Influencing and Information Operations

[William F. Owen]

Correct, although the major failings were at formation HQ level training. At all levels the training and understanding of individuals and teams in Influence Ops was terrible and our ability to harness money as a weapon system correspondingly woeful.
Please do not tell me that you have brought into Influence Ops. It's twaddle of the worst sort.

[Ken White]

I do know from harsh experience they will believe little or nothing you say, take all you offer, ask for more and change little if at all. Many will even change to harden their opposition to you... :wry:

Not to mention that your opponents, generally decentralized with far less bureaucracy and no over cautious senior people to placate plus the ability to use terror and intimidation will generally out-influence you... :rolleyes:

[Red Rat]

Please do not tell me that you have brought into Influence Ops. It's twaddle of the worst sort.

There could be a whole different thread starting here...;)

It depends on what you see Influence Ops being a means to an end or an end in itself. I err towards the role of armed forces being to kill the enemy thereby either solving the issue (you can't have a conflict if one side to the conflict no longer exists) or creating the necessary conditions whereby other organs of state can step in and start to solve the conflict. On that analysis then Influence Ops is a means to an end.

If on the other hand you regard the focused use of violence as one of several 'Influence' tools (the - AQ does Influence Operations with a kinetic element' analysis) then Influence becomes the end in itself with use of force one of the means.

I don't think you can write off the full panoply of Influence ACtivities and I also think that we (UK Armed Forces plc) remain mired in confusion as to what we want from Influence Activities at all levels; and by staffing (in true British fashion) with sometimes enthusiastic amateurs we do what little we do badly...:rolleyes:

By Influence Activities/Ops I certainly do not mean that we can apply pressure or inducements with any degree of certainty as to what the 'influencing effect' will be (if x then y); most of us have problems understanding our wives let alone strangers in a foreign culture.

[Ken White]

This thread has been initiated at the suggestion of Red Rat in the Post just above. To start the thread, these two links have some background information:

Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom – What Went Wrong? (.pdf) (http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/cox.pdf).

Air University Cyberspace and Information Operations Study Center (http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/).

Here are links to previous Blog Posts or Threads on the topic from the SWJ Archives:

Here are links to earlier Threads on the topic that are in the Council Archives:

Who's Running the information War (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=95514&postcount=1).

DoD Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=27561#post27561).

Winning the Ground Battles but Losing the Information War (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91679&postcount=1)

Pentagon Reviewing Strategic Information Operations (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=89918&postcount=1).

Newest evolution of FM 3-13, Information (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=67078#post67078).

Consider the posts of Wilf, Red Rat and I above and then share your thoughts on coalition ability or lack thereof. Comments from practicing FA 30 and other IO types welcome... :D

[Bob's World]

If one doesn't understand the role of ideology in insurgency, then they are not likely to understand how to employ information in support of the counterinsurgent either.

Consider:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/46-jones.pdf

[William F. Owen]

.
I don't think you can write off the full panoply of Influence ACtivities and I also think that we (UK Armed Forces plc) remain mired in confusion as to what we want from Influence Activities at all levels; and by staffing (in true British fashion) with sometimes enthusiastic amateurs we do what little we do badly...:rolleyes:
Based on that, I think we can! :D
I just re-read The UK COIN Manual, Army Code 71876, 2009. The Chapter on Influence activity is painful. It seems not to understand that the best way to gain support is to win. Support does not create power. Power creates support.
People come on side when it's clear you are the winning team. That is the only influence you want to have.

most of us have problems understanding our wives let alone strangers in a foreign culture.
Amen. So why try and employ the same ideas as you would canvassing for a political party or selling washing powder to warfare?

[Backwards Observer]

Welcome To Your Nightmare (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQtB-AF41p8)

[Ken White]

