, for redundancy. I recommend reversion to the Military of 1776-1947, led by The War Department, which still exists as the Department of the Army which embosses it's documents with the official seal of the "War Office". ref:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_War

-establishment of a staff for the Sec'y of Defense/War more in keeping with LTG Gavin's NME/DOD Staff than with the Calhoun Bureaus although I find both practicable. Ref: The back of his book War & Peace in The Space Age.

-transition to an Air-Mech Strike Force, highly mobile & deployable world-wide, prepared to win decisively & rapidly in land warfare on a three dimensional battlespace.

-development of specific & flexible response courses of action in order to satisfactorily replace "Massive Atomic Retaliation at a Time & Place of Our Choosing" with Maneuver Missions

-discontinuation of the bonus programs which dilute patriotic fervor & zeal with self centredness in the worst expression of the "me" generational impact on our land.

-expansion of military operations into space exploration for purposes of resource exploitation, scientific achievements, research & development & strategic defense.

In conclusion, I should like to keep this discussion in perspective by recalling that the "US Military" whose costs we are debating is simultaneously the most genuine charity, greatest engineering operation, most giving aid organization, best friend to the opressed & enslaved of Our Earth & the single greatest force for goodwill & peace in the history of man. Let these
facts be candidly evaluated with a mind toward unintended consquences in the budgetary process.

With my best wishes,

-B.

[Hacksaw]

Saved me more time than I want to admit in composing a reasoned response...

[slapout9]

The real issue is the Economy...it is not growing.....it is shrinking, so tax collection is way,way down. If we restore the economy the deficits will shrink just as quick as they grew if we adopt a sensible tax policy. Like Ike had....Elvis was in the 90% tax bracket;)

[Fuchs]

Ken, the U.S. Department of Energy's Budget is more about nukes and nuke disposal than about energy. There are significant hidden budgets outside of the DoD budget. Those hidden positions exceed the total military expenditures of several NATO allies.


Changing the fiscal transfer network won't change much, for it's not relevant in the short or medium term whether the money flows through a federal account or not. Wash DC could cut a couple programs and keep its income for balancing its budget, but the states would need to compensate for that or else the economic and social effects could be devastating.

A modern Western nation is a complex behemoth. Cutting away parts can cause a total collapse, especially when the balance was already lost after a false step.

Social peace and funding for school education cannot easily be given up in order to balance a federal budget.
A few aircraft carrier, the F-35 project, CVN-21 and a few other CVs, Arleigh Burke flight IV and several army & marines formations could disappear and hardly any suburb or downtown would notice the loss.

You could call it demobilization. The Cold War is over, after all - and South Korea is more than capable enough to handle North Korea on its own.

[SethB]

The larger piece of that puzzle is that a significant US drawdown could provoke countries like Japan to remilitarize, which could lead to regional tensions.

Say what you will about the late unpleasantness, it had significant advantages over the preceding half century.

As for school funding, we don't lack for that, either. We just don't get much for it. I would consider that to be an important distinction.

[Ken White]

Ken, the U.S. Department of Energy's Budget is more about nukes and nuke disposal than about energy. There are significant hidden budgets outside of the DoD budget. Those hidden positions exceed the total military expenditures of several NATO allies.and the fact that a lot of social welfare and support spending is in the DoD budget, contributes little or nothing to defense, really and which effectively offsets many of the other agency budget items.
Changing the fiscal transfer network won't change much, for it's not relevant in the short or medium term whether the money flows through a federal account or not.Strange statement. Both the deficit and the bogus, so-called 'entitlements' are a long term problem.

