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SWJED
08-03-2006, 09:17 PM
What follows are blog entries by Scott Kesterson on the Blog 8 at KGW News (http://www.kgw.com/). The links were sent along by a Canadian Army officer and good friend. Many of the blog entries follow the operations of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry of the 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (Edmonton) - an organization I had the oportunity to instruct and brief at their "ORTONA RAM" urban operations exercise in 2000. The blog also covers U.S. advisor embeds with the Afghan Army.

Here are the blog entries to include images and videos:

5 July 2006 - A Forgotten War (http://www.beloblog.com/KGW_Blogs/afghanistan/2006/07/a_forgotten_war.html)


In the early hours of the morning, on the edge of the runway, sat a US Air Force cargo plane with its rear door open, its ramp resting on the ground. From the shadows, over the gravel and between the chain link fence, soldiers from all nationalities began to assemble. On one side the Americans formed, on the other, soldiers from the various nationalities here on this base... British, Canadian, French, Romanian, Dutch and Australian. Along side of the Americans stood a group of soldiers representing the Afghan National Army.

At the the head of the formation near the open back of the C-117, two flags could be seen drifting slowly in the early morning breeze; one was American, the other Afghan. As the soldiers continued to file in, audible commands could be heard over the noise of the flight line. The soldiers were brought into two unified formations, set in straight lines front to back and side to side, then left in a standing rest while they waited. A walkway divided them in the center.

As early morning moved to the twilight hours before sunrise, a vehicle could be seen driving up the runway. Its lights pierced the darkness as it drove under the aircraft wing and along side of the assembly of men and women. Making a hard right turn at the end of the formation, two soldiers could be seen sitting in the open back with a flag draped coffin between them; inside the casket lay the body of a fallen American soldier.

The vehicle backed in slowly towards the formation, coming to a stop a few feet from its end. The first two soldiers stepped out, boots touching the ground in unison. They were followed by six more. Standing together at attention, four on each side, the casket was removed from the back of the truck. Taking a firm grip on the handles hidden under the "Stars and Stripes," they made a precision right face, and began slowly walking towards the plane. With the men and women of uniform lined on each side, the procession marched slowly forward, as all of the soldiers were brought to attention and saluted in a final farewell to a fallen comrade.

Behind the procession marched a lone Canadian. He volunteered his time, as he does for every one of these ceremonies. Playing the bag pipes, his music cut through the noise of aircraft and equipment, settling in on the hearts for all to hear. A moment of silent tears and introspection.

21 July - A Note to Readers (http://www.beloblog.com/KGW_Blogs/afghanistan/2006/07/update_a_note_to_readers.html)


On our first morning of being attacked, I found myself holding back tears as I filmed Canadians fighting a fight that began on American soil. In interviews that followed, I discovered the depth of commitment that these soldiers held in their hearts, as they expressed their belief in purpose and shared their emotions, at times with tears. Two countries, each proud of their roots and history, unified across the border that distinguishes each of us...

27 July 2006 - Panjawi, Part 1 (http://www.beloblog.com/KGW_Blogs/afghanistan/2006/07/panjawi_part_1.html)


We arrived at the fire base just after dark. A multi-national convoy of Canadian, American and Afghan soldiers and vehicles. Passing through the gates and barriers protecting the outer cordon, all one could see was a mass of armored personnel carriers, trucks, and tents. Following a quick meal of packaged rations, the Canadians gave a brief of their battle plan. The initial movement for the operation was scheduled for shortly after mid-night. That left us less than two hours for sleep.

The first phase of the operation was to take place in Panjawi in the southern part of Afghanistan. A few weeks earlier in this same area a US Special Forces team along with two Army National Guard embedded trainers and a detachment of Afghan National Army soldiers were engaged by a group of Taliban for nearly a day and a half. The fighting was intense. When the US and Afghan units finally withdrew, a US Special Forces soldier and an Army National Guard embedded trainer had been killed; the Special Forces medic had been seriously wounded.

Panjawi has been an area of rising Taliban and Pakistani insurgent activity. The plan called for an insertion into the area during the night, hitting the targeted compounds at first light...

27 July 2006 - Panjawi, Part 2 (http://www.beloblog.com/KGW_Blogs/afghanistan/2006/07/panjawi_part_2_1.html)


The temperature had risen to 138 degrees Fahrenheit. Laden with the addition of forty to fifty pounds of gear, sweat poured from our bodies soaking our clothes and boots. We couldn't drink enough, downing half liter bottles of water without a breath. Gatorade was added whenever possible, as packets of the dry mix were distributed around and shared from soldier to soldier.

It was now approaching mid-day and we were headed back along the same dirt road where we had been ambushed a few hours before. Again, we entered on foot. This time, however, we used the Canadian light armored vehicles as a moving screen as we pushed back into the area. And again, that smell of the dead filled the air as we crossed the ditch under the blistering sun.

Maj. Francis, the Missouri National Guard Embedded Trainer (ETT), and his squad of Afghan soldiers began by searching the various mud huts and living compounds along the route. A labyrinth of corridors and doorways revealed themselves from behind the gates of every entry. The process was slow, with the obvious dangers of ambush, booby traps and surprise. Success in these moments is measured in steps and inches. The squad completed the task without incident, finding nothing but empty spaces and locked doors...

Villagers usually know when the Taliban and insurgents are in the area. They also know when to flee, as the try to avoid the misfortune that will ultimately befall as the insurgents are rooted out. It is a fine line of survival for them. Being essentially powerless in this war, the villagers are placed in the middle having to choose sides between a force that lives among them and a force that has come from afar. For many, the choice is on par with rolling the dice on the table of craps. Choosing one side over the other is too often a gamble for their life as they make a choice of sides, of who will win and of who will be part their future. The insurgents know this, and use the current climate of political uncertainty in both the United States and that of the countries involved with the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) as an active part of their information and propaganda. The end result is that the insurgents too often end up winning the information campaign, swaying villagers by fear or threat of reprisal to their side. Support is given, places of refuge are taken and the insurgents gain a foothold with a malignancy of a cancer...

27 July 2006 - Hydarabad - Dawn Raid (http://www.beloblog.com/KGW_Blogs/afghanistan/2006/07/dawn_raid_1.html)


After three days in Panjawi the soldiers and equipment were sent to a staging area an hour to the east. This was to be the beginning of the biggest phase of Mountain Thrust, a joint operation of British, Canadian, American and Afghan soldiers. The British had already moved one of their units into place, to a northern point in the Helmund Province. The Canadians coordinated the move; American and Afghan units were under Canadian command.

The assembly area seemed like any other area of deserted landscape in this part of Helmund Province. Flat, dry, and littered with stones, life seemed to have left this place long ago, offering itself now as a parking lot for the columns of vehicles lined in a row. We had left early to get here, with the instructions that we would move again in a few short hours. However, the British, in what was to become a recurring pattern during this phase of Mountain Thrust, had failed to plan, leaving their pre-positioned unit in the north without adequate supplies of water. With flights of their Lynx helicopters grounded due to its inability maintain aerodynamic stability in the hot atmosphere of the Afghan summer, the British had failed to provide effective resupply alternatives. Complicating matters further was their lack of armored vehicles. Working from a military strategy that seemed to blend imperial arrogance with the tactics of the North African campaign under Montgomery, the British were under equipped for the fight. Fielding open topped Land Rovers with two machine guns mounted forward and aft, it was not unlike viewing a scene from the series "Rat Patrol." Thus, lacking the needed assets to move supplies or to ferry troops safely, the unit that had been pre-positioned to lead the attack, became the Achilles heal. With only 67 bottles of water remaining amongst the 120 men, and with temperatures pressing above 120 degrees F., the entire operation was postponed while American and Canadian assets were coordinated to essentially, save the Queens arse...

SWJED
08-03-2006, 09:29 PM
2 August - Gorak - Blocking Position (http://www.beloblog.com/KGW_Blogs/afghanistan/2006/08/gorak_blocking_position_1.html)


We had sat in place for over twenty-four hours. Using the vehicles as an escape from the heat and the sun, the Canadian soldiers tucked themselves into the seats and crew areas in an attempt to remain cool. Empty water bottles were piled in the open on the desert floor along side of the now torn cardboard boxes in which they were packed. Water is life here, the discarded plastic bottles sitting as a reminder of the fine line between success and failure.

The waiting is the most difficult, even more than the heat. With the pulse of intensity from the previous morning's raid still flowing through these soldier's veins, the order to shave, given from the visiting senior staff, sparked emotions and frustration. "We haven't even been thanked for yesterday's success, but there's time to tell us to shave," were the words from one of the A Company, Red Devils, 2d Platoon soldiers. The discontent continued to be voiced as the day progressed

When the order to move was finally given, preparations were precise and focussed. The Red Devils quickly suited into their body armor, completed last minute weapons checks, finding their places in their vehicles. The day had pushed to early afternoon, and there were still several hours of travel ahead. As we left our camp, the fires that had been set to incinerate the piles of bottles and emptied packages from meals-ready-to-eat, could be seen thrashing in the desert winds.

The mission was divided into two parts: secure a landing zone for a resupply drop for British troops; and, then move to secure the pass at Gorak, in the northeastern part of Helmand province. Now two days delayed, the beginning of the main effort for Operation Mountain Thrust had finally begun. We arrived at the site of the landing zone within an hour, having driven north of Sangin through Helmand Province. This part of the operation represented the third major effort of Canadian and US forces working together to try and keep the British troops adequately supplied...

marct
01-29-2007, 02:00 PM
From CBC.ca



Document outlines Canada's military plans in Afghanistan
Last Updated: Monday, January 29, 2007 | 7:49 AM ET
CBC News

The Canadian military effort in Afghanistan will be complete when Afghan security forces are established and the Afghan government gains full control of the area, says a new document from the military's chief of defence staff.

The document — authored by Gen. Rick Hillier and obtained recently by CBC News —stated that the military's job in Afghanistan is considered successful and completed:

* when new Afghan security forces "are established" and "fully controlled" by the Afghan government.
* when those forces are trained and can conduct their own "counter-insurgency operations."
* when the forces can defend against foreign fighters and "effectively control borders."
* and when "terrorist groups are denied sanctuary within Afghanistan."

The military plan is achievable, but not in the short term, said Rob Huebert, a military analyst at the University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/01/28/military-objectives.html)

CBC also has the results of the latest poll on Canada's involvement in Afghanistan (Nov 2006) available here (http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/afghanistan-survey2006.html).

