Insurgency vs. Civil War [Archive]

M-A Lagrange

06-24-2010, 03:45 PM

Rex Brynen
I would largely agree (although I would probably count RSA as a civil war), in general civil wars are a subset of insurgencies. A few defining features:

1) Severity. We don't consider the Red Army Faction versus West Germany a civil war. (I'm sometimes tempted to define civil war as an insurgency that reaches the point that the government thinks "holy crap, we could lose this!")

2) Internal actors (although they may have external patrons). Violence wholly directed at an occupying power would not be a civil war.

3) Insurgency targets an established authority. In those rare cases where there is no authority--Somalia at certain times--you could have the unusual case of a civil war that isn't an insurgency.

Rex, what would be DRC?
A war conducted by local actors in the name of external powers who are not happy that the pupet they pupet in place, after overpassing an established authority, is no more listening to them?
Just to add some fun, you can even add the fact that you have at least 2 external powers who are fighting indirectly to take control over strategic natural resources in a cold war like manner... (But that's just if you wanna go in details).

By the way, Liberia was no insurgency. It was a civil war but the rebel (Taylor) invaded the country without national support and insurgent network.
But 1) his troops were mainly liberian and 2) his obective was to reconquere power in the name of a liberia ethnic group (the Kongo).

ryanmleigh

06-24-2010, 04:02 PM

Rex-
Did you truly mean to say that civil war is a subset of insurgency, or did you mean that insurgency is a subset of civil war? Your example 1 would lead me to believe that there is scale of intrastate conflict, with civil war residing somewhere at the top and insurgency falling somehwere below that.

The current literature would also support some concept of scale. According to COW (Correlates of War) University of Michigan, political violence must incur at least 1,000 deaths to be considered a civil war. There is also a necessity for a minimum number of casualties incurred by the incumbent forces in order to achieve civil war status.

Much of the discussion so far has been terrific, to some degree I think it highlights some of the confusion surrounding the concepts of civil war and insurgency. I believe that is why it is important to identify the differences between them. It goes further than just categorizing conflict. Understanding the conflict should have an impact on how we address it.

William F. Owen

06-24-2010, 04:07 PM

Much of the discussion so far has been terrific, to some degree I think it highlights some of the confusion surrounding the concepts of civil war and insurgency. I believe that is why it is important to identify the differences between them. It goes further than just categorizes conflict. Understanding the conflict should have an impact on how we address it.
OK. I'd really like to see you put some flesh on the bones here.
From a practitioners point of view, calling it a Civil War or an insurgency is actually completely superfluous, unless it's blindingly obvious, which it is. Warfare is pretty much warfare. War is War.

ryanmleigh

06-24-2010, 04:36 PM

From a practitioners point of view, calling it a Civil War or an insurgency is actually completely superfluous, unless it's blindingly obvious, which it is. Warfare is pretty much warfare. War is War.

I agree wholeheartedly with your statement. At the tactical level, where the rubber meets the road, all war is war. However, I would argue that at the operational and strategic level there is difference in how we approach different types of conflict. That is why I think there is utility is identfying the differences.

William F. Owen

06-24-2010, 04:47 PM

However, I would argue that at the operational and strategic level there is difference in how we approach different types of conflict. That is why I think there is utility is identfying the differences.
OK, well apart from the fact I do not think there is an "operational level of War" what is that utility? Why does it matter as concerns strategy or policy?

ryanmleigh

06-24-2010, 04:53 PM

The most immediate example I can think of is the disposition and composition of the ANSF in Afghanistan. If we say that we are conducting a COIN strategy in Afghanistan then should force levels not be heavily weighted for the police instead of the army. Yet both the current levels and the espoused end state levels represent a large disparity of army to police, somewhere around 240,000 to 180,000. If we are conducting COIN should those numbers not be reversed? That is just one quick example of why it might matter.

Interesting also to hear to don't believe in the operational level of war. Another discussion I wouldn't mind getting involved in.

jmm99

06-24-2010, 05:37 PM

in trying to differentiate between insurgencies and civil wars ?

E.g., military-side (and at what level); or political-side (including legal as a subset of political) ?

And then there could be an "armed social science" definition, as to which I am sure Wilf can lead the charge. ;)

Back to Wilf's first post here - why is it important to you to differentiate ?

Regards

Mike

PS: As regards military vs police ratios, I (from the political-side - police as part of a functioning criminal justice system) can't see where calling a problem an insurgency or civil war would make any difference in deciding on military-police ratios. The ratios and functions of military and police depend on the tangible context - not what you call that context. That context may or may not allow police and judges to operate. As Wilf will say, JMM, I don't want to be baby-sitting your cops and judges - and that posits that I have competent cops and judges (not a given in Astan).

John T. Fishel

06-24-2010, 05:52 PM

over Somalia - kinda like his quible with me over RSA (and I can see his point in both cases), the real issue as Wilf succinctly put it and JMM reiterated in his lawerese ;), why do you want to differentiate? what is your purpose? If it is purely academic, then you might need an operational definition which can pretty much be what you want it to be (so long as it doesn't do too much violence to the general understanding of the term a la Webster),:eek:

Cheers

JohnT

ryanmleigh

06-24-2010, 06:18 PM

Since there seems to be some issue with why I am looking for a distinction between insurgency and civil war, please allow me to illuminate.

1. I find the lack of coherent difference between the use of terms problematic when assessing conflict.

2. Academic literature seems to intermix the terms, some write very clearly about insurgency separate and distinct from civil wars. Others ignorantly or intentionally intermix terms in both research and literature which can then be used by practitioners of war while not understanding the logic behind the data.

3. I am currently writing a monograph on the distinctions and thought it might be possible to reach a larger audience in order to create discourse as to the meaning of the words insurgency and civil wars.

If the concensus is that there is no difference, fine so be it. I accept that. However, I would still be interested in the discussion which revolves around the use of the words in both strategy and policy.

I hope this helps to clarify why I think there might some utility in identifying any difference. Whether it is political or military. I still find it instructive to debate the meaning of the words.:cool:

Rex Brynen

06-24-2010, 06:25 PM

The current literature would also support some concept of scale. According to COW (Correlates of War) University of Michigan, political violence must incur at least 1,000 deaths to be considered a civil war. There is also a necessity for a minimum number of casualties incurred by the incumbent forces in order to achieve civil war status.

I've never understood why CoW uses an absolute threshold, and not a relative one. 100 dead in Tuvalu would be a civil war. 100 dead in DR Congo is a bad morning.

Yes, I mean to say civil war is a subset of insurgency. Insurgency is simply violence against established authority. Civil wars are always large insurgencies (hence the "war").

But, to reiterate what several have now said--it all depends on why you're slotting things in conceptual boxes.

Entropy

06-24-2010, 06:28 PM

Differentiation is certainly difficult and there isn't a universal distinction. One might even argue the only difference is semantic, driven by a rhetorical or propagandist purpose. The distinction is also self-referential to a large degree which would mean that, like "terrorism" there can never be a universally accepted definition.

However, here's a possible simplistic distinction:

Insurgency will always contain a heavy focus on civic action by one or both of the belligerents (usually both). In a civil war civic action is minimal or absent and the focus is on military means.

Thoughts?

Bob's World

06-24-2010, 06:31 PM

OK. I'd really like to see you put some flesh on the bones here.
From a practitioners point of view, calling it a Civil War or an insurgency is actually completely superfluous, unless it's blindingly obvious, which it is. Warfare is pretty much warfare. War is War.

If a distinction does not help you deal with a problem more effectively, it probably lends more confusion than help. IW, 4GW, Asymmetric Warfare, etc spring to mind. New names that don't help me solve the problems they describe.

To say that the historic (and recent) distinctions for using the term insurgency or civil war to describe a conflict are a bit loose is generous. I haven't seen a clear distinction and have never seen much rhyme nor reason to how these things have been sorted.

Now, where I disagree with Wilf is that conflict between a state and its own populace is the same as conflict between two states. I understand where he's coming from, and we agree to disagree on this matter. My position is that when a state employs its military against its own populace in COIN that it may suppress the conflict for a time, but makes the underlying insurgency worse, and merely pushing the problem down the road a bit.

That said, if a serious distinction was made between a civil war and an insurgency that divides it into problems with two distinctly different solutions, then there is some value. I don't think agonizing over strategic-operational-tactical levels of conflict applies or his helpful though, so I wouldn't go down that path. If it is insurgency at a tactical level it is insurgency at all levels. Same for Civil War.

So one distinction that I have been playing with lately is that insurgency is revolutionary, an informal or illegally formed movement within a state to either change the current organic government; separatist, break some piece off from a state to form a new state; or Resistance, to overthrow some occupying/colonial force and its puppets. In all these cases I do not believe the COIN force is best served by treating the conflict as "warfare", but rather as a civil emergency that requires addressing the causal concerns rooted in the perceptions of their Legitimacy, the Injustice and Disrespect perceived by the populace, and ensuring that the populace has trusted legal means available to them to address these concerns. There will be fighting, after all, by definition the insurgent is acting outside the law and opens himself to full fury of the state, but resolution will come from addressing the root causes.

A Civil War distinction makes sense if rebel segment of the state has acted within the con struts of the law to separate themselves legally, form a new state, and are then fighting to secure that end. This is what happened in the American Civil War. A new nation was formed legally, that legality was challenged by the Union, and the two state waged a war to settle the matter. Perfectly logical to treat such an event as warfare. However, once one of those states is defeated in war, it may then devolve into an insurgency based on some mix of the categories above.

So based on this definition, there was no civil war in Iraq (unless the Kurds decide to make a full break as a state), and there is no civil war in Afghanistan. Both are insurgencies and are best resolved by addressing them as a whole as civil emergencies which require a main effort of addressing the failures of governance as perceived by their respective populaces; and a supporting effort of justly applying the rule of law to those who bring violence to the state and the populace to achieve their ends.

SteveMetz

06-24-2010, 06:37 PM

marct

06-24-2010, 06:39 PM

Interesting discussion, folks and, since I know how much Wilf loves social sciences, I thought I'd toss in my$.0195.

If the concensus is that there is no difference, fine so be it. I accept that. However, I would still be interested in the discussion which revolves around the use of the words in both strategy and policy.

Well, words, in and of themselves, have no meaning, only that which is ascribed and agreed to by those who use them. That, BTW, isn't just playing with semantics; it's a root behind semantics.

On "civil war" vs. "insurgency", I tend to think of them as overlapping circles of meaning, with a fair amount of overlap. In some cases, civil wars have absolutely nothing to do with policy or governance structure (the dynastic wars of the 11th - 16th centuries are examples), while in other cases it is, IMHO, possible to have a "civil war" with little or no violence and, certainly, no open warfare (think along the coup d'etate line or, at the other extreme, the economic lawfare of the Byzantine bureaucrat faction against the aristocracy).

I hope this helps to clarify why I think there might some utility in identifying any difference. Whether it is political or military. I still find it instructive to debate the meaning of the words.:cool:

Personally, I've found that it it really useful to assume that the boundary condition of conceptual terms gets defined by identifying central characteristics and then assigning membership values for specific instances to each of those core characteristics and seeing what clusters develop. Sometimes when you do that, what you think is one or two competing terms actually shows up four or five clusters.

Cheers,

Marc

Entropy

06-24-2010, 06:44 PM

Yes, I mean to say civil war is a subset of insurgency. Insurgency is simply violence against established authority. Civil wars are always large insurgencies (hence the "war").

Not sure I agree with that. How do you define "established authority?" Who, for example, was the established authority in the Russian civil war? What about cases where the insurgency gains the upper hand and becomes "established" but elements of the old regime remain and continue to fight? At what point to they change from being the "established authority" to the insurgent?

Bob's World

06-24-2010, 07:06 PM

This seems to have been pretty well covered, but insurgency is a strategy that is sometimes used in civil wars. A civil war is simply an armed conflict where the antagonists are exclusively or primarily citizens of the same state.

But if this is the official answer, I think it is worthy of a deeper look.

If insurgency is merely a strategy employed by a civil war opponent to the state it really doesn't offer much to the counterinsurgent in terms of helping him understand and resolve the threat. Simply defeat the civil war opponent and the insurgency will go away.

But that's not how it works. Every time that tact is taken (and that is often), the insurgency simply flares back up. Perhaps with a new name, new leadership, new ideology, often even a different segment of the society; but always to counter the same failed system of governance that gave rise to the last flare up.

I think we do better when we look at insurgency as a set of conditions that may well manifest in several forms: a miserable populace that does not dare act out; a populace that does act out - either choosing non-violent (subversion) or violent (insurgency) means. The key to effective COIN is to address the conditions and not merely set out to defeat those who dare to respond to the conditions.

marct

06-24-2010, 07:17 PM

This seems to have been pretty well covered, but insurgency is a strategy that is sometimes used in civil wars. A civil war is simply an armed conflict where the antagonists are exclusively or primarily citizens of the same state.

But if this is the official answer, I think it is worthy of a deeper look.

If insurgency is merely a strategy employed by a civil war opponent to the state it really doesn't offer much to the counterinsurgent in terms of helping him understand and resolve the threat. Simply defeat the civil war opponent and the insurgency will go away.

Hmmm, well "insurgency", at least in the sense of a popular uprising, might be a tactic employed in a civil war but, on the whole, I have to agree with Bob that it certainly can't be limited to that.

I think we do better when we look at insurgency as a set of conditions that may well manifest in several forms: a miserable populace that does not dare act out; a populace that does act out - either choosing non-violent (subversion) or violent (insurgency) means. The key to effective COIN is to address the conditions and not merely set out to defeat those who dare to respond to the conditions.

Agreed about manifesting in several forms, but I'm not sure I agree with you on the implied crisp distinction between insurgency and subversion. For example, I would argue that Ghandi was an insurgent rather than a "subversive".

ryanmleigh

06-24-2010, 07:31 PM

Bob's World

06-24-2010, 07:31 PM

Just applying Kitson's distinction. Same root cause, Subversion as it grows, Insurgency once the violence exceeeds a certain level (just to show I don't have to come up with my own approach for everything, and to throw Wilf a well-earned bone). But it is these causal conditions of insurgency at the roots of this whole mess that must be the main effort focus of good (effective) COIN. Too often we slave away at defeating the symptoms as they manifest and largely ignore the root causes.

This gets to the crux of my work; and why I see Karzai's efforts with reconciliation as the key to success in Afghanistan, regardless of what General we put in charge of the military coalition efforts. The coalition's military efforts have to be a supporting effort to a supporting effort (Afghan military efforts) for there to be true success. But that is not how we're approaching this.

By focusing on what Karzai is doing at the GIROA level we get at the actual heart of the insurgency. If he is unwilling to go all in on addressing the causal factors, then that is the metric we are looking for in terms of beginning our down-sizing of military effort. We can't just be the goon squad that keeps him in power.

marct

06-24-2010, 07:41 PM

Based on a lot of the recent discussion is there a need to distinguish between the political and military aspects of conflict. Could it be as simple as saying that civil war is primarily a military conflict with political action secondary while an insurgency is primarily a political conflict with military action secondary?

It might, possibly, be easier to concentrate on the concept of civil war as a conflict to determine who will rule, while and insurgency would be closer to how they will rule.

Just applying Kitson's distinction. Same root cause, Subversion as it grows, Insurgency once the violence exceeeds a certain level (just to show I don't have to come up with my own approach for everything, and to throw Wilf a well-earned bone). But it is these causal conditions of insurgency at the roots of this whole mess that must be the main effort focus of good (effective) COIN. Too often we slave away at defeating the symptoms as they manifest and largely ignore the root causes.

Agreed (sort of :wry:). As I said earlier, I can think of "insurgencies" that were basically non-violent. I came up with another one as I was dealing with my "microsoft moment" (you know "Install these updates now or we will destroy your computer...."): the Catholic Church.

This gets to the crux of my work; and why I see Karzai's efforts with reconciliation as the key to success in Afghanistan, regardless of what General we put in charge of the military coalition efforts. The coalition's military efforts have to be a supporting effort to a supporting effort (Afghan military efforts) for there to be true success. But that is not how we're approaching this.

By focusing on what Karzai is doing at the GIROA level we get at the actual heart of the insurgency. If he is unwilling to go all in on addressing the causal factors, then that is the metric we are looking for in terms of beginning our down-sizing of military effort. We can't just be the goon squad that keeps him in power.

Totally agree in the specifics of Afghanistan, Bob. I would argue, in fact, that a number of ISAF efforts have been counter-productive to resolving that conflict.

jmm99

06-24-2010, 08:53 PM

Let me take just one very narrow topic - how have insurgencies and civil wars been treated under domestic law and international law over the last 200 years ?

To answer that, I'd have to put together a list of armed conflicts (which is the key I Law term) that may be called a lot of different names - insurgencies, civil wars, insurrections, rebellions, resistence to occupiers, national liberation wars, etc.

In short, I look at a bunch of "Small Wars" in Callwell's jargon (or "Shadow Wars" in Asprey's jargon) and end up with some "operational definitions" as brother Fishel terms them - definitions not carved in stone but set up for working purposes.

Then I'd look at how each of those armed conflicts was treated legally, domestically (at least two views there - e.g., the War of Southern Rebellion vs the War of Northern Aggression) and internationally (many possible views).

That would be quite a study - one I don't plan on starting and finishing this month. :)

And - it would be largely immaterial to all except a small group of Laws of War folks.

Regards

Mike

MikeF

06-24-2010, 09:34 PM

Bob's World

06-24-2010, 09:56 PM

Here's what I was taught- the independent variable is the guerrila's capacity to conduct violence.

So,

An insurgency can be labeled a civil war once the guerrila builds the same capacity to conduct violence (military mass) that the host nation possesses.

Applied loosely, this does not have to mean the the guerrila possesses the same amount of tanks as the host nation. That's why one could justify Iraq moved into a civil war between late 2005 and early 2006.

I don't like it though, don't see the difference as being one of scale or capacity, but rather one of nature. How is the nature of insurgency unique from that of civil war?

I see civil war as being much more like any other state on state war, except that in this case one state decided to form into two states and then wage state on state war. So for me civil war is war. It only denotes that both sides were a single state before it started and are fighting over the split.

Insurgency need never split the state. As I (frequently, Ken reminds me :)) state, I see insurgency as a unique set of causal conditions rooted in certain fundamental failures on the part of the government as perceived by their populace. As Marc indicates, this can then manifest itself in several forms, some non-violent, some violent, some legal, some illegal. The causal roots are the same for this family of insurgency-based conflict. Regardless of how it manifests, addressing the causal roots must be the focus/main effort of the COIN effort. If it goes violent you have "classic insurgency"; if it goes illegal, but non-violent, you have "classic subversion; if it stays legal but stays non-violent you have politics. You may get each sequentially, or at the same time, or in a crazy mix over years and years. So long as the causal roots remain unaddressed it is the gift that keeps giving.

Rex Brynen

06-24-2010, 10:06 PM

I see civil war as being much more like any other state on state war, except that in this case one state decided to form into two states and then wage state on state war. So for me civil war is war. It only denotes that both sides were a single state before it started and are fighting over the split.

Perhaps you're projecting too much from the US case? Most civil wars (English, Russian, Lebanese, Liberian, etc) aren't primarily about political separation, they're about control.

Steve Blair

06-24-2010, 10:07 PM

I would tend to agree with Rex. U.S. historical examples are often rather singular and can be difficult to use on a wider scale or stage.

ryanmleigh

06-25-2010, 03:28 AM

Perhaps you're projecting too much from the US case? Most civil wars (English, Russian, Lebanese, Liberian, etc) aren't primarily about political separation, they're about control.

Rex, very interesting thread. Do you think you could possibly expand on the idea of control some? In the context you are using the word control, control of or over what? Not trying to nail you down or anything I am just curious what you meant by control.

Rex Brynen

06-25-2010, 04:35 AM

Rex, very interesting thread. Do you think you could possibly expand on the idea of control some? In the context you are using the word control, control of or over what? Not trying to nail you down or anything I am just curious what you meant by control.

Political control--over regime, territory, and the allocation of resources.

Bob's World

06-25-2010, 05:56 AM

Perhaps you're projecting too much from the US case? Most civil wars (English, Russian, Lebanese, Liberian, etc) aren't primarily about political separation, they're about control.