Plus the defense budget is almost totally Federal, the States providing only a small amount for the National Guard. The distortion factor is an issue.
...Wash DC could cut a couple programs and keep its income for balancing its budget, but the states would need to compensate for that or else the economic and social effects could be devastating.Er, did you miss this I wrote above:"...Just redistributing tax intakes to more accurately reflect governmental level responsibilities would save billions." I didn't suggest cutting any social programs, I just think they do not belong to the Federal government and any sensible interpretation of the US Constitution supports me on that.
A modern Western nation is a complex behemoth. Cutting away parts can cause a total collapse, especially when the balance was already lost after a false step.I didn't suggest cutting much of anything. What I did suggest was reworking the processes to eliminate federal intrusion in State and local business.
Social peace and funding for school education cannot easily be given up in order to balance a federal budget.Didn't suggest that, either -- where do you get these ideas??? :confused:

Your use of the Krupp-Bismarkian 'social peace' is interesting. We -- all nations -- had that before Otto jumped on Alfred's 'social peace' idea. Otto jumped on it to get not social peace but a complaisant citizenry. My personal belief is that was a poor bargain.
A few aircraft carrier, the F-35 project, CVN-21 and a few other CVs, Arleigh Burke flight IV and several army & marines formations could disappear and hardly any suburb or downtown would notice the loss.Wouldn't hurt our capability that much so I could live with all that -- except the F-35; several reasons that needs to stay, not least to keep the Taifun and Gripen lines from getting too big. ;)

Nor would said suburbs or downtown accrue much benefit. I truly do not believe you realize how venal our Congress really happens to be...
You could call it demobilization. The Cold War is over, after all - and South Korea is more than capable enough to handle North Korea on its own.You could call it that. The Left around the world would applaud. The Left here would applaud. I say it would be abysmally stupid and would invite even more subtle little attacks than the US currently receives -- and I'm not talking the small amount of overt stuff, I'm talking about the under visibility level sniping, cuts and little debilitating action that many, including some alleged friends, engage in.

The"cold" war continues, just different plays and players. We suffer the penalty of being the big guy everyone loves to hate. :cool:

Cheer up; China and India will not be denied, mayhap before you die, they'll eclipse us. But I doubt it... ;)

[Fuchs]

Er, did you miss this I wrote above:"...Just redistributing tax intakes to more accurately reflect governmental level responsibilities would save billions." I didn't suggest cutting any social programs, I just think they do not belong to the Federal government and any sensible interpretation of the US Constitution supports me on that.

The "Welfare" part in the U.S. constitution can be interpreted differently. besides, shuffling accounts does not provide savings in itself. State legislators could do the same weird things to budgets as federal legislators.



The 19th century 'social peace' thing isn't so important here. Austerity measures that hit the poor by cutting transfers will cause social troubles and unrest, that's what's counts.

By the way; Germans rather think of Erhardt and his Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy) at the keyword Sozialer Friede (social peace).


There's a reason why Europe's industrialised countries used some welfare programs to influence social problems and the U.S. did not; Europe had no uncolonized West where the poor could go and grab natural ressources to fix their economic problems.

[Steve Blair]

There's a reason why Europe's industrialised countries used some welfare programs to influence social problems and the U.S. did not; Europe had no uncolonized West where the poor could go and grab natural ressources to fix their economic problems.

And if you think that's what drove Western expansion in this country I'd suggest you go do some more reading. There were elements of that to be sure, but for the most part it was spurred by wealthy Easterners looking for new investments and/or areas to exploit. The "poor family with a covered wagon" might play well on TV, but it wasn't really the backbone of the expansion.

[Fuchs]

And if you think that's what drove Western expansion in this country I'd suggest you go do some more reading. There were elements of that to be sure, but for the most part it was spurred by wealthy Easterners looking for new investments and/or areas to exploit. The "poor family with a covered wagon" might play well on TV, but it wasn't really the backbone of the expansion.

Well, either those few rich entrepreneurs dropped babies real fast and didn't care enough for them to keep them from becoming poor workers - or the poor people working in the West had come from the East.

[Ken White]

The "Welfare" part in the U.S. constitution can be interpreted differently. besides, shuffling accounts does not provide savings in itself. State legislators could do the same weird things to budgets as federal legislators.Opel and VW. :D

Yes, that word "welfare" can have differing interpretations. However, you're still missing the point;

The Feds take in the most money, so much that even in their wildest schemes, they cannot spend it all. Thus they pass a large quantity of funding down to States, local governments and even NGOs to spend on project of dubious merit. Because of the way the Federal budgeting process works, those funds are not provided to end user for best applications but for specific program items like this (LINK) (http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2009/09/two_central_new_york_businessm.html). That's a small amount but those types of thing repeat in every State. It adds up. The issue is both for what the money must be spent and the Federal diktat ability that overrides State and local desires and concerns. Add the not inconsequential costs of administering such inefficiency and simply allowing the proper level of government to do its own taxing for its responsibilities without intrusion for above would be a tremendous saving.