I question whether my subject / title just above isn't an oxymoron. To use the vernacular, Ain't sure you can get there from here. More correctly, I'm unsure the US can get there...
If one doesn't understand the role of ideology in insurgency, then they are not likely to understand how to employ information in support of the counterinsurgent either...At that link, you list five points to which I provide five counterpoints ;):
1. Insurgent ideology is largely disposable, and any particular message is useful only so long as it binds the populace to the cause, and the counterinsurgent is also either unwilling or unable to co-opt it.True. However, a third party has little to no leverage in countering the insurgent message for numerous reasons.
2. The insurgent only has to tell the populace what they want to hear, the counterinsurgent must actually perform in providing the populace what they need.Again true; again a third party has little sway in providing the populace of the host nation goods or services or forcing host nation performance.
3. There are two steps to an effective counter-ideology program:
-- Compete a superior ideology with the populace in the marketplace of ideas, and
-- Assess the populace, and co-opt or agree with the insurgent where logical.Again true, my comments above apply.
4. Actions speak louder than words. Ones major operations are their true Strategic Communications, and any official messages to describe those actions will either lend or take credibility based upon their consistency with the public’s perception of the nature of those operations.Ah, at last we get to the thread topic, information operations. :D Again I agree that you are correct -- and one more time, I cite the fact that an intervenor can suggest, assist and provide support of all sorts -- but is unlikely to be able to do the things you suggest.

Specifically, an intervenor will be unable perform actions -- or provide information -- rapidly enough if for no other reason due to the coordination required with the host government.

My question of you, then, is how does an intervening nation arrive at the point of being able to influence the population of the host nation by using the counter actions you list?
5. U.S. ideology holds that when government fails, insurgency is both the right and the duty of the populace.That may be correct in the eyes of some in the US, others may not agree. Regardless, I'm unsure that it has anything to do with Information Operations or is the policy of the US Government...

I do not disagree with the thrust of your linked paper. However, I do not see how the counters you suggest, the examples you provide, apply to our current efforts in Afghanistan. We could apply them if we had a domestic insurgency but we cannot apply them to the insurgencies of others. While I understand the linkage of information operations to counter ideology, I do not understand how the US can apply your prescriptions elsewhere in the world, particularly in nations with significant economic and structural problems.

Further, I question how we, as large, cumbersome and bureaucratic as we are, can ever be expected to succeed in besting a lighter, more decentralized and agile opponent in many facets of information operations. We can certainly outperform many opponents (including the current crew) in some aspects but in the defeat of an ideology, I'm curious to know how you would address our lack flexibility and speed issues?

[Dayuhan]

If one doesn't understand the role of ideology in insurgency, then they are not likely to understand how to employ information in support of the counterinsurgent either.

Consider:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/46-jones.pdf

I'm not quite sure how this fits with the insurgencies we're actually trying to manage today:


Bin Laden, on the other hand, is no Messiah. He uses an ideology infused with religious overtones to rally the populace to rise up for political change for the same reason so many leaders who have gone before him have: it works. The question then for the counterinsurgent, is how to defuse that message without affronting the valid religious beliefs of the very populace whose support, as the true center of gravity in any insurgency, we are battling for.

I can't see that Bin Laden's ideology has ever inspired any populace anywhere to "rise up for political change". It has inspired small numbers of people to commit and directly support acts of violence, but that's a very differnet thing. The "insurgencies" in Iraq and Afghanistan were not about Bin Laden's message rallying populaces to rise up for political change. They were driven by local narratives and local issues; bin Laden may have used them for his own ends but he and his ideology are beneficiaries, not the cause, of those insurgencies. What message are we actually fighting in Afghanistan? Is it "establish an Islamic caliphate dominated by Wahhabi and/or Deobandi beliefs" or is it "drive the foreigners out of Afghanistan"?

To some extent there is certainly an ideological component to insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan and Iraq, but the US has no duty, right, or capacity to launch competing ideologies into the local marketplaces of ideas.

In Afghanistan I suspect the core of the ideological battle lies in the struggle to frame the conflict. The US is trying to frame the war as an insurgency, the Taliban fighting to overthrow the Karzai Government with the US "doing FID" in support of the Karzai Government's COIN. The Taliban want to frame the conflict not as an insurgency, but as resistance to foreign occupation: Taliban vs the invaders, us vs them. I'm not at all sure we're winning that particular fight.

[Bob's World]

Further, I question how we, as large, cumbersome and bureaucratic as we are, can ever be expected to succeed in besting a lighter, more decentralized and agile opponent in many facets of information operations. We can certainly outperform many opponents (including the current crew) in some aspects but in the defeat of an ideology, I'm curious to know how you would address our lack flexibility and speed issues?