Marc

SWJED
01-29-2007, 02:06 PM
Today's LA Times - Afghan War Takes a Toll on Canada (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afcanada29jan29,0,3507105.story?coll=la-home-headlines).


In the wind-scoured high desert that was once the heartland of the Taliban movement, the will and determination of a little-heralded American ally have been undergoing a harsh test.

For the last six months, the task of confronting insurgents in volatile Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan has largely fallen to Canada, whose troops have participated in myriad peacekeeping missions in recent years but had not seen high-intensity combat since the Korean War.

Although its nearly 3,000 troops account for less than 10% of the allied forces in Afghanistan, Canada absorbed nearly 20% of the coalition's combat deaths last year, losing 36 soldiers...

The deployment is a strain for military families. Moreover, the Canadian mission points up the stresses and strains caused by unequal burden-sharing within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization...

marct
01-31-2007, 03:46 PM
Another one of the CBC backgrounders


Atlantic Canada's role
Last Updated Jan. 29, 2007
CBC News

With snow blowing around their heads and settling on their boots, more than 2,000 family members and friends of Atlantic Canadian soldiers lifted red placards over their heads hoping to form the largest human flag ever made.

http://www.cbc.ca/canada/new-brunswick/background/afghanistan-atlantic/gfx/human-flag070119.jpg

The crowd, which gathered at CFB Gagetown on Jan. 12, just one week before the first planeload of soldiers was set to depart for the conflict in Afghanistan, wanted to show support for the 1,160 troops from the Atlantic region joining the NATO-led mission.

The deployment also contains a large group of reservists - approximately 240 Atlantic Canadian volunteers - who have put their professional and personal lives on hold to join the conflict.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/new-brunswick/background/afghanistan-atlantic/index.html)

Merv Benson
01-31-2007, 04:58 PM
Marc, I think the Canadian effort in Afghanistan has been first rate and your countrymen need to know that it is appreciated. I think we may be able to find work for these guys in a football game card section when they get back. Go Canada.

Stan
01-31-2007, 05:01 PM
Hi Marc !


4. I would like to know how you feel about Canada's involvements around the world in the last several decades. Please tell me if you are proud or not proud of each of the following: a) Canada's involvement in United Nations peace-building operations around the world since World War Two?
Proud 92%


I remember crossing the Zairian/Rwandan border with Tom. I don't recall how many clicks later once in Rwanda, but we came along a Canada patrol with a 113 APC. Something like night and day when we first came across the French (they didn't have an APC) they didn't have much of a sense of humor. I think I impressed them with my "Belgian" french though :D

I'm glad your public is behind your military. I liked their attitude in Rwanda and most importantly, their professionalism.

Yes, Marc, that would be a compliment !

marct
01-31-2007, 05:10 PM
Marc, I think the Canadian effort in Afghanistan has been first rate and your countrymen need to know that it is appreciated. I think we may be able to find work for these guys in a football game card section when they get back. Go Canada.

It's a weird situation in some ways. We have a lot of the politicians disparaging what we are doing, but there has been a lot of spontaneous public support. A lot of the people who you would normally think of as "left wingers" actually support our involvement in Afghanistan, and a larger number would probably support us if there was a deployment in strength to Darfur.


I'm glad your public is behind your military. I liked their attitude in Rwanda and most importantly, their professionalism.

Yes, Marc, that would be a compliment !

Thanks, Stan :).

Marc

marct
05-25-2007, 01:37 PM
From CBC.ca


Canadian troops begin major offensive against Taliban
Last Updated: Friday, May 25, 2007 | 12:49 AM ET
The Canadian Press

Canadian soldiers have embarked on their most ambitious operation against the Taliban in nearly two months.

Operation Hoover saw Canadian tanks and infantry push overnight into Zhari district, a volatile region on the western edge of Kandahar province.

The operation includes Canadian, Portuguese and Afghan infantry, with support from the tanks, British air power and distant howitzer positions manned by gunners from the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/05/24/afghan-soldiers.html)

TROUFION
05-25-2007, 02:02 PM
Also on the ground Friday were members of Canada's CIMIC team — Civilian Military Co-operation — to assist forces in their interaction with local civilians, who have been repopulating the region in recent months.

The Op looks very promising when you note the inclusion of the CIMIC. Without this it would seem remenicent of one of Lester Grau's case studies.

marct
05-25-2007, 02:11 PM
The Op looks very promising when you note the inclusion of the CIMIC. Without this it would seem remenicent of one of Lester Grau's case studies.

Quite true. I will also be interested to see how they are integrating the British airpower. It will be an interesting example of a truly combined arms operation.

Old Eagle
05-25-2007, 03:16 PM
I wonder how they get past the language barrier w/air support.:p

marct
05-25-2007, 03:53 PM
I wonder how they get past the language barrier w/air support.:p

Sign language ;).

http://www.sibelle.info/images/falluj.jpg

Uboat509
05-25-2007, 11:20 PM
Is it wrong that when I saw this I immediately thought of Bob and Doug Mackenzie charging up an Afghan mountain?

SFC W

marct
05-26-2007, 09:38 PM
Is it wrong that when I saw this I immediately thought of Bob and Doug Mackenzie charging up an Afghan mountain?

Bob and Doug would never charge up a mountain - unless the Taliban were stealing our beer! Now that is the true Canadian definition of "terrorism"!:eek:

Marc

Rex Brynen
09-05-2007, 12:59 PM
The Ottawa Citizen, 4 Sep 07: Command performance: Mission has created 'organizational perfect storm' (http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=8d7668e8-b17e-439a-800f-dbc015e0da2e)

....The military command whose job is to help Canadians at home in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster is not getting the attention or priority it should because the country's generals are focused on the Afghanistan war, according to a report produced for Gen. Rick Hillier and leaked to the Citizen.

At the same time, Canadian Forces personnel assigned to another command in charge of the Afghanistan mission are burning out from too much work and their organization is not seen to be sustainable in the long run.

The 62-page report produced in January for chief of defence staff Gen. Hillier details the progress of his ambitious plan to transform the Canadian Forces into an organization that is efficient, relevant and responsive to the needs of the government and public.....

Jedburgh
09-05-2007, 01:42 PM
CF Transformation - From Vision to Mission (http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/cft-tfc/intro_e.asp)

There are quite a few documents and presentations linked on this site, providing background going back a couple of years on Canadian military transformation. And you have the option of reading it in French....

Jedburgh
09-05-2007, 01:51 PM
Forward Operating Base (FOB) Robinson - Board of Inquiry (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/robinson/index_e.asp)

Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), released today (7 Aug 07) the findings from the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Robinson Board of Inquiry (BOI) that investigated the March 28/29 2006 firefight between allied forces and members of the Taliban.

Private Costall was killed as a result of gun fire originating from a weapon manned by a US Army soldier during an attack of unprecedented intensity by Taliban forces from multiple directions. The firefight resulted in the death of Private Robert Costall and injuries to three other Canadian soldiers serving with the Canadian Quick Response Force of Task Force Afghanistan. Master Sergeant John Stone, U.S. Army, was also killed in the same incident and one other US soldier was injured....
The report is in three parts with some portions redacted, but they haven't bothered with the "Secret" markings top and bottom of each page, which are still clear as day....

Michael Shannon
09-06-2007, 05:17 PM
The key to understanding "transformation" in the Canadian sense is that it was never intended to produce increased combat power or readiness. It was designed to kick out ad hoc battle groups for scheduled missions along the lines of SFOR in Bosnia while at the least maintaining the size and rank structure of the regular officer corps. For example the notion of having fewer full strength infantry battalions capable of rapid deployment was rejected in favour of maintaining skeletal units in order to retain the original number of command slots. The result being large scale augmentation of task forces going overseas by people plucked from other units and HQs, all of whom have to start training from scratch.

Inter-service, regimental and language group politics exacerbate the problems of organizing the CF and attempts by the Hillier, the CDS, to mimic US military organizations, with their much greater economies of scale, have only made things worse.

milnews.ca
09-09-2007, 09:58 PM
This is my first news post here (I'd like to share some highlights of media coverage of Canadian military issues from time to time) - all feedback (good and otherwise) appreciated!

On September 1, the New York Times (as well as its sister publication, the International Herald Tribune (http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/01/asia/taliban.1-126021.php)), told the world, "A year after Canadian and U.S. forces drove hundreds of Taliban fighters from the area, the Panjwai and Zhare districts southwest of Kandahar, the rebels are back and have adopted new tactics. Carrying out guerrilla attacks after NATO troops partly withdrew in July, they overran isolated police posts and are now operating in areas where they can mount attacks on Kandahar, the south's largest city."

The Globe & Mail (http://www.rbcinvest.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070901.wafghan01/front/Front/frontBN/rbc-front), Can West News Service (http://www.canada.com/cityguides/winnipeg/info/story.html?id=526a8069-727c-42f5-9a5c-7ef700008b09&k=51185) and other media outlets picked up the story, attributing the NYT. A later version (http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/02/asia/taliban.1-126021.php) of the New York Times story indicated, "The seesaw nature of the conflict is evident in Kandahar, where the local governor cites a slight drop in suicide bombings in the provincial capital as a sign of progress. But police officials and villagers bitterly complain that Canadian forces abandoned Panjwai and Zhare."

Canadian Forces officials denied leaving Afghan police in the lurch (http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=1754cc5a-a7ff-4641-9901-4d29ed46ea76&k=58801), while a later Can West story (http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=95ccda3f-30c8-41be-9a02-5c32507861c5&k=46321) took a slightly different tack later on -- it's the AFG police's fault that the ground wasn't held.

All this while various media outlets (including Canadian Press (http://www.recorder.ca/cp/National/070902/n090203A.html), the Hamilton Spectator (https://milnewstbay.pbwiki.com/One-Bloody-Weekend-1-Sept-07), and Legion Magazine (https://milnewstbay.pbwiki.com/One-Bloody-Weekend-1-Sept-07https://milnewstbay.pbwiki.com/OPMedusaLegionMagSeptOct2007) -- a magazine put out by the Royal Canadian Legion (http://www.legion.ca/)) were offering post-mortem coverage of OP Medusa (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Medusa), a Canadian-led offensive by elements of ISAF and the Afghan National Army that began in August 2006, in which 12 Canadian soldiers were killed. During the OP Medusa, Pte. Mark Graham was killed, and a number of troops injured, by fire from an American A-10 in Panjwai. (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/opmedusa/index_e.asp)

A first rate Canadian military news blog, The Torch (http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/09/hindsight-on-medusa.html), gave General Tim Grant, then-Commander of Canada's Task Force Afghanistan, a chance to give more of his side of the OP Medusa story. Back-and-forth (including comments from bayonets who say they took part in OP Medusa) also continued on a thread of Army.ca (http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,65890.0/all.html), a public internet forum NOT connected to the Canadian military.

