Local Defence in Afghanistan

[Rex Brynen]

From the Afghanistan Analysts Network (http://aan-afghanistan.com):

Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed Initiatives (http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/20100525MLefevre-LDIpaper.pdf)
by Mathieu Lefèvre
27 May 2010


In this latest AAN report, Mathieu Lefèvre unpacks the myths about local defense initiatives in Afghanistan. His analysis of three local defense initiatives shows the contradictions in the claimed successes and points at possible long-term security challenges posed by these initiatives.

In this report, Mathieu Lefèvre analyses three local defense initiatives in Afghanistan: The Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) and the Local Defense Initiative (LDI). The aim of the ANAP, launched by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) with international support in 2006, was to provide a ‘community policing’ function. The ANAP force was locally recruited and trained and the initiative was concentrated to the south and south-east of Afghanistan. Some of the challenges that faced the ANAP were inadequate logistical support, inadequate vetting, unclear command-in-control and issues of loyalty. According to Lefèvre lessons were not learnt from the shortcomings – and failures – of the ANAP, and consequently they have been reproduced in the AP3 and the LDI programs.

Lefèvre concludes that the three initiatives reproduce the same challenges: The relationship between the local defense initiatives and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is problematic, it has been difficult not to ‘pick sides’ when working with local militias, experimental in nature the programs lack proper accountability mechanisms and the programs run the risk of creating perverse incentives through rewarding criminal commanders rather than peaceful members of the community. Lefèvre also cautions against viewing these initiatives as a possible part of reintegration efforts.

[Jedburgh]

The 2nd Qtr issue of JFQ also discusses the subject in the Seth Jones article Community Defense in Afghanistan (http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-57/jones.pdf), this year's (published 26 May) Security Sector Reform Monitor - Afghanistan (http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/SSRM%20Afghanistan%20v3.pdf) devotes a brief section to Local Defence Initiatives, and RAND has a lengthier piece on Community Defense Forces currently in the works.

[JMA]

Gen. Petraeus Runs into Resistance from Karzai over Village Defense Forces (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/09/AR2010070905599.html?hpid=topnews) - - Joshua Partlow and Karen DeYoung, Washington Post.


As he takes charge of the war effort in Afghanistan, Gen. David H. Petraeus has met sharp resistance from President Hamid Karzai to an American plan to assist Afghan villagers in fighting the Taliban on their own. A first meeting last week between the new commander and the Afghan president turned tense after Karzai renewed his objections to the plan, according to U.S. officials. The idea of recruiting villagers into local defense programs is a key part of the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, and Karzai's stance poses an early challenge to Petraeus as he tries to fashion a collaborative relationship with the Afghan leader.

Of course Karzai will try to resist this plan. If the villagers can defend themselves against the Taliban they will be able to defend themselves against Karzai's forces in due course. Karzai knows that day will come.

[40below]

Gen. Petraeus Runs into Resistance from Karzai over Village Defense Forces (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/09/AR2010070905599.html?hpid=topnews) - - Joshua Partlow and Karen DeYoung, Washington Post.



Of course Karzai will try to resist this plan. If the villagers can defend themselves against the Taliban they will be able to defend themselves against Karzai's forces in due course. Karzai knows that day will come.

I always noticed that Afghan villagers were armed to the teeth and not shy about fighting. They already have a militia and a local defence program there, the trick is getting them to use it against the proper enemy.

[JMA]

I always noticed that Afghan villagers were armed to the teeth and not shy about fighting. They already have a militia and a local defence program there, the trick is getting them to use it against the proper enemy.

That is a double edged sword is it not? Today they fight for you, tomorrow against and thereafter for the highest bidder. Karzai probably understands this.

[subrosa]

perhaps they should incorporate their militia it and call it something like x risk management or kaala-oba etc etc...

[Cannoneer No. 4]

What successful counterinsurgent did not employ indigenous irregular auxiliaries?

