Small Wars in the "new" cash strapped Western economy

[davidbfpo]

The predicted, if not actual "crunch" on public spending in the West has appeared in other threads, but SWC have IIRC not considered what the possible impact will be on Small Wars.

An occasional SWC reader posed these questions:
I was talking this morning to someone about the future of countering extremism world wide considering we are broke. More information operations? Retrenchment? Let the Chinese "carry the can"?

Abu M has touched upon this question IMHO in this:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/06/state-coin-2010.html#comments

I hate scenarios normally as being too hypothetical and need a PPT. So imagination on for a moment please.

The 9/11 attack happens today, would the USA and allies embark on the follow-on Afghan campaign? I think not. Imagination off.

Is there such a concept and practice of cheap Small Wars? British Imperial history IMHO offers some examples, air power in Iraq between the wars and limited punitive campaigns in the NWFP / FATA up to 1947.

[William F. Owen]

Is there such a concept and practice of cheap Small Wars? British Imperial history IMHO offers some examples, air power in Iraq between the wars and limited punitive campaigns in the NWFP / FATA up to 1947.
Destroying the enemy can be done for comparatively cost. It's not hard. Worked in Oman, and could be done almost anywhere.
"Nouveau-COIN" cannot be done cheaply as it is entirely predicated on spending money on aid, and having the force level to "protect the population."

What the RAF did in Iraq could not be done today. The idea that it was even successful has recently been questioned, and not without reason.

[Chris jM]

Destroying the enemy can be done for comparatively cost. It's not hard.

Perhaps a wrong choice of words?

Destroying an enemy such as the Taleban and AQ is proving to be an extremely difficult and expensive undertaking, unless you have a different reading/ view of the situation than I do.

Defeating them could be done at far less a cost.

[William F. Owen]

Perhaps a wrong choice of words?

Destroying an enemy such as the Taleban and AQ is proving to be an extremely difficult and expensive undertaking, unless you have a different reading/ view of the situation than I do.

Defeating them could be done at far less a cost.
Chose my words with care. The action of destroying creates the effect of defeating.

[Chris jM]

Chose my words with care. The action of destroying creates the effect of defeating.

Makes sense, then, so I'll stand the semantic police down on this one...

... but I will have my logic cops probe a little further, out of curiosity's sake.

Doesn't your complete reliance on destruction limit your options? If you can defeat an enemy through deterrence, then that is legitimate is it not? Is there any meaning behind your insistence on 'destroy' that you would choose it above the more holistic, all-encompassing term of defeat?

[William F. Owen]

my logic cops probe a little further, out of curiosity's sake.
I bet you say that to all the girls!

Doesn't your complete reliance on destruction limit your options? If you can defeat an enemy through deterrence, then that is legitimate is it not? Is there any meaning behind your insistence on 'destroy' that you would choose it above the more holistic, all-encompassing term of defeat?
It is only a reliance because that is what armed forces do.
I can only deter him, if I do stuff that does actually deter him.
Killing - and specifically killing - is a very necessary part of that. Capture also works if the period of detention is long enough to deter as well.

"Own KIA" is the most powerful policy driver I know of. That was why the US left Vietnam, the Lebanon, and Mogadishu. It was why the Soviets left Afghanistan.

You will not win if you kill/capture one bad guy a month. You have to kill in numbers and with a frequency that causes the breaking of will. I strongly believe that is it far from impossible and actually more doable than we wish to admit, because we wish to focus on being "a force for good," instead of the instruments of destruction to set forth policy.

Do not kill the population. You need to make sure the only folks doing that are the bad guys, and yes you can differentiate the population from the bad guys. It requires skill and intelligence. It has been done many time before. .
The population will support the winning side. They always do.

Yes, make alliances and allies, IF that helps you find and kill the enemy -

[slapout9]

Chose my words with care. The action of destroying creates the effect of defeating.

Wilf, I always new you were a secret believer in EBO.:D:D

[Ken White]

..."Own KIA" is the most powerful policy driver I know of. That was why the US left Vietnam, the Lebanon, and Mogadishu...True but all those departures were due to an (IMO) unreasoned -- and in hindsight, unnecessary -- fear of domestic political defeat by policy makers. That does not negate your point, it amplifies it and allows me to point out that domestic politics in all nations drive international actions.

