The Quote of the Day, Year, maybe the Afghan War

[COMMAR]

Leave it to a young Lance Corporal to cut thru the BS & give it to you straight.


“They’re not willing to do the job it takes to defend their country,” said Lance Cpl. Lucas McGary, a rifleman with 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, out of Camp Lejeune, N.C. “They’re so worthless that their worthlessness doesn’t faze anyone anymore.”

Wow.. That's deep

All that same team stuff is 1st & foremost, but sometimes you need to hear if your a steamy pile o'shh..

It reminds me of what a LCpl/fireteam ldr told Maj Gen Natonski, MEF Fwd Cmdr Iraq, in a pacified Fallujah. This was after Natonski got caught in a firefight while leading a media tour. The insurgents fled into a building & Natonski jumped in the young team ldr's stack to "help" clear the building.

After clearing a reporter asked how'd it feel to have a selfless leader willing to lay it down & shoulder the same risk. The reporter was expecting some form of Adoration, but the young Tm Ldr just looked at Natonski & said he was a little too old & overpaid to make a good LCpl and walked off pissed w/the rest of his fireteam.

When asked if he was offended Natonski said no he would've been more offended by a Marine too afraid to speak his mind.

[COMMAR]

Undisciplined Afghans endanger Marjah Marines

By Dan Lamothe - Staff writer
Posted : Monday Jun 21, 2010 10:17:34 EDT

MARJAH, Afghanistan — Many Afghan National Army troops who work and patrol with U.S. Marines are considered a nuisance at best and a danger at worst.

Many refuse to go on patrol, smoke hashish and sleep while on guard — just a few things they do that would have any Marine in hot water.


But the general consensus from rank and file infantrymen is that for every good ANA soldier, there are at least five or six who are lazy, incompetent or both.

“They’re not willing to do the job it takes to defend their country,” said Lance Cpl. Lucas McGary, a rifleman with 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, out of Camp Lejeune, N.C. “They’re so worthless that their worthlessness doesn’t faze anyone anymore.”

Such frustration is fostered by incidents that span a variety of categories:

• 1. Safety. Marines say Afghan soldiers aren’t careful with their weapons, and numerous accidents have occurred because of it. On two occasions, an ANA soldier based with India Company, 3/6, negligently discharged a SAW within ANA living quarters, each time shooting a round into a wall, Marines said. Another time, an Afghan soldier partnered with India’s 3rd Platoon accidentally shot himself in the foot with an M16A2 rifle while on patrol, said Staff Sgt. Ryan Clay, the platoon sergeant.

An Afghan soldier partnered with Kilo Company, 3/6, recently wounded himself after negligently discharging his M16A2 as well. His weapon went off while his right hand was on the muzzle and the weapon was pointed skyward, said Staff Sgt. Gearold Provence, the staff noncommissioned officer in charge of an embedded training team. The weapon was set for a three-round burst — one round hit his thumb, another hit a finger and the third was discharged into the air, Provence said.

• 2. Discipline. Marines say that while some Afghan soldiers are willing to defend their country, many appear to have become soldiers for the paycheck, food and water. For example, while manning a small patrol base here, Marines with India Company’s 3rd Platoon struggled to get just two ANA soldiers to join them on most security patrols. Eventually, the 11 soldiers they partnered with were transferred to another security base with more supervision. Afghan soldiers also are frequently late for patrols, and sometimes sleep on the job when they’re supposed to join Marines in standing guard at patrol bases, Marines said.

• 3. Bravery. Some Afghans have performed courageously under fire, but many panic when the Taliban attacks, said Lance Cpl. Eric Sickler, a rifleman with India Company, 3/6. Pinned down in a firefight, some choose to stay behind cover and point their weapons over the top of barriers, blindly shooting at the enemy, he said. The problem has persisted despite numerous corrections, Marines said.

• 4. Officers. Marines say they are frustrated that whenever a decision has to be made involving the ANA, it must go through the senior-most Afghan officer available. The system runs counter to the Corps’ reliance on NCOs and slows decision-making on the run, they say.

http://marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/06/marine_ana_062110w/

[MikeF]

Steve the Planner Redux

Version 1. Clear-Hold-Beg
Version 2. Clear-Hold-Build
Version 3. Clear-Hold-Bribe
Version 4. Clear-Hold-Nag
Version 5. Clear-Hold-Kill

[RJ]

Version 5. Clear-Hold-Kill - Roger that Mike!