Legitimate sub-national paramilitaries under the effective control of village headmen, district chiefs, and provincial governors recruited from amongst the inhabitants of the battlefield won't be much to look at, won't have the appropriate tickets punched, won't be focused districtly developed enough to meet the high standards claimed by Afghan National Security Forces, but they are already there, already armed in most cases, with some retired Russian-killers for adult supervision.

[Mark O'Neill]

What successful counterinsurgent did not employ indigenous irregular auxiliaries?

Legitimate sub-national paramilitaries under the effective control of village headmen, district chiefs, and provincial governors recruited from amongst the inhabitants of the battlefield won't be much to look at, won't have the appropriate tickets punched, won't be focused districtly developed enough to meet the high standards claimed by Afghan National Security Forces, but they are already there, already armed in most cases, with some retired Russian-killers for adult supervision.

None.

[Bob's World]

Karzai himself took power through the employment of such forces, empowered by an outside source; so it is natural that he would be leery of the formation of the same now. A big portion of our difficulty in selling this program is that we have not effectively recognized that he will wisely fear that such a powerful tool could be used against him as well (he is not a foolish man).

Another aspect of our inability to sell this program is the insistence on focusing on the security / security force aspect of a program that is arguably 80% about extending the official governance of Afghanistan beyond the safe confines of the District and Provincial Centers out to newly empowered and protected local centers of Legitimacy among critical populaces in a few select, critical locations and fusing the two together.

Jimmy Gant's paper fired the imagination in similar ways to Lawrence’s "Seven Pillars"; but similarly the real story is lost in the excitement and romanticism.

There will be no great uprising of tribal forces( trained, enabled and led by a handful of Green Berets; or otherwise) sweeping across Afghanistan to remove the Taliban under this program.

It is no more, and no less than forming local militias to establish local security in order to allow the extension of formal governance to the people to draw upon their legitimacy; and to allow and empower the functioning of local governance as well. Empowering the local shura to bring in development projects and governance on their terms to address issues they see as important for their communities. It is a building of Hope. It is a recognition of Respect for historic systems. It is a transference of Legitimacy from the people to their government. It is NOT program to build private armies to wage COIN in parallel to GIROA.

We won't be able to sell this program until we ourselves understand what it really is that we are trying to sell.

[subrosa]

Bob's World cited in part:
There will be no great uprising of tribal forces( trained, enabled and led by a handful of Green Berets; or otherwise) sweeping across Afghanistan to remove the Taliban under this program.

What is your timeframe for this for not happening? now? or like a year after karzai strikes a deal with the taliban and pictures of animals are banned again? perhaps there will be even an uprising from the northern tribal forces(trained, enabled and led by a handful), again.

I dont think expanding power in the wali kandahar belt by fusing local and provincial powers is a good thing, specially if the taliban is going to be part of the official govt and this is their heartland. the shura plan sounds good but not the "fusing" part.

[Bob's World]

Bob's World cited in part:

What is your timeframe for this for not happening? now? or like a year after karzai strikes a deal with the taliban and pictures of animals are banned again? perhaps there will be even an uprising from the northern tribal forces(trained, enabled and led by a handful), again.

I dont think expanding power in the wali kandahar belt by fusing local and provincial powers is a good thing, specially if the taliban is going to be part of the official govt and this is their heartland. the shura plan sounds good but not the "fusing" part.

In so many ways the Puritans of the Mass. Coloney were very much like the Taliban; but the simple fact is that what they were selling was unsustainable once fully exposed to the light of day and difused by the inevitable (no matter how ruthlessly they tried to avoid it) immigration of people who did not hold to their harsh, strict doctrines. Similary, though the Taiban may come back, they will not likely be able to go back to the ways they ruled the dark, backwater Afghanistan of that past era that no one cared about. The world is looking now.