That seemingly obvious point is important for strategic and operational planners who often either forget that factor or overemphasize it without attempting to counter and obviate it and thus provide policy advice or plans that are flawed...

[William F. Owen]

That seemingly obvious point is important for strategic and operational planners who often either forget that factor or overemphasize it without attempting to counter and obviate it and thus provide policy advice or plans that are flawed...
I may even have to quote you... with due attribution!

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf:

Thought it was interesting that at no time did you mention shoveling billions of unaccountable aid to "friendly" political allies, building roads, schools, etc...

Just killing bad guys, using intelligence (and perhaps wisdom) as a discriminator between good and bad guys. What an interesting new concept for cost effective small wars.

First off, however, there is an army of contractors to feed. What does your concept have to do with them?

Second, both Churchill and Saddam decided that the best way, for example, to cost effectively deal with the Kurds was to gas them, bomb them, and machine gun them from the air.

Their "enemy" was not a bad guy or group of bad guys in a sub-population, but the sub-population itself. Isn't the bad guy to be killed defined by the problem you are trying to solve?

So, isn't the first cost effective step to figure out how to keep the military's role in complex problems limited until you can identify a particular problem, and problem definition, to which costly military solutions can be applied effectively.

Saving money in small wars, in my book, would be by better focusing solutions to fit the problems presented rather than throwing costly solutions on the ground to then seek out problems they could solve.

Examples: Using local, indigenous, or closely related (language, religion, custom) civilian, governance and policing folks to solve as many problems as possible, backed up by relentless military retaliation if they are screwed around with, or something goes bad. That was how the Brits and Pakistanis, for example, had traditionally controlled tribal areas in and around the Durand.

Distilled down, it is not unlike what the Central Highland strategies were all about in Viet Nam (not the whole war).

How did we get into this bewildering situation of pouring billions in cash into countries to, in effect, create much of the problems that we then try to overcome by billions of more dollars, and, in the end, try to tens of thousands of soldiers into to try to unscramble.

Cost effectiveness and targeted killing of bad guys are not synonymous with COIN, nation building and large deployments. Are they?

[William F. Owen]

Steve The Planner Not sure if we agree, but in rough order>

a.) Yes, I want to kill bad guys and not the good guys. The discriminator is their actions. Their armed opposition to your policy.
b.) No contractors, and certainly not western ones. At best as few as possible, because there may be some requirements for them, for logistics.
c.) If there was not a problem, the Army would not be there. You do not deploy until you have a mission. You should not deploy in the hope of finding one. It isn't complex.
d.) Absolutely use indigenous and local assets and resources, across the board. Absolutely invest in your allies.

All this does require wisdom and skill. Building schools, conducting social work, and "Nation building" are not things that win wars. They are things you do once the war is won and it is done by folks that are not soldiers.

....but you can conduct some activity to alleviate suffering, and gain allies, but it has to be selective and it has to have a military purpose, so you do if for mutual benefit. You do not go around handing out rice that the locals will give to the bad guys.

This stuff really is Warfare 101. Nothing original or insightful.

[Steve the Planner]

Right. Warfare 101.

If only, in Afghanistan, we could unscramble all these folks with bold, interesting transformational political visions from the core problems---then solve those.

The latest perplexing interpretation I recently read as the basis for COIN was that since it is politically incorrect to challenge AWK and central government corruption and ineffectiveness, we should, instead, strengthen local governance so it can demand regional and national transformation. Sounds like a long, complex, and costly way around the barn. Whatever the problem is, COIN can solve it, I guess.

Of course, the Afghan consultative jirga (whatever that exactly is) resulted in a central government commitment to hold the "olive branch" to the "angry brothers" who, on paper, the US seems to think are the "bad guys." This followed by key anti-Taliban Defense/Intel dismissals, and plans to create amnesties and opportunities for the "brothers."

Brothers, Bad Guys...So hard to keep track.

[Dayuhan]

a.) Yes, I want to kill bad guys and not the good guys. The discriminator is their actions. Their armed opposition to your policy.


Again there seems to be a sort of reflexive assumption that anyone who opposes our policy is a bad guy who should be killed. What if people are opposing our policy because our policy is stupid? Is there any one of us who is prepared to say that our policies are by definition smart?