Ken White
09-09-2007, 10:57 PM
Thanks for the post and the links.

Norfolk
10-04-2007, 09:45 PM
The key to understanding "transformation" in the Canadian sense is that it was never intended to produce increased combat power or readiness. It was designed to kick out ad hoc battle groups for scheduled missions along the lines of SFOR in Bosnia while at the least maintaining the size and rank structure of the regular officer corps. For example the notion of having fewer full strength infantry battalions capable of rapid deployment was rejected in favour of maintaining skeletal units in order to retain the original number of command slots. The result being large scale augmentation of task forces going overseas by people plucked from other units and HQs, all of whom have to start training from scratch.

Inter-service, regimental and language group politics exacerbate the problems of organizing the CF and attempts by the Hillier, the CDS, to mimic US military organizations, with their much greater economies of scale, have only made things worse.

Much the same sort of thing (minus most of the shiny new kit - and leaders who actually stood up to the politicos, like Hillier does - I wonder who will succeed him?) was going on in the 90's (The "Total Force/New Army" bit). No matter what other intentions are at work, as good as they are, preserving career officer slots in the CF almost always seems to overshadow things. Back then, three Regular infantry battalions were reduced to nil strength, except for the 10% who remained and manned the Bn HQ, and the other 90% were Reservists. When the Army nearly broke down under the stress of cuts at home and heavy overseas deployments (some "Regular" battalions in Yugo were composed of up to two-thirds Reservists, especially when the worst of the fighting and harassment was going on in '92 to '94), and the Airborne was disbanded (well, except for 3 Cdo), those three Regular infantry battalions were restored.

Funny thing was, despite having all these officer slots that they'd preserved during the lean years, the Army had to go out and try to recruit a whole pile new officers (and entice a lot of Reserve officers to go into the Regular Army), because they couldn't hold on to so many of the officers for whom they had gone out of their way to preserve places for. A lot of guys (Commissioned and Non-Commissioned) just weren't going to abide by the culture and the rules of the "New Army", and they got out. They took a large chunk of the Army's fighting skill and know-how with them when they did. Now, we've spent the last half-decade trying to reacquire those lost skills, as well as add new ones, and recruit people who will fit into the "Transformed Army".

Hopefully, we'll get it more or less right this time. But the "expensive hired help" syndrome is a chronic condition in the Canadian military, and it has always amounted to a, if not always the, principle consideration for the organization of the force structure of the Canadian Army. I mean, look at a rifle company nowadays: it has fewer riflemen now than it had over a decade ago, but back then it just had 2 officers (excluding atts) at Coy HQ (OC and 2i/c); now it needs 3 (with the addition of a Battle Captain that the LAVs require - didn't need that with M-113s). In the Canadian Army, officers are not intended to fill unit command and staff posts, it seems; rather, troops and equipment are "attached" or "assigned" to an organization of officers to form units that deploy into the field. I'm not even going to touch higher levels here.

milnews.ca
10-12-2007, 10:05 PM
Prime Minister Harper announces independent advisory panel on Afghan mission
Government of Canada news release, 12 Oct 07
News release (http://news.gc.ca/web/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=354149&) - PM's speaking notes (http://news.gc.ca/web/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=354379&categoryid=4&category=Speeches&)


Prime Minister Stephen Harper today announced the creation of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan. The panel’s role will be to advise Parliament on options for the mission after the current mandate ends in February, 2009.

“I am pleased to announce the formation of an independent panel of eminent Canadians who will consider our options and provide expert non-partisan advice that will help parliamentarians make our decision,” said the Prime Minister.

Chaired by former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley, the panel will examine four main options, while not excluding others:

1. Continue training the Afghan army and police so Canada can begin withdrawing its forces in February 2009;
2. Focus on reconstruction and have forces from another country take over security in Kandahar;
3. Shift Canadian security and reconstruction effort to another region in Afghanistan;
4. Withdraw all Canadian military except a minimal force to protect aid workers and diplomats.

The panel, which is to report to the Prime Minister and the Canadian public at the end of January 2008, is expected to conduct its deliberations while keeping in mind the sacrifices Canadians have made to date in Afghanistan, the potential for deterioration in security and development, Canada’s obligations to NATO and the United Nations, and the implications for Canada’s international reputation.

In addition to Mr. Manley, the panel includes former federal Cabinet Minister Jake Epp, former Clerk of the Privy Council Paul Tellier, former Canadian Ambassador to the United States Derek Burney, and Pamela Wallin, former Canadian Consul General in New York City.

“These individuals represent a wealth of experience in foreign affairs and each one of them has demonstrated their commitment to Canada through years of public service,” said Prime Minister Harper. “I have no doubt they will examine the issues honestly, fairly, and expertly, and offer wise, impartial counsel that will help Parliamentarians and all Canadians choose the right course for Canada in Afghanistan.”

While many observers online (http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,67165.0.html) seem comfortable with the idea, some are, at this point, underwhelmed (http://westernstandard.blogs.com/shotgun/2007/10/an-afghanistan-.html).

Of interest is the fact that the Chair of the team, John Manley, was a Deputy Prime Minister for the Liberal Party, not the party of the current Prime Minister.

Another interesting tidbit: the chair of the new panel recently wrote about the AFG mission (http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct07/manley.pdf) in a policy journal, "Policy Options" (.pdf) - the executive summary:

"The author first visited Afghanistan as Canada’s foreign minister following the ouster of the Taliban regime in 2002. Five years later, John Manley returned to Kabul and its environs as a private citizen and a director of CARE Canada, one of the leading NGOs working to rebuild that shattered country. In this view from the ground, as part of our continuing Mission Afghanistan series, Manley writes that security remains “the major issue, including for NGOs.” But while the “promise of 2002 has thus far been unrealized in the establishment of a true system of rule of law and sustainable Afghan institutions,” he also found measurable progress, including “programs in housing, micro-credit, infrastructure and community evelopment.”

Another interesting highlight from Manley's article:

.... there is no possible way to separate the development or humanitarian mission from the military one. There can be no meaningful progress on development without an improved security environment.

More, here... (http://milnewstbay.pbwiki.com/CANinKandahar)

milnews.ca
10-21-2007, 04:01 AM
On October 16, Canada's Governor General (the Head of State (http://www.gg.ca/gg/rr/index_e.asp)) delivered the Government's Speech from the Throne (http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sftddt-e.pdf) (.pdf), laying out the proposed legislative agenda of the ruling Conservative Party of Canada led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper (the head of government).

Following an opening recognizing the service of members of the Canadian Forces:


I would like to address the first words in this chamber to the members of the Canadian Forces, some of whom are present here today. Their commitment and courage in the name of justice, equality and freedom—whose benefits are not accorded to all peoples in the world—are worthy of our utmost respect...

Part of Governor General Michaëlle Jean's (http://www.gg.ca/gg/bio/index_e.asp) speech dealing with sovereignty and security (http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1368), which would have to be approved by the government before it was delivered, covered Canada's commitments to Afghanistan:


Nowhere is Canada making a difference more clearly than in Afghanistan. Canada has joined the United Nations-sanctioned mission in Afghanistan because it is noble and necessary. Canadians understand that development and security go hand in hand. Without security, there can be no humanitarian aid, no reconstruction and no democratic development. Progress will be slow, but our efforts are bearing fruit. There is no better measure of this progress than the four million Afghan boys and two million girls who can dream of a better future because they now go to school.

The Canadian Forces mission has been approved by Parliament until February 2009, and our Government has made clear to Canadians and our allies that any future military deployments must also be supported by a majority of parliamentarians. In the coming session, members will be asked to vote on the future of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. This decision should honour the dedication and sacrifice of Canada’s development workers, diplomats and men and women in uniform. It should ensure that progress in Afghanistan is not lost and that our international commitments and reputation are upheld.

Our Government does not believe that Canada should simply abandon the people of Afghanistan after February 2009. Canada should build on its accomplishments and shift to accelerate the training of the Afghan army and police so that the Afghan government can defend its own sovereignty. This will not be completed by February 2009, but our Government believes this objective should be achievable by 2011, the end of the period covered by the Afghanistan Compact. Our Government has appointed an independent panel to advise Canadians on how best to proceed given these considerations.

The bolded sentences in this section of the Speech from the Throne drew attention because this suggests that the government may have already decided on what it will propose as Canada's role in Afghanistan after its combat mandate in Kandahar expires in February 2009. Some observers say this may already be laying out the government's preferred option in spite of an independent review panel being set up to assess options for the mission (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4122). That panel is expected to have options ready for the end of January 2008.

milnews.ca
10-21-2007, 04:07 AM
Some more details on the blue ribbon panel:

Globe & Mail (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20071020.AFGHAN20/TPStory/National): Panel will visit AFG (but hold no public hearings)

Globe & Mail (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20071018.MANLEY18/TPStory/National): Panel chair receiving $1,400/day per diem

CanadianChristianity.com (http://www.canadianchristianity.com/nationalupdates/071020ottawa.html): Interesting links between one panel member and faith-based NGO providing aid in AFG

tequila
10-27-2007, 02:21 AM
Sure others have seen this before, but a good video here of Canadian troops in action in Afghanistan (http://youtube.com/watch?v=qaC-w2dIxZc) in 2006.

Rex Brynen
01-24-2008, 04:49 AM
In the fall, Canada's (Conservative) government established a non-partisan panel, head by former (Liberal) foreign minister John Manley, to make recommendations as to Canada's future role in Afghanistan.

That report is now out, and can be found here:

Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/013003/f2/013003-1000-e.pdf)

The key military recommendation is as follows:


2. Canada should continue with its responsibility for security in Kandahar beyond February 2009, in a manner fully consistent with the UN mandate on Afghanistan, including its combat role, but with increasing emphasis on training the Afghan National Security Forces expeditiously to take lead responsibility for security in Kandahar and Afghanistan as a whole. As the Afghan National Security Forces gain capability, Canada’s combat role should be significantly reduced.