I Recognize that "civil war" is a term used to describe all kinds of conflicts; most of which I would argue really weren't civil wars at all but rather were more insurgencies. But with no firm definitions to work with, why argue? So not projecting the US verson, but merely seeing it as distinct from insurgency, so perhaps a workable model for a definition of Civil War that is also distinct from insurgency.

Size is not a good distinction, and as the Maoist model suggests an insurgency can grow until it becomes very conventional in nature, so type of warfare being waged is not a good distinction either. I think you have to look at the causal roots to find viable distinctions; and this is also where you shape viable COAs for dealing with a conflict as well.

The historically sloppy use of the term "civil war" by historians really clouds development of a workable definition that makes it distinct from insurgency in a meaningful, helpful way.

William F. Owen

06-25-2010, 06:14 AM

The historically sloppy use of the term "civil war" by historians really clouds development of a workable definition that makes it distinct from insurgency in a meaningful, helpful way.
Again, why do we wish to differentiate? Basically the problem here is the silly word "insurgency" which has become so loaded, it has now ceased to be useful, thanks to the US COIN-club malarky.
IMO, it matters not if it's an Rebellion or a Civil War. You are still backing one side against the other, in line with US policy.
The mission is to make sure that the side you like wins. That's it!! Pick a side, and resource it, until it has defeated the armed opposition. Why make it more complex?

MikeF

06-25-2010, 11:07 AM

I don't like it though, don't see the difference as being one of scale or capacity, but rather one of nature. How is the nature of insurgency unique from that of civil war?

Sir, it's just a matter of what lens that you are using. I don't think that has to be mutually exclusive. Rather, I can blend scale/capacity and what you'd describe as the soul. I'd suggest we put them together in order to have a better understanding of the conflict. For example, two dudes who act violently over justified grievances over bad governance are less of a concern to me than a million man army gathering in DC.

Insurgency need never split the state. As I (frequently, Ken reminds me :)) state, I see insurgency as a unique set of causal conditions rooted in certain fundamental failures on the part of the government as perceived by their populace. As Marc indicates, this can then manifest itself in several forms, some non-violent, some violent, some legal, some illegal. The causal roots are the same for this family of insurgency-based conflict. Regardless of how it manifests, addressing the causal roots must be the focus/main effort of the COIN effort. If it goes violent you have "classic insurgency"; if it goes illegal, but non-violent, you have "classic subversion; if it stays legal but stays non-violent you have politics. You may get each sequentially, or at the same time, or in a crazy mix over years and years. So long as the causal roots remain unaddressed it is the gift that keeps giving.

That makes sense. And you still need to address the issue of control.

From Rex

Political control--over regime, territory, and the allocation of resources.

Excellent points Rex, but we must also remember that it's an illusion of control. That's actually one reason why I think that Glenn Beck is so paranoid these days. He finally realized most of the things he took for granted were illusions- security, economics, etc...They are based on the belief that something is true.

Economic example- My bank says that my savings account has $10000. Does the bank physically have my money on hand? No. They've reinvested it into loans, bonds, stocks, etc...If I go and ask for my money, then no problem. If everyone makes a run on the bank, then big problem.

Mike

SteveMetz

06-25-2010, 11:37 AM

But if this is the official answer, I think it is worthy of a deeper look.

If insurgency is merely a strategy employed by a civil war opponent to the state it really doesn't offer much to the counterinsurgent in terms of helping him understand and resolve the threat. Simply defeat the civil war opponent and the insurgency will go away.

But that's not how it works. Every time that tact is taken (and that is often), the insurgency simply flares back up. Perhaps with a new name, new leadership, new ideology, often even a different segment of the society; but always to counter the same failed system of governance that gave rise to the last flare up.

I think we do better when we look at insurgency as a set of conditions that may well manifest in several forms: a miserable populace that does not dare act out; a populace that does act out - either choosing non-violent (subversion) or violent (insurgency) means. The key to effective COIN is to address the conditions and not merely set out to defeat those who dare to respond to the conditions.

I would never purport to give an official answer. But the key distinction is between defeating an opponent and altering whatever conditions are that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. It doesn't matter whether a war is civil or international, or whether one of the antagonists uses a strategy of insurgency or not, simply defeating the enemy does not assure that the conflict will later re-emerge, but at least opens that possibility. E.g. World War I which did not alter the conditions that gave rise to it, while World War II did.

When a conflict does re-emerge, even if one of the antagonists used insurgency earlier they may not later. South Vietnam did not fall to an insurgency. In other words, a given conflict can have insurgency phases and non-insurgency phases.

Simply because something is a "civil war" does not, in itself, imply whether the goal should be the limited one of defeating existing enemies or altering the conditions which gave rise to the conflict. A civil war simply involves antagonists from the same nation.

M-A Lagrange

06-25-2010, 12:43 PM

ryanmleigh
Based on a lot of the recent discussion is there a need to distinguish between the political and military aspects of conflict. Could it be as simple as saying that civil war is primarily a military conflict with political action secondary while an insurgency is primarily a political conflict with military action secondary?

Probably far to simplistic, but still trying to wrap my head around the differences.

Some definitions from Wikipedia that have the advantage to be the ones from ICRC and great scholar:
Civil war:
James Fearon, a scholar of civil wars at Stanford University, defines a civil war as "a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies".Ann Hironaka further specifies that one side of a civil war is the state. The intensity at which a civil disturbance becomes a civil war is contested by academics. Some political scientists define a civil war as having more than 1000 casualties, while others further specify that at least 100 must come from each side. The Correlates of War, a dataset widely used by scholars of conflict, classifies civil wars as having over 1000 war-related casualties per year of conflict. This rate is a small fraction of the millions killed in the Second Sudanese Civil War and Cambodian Civil War, for example, but excludes several highly publicized conflicts, such as The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the struggle of the African National Congress in Apartheid-era South Africa.
Based on the 1000 casualties per year criterion, there were 213 civil wars from 1816 to 1997, 104 of which occurred from 1944 to 1997. If one uses the less-stringent 1000 casualties total criterion, there were over 90 civil wars between 1945 and 2007, with 20 ongoing civil wars as of 2007.
Further definitions
The Geneva Conventions do not specifically define the term "civil war". They do, however, describe the criteria for acts qualifying as "armed conflict not of an international character", which includes civil wars. Among the conditions listed are four requirements:
• The party in revolt must be in possession of a part of the national territory.
• The insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto authority over the population within the determinate portion of the national territory.
• The insurgents must have some amount of recognition as a belligerent.
• The legal Government is "obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war

Insurgency:
The United States Department of Defense (DOD) defines it as "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." The new United States counterinsurgency Field Manual, proposes a structure that includes both insurgency and counterinsurgency [COIN]. (italics in original)
Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. These definitions are a good starting point, but they do not properly highlight a key paradox: though insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been called revolutionary war or internal war, they are distinctly different types of operations. In addition, insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare.
The French expert on Indochina and Vietnam, Bernard Fall, entitled one of his major books Street without joy: insurgency in Indochina, 1946-63. Fall himself, however, wrote later on that "revolutionary warfare" might be a more accurate term. Insurgency has been used for years in professional military literature. Under the British, the situation in Malaya (now Malaysia) was often called the "Malayan insurgency"., or "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland. Insurgencies have existed in many countries and regions, including the Philippines, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Yemen, Djibouti, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Democratic Republic of the Congo, the American colonies of Great Britain, and the Confederate States of America.[16] Each had different specifics but share the property of an attempt to disrupt the central government by means considered illegal by that government. North points out, however, that insurgents today need not be part of a highly organized movement:
"Some are networked with only loose objectives and mission-type orders to enhance their survival. Most are divided and factionalized by area, composition, or goals. Strike one against the current definition of insurgency. It is not relevant to the enemies we face today. Many of these enemies do not currently seek the overthrow of a constituted government...weak government control is useful and perhaps essential for many of these “enemies of the state” to survive and operate."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency

I would more or less in accordance with Wilf. Insurgency is qualifying a way to conduct war not a good term to describe a “war”.

International and non international wars can be done through irregular warfare or regular warfare.
The use of irregular warfare tactics is not sufficient to describe a movement as acivil war or an insurgency.

Insurgency as others did point it can be against a national government from nationals. Or against a foreign government by nationals. While a civilwar is only 2 or more nationals parties against each others.

Bob's World

06-25-2010, 01:37 PM

Steve;

Actually S. Vietnam DID fall to insurgency. We tend to put way too much emphasis on the fact that a bunch of Westerners broke off a chunk of Vietnam in the middle of the insurgency and created this tremendous sanctuary for the insurgency called "North Vietnam." The creation of that state in mid-stream in no way changed the overall nature and goal of the larger insurgency. Ho followed the Maoist model with which prescribes advancing to decisive conventional operations as the final stage of the insurgency, which they surged up to several times, ultimately prevailing. We confused ourselves into thinking we had a state on state war with a supporting local insurgency and thereby got off track on our approach to the problem. We confuse ourselves often in these things by taking too seriously what governments think and perceive. Insurgency is all about what the populace thinks and perceives.

In other places we have confused ourselves by declaring "victory" because one insurgent group has been militarily defeated, while the underlying perceptions of poor governance with the populace have been largely untreated and continue to fester along re-emerging in violence a few years down the road (often with new groups, new ideologies and new leaders). Algeria and the Philippines spring to mind as a couple of recent classic examples of this. The insurgency is the perception among the populace, and is rooted in the government itself, not any one particular group that rises up to challenge that government.

Bob

SteveMetz

06-25-2010, 01:43 PM

Rex Brynen

06-25-2010, 03:15 PM

Economic example- My bank says that my savings account has $10000. Does the bank physically have my money on hand? No. They've reinvested it into loans, bonds, stocks, etc...If I go and ask for my money, then no problem. If everyone makes a run on the bank, then big problem.

Mike:

Feel free to send me some of that illusionary money in your bank anytime. :D

Steve Blair

06-25-2010, 03:16 PM

Mike:

Feel free to send me some of that illusionary money in your bank anytime. :D

No kidding!:D

Bob's World

06-25-2010, 03:20 PM

I have a bit of trouble defining a combined arms force of over 200K as an insurgent one. I think you fall into the trap of defining insurgency as anything Mao described. The Maoist approach was to use insurgency to prepare for conventional war.

I'll stick to my point that insurgency is a strategy, and a given protagonist may shift in and out of it. I think we befuddle ourselves when we try and define insurgency by its political objectives. We just can't transcend our obsession with the Cold War security environment.

Agree with your last sentence completely, but will hold firm that insurgency is a state of populace perception about governance rather than a strategy employed by a civil war movement. surging to that large decisive conventional force was always the goal of the Vietnamese insurgency, just as it was always the goal of Mao himself in China. That is probably, in fact, the key distinction of Maoist insurgency, the goal of achieving decisive effects through large scale conventional military operations. Most probably think it is the communist ideology he employed.

Most insurgencies take many forms, and the form does not define them. It is in their formation that one fines the insights that enable effective COIN.

MikeF

06-25-2010, 03:22 PM

Feel free to send me some of that illusionary money in your bank anytime. :D

Rex/Steve,

I've got 1,000,000 Iraqi dinars ready to transfer. Should buy you a cup of coffee :D.

Mike

Steve Blair

06-25-2010, 03:28 PM

Rex/Steve,

I've got 1,000,000 Iraqi dinars ready to transfer. Should buy you a cup of coffee :D.

Mike

So long as it's not Starbucks, you're on!:cool:

Entropy

06-25-2010, 04:01 PM

Steve;

Actually S. Vietnam DID fall to insurgency. We tend to put way too much emphasis on the fact that a bunch of Westerners broke off a chunk of Vietnam in the middle of the insurgency and created this tremendous sanctuary for the insurgency called "North Vietnam."

So why was the communist north created? If it wasn't because of poor governance by the south, then how could it be considered an insurgency, especially since the Vietminh were around before the partition and the creation of the RVN? Or, why can't the opposite case be made - that North Vietnam successfully fought off an insurgency from the south?

Similarly, what about the Koreas? Do we consider North Korea to be "insurgents" against the South? Or Germany before reunification? That doesn't make much sense. For all practical purposes, North Vietnam and South Vietnam were distinct states and one of those states conquered the other through conventional means. That the North also fostered an insurgency in the South (which ultimately failed) doesn't, it seems to me, make the entire conflict an insurgency.

Steve Blair

06-25-2010, 04:09 PM

This also doesn't really take into account the social and cultural differences between the north and south (and even some ethnic differences). No, I'd say Vietnam actually runs closer to the civil war side of things.

marct

06-25-2010, 04:19 PM

Staying away from Vietnam, how would you folks classify the Thirty Years War (outside of exceedingly messy)?

Steve Blair

06-25-2010, 04:25 PM

marct

06-25-2010, 04:40 PM

Not one of my big areas of expertise, but I would say that it began as something like an insurgency based on religion (with the inevitable cultural overtones) and then grew into a civil war and finally became a world war (of sorts, anyhow).

Could be, I honestly have no idea how to classify it using any of the current terms. "A great mutherin' mess" still seems to be the best classification for it :wry:.

In more on point terms, it appears to have had elements of insurgency, succession rebellion (e.g. Bohemia), various and sundry religious revolts / counter-revolts, inter-state warfare, military entrepreneurs becoming "legitimate" (e.g. Wallenstein), plus, plus, plus, as well as being a civil war in the HRE.

OTOH, another reason I brought it up is that the treaties that ended it are the foundation of the modern state system and, hence, a lot of our current definitions. Given that, it may be a useful case to look at to see if those definitions still make sense.

Steve Blair

06-25-2010, 04:43 PM

I went with my escalation definition because it seems to me to make the most sense based on my conception of both insurgency and civil war. And I do think that, as you pointed out, you can have an insurgency going on within a civil war (depending on the territory in question). I honestly don't see most of these things as being as cut and dried as we might prefer. But then again, I also don't see the Indian Wars as being insurgencies, either....:wry:

jmm99

06-25-2010, 05:00 PM

at the very end of WWII in 1945 by what they (Ho, Giap, etc.) called the August Revolution (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_Revolution). To them, they created the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the entire country - not just North Vietnam (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Vietnam)). They claimed governmental legitimacy from the August 25, 1945 abdication of Bao Dai in favor of Ho's government.

The Viet Minh had to deal with four foreign military occupiers during the 1945-1946 period: Japanese, Chinese, British and French. The Viet Minh and the French reached tentative agreements in 1946, which accepted French military forces in both the South and the North (replacing the other occupiers), but also recognized Ho's government. The French-VM accord blew up in the later half of 1946 and the First Indochina War ensued.

The position of Ho-Giap was that that war was the Resistence War - seeing France as a foreign invader with the restored Bao Dai as France's puppet. When that war ended in VM success, the Hanoi government was willing to allow a partition so that it could secure its base areas in the North. It had no intention of limiting itself to the North and its constitutions made clear that the DRV encompssed all of Vietnam.

Diem surprisingly survived and to some extent thrived in 1955-1959, with the US replacing France as South Vietnam's patron. Having completed their build-up of their Northern base areas, the Hanoi government re-instituted the Resistence War (using more of a neo-colonialist theme, and setting up the NLF as its front in the south).

The NLF guerrillas and cadres in the South (augmented by PAVN regulars) were therefore, in the Ho-Giap view, a typical resistence force looking forward to the day when it could achieve final juncture with the North's conventional forces. In short, Hanoi was waging unconventional warfare in the South against a quasi-foreign invader army.

Giap tried to effect a closing juncture in 1965, 1968, 1972 and 1975 (with final success). By that time, ARVN had committed half of its strength to baby sitting its pacification effort in rural areas (which saw some success before the final deluge).

So, what was Indochina-Vietnam in the South - an insurgency, civil war, resistence war, unconventional war with a conventional ending or something else ? Did and does it make a difference in what it's called ?

Regards

Mike

Entropy

06-25-2010, 05:16 PM

Staying away from Vietnam, how would you folks classify the Thirty Years War (outside of exceedingly messy)?

Good question!

One theme I'm getting from the discussion here is that people are classifying based on three rough criteria:

1. Classification based on how the conduct of the conflict - ie. guerrilla warfare vs "conventional" warfare.

2. Classification based on the actor's intent or "why they are fighting."

3. Classification based on the actor's type of organization- ei. nation states, tribes, etc.

One problem that makes the 30 years war difficult to classify is that today we base our interpretations of conflict around #3 - the nation state as the "standard" political entity. If two states are in conflict, then it is "war." If the conflict occurs within the borders of what we call a state, then it is civil war/insurgency. So, as long as we put the state at the top of the organizational hierarchy, I don't think we will be able to "fit" many types of conflict, including the 30-years war, into a war/civil war/insurgency construct.

Of course, Wilf will come in and remind us again that these classifications are arbitrary and largely useless because war is war.

Mike,

My point exactly - why can't South Vietnam be viewed as the "insurgents" against the North? This goes back to my earlier point that these classifications are often self-referential.

marct

06-25-2010, 05:51 PM

One theme I'm getting from the discussion here is that people are classifying based on three rough criteria:

1. Classification based on how the conduct of the conflict - ie. guerrilla warfare vs "conventional" warfare.

2. Classification based on the actor's intent or "why they are fighting."

3. Classification based on the actor's type of organization- ei. nation states, tribes, etc.

Nice summation, Entropy! Okay, what if we use these three classification, what, "dimensions(?), as the basis for defining a set of boundary conditions and see where that takes us? So,

1. the "How" a conflict is conducted would be tactical and grand tactical (yeah, I use the older system; so sue me :D). That "how" or, rather, a group / factions selection of a given "how" at a point in time, should be conditioned by a number of different factors such as technology, social organization, time, ideology, cultural mores. As such, we might want to refer to insurgency / COIN as an "operational" (grand tactical) choice amongst a variety of others such as "conventional", "raising political awareness" (a la Mao), subversion, popular demonstrations, terrorist strikes, counter-terrorism, etc.

2. the "Why" question is a lot "fuzzier" in some ways, but I would suggest it gets back to two core areas: competing narratives / systems and competing faction placement (dynastic wars or which general runs banana republic X this week?). I *think* that this is a more strategic and grand strategic level, and definitely more in line with questions of legitimacy, governance, strat comm, etc.

3. The organizational type question should also feed back into both the first and second types, and is probably the critical one in terms of international law (Mike?). That said, I suspect that it is also the least important in operational terms except inasmuch as it produces operational limitations. The other thing is that if we want to produce a model like this, we would probably have to decompose organizational type into sub-characteristics such as resource control, governance, force "reach" (possibly further sub-divided by battlespace?), etc.

Leaving off how useful this might be for generating definitions, especially by spotting definitional "holes" and overlaps, I think that this might also get to Bob's point about it having some practical use.

jmm99

06-25-2010, 06:40 PM

we are on the same page:

Mike,

My point exactly - why can't South Vietnam be viewed as the "insurgents" against the North? This goes back to my earlier point that these classifications are often self-referential.

So, let's then look at Giap's strategy as a counter-insurgency strategy (rather than an "insurgency" strategy), which was quite different from the conventional "clear-hold-build" COIN strategy.

In fact, it was the reverse:

1. build - establish the guerrillas and political cadres (ongoing from 1959 on a generally increasing basis).

2. hold - secure base areas (well accomplished, with some assistance from Kissinger, by the 1973 Paris Accords).

3. clear - achieve juncture of unconventional and conventional forces after causing dispersal of ARVN forces (success in 1975).

In a sense, Jim Gant has suggested something similar without citing Giap.

Regards

Mike

Steve Blair

06-25-2010, 06:48 PM

Of course, if we ignore Marc and focus on Vietnam, this could also take on a different aspect. SVN was never really heavily controlled by either the French or the Viet Minh (it wasn't as settled as the north, for one, and lacked the industrial base), and the traditional "seat" of Vietnamese government had been in the center of the country (Hue). So looking at local realities, it doesn't become as simple as a Northern counterinsurgency against the South. Much of SVN was something of a recent acquisition in historical terms, and the people there had developed different cultural patterns and dialects than their northern "cousins." Plus you had certain indigenous populations added to the mix as well.

Still, the Entropy/Mike angle is an interesting one, and might provide some insight into possible reasons for some of Giap's decisions and outlooks.

slapout9

06-25-2010, 07:36 PM

1. build - establish the guerrillas and political cadres (ongoing from 1959 on a generally increasing basis).

Mike

Yes,Yes,Yes that is exactly what we did when I went through the "One Minute Guerrilla Warfare Course" this was basic Special Warfare, which we seem to have forgotten and it can be done very fast as Operation Jawbreaker proved (we left out demobilization)as well as several others during the Ike administration. We had one bad one "Bay Of Pigs" and then went off on the COINISM theory.