We need to quit chasing the ball, position ourselves wisely, and allow our opponents to do the majority of the running around. If I am "countering" I am always chasing my opponent. If I am "competing" I am playing my own game, and making him come to me.

[Ken White]

resolutely opposed to the expenditure of ergs, that makes sense. As OpSec is a component of Information Warfare, I guess we don't need to go into exhaustive detail about ways to do that. ;)

However, there are two non violating questions I'll ask.

How do we balance the need for PsyOps and Info coloration with the need for legitimacy, honesty and more clarity in news releases for both domestic and international consumption?

How do we provide better institutional agility to impede the opponents flexibility advantage?

[Dayuhan]

How do we balance the need for PsyOps and Info coloration with the need for legitimacy, honesty and more clarity in news releases for both domestic and international consumption?

One of the problems we have with things like "info coloration" in disordered environments is that we tend to work through official media, which people in these environments have for the most part ceased to trust. They trust their own networks, variants of the old bush telegraph, and we've little capacity to influence that.

Our info ops often shoot themselves in the proverbial foot by vastly underestimating the sophistication, access to information, and ability to detect BS that prevail among the populace. It's harder to fool people than we sometimes seem to think. I once read a comment (on OEF/Philippines) from an American offcier to the effect that we needed to conduct information ops so that the populace of Basilan would know how cruel the Abu Sayyaf are. That was a bit of a laugh out lou moment: the citizens of Basilan already know all there is to know about the Abu Sayyaf. Many of them know more about the Abu Sayyaf than the CIA does. It's not a big island, and word gets around.

Again re the Philippines, another point from the referenced article that could use clarification... and another example of how our interpretation of information ops can vary with perception.


Recognizing that actions speak louder than words, the current Western message is dominated by our operations in Iraq. One of the most notable aspects of U.S. actions in Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, is that because the operations there are so clearly consistent with the West’s message, that it not only sends a powerful Strategic Communication throughout South East Asia, it has also proven to be quite resilient to regular attacks by various Muslim and Philippine media. Applying what is termed the “Indirect Approach,” no U.S. actions are done unilaterally, no U.S. bases have been built, and most importantly, nationalist insurgents are recognized as distinct from terrorist organizations, and all actions, be they counterterrorist or counterinsurgency, are done by, through and with the forces of the government of the Philippines.

The picture is a bit more complex than that. Attacks on the US presence from the mainstream (Manila-based) media and intelligentsia are dominated by the left, which has little popular credibility; they're loud, but nobody listens. The broader populace in the Christian north views the Muslim populace as an uncontrollable and irretrievably violent blight that needs to be brought under control by the harshest available methods ("it's the only language they understand". This audience is happy to get any possible help and if anything thinks we haven't gone far enough: many would be perfectly delighted to see the US go in en masse and put the boot down.

On the other side, the US presence in Basilan in particular has won widespread approval from the Muslim populace, not because of projects and funds but because of a near universal recognition that Philippine forces are far less abusive when Americans are around. It is fairly ironic that with all the talk of protecting the populace from the insurgents, we have in this case won over much of the populace by protecting them from our allies.

[Ken White]

... They trust their own networks, variants of the old bush telegraph, and we've little capacity to influence that.That's been my observation -- here and abroad. Or domestically and internationally -- cell phones are neat gadgets. ;)
Our info ops often shoot themselves in the proverbial foot by vastly underestimating the sophistication, access to information, and ability to detect BS that prevail among the populace. It's harder to fool people than we sometimes seem to think.Yep. I've seen that self inflicted wound bit many times in many places. A lot of Americans tend to forget others have been playing their own variations of information games a lot longer than we have. We often come across like marketers or used car sales people, tripping every BS meter for miles around...

They're generally better at our version as well. :wry:
It is fairly ironic that with all the talk of protecting the populace from the insurgents, we have in this case won over much of the populace by protecting them from our allies.Not ironic, sad. Basilan is not the first place that's occurred. :mad:

[Red Rat]

When I have sorted out my IT issues and in-tray I will be able to give this thread the time and effort it deserves. In the meantime here is what the current UK COIN doctrine says about the importance of Influence Activities.