The Good Old Days.

I heard a story from a Gunnery Sgt. who said that in the static stand off near the end of the hostilities, Marine Units would relieve other Marine units and sometimes US Army units, with their camo covered helmet's and legging's hidden in their packs and act like a fresh from the states unit.

They's act sloppy and slow while the sun was up and as soon as it was dark the leggins and helmet covers would be put back on.

Several NK night assualts were shredded when they attacks what they thought were green troops.

Ken White probably developed that tactic so he could sleep better while in the line.

[Infanteer]

What are "leggins"? :D

[Ken White]

What are "leggins"? :DLeggings, The US Army wore them, in olive green canvas until late 1944, the Marines kept them in khaki canvas until until 1953. This pic is from Okinawa, 1945, lead guy is a Navy Medical Corpsman, the rest may be Marines, uniform in the field is the same. Note some have the trousers tucked in the Leggings, others do not, typical of Marines in combat -- though not in peacetime.

The North Koreans called the Marines 'Yellow Legs' because the Marine leggings were khaki canvas and with good Korean mud, tuned a putrid yellow. The slow and sloppy bit is true, it was a favorite Marine trick in Korea. That's where I learned that if you look and act like you know what you're doing, you significantly cut the number of enemy initiated contacts. ;)

[JMA]

http://marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/06/marine_ana_062110w/

Any plan that foresees the handover of the security of Afghanistan to these clowns is bound to fail.

What is plan B?

[Old Eagle]

They can't continue to be clowns. We either fix the advisory effort, leave, or start building family housing, DoDDS schools, commisaries and hunker down for the next several decades.

[davidbfpo]

Any plan that foresees the handover of the security of Afghanistan to these clowns is bound to fail.

What is plan B?

JMA,

I'm not sure if SWC have looked at Plan B, although we have debated options. From my "armchair" it depends on whether the USA wants to remain a power in Afghanistan, principally to stop an AQ return (several assumptions there).

Plan B would mean a return to the use of warlord-run armies, including the Northern Alliance and not in all of Afghanistan. Sounds like partition doesn't it?

[JMA]

They can't continue to be clowns. We either fix the advisory effort, leave, or start building family housing, DoDDS schools, commisaries and hunker down for the next several decades.

I must admit that I have heard noting vaguely positive about the ANA in terms of discipline and operational performance. If you have please tell.

Does anyone really believe that Helmand will be pacified by any ANA other than comprising Pashtuns? Afghanistan is a tribal society and to ignore tribal issues and sensitivities would be a big mistake.

[JMA]

JMA,

I'm not sure if SWC have looked at Plan B, although we have debated options. From my "armchair" it depends on whether the USA wants to remain a power in Afghanistan, principally to stop an AQ return (several assumptions there).

Plan B would mean a return to the use of warlord-run armies, including the Northern Alliance and not in all of Afghanistan. Sounds like partition doesn't it?

We are already on plan B or C or whatever.

The first plan I heard was to prevent Afghanistan being used as a springboard for Al-Qaeda attacks against the US and the West. That was plan A I think.

So who do you start to hand over to next year? The ANA?

Then we need to ask ourselves who do the Pashtuns hate more, the infidels or the Northerners. So perhaps the combination of ISAF and Northerners is what is contributing to the growing Pashtun resistance to the infidel presence more than anything else?

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

what Ken left out was that he took that photo when he was the regimental Sergeant Major. :D

Then again, some wag at my Marine Corps unit reunion noted, while we were touring the National Museum of the Marine Corps, that he was positive this was me on the right.

[Pete]

Leggings. The US Army wore them, in olive green canvas until late 1944, the Marines kept them in khaki canvas until until 1953.
My dad had a pair of these (http://www.olive-drab.com/images/boots_combat_ww2_03.jpg) that lasted until the middle 1960s. My initial issue boots from 1977 are still going strong, probably because I rarely wore them because they were hard to shine.