Cavguy

06-26-2010, 12:57 AM

All-
I am looking for some assistance trying to differentiate between insurgencies and civil wars. I have already read most of the literature on the benchmarks necessary to meet the international standard for a civil war, I am more interested in what the community thinks about the differences between the two. Academic sources would be helpful, but I am just as inclined to read your opinions as well. I appreciate any assistance you all can provide.

See my answer in this post HERE (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=97259&postcount=13). Should confuse matters. Bottom line there is no CLEAR way to cleanly separate insurgency from civil war, in an academic sense. The real answer looks more like a Venn diagram depending on when/where you want to assess your case.

slapout9

06-26-2010, 03:47 AM

Ryan--

All civil wars are insurgencies if by insurgency we mean an effort to overturn a govt and replace it with another by armed means. Not all insurgenies are civil wars. If the govt is some external power or a clearly defined different group. Thus, the ANC insurgency against the RSA was not a civil war because both Afrikaners and Africans defined themselves as different peoples. Of course, the outcome was to redefine all S Africans as one people. And, I left off the Anglo S. Africans. so, perhaps, it was a civi war after all.:confused:

Cheers

JohnT

IMO that is about the best definition you can get. I would add if it is two opposing groups of "citizens"(legal residents) inside the same Geographic boundary or country, it will usually be viewed as Civil War. But as John points out whenever an External power/group "non-citizens" comes into the picture it will tend to be called an Insurgency.

The very term Insurgency is rather nebulous because it often depends on the viewpoint you have as to who is the good guy or bad guy. I have often thought that term was invented because it is more Politically acceptably to use that term as opposed to calling it some type of War(Civil or Un-Civil).

Bob's World

06-26-2010, 04:24 AM

So why was the communist north created? If it wasn't because of poor governance by the south, then how could it be considered an insurgency, especially since the Vietminh were around before the partition and the creation of the RVN? Or, why can't the opposite case be made - that North Vietnam successfully fought off an insurgency from the south?

Similarly, what about the Koreas? Do we consider North Korea to be "insurgents" against the South? Or Germany before reunification? That doesn't make much sense. For all practical purposes, North Vietnam and South Vietnam were distinct states and one of those states conquered the other through conventional means. That the North also fostered an insurgency in the South (which ultimately failed) doesn't, it seems to me, make the entire conflict an insurgency.

Ike's assessment, in '56 I believe, was that if an open election was conducted that Ho would have taken some 80% of the popular vote nation-wide. Now, if we had still been proponents of Self-Determination in '56 we would have said "excellent, the people know what they want and by helping them achieve it we will have an ally and have stayed true to our ideals." But of course, the Dulles boys and Ike were well on the path of a new strategy rooted in control of nations on the fringes of Communist China and Russia to help contain that threat. So instead of allowing a pure execution of democratic principles to allow a self-determination of governance that would have made the whole of Vietnam a communist state (perceived reasonably as a "loss" for our team).

Lansdale was already hard at work on the ground in the south working to make Diem into a Magsaysay (which he never was); and we began a concerted effort to slow-roll the election and prop up our illegitimate puppet in order to sustain the false division of "North" and "South" states; knowing that an election would have merged the nation as one under a communist Ho.

Faced with the loss of "Hope" in the blocked access to legal means of changing governance, along with the "Injustice” and "Disrespect" of the same, and the externally provided "Illegitimate" governance of Diem; the insurgency that had been waged against the French picked up steam once again; this time with Ho having the legal sanctuary of a State in North Vietnam to help support and sustain his pursuit of classic Maoist insurgency.

Point being, the machinations of governments do not determine if a movement is an insurgency or not. It is the roots within the populace that determine the nature of it.

Our national pride, coupled with the fear of the expansion of communist ideology, led us to make decisions counter to our national ethos, and embroiled us in an otherwise wholly avoidable conflict. We should learn from this experience. The best COIN is done well in advance of a situation going kinetic, and because we did not appreciate that fact we adopted policies that were largely responsible for what followed.

Korea was a very different situation altogether. I doubt very much that the leadership of the North was the governance desired by the populace of the South; and I doubt very much that the Governance of the North and their Chinese backers would have been willing to sit down with the Governance of the South and their American backers and agree to some nation-wide process of self-determination and everyone agreeing to live by the same. So it began with two states already formed. I would tend to put this then into my civil war category with traditional warfare then being a valid technique for resolving the conflict.

Just my take.

Bob's World

06-26-2010, 04:32 AM

Staying away from Vietnam, how would you folks classify the Thirty Years War (outside of exceedingly messy)?

But it was, as is often the case, one of many insurgencies all aimed against the illegitimate agents of the governance of the Holy Roman Empire. The wars were never about the promotion of Protestantism. (Ideology is always a critical requriement, but never an end unto itself. For some in movement, sure, but for the movement itself? No.)

In fact, Martin Luthor was pretty upset when smart political types recognized the value and power of his fresh thoughts on Christianity and co-opted them to fuel their insurgency against the Catholic governance.

All fueled by the information age created by the invention of the printing press, that served to "democratize" knowledge. Once the Catholic Church lost its monopoly on knowledge, it was only a matter of time before they also lost their monopoly on governance as well.

Ken White

06-26-2010, 05:08 AM

Our national pride, coupled with the fear of the expansion of communist ideology, led us to make decisions counter to our national ethos, and embroiled us in an otherwise wholly avoidable conflict. We should learn from this experience. The best COIN is done well in advance of a situation going kinetic, and because we did not appreciate that fact we adopted policies that were largely responsible for what followed.Actually, that's all correct but you left a couple of things out.

Add the fact that Kennedy in addition to wanting to appear tough on Communism (your 'national pride,' part 1) also wanted even more to boost the US economy which was in the doldrums and a small war would fit the bill nicely and aid Democratic electoral hopes.

Eisenhower had been tempted to do the same thing to boost Republican hopes but the then CofS Army, Matthew Ridgeway, talked him out of it. Kennedy moved people to insure no one tried to talk him out of it. He inherited a negatively inclined Lemnitzer as Chairman but replaced him with a recalled from retirement pro-intervention Maxwell Taylor to rid himself of a turbulent priest...

We also DID appreciate the fact that best COIN was done in advance of total deterioration but we deliberately and with full knowledge ignored it mostly for domestic political reasons ('national pride,' parts 2 and 3). That "fear of the expansion of communist ideology" was an excuse, not a reason. We do that kind of stuff a lot...

Our ethos is bi-polar. The ethos you espouse is in the books; the ethos we follow more often than not is keyed to cut throat domestic agendas and our international interests as perceived by the administration of the day. Lately, those all tend to be awfully mediocre...

All that is why for over two years I have continued to say the Jones version is great, ideally could be implemented -- but is not likely to be because it doesn't allow for such machinations which are critical to the survival of the US political class. Add our electoral process and the concomitant lack of continuity and your hopes are unlikely to be realized. :rolleyes:

Bob's World

06-26-2010, 05:54 AM

Ken,

No version of history is perfect, and I am sure I put my own twist on information that is already "well twisted" by others.

Key is that when we get into these messes that we do so knowingly. I am, based on my own personal experience with senior leadership, not so sure they appreciated the nature of the problem and how the actions they selected were likely to play out in the long run. We will still make political decisions for political reasons as you wisely point out, but armed with a more sophisticated understanding of these types of movements we can create into the original design aspects that can go a long way toward mitigating the downside of the likely consequences.

Dayuhan

06-26-2010, 06:54 AM

James Fearon, a scholar of civil wars at Stanford University, defines a civil war as "a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies".Ann Hironaka further specifies that one side of a civil war is the state.

If one side of a civil war must be the state, that would exclude a case like Somalia, where there is no state. Seems an unnecessary qualification to me.

The intensity at which a civil disturbance becomes a civil war is contested by academics. Some political scientists define a civil war as having more than 1000 casualties, while others further specify that at least 100 must come from each side. The Correlates of War, a dataset widely used by scholars of conflict, classifies civil wars as having over 1000 war-related casualties per year of conflict.

A numerical cutoff offers precision, and some absurd possibilities as well. If the cutoff is 1000/year, that means a conflict could easily be a civil war one year, an insurgency the next, then a civil war again... which makes the distinction less than useful.

I have a bit of trouble defining a combined arms force of over 200K as an insurgent one. I think you fall into the trap of defining insurgency as anything Mao described. The Maoist approach was to use insurgency to prepare for conventional war.

I'll stick to my point that insurgency is a strategy, and a given protagonist may shift in and out of it. I think we befuddle ourselves when we try and define insurgency by its political objectives. We just can't transcend our obsession with the Cold War security environment.

By that standard it seems that irregular warfare by internal forces opposed to the state is insurgency, while regular warfare by internal forces opposed to the state is civil war. That of course requires some fixed line defining irregular vs regular warfare.

Is irregular warfare the strategy, or insurgency... or are they the same thing?

Is the difference between civil war and insurgency purely quantitative, a civil war simply being a large insurgency? Or is there a qualitative difference as well?

Given current circumstances, a more relevant question might be how much foreign participation is required for a conflict to be inter-state, rather than civil war or insurgency. Are both civil war and insurgency by definition purely internal?

At a certain level the distinctions become semantic, and certainly there's going to be some overlap. At the same time, though, it's useful to have some consensus on what these terms mean.

Ken White

06-26-2010, 01:58 PM

...based on my own personal experience with senior leadership, not so sure they appreciated the nature of the problem and how the actions they selected were likely to play out in the long run.however, with similar experience, I frequently noted that the problem was generally well understood but that the ego of said senior soul overrode his common sense and he presumed he of all people would be able to overcome the obvious downsides.

Usually wrongly... :wry:

Bob's World

06-26-2010, 03:04 PM

however, with similar experience, I frequently noted that the problem was generally well understood but that the ego of said senior soul overrode his common sense and he presumed he of all people would be able to overcome the obvious downsides.

Usually wrongly... :wry:

I was thinking about this. I think they probably defined "The Problem" as that of keeping Vietnam being chalked up as a "loss" in the containment of communism column. Target fixation on that one aspect, coupled with some likely cockiness from recent successes the Dulles Brother concept of covert regime change was having, caused them to think this would all just sort out ok.

So I'll agree they went in eyes wide open and acting "knowingly", but I really don't think they acted "understandingly."

I think there is still a lot of that going around. Over fixate on one aspect of the problem and engage to address that; and then minimize the dangers from other aspects of the problem that we don't fully understand to begin with. Those being what ultimately turn out to be the real threat to achieving our interests all along.

Both in Vietnam and in the GWOT we went in over fixated on ideology; misunderstood both the role of insurgency in the GWOT, and also the (minor) role of ideology in insurgency. We fixated on the wrong aspect of the problem, exposing ourself to greater danger and risk to the aspects of the problem that were the most dangerous all along.

Entropy

06-26-2010, 03:48 PM

however, with similar experience, I frequently noted that the problem was generally well understood but that the ego of said senior soul overrode his common sense and he presumed he of all people would be able to overcome the obvious downsides.

Usually wrongly... :wry:

One thing I really didn't appreciate until these last ten years is the importance of domestic political considerations. A foreign policy or war strategy that appears completely bonkers may be the "best" at meeting domestic political considerations, which are inherently short-term. So I've concluded that rational national strategy really isn't possible unless the stars align and domestic politics and rational strategy are mutually supportive. My admittedly limited sense of history suggests that such alignments are exceedingly rare.

BW,

Point being, the machinations of governments do not determine if a movement is an insurgency or not. It is the roots within the populace that determine the nature of it.

Sure, but I don't see anything you wrote that contradicts the idea that the South and their US backers were the "insurgents" intent of overthrowing the "established" government headed by Ho. This is mainly a rhetorical argument I'm making as I personally think the conflict can't easily deconstructed into a single classification. Personally, I think there were three elements that aren't mutually exclusive:

1. A proxy war between great powers with opposing ideologies.
2. A civil war between two "states" created as a result of that proxy war.
3. An insurgency as part of that civil war.

Without #1, I'm not sure #2 and #3 would have occurred, but my knowledge of SE Asian history is admittedly weak.

Bob's World

06-26-2010, 04:15 PM

"Sure, but I don't see anything you wrote that contradicts the idea that the South and their US backers were the "insurgents" intent of overthrowing the "established" government headed by Ho."

I missed this chapter in the history book... I think you might of 'over-thunk' this one a bit.

Better i think to step back and see that there was a continuous effort by the populace of V. (not all of them, obviously many had cast their lot with the illegitimate occupiers) to throw out the French-Japanese-French-S.Vietnamese/US over a period of time in which the role of "counterinsurgent" changed hands often, but that of the insurgent was one of keep keeping on to once again regain some form of control and self-determination of their country and populace. State formed, keys to the South passed from one illegitimate owner to the next, all moot to the relentless pursuit of liberty by the insurgent.

Entropy

06-26-2010, 04:38 PM

Ken White

06-26-2010, 04:58 PM

I think they probably defined "The Problem" as that of keeping Vietnam being chalked up as a "loss" in the containment of communism column. Target fixation on that one aspect, coupled with some likely cockiness from recent successes the Dulles Brother concept of covert regime change was having, caused them to think this would all just sort out ok.That was the announced reason -- just as "Saddam's WMD" were the announced reason for going to Iraq... :D

Viet Nam was almost totally over the US economy and 'looking tough' for domestic political reasons. Communism was way down the list of 'why.'
So I'll agree they went in eyes wide open and acting "knowingly", but I really don't think they acted "understandingly."Depends on who your talking about. Most in State, DoD? I agree. The real decision makers up top -- Not at all, they understood but thought they were smart enough and the Army was good enough to make it work in spite of the drawbacks. They weren't and the Army was not. :rolleyes:

It also depends on what specific items are involved in the knowing versus the understanding. Most problems were understood and discounted -- again, just like Iraq... ;)

Egos.
Over fixate on one aspect of the problem and engage to address that; and then minimize the dangers from other aspects of the problem that we don't fully understand to begin with. Those being what ultimately turn out to be the real threat to achieving our interests all along.Sometimes. Just as often not. As I said, perception of the Administration in power at the time. See Afghanistan... :wry:
We fixated on the wrong aspect of the problem, exposing ourself to greater danger and risk to the aspects of the problem that were the most dangerous all along.We can disagree on that for the real deciders, you're possibly generally correct for the minions.

Egos. Plus we aren't as nice -- or as dumb -- as many would like to believe.

Bob's World

06-27-2010, 04:04 AM

I agree there was an insurgency in South Vietnam, and that the insurgency was supported by North Vietnam. I'm specifically disputing the idea that North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese government and the North Vietnamese people were "insurgents" against the government of South Vietnam. If that is what you're suggesting, then I'm not sure how any level of "good governance" by South Vietnam could end such an insurgency. I'm suggesting that a reasonable alternative view is that South Vietnam was a foreign-sponsored effort to foment an insurgency against the north with the goal over overthrowing the north and replacing the established government there.

We separate in our minds everything after North Vietnam was formed from everything prior. Granted, the majority of US direct engagement was after, so that was our paradigm. By the time most Americans knew where it was on a map the state of N. Vietnam had been there for 10 years and we were well entrenched in our support of the Diem government of the new state of South Vietnam.

My point is that we apply an artifical timeline based on OUR experience and assess meanings from that perspective onto that of the insurgent. I suspect if you were part of the Vietnamese movement to throw off this series of illegitimate governments and western interlopers you would see the formation of the state of N. Vietnam as just a waypoint toward your ultimate victory; a half-measure that provided you with a convenient sanctuary to continue to wage the insurgency from, as well as equally convenient access to the global governmental community through legal venues. Meanwhile the Maoist insurgency continued to complete the mission of removing foreign governments and their local puppets from the whole of Vietnam; surging to conventional warfare when feasible, falling back to unconventional tactics when necessary, but always pressing to that ulitimate victory.

The only way we could have addressed the legitimacy problems that the government of South Vietnam had was to go ahead and enable the nation-wide elections that Ike squelched back in 1956. But by 1965 with our perspective that these were two separate states, to hold such a 2-state election seemed rediculous, right?

slapout9

06-27-2010, 03:17 PM

Maybe the reason that Insurgency is so hard to define is because there is no such thing. It is not a valid concept...it mis-identifies reality. Either there are Civil Wars-citizens of a sovereign country rebelling against their government. Or Guerrilla Warfare -armed civilians fighting for some cause which doesn't recognize traditional boundaries(countries) and may or may not have anything to do with a political cause.

William F. Owen

06-27-2010, 03:48 PM

slapout9

06-27-2010, 05:40 PM

.....keep talking. I can see something useful here. You mean there is basically, war and rebellion? Am I reading you right?

Close enough. Yes and it goes to my experiences with the "one minute guerrilla course" What if you think of Viet Cong Insurgency as simple North Vietnamese Soldiers that simply wore civilian clothes? It was a covert invasion from the north "Guerrillas From The Mist of North Vietnam:D) later they just changed into regular NVA uniforms. So it was really nothing but an invasion.

This goes to MW and Wyly's lecture on the "Concept Of The Objective" we lost Vietnam because we never picked any Objectives in the NORTH,something vital to the enemy. We just blew up the south and gave them a band aid.?

Ken White

06-27-2010, 05:58 PM

By the time most Americans knew where it was on a map the state of N. Vietnam had been there for 10 years and we were well entrenched in our support of the Diem government of the new state of South Vietnam.Sort of. Our MAAG in Viet Nam was set up by Truman in 1950. South Viet Nam dates from 1949. When partition arrived in 1954, we had been there four years in ever increasing numbers (from 53 in 1950 to 900 in 1960 to 16K in 1963, 2% of the entire Army of the time...). The North authorized 'armed propaganda in 1956, raising that to an 'armed struggle' for the south in 1959. Kennedy made Viet Nam an about 30-40% household word during the 1960 campaign, made big headlines by massively upping the Adviser effort in 1961 and 62. In 1963 Viet Nam got the attention of most all Americans with Ap Bac.

Thus I'm unsure where you get the rather imprecise 10 years or when you think most Americans knew where on the map the country happened to be. Poetic and fictional license are cool but history and policy aren't 'posed to be licentious :D
I suspect if you were part of the Vietnamese movement to throw off this series of illegitimate governments and western interlopers you would see the formation of the state of N. Vietnam as just a waypoint toward your ultimate victory...Probably true but the majority of Viet Namese, those from and of the South (and the estimated 2M northerners who wanted to head south but were stopped by the Viet Minh) -- and Americans as well as others rightly see it in a different light.
The only way we could have addressed the legitimacy problems that the government of South Vietnam had was to go ahead and enable the nation-wide elections that Ike squelched back in 1956. But by 1965 with our perspective that these were two separate states, to hold such a 2-state election seemed rediculous, right?Wrong. Way wrong. Many have overestimated the control the North had over the NLF / VC. Ike didn't squelch the referendum (1955, not 56), the US position was that Diem's government had to be elected and have legitimacy. Lansdale in fact told Diem that if he stacked the deck and won with an overstated majority, he'd recommend that the US withdraw all support. However, the fact that the North would not have played fair caused most in the US Government to breathe a sigh of relief when Diem adamantly refused to a nationwide referendum. Thus the leftist myth -- and it is a myth -- that the US pushed Diem to that position.

A lot of Viet Nam 'history' is academically corrupted hogwash... :mad:

An idealized view of Viet Namese -- or US -- history can lead one to assumptions that won't hold up. Or have I said that before... :wry:

jmm99

06-27-2010, 06:20 PM

Here, just throwing out some discussion points - that is, in brother Fishel's terms, the two statements are possible operational definitions for working purposes. Read them in that light.

"war" = an armed conflict (violence) between two or more population groups regarded as separate population groups at the commencement of the conflict.

"rebellion" = an armed conflict (violence) within one population group at the commencement of the conflict, which separates into two or more population groups as the conflict progresses.

As used above, "population group" could be defined variously - e.g., AQ is a population group based on its ideology.