•This commitment is contingent on the assignment of an additional battle
group (of about 1,000 soldiers) to Kandahar by NATO and/or other allies
before February 2009.

Frankly--while I don't disagree with most of the conclusions--I'm unimpressed with the report's analysis of the military COIN challenges, and even less impressed with its assessment of the political and developmental components of stabilization. A great many of the recommendations fall into the "yes, but how?" or "easier said than done" category, such as:


c. Forceful representations with Afghanistan’s neighbours, in particular with Pakistan, to reduce the risks posed to regional stability and security by recent developments in that country; and

d. Concerted efforts by the Afghan government to improve governance by
tackling corruption and ensuring basic services to the Afghan people, and
pursuing some degree of political reconciliation in Afghanistan.

franksforum
01-28-2008, 08:04 PM
The report can be found in PDF format at this link:

http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/pdf/Afghan_Report_web_e.pdf

Stan
01-29-2008, 09:00 AM
OTTAWA (Reuters) (http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN2248709020080129)- Canada will pull its 2,500 troops out of Afghanistan early next year unless NATO sends in significant reinforcements...


The minority Conservative government wants the soldiers to stay beyond their current withdrawal date of February 2009 but in another potential threat to the mission, the main opposition Liberal Party expressed doubts about the idea of an extension.

Harper, who is exasperated at the refusal of many other NATO nations to commit more troops to Afghanistan, said the Alliance's failure to provide enough forces meant the whole future of the organization was under serious threat.

Harper said he accepted the recommendations of an independent panel which last week urged Canada to end its mission in the southern city of Kandahar unless NATO provided an extra 1,000 troops and Ottawa obtained helicopters and aerial reconnaissance vehicles.

"Both of those recommendations will have to be fulfilled or Canada will not proceed with the mission in Afghanistan. We believe these are essential to our success."

More at the link

Jedburgh
03-28-2008, 12:30 PM
Canadian Army Journal, Winter '08:

Canadian Armour in Afghanistan (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_4/CAJ_vol10.4_03_e.pdf)

Learning on the Run: Company Level Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_4/CAJ_vol10.4_05_e.pdf)

Learning from the Seven Soviet Wars: Lessons for Canada in Afghanistan (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_4/CAJ_vol10.4_06_e.pdf)

A Comprehensive Approach to Stability: The Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_4/CAJ_vol10.4_07_e.pdf)

Jedburgh
04-04-2008, 02:38 PM
Legion Magazine, 2 Apr 08: The Afghanistan Commitment (http://www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2008/04/the-afghanistan-commitment/)

It is decision time for Canada’s political and military leaders. And it is no easy question they have to answer. Indeed, it is a decision that could cost many lives. The question is this: what role will Canada next take on in NATO’s effort to stabilize Afghanistan?

With the end of Canada’s three-year commitment to its leading role in Kandahar province coming up in early 2009, Ottawa has in recent months been buzzing with debate about what should happen next.

While there are many options—everything from continuing the current combat role to complete withdrawal—the most often mentioned new role is one focused on the softer side of the mission, particularly the delivery of aid, reconstruction and the training of Afghan forces.....

milnews.ca
11-09-2008, 01:11 AM
....after being kidnapped four weeks ago without the media saying anything about it. Highlight mine - shared for research and discussion purposes only.

Abducted CBC journalist released in Afghanistan (http://www.cbc.ca/arts/story/2008/11/08/journalist-released.html)
CBC.ca, 8 Nov 08

CBC journalist Mellissa Fung was released to Canadian officials in Kabul on Saturday, four weeks after she was abducted.

Fung was taken by armed men who approached her in a refugee camp on the outskirts of Kabul on Oct. 12.

The journalist, who was stationed at the NATO military base in Kandahar but was visiting the Kabul-area camp to report on a story, was then taken to the mountains west of the Afghan capital.

Fung, normally based in Regina, was on her second assignment to Afghanistan.

As news of her release emerged on Saturday, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reported that she was in good health and undergoing a medical examination.

News of the abduction had been kept secret over concerns about her safety.

"In the interest of Mellissa's safety and that of other working journalists in the region, on the advice of security experts, we made the decision to ask media colleagues not to publish news of her abduction," CBC News publisher John Cruickshank said. "All of the efforts made by the security experts were focused on Mellissa’s safe and timely release."

"Fung's family was in daily contact with the team at CBC that was trying to negotiate this and help this go forward to the successful conclusion," said CBC journalist Susan Ormiston, who has also filed stories from Afghanistan.

Ormiston said several other reporters have gone into the same camp where Fung was taken. Fung was visiting the camp for internally displaced people to report on refugees who have streamed back into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran.

"It's a difficult situation. It's a management of risk all the time, and it's something that we journalists do on a regular basis," she said ....

More on linked title, or here (http://press.jrc.it/NewsBrief/moreclusteredition/en/CBC-409ad00ab79311baaf6ed3bc799d6b00.html) via the Europe Media Monitor (http://press.jrc.it/NewsBrief/clusteredition/en/latest.html) aggregator.

milnews.ca
12-12-2008, 05:06 PM
Canada's TF Afghanistan commander shares some of his plans for the winter - highlights are mine.

Task Force Kandahar ready for winter
BGen Denis Thompson, Maple Leaf magazine, 3 Dec 08
Article link (http://www.dnd.ca/site/community/mapleleaf/article_e.asp?id=4941) - .pdf permalink (http://milnewstbay.pbwiki.com/f/BGEN-THOMPSON-MAPLELEAF-112140DEC08.pdf)

Over the last few weeks, there has been a change in the air here in Kandahar Province. Clouds are appearing in the sky, the temperatures are approaching what Canadians might actually consider habitable, and we even had a brief rain shower a few mornings ago. All this means one thing: winter is coming – and so is a shift in our approach to operations here in Kandahar.

On our deployment to date, we’ve faced some interesting challenges and had successes that we don’t hear enough about.

This summer, we were able to significantly disrupt the insurgents’ command and control network. Many of their mid- and senior-level commanders were neutralized, including several key improvised explosive device (IED) experts. We also seized multiple IED facilities, weapons caches and supply nodes. Eliminating their leadership and disrupting their supply lines has a lasting effect on insurgents’ ability to operate in the province.

Afghan National Security Forces continue to make progress. One of our mentored kandaks [battalions] is assessed to have the highest level of operational readiness of any in the country. This unit is now conducting successful operations in Helmand Province, where the insurgents’ ploy to seize Lashkar Gah was soundly repulsed. This is reminiscent of the Afghan National Army’s quick victory over insurgents in the Arghanda, and another indicator of their growing operational capability.

The Afghan National Police is starting from further behind, but are making substantial progress as well. Of note is the fact that Kandahar City enjoyed relative calm during Independence Day celebrations, Ramadan, Eid, and several recent gatherings in and near the city. The big problem, of course, has been the recent spate of assassinations and attacks but, apparently, [Afghan] National Directorate of Security has recently arrested three individuals believed responsible for several of these murders.

Task Force Kandahar is focussing on two things.

First, we’re going to deepen the level of security in key areas in Kandahar Province, where the majority of the population resides – Kandahar City, the districts of Dand, Daman and Arghandab, and portions of Zharey and Panjwayi. Our aim is to increase local perception of security in these areas, and set the conditions for economic growth and reconstruction and development work.

Second, we’re going to take the fight to the insurgents in areas they consider to be “safe havens”. We have a distinct advantage in that we can continue to conduct operations throughout the cold winter months, while the insurgents are typically limited in the scope of their activities. In the past, many fled to Pakistan during the winter season, but increased anti-insurgent operations along the border region are making this less attractive. Our intent, therefore, is to deny the insurgents the ability to rest, re-supply, and reconstitute their leadership in Kandahar Province this winter. Doing this will force them further from population centres, limit their ability to conduct large-scale operations, and make it increasingly difficult for them to terrorize the population.

Members of Task Force Kandahar put forth an excellent effort on a daily basis. They are making a difference here, in spite of difficult conditions, and Canadians have every reason to be very proud.

milnews.ca
12-16-2008, 04:26 PM
First I've seen anyone be so specific - thoughts?

Canadian commander sees Afghan conflict peaking in 2009
GRAEME SMITH, Globe and Mail, 16 Dec 08
Article link (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20081216.wafghancanada1216/BNStory/Afghanistan/home?cid=al_gam_mostview)

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN — After years of bloody escalations in the Afghan war, the violence will finally start to subside in 2010, according to an unusually bold prediction by a top Canadian commander.

Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier (http://www.forces.gc.ca/dsa/app_bio/engraph/FSeniorOfficerBiographyView_e.asp?SectChoice=1&mAction=View&mBiographyID=47), responsible for all overseas forces (http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/about-notre/index-eng.asp) and widely viewed as the most experienced military official on Afghan issues, said he believes an influx of U.S. troops next year will bring a new surge in the violence.

But 2009 will mark an historic peak in the conflict, the commander said, and the level of bloodshed will start to decrease the following year as Afghanistan's government and security forces become strong enough to handle the situation.

“There will be decreased violence in 2010, and increased capacity naturally, especially where we're focused,” he said, referring to Canada's zone of operations in Kandahar.

Many analysts have predicted the Afghan war will grow next year, as thousands of U.S. forces are expected to challenge the Taliban's increasing hold on the country. Brigadier-General Richard Blanchette, NATO's chief spokesman, said recently that he expects greater conflict in 2009.

But the comments from Lieut.-Gen. Gauthier mark the first declaration of Canada's expectations of the results that will be achieved in the next season of fighting. It's a public expression of what other military officials have been saying in private, a “no pain, no gain” philosophy that describes a bigger war as necessary in the short term to achieve progress in the medium term.... (more on link)

A bit more from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation here (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/12/16/afghan-violence.html).

Fuchs
12-16-2008, 07:25 PM
Two Friedman units (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedman_(unit))?
That looks like we're really far, far away from success there.

milnews.ca
12-17-2008, 03:06 AM
...via Canadian Press (http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5j-RYCDiM9NqilxmUtfPOjQtg_xgg):

....As many as 20,000 additional U.S. troops are expected to bolster the American ranks by this coming spring - something that's bound to result in an increase in clashes with the Taliban, he noted.

"I think in the early going, with the large influx of U.S. troops, there will be more violence, just as there was more violence this year compared to last year because we have twice the number of combat troops," Gauthier said.