If we're going to address small wars from the perspective of economy, shouldn't the first and most necessary step be to review the policy?

To start with... in any given case, what are the objectives of the exercise? Are they clear, immediate, achievable, practical, and above all are they absolutely necessary? Are they sufficiently compatible with local objectives and beliefs that we aren't going to find ourselves fighting a whole pissed off populace who just doesn't want to be messed with?

If the answer to all of the above isn't a clear and unequivocal "yes", we can save a lot of money and trouble by just not going there, or not staying there, as appropriate..

[William F. Owen]

Again there seems to be a sort of reflexive assumption that anyone who opposes our policy is a bad guy who should be killed. What if people are opposing our policy because our policy is stupid? Is there any one of us who is prepared to say that our policies are by definition smart?
Huh? OK, it is their violent opposition to your policy that requires the application of armed force, and why would you set forth policy you know is stupid? Did anyone ever do that? Did anyone ever sort forth policy they knew or believed to be "un-ethical?"

Yes the policy maybe stupid. So what? Run for office and get elected.
They, the enemy, would not be opposing it if they thought it a good idea would they?

My concern in the setting forth of policy, via violence because the policy is violently opposed. If my policy maker says this is not a military problem, then why are we discussing it? The question has to be predicated on the need to set forth the policy and that policy is violently opposed.

Yes, I agree, you can save lots of money by simply doing nothing. How does that provide anything useful or any insight?

[Dayuhan]

why would you set forth policy you know is stupid? Did anyone ever do that?

Revise the question slightly: did anyone ever set forth stupid policy?

Corrolary question: has anyone ever burned extraordinary quantities of money, time, lives, etc in pursuit of stupid policy?


If my policy maker says this is not a military problem, then why are we discussing it?

We're discussing it because policy makers don't always make smart policy, and the first step in the pursuit of policy is to assess the policy to be sure it makes sense. If our policy is to stick our head in a hornet's nest and kill all the hornets who want to sting us but not the ones who don't, then we don't need to find the most economical way of killing only nasty hornets. We need a new policy.


Yes, I agree, you can save lots of money by simply doing nothing. How does that provide anything useful or any insight?

You can also waste a lot of money trying to do something that you don't need to do and probably can't do.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

You hit on it in the last line: What is it that can be done on a budget and schedule that is in the process of a radical downward shrink.

Since 9/11, there was a holiday from economic reality, and the cost is catching up.

How to do the most important things with that limited pie, in the places where it will have the most effect is a very different problem than: we are here so we must do something with the tools we brought.

Jonathan Alter's book covers the recent Obama review of Afghanistan, where Gen's Petreaus and McCrystal promised that if he committed to the COIN strategy and troop build up, they would be done before the start of the next Presidential election cycle. That was a civilian policy maker reacting to a military promise (Cross my Heart and Hope to Die), which he has now staked his political future on, rightly or wrongly... and the promise and plan keeps shifting like the sands.

I have always seen Afghanistan in the context of a confrontation of the new world to a very old vendetta based local culture whose time may or may not be done. Either way, surrounding development, population, and geo-political pressure continues to drive inexorably the conflict.

One obvious alternative is to substantially boost the Non-Pashtun population, and let it crush the Pashtuns and disable them after some ten or so years of crushing hardships (stop investing, stop aid, kill whenever you can). But that result is obviously undesirable, so we get dazzled with the idea of remarkably transforming things as if, like the US, everything turns on a dime. Just doesn't work that way.

Sure, it is the tenth year in Afghanistan, but most of that was low-intensity, low-commitment. Now, we want to do everything fast, including curing years of emerging defects in our strategy. Why? Because domestic patience, and other demands are all catching up. What to do?

[William F. Owen]

Corrolary question: has anyone ever burned extraordinary quantities of money, time, lives, etc in pursuit of stupid policy?
Of course, but again I submit no one has ever set forth policy they know to be stupid. People do what they see benefit in doing. Policy is always predicated on a pursuit of benefit to ones self/party/people/nation. LBJ did not embroil the US in Vietnam because he thought it was a dumb thing to do. Hitler did not invade Russia thinking "This is stupid," and nor did the Japanese attack Pearl Harbour in the belief that it made no strategic sense to do so.