-----------------------------
The North Vietnamese viewed it not as an invasion but as a series of campaigns (1959-1975) within one country. The North was their Rear Area, the South was their Front Area, with Laos and Cambodia as important LOCs. In the end, their one country concept won (Vietnam + 2 sats, Cambodia & Laos). That is not my opinion; but simply what Giap and other NVA generals said (e.g., Giap's Oct 1967 pre-Tet rant, "The Big Victory, The Great Task", part 1 (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/213/2130805016a.pdf) and part 2 (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/213/2130805016b.pdf)).

jmm99

06-27-2010, 07:01 PM

Vietnam has numerous examples of history being spun to fit the agenda of the spin's proponent. One of the simplest to debunk is Ike's "80%" statement, which was popularized by Wayne Morse (Sen. from Oregon - Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayne_Morse)) and others in the mid-1960's and after.

The actual original statement is as follows, Eisenhower's Views on the Popularity of Ho Chi Minh (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/ddeho.htm):

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-56 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Compnay, Inc., 1963), p. 372

I am convinced that the French could not win the war because the internal political situation in Vietnam, weak and confused, badly weakened their military position. I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai. Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part of Bao Dai was a factor in the feeling prevalent among Vietnamese that they had nothing to fight for. As one Frenchman said to me, "What Vietnam needs is another Syngman Rhee, regardless of all the difficulties the presence of such a personality would entail."

Italicized parts are what the spinners usually leave out - and they ignore the last two [bolded by me] sentences entirely - resulting in something like this:

"I am convinced and I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader."

Ain't agitprop wonderful ? ;)

The actual statement, of course, was aimed at the French War (1954 and prior), compares Bo Dai and Ho, and has nothing to do with 1956 and Diem (who did win an election against Bo Dai, and who was something of a Syngman Rhee).

Ironically, Ike's statement supports the position that the French playboy puppet Bo Dai was a negative influence on "good governance" (as Marse Bob Jones might say). And, other evidence is abundant that Diem in the net result did not establish governmental "legitimacy" (in security, opportunity and ideology). BUT, Ike's "Mandate" statement is not part of that evidence.

Regards

Mike

Backwards Observer

06-28-2010, 04:42 AM

Nothing new to anyone here, but interesting to me is how this old field manual is fairly clear and to the point. The writing style reminds me of a guy who would sing "You're in the Army now, you can't afford a cow etc. etc.". whenever some bull$ went down, or if he ran out of Chesterfields.

Section III. Insurgency - History, Causes and Prevention

5. Examples of Insurgency Movements

[excerpt]

(3) Elimination of foreign exploitation.

The resistance movement in Indo-China from 1946 to 1954 (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) is an example of the unified desires of major segments of the population to violently resist colonial exploitation. This was anti-colonialism in its truest form. All of Indo-China was characterized by an agrarian economy with low standards of living, high illiteracy, and low health standards. They were easily exploited by the forces of communism. Ho Chi Minh, a devoted Communist, with external support, launched an insurgency which culminated in the withdrawal of France from Indo-China. The insurgency continues in those portions of Indo-China (Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) outside the Communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

... --- ...

6. Basic Causes and Motivation Factors of Insurgency

The following conditions are characteristic of many transitional societies and lend themselves to the development of insurgent movements:

a. Social

(1) Conflicts in traditional social organizations and customs as a result of contact with other cultures.

(2) The expectation of radically improved living standards within a short period of time.

(3) Pressure of a dense and rapidly expanding population in an agrarian society.

(4) Divisive rifts in the population stemming from class, ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences.

(5) Aspirations of the underprivileged for improvement in their social status and opportunities for individual expression and individual satisfaction.

(6) Widespread illiteracy and an inadequate educational system.

(7) Indolent national character.

(8) The gap between the powerful urban elite and the unorganized and inarticulate majority of the peasants.

"Well, I don't think there is any question about it. It can only be attributable to human error. This sort of thing has cropped up before and it has always been due to human error." Oh, the Humanity!

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/maxwell1963doctrine.pdf

M-A Lagrange

06-28-2010, 06:31 AM

Apparently, we seem to reach some concensus here:
there are only wars (international wars) and rebellions (non international wars).
And among rebellion (I prefer non international wars) we have:
- insurgencies: rebellion from part of apopulation against foreign force or heavyly supported government by foreign forces
- civil war: rebellion of part of the population against the government but all actors are domestic.

Somehow, we come back to ICRC definitio of wars: international and non international. The trick being how to deferenciate a "riot" (non covered by GC and considered as purely domestic police issue) to insurgency/civil war.
And that is were the scale comes in. The ratio of 1000 death/year is absurd, knowing it covers also people who died because of consequences not only the KIA, but can be a starting point for measuring violence and qualify the events as war and not riots.
Also, there is a need to have organised bodies with political goals. (Still from GC)
For example drug lords, even if they cause more than 1000 death/year, are not entering in the closed circle of insurgents/rebels who get recognation by GC.
Actually, in my opinion, it's the international community which defines if a rebellion is or turn into a civil war or an insurgency.

Bob's World

06-28-2010, 06:49 AM

For what it's worth, while I recognize the the widely held nature of the positions promoted by both Mr,'s White and Owen, I non-concur on both:

Ken knows Vietnam and the history of US involvement there. I don't challenge any of his facts. I look at the facts and assess them based on my understanding of insurgency. Too many base their understanding of insurgency based on the US version of the facts. My opinion is that this leads to a very flawed understanding of insurgency. It is based on the perspective of the 3rd party FID actor instead of the 1st party insurgent actor, and lends a bias that confuses the rationale of those who were actually causing the problems and why they were causing them.

As to the "war is war" position; I hold that not all violence is war and it is dangerous to treat it as such and that COIN is best viewed as a civil emergency by the challenged government. In this light it is EXTREMELY valuable to understand the difference between insurgency and other forms of conflict so that one can apply an appropriate solution.

As we all know, most COIN is long, drawnout, and typically with very temporal results. I hold that this is because all too often it has just been seen as a type of warfare, with COIN approached as war as well. History says this only works if one takes the position that how the populace feels about being oppressed by their government does not matter. Oppression works, if continuous and ruthless. Enlightned governance as promoted by the West demands that such tactics be set aside, and require instead that governments actually listen to their people and make adjustments in how they govern when necesary to maintain stability. Not because they legally have to, but simply because that is what good governance does.

William F. Owen

06-28-2010, 09:45 AM

As to the "war is war" position; I hold that not all violence is war and it is dangerous to treat it as such and that COIN is best viewed as a civil emergency by the challenged government. In this light it is EXTREMELY valuable to understand the difference between insurgency and other forms of conflict so that one can apply an appropriate solution.
No one of note suggests that all war is violence.
War is the attempt to force political ideas onto people using violence.

Insurgency just means rebellion or revolt against authority. It has no more character than that, which I can see as useful. Revolts and rebellions have no common cause other than the desire to gain or alter political power, same as all war.

M-A Lagrange

06-28-2010, 09:56 AM

Bob's world:
As to the "war is war" position; I hold that not all violence is war and it is dangerous to treat it as such and that COIN is best viewed as a civil emergency by the challenged government. In this light it is EXTREMELY valuable to understand the difference between insurgency and other forms of conflict so that one can apply an appropriate solution.

Bob, I fully agree with you but then we come back to the question: how to deferenciate riots from insurgencies from civil wars.
The GC were written by states who were particularly concerned by protecting their independance and freedom of action to regulate violence, even with extreme violence, inside their borders.

I also believe that what would qualify most of the civil wars is the absence of recognised domestic government.
In an insurgency, the international community recognises 1 national government and does not recognise the opposite party as the official government. And that was all the chalenge of GC protocol 4: how move from police operations which are not covered by GC and are not wars to a situation that is not civil war (I would not qualify it as insurgency) but regognised as war. And therefore GC and law of war would apply.

Because with the too enlarge qualification of a situation as insurgency, there is a dilusion of COIN requirements and response.
A riot needs to have a police response and a governance response. But GC and LAW OF WAR DO NOT APPLY.
An insurgency requires military and governance response. And GC and LAW OF WAR DO APPLY.
How do you make the difference? recognising that the situation is a war is the starting point. War has to be war to be fought as a war. You need to name the game before playing it.

M-A Lagrange

06-28-2010, 10:05 AM

No one of note suggests that all war is violence.
War is the attempt to force political ideas onto people using violence.

Insurgency just means rebellion or revolt against authority. It has no more character than that, which I can see as useful. Revolts and rebellions have no common cause other than the desire to gain or alter political power, same as all war.

Wilf, riots are different from war. And states do recognise that difference.
The fact that rebellion are violence used to initiate a change of governance does not mean that they are always the starting point for a change of government.
Look at UK and France difficulties to recognise that Algeria or Ireland were wars and not police operation.

William F. Owen

06-28-2010, 12:37 PM

Wilf, riots are different from war. And states do recognise that difference.
Rioting is a break down in public order. It is nothing to with the setting forth of a policy via violence. Riots may be a part of that as in the Romanian Revolt of 1989. Revolts are political violence.

The fact that rebellion are violence used to initiate a change of governance does not mean that they are always the starting point for a change of government.
Look at UK and France difficulties to recognise that Algeria or Ireland were wars and not police operation.
War revolts and rebellions always Attempts to alter political power. Northern Ireland was never a war or even described as such. When I was in Algeria in 1995, we were in the middle of a Civil War, and it was called that by the Algerians.

slapout9

06-28-2010, 01:39 PM

how to deferenciate riots from insurgencies from civil wars.

IMO rioting is simply a "tactic." It can be used in any type of warfare, no need to deferenciate.

marct

06-28-2010, 02:00 PM

IMO rioting is simply a "tactic." It can be used in any type of warfare, no need to deferenciate.

Hey, Slap....

Most of the time I would agree with you, but it is possible for any tactic to become part of cultural norms, just "the thing that's done", and the French, especially the Parisian's, seem to have done that with rioting....

slapout9

06-28-2010, 02:10 PM

Hey, Slap....

Most of the time I would agree with you, but it is possible for any tactic to become part of cultural norms, just "the thing that's done", and the French, especially the Parisian's, seem to have done that with rioting....

Sure, in fact if it is successful it will become a norm. At that time we will attempt to give it it's own classification of warfare....like COIN,FID,UW,MF warfare, whole groups of think tanks will be formed to study Rioting Warfare:D

M-A Lagrange

06-28-2010, 02:21 PM

What is happening in Toronto falls under riots, not war. Such as Mai 68 in France.

The difference is important because it gives you the legal frame for operations.
Los Angeles riots were war? I do not think so despite a use of extreme violence and the use of national guards by USA.

But from your point, may be there is a need to consider what the population call the events. If they call it war it's a war. If they call it incident or riot: it's not a war. In fine, we come to the same point: how the government which is actually part of the conflict/event calls it is irrelevent. It's the populace perception that names such a things.

William F. Owen

06-28-2010, 02:22 PM

Sure, in fact if it is successful it will become a norm. At that time we will attempt to give it it's own classification of warfare....like COIN,FID,UW,MF warfare, whole groups of think tanks will be formed to study Rioting Warfare:D
Yeah.... that'll be progress. Suddenly we get to the point where academic distinctions are not actually useful and become counter-productive.

Sorry but riots are not warfare. They may be a small part of a wider conflict, but they will rarely, if ever be decisive, in terms of the specific action. Once rioting and civil disorder becomes so widespread as to change political power, you have an uprising or rebellion.

Ken White

06-28-2010, 02:29 PM

Quoth Bob...:wry:

For what it's worth, while I recognize the the widely held nature of the positions promoted by both Mr,'s White and Owen, I non-concur on both:Thy prerogative. As they say, you're entitled to your own opinion even if you are wrong. :o
Ken knows Vietnam and the history of US involvement there. I don't challenge any of his facts. I look at the facts and assess them based on my understanding of insurgency.Which we appreciate, as apparently few others possess your consummate knowledge of all things insurgency related. ;)
Too many base their understanding of insurgency based on the US version of the facts. My opinion is that this leads to a very flawed understanding of insurgency. It is based on the perspective of the 3rd party FID actor instead of the 1st party insurgent actor, and lends a bias that confuses the rationale of those who were actually causing the problems and why they were causing them.That is probably true but you always seem to forget that "too many" is not everyone. If the assumption is that you are the only one who is that prescient, then I suggest that may be incorrect. If the assumption is that one who did understand the nuances would never act on an erroneous basis, I suggest that may also be incorrect. If the assumption is that the US government would or will always act in the best national interest as opposed to own domestic partisan interests, I KNOW that's incorrect.

It is possible for persons to arrive at the same conclusion(s) as you, disregard the potential problems and proceed for various reasons as if there were none. The failure to recognize that "it does not have to be your way to be right" is the one glaring flaw in the Jones model. The perceptions and driving forces of others may not be -- rarely are -- as logical as you would like.

In the case of the US, most foreign efforts in the last 90 years or so have been and are driven almost solely by concerns of domestic politics and quite a bit of detailed knowledge of parameters of the situation are ignored more often than not. That was emphatically the case in Viet Nam and in Iraq regardless of the cover stories. That will likely not change.
In this light it is EXTREMELY valuable to understand the difference between insurgency and other forms of conflict so that one can apply an appropriate solution.True. The issue seems to be selecting the appropriate solution. Just as you and I look at some of the same facts and draw differing conclusions, others may have a quite different definition of 'appropriate.' Still others may reject all appropriate measures for odd reasons and just react viscerally.
Enlightned governance as promoted by the West demands that such tactics be set aside, and require instead that governments actually listen to their people and make adjustments in how they govern when necesary to maintain stability. Not because they legally have to, but simply because that is what good governance does.Sigh. Yet again your western centric thought processes seem to overrule your observations and logic and lead you astray. Not everyone subscribes to that 'enlightened' western model. Most in the world are skeptical of it... :(

You constantly say we shouldn't impose our way yet you wish to judge others by our way. Surely you can see that is a massive dichotomy.

slapout9

06-28-2010, 02:31 PM

Once rioting and civil disorder becomes so widespread as to change political power, you have an uprising or rebellion.

Yes, however a revolt or Revolution (American Revolution) has the goal of changing the entire system of government, a rebellion often still believes in the sitting government they just want a particular policy,law,or condition changed(American Prohibition).

William F. Owen

06-28-2010, 02:36 PM

Yes, however a revolt or Revolution (American Revolution) has the goal of changing the entire system of government, a rebellion often still believes in the sitting government they just want a particular policy,law,or condition changed(American Prohibition).
Good point - and the old words work best!

Steve the Planner

06-28-2010, 02:41 PM

MA:

Thanks for the warranted distinctions.

As a kid in Baltimore, when the King riots broke out, we were wisked off to Grandma's house at the beach.

From my perch in the back of our big Buick Station wagon, I watched the National Guard trucks rolling in as we rolled out, and watched the small groups of protesters in little town, hurling bottles at our car as we sped through.

This was not war, and it was not strategic or tactical. It was mass frustration, shock, horror, anger and a response to that. Civil, or uncivil, actions and reactions must be individually analyzed, just like the French Revolutionary movement.

I was reminded of that in a Michael Semple comment in todays Guardian about the rumors swirling around supposed negotiations between Karzai, ISI and Haqqani.

Michael Semple, a regional expert, said he was alarmed at the speed with which the political class was fissuring.

"Sane people, who've been part of this process all along, are now saying the country won't survive till the end of the year," he said.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/27/afghanistan-turmoil-peace-talks-pakistan

He went on to explain that, at present, the meetings are just a rumor, but that the deep fissures are quickly becoming evident.

But the article lays out the obvious parties, mostly Northern Alliance, who stand ready to engage, break, fracture, oppose re-emergence of the Talib-jan and ISI influence in Afghanistan.

I wonder whether announcement of actual talks progressing will provoke the same kind of understandable civil (or uncivil) reaction for the minorities who do not consider Talibs as their "young sons?"

What do we make of the actual Afghans opposing the folks that we do/did/don't support in any given year, when those folks pose specific concerns?

M-A Lagrange

06-28-2010, 02:42 PM

William F. Owen:

Good point - and the old words work best!

So shall we stay with the ICRC distinction only:
- Riots (which are not wars)
- Non international war (which covers civil war and insurgency)
- International war (which are what people call war)

:rolleyes:

William F. Owen

06-28-2010, 02:46 PM

So shall we stay with the ICRC distinction only:
- Riots (which are not wars)
- Non international war (which covers civil war and insurgency)
- International war (which are what people call war)

Why the distinction? I revert to my original query. Why do we care when it serves no purpose?

Rex Brynen

06-28-2010, 02:56 PM

Why the distinction? I revert to my original query. Why do we care when it serves no purpose?

In this case, the ICRC differentiates because it does make a difference--namely, what parts of international law do and do not apply.

However, in general your original point is spot-on--how we define a category is a function of what, analytically, we want to know. As it applies to England, for example, the category "can beat Germany" is rather different if I'm studying world wars, or world cup football ;)

M-A Lagrange

06-28-2010, 03:01 PM

Why the distinction? I revert to my original query. Why do we care when it serves no purpose?

Wilf,

It actually serves a purpose: to protect the combattants and the civilians by regulating the use of violence.
I am sure that former POW are happy to have benefit from that status. It gives an obligation to the parties to feed them, cure them and host them.
You see it as a limit for your operations but s**t happen and they have a utility...
Like you cannot apply collective punishment on civilians or PoW. You cannot kill wounded civilian and soldiers...
It also allows you to provide a status to the opponent:
- civilian in a riot
- combattant in a international or non international war

And finaly it serves the purpose of the States to determine what kind of operation and legal frame they will apply. Knowing that some may be whatching what parties are doing... (IHL does apply to all: State and non State actors!)

slapout9

06-28-2010, 03:27 PM

- Riots (which are not wars)

:rolleyes:

I would seriously consider getting rid of it. Riots may or may not be part of war and warfare at any level or type. The question to ask is WHY are they rioting? When that is known it will help guide you in determining the appropriate response. Rioting is an effect....until you know the cause(motive) you can't properly select a response. At least I couldn't.:wry:

M-A Lagrange

06-28-2010, 03:46 PM

I would seriously consider getting rid of it. Riots may or may not be part of war and warfare at any level or type. The question to ask is WHY are they rioting? When that is known it will help guide you in determining the appropriate response. Rioting is an effect....until you know the cause(motive) you can't properly select a response. At least I couldn't.:wry:

Slap,

the question is the legal status of the people who participate. In a riot taking place in a country at peace (cf L-A riots): the participants are civilians. And rioting is a break of public order punished by the civil code.

In a country at war, the question is more complex. The treatment given to anyone who riots will depend of the political objective of the authority that will use force.

Riots are usefull to qualify "insurgencies"/revolts/rebellion that are not reaching the scale of non international war. It leaves to the governments all liberty to intervene in the limits of civil law. And the people arrested by that government are not soldiers but criminal so they can be charge for murder. A charge you cannot use for a combattant against another combattant.
Actually, it is the States who negociated the GC who imposed that distinction. Knwing that it was done at a time were strikes were illegal and handled as riots whith the use of the army.

William F. Owen

06-28-2010, 03:47 PM

It actually serves a purpose: to protect the combattants and the civilians by regulating the use of violence.
I am sure that former POW are happy to have benefit from that status. It gives an obligation to the parties to feed them, cure them and host them.
....but in reality, it doesn't. It fails because most of the so called laws are built on the system of differentiation that fails in application.
What do you do with the 16 year old girl you catch driving the vehicle with 106mm RRL on the back?
If you get captured by Hezbollah, kiss good-bye to your POW status!
I am all for ROE and correct prisoner handling/status, but the supposed differentiation has very little on the practical application.

M-A Lagrange

06-28-2010, 03:59 PM

....but in reality, it doesn't. It fails because most of the so called laws are built on the system of differentiation that fails in application.
What do you do with the 16 year old girl you catch driving the vehicle with 106mm RRL on the back?
If you get captured by Hezbollah, kiss good-bye to your POW status!
I am all for ROE and correct prisoner handling/status, but the supposed differentiation has very little on the practical application.

Wilf,

I know it's a complex and frustrating game. Never denied that.
From your two exemple:
The girl is a PoW as long as she cannot prove it's not her weapon. After, yes, there is the pb of countries where having a AK is legal and necessary. But then you legislate and restrict the categories. And finaly if she can prove she is not part of a organised military movement: she is a civilian most probably offensing the civil code.

As for hezbollah: absence of reciprocity is NOT an argument to not apply the GC. And believe me, behing hostage of crazy armed groups which are not the hezbollah is not a pleasure neither, far from it.