Karzai must reach out to that aspect of his populace that look to the Taliban for governance as that is the heart of his current insurgency. To not do so out of fear of Taliban doctrine would be extremely short-sighted. He must also do this in a way that does not alienate the populace whose support his government already has. This is the true nature of the challenge in Afghanistan is the tendency to be either "all in" or "all out." Any successful government in Afghanistan (and we should never assume that it must include Mr. Karzai, or anyone else for that matter) must be able to break this pardigmn and reach across tribal/regional/lingquistic/ethnic/religious lines and create an inclusive compromise.

We make the problems in Afghanistan worse when we either over-promote one party (say, the current GIROA); or overly work to block other parties (Haqqani, Taliban, etc) from participation. Good COIN is about fixing government and addressing popular concerns, not ensuring that the failed status quo prevails and the challenger is defeated. To assume the latter is our role is to make the US and the Coalition a pathetic bitch lap dog of the current government of Afghanistan; and if that is a course we take, it will be because we don't understand the nature of the threat in ways that have caused us to exaggerate the fears in our minds.

Karzai understands our fears and plays upon them. One thing that I am constantly struck by when I meet with senior people from Pakistan and Afghanistan both, is that these people have a far more sophisticated understanding of insurgency accross the board than virtually any US "expert" on COIN that I have either spoken with or read. Our experts have studied COIN and even executed operations they thought were COIN; but one must understand insurgency to truly understand COIN; and the people who have risen in these communities have successfully been back and forth on both sides of insurgency and counterinsurgency their entire lives. This isn't something they read about, it is the world they live in.

The same was true for America's Founding Fathers. They grew up in oppression, led an insurgency, and then immediately found themselves in a new era of complex counterinsurgency. They did not talk in terms of insurgency and counterinsurgency, they just did what they needed to do to prevail.

As to village stability operations, they are not a great panacea; but they are a great supporting effort to an effective COIN campaign. But understand this; the last thing Karzai wants is an effective COIN campaign, as that implies to a wise insurgent/counterinsurgent like himself that he must change, or perhaps even go; and he is not keen on either one. Far better for him to just leverage the fears of the West to get them to simply stay and hold the symptoms of insurgency at bay; as that enables him and his cronies to stay just the way they are.

[subrosa]

OK fair enough- now that the world is watching they probably wont ban nail polish and high heels, but still, compromises will have to be made on social policy and more restrictions will be imposed on the afghan people if radical islamists become the lawmakers. that being said, they can go many ways - join the system, indulge in the lure of money and power and fun, or try to win hearts and votes by presenting their austere image versus the lavish ways of their incumbents, push their ideology as much as they can. who knows how they will actually behave versus their intentions. could be better than we think. could be worse.

my concern is that right now alqaida and the afghan taliban operate side-by-side in the fata. lets assume that siraj haqqani becomes the new mayor of kandahar after the peace process and publicly denouncing ties with alQ. and lets assume alQ tries to return to into afghanistan and starts by funding madrassas and "development" projects in siraj's new territory. haqqani will be inclined to turn a blind eye to peripherial activities like teaching 'wiring' in PT class.
empowered BUT independent village defense forces might be a good way to keep checks and balances on the soon to be ex-bff of alQ, kind of like federalism on a local level. it is a matter of trust. as of lately karzai is under the influence of pakistan and taliban and allegedly other substances-so no wonder he his paranoid and resisting advice that may even be in his interest. just hope he is as paranoid about pakistan and taliban as he is of the village defense forces!

[wmthomson]

Hamid Karzai agreed to the creation of local security forces today. General Petraeus has supposedly been pushing for localized forces since he took command of Afghanistan operations earlier this month. (Press Release from Afghan Government (http://president.gov.af/Contents/91/Documents/2012/local_police_eng.html))

This initiative certainly is a small step towards some decentralization of an absurdly over centralized government; thus it appears a positive step towards achieving success in Afghanistan. Neither the culture nor geography ever seemed to lend themselves to centralized government, at least not at the level Karzai has instituted.