The Psychological Dimension : Influence Activity

The need to win and maintain popular support in the theatre of operations and at home is vital to both sides. Gaining and Maintaining Popular Support is a principle of COIN. The idea of ‘popular support’ is acknowledgement that COIN operations have a very strong psychological dimension. All actions taken by military forces, whether or not they involve the use of force, have an effect, and such effects as can be determined require to be considered as plans are drawn up and operations undertaken. In the same way, actions carried out by the enemy require careful consideration so that weaknesses and inconsistencies can be exploited.

The contest for the support of the population provides COIN with its principle distinguishing characteristic; it is concerned primarily with moulding the population’s perceptions. This is a difficult and intangible business. It is one made even more complicated when operating in a country whose culture is not well understood by the intervening forces. It places a premium on developing cultural awareness and maintaining continuity in approach. Each COIN campaign requires an agreed single vision of the future for the host nation that is consistent across any coalition or alliance. The ‘vision’ is a competing narrative, the statement of what the UK with allies and civilian partners is trying to achieve. The narrative should be stronger then the insurgent’s message, should seek to persuade rather than coerce, should emphasise security and development within its text and should be reflected in the UK information strategy.

The narrative is central to the COIN effort. The narrative must be a carefully crafted message which aims to strengthen the legitimacy and build the authority of the indigenous government in the eyes of the population. It has to resonate with the local population, use their words and imagery in a way that taps into deep cultural undercurrents. The narrative aims to convince the people that the indigenous government, supported by international forces and organisations, can deliver a better future in terms of security, justice and material wealth.

It should be assumed that every decision made, every action taken and message published or broadcast shapes the opinion of the indigenous population, the insurgent, allies and the domestic and international audiences. Commanders should focus on shaping perceptions through their activities in the physical, cognitive and information domains.

[William F. Owen]

The narrative is central to the COIN effort. The narrative must be a carefully crafted message which aims to strengthen the legitimacy and build the authority of the indigenous government in the eyes of the population. It has to resonate with the local population, use their words and imagery in a way that taps into deep cultural undercurrents. The narrative aims to convince the people that the indigenous government, supported by international forces and organisations, can deliver a better future in terms of security, justice and material wealth.
This is just rubbish. Narratives do not change peoples minds. To assume that a narrative is anything other than the story that informs the political belief is delusional. You do not, and cannot win by having a "better story." That is fatuously optimistic at best.

30 years of violence in Northern Ireland did not change either sides' "narrative." 90 years of violence in Israel/Palestine has never changed or altered either sides "narrative."

[Red Rat]

This is just rubbish. Narratives do not change peoples minds. To assume that a narrative is anything other than the story that informs the political belief is delusional. You do not, and cannot win by having a "better story."

Narratives in themselves do not change peoples minds. But I view narratives as a means by which the campaign across the lines of operation (LOO) can be articulated and understood. This is the story we want to tell - how can we tell it across the LOOs and do our actions fit into this or are they counter-productive? Then our actions and words develop coherence and people may decide to support us (based on the fact that we are winning and we will make them rich (er). :D

[William F. Owen]

But I view narratives as a means by which the campaign across the lines of operation (LOO) can be articulated and understood. This is the story we want to tell - how can we tell it across the LOOs and do our actions fit into this or are they counter-productive?
So what you are saying is the "Narrative" is the basically the Policy? - the reason why we are "there."
We put the Policy into a story form so that we can check if it is coherent with the levels of force used and all instruments of power?

So it's a story we tell to ourselves to check we are doing the right thing? OK, that's interesting. How does this have anything to with the merits IO?

Is IO really just stating the policy?

[Hacksaw]

In a sense I think yes and more regarding what IO is simply because it involves both internal and external consumption and it is damn near impossible to narrowly deliver info...

So it is in the end about consistency... and if we aren't consistent we cannot expect anyone to believe our sources/networks... along with Red Rat the sum of our activity conveys a message... if I send a foot patrol through town I am making a statement and that statement is nuanced by how the patrol is executed... what is their combat load, how do they interact with the population... I'm not talking about handing out candy because they makes us nice guys... always thought one of the worst decisions in OIF 1 was not sending a significant force through Fallja and Tikrit... nothing like a little discomfort for folks to understand that they don't control their own destinies...

I'm rambling so i'll stop here, but I disagree vehemently with what you call twaddle as a general rule... IO doctrine in US Army is actually moving towards the wholistic consistency viewpoint and less towards messages, tlaking points and the like

[William F. Owen]

So it is in the end about consistency... and if we aren't consistent we cannot expect anyone to believe our sources/networks... along with Red Rat the sum of our activity conveys a message...