GC serve a purpose: once you catch the opponant leaders who did not apply it, you can trial them for war crimes!
That's what happened for Yugo.

slapout9

06-28-2010, 04:06 PM

Slap,

the question is the legal status of the people who participate. In a riot taking place in a country at peace (cf L-A riots): the participants are civilians. And rioting is a break of public order punished by the civil code.

Not exactly. legal status is often determined by his motive not a specific tactic used. Murder was a common tactic used by Charles Manson and Bill Laden but both would be charged differently based upon their motive. Both of these happened in a country at peace.

William F. Owen

06-28-2010, 04:12 PM

The girl is a PoW as long as she cannot prove it's not her weapon. After, yes, there is the pb of countries where having a AK is legal and necessary. But then you legislate and restrict the categories. And finaly if she can prove she is not part of a organised military movement: she is a civilian most probably offensing the civil code.
OK and how do I issue orders for opening fire based on that? A 106mm RRL is a crew served Anti-tank weapon. She knows it's on the vehicle.

As for hezbollah: absence of reciprocity is NOT an argument to not apply the GC. And believe me, behing hostage of crazy armed groups which are not the hezbollah is not a pleasure neither, far from it.
Fully aware, and that was not my point. My point was that given the rules you apply for your own conduct, the external categories are superfluous/irrelevant.

GC serve a purpose: once you catch the opponant leaders who did not apply it, you can trial them for war crimes!
That's what happened for Yugo.
The problem is the GC were not applied to 90% of conflicts that occurred in the 20th and 21st century. Their application today is entirely selective and arbitrary. They are applied in line with policy and not in line with an objective criminal justice system.
From a practical stand point, non-operational distinctions serve no useful purpose.

M-A Lagrange

06-28-2010, 06:35 PM

=William F. Owen;101720]
OK and how do I issue orders for opening fire based on that? A 106mm RRL is a crew served Anti-tank weapon. She knows it's on the vehicle.

I do not know, that's your job, not mine. But Iwould gess that if she is alone you try to stop the vehicle first and then use lethal force. GC is not against the use of lethal force, it is just rules to regulate it.

Fully aware, and that was not my point. My point was that given the rules you apply for your own conduct, the external categories are superfluous/irrelevant.

My categories are limited to combattant and non combattants. The distinction between armed opponent and unarmed active supporters VS civilians in more complex contexts. What superfluous categories are you talking about?
Women and children under 7? Cause they are protected by the GC with limitations to the combattants. A childsoldier is a child but also a soldier. A women with weapons is a combattant...
Woundeds are protected what ever they are. But do not play it silly neither, the case of Falouja of the marines caught into killing an disarmed opponent proved that military and humanitarian lawers are not stupid. If I well remember he was cleared or lightly charged. In the heat of action things happen. I am the first one to recognize it.
Where do you want to go? To the weapons treaties and the use of phosphorus for defense and blablabla?
That's the rules, it's not me who set them. It's the States which have signed the papers. Advocating for a better and larger application is not taking position against Israel existence.
It's making the work more complex that's it. You think that the problematic of parties and combattants families and dependants is more simple? At what point of time you start to feed a combattant when you give food to a child who is just telling his dad (who is a opponent/ennemy ative combattant) what he saw while playing outside? :confused:

The problem is the GC were not applied to 90% of conflicts that occurred in the 20th and 21st century. Their application today is entirely selective and arbitrary. They are applied in line with policy and not in line with an objective criminal justice system.
From a practical stand point, non-operational distinctions serve no useful purpose.

From a practical point of view, it does serve a purpose. Prisoners exchange are part of GC and ICRC work. Not the most known and regarded but one of the most usefull.
The application of any laws is arbitrary. Who said it was not right that I cannot be steal what I like? :D

My point was just to say that the simple but already complex and agreed distinction between riot; international war and non international war is all what is needed.
Once you have that, you have your legal frame to conduct operations and set your ROE and TOE.

The point is also that non international wars are most of the time settled with an amnisty law for both parts as none did respect any legal frame civil or humanitarian.
But I agree with you that 90% of the conflicts are not conducted according to GC. Does not mean that GC is irrelevant.

Not exactly. legal status is often determined by his motive not a specific tactic used. Murder was a common tactic used by Charles Manson and Bill Laden but both would be charged differently based upon their motive. Both of these happened in a country at peace.

Mike would certainly be more qualified than me for this. But riots are events. So are wars.
In France, when you destroy properties (public or private) or kill/wound/capture: you perpetrate an offense if you are not at war.
When you are at war and that you are part of a recognised party of the conflict: you do not perpetrate an offence when you destroy public or private properties that serve a military purpose. You do not perpetrate an offense when you kill/wound/capture a combattant.
Being a combattant is a legal status that opens you a different categoriy of rights (and obligations) than a civilian.

The motives (and somewhere I feel that we have a lost in translation pb here) has nothing to do with the offense. It just determines the degree of the offense.
Riots are no tactics. Isolating cops to smatch them is a tactic. At the best riots can be a strategy to destabilise a country and create conditions for a civil war. (Non international...)

slapout9

06-28-2010, 06:57 PM

Mike would certainly be more qualified than me for this. But riots are events. So are wars.
In France, when you destroy properties (public or private) or kill/wound/capture: you perpetrate an offense if you are not at war.
When you are at war and that you are part of a recognised party of the conflict: you do not perpetrate an offence when you destroy public or private properties that serve a military purpose. You do not perpetrate an offense when you kill/wound/capture a combattant.
Being a combattant is a legal status that opens you a different categoriy of rights (and obligations) than a civilian.

The motives (and somewhere I feel that we have a lost in translation pb here) has nothing to do with the offense. It just determines the degree of the offense.
Riots are no tactics. Isolating cops to smatch them is a tactic. At the best riots can be a strategy to destabilise a country and create conditions for a civil war. (Non international...)

Where I live a riot can be considered a crime(offense) AND an act of war because it is considered to be treason. The difference is going to be the motive, often determined by which group (if any your are associated with). If you are with a criminal group it will be viewed as a crime, if you are associated with a terrorist group or some group abdicating the overthrow of the government (treason) it could be considered an act of war. Confusing isn't it?

M-A Lagrange

06-28-2010, 07:14 PM

Where I live a riot can be considered a crime(offense) AND an act of war because it is considered to be treason. The difference is going to be the motive, often determined by which group (if any your are associated with). If you are with a criminal group it will be viewed as a crime, if you are associated with a terrorist group or some group abdicating the overthrow of the government (treason) it could be considered an act of war. Confusing isn't it?

Slap,

I think that the fact that you are part of a terrorist group would not help you neither in France.
The thing is that if you are part of a terrorist group you would most probably be charge for association with a terrorist group under the civil code. And judge by a civil judge. Which is not good in the best case.

Steve the Planner

06-28-2010, 07:52 PM

After the Governor of Salah ad Din's son was accidentally shot in Bayji in 2008, we were under orders, to affirmatively show respect and reverence to our Iraqi civilian interlocutors (like an order was needed). Every one was motrified on all sides.

So we turn to anti-US protests following accidental deaths. Is any man's son's death any less horrible?

A riot of citizens opposing wrongful deaths in a country at war, even is incited by our opponents, is still a legitimate civil action, and not an act of war.

The citizens involved are both right, and have a right, even if armed or causing property damage. (Self-defense being any person's natural right).

Again, these simplifications are conceptually helpful, but specifically useless until aligned to the real act, and the actual motivations (like Slap said), and not just what we short-hand their motivations to be.

slapout9

06-28-2010, 08:17 PM

Slap,

I think that the fact that you are part of a terrorist group would not help you neither in France.
The thing is that if you are part of a terrorist group you would most probably be charge for association with a terrorist group under the civil code. And judge by a civil judge. Which is not good in the best case.

Whew..... glad we got that settled:D:D Just pass a law taking the word rioters out of the dictionary...that will fix it.

Presley Cannady

06-29-2010, 02:11 AM

What's the difference? Why none at all. They're synonyms to help extremely wordy types avoid writing sentences like "[t]he Federal counter-insurgents finally met the insurgents at Fort Sumter, thus begins the American Insurgency." Additional synonyms crop up in the Man's ultimately losing battle to deprive English of any and all proper nouns and connotations.

On that note, what's the difference between "coalition" and "allies?" Or "multiple kill vehicle" and "shot?" Hint, these euphemisms really started to take off after Microsoft Word debuted.

slapout9

06-29-2010, 02:20 AM

"[t]he Federal counter-insurgents finally met the Confederate insurgents at Fort Sumter, thus begins the American Insurgency."

A slight adjustment:wry:other than that I think you hit it.

Bob's World

06-29-2010, 03:57 AM

OK and how do I issue orders for opening fire based on that? A 106mm RRL is a crew served Anti-tank weapon. She knows it's on the vehicle.

Fully aware, and that was not my point. My point was that given the rules you apply for your own conduct, the external categories are superfluous/irrelevant.

The problem is the GC were not applied to 90% of conflicts that occurred in the 20th and 21st century. Their application today is entirely selective and arbitrary. They are applied in line with policy and not in line with an objective criminal justice system.
From a practical stand point, non-operational distinctions serve no useful purpose.

Currently our guys are agonizing over questions of if a person is a targetable insurgent or not at the flag level, in comfortable rooms, at no personal danger; often judging harshly the acts of men acting quickly, with just the information there senses and judgment provide, with the knowledge that to fail is to either face death for you and your comrades on one extreme, or professional/criminal charges on the other. We've made this too hard.

There are well accepted principles of criminal liability that should be applied:

Clearly anyone riding (willingly) in a vehicle that is assessed as a legitimate target has, at a minimum, an accomplice liability that makes them targetable as well. For any innocents in such a vehicle that are injured or killed in an otherwise legitimate engagement are seen as an unfortuntate, but unavoidable cost of enforcing the law. No Cop would likely be held to task, and soldiers should have much broader parameters.

Currently we make false divisions of "civilians" and "insurgents"; but the fact is that they are all civilians. The issue is rather one of liability, not gender or age. We've PC'd ourselves into a box, and need to rationally work our way back out of that box.

"PID" or "Positive Identification" is also a loaded and dangerous term. If a Predator picked up this vehicle and didn't see the girl they may well report to the ground commander "PID of a vehicle full of armed insurgents with a recoilless rifle on the back;" 10 minutes later an armed OH-58 may come on station and the crew (though they clearly ID the girl) may report that they have "PID" as well, meaning that they are certain they are tracking the same vehicle the Predator had been tracking. A detailed playback of the crew recording may well indicate that they saw and mentioned the presence of the girl. The ground commander, who is at most risk and busy with a million things, may have only had reported to him that both the Pred and the 58 have PID. He then gives the authorization to engage the target, and he is the one held to task later for a "CIVCAS" incident. We need to be smarter than this.

Concepts like "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" are way more certain than "PID". The predator reported PID and probable cause on the vehicle, the OH-58 has PID, but when queried by the ground commander if they too have probable cause they come back that they only have reasonable suspicion due to there concerns about the presence of the girl. The ground commander knows he needs Probable Cause to engage, so he tasks the pilot to get more info to see if he can either get to PC and engage, or take some other less kinetic action (an aerial vehicle interdiction team could be brought in to stop the vehicle, etc).

All of this is subjective, but cops make these subjective assesments every day. They know what they need for Reas. Susp; and what it allows them to do. They know what they need for Prob. Cause; and what it allows them to do. They also know when they need to appeal to a higher authority, and have the DA go to a judge for a finding of probable cause and the issuance of a warrant (some decisions would similarly be held by higher HQs to make).

By applying legal analysis for what is now military prosecution, it paves the way to later transitioning smootly to criminal prosecution as the situation begins to stabilize. By recognizing from the start that COIN is a civil emergency rather than a war such thinking is logical. By seeing COIN as war, such thinking is easily dismissed.

The problem is not the idea of "Pop-Centric COIN" per se, much of the problem is in our understanding of insurgency and our overall approach to the same. I think Pop-Centric is the product of some smart people who have studied a lot of COIN, but have not studied a lot of insurgency. (This is one huge benefit of the SF community remaining rooted in Unconventional Warfare. UW is all about waging insurgnecy. It doesn't make every SF guy an expert on insurgency, but it at least insures that each has a foundation in insurgency. No one else gets that. )

Our current approach to COIN is a mix of warfare and 'peacefare', and it is confusing. Pick one. WILF, I believe, picks warfare. I think enduring ends are achieved more effectively by waging peacefare (which in my opinion would definitely authorize taking out the vehicle with the girl as described in the example above); but reasonable minds can differ.

William F. Owen

06-29-2010, 04:44 AM

Currently our guys are agonizing over questions of if a person is a targetable insurgent or not at the flag level, in comfortable rooms, at no personal danger; often judging harshly the acts of men acting quickly, with just the information there senses and judgment provide, with the knowledge that to fail is to either face death for you and your comrades on one extreme, or professional/criminal charges on the other. We've made this too hard.
Sorry Bob, but WRONG! Cannot speak for anyone else, but feet are firmly fixed with Rifleman Shagnasty, Sniffy, and Corporal F*cknuts. It is precisely the ethereal and arcane lack of relevance to their level that concerns me.

See an enemy vehicle moving with support weapon on board? Open fire. It's not even a debate. I don't care if Mother Teresa and Rabbi Feldman are driving it. Point being what does it matter if it's a civil war or an insurgency?

William F. Owen

06-29-2010, 04:51 AM

My categories are limited to combattant and non combattants. The distinction between armed opponent and unarmed active supporters VS civilians in more complex contexts. What superfluous categories are you talking about?
Women and children under 7? Cause they are protected by the GC with limitations to the combattants. A childsoldier is a child but also a soldier. A women with weapons is a combattant...
Woundeds are protected what ever they are.
...and that all being the case, how does the distinction between Insurgency and Civil War help?
Child and Woman soldiers occur in both regular and irregular forces. The deliberate targeting of civilians has always been a crime, but no Air Force Commander in the 20th or 21st Century was ever prosecuted.
War is war.

Bob's World

06-29-2010, 06:11 AM

M-A Lagrange

06-29-2010, 06:14 AM

...and that all being the case, how does the distinction between Insurgency and Civil War help?
Child and Woman soldiers occur in both regular and irregular forces. The deliberate targeting of civilians has always been a crime, but no Air Force Commander in the 20th or 21st Century was ever prosecuted.
War is war.

Trying to be a reasonable man, I would tend to support Wilf and Bob here.
My points being first that we already have the perfect distinction into wars:
- international
- non international
- and riots which are similar by the result but which are not legally speaking wars.
To come to those categories, mankind did argue a lot. And it's a pretty good consensus.

Secondly, Bob point is of quality, as usual, in the fact that you conduct pop centric operation among the people and that obliges you to have some highly trained lawer and soldiers to establish TOE and ROE. And that finally, the decision has to be taken on complete information.

The case of the pickup monted with an anti air craft weapon in the back (driven by or not by an under age person) is pretty clear. (By the way what is criminal is to use the underage combattant not to stop he or she from doing stupid things. He or she can be a victim, as in too many countries in Africa, but he or she is a combattant as long as he or she belongs to a chain of command and conduct military/paramilitary activities).

Finaly, the british bomb commander was not rewarded for his participation to WW2 as the others. (he was not made a Sir). That's the complex way of war winners to actually recognise they did wrong things under the necessity of war.

Separating insurgencies to civil war is either based on populace perception or governmental propaganda.
The insurgents are always the terrorist of the loyalist government. And when a war is made by loyalist and insurgents forces killing randomly civilian for terror it's always perceived by the population as a civil war. I would say that the territorial dimension has its importance. If it's abroad: it is perceived as an insurgency (Franco Algerian war). If it is inside the country initial borders it is perceived as a civil war (last Algeria war in the 90).

What ever, on a legal base, this does not help. GC, Law of war and weapons treaties apply the same for civil war and insurgencies.

Now, I have a question, but may be it's for another threat: what do you do with a positive identified 16 years old girld insurgent driving a non identified/labeled truck loaded with BP5 to a location which is a suspected training camp?

William F. Owen

06-29-2010, 06:34 AM

Finaly, the british bomb commander was not rewarded for his participation to WW2 as the others. (he was not made a Sir). That's the complex way of war winners to actually recognise they did wrong things under the necessity of war.
errr... do you mean GOC Bomber Command, Sir Arthur Travers Harris, 1st Baronet GCB OBE AFC , knighted by the King in 1946?

Now, I have a question, but may be it's for another threat: what do you do with a positive identified 16 years old girld insurgent driving a non identified/labeled truck loaded with BP5 to a location which is a suspected training camp?
Well no real context, but if she doesn't have a weapon then I'd seek to "follow and detain." - and personally I'd get my hands on some of that BP5!!!

If it really is BP5 it's probably stolen. You'd certainly have grounds to detain her.

M-A Lagrange

06-29-2010, 06:58 AM

Wilf,

BP5 as yu know are highly proteine fat satured peaned butter for malnurish children. It's also what the somaly call "good war food" cause it's light (less than 250g) and feeds you as a meal. With 1 liter of water you are good for the day.

Here were are in the complex problem of identification: you may be in the case of someone supplying fighters on operation preparation or just in the case of someone bringing food for the kitchen of a nutrition center used as cover.
In first case: you may have a legal target.
In the second case: you alienate all a population by making children starve.

But that does not help for the difference between civil and insurgency wars.

slapout9

06-29-2010, 12:43 PM

[QUOTE=M-A Lagrange;101731
The motives (and somewhere I feel that we have a lost in translation pb here) has nothing to do with the offense.
[/QUOTE]

Been thinking about this. When you say rioters you mean people who may engage in criminal activities in a war zone, but may have nothing to do with the actual conflict. They may be engaging in a food riot just to survive, as opposed to being part of the insurgency. Example there were food riots during Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana but the people were not charged with a crime because it was considered an act of survival as opposed to a criminal act. Is this more in line with what you mean by rioters?

M-A Lagrange

06-29-2010, 03:44 PM

Been thinking about this. When you say rioters you mean people who may engage in criminal activities in a war zone, but may have nothing to do with the actual conflict. They may be engaging in a food riot just to survive, as opposed to being part of the insurgency. Example there were food riots during Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana but the people were not charged with a crime because it was considered an act of survival as opposed to a criminal act. Is this more in line with what you mean by rioters?

Well, rioters can be:
- As you said people using violence to survive after a natural disaster/conflict. But it's not what GC is talking about.
- civilian who use violence against the government to revolt against a decision, a meeting, the government... But it does not reach the level of a war. Like Toronto during the G20. (and strikers when the GC were written) And that's what is in the GC.
This is to recognise 2 things:
- first that states have the right to use some violence against their citizens.
- secondly that all civilian movements as protest which degenerate are not wars and cannot be handled as wars: by the use of lethal force.

Spontanous movements of inorganised crowd that attacks a police post after a racist incident (like it happens in France or the US sometimes) cannot be handled with the systematic use of lethal violence as in front of you, you have civilians and not combattants (under the GC definition of lawful combattant in war).

I hope that helps

Levi

06-29-2010, 05:24 PM

They are just words, so we don't have to say "that thing happening in that one place". I have talked to people about COIN and whatnot, (see?) and noone agrees on much, except that at some point somebody has to physically do something. Otherwise we just talk about wars, and nothing happens. I am with wilf. I see a need for a word to communicate a meaning to me. Call it whatever you like. I think most words like civil war and counter-insurgency and revolution are mostly propaganda, to make something sound good or bad depending on the target audience. I don't want to see standard definitions, because who defined what? Dont give me a word, and then tell me what it means. Let me mull it over, I will decide. Orders are something else entirely.

jmm99

06-29-2010, 05:31 PM

Near the start of this thread, Wilf asked (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=101260&postcount=3):

Why differentiate? What purpose does it serve?

It certainly does not so far as the GCs are concerned. They are based on whether there is an "armed conflict" and whether that "armed conflict" is "international" or not.

The major differentiation in application of the GCs hinges on whether the 1977 AP I and II have been adopted, along with other treaties and "customary international humanitarian law", or not (as in the case of the US).

Of course, even where only the 1949 GCs have been adopted, a country can, for military and political reasons (as the US has done) adopt ROEs and RUFs far more restrictive than what its Laws of War would allow. Just for fun, compare what FM 27-10 would allow for those rules vs what they actually are.

So, why should we want to distinguish between an "insurgency" and a "civil war" ? In what areas do advantages accrue depending on whether the "armed conflict" is called an "insurgency" or a "civil war" ?