As David Kilcullen said a few days ago on NPR, it is easier to convince a guy to fight for his town then go some place else and fight for some one else’s. Local police will certainly have a better understanding of the human terrain then national police could. The villages do have an opportunity to side step the Karzai government altogether, thus undermining its legitimacy, but it can’t get anymore illegitimate then it already is, so do we really care at all?

Appears like a positive step. Should we push for more decentralization? Or are we just opening up a greater opportunity for rampant warlordism? Are more armed groups the answer to countering a resurgent Taliban?

I certainly think so, much could go wrong of course, but you cannot govern and secure Afghanistan from Kabul anyway, so let’s give it a try.

[subrosa]

like i said above- all they had to do is change their name and karzai would accept!
"local police" sounds very nice and im glad this all worked out!

[40below]

So are these new local police forces part of, an adjunct to, totally separate from or a replacement for the ANP?

[wmthomson]

The new local police force will operate separately from the ANP but will still fall under the authority of the country’s Interior Ministry.

[JarodParker]

like i said above- all they had to do is change their name and karzai would accept!
"local police" sounds very nice and im glad this all worked out!

Reminds me of a little anecdote from one of the OIF books (Fiasco, Imperial Life..., or some other book)...


Sometime in 2003, it occurred to the CPA proconsul Paul Bremer that however much the Kurds had aided the toppling of the Ba'ath and any American-led effort to rebuild Iraq, they were not going to be allowed to maintain a standing "sectarian" militia of their own. This meant that the peshmerga, the well-armed and well-trained Kurdish army, would have to go. Bremer appointed a consultant from the RAND Corporation to negotiate its disbandment with Masour Barzani of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Irbil.

"Look, we'll let you have mountain rangers, a rapid reaction force and a counterterrorism strike force, but no Kurdish army," said the RAND consultant, proceeding to explain the problems of martial division in a federated democracy to a man who'd helped hold together the only democratic polity Iraq had ever known up to then.

Keep in mind that the peshmerga were for twelve years, along with the U.S. and British fighter jets patrolling the No Fly Zone, the only line of defense between the Kurds and Saddam's forces of genocide. After a few seconds' deliberation, Barzani agreed. Hand-shakes and wiped brows all around. But just as the RAND consultant was boarding the plane that would shuttle him back to the Green Zone, it occurred to him to ask what the Kurdish translation of "mountain rangers, rapid reaction force and counterrorism strike force" might be. With a wry grin on his face, Barzani replied: "peshmerga."

Link (http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:fOSCM3ByCTgJ:www.jewcy.com/daily_shvitz/how_we_got_to_a_failed_state_of_iraq+book+fiasco+a necdote+peshmerga&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)

[Jesse9252]

Some questions about this local police plan:

1) How are we going to prevent these "local police" from simply becoming the militia of whoever is the strongest powerbroker in whatever area they are operating in? I doubt the Ministry of Interior is really going to be keeping a tight leash on things considering the state it's in. Who is going to set the left and right lateral limits for these units and then supervise them to make sure they are adhering to their boundaries? For that matter, who is going to do the initial vetting to prevent the police from becoming filled with Taliban sympathizers from the start, thus invalidating the whole process?

2) The ANP is already notorious for its poor behavior, corruption, and tendency to abuse the general population. These local police seem even less accountable than the ANP--they will belong to a 'looser' institution and they will receive no training.

3) I am by no means an expert on the ANP, but I got the sense that most of the units were already local to begin with. After 5 minutes on Google I found the 2006 DoS IG's Assessment of Afghanistan Police (http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/76103.pdf) which is quoted below. So how will these local police be different than the local police that already exist (or did circa 2006)?:

Although the Tashkil calls for recruiting officers in all five ANP regional areas, the assessment team was unable to verify their presence in the regions. Based on interviews with the RTC commanders, mentors, and police district chiefs, almost all recruiting occurs at the police district level.In effect, police are recruited locally to serve locally.