That message is the policy. The other side oppose your policy. Is IO merely the desire for your actions (strategy) to match your message (policy)?

but I disagree vehemently with what you call twaddle as a general rule... IO doctrine in US Army is actually moving towards the wholistic consistency viewpoint and less towards messages, tlaking points and the like
OK, so IO doctrine is a good thing? Is that good thing "Information Operations" or "Influence Operations?" - because these are two different things.

[Hacksaw]

In most things we are in violent agreement...
As for which it depends on whose definitions you use and in the case of the US Army it seems torn as to which it will use internally and whether they will remain consistent with joint doctrine or attempt to influence AGAIN the direction that joint doc takes...

I can certainly agree that the tortuous path that this has taken has been... well toruous...

Agree it is what the policy is or what we want the policy to be in the absence of policy:eek:

and this is topic in which we can play parlour word games for as long as we wish... I just never thought any of this was NEW... as a division planner I explicitly/in parallel considered the conduct of operations regardless of intensity... if we are conducting an attack to destroy... reduce to the point that the organization can not be reconstituted (well that has an info content to it in terms of the immediate task and subsequent conduct of operations) that is probably coached in terms of defeat...

and if as a planner I'm not thinking in those terms... well I cheated the CDR and the unit

[Hacksaw]

That was tortuous and incomprehensible...

WILF I think as usual we agree...

Terms mean something and in that regard the US ARMY, and those we touch have been less than disciplined...

but...

If those who are paid to help the commander think, through both the current and future fight, if they aren't considering the info content of their operations... words, images and actions.... they aren't doing their job and they don't need an "Info Specialist"... they just need a new job

[Red Rat]

If those who are paid to help the commander think, through both the current and future fight, if they aren't considering the info content of their operations... words, images and actions.... they aren't doing their job and they don't need an "Info Specialist"... they just need a new job

Yes!!! I am still thinking through Wilf's points, but I am in violent agreement with the above!

IMHO COIN is more complex then conventional operations only because from a military perspective the military is doing more of what other government departments / NGOs / other governments should be doing in conventional warfare.

In COIN we may or may not be dealing more with the Influence side - which should be done by the indigenous government (but if it was doing things right we probably wouldn't be in a COIN scenario in the first case...) Having got sucked into the Influence Activities we have specialised it, instead of subsuming it into generic G3/5/7 activities. The result? A blossoming cadre of specialists and an increasingly esoteric lexicon of terms; the one generating the other!

That is not to say that I do not think that Influence Activities are not practical, effective and necessary, I just think we have lost sight of the woods for trees :rolleyes:

[William F. Owen]

IMHO COIN is more complex then conventional operations only because from a military perspective the military is doing more of what other government departments / NGOs / other governments should be doing in conventional warfare.

Complex or just different? In Irregular warfare it is usually harder to physically find, fix, strike, and exploit the enemy. It is also harder to match your policy with your actions, because the enemy is within or close to the population. Agreed.

Now does any of that make it "complex." I agree that linking policy with tactics and strategy may be difficult - but that is why I focus on the enemy and not "armed social work."

[Red Rat]

More difficult quite probably, but more complex I do not think so. Essentially we are doing the same thing in conventional warfare as we are in COIN except with emphasis on different parts of the system.

Digressing slightly, but on the difficulty side; I wonder if we put two evenly matched opponents (in terms of military capability) against each other whether thay would find conventional ops any more difficult then COIN ops? Of the 'find, fix, strike and exploit' elements; in COIN none of them leap out as any more difficult to do then in conventional ops, less I think 'exploit'.

With COIN the insurgent has an assymetric advantage in 'find, fix, strike., exploit' but we tend to regard conventional ops as easier because historically in the mid-late 20th century we've had the advantage in 'find - strike'.

[William F. Owen]

More difficult quite probably, but more complex I do not think so. Essentially we are doing the same thing in conventional warfare as we are in COIN except with emphasis on different parts of the system.
Hurrah!! My work here is done... Wilf to Mother Ship, smoke out!