Regards

Mike

ryanmleigh

07-06-2010, 02:50 PM

I think we do better when we look at insurgency as a set of conditions that may well manifest in several forms: a miserable populace that does not dare act out; a populace that does act out - either choosing non-violent (subversion) or violent (insurgency) means. The key to effective COIN is to address the conditions and not merely set out to defeat those who dare to respond to the conditions.

Bob- Would you say that these root conditions are the same for either civil war or insurgency? Or are there different conditions that lead to different forms of warfare. I imagine that the initial conditions (personnel, equipment, funding) would have an impact on the way the conflict progresses.

Therefore I would also think that there may be different root causes of conflict which make it look, smell, or be an insurgency vice a civil war. Examining the root causes then would be one way to differentiate between the two forms of conflict. Wouldn't you agree?

ryanmleigh

07-06-2010, 03:04 PM

I'll stick to my point that insurgency is a strategy, and a given protagonist may shift in and out of it. I think we befuddle ourselves when we try and define insurgency by its political objectives. We just can't transcend our obsession with the Cold War security environment.

Sir- Is insurgency really a strategy, or is it more just a tactic in the conduct of war? Maybe an operational approach in the broader context? Probably just confusing myself.

For me it seems like an insurgency would be the way, while terrorism, subversion, guerrilla warfare would be the means to conduct achieve political objectives.

If there is no political objective other than the overthrow of a government, would it not then be a civil war? Maybe I am just misguided.

ryanmleigh

07-06-2010, 03:09 PM

Not one of my big areas of expertise, but I would say that it began as something like an insurgency based on religion (with the inevitable cultural overtones) and then grew into a civil war and finally became a world war (of sorts, anyhow).

Sir- Your explanation again takes me back to a sliding scale of violence in conflict. With steps along the way. With insurgency residing somewhere near the bottom, and civil war higher on the steps along the way. Would you agree?

ryanmleigh

07-06-2010, 03:28 PM

IMO that is about the best definition you can get. I would add if it is two opposing groups of "citizens"(legal residents) inside the same Geographic boundary or country, it will usually be viewed as Civil War. But as John points out whenever an External power/group "non-citizens" comes into the picture it will tend to be called an Insurgency.

The very term Insurgency is rather nebulous because it often depends on the viewpoint you have as to who is the good guy or bad guy. I have often thought that term was invented because it is more Politically acceptably to use that term as opposed to calling it some type of War(Civil or Un-Civil).

So the introduction of an (outside the state) third party would help to distinguish an insurgency from a civil war. Otherwise, any number of parties inside a state fighting for control over the people would be a civil war?

slapout9

07-06-2010, 06:06 PM

So the introduction of an (outside the state) third party would help to distinguish an insurgency from a civil war. Otherwise, any number of parties inside a state fighting for control over the people would be a civil war?

Yes, the tricky part is national boundaries were often drawn by imperial/colonial powers,in which case the indigenous populations may not recognize these boundaries in any real sense. So you could have a civil war/insurgency at the same time.

Example the Taliban are Pashtun....half live in Afghanistan and half live in Pakistan and IMO they don't really care about any border drawn by some foreign power,it is Pashtunastan to them. That as why I think it is much better to understand them in terms of "Bands of Guerrillas in the mist" as opposed to Insurgency/Civil War. Just my 2 cents.

ryanmleigh

07-07-2010, 02:09 PM

All- some more to chew on. This came from Dr. Sambanis at Yale who is also a leading civil war scholar who has worked with Drs. Collier and Hoeffler on multiple projects. He wrote "A reasonable way to distinguish between civil war and insurgency is to think of insurgency as a strategy that can be used in a civil war and civil war can be the term that describes a conflict that engages the majority of the population (by contrast, an insurgency might be a strategy pursued by a small group with relatively low levels of public support). As you know, there is no consensus on the definition of these concepts, but a distinction such as the one I suggest might help you support your claim that different interventions/policies can be effective in countering insurgency vs. civil war."
Anyone with more thoughts?

slapout9

07-07-2010, 02:44 PM

All- some more to chew on. This came from Dr. Sambanis at Yale who is also a leading civil war scholar who has worked with Drs. Collier and Hoeffler on multiple projects. He wrote "A reasonable way to distinguish between civil war and insurgency is to think of insurgency as a strategy that can be used in a civil war and civil war can be the term that describes a conflict that engages the majority of the population (by contrast, an insurgency might be a strategy pursued by a small group with relatively low levels of public support).

Don't understand why size has much to do with it. In the end the Government is overthrown either by a small group or a large group.:confused:

ryanmleigh

07-07-2010, 02:49 PM

That is very similar to the question I asked him back. He implies that there is some connection to the amount of popular support. He has not responded back to me yet. Could it have something to do with an insurgency using only guerrilla and UW tactics, while a civil war might have uniformed armies using full spectrum of tactics to win? I am not sure if that simplifies or confuses the discussion.

slapout9

07-07-2010, 03:11 PM

while a civil war might have uniformed armies using full spectrum of tactics to win?

That is why I say a civil war can only happen inside the defined boundaries of a nation. If it is inside a nation it doesn't matter if they are uniformed or guerrillas or a mixture, it is still citizens using armed revolt to overthrow THEIR government. What changes it and is a useful for understanding the situation is when an outside influence enters the picture. Civil Wars can be decided completely internally. Insurgencies will have to be decided by somehow dealing with external support (Afghanistan and Pakistan as a modern example.)

wmthomson

07-07-2010, 03:19 PM

Insurgencies will have to be decided by somehow dealing with external support (Afghanistan and Pakistan as a modern example.)

Are you suggesting that one defining characteristic of insurgencies is outside support, that the must necessarily have it to be an insurgence?

slapout9

07-07-2010, 03:24 PM

Are you suggesting that one defining characteristic of insurgencies is outside support, that the must necessarily have it to be an insurgence?

Yes, if that element is not there then I think you have a civil war.

wmthomson

07-07-2010, 04:05 PM

slapout9

07-07-2010, 04:16 PM

It would seem that if you assign to an Insurgency the unique attribute of requiring outside support (which is a very interesting idea) then size plays an important role in differentiating the two, in that, outside support is only really sought for two reasons, a lack of material or ideological support internally. Either way they are both the result of not having enough popular support internally to maintain the fighting force or recruit enough fighters. This necessary minimum level of internal support to sustain the fight might be what Dr. Sambanis is getting at when he talks about size and having popular support etc.

This leads me to thinking (and this may have already been discussed) that perhaps the difference between Civil war and Insurgency is as simple as an insurgency is just a conflict that has not reached the maturity, or minimum sustainability, required of a civil war. They both exist on a spectrum of conflict resulting from internal discontent, one is just further along then the other if you will.

My viewpoint is old school I remember when the Soviet Union said they were going to export Revolution (Insurgency) around the world. In traditional Marxist form they infiltrated foreign agitators to exploit political,economic and social(class) contradictions to start revolutions. They would be happy with a large force revolution or a Coup De' ta (spelling) small force didn't matter much to them. But the key factor was a foreign power(dosen't have to be a state) exporting insurgency(revolution).

ryanmleigh

07-07-2010, 04:34 PM

The form, function, and tactics employed in an insurgency are what typically qualify it in some manner as one of the many terms we hear applied to it. Thus, if the purpose of the insurgency is to replace an existing sociopolitical order, it is revolutionary in nature. If the insurgent units are small bands employing unconventional tactics, it is guerrilla warfare. In discussing this problem, Samuel Huntington remarked, satirically, “No doubt each term serves some purpose, although one cannot help but feel that semantics has perhaps outstripped theory.” If the insurgents are illegitimately using violence against the population, then it is terrorism. All of these terms are still applicable to an insurgency; these terms just become qualifying descriptors of the conflict.

ryanmleigh

07-07-2010, 04:39 PM

In his article entitled “What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition,” Dr. Samabanis provides a distinctive and useful definition of civil war. The essence of his definition clarifies some of the general confusion surrounding classifications of armed conflict. Therefore, if armed conflict meets the following benchmarks, the conflict in question is determined to be a civil war:
(a) The war takes place within the territory of a state that is a member of the international system with a population of 500,000 or greater.
(b) The parties involved in the conflict (incumbent and challenger) have political and military organizational structures, and they have publicly stated political objectives.
(c) The government (through its military or militias) must be a principal combatant. The main insurgent organization must be locally represented and recruit locally.
(d) Throughout its duration, the conflict must be characterized by sustained violence, at least at the minor or intermediate level.
(e) Throughout the war, the weaker party must be able to mount effective resistance.

There are more of these benchmarks in the article, but they have to do more with onset and conclusion of conflict than in trying to differentiate between the two. Again, here Dr. Sambanis intermixes the terms civil war and insurgency. I believe it has to do with his understanding of the scale of conflict being a decisive factor in separating the two.

slapout9

07-07-2010, 04:41 PM

slapout9

07-07-2010, 04:45 PM

In the end this is what I believe. JFK speech at West Point......it's all Special Warfare.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7WSHVh-ZtMs&feature=related

jmm99

07-07-2010, 05:56 PM

Rex Brynen

07-07-2010, 06:17 PM

ryanmleigh

07-07-2010, 07:22 PM

My viewpoint is old school I remember when the Soviet Union said they were going to export Revolution (Insurgency) around the world. In traditional Marxist form they infiltrated foreign agitators to exploit political,economic and social(class) contradictions to start revolutions. They would be happy with a large force revolution or a Coup De' ta (spelling) small force didn't matter much to them. But the key factor was a foreign power(dosen't have to be a state) exporting insurgency(revolution).

Slapout,
Understanding where your coming from is helpful. Do you think it still applies to the insurgencies that we are seeing today. Out of the numerous long term insurgencies since the fall of the Soviet Union, there are only a handful that are directly linked to Marxist-Communist ideology (Nepal and Peru being two off the top of my head). Does your paradigm change if we are talking about an conflict with something other than communist ideology. For instance: religious, nationalist movement, anti-colonial, anti-modernity, anti-state nationalism? (GAM, JKLF, LTTE, PKK, ETA, Hamas, IRA, JKHM just to name a few off the top of my head). [For more reading on these please check out Terror, Insurgency, and the State by Heiberg, O'Leary, and Tirman]Would any of these other causes of conflict change your understanding?

ryanmleigh

07-07-2010, 08:16 PM

not Dr Samabanis (you got it right the second time around). Here's the CV for Nicholas Sambanis (http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/experts/sambanisn/sambanisn_cv.pdf), Yale University, Department of Political Science. He's a known factor in the study of "Civil war" from the standpoint of political science, not law.

That's not my field of expertise - quantitative political science; and my questions remain unanswered - which is fine. Bye-bye.

Thank you for the correction, not quite sure how that extra a got in there. Sorry to disappoint on not answering your questions. Isn't the discussion stimulating enough to entice you continue to participate? I am an international law neophyte. If you have more to contribute from that aspect I find all of it very interesting. Cheers.

slapout9

07-07-2010, 08:45 PM

Slapout,
Understanding where your coming from is helpful. Do you think it still applies to the insurgencies that we are seeing today. Out of the numerous long term insurgencies since the fall of the Soviet Union, there are only a handful that are directly linked to Marxist-Communist ideology (Nepal and Peru being two off the top of my head). Does your paradigm change if we are talking about an conflict with something other than communist ideology. For instance: religious, nationalist movement, anti-colonial, anti-modernity, anti-state nationalism? (GAM, JKLF, LTTE, PKK, ETA, Hamas, IRA, JKHM just to name a few off the top of my head). [For more reading on these please check out Terror, Insurgency, and the State by Heiberg, O'Leary, and Tirman]Would any of these other causes of conflict change your understanding?

It is all exactly the same to me as far as the mthod used,instead of Marx just replace it with a religious cause,ethnic cause or anything else. However Marx has been so forgotten that people don't realize his importance, mostly in economics. Marx is like Clausewitz most people have never read him, but quote him a lot:wry: People forget that Marx was an economist before he became a revolutionary. Today's current financial crises is described perfectly by his economic theories but few would even realize that he described the inherent "Crisis Of Capitalism" they just regurgitate some slogan of what somebody said he meant, instead of finding out for themselves. I have strayed from the threads main subject, but economic revolutionaries(insurgencies) are going to be far more prevalent in our future, and may initiate a pretty classic Marxist class type civil war.:eek:

Forgot this:Terrorism is just a form of exporting revolutions to me.

jmm99

07-08-2010, 02:34 AM

how you elect to conduct your thread is up to your judgment and discretion. And, no, I was not disappointed that you chose not to answer either Wilf or me.

BLUF: I have better things to do than to play the role of a Twenty Questions Answeree (that was a very ancient radio quiz program) to a questioner who won't deign to tell me where he is going with this so-called Members' Project. I posit that you have some sort of project outline, as would befit an infantry soldier - so show me your bloody "sandtable".

I forgot the url to the Wiki, Civil War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war) that cites Collier, Paul; Sambanis, Nicholas, eds (2005). Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis.

That Wiki briefly deals with a legal definition in its subsection, Further definitions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war#Further_definitions):

The Geneva Conventions do not specifically define the term "civil war". They do, however, describe the criteria for acts qualifying as "armed conflict not of an international character", which includes civil wars. Among the conditions listed are four requirements:[7][8]

- The party in revolt must be in possession of a part of the national territory.

- The insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto authority over the population within the determinate portion of the national territory.

- The insurgents must have some amount of recognition as a belligerent.

- The legal Government is "obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military.

7.^ Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, (Volume II-B, p. 121).

8.^ See also the International Committee of the Red Cross commentary on Third 1949 Geneva Convention, Article III, Section "A. Cases of armed conflict" for the ICRC's reading of the definition and a listing of proposed alternate wording.

Actually, the above quote is an attempt at defining a "belligerent" (not a civil warrior), as opposed to an "insurgent".

The definition of belligerent in 1968 (re: Vietnam and other conflicts of that era), from Max Sorensen (ed.), Manual of Public International Law (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Manual-Public-International-Law-Sorensen/dp/0333016637) (1968) (I'm citing to the hardcover ed. in sec. 5.25 "Recognition of belligerency"):

As we have already indicated in 5.11, the insurrection of a part of the population of a state against the established government may give rise to a situation where that government can no longer fulfil its state responsibility with respect to third[-party] states in matters arising out of the conflict. In such circumstances, the recognition of belligerency is the proper concern of international law.
....
It is generally agreed that recognition of belligerency should be granted only if:

i. there exists within the state an armed conflict of a general, as distinct from one of a purely local, character;

ii. the rebels occupy a substantial portion of the national territory;

iii. they conduct the hostilities in accordance with the rules of war and through organized groups acting under a responsible authority; and

iv. there exist circumstances which make it necessary for the recognizing state to define its attitude to the conflict. [JMM, e.g., one or both of the belligerents engage in high seas acts which affect the third-party's shipping]

These conditions still hold for states (such as the US) that stand on the 1949 GCs and the prior Hague rules. States that have adopted the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II would have different conditions (e.g., "transitory guerrillas" vs the brightline requirements in sub iii bolded above).

The principal effects of belligerency recognition (by "enough" third party states), and keeping in mind that belligerency recognition is neither recognition of a nation-state nor recognition of a nation state government, are (from Sorensen):

i. It becomes henceforth possible to apply rules of international law governing the conduct of hostilities to the relations between the recognized lawful government and the recognized belligerent authorities. The civil conflict is transformed into a war governed by international law in all respects, for example, neutrality. ....
....
ii. The international responsibility for the acts of the recognized belligerent authorities is transferred to them from the lawful government. ....
...

The recognition of insurgents as a belligerent power resembles more the recognition of a community as a state than the recognition of an individual or group of individuals as a government. By the effective control of the insurgent government over part of the territory and people of the state involved in civil war an entity is formed which indeed resembles a state in the sense of international law.

See Common Article 2 of all four 1949 GCs for inclusion and exclusion of Powers to an armed conflict (as opposed to High Contracting Parties) based on their acceptance and application of the 1949 GCs - and this thread, Defending Hamdan (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6118).

"Quid pro quo, Doctor; quid pro quo (http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/The_Silence_of_the_Lambs_(film))" - and I may pass on some of Sorensen's comments on defining "Insurgency" (sec. 5.26). ;)

Regards

Mike

ryanmleigh

07-08-2010, 03:54 AM

Mike-
I thought I had explained my intentions somewhat coherently in post #15. If that doesn't meet the mail, then I apologize for wasting your time. I certainly was not intending on having you answer 20 questions. I was merely trying to stir the pot and generate some discourse which might increase my own understanding of the differences between the two. The gist of my argument is that based on our understanding of a given conflict that we will design strategies in such a way to be successful. If we fundamentally misunderstand a conflict, then any solution that we design for that conflict will be incoherent. I believe that a response that is based on a better understanding will be more effective in achieving our objectives. That's it. Sorry to waste your time.

P.S. thank you for the legal references. I think they will be useful. I had started to go down the belligerent route, but got sidetracked. I will certainly revisit that again.

Bob's World

07-08-2010, 12:58 PM

Bob- Would you say that these root conditions are the same for either civil war or insurgency? Or are there different conditions that lead to different forms of warfare. I imagine that the initial conditions (personnel, equipment, funding) would have an impact on the way the conflict progresses.

Therefore I would also think that there may be different root causes of conflict which make it look, smell, or be an insurgency vice a civil war. Examining the root causes then would be one way to differentiate between the two forms of conflict. Wouldn't you agree?

Any distinction must provide some value in suggesting a unique type of problem that requires a unique category of solution.

In that vein, recognizing that over the recorded history of warfare these terms (civil war, revolt, insurrection, insurgency, etc) have been used randomly for a wide range of reasons (a snappy name that rolls off the tongue and is pleasing to the ear probably as high a reason as any), we really cannot look to historic precedence for our answer, merely for examples.

So, I see insurgency as being any informal, illegal revolt growing out of a populace in response to perceptions of "Poor Governance" (rooted in Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and/or Hope) to address some combination of Revolution (change the government), Resistance (remove an unwanted foreign body) or Separatist (break a chunk off to form a new state). I see these as much more being Civil Emergencies rather that true warfare, and should be addressed in a manner that recognizes that the causation is rooted in how a populace feels about its own governance, and that the government must tailor its response to focus on addressing those perceptions, while managing the violence and dealing with the (by definition) outlaw insurgents in a manner that never forgets they are the tip of an iceberg-like segment of the society, and that one cannot just shave the offensive section of the populace off and resolve the problem.

Civil War, on the other hand, is when a State breaks cleanly at the start of the conflict into 2 or more distinct legal entities, with clear boundaries and formal governing bodies. The new states willing to fight to retain their newly declared independence, and the remnant of the old state willing to fight to prevent the same. This is more traditional warfare between these two governments. Once the Civil War is resolved by accepted principles of warfare, however, one may find them self with all of the conditions of insurgency as described above that must be appreciated and managed as well.

Some may say that I am leaning too heavily on the American experience. No, it is merely a distinction that to me provides some form of worthwhile merit.

So, between a populace and its government: insurgency.

When a new government forms, and a new state is formed: Civil War.

In Iraq then, to find a current example, If the new Kurdish state with its distinct border and governance and the existing Iraqi state square off over the desire of greater sovereignty for that Kurdish state, it would be civil war. Any thing that has happened in Iraq over the past 7 years has not, IMO, been civil war.

(note: even with this distinction, it gets fuzzy pretty fast for a separatist movement; such movements probably need to be addressed with a mix of approaches from the start)

Rex Brynen

07-08-2010, 01:47 PM

Civil War, on the other hand, is when a State breaks cleanly at the start of the conflict into 2 or more distinct legal entities, with clear boundaries and formal governing bodies. The new states willing to fight to retain their newly declared independence, and the remnant of the old state willing to fight to prevent the same. This is more traditional warfare between these two governments. Once the Civil War is resolved by accepted principles of warfare, however, one may find them self with all of the conditions of insurgency as described above that must be appreciated and managed as well.

Some may say that I am leaning too heavily on the American experience. No, it is merely a distinction that to me provides some form of worthwhile merit.

I think there are two rules of thumb that ought to guide conceptual definitions:

1) Does the category have any analytical utility? The whole purpose of applying labels and drawing conceptual boundaries, after all, is to aid analysis.

2) Does the use of the term more-or-less coincide with the way the term is used by scholars and a broader audience? If it doesn't there is simply too much scope for increased confusion.