"I fully expect the insurgents will come out in force in 2009 and we will come out in force in 2009 and there will be violence and there will be a higher level of violence than there was in 2008."

Gauthier said he doesn't expect anything to be resolved in the early going, but predicted better security as more Afghan National Army soldiers join the field and NATO's training mechanisms churn out additional Afghan Uniformed Police officers.

That will give the coalition "traction" in terms of security personnel at the same time as the full impact of the U.S. troop surge is felt, he added.....

milnews.ca
12-28-2008, 02:07 PM
26 Dec 08 - "One Canadian soldier was killed and three others were injured when their armoured vehicle was struck by an explosion in Zharey District about 12:45 p.m. Kandahar time, December 26, 2008." (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2834)

27 Dec 08 - "Two Canadian soldiers, as well as one member of the Afghan National Police and one Afghan interpreter were killed on December 27, 2008, when an explosive device detonated in their vicinity in the Panjwayi District." (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2836)

Condolences to the friends, colleagues and family of the fallen, and hopes for a full and speedy recovery for the wounded.

:(

Shamus
12-28-2008, 03:58 PM
May they rest in peace.Condolences to the families.

Adam L
12-28-2008, 07:23 PM
My deepest condolences to the families, friends and comrades of the fallen. For those wounded, I hope for a full and speedy recovery.


Adam L

Ron Humphrey
12-28-2008, 09:39 PM
A reminder once again that although some countries may be said to "carry" a greater share of the burden their families however no matter where they are carry the burden equally. May those who can recover well: for those who can't let us never forget their efforts.

milnews.ca
01-04-2009, 02:44 PM
Link to earlier news release announcing investigation, and some MSM coverage, below text....

Charge Laid Relating to Death of Presumed Insurgent
Canadian Forces National Investigative Service news release CFNIS 2009-01, 2 Jan 09

News release link (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2840)

OTTAWA – The Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) has charged one military officer late yesterday with an offence relating to the death of a presumed insurgent in Helmand Province on or about October 19, 2008.

Captain Robert Semrau was charged with one count of second-degree murder, contrary to Section 130 of the National Defence Act (http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowDoc/cs/N-5/bo-ga:l_III::bo-ga:l_IV//en?page=3&isPrinting=false#codese:130), pursuant to Section 235(1) of the Criminal Code (http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowDoc/cs/C-46/bo-ga:l_VIII::bo-ga:l_IX//en?page=6&isPrinting=false#codese:235). Captain Semrau was a member of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team at the time of the incident. He is accused of shooting, with intent to kill, an unarmed male person. Captain Semrau is currently in Military Police custody and will be transported back to Canada shortly for a hearing before a military judge to determine whether he is to be retained in custody.

The Commander Task Force Kandahar was made aware of the allegations on December 27, 2008 and notified the CFNIS who immediately initiated an investigation. The CFNIS laid the charge after analyzing the evidence and interviewing witnesses. As the matter is now proceeding in accordance with the Code of Service Discipline, and another part of the investigation is still ongoing, it would be inappropriate to comment further at this time.

The CFNIS (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2824) is an independent Military Police unit with a mandate to investigate serious and sensitive matters in relation to National Defence property, Departmental employees and Canadian Forces personnel serving in Canada and abroad....

"CFNIS Investigation Started" (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2839), CFNIS 2008-08, 31 Dec 08

Globe & Mail (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090102.wvsemrau0102/VideoStory/International/home?pid=RTGAM.20090102.wsemrau0102) posts video of officer, taken by US military, before operation in question

Army Times (http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/01/ap_CanadianMurdercharge_010209w/) shares original Canadian Press version of story

milnews.ca
01-07-2009, 02:20 AM
...from a Canadian Press wire service account (http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/090106/national/afghan_cda_investigation) of a custody hearing held today (6 Jan 08), with the usual caveats (innocent until proven guilty; nothing PROVEN in court, only stated; the process ain't over until it's over)....

...Tuesday's court hearing was to determine whether Semrau should be released from custody in a military cell at Canadian Forces Base Petawawa, where he was recently transferred from Afghanistan. Although both the Crown and the defence agreed Semrau should be granted bail, presiding military judge Lt-Col. Louis-Vincent d'Auteuil reserved judgment until Wednesday....


....Capt. Robert Semrau, 35, faced his first court appearance Tuesday since being charged Dec. 31 for an offence alleged to have taken place last October in Helmand Province. According to an agreed "synopsis" of known circumstances surrounding the Oct. 19 incident, Semrau was with a Canadian operational mentor and liaison team under British command and working with the Afghan National Army when they were ambushed by the Taliban during a 26-kilometre overland pursuit. A U.S. Apache helicopter was called in, after which the group discovered one dead insurgent and another with wounds "too severe for any type of treatment" in the field. An assault rifle was taken from the injured man. According to the court document, the dead and wounded were photographed by Semrau's group "in accordance with standard procedures," after which Semrau was seen standing alone by the two insurgents. Two shots were heard and "at least one witness" will say he saw Semrau firing his rifle at the wounded insurgent. The Canadian and ANA forces then immediately moved on, and the body of the allegedly murdered insurgent was never recovered....


....While the Crown contends that Semrau fired the two shots that were heard by witnesses, Turner told the court "the defence theory, of course, will be different." The case appears far from open and shut. Military prosecution lawyer Maj. Marylene Trudel noted that military prosecutors have not yet even determined whether there is a reasonable prospect of conviction, and said the charges could change as the investigation progresses. "We're still a step behind that process," she told the court in arguing for Semrau's release pending trial....

milnews.ca
01-07-2009, 08:23 PM
"Military judge releases captain pending murder trial" (http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5hqD6umK-roH60F8O2AcBS3mHBXtA)

A military judge has released an army officer charged with murdering a wounded and apparently unarmed enemy fighter in Afghanistan. The judge, Lt.-Col. Louis-Vincent d'Auteuil, has granted a joint request by both defence and prosecution to allow Capt. Robert Semrau, 35, to rejoin his unit at Canadian Forces Base Petawawa and live at home in neighbouring Pembroke, Ont. D'Auteuil placed conditions on the soldier's release, however, ordering him to remain under military authority, to stay in Canada, to surrender his passport and not to communicate with any Afghan National Army troops or five Canadian soldiers. Semrau is also not allowed to handle any weapons or explosives, even in his soldierly duties, without prior approval from the court....

jmm99
01-07-2009, 10:01 PM
Bio of judge, Lt.-Col. Louis-Vincent d'Auteuil, is here (http://www.forces.gc.ca/cmj/biosDauteuil_e.asp).

A website supporting Semrau is here (http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=41254404235).

The military prosecutor Major Marylene Trudel is one of my many distant Trudel cousins - all go back to one man, Jean Trudel (b. 1629), here (http://www.genealogie.umontreal.ca/en/Pionnier.asp?71194).

We shall see how French-Canadian justice works in the 21st century.

reed11b
01-07-2009, 10:07 PM
Am I reading this correctly, he is suspected of being guilty of killing a mortally wounded enemy who was not going to be given any aid (triaged out)? So it would not have been murder if the enemy combatant had been dis-armed and left to die? I'm a little confused. :confused:
Reed

jmm99
01-08-2009, 03:41 AM
when we discussed this case before heading home. Assuming the CPT shot the guy (not entirely beyond a reasonable doubt from the limited facts), it might have been a mercy killing. If so, we concluded he shouldn't be charged - based on our own morals & ethics, not on any criminal law concepts (she's a criminal justice grad).

I really want to see how the facts develop in this one.

milnews.ca
01-14-2009, 01:23 AM
when we discussed this case before heading home. Assuming the CPT shot the guy (not entirely beyond a reasonable doubt from the limited facts), it might have been a mercy killing. If so, we concluded he shouldn't be charged - based on our own morals & ethics, not on any criminal law concepts (she's a criminal justice grad).

I await more information from the trial process, I'm FAR from a legal expert, and I presume innocence until guilt is proven, but there is a case to be made that the Geneva Convention (1949) (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm), esp. Article 3, may come into play here:

....Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria....

Ken White
01-14-2009, 01:28 AM
I await more information from the trial process, I'm FAR from a legal expert, and I presume innocence until guilt is proven, but there is a case to be made that the Geneva Convention (1949) (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm), esp. Article 3, may come into play here:Does it have any force in Canadian law?

Does violation of the GC lead to an allegation of homicide in this case?

Seems to be a non-issue (with respect to Captain Semrau's case) to me... :confused:

120mm
01-14-2009, 12:27 PM
I await more information from the trial process, I'm FAR from a legal expert, and I presume innocence until guilt is proven, but there is a case to be made that the Geneva Convention (1949) (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm), esp. Article 3, may come into play here:

Once upon a time, "battlefield euthanasia" was considered humane treatment.

I don't think anyone is arguing that the officer involved didn't shoot a wounded man. I am struck by the irony of the officer being tried for a so-called mercy killing.

What if the officer involved would've just left the man there, to die? Wouldn't similar charges apply? What is the standard, exactly, for when a grievously wounded enemy soldier makes mission accomplishment impossible?

milnews.ca
01-16-2009, 12:23 PM
...I'm looking forward to hearing more from the proceedings to find out more details about things like this:

Does it have any force in Canadian law?

Does violation of the GC lead to an allegation of homicide in this case?

Seems to be a non-issue (with respect to Captain Semrau's case) to me... :confused:
- all I have is what's been written in the MSM, which is also why I used "may".

As for this, 120mm:

What if the officer involved would've just left the man there, to die? Wouldn't similar charges apply? What is the standard, exactly, for when a grievously wounded enemy soldier makes mission accomplishment impossible?
I'd LOVE to hear from any legalists on this one, too, since MSM is only covering what's coming out of the process for the moment, and not speaking to experts about such issues. Mind you, depending on how such issues are covered, beware what you wish for re: effects on pubic perception of the proceedings and the individual.

120mm
01-17-2009, 01:21 PM
Once upon a time, I taught patrolling, and believe you me, there is no good LOLW-compliant answer for the grievously wounded combatant, or the EPW who cries out.

jmm99
01-17-2009, 10:23 PM
In another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=64512#post64512), I've been flopping about like a large-mouth bass in the bottom of the boat on much the same issue. Perhaps, some progress was made in my presentation at posts ## 54-56 - you judge.

Any how ways, my theory is that operational law must correspond to what is a reality in the field (law serves the soldier; the soldier does not serve the law); which requires placing more discretion in the field commander to set the rules, based on the "totality of circumstances" as viewed by him and subject only to some very general guidelines.