Of course, the problem with that is the centralizers and control freaks lose control... :rolleyes:
The 19th century 'social peace' thing isn't so important here...Yes, it is. I have watched the US in three generations go from a relatively free and wealthy nation with a number of innovative and forward looking people to a nation of introspective, risk averse folks who want the government to fix everything. That cannot happen, no nation ever has, can now or will ever be able to afford to do that.
Austerity measures that hit the poor by cutting transfers will cause social troubles and unrest, that's what's counts.Again, you miss the point. Are you doing that purposely? :confused:

The issue is to stop transfers, yes -- but not to cut programs; I have not suggested stopping any program. I have suggested instead simply to support the program at the appropriate level of government. National defense is a federal responsibility, period. Social Welfare (in your definition), broadly, is a State and local responsibility. Education is a local responsibility.

Most Europeans with their relatively small nations -- Germany is smaller than Montana, France is larger but smaller than Texas -- long tradition of centralized government and until recently fairly homogeneous populations do not understand that federalism and a decentralized approach to governance is far more necessary in the US.
By the way; Germans rather think of Erhardt and his Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy) at the keyword Sozialer Friede (social peace).I thought as much, so do some in the US who agree with that approach. I'm not among them, I'm with the majority in the US who think such 'peace' is an ephemeral chimera and views it with great skepticism.
...Europe had no uncolonized West where the poor could go and grab natural resources to fix their economic problems.Steve Blair answered that, I'll only add that most people went to find land as you say -- and to work for those people he cited; a good mix. Little is as simple as you seem to wish...;)

I'll also point out that most of those '"poor" you cite were recent immigrants who left Europe because they didn't want to be there, thought the opportunities in the US would be better. found that to be true, stayed here -- and are no longer European and do not think like Europeans; their values often differ markedly.

With that, we've bored everyone with this off thread chatter. We will disagree on most of that and that's okay. What we can agree upon, I suspect, and thus return to the thread is this:

Social welfare is arguably a federal responsibility but national defense is unquestionably federal. The US has fiscal problems that are self induced but adequate funding should be available to keep forces at current or somewhat lower levels with only slight degradation. Whether that's desirable or not is a policy question on which people can and will differ. The answer to the question "Is the US Military Affordable?" will not determined by anything written at the Small Wars Council. Time will tell.

[qp4]

The Army:
Combine division BCTs into two larger BCTs instead of four each. This will reduce the number of HQ positions.


I'm really at a loss here, are you not keeping up with the US Army at all? I understand there is bloat at the BDE and DIV HQs, but that's due to a number of factors, not the least of which is the experienced force that simply has to go somewhere when they get promoted.

More importantly however is that the US Army is using BDE and DIV HQs as plug and play units. The colors are pretty much there for lineage at this point, though each does seem to have its own character. It is the BDE and DIV HQ that not only control the battlefield, but contain the assets that aren't just trigger pullers. We need more of these, a BDE HQ is great for the number of battalions it trains, but in our current operational set we'd be better off with a BDE HQ for two or most three line BNs.

[Entropy]

The Feds take in the most money, so much that even in their wildest schemes, they cannot spend it all. Thus they pass a large quantity of funding down to States, local governments and even NGOs to spend on project of dubious merit.

In short, it's violating the principle of subsidiarity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subsidiarity).


There's a reason why Europe's industrialised countries used some welfare programs to influence social problems and the U.S. did not; Europe had no uncolonized West where the poor could go and grab natural ressources to fix their economic problems.

The reason is federalism and an American culture distrustful of centralized power and too diverse to provide a foundation necessary to support such a social contract.

[gute]

I'm really at a loss here, are you not keeping up with the US Army at all? I understand there is bloat at the BDE and DIV HQs, but that's due to a number of factors, not the least of which is the experienced force that simply has to go somewhere when they get promoted.