Digressing slightly, but on the difficulty side; I wonder if we put two evenly matched opponents (in terms of military capability) against each other whether thay would find conventional ops any more difficult then COIN ops? Of the 'find, fix, strike and exploit' elements; in COIN none of them leap out as any more difficult to do then in conventional ops, less I think 'exploit'.
Well that's the Wargame Model, where the winner simply destroys more of the fielded force. It's excellent for teaching tactics, if the loss-exchange ratio is factored in. - but the contest is made simple by understanding that the enemy is exactly like you. Why not make them both Irregular Forces? As in UVF v PIRA? or Northern Alliance v Taliban?

With COIN the insurgent has an assymetric advantage in 'find, fix, strike., exploit' but we tend to regard conventional ops as easier because historically in the mid-late 20th century we've had the advantage in 'find - strike'.
I'm not sure the British in Normandy or Korea would have viewed life as easy.

[Tukhachevskii]

... I have always thought that the Political Warfare Executive (www.psywar.org/psywar/reproductions/MeanTechMethod.pdf) had it down pretty much pat with regards to the definition, uses and effects desired from Political Warfare/IO. The way I see it we have, with our stylish terminology, methodological fuzziness and cultural relativism (which defangs our messaage in favour of watering it down to prevent the yokels from being offended and thereby end up with wishy washy programmes that the wily village types can see through/or goes over their heads), lost the plot slightly.


The attitude to the enemy and to his subject peoples is belligerent; the attitude to friendly and still independant peoples is persuasive. One is disruptive behind the lines of the enemy; the other is concilliatory in the councils of our freinds. One requires the mentality and techniques of subversion; the other, in open relationship, means frankness and information. The one seeks to destroy the confidence of the enemy; the other seeks to win the confidence of friends.
(vii) To clarify this distinction, it is necessary to define (a) Publicity, (b) Propaganda, (c) Political Warfare.
(a) Publicity- Publicity is the straightforward projection of a case; it is the build-up of a picture in the mind of the audience which will win their confidence and support. It is information which we want them to have, but also information they they want to have. It seeks to create the right impression and to remove the wrond impression. Its object is mutual goodwill. It is the presentation of the evidence, leaving the judgement to the audience. It is succinctly, as the Americans expressed it in their original information organisation; "Facts" and "Figures".

(b) Propaganda- Propaganda on the other hand, is the deliberate direction, or even manipulation of information to secure a definate objective. It is an attempt to direct the thinking of the recipient, without his conscious collaboration, into predetermined channels. It is the conditioning of the recipient by devious methods with an ulterior motive. Propaganda emphasises those facts which best serve its purpose. It creates the atmosphere in which the audience is most susceptible to suggestion. By power of suggestion, which in favourable circumstances becomes instruction, it secures positive action.

(c) Political Warfare- Political Warfare employs both publicity and propaganda. That is to say, it can and must be as objective as possible in its projection of the British or Allied case. It, too, has to seek the goodwill of those in the enemy and enemy-occupied countries who are already sympathetics to that case. It has to demonstarte and not merely claim the certainty of victory. It has to show by force of example that we have something better to offer than the Nazis.
[...]
Political Warfare could be described as "Propaganda in Battledress" in the sense that it has to convert propaganda into a striking force and to ensure that, at the right moment and under proper discipline, ideas and emotions are translated into action. It must, psychologically, disarm the enemy. It must instil in the hidden armies behind the Axis lines not only the spirit of resistance to the enemy, but the will to strike down that enemy. (pp.3-5)

[Red Rat]

I'm not sure the British in Normandy or Korea would have viewed life as easy.

Not easy but probably more straightforward.

I am struck by Tukhackevskii's contribution. In 1942 we produce a masterpiece of brevity and clarity in the dark arts, but let no-one read it. :confused:

Today we produce tomes of the stuff, distribute liberally but no-one can understand it! :( When it comes to doctrine and influence I think we may have 'blue on blue'd' :eek:

[William F. Owen]

Today we produce tomes of the stuff, distribute liberally but no-one can understand it! :( When it comes to doctrine and influence I think we may have 'blue on blue'd' :eek:
I hear you! I think we could save a lot of drama by burning down DCDC for a start.

[Presley Cannady]

More difficult quite probably, but more complex I do not think so. Essentially we are doing the same thing in conventional warfare as we are in COIN except with emphasis on different parts of the system.