The MoI lacks a national assignment system for graduates of the training centers and the police academy. Presently, graduates of the RTCs return to the province from which they were recruited. According to a MoI official, this assignment system promotes corruption. The official said the corruption is systemic and is related to tribal relationships and local or provincial loyalties. Some MoI officials suggest that the only way to fight corruption of this nature is by adhering to a national recruiting and assignment system. Because Afghans are subject to strong tribal influences, officials believe the best method to ensure police loyalty to the central government is to minimize the provincial/ethnic allegiance by assigning them to provinces other than their own.

The MoI intends at some point to improve the assignment process and assign graduates to provinces other than their home areas. The Minister of Interior has appointed himself champion of nationalizing the ANP and has started a recruiting campaign based on national service.

Several Afghan trainees interviewed at the RTCs said they would be willing to move from their province. Those who thought otherwise, however, expressed a more realistic view. For example, one RTC deputy commander said many policemen would be unwilling to move. He recalled that 60 policemen from other provinces had been assigned to serve in his province, but only two arrived for work. Police prefer to serve in their own province because of ethnic affiliations, travel difficulties, and problems sending pay home to families. Young policemen are reluctant to work in a different province than their own because locals do not accept them due to ethnic, religious, and language differences. In Bamiyan province, for example, many local recruits only speak a language unique to their area, making assignment outside the region

I really do hope this works. Any plan for trying to solve the police problem--or really any problem--in Afghanistan is going to have lots of negatives associated with it. In this instance, though, I am not convinced the potential positives outweigh those negatives...

[Jesse9252]

And further Googling yields this, from a USIP report on Afghanistan's Police (http://www.usip.org/files/afghanistan_police.pdf):

The Afghan National Police Auxiliary
In late 2006, the United States authorized the creation of the Afghan National Police Auxiliary, a quick-fix effort to help address the growing Taliban insurgency in southern Afghanistan. Under this plan, provincial governors could recruit 11,271 men from 124 high-risk districts in 21 provinces into the ANPA, a militia force intended to reinforce the ANP. The purpose of the ANPA was to man checkpoints and perform community policing functions, freeing the ANP for counterinsurgency operations. Recruits received five days of classroom instruction on the Afghan constitution, ethics, and police techniques and five days of weapons training. Each recruit was then given an AK-47 assault rifle, a standard ANP uniform, a $70 dollar monthly salary, and a one-year contract. Since ANPA members were locally recruited, they were vulnerable to factional control and manipulation. Despite initial assertions that ANPA recruits would be thoroughly vetted, many were thought to be Taliban agents and nearly all were members of forces loyal to provincial power brokers.

The creation of the ANPA was widely criticized for reversing the effects of the 2005 Disband Illegally Armed Groups program, which disarmed and demobilized gangs that served local power brokers by reconstituting and legitimizing tribal militias and groups loyal to powerful warlords. The ANPA was also challenged by regular ANP officers, who questioned why the ANPA received the same salary and wore the same uniform as professional police- men but had far less training and did not owe allegiance to the national government. Some 8,300 ANPA members received training by July 2007, but incompetence and ineffetiveness of the force resulted in its being disbanded in May 2008.
Surely the folks pulling the strings cannot have forgotten about this initiative altogether. So what is different about the 'local police' in 2010 that will help them avoid the fate of the ANPA 2006-2008?

[jcustis]

1) How are we going to prevent these "local police" from simply becoming the militia of whoever is the strongest powerbroker in whatever area they are operating in? I doubt the Ministry of Interior is really going to be keeping a tight leash on things considering the state it's in. Who is going to set the left and right lateral limits for these units and then supervise them to make sure they are adhering to their boundaries? For that matter, who is going to do the initial vetting to prevent the police from becoming filled with Taliban sympathizers from the start, thus invalidating the whole process?

That's a million dollar question right there, and an example of the enigma wrapped in a riddle, that is this place.