So, it is more important to me to hear from field folks on what they think the rules should be in this and related situations (basically a point A to point B problem with an intermediate hitch which requires a go or no go decision).

Don't have to be a lawyer - this is a "what the rules should be" problem with no "correct answer". Also, we could have a general rule (fitting situations A, B, C and D), together with exceptions for E, F and G.

There are some articles out there (feel free to find them), but are not particularly helpful cuz they tend to be top down solutions - law imposed on soldiers, not law developed by and for soldiers. Betcha we can do better.

I'd appreciate comments on this proposition.

------------------------
These kind of problems caused Grotius (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hugo_Grotius) to develop his work on the laws of war. The problem with Grotius' (the European or Code Systems) method of legal development is a tendency to impose law from above (theorists). That is contrary to the UK-US method of legal development (in its pure form) which derives the law from actual practice (Bracton and those who have followed him for 800 years). Guess which school of thought I belong to.

reed11b
01-17-2009, 11:07 PM
In another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=64512#post64512), I've been flopping about like a large-mouth bass in the bottom of the boat on much the same issue. Perhaps, some progress was made in my presentation at posts ## 54-56 - you judge.

Any how ways, my theory is that operational law must correspond to what is a reality in the field (law serves the soldier; the soldier does not serve the law); which requires placing more discretion in the field commander to set the rules, based on the "totality of circumstances" as viewed by him and subject only to some very general guidelines.

So, it is more important to me to hear from field folks on what they think the rules should be in this and related situations (basically a point A to point B problem with an intermediate hitch which requires a go or no go decision).

Don't have to be a lawyer - this is a "what the rules should be" problem with no "correct answer". Also, we could have a general rule (fitting situations A, B, C and D), together with exceptions for E, F and G.

There are some articles out there (feel free to find them), but are not particularly helpful cuz they tend to be top down solutions - law imposed on soldiers, not law developed by and for soldiers. Betcha we can do better.

I'd appreciate comments on this proposition.

------------------------
These kind of problems caused Grotius (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hugo_Grotius) to develop his work on the laws of war. The problem with Grotius' (the European or Code Systems) method of legal development is a tendency to impose law from above (theorists). That is contrary to the UK-US method of legal development (in its pure form) which derives the law from actual practice (Bracton and those who have followed him for 800 years). Guess which school of thought I belong to.

I don't think this one even falls under a "should be". While the good Captain probably should receive some sort of "corrective action" for not following the correct ROE, it is not "murder". The insurgent, from what little we have, was already triaged out, and was being left to die. If this is not murder then neither is speeding up the process. Was it inappropriate? It probably was, but it was not murder. Of course I am far from a lawyer and a strong believer in the precedence of "intent" of the law outweighing the "letter" of the law. I certainly hope that the CA legal system sees it the same way or I will lose a great deal of respect for our Northern Neighbor.
Reed

milnews.ca
02-24-2009, 11:53 AM
NATO statement (http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/02/pr090223-178.html):

Elders from a village located approximately 15 km west of Kandahar City alleged today that two local children were killed and two were wounded when unexploded ordnance they were handling detonated. It is alleged that the unexploded ordnance was left behind by ISAF soldiers who were conducting a practice range exercise in the area the day prior, however the nature of the munition involved has yet to be determined....

I have to say I was disappointed in CNN's initial version of the story (http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/02/23/afghanistan.rockets/index.html?eref=rss_latest):

Villagers in southern Afghanistan stacked the bodies of two dead children in front of a provincial council Monday to protest their deaths in a rocket attack. The villagers blamed Canadian rockets for killing the children and injuring five men, but their claims could not immediately be verified....
I've sent CNN links to other MSM sources, and await with interest to see what they do with them.

Now, there seems to be a range of narratives (http://en.rian.ru/world/20090224/120271624.html) out there:

....Some media sources reported the children were killed when a missile hit a house in the Panjwai village. Five other people were injured. However Canadian media reported that the children may have died when an unexploded bomb detonated as they searched for scrap metal in the Panjwai valley. A local police chief said the deaths may have been caused by a Taliban attack ....

I've found nothing on English-language jihadist fora with the Taliban's version of events yet - will share if/when I find anything.

Shameless & brazen self-plug: a little more here (http://milnewsca.wordpress.com/2009/02/23/shame-on-cnn/).

120mm
02-28-2009, 09:17 PM
Disappointed in CNN reporting? Isn't that analogous to being disappointed that a rattlesnake will bite, or that the sun comes up in the East in the morning?

You ARE talking about a TV channel that has a running "Global Warming Will Kill Us All" feature disguised as "news" aren't you?

milnews.ca
03-06-2009, 02:23 AM
...but I can dream, can't I?

BTW, here's the results of the initial probe, from the Canadian Forces statement (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2882):

....Preliminary findings, based on the evidence collected, witness interviews and analysis of explosive residue by in-theatre explosives experts, determined that the device which caused the blast was most probably an unexploded anti-personnel improvised explosive device (IED) or mine not consistent with ammunition used by Canadian Forces (CF) personnel. The CFNIS is confident that further detailed analysis of the evidence by forensic laboratories will validate the preliminary findings....

and from an ISAF statement (http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/pressreleases/2009/03/pr090303-213.html):

....Brigadier-General Jon Vance, the commander of Canadian troops in Kandahar province, said the explosive did not belong to his soldiers, who held a range practice in the area the day before the tragedy.

“The burden of proof and experience in this part of the province places the likelihood of harming people with explosives squarely on the shoulders of the insurgency, not on the shoulders of Canadians” said Vance.

The preliminary findings of the investigation have determined that the device which caused the explosion was most probably an Improvised Explosive Device or mine not consistent with ammunition used by the ISAF troops previously in the area. These findings are based upon the evidence collected, witness interviews and analysis of explosive residue....

TROUFION
03-07-2009, 12:51 PM
Insurgent TTP:

When any event happens in which a civilian death, particularly of women and children, occurs immediatly blame the Coalition Forces. (The exception would only be if an insurgent was caught red handed and on film, then the insurgents will generally remain quiet on the occurance and try to divert attention elswhere).

For the insurgents the truth is of less (or of no) importance it is the timeliness of the spin. In this case it was a near spontaneous reaction. Nearly as fast as the explosion itself they had the spin machine rolling.

While coalition forces bring in experts to conduct forensic analysis to identify the true cause of the incident and wait to put out press releases the insurgents fire away with their version. They thereby gain the upper hand.

It is the nature of the beast.

We counter it through active and constant engagement with the population , the key leadership and a consistent information campaign. The burdens of proof will always fall on us. We need to generate a faster tempo on delivering the truth to gain the trust of the locals. Easier said than done, but it can be done. -T

milnews.ca
03-27-2009, 03:40 PM
At least according to a senior government official quoted in this account (http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/story.html?id=1431328)....

“Canada’s area of responsibility in the Taliban heartland will be cut by nearly half this summer as part of U.S. President Barack Obama’s new Afghan strategy, to be unveiled Friday. But Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan is to retain control of some of Kandahar’s most violent areas — Kandahar City and the farming districts to the west of the provincial capital where three-quarters of Kandaharis live. Canada’s army also will remain NATO’s point of contact with the provincial governor. “Canada will be more focused on major population centres in and around Kandahar city, which is exactly where we want to have an impact with our priorities,” David Mulroney, the Privy Council Office deputy minister who heads the government’s Afghanistan Task Force, told an all-party committee of MPs Thursday….”
.... as well as RUMINT shared in this account (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090325.wafghan25/BNStory/International/home) from earlier in the week....

…. Rumours have been circulating among local Afghans that the Canadians are planning to pull out of all districts except for Zhari, Panjway and Kandahar city….

A little more here (http://milnewsca.wordpress.com/2009/03/27/cefcom-telegraphs-new-can-focus-in-afg-three-months-ago/).

120mm
04-03-2009, 04:32 PM
I say they need to put more Tim Horton's in the city, as well as in KAF.

It's hard to stay insurgent with a fresh hot coffee and a friendly face in the morning...

120mm
04-30-2009, 07:28 AM
I think these two articles stand on their own, without comment, to illustrate how perspective affects things:



NATO slaps restrictions on Canadian media in Kandahar (http://www.cbc.ca/arts/media/story/2009/04/29/afghanistan-media-restrictions.html)

Source: The Canadian Press

29 April 2009

NATO has imposed tough new restrictions on foreign journalists covering the war in southern Afghanistan , changes that could affect how much Canadians see and hear from war-torn Kandahar .

The new measures, imposed in early March, mirror the way the U.S. military manages reporters in Iraq .

The restrictions make it virtually impossible for Canadian journalists to leave Kandahar Airfield on their own to interview local Afghans and return unimpeded to the safety of NATO's principal base....

Assignment Kandahar: Censorship, and what is not (http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/posted/archive/2009/04/29/assignment-kandahar-censorship-and-what-is-not.aspx)

By: Brian Hutchinson

29 April 2009

Canadian Press has moved a misleading story from Ottawa that says “tough new restrictions” imposed on reporters embedded with Canadian Forces at Kandahar Airfield “make it virtually impossible” for us to leave the base on our own and report goings-on outside the wire.

This comes as a complete surprise, because I had no trouble leaving the base on my own the other day, meeting with my local Afghan “fixer,” and traveling into town to report a story about Afghans that appeared Tuesday in the National Post and on canada.com.

I also blogged about my brief encounter with local kids at a Kandahar city swimming hole.