Your definition of "civil war" certainly meets test #1, but I would argue it doesn't meet test #2, since it excludes a great many things that most folks understand as "civil wars" (Lebanon, Algeria, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc).

Instead, your definition seems to better fit the existing category of "wars of secession."

On a side note--since my current summer job involves pouring over hundreds of intel judgments to look at the way language is used, and the ambiguities that can arise from this--the whole discussion highlights the way in which analysts need to be very careful that the terms they use in assessments or policy advice are understood by clients in the same way. From the discussion above, it's clear that if someone wrote a memo to Bob and I warning of "a growing risk of civil war" the two of us might well understand that prediction in very different ways...

jmm99

07-08-2010, 02:43 PM

I believe we have at least a temporary agreement on most points - some suggestions and comments; submittted with the hope that you will stay on the rez (a forlorn hope, but a hope :)).

from BW
... in response to perceptions of "Poor Governance" (rooted in Legitimacy, Justice, Respect and/or Hope....

I'd suggest something like a "negative perception of existing governance" (by the insurgent group) and leave out value-laden terms such as "good, poor and bad governance". A good chunk of objections to your theories comes from your use of those terms.

As to "Legitimacy", that is one of my current buzzwords - which I have not tried to define in general terms; but for which, I could provide some examples (besides the obvious legal ones) rooted in my concepts of Ideology, Opportunity and Security (or of "relatively better insecurity" in more Marc Legrangian terms). That triad may not be much different than your Justice, Respect and/or Hope triad.

Yup, as to as much emphasis on Civil Emergency as is "reasonably possible" (how's them for litigation language). Meet violence with violence (with no apologies for being violent). Meet non-violence with non-violence (cutting the insurgents some slack by not over-reacting to smaller provocations) - let the insurgents up the ante to terrorism (Intefada I vs Intefada II). Generally, meet military with military; political with political (realizing that political insurgencies can develop a nasty side in a hurry - and that some counter-violence will still be needed in the political struggle).

from BW
Civil War, on the other hand, is when a State breaks cleanly at the start of the conflict into 2 or more distinct legal entities, with clear boundaries and formal governing bodies. The new states willing to fight to retain their newly declared independence, and the remnant of the old state willing to fight to prevent the same. This is more traditional warfare between these two governments. Once the Civil War is resolved by accepted principles of warfare, however, one may find them self with all of the conditions of insurgency as described above that must be appreciated and managed as well.

Some may say that I am leaning too heavily on the American experience. No, it is merely a distinction that to me provides some form of worthwhile merit.

So, between a populace and its government: insurgency.

When a new government forms, and a new state is formed: Civil War.

I've no real objection to looking at civil war in this way. Basically, you are equating a "civil war" with "recognition of a belligerent", which is similar to (but not the same as) "recognition of a new state" - the Soresen concept explained above. Don't simplify too much here - "distinct legal entities" are fine; but "new states" go a bridge too far.

As you recognize (and we agree), bright lines are hard to draw.

In simple terms, a "belligerent" is an "insurgent" who has gained some respect. Or, in my local Finlander terms, a belligerent is a "hi'glas" insurgent - or a drunken Finlander. :D

Our Civil Rights struggle and our Civil War are fine examples of a non-violent response and a violent response. We've never differed on those.

Now, if we can just work on the American Revolution and get around to my (proper) interpretation of the Declaration of Independence. ;)

-----------------------
Brief note to Rex.

from Rex
I think there are two rules of thumb that ought to guide conceptual definitions:

1) Does the category have any analytical utility? The whole purpose of applying labels and drawing conceptual boundaries, after all, is to aid analysis.

2) Does the use of the term more-or-less coincide with the way the term is used by scholars and a broader audience? If it doesn't there is simply too much scope for increased confusion.

No doubt. That's why I prefer "recognition of belligerency" cuz that's been around from before the Hague Rules.

If belligerency is recognized, that recognition will cause (or should cause) a change in policy in each of the affected Powers. Since both the military struggle and the political struggle are (or should be) merely continuations of policy by other means (how's that for slipping in a little Mao-Giap), the expected changes in policies have some analytical value.

The drawback in using I Law terms is your second point - they are fairly well defined (at least well exemplified), but lack a broad audience.

Regards

Mike

Ken White

07-08-2010, 03:06 PM

I think there are two rules of thumb that ought to guide conceptual definitions:

1) Does the category have any analytical utility? The whole purpose of applying labels and drawing conceptual boundaries, after all, is to aid analysis.

2) Does the use of the term more-or-less coincide with the way the term is used by scholars and a broader audience? If it doesn't there is simply too much scope for increased confusion.Which I submit is the case in this attempt to finitely define the infinitely indefinable.

For what purpose?
...analysts need to be very careful that the terms they use in assessments or policy advice are understood by clients in the same way.Quite true and perhaps counterintuitively, also exceedingly difficult. Few things are as simple as we would like them to be, warfare and it's cousins particularly so. I've watched this thread from inception and Post 15 not withstanding still have the same question. Why? :wry:

William F. Owen

07-08-2010, 03:17 PM

Steve Blair

07-08-2010, 03:39 PM

OK but that does accurately describer either English Civil War, or even the Lebanese Civil War. It only marginally describes the US Civil War. Were not the Southerners called "Rebels?"

Early IO, Wilf. Early IO. The Southern states had a functional central government, complete with ambassadors sent to Europe. And they came close enough to official recognition to worry a number of folks in Washington on more than a couple of occasions. Remember that the Confederates actually put conscription into practice before the Federal government, and were collecting taxes and supporting a coordinated war effort. Their emphasis was on states' rights (to a fault in some cases), but the government of Jefferson Davis did function as a national government (even if it didn't gain outside recognition in the formal sense) until close to the end of the war.

Was their goal realistic? I don't happen to think so. But don't confuse an unrealistic goal with lack of execution or internal governmental function.

William F. Owen

07-08-2010, 03:53 PM

Early IO, Wilf. Early IO. The Southern states had a functional central government, complete with ambassadors sent to Europe. And they came close enough to official recognition to worry a number of folks in Washington on more than a couple of occasions. .
IO? More like actual diplomacy, and yes, IIRC Queen Victoria did recognise the South.
Yes, the South had a functioning local government, and became a de-facto state, so wouldn't that make it State v State. In the English Civil Wars, the wars were for control of the nation. In the US Civil War the war was for secession. Correct? The South wanted their own state.

...and point being why is this important?

Bob's World

07-08-2010, 04:04 PM

All,

As I began my last post, merely my opinion, and that historical use of these terms provides little help as there has been no single set of rules to guide the naming conventions of those conflicts.

Will violently agree with anyone who suggests that many conflicts that are widely referred to as "Civil Wars" are in fact some form of insurgency. On that note, the American Revolution is much more an English Civil War than the "English Civil War" was.

Note that the causal factors (which Mike, Rex, et al, I define in my paper and use consistently IAW those definitions) for Civil War are often the same as the causal factors for Insurgency. The difference comes then in how those conditions manifest.

They may manifest as non-violent, but illegal subversion.

They may manifest as violent, illegal insurgency.

They may manifest by a decision to form governments, build armies, and declare independence as a new state.

In that last case, I believe the state-on-state conflict can be approached as war, but that in the first two that it is best approached as civil emergency. I also believe that once the rebel "state" is defeated one may well find them self with either a subversion or an insurgency on their hands, and that they should keep that in mind as they fight the war, and be prepared to transition to MSCA-based COIN practices to deal with the subsequent civil emergency.

(Oh, has to "staying on the reservation," I've always held in higher regard those who refused to submit to the rule of their oppressors and stayed off the reservation, than those who surrendered everything they stood for to accept a role cast for them by those same oppressors.) :)

tequila

07-08-2010, 04:05 PM

IIRC Queen Victoria did recognise the South.

If she did, her Government did not.

davidbfpo

07-08-2010, 04:09 PM

Wilf stated:
yes, IIRC Queen Victoria did recognise the South

No, Great Britain did not recognise the Confederacy and even though Queen Victoria had influence exercising the royal perogative like that was not an option. Recognition was subject to a public and parliamentary debate. As I recall the USN -v- blockade runenrs did cause a few diplomatic "storms".:wry:

William F. Owen

07-08-2010, 04:10 PM

If she did, her Government did not.
In which case I stand corrected. Having said that, the British Army did attach at a number of observers to the Southern Army at various times.

Steve Blair

07-08-2010, 04:23 PM

IO? More like actual diplomacy, and yes, IIRC Queen Victoria did recognise the South.
Yes, the South had a functioning local government, and became a de-facto state, so wouldn't that make it State v State. In the English Civil Wars, the wars were for control of the nation. In the US Civil War the war was for secession. Correct? The South wanted their own state.

...and point being why is this important?

It's important because you stated earlier that the US Civil War only marginally met Bob's definition. In fact it comes much closer to his definition than you seem to realize. And that makes it important within the context of his discussion.

The South's government wasn't a de-facto state. In its view it was a state. The key is "in its view." The Federal government never recognized the South's proclaimed right to leave the Union, but if you use Bob's definition you have two "states"-one fighting to leave the existing order and the other trying to maintain the existing order.

And your memory is correct, David. The blockade runners caused a number of issues, both in terms of the Navy's response to them and the fact that some of them were constructed and fitted out in British shipyards. So you had protest and counter protest, but much of that died out after 1863.

jmm99

07-08-2010, 10:19 PM

I have to write briefly here in support of both Wilf and David - sucka$$ that I must be. :)

There are three kinds of recognition:

1. Recognition of the existence of a nation-state.

2. Recognition of the government (or lack thereof) for that state.

3. Recognition of one or more belligerents (other than the lawful government) within that state.

In the pecking order of the three recognitions, recognition of a belligerent is the least significant; but better than being a mere insurgent. These are 19th century legal terms, BTW; although insurrection and rebellion were used as often as not, rather than insurgency.

The key three events re: Wilf's point and David's counterpoint were:

19 & 27 Apr 1861 - Pres. Lincoln proclaims blockades of southern ports; Congress not being in session.

13 May 1861 - Queen Vic issued her proclamation of neutrality, which was followed by similar declarations or acquiescences by other nations.

13 July 1861 - Congress ratified the southern blockades and gave its act retrospective application to the presidential proclamations in April.

Queen Vic's proclamation of neutrality constituted recognition of the South as a belligerent (but not as a nation-state or a lawful government), as decided by Justice Grier's majority opinion in the Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (1863).

So both Wilf and David are right; but also are guilty of not specifying which recognition was given (type 3) and which were refused (types 1 and 2).

Besides the Prize Cases, another set of cases (involving less money, but life itself) hinged on belligerency. In the early days of the Civil War, some Confederate soldiers and sailors were indicted, tried and sentenced to be executed for treason (land) or piracy (sea). No executions were carried out; and the prisoners were quietly turned over to the military to be detained as EPWs. Justice Grier (a moderate in an era of absolutism) was involved in that process as well.

General Order 100 (Lieber Code) of 1863 also regularized the conduct of the war; and is granddaddy to the Hague and Geneva Conventions.

Some habeas issues still persisted after 1863 (e.g., Ex Parte Milligan). But, as Steve correctly notes, the legal issues raised by belligerency quieted down after 1863.

Regards

Mike

slapout9

07-09-2010, 02:54 AM

At the risk of complicating things a lot this is talked about in some of the articles on 4GW (4th Generation Warfare) the decline of the legitimacy of the Nation/State which is being attacked by population groups that will no longer support them or perform the legitimate functions of Government for them because they have been sold off or outsourced. So you get Insurgents,Guerrillas,Ethic groups,Regular Criminals,Cross Border Criminals,Rouge International Corporations,Tali-Banksters,Religious Groups, Pink Elephants,Talk show hosts and Rolling Stone reporters.:)

For your listening pleasure and cultural enhancement. "Ball Of Confusion" by The Temptations

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=miZWYmxr8XE

Bob's World

07-09-2010, 03:27 AM

Dayuhan

07-09-2010, 04:18 AM

I'm tempted to argue that "civil war" is simply an internal conflict of sufficient duration and dimension to be reasonably called "war", and that "insurgency" is a subset of civil war, typically involving irregular armed resistance to governance by a populace or portion thereof.

Like others here, though, I'm not convinced that the distinction is terribly useful, even in the unlikely event that we could agree on what the distinction is. The ability to apply a label to a conflict (or anything else) does not necessarily enhance understanding, and can obstruct understanding if the label carries enough assumptions with it.

slapout9

07-09-2010, 01:37 PM

Concepts of Sovereignty are indeed changing. Classic example is the "Failed" and "Failing" State list, with criteria that essentially define a successful state as one that conforms to the Western standards born of Westphalia. Most such states, not surprisingly, are in places as Africa, where such foreign forms of governance were imposed upon them by Colonial masters. As they reject these foreign concepts and seek forms that make more sense within their own cultures they are branded as "failed" by the West.

I think the Kurdish situation as well as the Pashtun situation cry out for fresh perspectives on Sovereignty as well. Ways to recognize unique forms of autonomy within multiple states, without also having to rip those same states apart first to do so.

Yes, and your original premise that insurgencies are caused by bad governments is at the root of everything. If government Provides and Protects it's citizens you will never have to worry about a civil war or an insurgency because there will be no motive to have one internally and no contradiction that could be exploited by any out side power. And if you run across the Charles Manson Guerrilla fighter who just wants a revolution for the heck of it, the population will take care of him very quickly.

ryanmleigh

07-09-2010, 02:29 PM

From The Dictionary of Modern War by Luttwak and Koehl, circa 1991:

Insurgency: A localized internal war between a constituted government and rival elements originating in the same national territory, which may be guerrilla, civilian-insurrectional, or terrorist in nature. Revolutionary war mya begin as an insurgency, but one need not develop into the other. The term correctly applied to localized conflicts, often caused by ethnic or regional demands for autonomy or secession.

Internal War: Organized armed conflict between parties that mainly originate from, and are based in, the same territory. If two or more parties acknowledge a common nationality while they openly wage war, the conflict is a civil war. If two or more parties acknowledge a common nationality, but one party relies mainly on guerrilla warfare and subversion, the conflict is revolutionary war. If two or more parties are fighting for control of less than the totality of the national territory, the conflict is an insurgency (normally ehtnic or regional).

Insurrection defines mass civilian action against the established power, a mode of conflict that can succeed only if the armed authorities refrain from using the force at their disposal because of poltical inhibitions.

Revolutionary war: armed conflict between a government and opposing forces, wherein the latter rely mainly on guerrilla warfare and subversion rather than formal warfare. The revolutionary side operates by establishing a rival state structure which embodies a political ideology, and which is intended to replace the existing order. This competing administration is itself the chief instrument of warfare. In revolutionary war, the winning side out-administers, rather than out-fights, the loser; the covert administration collects taxes, conscripts, and information-all of which can be extracted from the population even if the government is in apparent military control of the area in question.

Using the current situation in Afghanistan as a case study, it would appear to me that Taliban is fighting for all of the country, which it had most of prior to OEF, making the conflict resemble more of a civil or revolutionary war. From the Taliban point of view, we (collective) could be seen as insurgents, and they are waging the counter-insurgency campaign. While the Tlaiban may utilize different tactics, I think it is hard to argue that the Taliban use mainly guerrilla tactics when they have massed into formations as large as 250 to attack targets. They also use very conventional combined arms manuever to attack our hard target installations. While this is not country wide, or always occurring, it does happen frequently.

Perhaps we (imperial) are afraid to make the call because of our own hubris and therefore lose the moral high ground? Thoughts?

slapout9

07-09-2010, 03:11 PM

"Revolutionary war: armed conflict between a government and opposing focres, wherein the latter rely mainly on guerrilla warfare and subversion rather than formal warfare. The revolutionary side operates by establishing a rival state structure which embodies a political ideology, and which is intended to replace the existing order. This competing administration is itself the chief instrument of warfare. In revolutionary war, the winning side out-administers, rather than out-fights, the loser; the covert administration collects taxes, conscripts, and information-all of which can be extracted from the population even if the government is in apparent military control of the area in question."

I like this better(highlighted the important parts) a government and opposing force,doesn't matter if they are civil warriors or insurgents or both they simply oppose the government. In this case I would call it a Religious/Political ideology.

Backwards Observer

07-10-2010, 06:43 AM

From the SWJ Aladdin's Cave of Field Manuals:

102. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. Insurgency Defined. - - A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported or exploited.

b. Counterinsurgency Defined. - - Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

...---...

106. EVOLUTION OF FORCES

Resistance stems from the dissatisfaction of some part of the population. The dissatisfaction may be real, imagined or incited and is usually centered around a desire for - -

(1) Political change.

(2) Relief from actual or alleged oppression.

(3) Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation.

(4) Economic and social improvement.

(5) Religious expression.

Resistance movements may form locally or be inspired by “sponsoring powers.” The evolution of the guerrilla force usually follows a sequence of events that form a pattern:

(1) The existence of a dissident group.

(2) The emergence of groups which are willing to bear arms.

(3) The appearance of strong, determined leaders to further organize and orient these groups. As members of underground organizations are identified and resistance grows, guerrilla bands form in secure areas to become the military arm of the guerrilla force.

(4) Initial successes are exploited to convince elements of the population to support an effective guerrilla organization.

(5) Seeking and accepting support from external sources.

(6) The employment of equipment and personnel furnished by external sources

(7) The integration of the guerrilla forces into a regular military organization.

Like FM 31-22 from 1963, the USMC FMFM 21 seems to this reader to be a lot more straightforward than much of the current literature. Given that the Cold War also featured a massive ideological struggle, these old field manuals paradoxically seem to have much less of an underlying ideological bias, and are impressive for their measured sobriety. One of the first things to stand out between the USMC and the Army manuals, however, is FMFM 21's unapologetic use of the concept of evolution to describe the change of guerrilla units through time. One imagines that this well befits an organisation that emerges from the sea to fight on the land (and from the air).

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/fmfm21.pdf

M-A Lagrange

07-10-2010, 10:43 PM

From the SWJ Aladdin's Cave of Field Manuals:
Like FM 31-22 from 1963, the USMC FMFM 21 seems to this reader to be a lot more straightforward than much of the current literature. Given that the Cold War also featured a massive ideological struggle, these old field manuals paradoxically seem to have much less of an underlying ideological bias, and are impressive for their measured sobriety. One of the first things to stand out between the USMC and the Army manuals, however, is FMFM 21's unapologetic use of the concept of evolution to describe the change of guerrilla units through time. One imagines that this well befits an organisation that emerges from the sea to fight on the land (and from the air).

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/fmfm21.pdf

It is interresting also to consider that after the Cold War, civil wars and "revolutionary war" became insurrections.
It is part of the actual ideology struggle between states and individuals as legal international bodies of the International Laws. By using the na,e insurrection, you assume that the government is always right. The term civil war leaves an open question on who are the right guys. But since we did win the Cold War, the only good guy can be the State.
And this is were the propaganda starts....;)

jmm99

07-11-2010, 01:31 AM

the French Army, that is - and its TdM (Troupes de Marine (http://www.troupesdemarine.org/index2.htm)) branch, just to keep it in the family. :D

Bonsoir Legrange,

You keep me active finding where you get some of your ideas. So, here we look at "insurrection" (Fr) = "insurrection" (Eng). But is that really an accurate translation of our (US) thought. Ne pas !

No doubt, current French doctrine is filled with "insurrection" - both the French originals and in English translations and paraphrases. E.g.:

FT-01 (http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/doctrineFT/doc_fond/FT_01/FT-1.pdf) Gagner la bataille, Conduire à la paix, les forces terrestres dans les conflits aujourd’hui et demain; CENTRE DE DOCTRINE D’EMPLOI DES FORCES, PARIS, JANVIER 2007 (pp.16-18):
....
133 - Des conflits symétriques aux conflits asymétriques
....
Les modèles dissymétiques et, plus encore, asymétriques sont désormais les conflits de référence pour notre armée. Or, les guerres asymétriques trouvant leur pleine expression dans l’insurrection, la guérilla, le terrorisme ou la manipulation des populations, certaines capacités indispensables dans la conduite des guerres symétriques ou dissymétriques s’avèrent partiellement inadaptées à l’asymétrie des conflits.

and translated.