[slapout9]

That's a million dollar question right there, and an example of the enigma wrapped in a riddle, that is this place.

I'd like to know the answer to that question myself. What is this rush to put in Policeman when maybe you need Soldiers first?

[subrosa]

JarodParker- that is so funny and how clever! in some places words count more than actions.

[subrosa]

this whole initiative is based upon the underlying assumption that the villagers do not want taliban insurgents in their villages.

[Jesse9252]

this whole initiative is based upon the underlying assumption that the villagers do not want taliban insurgents in their villages.
I'm not sure if that assumption holds true. Only 24% of key districts in Afghanistan support or are sympathetic to the government. And most of those are not in the south and the east.

Increasing the amount of police could actually undermine support for the government, especially if they are drawn locally and are more likely to be implicated in corruption and warlordism. In Marja, the local police that had been in place before Operation Moshtarek were so despised that the senior Marine was actually told: "‘We’re with you. We want to help you build. We will support you. But if you bring in the cops, we will fight you till death.” So far there has been no discussion of the measures that will/should be put into place to prevent these 'new local police' from becoming just as corrupt, ineffective, and counterproductive as the 'old local police' that have been tried before.

[subrosa]

it does not have to be mutually exclusive- the villages could hate the taliban and dislike the government at the same time. specially in the south and east where the provincial government is known to be corrupt.

i thought that the actual villagers were supposed to be the new cops, so there would be no question of bringing cops in from the outside, since they would already be there. the recruits would be the villagers you described below who are already willing to fight. they would just have to be trained and armed.
i dont know how local is local in this context.

[Bob's World]

For what it's worth, my assessment is that most of the rural areas where the insurgency is the strongest (and where this SOF Village Stability Operations program is being implemented) are what I would call Self-Governed Spaces.

They really have little use for external governance (or any of the bells and whistles that come with it) of any sort. GIROA is something they rarely see, and the Taliban come down out of the mountains to make their life hell, but at least they see them. Many such villages DO want the Taliban out, but GIROA isn't there to help them do that, and they can't do it by themselves.

This is where VSO comes in. A village either stands up and pushes the Taliban out and then calls for help; or they invite us in in advance and ask for such help. Everything worked through this Self-Governing mechanisms of the Village-Tribal-Religious local leadership. We help them organize local security and bring in some small development projects; again, all through the local leadership, and all employing local labor.

Next step is to then gather up GIROA officials who are forted up back at the District Center and take them out and introduce them to their own populace. To connect the official to the legitimate, and fuse the two together in a healing process.

There are no militia armies being built to go wage war on the Taliban, that is the loud voice of ignorance in the national media and similarly loud and disconnected Bloggers and columnists. These security forces cannot do law enforcement, and are purely defensive in nature; and now, are formally under the GIROA umbrella as a legitimate, official security force.

Not very sexy, but in a few, select, critical communities it is having significant effects; many of those effects extending far beyond those small, brave communities.

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 26 Jul 10: Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces ( http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1002.pdf)

Afghan and NATO officials have increasingly focused on protecting the local population as the linchpin of defeating the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Certain steps are important to achieving this objective, such as building competent Afghan national security forces, reintegrating insurgents, countering corruption, and improving governance. This document focuses on a complementary step: leveraging local communities, especially the use of traditional policing institutions (http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Afghanistan%20A%20History%20of%20Utilization%20of% 20Tribal%20Auxiliaries.pdf), such as arbakai (http://www.crisisstates.com/download/op/OP7.pdf), chagha, and chalweshtai, to establish security and help mobilize rural Afghans against the Taliban and other insurgents.