We're discussing it because policy makers don't always make smart policy, and the first step in the pursuit of policy is to assess the policy to be sure it makes sense.
OK, but those are all things that take place in terms of formulating policy. Its part of the policy making process. The job of soldiers is to set it forth. This creates two basic questions.
a.) Can this be set forth using violence?
b.) What is the cost of doing so? - for cost, read negatives. Things that would undermine the policy.

Soldiers have a duty to point out that the policy may not be achievable via the military instrument. That's it. The second you bounce around with soldiers suggesting policies that might be possible, you end up with the mess we have today of soldiers not being able to tell the difference between strategy and policy. If you doubt me, go and watch the videos of the last big SSI conference.

You can also waste a lot of money trying to do something that you don't need to do and probably can't do.
So you write the report saying that. The Policy maker probably doesn't care about your opinion. He has a policy.

[Dayuhan]

Of course, but again I submit no one has ever set forth policy they know to be stupid.

Ok, so we agree that policies are sometimes stupid. That's a start. Of course the people making the decisions didn't know at the time that they were stupid, but that's often not because they couldn't know, but because they chose not to know.

One way to assure bad policy decisions is to stop questioning decisions and to stop challenging the assumptions behind policy.


Its part of the policy making process. The job of soldiers is to set it forth.

Fine. Are you a soldier? I am not, and I see no reason not to question policy. Nor do I see any reason not to point out that the first step in making our war-making practice compatible with financial constraints is to apply decisions that call for the application of military force to a great deal more scrutiny than recent decisions appear to have received.

If we are mucking about in a foreign country in pursuit of a policy, and the populace or a substantial portion thereof finds that policy objectionable enough to warrant violent resistance, are you not prepared to even consider the possibility that the policy is the problem?


The Policy maker probably doesn't care about your opinion. He has a policy.

I know very well that the policy makers don't care about my opinion, or yours. Neither do those who make strategy or tactics. We are amusing ourselves here, not exerting influence.

[William F. Owen]

One way to assure bad policy decisions is to stop questioning decisions and to stop challenging the assumptions behind policy.
No argument there. You should care about politics, because politics does care about you.

Fine. Are you a soldier? I am not, and I see no reason not to question policy.
Not a soldier anymore and a remarkably mediocre one when I was. As I say, you should question policy - BUT - you are entering the realm of political argument. Arguing about politics is, to my mind, a pretty fruitless exercise.
My concern is "strategy and tactics." Tis what I study and write about. It stands entirely separate from my political beliefs - which I take care not to inflict on other, unless forced, as in denied a legitimate status.

If we are mucking about in a foreign country in pursuit of a policy, and the populace or a substantial portion thereof finds that policy objectionable enough to warrant violent resistance, are you not prepared to even consider the possibility that the policy is the problem?
OK, but those are entirely political opinions. What actions make the US more or less safe is not a set of objective conditions. It is opinions based in political belief. Strategy and tactics stands apart from that.

We are amusing ourselves here, not exerting influence.
My comment was about policy makes in general and not your or my opinion specifically, but I concur. Neither of us is going to alter the price of bread in Khandahar anytime soon.

...but I do know that some of what gets written here does make serving men think, and some influential people do read this. Be assured, I do not delude myself as to the merit of anything I write. I use SWJ as a mental running track, to hone arguments and ideas, and am very grateful to those who challenge me in a useful way.

[Dayuhan]

you are entering the realm of political argument. Arguing about politics is, to my mind, a pretty fruitless exercise.
My concern is "strategy and tactics." Tis what I study and write about.

I study and occasionally write about policy. Entirely pointlessly, as far as I can tell: to the best of my knowledge nothing I've written has ever had a vestigial shred of impact on actual policy.

I'm not sure that strategy and tactics stand apart from policy. If policy is not sensible, doesn't discussion of strategy and tactics become sort of pointless? Policy is where it starts: if we get that wrong, we're going to have a damnably difficult time getting anything else right. "Assume a policy" seems to me a rather shaky basis for the sort of discussion that goes on here.

If we've entered a situation and things are not going as we planned and expected, doesn't it make sense to start our reassessment with a review of policy?


I use SWJ as a mental running track, to hone arguments and ideas

As do I, though realistically to no end beyond my own amusement.