Canadian military personnel were aware that I was leaving KAF. In fact, a member of their public affairs staff drove me to a gate where

I met my fixer. The same soldier picked me up on my return to KAF. More of an effort for him than me......

davidbfpo
07-29-2009, 10:45 AM
Came across this concise explanation of the Canadian-Afghan role around Kandahar, with open source mapping overlay: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_05_11.html#006414

Note the article revolves around leaving a strongpoint - due to resupply problems, nothing by road and no helicopters.

davidbfpo

frank
07-29-2009, 02:15 PM
The Canadian helicopter shortage is a direct result of the former socialist government that gave away the Chinooks and dissolved the tactical helicopter transport unit just to make points with it's core voters. Now the force struggles to rebuild tactical helicopter assets. The 214's flying where a political decision. by the above mentioned government (Liberals under Chretien), because the plant is in Quebec, he is from Quebec....well, you get the idea.

milnews.ca
08-05-2009, 04:29 PM
...to make up for my delinquency:

1) Canada's latest fallen - two military engineers:
http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5jEQlVHfiZ325_U1aUfeePNoMTinQ
- were killed by a (second) IED while securing the area following another (first) IED blast

2) How Canadian special forces are helping fight the IED fight:
http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/665009
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/07/canadian-special-forces-ops-in-afstan.html
http://milnewsca.wordpress.com/2009/06/27/canadian-special-forces-disarm-suicide-bomber/

3) Commentary on how Canadian public support for the mission could have been higher now if more politicians communicated more about the "why":
http://www.canada.com/news/History+bound+repeat+itself+Afghanistan/1848370/story.html
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/674568

4) From davidbfpo's spotted blogger, BruceR (a former OMLT trainer/mentor with the Canadian Forces), some interesting insights re: why growing and deploying the ANA isn't working as planned:
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_07_02.html#006459
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_07_31.html#006485
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_07_31.html#006486

5) Canadian and US Officers' Paper on UAVs Over K'har (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/coin/archive/2009/07/22/a-new-issue-of-coin-center-colloquium-released.aspx): "The key to successful employment of the UAV is the relationships formed between UAV pilots and the ground personnel directing the aerial surveillance and strikes performed by the aircraft, articulation of priorities, and building and sharing a detailed intelligence picture."

6) My assessment (humble crystal balling, really) of the wording of the Parliamentary Motion regarding the future of Canada's mission in AFG (motion wording mentions being out of KANDAHAR by end of 2011, not out of AFGHANISTAN):
http://milnewsca.wordpress.com/2009/07/06/can-leaving-khar-or-afg-2011/

milnews.ca
09-18-2009, 05:39 PM
The latest, from this Canadian Forces news release (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=3118):

Captain Robert Semrau will face a General Court Martial in relation to the shooting death of a wounded insurgent that occurred in Afghanistan in October 2008.

Capt. Semrau was arrested on December 31, 2008, by the National Investigation Service and charged with Second Degree Murder while deployed in Afghanistan as Commander of an Operational Mentor Liaison Team. Capt. Semrau was released under conditions on January 7, 2009, by the Military Judge presiding over the custody review hearing at CFB Petawawa.

Following referral to the Canadian Forces Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP), Captain (Navy) Holly MacDougall, the original charge of Second Degree Murder, and three additional charges were brought forward or “preferred” to Court Martial.

The charges facing Capt. Semrau are:

* Second Degree Murder - contrary to Section 130 of the National Defence Act, pursuant to Section 235(1) of the Criminal Code;

* Attempt to Commit Murder (alternative to the Charge of Second Degree Murder) - contrary to Section 130 of the National Defence Act, pursuant to Section 239(1)(a.1) of the Criminal Code;

* Behaving in a Disgraceful Manner – contrary to Section 93 of the National Defence Act; and

* Negligently Performing a Military Duty - contrary to Section 124 of the National Defence Act.

The charges have been forwarded to the Court Martial Administrator who will convene a General Court Martial at the first available date and at a location to be determined.

A General Court Martial is composed of a military judge and a panel of five members. The accused is represented by a defence counsel designated by the Director of Defence Counsel Service.

The DMP considers two main issues when deciding whether to prosecute a charge at court martial:

* Is the evidence sufficient to justify the continuation of charges as laid or the preferral of other charges?

* If the evidence is sufficient, does the public interest require a prosecution to be pursued?

DMP continually reassesses these issues as new information about the case becomes available and has the discretion to bring forward, or “prefer,” the charge or any other charge based on facts disclosed by evidence in addition to, or in substitution for, the charge.

milnews.ca
09-25-2009, 11:46 AM
1) One wounded warrior returns to the fight (http://www.canada.com/health/Amputee+soldier+heads+back+Afghanistan/2025638/story.html), while another moves on into the civilian world to continue advocating for the wounded (http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5iEt9jrUBb1B3egisTVzN8UrrpXog).

2) Canadian counter-IED team sets up web page here (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/ciedtf-focdec/index-eng.asp) to get information to and from soldiers.

3) Canada's latest quarterly report on the mission in Afghanistan (http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/news-nouvelles/2009/2009_09_15.aspx?lang=eng) is out (and my haiku summary (http://milnewsca.wordpress.com/2009/09/16/afg-report-haiku/) of the initial coverage).

4) Newest Canadian Ambassador to AFG (http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/698216) and Representative of Canada in Kandahar (ROCK) (http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/090923/national/afghan_cda_rock) settling into new posts.

5) Canada is making it a bit easier for Afghans who have helped Canadians in Kandahar move to Canada (http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/news-nouvelles/2009/2009_09_15b.aspx?lang=eng) (but only until 2011 (http://milnewsca.wordpress.com/2009/09/15/immigration-idea-problem/)).

6) Given all the range of statements made by Canadian politicians, my own humble triangulation (aka Wild Ass Guess) (http://milnewsca.wordpress.com/2009/09/19/can-post-2011-afg-mission/) of what Canada's mission in AFG could look like post-2011.

milnews.ca
10-15-2009, 02:34 PM
* Still confusion over Canada's post-2011 role in Afghanistan - Prime Minister says no more military mission post-2011 (http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/Civilian+operation+will+replace+military+mission+A fghanistan+after+2011+Harper/2103637/story.html), while his spokesperson says Canadian troops will train (but not mentor) Afghan security forces (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/10/09/afghanistan-soldiers-canadian.html). Some say the messaging ambiguity is because there may be a tug of war over how "military" Canada's post-2011 presence should be (http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,49908.msg881955.html#msg881955). Others say minority government politicians are reluctant to be clear with an election always potentially one confidence vote away: "Vagueness means votes–or so their demented thinking goes." (http://canada-afghanistan.blogspot.com/2009/10/earning-prize.html)

* Canada's Task Force Afghanistan boss joins the troops on patrol (http://www.canada.com/Canadian+general+force+change+Afghanistan/2055181/story.html).

* Canada's Battle Group commander (http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5hIipXff32d_p5lIK3OG7l9NSbqKg): "Canadian troops are getting dramatically better intelligence from villagers now than they were before the summer, and they're getting more of it."

* The Canadian Forces is looking for Voice Response Translators (http://milnewsca.wordpress.com/2009/09/30/merx-voice-translator/) to help troops communicate with Afghans when an interpreter's not about.

* September's "Taliban Lies of the Month about Canadian Casualties" (http://milnewsca.wordpress.com/2009/09/30/tpw-sept-2009-summary/).

Seahorse
10-15-2009, 09:42 PM
* The Canadian Forces is looking for Voice Response Translators (http://milnewsca.wordpress.com/2009/09/30/merx-voice-translator/) to help troops communicate with Afghans when an interpreter's not about.


I understand the requirement for such a capability, however this 'solution' appears very short-sighted indeed and will not provide the sort of direct translation support that may be required, and will likely result in additional training etc for the deployed troops with little utility.

I would propose something far simpler and better which would meet all the current and several other potential requirements/applications. I propose that a call center be setup in Kandahar with native and english speakers, similar to the call centers that exist in India to respond to North Americans. Such a centre could act as an on-demand, real-time translation service supported through local cellular telephone capabilities, and supplemented by Army or satellite radio links where required. Soldiers could communicate directly with anyone they require regardless of language or sex. Such services could be further supplemented with laptop communications for web broadcast of specific messages and information - such as medical advice, notices , psyop, IO and CIMIC related materials etc tailored to the audience.

In addition, such a system would protect the translators as well, since they would not be revealing their identities to other Afghans. Local Afghans could staff some of these positions, and the centre could respond to a multitude of users and services such as 411 or 911 types of services.

Something to consider, that is low tech but provides high bandwidth communication.

Regards,

David

davidbfpo
10-15-2009, 10:26 PM
David,

I posted this elsewhere a while ago:

The UK police and others make extensive use of 'Language Line' for telphone translation; I've only used it for prisoners in custody, when upon arrival their rights etc need to be explained (seperate arrangements for interviews). Their website is: http://www.languageline.co.uk/ (they are originally a USA based company).

davidbfpo

Ken White
10-16-2009, 12:17 AM
LINK (http://www.languageline.com/page/industry_government/).

Though US DoD is not listed, I know they use it on occasion. Classification can be a problem for many uses.

milnews.ca
10-16-2009, 02:53 AM
...especially considering cell phone coverage in the country (it MUST be good if the Taliban wants it shut off at night, right?).

Some of the phrases the Statement of Work (http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/STATEMENT-OF-WORK-VOICE-RESPONSE-TRANSLATORS) calls for the machine to translate appear to deal with prisoner and patient handling situations, as well as training groups, so the call centre may not be an across-the-board solution.

Thanks Ken & David for the other links.

davidbfpo
10-16-2009, 08:45 AM
I am told by another SWC member that cellphone use would not be appropriate, OPSEC aside, there is poor coverage etc. Not sure culturally how Pashtuns would regard speaking via a handset to a strang, remote voice. Any Afghan veterans know?

Technical, cultural and more aspects to consider.

davidbfpo

Seahorse
10-16-2009, 06:16 PM
Agreed that there are other aspects to consider and in fact I would expand the concept one step further to consideration of an Avatar based solution which would present a real-lifelike caricature on the phone/PDA to actually interact with the local Afghan. Such Avatars can be tailored right down to the specific tribe and sex and incorporate facial body language and mannerisms to reinforce the interaction.

Cell phones work in the majority of the populated areas and can be augmented to interface with radio or satcom where necessary. As one already mentioned, cellphones were being used so effectively that insurgents began attacking towers. Lastly, there will always be those that decry the operational classification issues but these are mostly invalid arguments. Most classifications are way too restrictive and severely limit the implementation of solutions. Protective solutions exist to safeguard the communication as well and the benefits could far outweigh any classification concerns.

David

Rex Brynen
10-16-2009, 07:29 PM
Not sure culturally how Pashtuns would regard speaking via a handset to a strange, remote voice.

I know how Canadians would respond if foreigners with guns made us speak via a handset to a strange, remote voice. It is hard to believe that Afghan reactions would be any more positive.

As an emergency measure it might have some utility, but if it becomes a technological alternative to employing the appropriate number of well-trained interpreters it seems highly problematic.