More importantly however is that the US Army is using BDE and DIV HQs as plug and play units. The colors are pretty much there for lineage at this point, though each does seem to have its own character. It is the BDE and DIV HQ that not only control the battlefield, but contain the assets that aren't just trigger pullers. We need more of these, a BDE HQ is great for the number of battalions it trains, but in our current operational set we'd be better off with a BDE HQ for two or most three line BNs.

I do try to keep up with the U.S. Army, but I am no where near as knowledgeable as many who post on this site. I have a great affection for all things military, but my experience is limited to a stint in the Corps 20 years ago and 18 years of putting dope dealers in jail.

Have you read an article titled Why Small Brigade combat Teams Undermine Modularity? I apologize for my lack of computer skills or I would have linked the article. I do believe someone has linked the article under a different discussion. I may have missed the point(s) of the article so I am interested in your opinion of this article.

[Kiwigrunt]

Have you read an article titled Why Small Brigade combat Teams Undermine Modularity? I apologize for my lack of computer skills or I would have linked the article.

Here it be (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/melton.pdf)

[slapout9]

Steve Blair answered that, I'll only add that most people went to find land as you say -- and to work for those people he cited; a good mix. Little is as simple as you seem to wish...;)


Steve is right but so is Fuchs to great extent, by claiming land they essentially had free capital something that can't happen today. My Great Grandparents simply staked a claim on a piece of land that had a water supply. At the time I didn't understand a lot of what they said when they talked about never having a job and never really having any money but living quite well. They saved their Social Security Checks (literally put them in a drawer) because they didn't no what to do with them and they certainly would never trust or use something called a Bank:eek: Early settlers were the original Hippies, it was all about Land, Labor and Tools and being a good neighbor. I think there is lesson in UNlearned in there somewhere.

[Steve Blair]

Steve is right but so is Fuchs to great extent, by claiming land they essentially had free capital something that can't happen today. My Great Grandparents simply staked a claim on a piece of land that had a water supply. At the time I didn't understand a lot of what they said when they talked about never having a job and never really having any money but living quite well. They saved their Social Security Checks (literally put them in a drawer) because they didn't no what to do with them and they certainly would never trust or use something called a Bank:eek: Early settlers were the original Hippies, it was all about Land, Labor and Tools and being a good neighbor. I think there is lesson in UNlearned in there somewhere.

Actually the Homestead Act was a little more complicated that someone just claiming land. They had to prove it up (in other words homestead and start putting in crops), and there were some other requirements as well. And as far as the original settlers being Hippies...that looks cute in retrospect but the reality on the ground was far different and very harsh.

I could go on about Frontier history, but that's diverting the thread as Ken pointed out.

[slapout9]

Actually the Homestead Act was a little more complicated that someone just claiming land. They had to prove it up (in other words homestead and start putting in crops), and there were some other requirements as well. And as far as the original settlers being Hippies...that looks cute in retrospect but the reality on the ground was far different and very harsh.

I could go on about Frontier history, but that's diverting the thread as Ken pointed out.

Yes, but the point none the less is they were essentially given free capital and the associated risk with it. And based upon my own real life personal history is wasn't that complicated at all, the size was determined largely by what you could control (homestead) and that was largely based upon the size of your family.....hence the problem that would arise when families grew the land disputes followed. The reality of how harsh it was depended on where that land was and what natural resources were associated with it(game,fish,timber,water,minerals,etc.) as history shows some people,families did very well indeed.

[bourbon]

The Tyranny of Defense Inc. (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/the-tyranny-of-defense-inc/8342/), by Andrew J. Bacevich. The Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2011.

In 1961, Dwight Eisenhower famously identified the military-industrial complex, warning that the growing fusion between corporations and the armed forces posed a threat to democracy. Judged 50 years later, Ike’s frightening prophecy actually understates the scope of our modern system—and the dangers of the perpetual march to war it has put us on.

[Cole]

The Tyranny of Defense Inc. (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/the-tyranny-of-defense-inc/8342/), by Andrew J. Bacevich. The Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2011.

Thanks Bourbon. But perhaps a quote from his article that the percentage of overall military spending was 50% of the federal budget back then and that it represented 10% of GDP would have put his article in better perspective. I also hear all the time that the top tax bracket back then was 90%.