Effectively leveraging local communities should significantly improve counterinsurgency prospects. Gaining the support of the population—especially mobilizing locals to fight insurgents, providing information on their locations and movements, and denying insurgent sanctuary in their areas—is the sine qua non of victory in counterinsurgency warfare. By tapping into tribes and other communities where grassroots resistance already exists, local defense forces can help mobilize communities simultaneously across multiple areas. The goal should be to help cause a “cascade” or “tip,” in which momentum against the Taliban becomes unstoppable. In 2010, a growing number of communities in Kandahar, Helmand, Paktia, Herat, Paktika, Day Kundi, and other provinces mobilized and fought against insurgents. These cases present significant opportunities for counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.

Successful efforts to protect the population need to include better understanding of local communities. Indeed, the Afghan and NATO governments often present the struggle as being between the Taliban and the central government in Kabul. But this dichotomy is false and is not likely to persuade rural villagers, who have never relied wholly on state institutions for law and order. Rural communities tend to be motivated by self-interest and self-sufficiency, preferring to secure their own villages rather than have outsiders do it for them. A failure to adopt an effective bottom-up effort will likely cripple counterinsurgency efforts. This analysis documents three lessons about the viability of establishing bottom-up security in Afghanistan.
Complete document at the link.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den a pointer to a Human Rights Watch report on the Afghan Local Police (ALP).

Comment:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2011/09/new-afghan-local-police-units-failing.html

Cited HRW report:http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0911webwcover.pdf

One chapter is entitled:
The Afghan Local Police:“Community Watch with AK-47s"

[Jedburgh]

FP, 27 Oct 11: Afghan Local Police: When the Solution Becomes the Problem (http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/27/afghan_local_police_when_the_solution_becomes_the_ problem)

...The ALP was launched last year by the Afghan government to recruit local units to defend remote, insecure areas of the country against insurgent threats and attacks. Recruits are nominated by a local shura council, then vetted by Afghan intelligence and trained for up to three weeks by U.S. forces. General David Petraeus, the former ISAF Commander in Afghanistan, touts the ALP as successfully thwarting the insurgency.

But this narrative is very different from the one Refugees International discovered on a recent visit to the country. In May, we traveled to Afghanistan to conduct an assessment of the humanitarian situation in the country, in light of the increasing displacement caused by conflict. During the course of our 16-day mission, we conducted over 50 interviews with displaced Afghans, local organizations, UN officials, aid workers, human rights researchers, government officials, security analysts, and journalists in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and surrounding areas. To our surprise, the rapid rollout of the ALP program was widely criticized by Afghans and humanitarian actors. Almost every single one of our interviewees highlighted the growth of the ALP and the simultaneous rise of other pro-government militias as their top concern for the security of civilians and stability in the country, particularly in the north.

Many told stories of ALP forces using their newly gained power and guns - furnished by the U.S. - to harass, intimidate, and perpetrate crimes against the very civilians they were recruited, trained, and paid to protect. Some even reported that powerful warlords were pressuring local leaders to formalize pre-existing militias into the ALP - often around tribal, ethnic or political lines - to avenge personal disputes or strengthen their influence....

[jcustis]

I need to read the article in depth, but I am already curious just how well these ALP start-ups were supervised

[Jedburgh]

RAND 18 Sep 12: Locals Rule: Historical Lessons for Creating Local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond (http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1232.pdf)

Local defense forces have played a key role in counterinsurgencies throughout the 20th century. With the recent development of the Afghan Local Police (http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/7084~v~The_Afghan_Local_Police_.pdf) (ALP) as a major part of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, lessons learned from earlier efforts to build local defense have become increasingly salient. This study examines eight cases of local defense forces used in the context of counterinsurgency in Indochina, Algeria, South Vietnam, Oman, El Salvador, Southern Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq. It covers an extensive time period (from 1945 to the present) and geographic scope, as well as a wide range of intervening countries and regimes, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, and the Soviet Union. The authors compare the lessons learned from these eight cases and apply them to the current development of the ALP (http://www.dodig.mil/SPO/Reports/DODIG-2012-109.pdf), in order to outline potential challenges and to suggest a way forward that takes into account the historical experience.