[William F. Owen]

I'm not sure that strategy and tactics stand apart from policy. If policy is not sensible, doesn't discussion of strategy and tactics become sort of pointless?
Excellent question. If the policy cannot be made to work, using all instruments of power, then it is probably a dumb policy - The US periods Prohibition being a good example.
I think "Nation building" is probably in the same bracket - BUT IF that is the policy, what do you do about those opposing it using violence?

IMO, the distinction between policy and strategy is vital to getting people to understand what strategy is.

[Dayuhan]

Excellent question. If the policy cannot be made to work, using all instruments of power, then it is probably a dumb policy - The US periods Prohibition being a good example.

I would qualify that and say "all acceptable or reasonable instruments of power". The US might have succeeded in imposing prohibition if they'd shot drinkers on the spot, and we might succeed in imposing the governance we desire on Afghanistan by killing anyone who doesn't accept it... that doesn't make those instruments of power acceptable or reasonable. In general, if a policy can only be imposed through the use of exorbitant force, it's probably not a good policy. If the cost of imposing a policy exceeds the benefits the policy is supposed to produce, it's probably not a good policy.

If we're imposing policy on another country (something I personally think is generally not a great idea) and a significant portion of the populace objects to our policy, it's a pretty good sign that the policy needs work.


I think "Nation building" is probably in the same bracket

We agree on something... will wonders never cease?


BUT IF that is the policy, what do you do about those opposing it using violence?

That depends on why they're opposing it. If they are opposing the policy because they perceive it as a threat to their interests and using violence because they see no other available option, it may be possible to adjust the program so that neither their interests nor ours are necessarily compromised, or at least so that they see a reasonable prospect of peaceful resolution. People don't generally go to the considerable trouble of fighting without some reason. If the reason can be removed without compromising the goals of the policy, the fight can be settled without having to run about the place slaying and smiting. After all, it's not entirely reasonable to expect residents of other countries to submit to our policies: certainly they have no automatic obligation to do so. If we're in another country the onus is on us to adjust our policies to make them acceptable to the locals, not on the locals to submit to us.

It may be necessary to kill people; it may not be. Ideally killing would be the last resort, not the first. And if we're killing people who believe with reasonable cause that they are fighting to defend themselves or their interests, that again pushes us pack to a critical need to review and probably alter the policy. If our policy requires us to kill people who are doing exactly what we would do in their shoes, it's probably a bad policy.



IMO, the distinction between policy and strategy is vital to getting people to understand what strategy is.

Agreed. Also vital to getting people to understand what policy is, and how it affects strategy.

[William F. Owen]

I would qualify that and say "all acceptable or reasonable instruments of power".
Would anyone ever employ instruments of power that they thought unreasonable or unacceptable? Judgement as to reason and acceptability is a political opinion.

If we're imposing policy on another country (something I personally think is generally not a great idea) and a significant portion of the populace objects to our policy, it's a pretty good sign that the policy needs work.
Well that's the reason countries go to war with each other. Conflicts come from policies. If you are prepared to kill to set forth policy, you do not care what the other side thinks.
What if the vast majority of Iraqis thought Kuwait should be part of Iraq?

It may be necessary to kill people; it may not be. Ideally killing would be the last resort, not the first.
Agreed. Killing is a last resort, and but also one that can be forced upon you. Once it is, it has to be done effectively, and with the objective of breaking the will of the other side to persist in that course of action.

If our policy requires us to kill people who are doing exactly what we would do in their shoes, it's probably a bad policy.
Everyone who has ever fought against the US has had a very good reason for doing so, in their own eyes.

[Dayuhan]

Would anyone ever employ instruments of power that they thought unreasonable or unacceptable? Judgement as to reason and acceptability is a political opinion.

Nations have been known to employ instruments of power that their own populace thought unreasonable or unacceptable. That's generally not sustainable, at least in a democracy.

Yes, such judgments are a political matter. They are also critical to success and they demand consideration. I see no reason why issues of politics or policy should be excluded from this discussion. They are in fact the subject of the discussion. If we want to bring the practice of war within realistic budgetary constraints we must start with policy adjustments.


Well that's the reason countries go to war with each other. Conflicts come from policies. If you are prepared to kill to set forth policy, you do not care what the other side thinks.
What if the vast majority of Iraqis thought Kuwait should be part of Iraq?