A quick trip to see what things cost in 1960 reveals this.

$12,700 cost of a NEW house
$2,600 cost of a new car
$220 cost of 23" TV
$20.30 cost of electric razor
30 cents cost of can of Ravioli
25 cents cost of gallon of gas
20 cents cost of loaf of bread

What this shows me is that food and electric devices are still very much a bargain relative to 1960. For instance, I can't imagine paying about the same for a can of Ravioli or a loaf of bread today as a gallon of gas, or $240 for an electric razor. And actually gas is pretty cheap today, too, even at $3 a gallon.

Use that 25 cent cost of 1960 gas as a baseline and multiply by a factor of 12. That same factor correlates pretty well to a car (12 x $2,600 = $31,200) which is a relative bargain considering the modern features you can get for a car that price today. Where that factor fails is in the cost of a house. If you use the median price of a price in the midwest and south, the current price tracks closely with 12 x $12,700 which is $152,400. But try paying that much for a house on the east or west coast and you are in for a rude surprise.

So I would advocate that many of the economic ills we face today are directly attributable to the artificial inflation of houses and incomes in our nation's primary commercial coastal hubs...like Boston. Also, the cost of paying for college is higher today relative to 1960, because apparently professors with Ph.D.s seem to think they are worth more money.

The cost of state civil servants in many of our nations hubs is also driving many problems. California for instance, may have a half trillion dollars in underfunded pension obligations. In San Jose, where I'm originally from, a police officer STARTS at over $80,000 and can make much more with overtime. So Mr. Bacevich's big city contemporaries are contributing to the problem as well, through both high salaries and high pensions. And the fact that Professor Bacevich lives near Boston tells me he probably owns a house worth considerably more than 12 times the average price of a new home in 1960...which in turn drives up prices of neighboring homes, which in turn drives up salaries of all folks living near Boston...increasing that 1 in 7 poverty rate and making affordable, safe, quality housing nearly nonexistent if you desire a reasonable commute.

I also would argue that the threat of an actual nuclear explosion in a major western city is every bit as real a threat today due to the extremists that Bacevich seems to think are an exaggeration. After all, both North Korea, soon Iran, and current Pakistan and India have nukes and targets they would be inclined to use them on either as extreme individual leaders, scientists, or military personnel in those states or while selling them to state-sponsored terrorists (except India). Unlike Russia and China in 1960, extremists don't view MAD the same way. We never experienced any actual attacks by Russians or Chinese since 1960 which is hardly the case reference extremist states and the terrorists they breed.

So no. I don't think our presence in Afghanistan and Iraq are/were worthless exercises or an example of the military-industrial complex, or that military contractors are thieves. Also believe value exists to local economies in having military bases, or military manufacturing facilities nearby. With the price of housing and union demands, civil manufacturing is pretty much dead for many things in the U.S. That is hardly the case for military gear. And it wouldn't have to be the case if those who live near shorelines in inflated real estate allowed off shore oil drilling and wind mills generating electricity. A few new nuclear power plants and oil refineries might help, too. After all, Iran is pumping out 2.6 million barrels of oil a month now thanks to military efforts, believe I read. Think how high the price of oil would be currently if they were still only exporting "oil for food."

Think how much more manufacturing we would generate in the U.S. if everyone studied history in college instead of math and engineering...oh wait...

[bourbon]

What this shows me is that food and electric devices are still very much a bargain relative to 1960.
Where that factor fails is in the cost of a house.
Cole, I think you need to examine changes in the past 50 years.

Simply put, the way a home is built in 2011 is more similar to the way it was in 1960, than the way consumer electronics were manufactured or food was produced in 1960 compared to the way they are today.

Modern technology and globalization has brought efficiency and competitive forces which have driven food and consumer electronic production costs downward. On the other hand, housing remains a labor intensive industry; and I do not believe that the housing industry has experienced the technological efficiencies or the competitive forces of a similar magnitude.

This is to say nothing of the role in which speculation has played in housing.