Rex Brynen
11-19-2009, 12:22 PM
Canada complicit in torture of innocent Afghans, diplomat says (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-complicit-in-torture-of-innocent-afghans-diplomat-says/article1369069/)

Ottawa — From Thursday's Globe and Mail
Published on Wednesday, Nov. 18, 2009 10:08PM EST


In a damning indictment of how Canada handled prisoners early in its southern Afghan mission, a government whistleblower says all captives that Canadian soldiers transferred to local authorities ended up being tortured – even though many were likely innocent.

The revelation to MPs by Canadian diplomat Richard Colvin, who served 17 months in Afghanistan, is the first ever testimony by a government official that says the country's military handed over detainees to certain torture.

The Harper government has never admitted it knew this was happening.

In his remarks to a Parliamentary committee on the Afghanistan mission, Mr. Colvin also described a startling pattern of indifference and obstruction to his attempts to warn higher ups of what was happening in 2006 and 2007.

He said Canada's “complicity in torture” ultimately thwarted its military aims in the southern Afghan province of Kandahar.

“Instead of winning hearts and minds, we caused Kandaharis to fear the foreigners. Canada's detainee practices alienated us from the population and strengthened the insurgency.”

On a personal note, I know Richard quite well, and have worked with him in other capacities. He's an outstanding diplomat.

Rex Brynen
11-20-2009, 06:10 AM
Conservatives shoot the messenger over torture allegations (http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/11/19/don-martin-tory-attacks-only-boost-diplomat-s-credibility.aspx)

Don Martin
National Post
Posted: November 19, 2009



OTTAWA — In an organized smackdown rarely seen in Ottawa, the government turned inward on Thursday to attack a new enemy in its Afghanistan conflict — senior Washington embassy intelligence officer Richard Colvin.

After 15 years of steadily rising through the foreign service ranks, Mr. Colvin now stands accused of being a Taliban stooge, someone so easily duped by torture complaints that he shredded his diplomatic reputation by passing along their accusations.

Mr. Colvin became fodder for such accusations the minute he told MPs that a full year of warnings about detainee torture had been ignored at the highest levels of the military and public service.

He even hinted at tentative, but unproven, connections to the government itself. That made his testimony very, very dangerous — and that’s why the Conservatives have launched a campaign to discredit Mr. Colvin.

But it faces a big problem. Every action by this government to date has only enhanced the diplomat’s credibility.

Mr. Colvin was promoted to the Washington job under a Conservative reign after 16 years of unblemished duty in hotspots like Sri Lanka, Russia, the Palestinian territories and Afghanistan. While serving in Kandahar, he was told his insights were too sensitive to be put in writing, he says. His emails have been declared off limits on national security grounds. And he’s been told to shut up on this file or risk being charged under the Canada Evidence Act.

Those actions all speak to the significance and sensitivity of his input, not the ramblings of a rogue diplomat spreading stories from his imagination.

40below
07-16-2010, 02:06 PM
I found this extremely interesting that trhe new (old) Canadian commander in Afghanistan is allowing troops latitude to do stuff like shoot bad guys:


In a war where the enemy hides in villages, and fights mainly with homemade bombs hidden in cooking pots, water jugs, farmer’s fields and trees, it’s not often Canadian soldiers get to fight back.

Oscar Company was savouring some payback, a sweet taste they’ve been enjoying more often in recent days.

Since Brigadier-General Jon Vance returned to take command in early June, the kill chain has been cut shorter, and Canadian troops on the battlefields of eastern Panjwai district say it’s getting easier to take the fight to the insurgents.

Major Steve Brown, commander of Oscar Company, in the 1st Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment battle group, called Vance “a no-nonsense kind of guy” whose personality has helped reshape battlefield operations.

The increased intensity of armed engagements with insurgents also forced change, Brown added.

“Part of that is shortening that kill chain,” said Brown, 37, of Mansfield, Ontario. “I don’t want to say that we are reducing the safeties with respect collateral damage. We’re certainly not doing that. You can’t compromise on stuff like that.

“You’ve got to protect the population. But it’s becoming easier and easier to discern enemy tactics, techniques and procedures with the ‘pattern of life’ of the locals.”

http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/afghanmission/article/836407--on-the-battlefield-canadian-soldiers-get-permission-to-shoot?bn=1


This could go in a few places so mods, feel free to move it.

JMA
07-18-2010, 08:49 AM
The latest, from this Canadian Forces news release (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=3118):

Deliberations begin in Semrau court martial (http://ottawa.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20100717/semrau-court-martial-100717/20100717/?hub=OttawaHome)

What is the man's defence? A mercy killing of someone who was "98%" dead already?

JMA
07-18-2010, 08:52 AM
I found this extremely interesting that trhe new (old) Canadian commander in Afghanistan is allowing troops latitude to do stuff like shoot bad guys:



http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/afghanmission/article/836407--on-the-battlefield-canadian-soldiers-get-permission-to-shoot?bn=1


This could go in a few places so mods, feel free to move it.

This is an interesting comment. Can anyone elaborate?


“You’ve got to protect the population. But it’s becoming easier and easier to discern enemy tactics, techniques and procedures with the ‘pattern of life’ of the locals.”

40below
07-18-2010, 01:07 PM
Team Canada at Free Range International are my absolute favourite COINdanistas and they got a great article in today's Star. It's going to be totally ignored by the powers that be - I posted it on my FB and within two minutes I had infantry soldiers posting about how aghast they were that anyone would roll around Khar without 14 tons of armour.
Some great stuff here, but this is my favourite quote:


“They are the best crew in the country,” the blogger, Tim Lynch, an American contractor who does work similar to Team Canada in safer Nangahar Province, wrote in an email to the Star. “They have balls the size of grapefruit.”

http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/afghanmission/article/837190--riding-with-ghosts

milnews.ca
07-27-2010, 01:46 PM
Deliberations begin in Semrau court martial (http://ottawa.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20100717/semrau-court-martial-100717/20100717/?hub=OttawaHome)

What is the man's defence? A mercy killing of someone who was "98%" dead already?
A little bit of catching up: he was found not guilty of murder, but guilty of dishonourable conduct - this (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=3475) from the Canadian Forces:

In summary, the military panel reached the following verdict:

Not guilty: Charge of Second-degree murder, contrary to Section 130 of the National Defence Act, pursuant to Section 235(1) of the Criminal Code;

Not guilty: Charge of Attempting to commit murder with a firearm (alternative to the Charge of Second Degree Murder) - contrary to Section 130 of the National Defence Act, pursuant to Section 239(1)(a.1) of the Criminal Code;

Guilty: Charge of Behaving in a disgraceful manner – contrary to Section 93 of the National Defence Act; and

Not guilty: Charge of Negligent performance of a military duty - contrary to Section 124 of the National Defence Act.

The sentence will be determined at a later date.

Reader's Digest of defence (http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/833005), from the Toronto Star:

Shaky recall, sloppy investigators and conflicting accounts of what happened on an Afghan battlefield almost two years ago mean an army captain should not be convicted of killing a wounded, unarmed Taliban fighter, the officer’s defence team argued Wednesday ....

So far in the sentencing hearing, the then-TF Commander (saying his view represents that of the chain of command) is calling for Semrau to be kicked out (http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2010/07/26/14828631.html), while a subordinate says he was a good officer (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2010/07/26/semrau-sentencing026.html). On the plus side, from one of the media accounts:

.... His commanding officer, Lt.-Col. Kevin Cameron of the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment, based in Petawawa, Ont., said he would have no reservations about accepting Semrau back into his unit ....

Max punishment under S.93 NDA (http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-n-5/latest/rsc-1985-c-n-5.html#sec93): "imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to less punishment".

JMA
09-10-2010, 01:22 PM
A little bit of catching up: he was found not guilty of murder, but guilty of dishonourable conduct - this (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&id=3475) from the Canadian Forces:


Reader's Digest of defence (http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/833005), from the Toronto Star:


So far in the sentencing hearing, the then-TF Commander (saying his view represents that of the chain of command) is calling for Semrau to be kicked out (http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2010/07/26/14828631.html), while a subordinate says he was a good officer (http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2010/07/26/semrau-sentencing026.html). On the plus side, from one of the media accounts:


Max punishment under S.93 NDA (http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-n-5/latest/rsc-1985-c-n-5.html#sec93): "imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to less punishment".

Sentencing delayed until 21 September. Link (http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Taliban+shooting+Semrau+sentencing+postponed/3496299/story.html)

JMA
12-27-2010, 07:58 AM
Capt. Robert Semrau dismissed from the Forces (http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/10/05/capt-robert-semrau-dismissed-from-the-forces/)


A Canadian soldier has been kicked out of the army—but spared a stint in prison—for shooting a severely wounded insurgent on the battlefields of Afghanistan two years ago. Capt. Robert Semrau, whose controversial case sparked a nationwide debate about the ethics of mercy killing in a war zone, stood at the front of a packed courtroom Tuesday morning as a military judge announced his punishment: a demotion in rank, and dismissal from the Forces.

Been there, faced that situation (on a number of occasions), the bottom line is you can't play God yourself nor allow your soldiers to do so. He should count himself lucky.

kprtpolof1
09-03-2011, 05:46 PM
For those of you who don't know, the Canadian Forces handed over control of Panjwayi and Dand districts, Kandahar province, to US forces in July, thus ending our 5 yr + combat mission.

Of course, the US forces there now do not have the force density of CF deployments in 2010-2011, but hopefully things won't go all to hell over there...

http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2011/07/05/canada-troops-end-war-handover-kandahar-afghanistan_n_890060.html

davidbfpo
03-15-2014, 02:32 PM
This week the last Canadians left Afghanistan, they were part of a hundred strong training component. Two responses, one reflective by a Canadian journalist:
At many National Hockey League games in Canada, members of the Canadian Forces are introduced. Far from turning their faces away, as in the song about wounded Australian soldiers returning from the First World War, fans rise for a standing ovation.

(Later) Sacrifice and danger brought the military a respect it had been lacking, which is what the military men who bought into the Afghan mission were hoping would happen. They were right in these domestic hopes, but largely wrong in their Afghan ones.

Link:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/afghanistan-we-lost-the-war-but-won-the-battle/article17485848/

I wonder if the public impact is partly due to the extensive use of reservists? As noted by others with the Danish contribution.

Then there is the blatant crowing by the Taliban:
Your sacrifices have brought us freedom. The beacons of your blood have lit the way to independence. Celebrate the victory and freedom from the Canadians..

Link:http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/03/14/taliban-issues-congratula_n_4962039.html?ncid=tweetlnkushpmg00000 067