Are we at war with Afghanistan? Is the populace of Afghanistan "the other side"? For better or worse, when we impose ourselves on another nation's internal politics and try to establish a government that cannot survive without popular consent, we'd better care what that populace thinks, whether or not they are "the other side".

If Iraqis thought that Kuwait should be part of Iraq and Kuwaitis thought otherwise, we would be inclined to respect the views of the Kuwaitis, at least as far as Kuwait goes. It's bit easier to figure out when we deal with conflict among states. That's not always what we're doing.

Again, if we don't get the policy end straight we end up assigning military forces goals that cannot be achieved by military force and may not be achievable by any means. If we do that, no amount of strategy or tactics is going to salvage the situation.

[William F. Owen]

They are in fact the subject of the discussion. If we want to bring the practice of war within realistic budgetary constraints we must start with policy adjustments.
I think the best I can say here is wars are expensive. Don't fight unless...

Are we at war with Afghanistan? Is the populace of Afghanistan "the other side"?
Could be you picked a side in a Civil War that you intervened in? ...or didn't...

Again, if we don't get the policy end straight we end up assigning military forces goals that cannot be achieved by military force and may not be achievable by any means. If we do that, no amount of strategy or tactics is going to salvage the situation.
Exactly my point. Show me the policy, and we can then discuss the strategy. :D

[Dayuhan]

I think the best I can say here is wars are expensive. Don't fight unless...

That was the point I was trying to make in the first place. "Unless" the objectives are clear, immediate, achievable, practical, and above all are they absolutely necessary... and sufficiently compatible with local objectives and beliefs that we aren't going to find ourselves fighting a whole pissed off populace who just doesn't want to be messed with.

If they aren't maybe better not to go in the first place, especially if money is an issue.


Could be you picked a side in a Civil War that you intervened in? ...or didn't...

Or we created a side that didn't exist until we came along, and for some reason thought everyone would just go along with it...


Exactly my point. Show me the policy, and we can then discuss the strategy. :D

So we agree: start with a policy that makes sense. That's what has to be discussed and resolved before trying to aply strategy or tactics.

[William F. Owen]

So we agree: start with a policy that makes sense. That's what has to be discussed and resolved before trying to aply strategy or tactics.
If the world were logical and rational, you'd be right.
I absolutely agree that you cannot do strategy without policy. I am less convinced that folks can have sensible policy discussions.

[Dayuhan]

If the world were logical and rational, you'd be right. I absolutely agree that you cannot do strategy without policy. I am less convinced that folks can have sensible policy discussions.

Sensible is possibly too much to expect. One might reasonably aspire to reduce the level of stupidity to manageable proportions, and thus to diminish the dimensions of the apparently inevitable sinkhole that strategists and tacticians have to dig themselves out of.

[Entropy]

Interesting discussion. With respect the the US, I think the biggest problem we have right now is the lack of any kind of coherent national vision for the future except, I guess, to try to remain the sole global superpower. At least during the Cold War there was a purpose - a "struggle" which partially guided us. Now? Nothing that I can see except to maintain a kind of status-quo, though I admit I may be completely missing something. We haven't really been forced, as a nation, to reevaluate where we're at and our priorities. That will change given our government financial unsustainability.

[Ken White]

Interesting discussion. With respect the the US, I think the biggest problem we have right now is the lack of any kind of coherent national vision for the future except, I guess, to try to remain the sole global superpower.Not that, I fully agree with that and that lack of coherent vision is due to our electoral process and political system -- but there is broad agreement that we should try to maintain position to the extent possible within the mood swings that are bound to occur.
...At least during the Cold War there was a purpose - a "struggle" which partially guided us.That's the quibble point. I agree that there was a purpose (to remain atop the heap) but the belief that we had a coherent plan and policy throughout the 1947-1999 period is way wrong...

We had a policy of containment and little more, each electoral cycle introduced changes in funding (and thus direction), strategies, policies and effort. The only real difference in then versus now is that there was one overt (if nominal only) threat, one massive nation on which to focus.
Now? Nothing that I can see except to maintain a kind of status-quo, though I admit I may be completely missing something. We haven't really been forced, as a nation, to reevaluate where we're at and our priorities. That will change given our government financial unsustainability.Heh. I wouldn't bet on that. We are the world master at cobbling together band aids to make patches...:rolleyes:

We'll bumble along until there's a true existential threat. Fear not, one will appear. They always do. Then we'll get squared away for a bit before we drift back into naval gazing (pun intended). It's the American way, cyclical chaos. :D

[Dayuhan]

Quote:
...At least during the Cold War there was a purpose - a "struggle" which partially guided us.