So I would advocate that many of the economic ills we face today are directly attributable to the artificial inflation of houses and incomes in our nation's primary commercial coastal hubs...like Boston. Also, the cost of paying for college is higher today relative to 1960, because apparently professors with Ph.D.s seem to think they are worth more money.
...
And the fact that Professor Bacevich lives near Boston tells me he probably owns a house worth considerably more than 12 times the average price of a new home in 1960...
Again, speculation in housing plays a large role. Also the tech and financial sectors of the economy are centered primarily in the commercial coastal hubs, and these industries have made for a disproportionate share of the past 20 years economic gains; as a result real estate prices followed similar growth geographically.

I would say the rise of college tuition costs has had more to do with the decline in state financing than it does with professor’s salaries. I would also look at the massive expansion of full-time support staff and administrative positions; you didn’t all these IT workers 20 years ago, and you didn’t need all the back office staff to deal with all these laws and regulations 50 years ago. The shift toward a focus on student amenities rather than academics also needs to be considered.

This forum has several Ph.Ds who are college professors, and I think most would say they could be making more money if they did something other than teaching (at-least in pre-2008). Maybe less so for the liberal arts types, but for someone like selil in IT, I am sure the difference is in the hundreds of thousands of dollars in annual income.


Further, as a Boston University graduate and having had the privilege of taking Professor Bacevich’s American military history course, I can say that the school could easily double or triple his salary and still get its money worth. His course was the most rewarding educational experience I have ever had, and I say this as someone who at the time of taking the course was a non-matriculated student with a problem in motivation and a poor educational track-record in both experience and in practice.

Lest you have the impression that Professor Bacevich is some lefty academic jagoff or are unfamiliar with his background (which this article does not get into); it is notable that he is a West Point graduate and Vietnam vet who retired from active duty with the rank of Colonel. He is also an old school conservative and devout Catholic. This makes him a unique voice in the academic, for which he should not be brushed aside as a liberal academic elite.

And fwiw, Prof. Bacevich uses public transportation and shares a compact sedan with his family iirc. I would imagine such thrift extends to the rest of his lifestyle, including his house.

[Bob's World]

The U.S. military could become much more affordable if we did the following simple steps:

1. Stop subsidizing the defense of Western European and NE Asian and North American countries that are more than capable of providing their own defense. We have sustained this bill in order to keep a string on these guys that we can pull when we want them to do something that supports our interests, but may not necessarily support their own. Time to find a new tool for garnering that type of support, or come up with new foreign policies that demand it less often.

2. Stop seeking to "contain" problems that were arguably legitimate "threats" 40-60 years ago, but are now much more an issue of will and pride rather than national security.

3. Stop seeking to control every outcome around the globe that impacts upon some U.S. national interest or another. Assume a little risk, employ a little more diplomacy, and become a lot more flexible in how we work with others.

4. Focus on the capabilities required to deter and defeat the types of threats that actually pose a threat to our national survival.

5. Re-balance the force between the RC and the AC to fully extricate ourselves from a Cold War paradigm that required a large, forward deployed force to deter Soviets in Western Europe primarily, but also the North Koreans and the Chinese somewhat as well.

Such changes will not only produce immediate savings, but will also serve to reduce the friction that contributes so much to the "irregular warfare" that vexes us today.

[Fuchs]

The U.S. military could become much more affordable if we did the following simple steps:

1. Stop subsidizing the defense of Western European and NE Asian and North American countries that are more than capable of providing their own defense. We have sustained this bill in order to keep a string on these guys that we can pull when we want them to do something that supports our interests, but may not necessarily support their own. Time to find a new tool for garnering that type of support, or come up with new foreign policies that demand it less often.

I'm not sure that this happens at all. Sure, there are troops deployed overseas, but I don't think that European security is being enhanced by U.S. troops in Europe (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/04/military-spending-free-riding.html). The European NATO military is sufficient, even if compared with Arab, Iranian and CIS military power at once.

It's similar with East Asia. South Korea's forces are clearly superior to North Korea's, and the lone U.S. division in South Korea and a few jets on Okinawa don't change that.

Taiwan's security strategy doesn't even seem to depend on military power, especially not land power. They could expect few if any U.S. land forces as reinforcement (paras maybe), but their army is the most neglected of their armed services - basically a mediocre 70's force.