I'm not sure even that distinction is meaningful, let alone real. Sure, there's this very lengthy framework with lots of new diagrams purporting to be models, but application devolves into applying scheme and or mass "as the situation requires" (in view of the planner and his commander), which is essentially what happens in conventional formations today and in...well...pretty much every other formation in the past. More concretely, what passes for models connecting to COIN principles uniquely to disposition and equipment of the army, her movement, and rules of engagement also appear to be ad hoc. Consequently, there's no way to tell simply based on principle or resultant model whether any of this stuff actually works, let alone draw boundaries between COIN and non-COIN types of operations.


Digressing slightly, but on the difficulty side; I wonder if we put two evenly matched opponents (in terms of military capability) against each other whether thay would find conventional ops any more difficult then COIN ops? Of the 'find, fix, strike and exploit' elements; in COIN none of them leap out as any more difficult to do then in conventional ops, less I think 'exploit'.

With COIN the insurgent has an assymetric advantage in 'find, fix, strike., exploit' but we tend to regard conventional ops as easier because historically in the mid-late 20th century we've had the advantage in 'find - strike'.

How does a military's advantage in intelligence and firepower confer an inherent advantage to insurgents in fixing and scheming?

[Red Rat]

I'm not sure even that distinction is meaningful, let alone real. Sure, there's this very lengthy framework with lots of new diagrams purporting to be models, but application devolves into applying scheme and or mass "as the situation requires" (in view of the planner and his commander), which is essentially what happens in conventional formations today and in...well...pretty much every other formation in the past. I think that we are agreeing here?



More concretely, what passes for models connecting to COIN principles uniquely to disposition and equipment of the army, her movement, and rules of engagement also appear to be ad hoc. Consequently, there's no way to tell simply based on principle or resultant model whether any of this stuff actually works, let alone draw boundaries between COIN and non-COIN types of operations. Hmm, two points:


Does it work? There have been successful COIN campaigns so COIN does work. Why the successful campaigns were successful is often a matter of debate, take the ongoing debate about the effectiveness of the campaign in Iraq and what role the Surge played. The current US narrative is very different from the Iraqi narrative and the truth is that success was down to a combination of factors and probably no single factor. Does the current system in AFG work - not sure yet! How can we measure success? Even less clear!
Is there a boundary between COIN and non-COIN?
IMHO there is not a clear distinction between COIN and non-COIN, it is on a sliding (and blurred) scale of warfare. For an army conducting operations however there are major differences in how it organises, trains and operates between COIN and major combat operations (combined arms manoeuvre ops at bde level and above).




How does a military's advantage in intelligence and firepower confer an inherent advantage to insurgents in fixing and scheming?

I think an army has an advantage in firepower, not necessarily in intelligence, and certainly not in the early stages of a campaign and not in foreign cultures. One of the fundamental problems of COIN is that armed forces often find it difficult to bring their advantages in firepower and tactical mobility to bear effectively, normally because they lack the intelligence to do so. Plus an army's hierarchical command structure, under civilian control is normally slower and less responsive then an insurgent's structure.

[William F. Owen]

[LIST]
Does it work? There have been successful COIN campaigns so COIN does work.
Exactly! Rebel Groups collapsed once they faced a military and police force who could present a real existential threat to the groups themselves. That means killing capture and coercion. It is that simple.
Defeating Rebels requires the conduct of warfare against them.

[Red Rat]

I am inclined to agree with Wilf on this.


Civil Government deals with the root causes of an insurgency, the politics, grievances, governance, resource issues et al.

The security forces deal with the symptoms of insurgency - the armed groups.

Both must happen in concert and neither by itself will be successful in the long term.

The problem we have at the moment is that the inability of the wider government to deal with the wider issues has lead to the military taking more of a role in these, which has diffused military effort and clouded (not to say confused) military thinking.

[Ken White]

...................

[davidbfpo]

Maybe of interest, this is an annual commercial conference in London and there are number of downloads. The podcasts require registration. Many good points made by Simon Bergman in his podcast.

Link:http://www.info-opseurope.com/Event.aspx?id=293652

[JMA]

I am inclined to agree with Wilf on this.


Civil Government deals with the root causes of an insurgency, the politics, grievances, governance, resource issues et al.