FT-01 (http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine13/version_us/doctrine13_us.pdf) (ENG) Winning the Battle, Building Peace; Land Forces in Present and Future Conflicts; CENTRE DE DOCTRINE D’EMPLOI DES FORCES, PARIS, JANVIER 2007 (pp.16-18)
...
1.3.3 – From Symmetrical to Asymmetrical Conflicts
...
Dissymmetrical and, even more so, asymmetrical conflicts have become the points of reference for the French Army. Since asymmetrical warfare finds its full expression in insurrections, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and the manipulation of populations, certain capabilities which are indispensable for the conduct of symmetric or dissymmetrical warfare have proven to be illadapted in part to asymmetrical conflicts.

One more example in French (which uses both "insurrection" & "mouvement révolutionnaire"):

DOCTRINE D’EMPLOI DES FORCES TERRESTRES EN STABILISATION (http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/doctrineFT/doc_trans/doctrine_emploi_FT_stabilisation.pdf); CENTRE DE DOCTRINE D’EMPLOI DES FORCES, PARIS, 2006 (p.15):

... intervention dans un conflit interne où une armée n’arrive pas à maîtriser une insurrection / un mouvement révolutionnaire, etc.), la FOT (Force Opérationnelle Terrestre) peut se trouver exposée à divers niveaux de menace classique ...

and another in English:

DOCTRINE - general military review (http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine_us.htm); Lessons learned: Principles of Pacification and Organization; MAY 2007, DOCTRINE # 12:

Doctrine: What type of enemy can be met in these areas and how is it organized?

On the Afghan theater of operations as well as on many mountainous theaters where more or less known asymmetric operations are taking place [3], the mountains constitute sanctuaries where insurrection movements get equipped, train, are refurbished and that they use for relocating their fighters and to organize their logistical flows.

and finally this monograph:

LE RÔLE DES MILITAIRES (http://www.c2sd.sga.defense.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Document.pdf) DANS LA RECONSTRUCTION D’ÉTATS APRÈS LES CONFLITS, Yann BRAEM, Alexandra de HOOP SCHEFFER, Christian OLSSON, Raphaël POUYÉ, 2007; Ce document constitue le rapport final de l’étude commanditée au Center for Peace du CERI/Sciences Po par le C2SD. CCEP 2006 SOC-138, Conv DEF/C2SD/2006 n°90.

which uses "insurrection" just short of 100 times.

Now all of this French "insurrectionism" seemed a bit suspicious to this partial product of some ancien TdM genes. Where was the term "insurgency" ?

Actually, the French Army translated it out of existence and made it into "insurrection" ! Thus, from the DOCTRINE - general military review article above (p.7):

The Marines and the US Army have just issued a new “Joint Doctrine” pertaining to counterinsurrection. It is based upon the Afghani and Iraqi experiences. ...

Whoa, Cheval ... Not (in English) a Joint Doctrine re: "counterinsurrection", but one re: "counter-insurgency".

That French translation of "counter-insurgency" into "counterinsurrection" also shows up clearly in the 2007 LE RÔLE DES MILITAIRES monograph above (p. 92):

Dès le début des années 1970 cette stratégie visant à lutter contre le PIRA fut mise en oeuvre par le brigadier Frank Kitson, l’un des principaux hérauts britanniques de la contre-insurrection coloniale aux côtés de Thompson, Clutterbuck et Tugwell [129].

[129] WILLIAMS (P), From Counter Insurgency to Internal Security: Northern Ireland 1969-1992, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.6, n.6, printemps 1995; Voir également: KITSON (Frank), Low Intensity Operations: subversion, insurgency and peacekeeping, London, Faber and Faber, 1971.

So, for some reason, French doctrine prefers "insurrection" to "insurgency"; despite such perfectly good French (per my battered Larousse) as insurgé = insurgent, and insurger = to revolt, to rebel, to rise.

And, perhaps, the devious TdM (;)) have decided that, as you say:

By using the name insurrection, you assume that the government is always right.

But, that shift in meaning is not demonstrated in the Anglophone world; nor at Geneva at the ICRC - just consider APs I and II, as well as the ICRC studies of Direct Participation in Hostilities and of Customary International Humanitarian Law, which are scarcely slanted in favor of incumbant governments.

Colonialement, tu ancien Marsouin :)

Mike

Bob's World

07-11-2010, 12:05 PM

Interesting.

Particularly the dangerous trap of a "presumption that the government is always right." I will concede that there is also danger in presuming 'that the government is always wrong.'

Sometimes, as in America's case with the events of 9/11, it is not a matter of Fault so much as a matter of Responsibity. Politicians struggle to separate those two very different concepts; and in that struggle they assume positions that make effective counterinsurgency extremely difficult as well.

Is insurgency the government's fault? Often, but not always. There are evil and greedy men everywhere. Is insurgency government's responsibility? Always.

In my short time as a Prosecutor working with literally thousands of my fellow citizens who were charged with a felony drug crime (of all ages, gender, economic and social backgrounds in nearly equal numbers, btw), I noticed two broad categories: Those who refused to take responsibility for their situation and were making no progress in dealing with their problem; and those who took responsibility for their situation and were immediately and clearly on the path to recovery (with recovery being a life-long journey, not an endstate one can simply achieve and be done with).

Governance is very much like this. Do we love to blame our drug problems as individuals and as a nation on those who provide the drugs? Absolutely. There are millions of excuses (and I've heard half of them) for avoiding the measure of responsibility required for true progress. Similarly we love to blame our insurgencies, revolutions, insurections, etc, etc on those who form and join such movements as well. This is human nature, but it is an aspect of human nature that once identified as something that must be overcome, can be.

We need to develop the "34-foot tower" for politicians. Determined as a height in which the survival instincts in one's brain would screeam "don't jump, you'll die!" airborne students are trained to overcome a healthy instinct and instead place trust in their equipment. Politicians also need to spend a couple weeks with some "governmental blackhats" to get trained out of some similarly defeatest instincts.

I write this from a hotel lobby a mile or so south of the Capital (Giants are in town, and today is game three) and took the time to make a Hage to the National Archives yesterday. The words are sadly faded and largely unreadable on 6 precious sheets of parchment, but their meanings and power are timeless. 1-4-1. One page of Declaration of Independence; Four pages of a Constitution; and One page of a Bill of Rights. This is our equipment in which we must trust.

I picked up a couple of great books as well, from one of them:

The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions that I wish it to be always kept alive. It will often be exercised when wrong, but better so than not to be exercised at all. Thomas Jefferson (to Abigail Adams, February 22, 1787)

davidbfpo

07-11-2010, 01:06 PM

Bob's World cited in part:
The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions that I wish it to be always kept alive. It will often be exercised when wrong, but better so than not to be exercised at all. Thomas Jefferson (to Abigail Adams, February 22, 1787).

I do wonder if this concept of tolerance - on both sides of the Atlantic and elsewhere - has been eroded in recent times. Thirty years ago in the UK there were advocates of Britain being ungovernable (see Professor Sammy Finer's writings on this) and without exception the concept of the strong state has moved forward.

We appear now to be in an era where state effectiveness, as distinct from coercive capability, has diminished in many realms of social activity; I hesitate to mention the banking crisis - well covered on another thread. The state still seeks to have the appearance of being effective, in an almost theatrical manner trying to provide confident security.

Other countries, with very different cultures and traditions, have what appears to be a high tolerance level of dissent, even rebellion - provided it is not in key areas, e.g. India with its many insurgencies.

Backwards Observer

07-11-2010, 03:48 PM

But since we did win the Cold War, the only good guy can be the State.
And this is were the propaganda starts....;)

I love the smell of Gallic cynicism in the morning. One of the things that confused me when reading Trinquier's, Modern Warfare, was that even with all the casual brutality, the writing was so upbeat he hardly seemed like a Frenchman. Maybe it was the translator's inflection.

jmm99

07-11-2010, 06:43 PM

from BO,
... the writing was so upbeat he hardly seemed like a Frenchman....

I think you've known too many Parisiens, and not enough French-Canadiens. :D

I can't think of anything more upbeat than a bunch of FCs whooping it up. :)

It is admittedly rather difficult for a Parisien to appear upbeat when he is looking down on you from the lofty perch of a nose that appears to extend to infinity (my mind picture of Charlie Gallstone).

Trinquier came from the French Alps (La Beaume), where one has to be upbeat to mount the heights (and other things).

Cheers

Mike

Backwards Observer

07-12-2010, 03:57 AM

I think you've known too many Parisiens, and not enough French-Canadiens. :D

Trinquier came from the French Alps (La Beaume), where one has to be upbeat to mount the heights (and other things).

Cheers

Mike

Mike, you're probably right, and that would explain the ski instructor who told my friend's sister in a salacious whisper, "Tonight, I will take you up the Alps..."

M-A Lagrange

07-12-2010, 11:39 AM

Before responding on Trinquiet, I will answer to Mike.

The rise of individual rights was part of the end of war as a democracy promotion process up to the end of the cold war. In his book, David Rieef (a bed for the night) describes how the promotion of Human rights was at the center of the “cultural objectives”. The apogee of such approach was the operation Restore Hope and then the Kosovo war made in the name of the military humanitarian intervention. The ideology behind it being that individual Rights, particularly Human Rights, were International Law and community primary concern and trigger for the just use of violence and war.
Now; we are in a reverse position were the Cold War consensus on democracy is shared and accepted and is challenged by the “Non State War actors”. The legitimacy of democratic webberian state has been established, and the victory of individual rights as only legitimate primary concern of the State (The responsibility to protect).
So now, there is a counter balance tendency from the States (as moral legal object) to come the primary concern of International Law.
This is translated into language by the shift from civil war to insurgency to qualify specific non international wars. By qualifying a non international conflict as an insurgency, implicitly, it is assumed that the State which is being challenged has all the characteristics of a democratic webberian State and is unjustly challenged as THE only acceptable governance regime.
While in a civil war, as in Spanish civil war in the 30th or after the fall of Berlin Wall in East Europe, the population is defending the values of democracy.
This becomes even more obvious if you take the Atlani Duault (Humanitarian Aid in Post-Soviet Countries: An Anthropological Perspective) analyses of the rise of civil society in USSR as a cultural weapon to create a civil counter power in former communist regimes. http://www.amazon.fr/Humanitarian-Aid-Post-Soviet-Countries-Anthropological/dp/0415448840/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=english-books&qid=1278934397&sr=1-1
So the use of insurgency (Which is depreciative) is made to justify the defense of the ideological victory of Cold War which imposes democracy as the only acceptable standard of government. (Not saying I am against).

Well, L'Etat ne peut qu etre moi!:D

jmm99

07-12-2010, 07:31 PM

I'd look at the issues you have mentioned more as issues in national and international politics than as international law questions.

Although, how those issues are resolved politically will certainly affect how international law develops over the next few decades.

E.g., one can question whether the 1977 Additional Protocols would have the same governmental support now as they had then. The old revolutionaries the APs favored then are probably not liking them when they are the incumbants facing "national liberation movements" and "freedom fighters". One even can question whether the 1949 GCs would have as many adherents if they were offered fresh today.

This statement seems unsupportable:

from MAL
While in a civil war, as in Spanish civil war in the 30th or after the fall of Berlin Wall in East Europe, the population is defending the values of democracy.

I'm hard pressed to see either side in the Spanish civil war as "defending the values of democracy". I can't see where there was civil war in the Eastern Bloc after the Wall fell - the incumbant systems mostly collapsed. And then we have Rwanda, where that civil war had nothing to do with democracy and a lot to do with killing in a climate of ethnic absolutism.

Now, as to Alpine mouton .....

Regards

Mike

ryanmleigh

07-13-2010, 12:48 PM

All-
Just received a new paper from Dr. Kalyvas at Yale and Laia Balcells at the Institute for Economic Analysis entitled "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict." In it they demonstrate that irregular war is not the paradigmatic mode of civil war, as widely believed. Rather, it is shown to be closely associated with the strucutral dynamics of the Cold War.

Specifically with respect to the current discussion they write
Contrary to widespread belief, not all civil wars are insurgencies. We diaggregate civil wars based on their technology of rebellion, which we conceptualize as the joint military technologies of states and rebels engaged in armed conflict. Conventional civil war takes place when the military technologies of states and rebels are matched at a high level; irregular civil war emerges when the military technologies of the rebels lag vis-a-vis those of the state; and symmetric non-conventional war is observed when the military technologies of states and rebels are matched at a low level.

They also introduce the idea of a robust insurgency, which is separate and distinct from guerrilla warfare. Overall, I found it a very informative article and enlightening given the context of our discussions here. Thank you all for the rich discourse that we have been generating. I find it all extremely informative and significantly useful in generating a new level of understanding with respect to the differences between everyone's ideas.

M-A Lagrange

07-13-2010, 01:04 PM

Mike,

1) I'll keep on the fact that Spanish civil war had one "good guys side" and & "bad guys side".
For Eastern Europe, I was refering to Caucescu fall to be precise. A limited and small civil war. Or to Yougoslavia.
But it has not so much importance.

I'd look at the issues you have mentioned more as issues in national and international politics than as international law questions.

Although, how those issues are resolved politically will certainly affect how international law develops over the next few decades.

E.g., one can question whether the 1977 Additional Protocols would have the same governmental support now as they had then. The old revolutionaries the APs favored then are probably not liking them when they are the incumbants facing "national liberation movements" and "freedom fighters". One even can question whether the 1949 GCs would have as many adherents if they were offered fresh today.

This is completely the question. Refering to a situation as an insurgency allows to keep it under the level of "internal troubles".

ryanmleigh

07-14-2010, 03:24 AM

From John Macklinay's book Insurgent Archipelago he describes the components of current insurgencies post-Cold War on page 4 and 5 as
1. Insurgency is essentiallly a political process.
2. The techniques of an insurgency evolve with the society from which it arises.
3. Organizing an insurgency is an act of desparation, a course of action only taken when all other avenues of advance have been blocked.
4. An insurgency has to involve the population; its energy, its ability to sustain itself and to continously replace and regenerate its losses, arises from popular support

Later, on pg 223 he goes on to describe insurgency as
Insurgency is essentially a political activity and not a form of warfare. (the word insurgent)refers to the act of rising up against a stronger authority. It is not a method of fighting, it cannot be used to defeat armies or invade territory. Certainly the military forces which emerge at the final stages of an insurgency to fight civil wars can do these things, but insurgency refers to the stages of activism and subversion that precede this development

Given Mackinlay's description of insurgency, would anybody disagree with the concept of a scale of conflict along which multiple activities lie. Starting at the most benign level there is legitimate political activity (I argue a form of conflict) progressing into illegitimate political activity, into the realm of subversion, through insurgency, past rebellion and ending somehwere around civil war. Thoughts?

slapout9

07-14-2010, 04:20 AM

Given Mackinlay's description of insurgency, would anybody disagree with the concept of a scale of conflict along which multiple activities lie. Starting at the most benign level there is legitimate political activity (I argue a form of conflict) progressing into illegitimate political activity, into the realm of subversion, through insurgency, past rebellion and ending somehwere around civil war. Thoughts?

Again I say it's just pretty basic Marxist stuff. Class Warfare.Take any cause in the World an substitute it for Class Warfare.... but the Method of revolution is exactly the same.

Whenever power unjustly concentrates in the hands of a few all types of Unconventional methods will be used to advance or stop a political cause.
In America our Democracy is based on Bribery(Campaign contributions) and Blackmail(negative Campaign adds) that is why Rich people have such an over whelming and unfair advantage.

A stable Democracy will never let this happen(FDR and his Trust Busters) because it often does go down the path to a Civil War/Revolution as you have mentioned. That is why you are seeing folks like the Tea Party emerge and that is why they show up at political rallies with firearms, they know they have nowhere near the monetary resources to fight the Major political parties so they resort to intimidation and threats of force to counter balance this concentration of financial wealth that they perceive as having been unjustly acquired and used against them.

Bed time:)

William F. Owen

07-14-2010, 04:45 AM

From John Macklinay's book Insurgent Archipelago he describes the components of current insurgencies post-Cold War on page 4 and 5 as
Quote:
1. Insurgency is essentiallly a political process.
2. The techniques of an insurgency evolve with the society from which it arises.
3. Organizing an insurgency is an act of desparation, a course of action only taken when all other avenues of advance have been blocked.
4. An insurgency has to involve the population; its energy, its ability to sustain itself and to continously replace and regenerate its losses, arises from popular support.
1. All wars are essentially a political process.
2. Not true. So IEDs were an expression of Irish Republicanism? Same basic IEDs are used worldwide.
3. So what? That is not wholly correct either and sometimes the violence is the preferred means. - Look at the RUF in Sierra Leone. They don't want political dialogue.
4. Again wrong. Some insurgencies do benefit from popular support, but external support can supplant that and a very minor proportion of the population can sustain a successful insurgency.

Given Mackinlay's description of insurgency, would anybody disagree with the concept of a scale of conflict along which multiple activities lie.
Mackinlay is wrong. He's clearly never read Clausewitz, and has an peculiar understanding of war and warfare. Irregular Forces have defeated armies and invaded territories. Cuba wring any bells? Nicaragua?
To say "Insurgency is essentially a political activity and not a form of warfare. (the word insurgent)refers to the act of rising up against a stronger authority." is sophistry. It's a deliberately false definition designed to pass as insight. All Warfare is a political activity. It aims to use violence to secure political objectives.

William F. Owen

07-14-2010, 06:42 AM

If someone really wants to understand where Mackinlay is coming from, look at this paper here (http://www.rusi.org/publications/whitehall/ref:I44C63593D5AD6/).
IMO, reflects the classic problem of wanting to believe that there is something called insurgency, which is somehow a distinct form of conflict and somehow it is hard to understand and paradoxical.
Thus we have nonsensical ideas like "Complex Insurgency" and "global insurgency." All in all, not helpful.

M-A Lagrange

07-14-2010, 11:40 AM

Slap,

Your point is interresting cause according to Bourdieu and his theory on social class relations, what characterises politic is actually the use of "symbolic violence" between social classes. According to him, you have a dialog breakdown, that can lead to war (including riots, insurgencies, civil war...), when at least one social group/class feels it cannot use symbolic violence to express his self and then swich to real/physical violence as a dialog tool.

But we stay in the boundaries set by Clausewitz: war is politic made by other means.
While some deconstruction theory guys would argue that politic is war made by other means...

slapout9

07-14-2010, 12:48 PM

slapout9

07-14-2010, 12:53 PM

I posted this on another thread but it has some merit here I think. It's the "Leaders Handbook To Unconventional Warfare" by a LTC in the Green Beret's. It is based on the old school thinking which is pretty much the way I learned it, but sometimes old turns out to be new.

http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/Assets/SWCS%20Publications/Leaders%20Guide%20Final.pdf

najeebamergul

11-15-2011, 09:53 AM

Well to me there does exist difference between an insurgency and a civil war. An insurgency though an armed rebellion, is smaller in size and mostly restricted in limited geographic area (s) and does not have wider legitimacy in the masses. In contrast, a civil war is a state when a government completely loses control (both physically and ideologically) of a country. The complete state becomes lawless. And the government forces and armed groups control small pockets of influence. In civil war the rebellions have legitimacy (or they are powerful enough to gain one) in the masses.

Therefore, an insurgency easier to tackle by the state itself or with the help of allies, for example, LTTE of Sri Lanka. Whereas, when a country plunges into a civil war, it gets extremely difficult to control, for example Somalia.

Najeeb Amer Gul, Pakistan

Shir Panjshir

02-16-2015, 06:33 AM

Bob's World

02-16-2015, 02:54 PM

I would concede that the simplistic statement "war is war" is accurate, but only if those who cling to that belief were willing to concede that not all political violence is war, and then have a rational discussion as to what that means.

I think the facts of history show that the nature of political violence within a single system of governance (CvC's social trinity is a simple workable model) is fundamentally distinct in nature from political violence between two or more systems.

These systems are like a single cell organism. Revolutionary insurgency is within a single system, and probably better thought of as civil emergency than as some form of war. War requires a warfare solution, but civil emergencies require a very different perspective and family of approaches.

Civil war occurs when one of these single cell systems of governance effectively divides and becomes two systems. Now what was once revolution and civil emergency is now civil war and war. The nature of the conflict changes.

Typical factors, such as size of the conflict, tactics employed, or degree of violence are largely moot. The critical factor is if a division has occurred. Iraq and Syria both retain revolutions, but both are equally in a state of civil war with the emergent Sunni state that is under ISIL governance.

A key fact not in current conversations is that a defeat of that ISIL governance solves little - but it will convert civil war back into powerful, fragmented, revolutionary civil emergency.