I'm furthermore not even sure that the U.S. is even intent on subsidizing allied powers' national security.



My only logical explanation for the whole forward-basing (which is really risky, think Force Z (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinking_of_Prince_of_Wales_and_Repulse)) is therefore rather your third point; an extreme bully interventionist foreign policy.
It just happens to look like your first point, but that's mere façade.

[bourbon]

The cost of state civil servants in many of our nations hubs is also driving many problems. California for instance, may have a half trillion dollars in underfunded pension obligations. In San Jose, where I'm originally from, a police officer STARTS at over $80,000 and can make much more with overtime. So Mr. Bacevich's big city contemporaries are contributing to the problem as well, through both high salaries and high pensions.
Yes, the cost of state civil servants is an issue. A bigger issue is losses to state pension funds from investment in mortgage-backed securities and toxic derivative crap, much of which fed into the housing bubble in the first place.


A few new nuclear power plants and oil refineries might help, too. After all, Iran is pumping out 2.6 million barrels of oil a month now thanks to military efforts, believe I read. Think how high the price of oil would be currently if they were still only exporting "oil for food."

Think how much more manufacturing we would generate in the U.S. if everyone studied history in college instead of math and engineering...oh wait...
I think you meant to say that Iraq is now pumping 2.6 million bbl/yr, but wrote Iran. But still in error you were on to something, and that is the significant influence that Iran now holds over the Iraqi government and its oil.

Speculation through commodity index’s drove the 2008 oil price spike, and while structural issues exist in the oil market the speculators remain a significant contributor to high oil prices today. Additional Iraqi production is a marginal issue next the speculators.

Besides, the traditional strategy has favored suppressing/red-lining Iraqi oil production – so I am not sure it is favorable for us. But you would need someone who studied history to explain that concept for you...

[bourbon]

From the Pentagon to the private sector: In large numbers, and with few rules, retiring generals are taking lucrative defense-firm jobs (http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/12/26/defense_firms_lure_retired_generals/), By Bryan Bender. The Boston Globe, 26 December 2010.

The Globe analyzed the career paths of 750 of the highest ranking generals and admirals who retired during the last two decades and found that, for most, moving into what many in Washington call the “rent-a-general’’ business is all but irresistible.

From 2004 through 2008, 80 percent of retiring three- and four-star officers went to work as consultants or defense executives, according to the Globe analysis. That compares with less than 50 percent who followed that path a decade earlier, from 1994 to 1998.

In some years, the move from general staff to industry is a virtual clean sweep. Thirty-four out of 39 three- and four-star generals and admirals who retired in 2007 are now working in defense roles — nearly 90 percent.

And in many cases there is nothing subtle about what the generals have to sell — Martin’s firm is called The Four Star Group, for example. The revolving-door culture of Capitol Hill — where former lawmakers and staffers commonly market their insider knowledge to lobbying firms — is now pervasive at the senior rungs of the military leadership.

Among the Globe findings:

■ Dozens of retired generals employed by defense firms maintain Pentagon advisory roles, giving them unparalleled levels of influence and access to inside information on Department of Defense procurement plans.

■ The generals are, in many cases, recruited for private sector roles well before they retire, raising questions about their independence and judgment while still in uniform. The Pentagon is aware and even supports this practice.

■ The feeder system from some commands to certain defense firms is so powerful that successive generations of commanders have been hired by the same firms or into the same field. For example, the last seven generals and admirals who worked as Department of Defense gatekeepers for international arms sales are now helping military contractors sell weapons and defense technology overseas.

■ When a general-turned-businessman arrives at the Pentagon, he is often treated with extraordinary deference — as if still in uniform — which can greatly increase his effectiveness as a rainmaker for industry. The military even has name for it — the “bobblehead effect.’’

“We are changing the perception and maybe the reality of what it means to be a general,’’ said retired General Robert “Doc’’ Foglesong, who retired as the second-ranking Air Force officer in 2006.

“The fundamental question,’’ he said, “is whether this is shaping the acquisition system and influencing what the Pentagon buys. I think the answer is yes.’’