The security forces deal with the symptoms of insurgency - the armed groups.

Both must happen in concert and neither by itself will be successful in the long term.

The problem we have at the moment is that the inability of the wider government to deal with the wider issues has lead to the military taking more of a role in these, which has diffused military effort and clouded (not to say confused) military thinking.

Yes, and at the central level the input of the various players is managed.

For your key military units they need to kill and kill effectively with perhaps some "rules" as to how civilians are dealt with.

Then you have the "civil ops" people who do their bit, maybe not even armed.

As I have said before I see no need for using your elite units to hand out sweeties and footballs.

[RobSentse]

Think at how difficult it is to influence, say, your teenage kids, into a particular course of action. You know them. They have grown up in your house.
You know the groups they belong to, their interests, their likes and dislikes. Yet as every parent knows influencing a 16 year old into a particular course of action can be difficult.

Now apply this thinking to any person whom you do not know, who has grown up in a completely different culture with different values and beliefs anchored in a wholly different world from our own.

How do you want to influence them?

http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/special/Special%20Series_Web.pdf/view

www.linkedin.com
www.scribd.com/amniat

[RobSentse]

Know the human environment as operations are predominantly conducted in urbanized terrain.
Understanding the environment is fundamental in either conducting operations and analyzing any threat.

Current and future operations is like Microsoft fighting Google: You do not fight the competition; you fight for the approval of the client.
So, you fight fair, your competition fights 'unfair' and uses 'dirty' tricks Be aware that your clients can also be your supplier, but also your competitor.
After all, your competitor of yesterday, could be your client of tomorrow.

It is possible to get in control by providing superior service, products, marketing (presence, posture, profile) at a reasonable cost anytime, all the time.
For that it is important not to force your client. Instead of that, persuade him, influence his perception, give him choices. In order to not let your competitor define your actions you have to maintain the initiative and get his best people to join you.
The challenge is to give the market confirmation, via their own opinion leaders, that his choice is right/wrong (peer pressure!).

So, be present in the market all the time, everywhere.
Understand your clients and synchronize your strategy accordingly.
Avoid misinterpretation and not changing fast enough because otherwise you will lose your best people to your competition.

Do not think that you have to defeat an opponent to "win" (which is quite un-military).

www.linkedin.com
www.scribd.com/amniat

[William F. Owen]

Current and future operations is like Microsoft fighting Google: You do not fight the competition; you fight for the approval of the client.
That is dangerous rubbish. Current and future conflict is and will always be about killing for political purpose. Breaking of will is what wins the military competition and thus is most likely to deliver an opposed political objective.

For that it is important not to force your client. Instead of that, persuade him, influence his perception, give him choices. In order to not let your competitor define your actions you have to maintain the initiative and get his best people to join you.
Again, rubbish. You break his will. the enemy's armed faction is not a client. It's an opponent.

Do not think that you have to defeat an opponent to "win" (which is quite un-military).
Yes you do. If you are not fighting then you are just doing politics. No fighting, no armies. Normal political discourse.

[slapout9]

Know the human environment as operations are predominantly conducted in urbanized terrain.
Understanding the environment is fundamental in either conducting operations and analyzing any threat.

Current and future operations is like Microsoft fighting Google: You do not fight the competition; you fight for the approval of the client.
So, you fight fair, your competition fights 'unfair' and uses 'dirty' tricks Be aware that your clients can also be your supplier, but also your competitor.
After all, your competitor of yesterday, could be your client of tomorrow.

It is possible to get in control by providing superior service, products, marketing (presence, posture, profile) at a reasonable cost anytime, all the time.
For that it is important not to force your client. Instead of that, persuade him, influence his perception, give him choices. In order to not let your competitor define your actions you have to maintain the initiative and get his best people to join you.
The challenge is to give the market confirmation, via their own opinion leaders, that his choice is right/wrong (peer pressure!).

So, be present in the market all the time, everywhere.
Understand your clients and synchronize your strategy accordingly.
Avoid misinterpretation and not changing fast enough because otherwise you will lose your best people to your competition.

Do not think that you have to defeat an opponent to "win" (which is quite un-military).

www.linkedin.com
www.scribd.com/amniat

Been thinking about your comparison of war and business models and I am not convinced yet, but what you say is interesting. Could you go into more detail?