That's the quibble point. I agree that there was a purpose (to remain atop the heap) but the belief that we had a coherent plan and policy throughout the 1947-1999 period is way wrong...

I don't see any disagreement there. He didn't say anything about a coherent plan or policy, he spoke of a struggle providing partial guidance. "Partial guidance" and "purpose" are not so far apart.

Of course our system does not lend itself to long term policy. That's both strength and weakness: we veer about a bit, but we can also adapt or discard policies that are unsuccessful or no longer appropriate.

I would say that the "sole superpower" ambition needs to be adapted or discarded; it's neither desirable nor possible. An attempt to maintain sole military dominance without sole economic dominance - which we have not got and will probably never again have - is only going to end with us nailing ourselves to a fiscal crucifix. The challenge is not the maintenance of sole superpower status, but the development of a realistic strategy for advancing and protecting our long-term interests in a multipolar world.

[Ken White]

during the Cold War were homogenized and relatively consistent, that we might have had a 'strategy' -- we did not. They were not, they were all over the place. Nor am I saying Entropy isn't aware of that, I just tossed out a reminder...
Of course our system does not lend itself to long term policy. That's both strength and weakness: we veer about a bit, but we can also adapt or discard policies that are unsuccessful or no longer appropriate.You know that and I know that. Thousands if not millions of Americans know that including some in high places. Unfortunately, there is plenty of evidence that others folks in high places either do not know that or often attempt to willfully disregard it.

I simply like to remind everyone of that reality often enough to be tedious. Never know when someone who reads it may get in a policy position and need to -- and hopefully not fail to -- recall that harsh little fact of life... :D
I would say that the "sole superpower" ambition needs to be adapted or discarded; it's neither desirable nor possible.I would go with adapted -- which it is doing and will do as it has for almost 100 years. Discarding it is likely to attract Jackals, Hyenas and Vultures. Regrettable but fact. :eek:
An attempt to maintain sole military dominance without sole economic dominance - which we have not got and will probably never again have - is only going to end with us nailing ourselves to a fiscal crucifix.I do not think we're trying to do the military thing; effective deterrence and dominance are two different things. Need the deterrence bit, forcefully applied, else you get in the position that failing to deter from 1979 until 2001 put us in.

Clinton, Rubin and Summers tried the economic thing and we can see where that got us. I agree with you that is not going to happen and it should not.
The challenge is not the maintenance of sole superpower status, but the development of a realistic strategy for advancing and protecting our long-term interests in a multipolar world.I do not think we trying to maintain "sole superpower" status (though a few foolish people in government may harbor that dream; they're a minority). As I've said many times, we do not do strategy; grand strategy, which is what you're after -- that requires continuity we do not have. We can do long term policy and we do that and I see no evidence that it is not trying to adapt to the multipolar world that is very similar to the one into which I was born and spent formative years. That's the real quibble -- the Cold War was a period of great artificiality it appeared to be a bi-polar world (wasn't but appeared to be...) and every one got spoiled and forgot how to act in the multipolar world. We're slowly (too slowly IMO) figuring it out -- but we are NOT going to give much more than we absolutely have to. And we should not. That too is a facet of multipolarity...:cool: ;)

[Dayuhan]

I would go with adapted -- which it is doing and will do as it has for almost 100 years. Discarding it is likely to attract Jackals, Hyenas and Vultures. Regrettable but fact. :eek:

Very true, and I certainly wouldn't advocate discarding "sole superpower" and moving to "anonymous member of the pack". I thought more of discarding "sole superpower" in favor of "large and potentially aggressive member of the pack, not wisely messed with".

Sole superpower is just too demanding, we'll bleed ourselves dry if we try to maintain that. This does not mean we have to emasculate ourselves.

[Ken White]

...of discarding "sole superpower" in favor of "large and potentially aggressive member of the pack, not wisely messed with".I just hope we can be that smart. :wry: