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View Full Version : Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan?



JMA
06-26-2010, 11:42 PM
Moderators Note: This is a new thread started as a thread http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9069 on Presence Patrolling developed into a new theme. Several posts moved here.


In response to my question "...RLI fire force at the height of the war 84%. Can you venture a guess as to why this stat may be significant?"


It was important to you because you were there, it was important to Rhodesia due to the relative numbers on both sides and it is important as a statistic because it applies to one war in one nation at one time. Can Fire Force tactics be replicated in, say, Afghanistan today? No.

No, the kill rate is important in any war. If you keep killing 80 odd % of all enemy contacted you keep beheading their leadership and do not allow a build up combat experience. It is exponentially better than anything around or below the 10% mark. All armies in all wars should strive to improve their kill rate per contact as the benefits are self evident.

Can the Fire Force be replicated? I don't know and certainly you don't know. As far as I am aware it has not been given any serious thought. I'm sure at some point (probably too late to be of assistance) it will be considered.

Ken White
06-27-2010, 12:20 AM
No, the kill rate is important in any war.Obviously. Further and as you know, that rate is subject to numerous variables and to fudging. IIRC, that quoted Fire Force rate has been called by 'inflated' some who were present. I have no intention of debating that as it is, as I said, broadly irrelevant to this thread.
Can the Fire Force be replicated? I don't know and certainly you don't know...As a matter of fact, unlike you, I do know. It is not broadly replicable in Afghanistan for several reasons -- even though variations on it are being conducted constantly and have been since 2001. There are many helicopter assaults and a number of small parachute assaults. Note also there is little in the news media about those operations...

Fire Force will not be broadly replicated in Afghanistan for two reasons. The US Army is too risk averse and the operational methodology has limited utility in the effort in Afghanistan as it is currently structured (that could change and the techniques can be used as needed as they are today -- but it is unlikely to change to include large scale use, there simply is no need). Both those reasons are driven by the fact that there is no overarching national interest in the war of choice, not existential, that is Afghanistan today.

JMA
06-27-2010, 02:04 AM
Obviously. Further and as you know, that rate is subject to numerous variables and to fudging. IIRC, that quoted Fire Force rate has been called by 'inflated' some who were present. I have no intention of debating that as it is, as I said, broadly irrelevant to this thread.

I would love to know who these "some" were.

There was no incentive to inflate the kills and in any event the Selous Scouts pseudo teams would have pretty accurate numbers on who fire force was called out on. They would say they have a group of 20 for us and we would respond. and at the end of the day there were 17/8 bodies that is what went into the SITREP. Quire simple.

These are Selous Scout figures that I only came across years later. On the ground we took each call-out as it happened, one at a time. Stats were not our game at the time. What we did realise was that we had one real chance to get that insurgent on that given day and we went for it as best we could.


As a matter of fact, unlike you, I do know. It is not broadly replicable in Afghanistan for several reasons -- even though variations on it are being conducted constantly and have been since 2001. There are many helicopter assaults and a number of small parachute assaults. Note also there is little in the news media about those operations...

Fire Force will not be broadly replicated in Afghanistan for two reasons. The US Army is too risk averse and the operational methodology has limited utility in the effort in Afghanistan as it is currently structured (that could change and the techniques can be used as needed as they are today -- but it is unlikely to change to include large scale use, there simply is no need). Both those reasons are driven by the fact that there is no overarching national interest in the war of choice, not existential, that is Afghanistan today.

Come on Ken. Clearly you know next to nothing about the fire force concept. The fire force concept is neither straight forward heli-borne assault nor is it merely a parachute drop. It took us years to figure out and then perfect.

By risk averse do you mean they don't want a helicopter shot down?

And yes the situation on any battlefield is fluid so yes things could change which may require a change of tactics. So maybe it was not correct to say the fire force concept "will not be broadly replicated in Afghanistan" but rather that it may at some future point be attempted to a larger or lesser degree.

But I tend to agree with you that as long as the desire to close with and kill the enemy is not allowed (ROE) or does not exist then correctly there is no point in introducing something which would lead to an increased kill rate with an associated higher risk of casualties.

William F. Owen
06-27-2010, 04:40 AM
Can the Fire Force be replicated? I don't know and certainly you don't know. As far as I am aware it has not been given any serious thought. I'm sure at some point (probably too late to be of assistance) it will be considered .
Is it a distinct concept? A great many British officers are well read on the Rhodesian War, but there are a number of factors peculiar to equipment and applications that make direct replication pretty pointless.
Using ISTAR "assets" to cue airmobile forces into contact is not exactly a concept unique to "Fire Force."
I submit that the general concept of operations is pretty well understood, and if applied in current theatres would look substantially different.

JMA
06-27-2010, 10:50 AM
Is it a distinct concept? A great many British officers are well read on the Rhodesian War, but there are a number of factors peculiar to equipment and applications that make direct replication pretty pointless.
Using ISTAR "assets" to cue airmobile forces into contact is not exactly a concept unique to "Fire Force."
I submit that the general concept of operations is pretty well understood, and if applied in current theatres would look substantially different.

Thats fine, it evolved specifically in the context of the Rhodesian war at the time using the aircraft and weapons and troops available at the time against that enemy (or those two enemies).

Group Captain Peter Petter Bowyer's book "Winds of Destruction" gives a good insight into the process (from the air force side) that led to the refined final fire force product. Professor Wood's book "Counter Strike from the Sky" is enlightening but is not a text book.

There is an exercise on the go somewhere in North America where the concept and various principles are being workshopped to give an understanding as to why certain things were done in a certain way within the context of aircraft, weapons, equipment available and the enemy and terrain considerations. This I believe includes a practical phase and ends with another workshop as to which of their weapons, troops, aircraft are most suited to such an application the the enemy and terrain environment of their current operational theater. The first serious attempt I have heard of.

What is refreshingly different is that these people are saying "help us understand the concept and the principles so we can see how we can apply them within our current circumstances". Refreshing to see some open minds in decision making positions (somewhere at least). I hope it works out for them.

PS: I would be interested to know how one becomes well read on the Rhodesian War?

William F. Owen
06-27-2010, 12:04 PM
PS: I would be interested to know how one becomes well read on the Rhodesian War?
By reading the small number of available books and the large number of magazine articles that got written in the 1980's. While not entirely comprehensive or exhaustive, anything available on the Rhodesian war was a hot topic in the British Army in the 1980's - some of it for not entirely laudable reasons.

jcustis
06-27-2010, 12:34 PM
There is an exercise on the go somewhere in North America where the concept and various principles are being workshopped to give an understanding as to why certain things were done in a certain way within the context of aircraft, weapons, equipment available and the enemy and terrain considerations. This I believe includes a practical phase and ends with another workshop as to which of their weapons, troops, aircraft are most suited to such an application the the enemy and terrain environment of their current operational theater. The first serious attempt I have heard of.

What is refreshingly different is that these people are saying "help us understand the concept and the principles so we can see how we can apply them within our current circumstances". Refreshing to see some open minds in decision making positions (somewhere at least). I hope it works out for them.

Who is giving this effort a go, and what is the conceptual framework of the experimentation? I'm keen to get dialed in on the process they are following.

As for the question of portability over to current operations in Afghanistan, I have to side with Ken to some degree when it comes to whether FF ops would work. I agree that risk aversion is going to be one of the greatest detractors. A larger issue is the simple fact that the enemy forces are operating in significantly different ways in terms of their mobility, techniques of camouflage, methods of attack, etc.

One example that is a big difference stems from the fact that the current ROE would never support FF tactics, especially since the Taliban are woven into the populace much more so than ZANLA/ZIPRA terrs were with Rhodesian villagers. In most of my reads, the terr gangs were typically on the move, and could be intercepted as such as they crossed the borders and into the op areas. The pattern of life is vastly different, and although modifications could certainly be made to mimic the effects of FF ops, but through different means, it comes down to a discussion of whether the juice is worth the squeeze. We are working a population-centric strategy, not a counterinsurgent strategy. Until that shift is made, the supporting network of assets, conventional forces, surveillance and reconnaissance techniques, etc., cannot be shifted to suit the heliborne maneuver FF ops excelled at.

davidbfpo
06-27-2010, 03:56 PM
A new thread started as a thread on Presence Patrolling developed into a new theme. Several posts moved here.

Fire Force posts have appeared before mainly IIRC in the Rhodesian COIN thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2090

Ken White
06-27-2010, 06:25 PM
operations are a few references recently provided me by a serving US Army person. I was familiar with most, a few others were new to me. Altogether an interesting mix of perceptions, history and narrative of a concept that was highly innovative, very daring and very successful in the limited war (only in terms of location, constraints, geography and forces) for which it was purposely designed and in which it was successfully employed...

With one exception this list is provided in the format in which it was received, no particular order that I can discern. The exception was moving the thread from SWC from its original third from the bottom position to the top of the list:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=868

http://selousscouts.tripod.com/fire_force__part_one.htm
http://www.rhodesianforces.org/RhodesiaStudyinmilitaryincompetence.htm
http://www.jrtwood.com/article_mudzi.asp
http://www.booksofzimbabwe.com/store3/erol.html
http://www.scribd.com/doc/2546611/CounterInsurgency-in-Rhodesia-by-J-K-Cilliers
http://www.jrtwood.com/article_fireforce.asp
http://www.30degreessouth.co.za/index.php
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/pettis.html
http://books.google.com/books?id=k3gNAQAAIAAJ&dq=rhodesian+fire+force+kill+ratio&source=gbs_similarbooks_s&cad=1
http://selousscouts.tripod.com/counterinsurgency_in_rhodesia.htm
http://www.memoriesofrhodesia.com/media/documents/war-1.pdf
http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/pdf_extract/76/305/483
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a916401550

http://theeagleswillgather.blogspot.com/2009/04/americans-in-rhodesia-pt-2.html
http://www.psywarrior.com/RhodesiaPSYOP.html

As one can see, there has been much interest in the concept in US military circles since the 70s... :cool:

H/T and thanks to he who sent the list. ;)

JMA
06-27-2010, 06:26 PM
As for the question of portability over to current operations in Afghanistan, I have to side with Ken to some degree when it comes to whether FF ops would work. I agree that risk aversion is going to be one of the greatest detractors. A larger issue is the simple fact that the enemy forces are operating in significantly different ways in terms of their mobility, techniques of camouflage, methods of attack, etc.

You are the experts on Afghanistan, John. However, it may be possible to look across the all the Op areas to see where the enemy mobility, techniques of camouflage, methods of attack, etc. may best suit the application of such a concept in a beta test pahse.

I suggest that one needs a point of departure and I suggest should go something like this:

Name: Call it a QRF (Quick Reaction Force) or some name of your own making so as to say that it is a concept YOU are developing based on models of similar elsewhere. This is important because some people just don't like the thought of adopting other peoples ideas.

Outline concept: The QRF concept aims to maximize the numbers of enemy (Taliban) kills and captures in each group which which contact is made. Such a force will be commander from the air by and Airborne Commander who will have armed fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft under direct permanent command together with specialised Infantry trained troops who will be carried by rotary wing aircraft or available for para deployments where circumstances so demand. The QRF will be required to relentlessly pursue the enemy to achieve the maximum result using ISTAR, combat tracking and other tactical means including night fighting techniques. The force must be able to maintain a 24 hour operational presence in the contact area including aircraft, fresh troops, revolving airborne commanders with full logistical and medical support.

We used the example from the Butch Cassidy movie where when the gooks get to the point where they ask "who are those guys" you know you got them where it hurts?

Also I would state that there must be strong general agreement that maximizing the kill rate per contact is important to the war effort in terms of breaking the continuity of control structures the enemy put in place to control the local population.

Ken White
06-27-2010, 07:03 PM
Name: Call it a QRF (Quick Reaction Force) or some name of your own making so as to say that it is a concept YOU are developing based on models of similar elsewhere. This is important because some people just don't like the thought of adopting other peoples ideas. Very valid point. The good news is that we use the QRF term and it has various permutations -- to include the type operation of which you write.

That particular type of op we used heavily in Viet Nam from 1961-72 and we then called it 'Eagle Flight' ...
An Eagle Flight operation was a tactical concept which involved the employment of a small, self-contained, and highly trained heliborne force. Tactical planning emphasised the use of this force to locate and engage the enemy or to pursue and attack an enemy which was fleeing from a larger friendly force. As an airmobile force it was also prepared to engage any enemy force which had been located and fixed by other friendly forces. The inherent flexibility of the Eagle Flight as a force that was ready for immediate commitment, either alone or in conjunction with other forces, was it's most significant feature.

An 'Eagle Flight' was a variation of the normal heliborne operations developed in Vietnam in order to:

* complement the operations of committed heliborne or ground forces
* extend the combat effectiveness of such forces
* operate independently, either alone or reinforced, on a variety of missions

As it's name implies, it was a force that was designed to search for, pursue and attack it's quarry.(emphasis added /kw)

LINK (http://www.eleven-bravo.co.uk/the-war/tactics/eagle-flight.php)

Disregard the site type, that's a good, accurate and concise description regardless. There's plenty of other info on the concept from other sources available through Google.

Occasionally, when required, fixed wing aircraft were also used. Generally in Viet Nam due to the size of the country and location of forces, no parachute capability was required (Though the entire First Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division [Airmobile] was initially parachute qualified for that purpose). Success in Viet Nam was mixed, usually they were effective, sometimes extremely effective. Occasionally range / time / bureaucratic constraints allowed Clyde to escape.

In Afghanistan, it is sometimes is required and is used by elements of SF and SOF including the 75th Ranger Regiment; one company of 3-504 Parachute Infantry made one jump in conjunction with a heliborne force and other parachute elements. There have probably been others. One of the problems with the concept in Afghanistan is the large amount of open and large amount of very mountainous terrain. The density altitude has an effect on aircraft capability in some places as well.

The current usage is in fact to call it a QRF (or a local peculiar name) but the Eagle Flight concept dates from the late 50s in the US Army and was the model for several variants in other nations.

JMA
06-27-2010, 07:04 PM
One example that is a big difference stems from the fact that the current ROE would never support FF tactics, especially since the Taliban are woven into the populace much more so than ZANLA/ZIPRA terrs were with Rhodesian villagers. In most of my reads, the terr gangs were typically on the move, and could be intercepted as such as they crossed the borders and into the op areas. The pattern of life is vastly different, and although modifications could certainly be made to mimic the effects of FF ops, but through different means, it comes down to a discussion of whether the juice is worth the squeeze. We are working a population-centric strategy, not a counterinsurgent strategy. Until that shift is made, the supporting network of assets, conventional forces, surveillance and reconnaissance techniques, etc., cannot be shifted to suit the heliborne maneuver FF ops excelled at.

Initially the terrs would sleep in the villages with the locals to enjoy the comforts that they indulged in. The first trick was to get them out of the villages at night and was achieved to great extent through a series of army/police joint of separate "knock-ups" of the villages at night. This forced the terrs base in camps in the bush near villages and only resort to sleeping in the villages when it rained.

Once that was achieved it gave air recce the opportunity to check for track patterns which would give away the location of such a base. Or an OP would be able to spot out of the ordinary movement between the village and this area of bush. (Food or water being carried, sometimes blankets etc.) Best OPs being manned by black troops who would notice in an instant if something was up.

Given that yes we had no ROE and while that said certainly there was no gratuitous killing of civilians where I was involved. There were times where the gooks put on dresses or tried to blend in with the locals then we just cordoned off the area, handed over to local police or army callsign and left them sift through the mass of humanity with the of police SB (Special Branch). So yes one has to either get them to separate themselves from the locals or hide their weapons and try to blend in with the local and then offer the locals some secret means of indicating who the Taliban are. It was mentioned in another thread somewhere how the value a biometric (fingerprint) database would have. Very quick then to identify who is not from that village. Should be a cinch using modern technology and getting the locals to register for all the aid they receive (probably being done already).

If the enemy separate then the game is on using trackers/ISTAR or whatever.

I don't see a QRF affecting local ops and troops other than where the response is to them getting ambushed or whatever. Clearly there would need to be coordination and knowledge of where these friendly forces are and maybe they could be drawn in to assist with the follow up/pursuit phase.

JMA
06-27-2010, 08:17 PM
Very valid point. The good news is that we use the QRF term and it has various permutations -- to include the type operation of which you write.

That particular type of op we used heavily in Viet Nam from 1961-72 and we then called it 'Eagle Flight' ...

There you go, you have you now have Eagle Flight II or whatever.

Much has changed in the aircraft available to be used on such a mission.

The Alouette III had a number of advantages in that it was cheap (not for Rhodesia) but cheap anyway, difficult to shoot down with pilot wrapped in an armoured seat and the tail rotor and fuel line being the other vulnerabilities. It could also land in tight LZs and we loved the little baby but when we got 11 AB205As via the Lebanon in a sanctions busting deal we gained loiter time benefits to off set the need for slightly larger LZs. (To illustrate the LZ thing my callsign was once uplighted out of Mozambique by three choppers which picked us up from under the Cohora Bassa power lines which required some deft maneuver by young but experienced pilots.)

I don't know what choppers are available to which service today. Perhaps one would look for one which best meets the following:
* Armed with suitable multibarrelled machine gun (with night firing ability)
* Can carry at least eight troops plus crew
* Have low natural vulnerability to ground fire (few vulnerable points)
* Good range/loiter time
* Ability to operate at higher altitudes.
* Night flying ability with thermal imaging.

Gunship could be anything as it should probably be assumed that no suitable command chopper/gunship combo exists. Then a command chopper should be selected as it would carry the airborne commander. Could be one of the troop carrier type but differently fitted out.

Then the CAS, the Cessna 337G was what we had and it was able to provide CAS at less than 50m from FLOT. Even had a 18 gallon Frantan (Napalm) just to cook a few at a time. I don't what is available to provide that degree of CAS? This aircraft would mark for any swift air to follow.


Occasionally, when required, fixed wing aircraft were also used. Generally in Viet Nam due to the size of the country and location of forces, no parachute capability was required (Though the entire First Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division [Airmobile] was initially parachute qualified for that purpose). Success in Viet Nam was mixed, usually they were effective, sometimes extremely effective. Occasionally range / time / bureaucratic constraints allowed Clyde to escape.

In theory it seems like a standard infantry type operation. But as we all know not all infantry soldiers are the same. So one needs to find a source for aggressive soldiers with or without para training (depending on the requirement). The RLI were quicker/more confident/more aggressive than other units with a highest kill rate. From my experience of the Brits who came to Rhodesia I would say go for a Scottish regiment, they had about the right skill/aggression mix.

We only did parachuting because we did not have enough choppers. The para requirement may be necessary where there is a need to react to a distant contact/call out where the choppers can fly in with full fuel plus maybe a temporary tank on board and pick up their troops from an LZ closer to the area where troops extra fuel etc have been dropped.

If ineffective then one can ask why? A debrief should spell it out and lessons can be learned. I don't know the type of bureaucratic constraints that were endured but time and distance were always factors and where we would have little time on the ground before nightfall we tried to delay the call-out until the next day (impossible of course if responding to own forces in trouble).

I would suggest that the person who drives this would have to have the seniority and the willingness to bang some heads together to get units to cooperate to achieve the best outcome.


In Afghanistan, it is sometimes is required and is used by elements of SF and SOF including the 75th Ranger Regiment; one company of 3-504 Parachute Infantry made one jump in conjunction with a heliborne force and other parachute elements. There have probably been others. One of the problems with the concept in Afghanistan is the large amount of open and large amount of very mountainous terrain. The density altitude has an effect on aircraft capability in some places as well.

The current usage is in fact to call it a QRF (or a local peculiar name) but the Eagle Flight concept dates from the late 50s in the US Army and was the model for several variants in other nations.

Once you have a permanent QRF serving an area then its amazing what changes. Suddenly vehicle ambushes reduce as they know they will have to run for their lives possibly for days. Patrols being randomly fired on will reduce as they will get to know that they will be met with a very aggressive air borne response. And as a result troops can patrol in smaller numbers because of the guaranteed quick response.

Rex Brynen
06-27-2010, 09:31 PM
JMA:

At what distance from the (potential) contact were the LZs, typically? And how often did the LZs end up being hot?

I ask because, as I remember ZANLA and ZIPRA, they had a relatively low ratio of RPG-2 and RPG-7s, and weren't terribly competent with mortars, heavier MGs, or RCL. I'm wondering how much adjustment might be necessary against a Taliban opponent who has a long history (dating back to the Soviet era) of using those weapons against helicopters LZs.

Kiwigrunt
06-27-2010, 11:37 PM
Thanks for those links Ken (post 9), I too had not seen some of them.


@JMA.

Further to Rex’s last post and repeated emphasis by Ken and others that both the terrain and the enemy in A-stan are very different from what you encountered in Rhodesia, this (http://www.rhodesianforces.org/RhodesiaStudyinmilitaryincompetence.htm) article (Ken’s third link) is rather sobering indeed with regards to the relative, or should I say total, incompetence of your enemy.

This is by no means a criticism of the Rhodesian forces, which going by what I’ve read over the years I hold in high regard. However, an enemy as incompetent and almost docile as the one described in this article does paint a picture very different from what we are seeing in A-stan with the Taliban. They too may not be the most competent imaginable, and may by and large be crap shots, but they do appear to be actually using their AKs, which may go a long way to explaining why they initiate most contacts as opposed to your experience in Rhodesia. Especially the way (as described in the article) that you would advance to contact in extended line and just clean them up as if you picking up rubbish off a lawn is not likely to work in A-stan, where the ‘rubbish’ will shoot before you do.

I wonder if even a technique like Drake Shooting would be as effective or even achievable with a more proactive and aggressive enemy.

Also, your ability to, over time, separate the terrs from the locals may not be so easily done in A-stan.

In Timor, we too had a QRF platoon with one or two Hueys on standby. But our ‘enemy’ was probably not far different from yours. Over the nearly four years there we lost two soldiers KIA (one Kiwi and one Nepalese), but overall we had little reason to fill our nappies.
I don’t know what the losses were for the Eagle Flights that Ken linked to, but if this sort of QRF actions were to become the norm than I should think that it will not take the Taliban long to come up with a suitable response which may give NATO a much larger KIA count then they currently experience with IEDs. And that of course, as we know by now, flies in the face of our current ‘safety first’ approach. The only good thing about that (tongue in cheek) would be that that would remove the IED issue out of the lime-light, since the percentages would swing the other way. And then we’d have people asking why NATO is so stupid and callous to use so many helicopters…

Using QRF as stand-off blocking forces to increase the likelihood of cold LZs may not work so well either, given the Taliban’s ability to melt into the population.

Now, I’m not saying that I disagree with you. I think QRFs are a good idea and are probably used in A-stan a lot more than we know anyway. But to make something like that THE tactic, as per Selous Scouts, is IMO likely to be much more difficult and painful than you seem to imply and believe. But then, I too am not on the ground….

Ken White
06-28-2010, 01:35 AM
Thanks for those links Ken (post 9), I too had not seen some of them.You're welcome -- and thanks again to the original provider who lurks occasionally.
I don’t know what the losses were for the Eagle Flights that Ken linked to...All anecdotal though I suppose the stats are out there somewhere...

Went on four in 1966, one very successful, two somewhat so and one failure to make contact. Only pulled the mission for about two weeks to allow the Platoon that normally did it to train up some replacements. I can recall hearing about four or five others they pulled which were good hits. There were many more from other Bns in our Brigade, one tended to hear about them only if they were really great or really bad and to hear of few if any from other Bdes locally and none from units in other Corps areas. Though I do know the Aero Rifle platoons from the Cav Sqns did a great many.

Can recall about a dozen or so more of probably three or four times that many conducted that year in the Bde from my second tour (most of which I spent in the Bde 3 shop). IIRC, only one was a success beyond expectations, most did okay, three or four were dry with no hits and two went into hot LZs and lost birds and people necessitating the launch of backup flights from other units -- in both latter cases that was in late 1968 when the VC had adapted and were using 12.7mm DShKs specifically brought in but not exclusively used to ambush Eagle Flights -- thus your comment about enemy adaptation to any successful technique is correct.

William F. Owen
06-28-2010, 04:41 AM
So boiling this down, it's essentially the use of an Airmobile Reserve, that requires

a.) A Support Helicopter - UH-60, AB-412, EH-101, CH-47?
b.) Airborne Command Post - AH-64, UH-60?
c.) Attack Helicopters and/or FGA. - AH-64, A-10?

Obviously a UAV or some of the aircraft being equipped with suitable EO Payloads would help as well.

A near identical set up was used to get SOG-Recon Teams in and out of their AO between 1966 and 72. It could take 12-14 aircraft to get an 8 man RT on the ground, and even more to get their QRF Hatchet Force platoons in or out if required.
The Airborne CP was usually an OV-10, O-2 or O-1 with a "Covey Rider" who controlled the whole show.

JMA
06-28-2010, 08:24 AM
JMA:

At what distance from the (potential) contact were the LZs, typically? And how often did the LZs end up being hot?

I ask because, as I remember ZANLA and ZIPRA, they had a relatively low ratio of RPG-2 and RPG-7s, and weren't terribly competent with mortars, heavier MGs, or RCL. I'm wondering how much adjustment might be necessary against a Taliban opponent who has a long history (dating back to the Soviet era) of using those weapons against helicopters LZs.

Let me use a simple example (for ease of explanation without a diagram).

Say a patrol has made contact with insurgents and are currently engaged in contact.

The force deploys (maybe 30 minutes flying time maybe less). On the run in the Airborne commander gets what briefing he can from the commander on the ground and as he comes over target the troops mark FLOT and indicates the insurgent position with whatever (anything but mortars).

The Airborne Comdr is now in command of the battle.

(Note: As there is already a contact in progress the route of the aircraft to the target can be direct as opposed to a route where the sound of the approaching choppers is attempted to be hidden.)

* The command chopper orbits the main contact area (+ 1,000 ft) to assess the situation and if not a gunship itself could instruct the attached gunship/gunships to engage the insurgent position.

* The fixed wing goes into higher orbit and observes.

* Trooping choppers are instructed to go into low level orbits over 'areas of interest' outside the main contact area to observe and await instructions to drop their troops. (These choppers served to either force insurgents under their orbit to go to ground or draw fire which would give away the insurgents position).

Once the Airborne Cmdr had made his plan then he would instruct the trooping choppers where to drop their troops. The idea being to prevent the escape/withdrawal of the insurgents. The individual LZs would be as close to where the troops were needed as possible. Where it was necessary a gunship may provide suppressing fire to cover the landing.

Once the trooping choppers have dropped their troops they may be instructed to stay in orbit over a particular area or to return to collect more troops.

The LZs are individual to each chopper and not one large LZ to take all the choppers at the same time. If necessary the chopper itself can prep-fire the area around the LZ or get covered by a gunship when going in.

If the troops are being dropped to block any flight down a river line they would drop the troops as close to the river line as possible then the Airborne Cmdr would give instructions to the callsign on what direction to move in to get into position.

Should there be a need to redeploy troops they would be instructed to move to a LZ (if necessary the Airborne Cmdr may need to direct them (say "go 200m west and you will find an LZ, call when ready for uplift")

OK, Rex thats about what we did. And yes we took a lot of fire in the air. And we managed it.

I would suggest if you are looking for Afghan experience you find out what happened to the Soviets. This should be detailed research by intel guys who would try to speak to the old Mujahideen fighters, the Pakistanis who trained them the CIA who in trained trained them as to what the anti-air tactics were. Then get the Moscow embassy to speak to old soviet pilots as to their experiences and counter measures. For now though look at the site List of Soviet aircraft losses in Afghanistan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Soviet_aircraft_losses_in_Afghanistan)

Rex there are always counter measures and certainly any guy who fires a RPG should be turned into an instant martyr as all guns turn on him. That should be golden rule number one. This whole thing would be a journey or a process. Starting with baby steps and building up from there. Ken has touched on similar type ops in Vietnam, read up on them as well.

As to RPGs. In our situation it was only the command chopper that was at 1,000 ft in the orbit which was vulnerable to this. The low level orbits were vulnerable to small arms fire but only for a few seconds if very close by.

Again all you have to do is go a speak to the hundreds of old guys who flew choppers in Vietnam and other wars and they would be honoured to share their experiences with you and offer some advice. All the info you need is out there all you have to do is go and find it. So don't sweat the RPG risk, go ask the pilots how they would fly in that sort of terrain with that sort of risk. Its actually easier than you may think.

(Rex, I don't know your military experience, you may well have flown choppers at some point for all I know. I write this like you haven't forgive me.)

Red Rat
06-28-2010, 08:55 AM
What was the balance between the FireForce being Proactive and Reactive? I have never done airmobile but the FireForce concept sounds like Combined Arms (Air) Manoeuvre in concept, I am intrigued by the tasking of it however. In UK doctrine a QRF or ARF (Airborne Reaction Force) is reactive, whereas I get the impression that that distinction was not necessarily the case with the FireForce.

IMHO part of the problem, certainly for UK elements in AFG, is that they are essentially fixed in ground holding roles and have very little capability at BG and Bde level to manouevre. Whether it is done by air, land (or sea ;)) the ability to maintain an uncommitted reserve and manoeuvre force at the time and place of your chosing is one of the fundamentals.

JMA
06-28-2010, 09:06 AM
Thanks for those links Ken (post 9), I too had not seen some of them.


@JMA.

Further to Rex’s last post and repeated emphasis by Ken and others that both the terrain and the enemy in A-stan are very different from what you encountered in Rhodesia, this (http://www.rhodesianforces.org/RhodesiaStudyinmilitaryincompetence.htm) article (Ken’s third link) is rather sobering indeed with regards to the relative, or should I say total, incompetence of your enemy.

This is by no means a criticism of the Rhodesian forces, which going by what I’ve read over the years I hold in high regard. However, an enemy as incompetent and almost docile as the one described in this article does paint a picture very different from what we are seeing in A-stan with the Taliban. They too may not be the most competent imaginable, and may by and large be crap shots, but they do appear to be actually using their AKs, which may go a long way to explaining why they initiate most contacts as opposed to your experience in Rhodesia. Especially the way (as described in the article) that you would advance to contact in extended line and just clean them up as if you picking up rubbish off a lawn is not likely to work in A-stan, where the ‘rubbish’ will shoot before you do.

I wonder if even a technique like Drake Shooting would be as effective or even achievable with a more proactive and aggressive enemy.

Also, your ability to, over time, separate the terrs from the locals may not be so easily done in A-stan.

In Timor, we too had a QRF platoon with one or two Hueys on standby. But our ‘enemy’ was probably not far different from yours. Over the nearly four years there we lost two soldiers KIA (one Kiwi and one Nepalese), but overall we had little reason to fill our nappies.
I don’t know what the losses were for the Eagle Flights that Ken linked to, but if this sort of QRF actions were to become the norm than I should think that it will not take the Taliban long to come up with a suitable response which may give NATO a much larger KIA count then they currently experience with IEDs. And that of course, as we know by now, flies in the face of our current ‘safety first’ approach. The only good thing about that (tongue in cheek) would be that that would remove the IED issue out of the lime-light, since the percentages would swing the other way. And then we’d have people asking why NATO is so stupid and callous to use so many helicopters…

Using QRF as stand-off blocking forces to increase the likelihood of cold LZs may not work so well either, given the Taliban’s ability to melt into the population.

Now, I’m not saying that I disagree with you. I think QRFs are a good idea and are probably used in A-stan a lot more than we know anyway. But to make something like that THE tactic, as per Selous Scouts, is IMO likely to be much more difficult and painful than you seem to imply and believe. But then, I too am not on the ground….

I'll answer this fully a little later when I get a chance. In the meantime let me put on my old "School of Infantry hat" and say that you have put forward a number of reasons why you think this concept won't work in Afghanistan. Now try to put your positive hat on and think of a few (at least) reasons why you think it could. We can compare notes later.

William F. Owen
06-28-2010, 09:39 AM
IMHO part of the problem, certainly for UK elements in AFG, is that they are essentially fixed in ground holding roles and have very little capability at BG and Bde level to manouevre. Whether it is done by air, land (or sea ;)) the ability to maintain an uncommitted reserve and manoeuvre force at the time and place of your chosing is one of the fundamentals.
IMO, When and if you do not have an un-committed reserve, you have become "fixed." If that is a permanent state, you can do nothing which is effective.

Rex Brynen
06-28-2010, 02:00 PM
(Rex, I don't know your military experience, you may well have flown choppers at some point for all I know. I write this like you haven't forgive me.)

Thank you for writing in simple words that wouldn't confuse me. I had to look up "chopper," but found a nice book with a picture in it. :D

http://champthechopper.co.nz/images/Characters/Champ_Large.gif

The Soviets lost approximately a helicopter a week in Afghanistan, although I'm not sure what proportion of those were MANPADs versus other things. There's some discussion of both hiliborne operations and mujahiddin counters in Lester Grau et al, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War.

As I remember it, the RLI also suffered its largest single losses of the war when a SAAF Puma was hit--by an RPG 7, I think--in Mozambique in 1979, during Ops Uric/Bootlace.

None of this, of course, is a reason not to use a modified Fire Force technique in Afghanistan. However, as several have pointed out, it is important to identify how conditions may differ there from southern Africa (or, for that matter, Vietnam).

Rex Brynen
06-28-2010, 02:37 PM
Ken's earlier and very useful list of Fire Force articles included one piece from JRT Wood's website on the Rhodesia war (http://www.jrtwood.com), but missed his main (57pp) article on Fire Force: Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia, 1962-80 (http://www.jrtwood.com/article_fireforce.asp). Well worth a read.


http://www.jrtwood.com/images/articles/fire_force_3_1200.jpg

Ken White
06-28-2010, 02:46 PM
...(or, for that matter, Vietnam).Afghanistan is four times larger than Viet Nam with about twice the population and has about one fourth the number of friendly troops that were serving in VN at the peak. Populace attitudes are antithetical and the enemy contrasts in many respects. If all that weren't difference enough, the terrain is almost diametric and is far more troublesome for military purposes. The altitude alone has a significant impact on operations for humans, vehicles and especially for aviation...

That said, many of the same TTP can still be and are being applied with environmental modifications.

jcustis
06-28-2010, 03:59 PM
I hate to sound like a broken record with this, but the current ROE cannot facilitate the employment of firepower and supporting arms that made FF ops successful. Everything else is totally feasible, save that one issue. In fact, it isn't even so much a question about the ROE in total, but the element of positive identification (PID) that is required. We are fighting a population-centric fight, and I'll go out on a limb in doing so, but I think I can state unequivocally that the RSF were fighting a counterinsurgent fight. Means to the ends then would not nest with the options we are employing today. Unfortunately, FF was born out of that counterinsurgent strategy, and would have limited applicability if used by main force units.

Fuchs
06-28-2010, 06:32 PM
I've read about the "Fire Force" tactics again and again, but I simply don't get what's special about it.

Enemies on foot are detected, airborne encircles the enemy (or blocks at least some escape routes), slow-movers do some air/ground attacks, airborne keeps fighting.

So what's special? Didn't the same fail to meet the hopes thousands of times in VN?

Rex Brynen
06-28-2010, 06:55 PM
So what's special? Didn't the same fail to meet the hopes thousands of times in VN?

Given the remarkably high contact and kill rates claimed by the RLI, the question then becomes:

1) Were they doing something others weren't, or ISAF isn't; or

2) Were the conditions (poor opponent, terrain, ROE, etc) that led to the RLI's apparent operational success something that can't be replicated in Afghanistan; or

3) Are the contact and kill rates claimed for the RLI accurate.

As far as I can see, those are the three logical possibilities--and working out which apply is the purpose of the thread.

Steve Blair
06-28-2010, 07:10 PM
I'd be tempted to go with door #2, Rex, and say that it was a combination of terrain and other operational factors. Count accuracy is always a question (no matter what), and there is also the very different political and military situation, but #2 is still (for me) the biggest factor.

jcustis
06-28-2010, 07:24 PM
Given the remarkably high contact and kill rates claimed by the RLI, the question then becomes:

1) Were they doing something others weren't, or ISAF isn't; or

2) Were the conditions (poor opponent, terrain, ROE, etc) that led to the RLI's apparent operational success something that can't be replicated in Afghanistan; or

3) Are the contact and kill rates claimed for the RLI accurate.

As far as I can see, those are the three logical possibilities--and working out which apply is the purpose of the thread.

Rex, this outline is a good way to continue the analysis, and Fuchs' point stir things up sufficiently enough to merit a thought or two as well.

To Fuch's question, he is exactly right, there was nothing special about FF ops per se. The sequence of the contacts were often just as he lays out.

There were, however, a myriad of individual and discrete elements to FF that, when meshed together and synergized just right, posed a potent cocktail of firepower, aggressive action, and superb command and control that spun off from the right platforms used at the right time.

It has to be noted though, that FF ops experienced that evolution into the Jumbo FF over time, and the kill rate did not hit the ratio often quoted until later in the war. A lot of terrs got away during the early stages, until adaption came into play.

To Rex's points, there are several conditions that exist now that would prevent a similar capability from being employed to similar effect.

To question 1, the answer is ABSOLUTELY!!! The first thing that comes to mind is the mobility of the individual RLI or RAR trooper. The risk calculation favored their ability to jump off into the fight in shorts and tennis shoes early on for goodness sakes, and even thought the uniform changed to full fatigues later on, they never donned armor. Their mobility, relative to the enemy on the ground, was superb. A troop on the ground today, even wearing a plate carrier with front and back and side SAPI plates, plus helmet, plus nut flap, plus uniform and boots, has to easily weigh 20-25 pounds more than the RLI trooper, even though they used the SLR and 7.62 ammo is heavier. When you look at the loadouts that were used when conducting externals, the weights crept up there, but they never wore armor despite the similar threats of small arms fire.

To question 2, anecdotal evidence suggests that the opponents during the Rhodesian War were especially poorer than what we face today, and we less disciplined afield as well. I've spoken on the ROE, and I think Ken's comments about terrain stand alone. The terrain the EN chooses to fight us from here is typically more complex, and therefore easier to melt into in order to break contact through.

To question 3, there is always the possibility of exaggeration and inflation. IIRC, there was an additional payout for putting a terr down, and that there were reports of actual noncombatant deaths being claimed as kills. I can't remember which book it was in (At the Going Down of the Sun perhaps?).

Two constants, the weight of our equipment and the terrain, are always going to be there. The ROE has the potential to be changed, but even the boldest commander is not going to drop the protective equipment standard to a point where I think we could maneuver at great capability.

davidbfpo
06-28-2010, 08:30 PM
Like Jon C. I have delved into the Rhodesian War and so from my "armchair" the big difference is the lack of intelligence to identify and fix the farmer, sorry Taliban fighter.

The Rhodesians had a variety of methods to get their intelligence and I suspect some is still not known. Whatever the criticism of the Rhodesian war effort for not understanding their Africans, they found alternatives - notably informants at the start, later on covert observations and the Selous Scouts in their recce role.

In Afghanistan we appear to have a mass of information and little intelligence. As Ken W. has posted there are successful operations that have identify and fix, they are the exception IMHO. All too often we appear to know little beyond a few hundred metres (as I have remarked before).

It is important to note that when the Rhodesians mounted external operations it removed almost all air assets for up to a week and in that time the internal kill rate slumped. Probably not an issue in Afghanistan air assets, where it is an issue is having "boots on the ground" that as RR says are simply not there.

For those who want a contrary viewpoint J.K. Cilliers book 'COIN in Rhodesia' from 1985 is worth a peek (and is listed in Ken's Post No.9).

Thinking and remembering now. The tactics used in South West Africa, now Namibia, by the Koevoet (a police unit), did not involve air assets, but armoured trucks, tracking and more.

Starbuck
06-28-2010, 08:34 PM
When I created a "COIN for Aviators" class, I used the example of the Rhodesian light infantry as a prime example of a rudimentary Quick Reaction Force. While some of the specifics seem to have changed (parachute drop vs. helicopter landing), the concept seems largely the same as a modern-day QRF.

It's important we put much of the RLI's tactics in perspective: their development of a parachute-in approach was the result of a lack of helicopter transports. The RLI's air assets would be dwarfed by a modern-day Army Combat Aviation Brigade, with seven C-47s (DC-3s) and eight Alouette helicopters (plus a few miscellaneous fighters and bombers) consisting of the entire air contingent. That was about it. The entire air lift portion would be dwarfed by a mere two companies in an assault helicopter battalion.

Thus, the concept of parachuting in was one of necessity. While it might sound attractive and novel, it was not without its shortfalls. A DC-3 can only travel at around 130 knots, which is roughly the cruise speed of a Black Hawk or Chinook. Each C-47 also had a payload of, at maximum, 26 paratroopers. According to James Corum, approximately 20-30 RLI troops would be dispatched at any given time against insurgent bands (numbering anywhere from 6-30 men). Their primary mission would be to defend white homesteads against insurgent attacks. Thus, they were to hold ground. Their air support would be a Alouette helicopters with aerial munitions.

Dropping paratroopers in to combat--sometimes at 300' AGL--was a risky proposition. Certainly, based on experience in airborne units, this would be about as dangerous as the enemy.

The RLI's air units were often tipped off by the Selous Scouts or horse-mounted scouts, many of whom might perform the same roles as UAVs.

Modern QRFs might consist of a platoon on alert with some UH-60s and AH-64s for fire support--not at all unlike the RLI's concept. Indeed, it appears we have a very similar set of TTPS, at least superficially.

The difference might be in the kill ratios, which would be interesting to examine. The RLI killed over 1600 insugents, with minimal losses, according to Corham. Why might this be so? It's worth looking in to.

It should also be noted that, despite the RLI's professionalism, they were ultimately voted out of power in the early 1980s, giving rise to modern Zimbabwe. Tactics are important, no doubt, but strategy and politics always win.

Starbuck
06-28-2010, 08:37 PM
1) Were they doing something others weren't, or ISAF isn't; or

2) Were the conditions (poor opponent, terrain, ROE, etc) that led to the RLI's apparent operational success something that can't be replicated in Afghanistan; or

3) Are the contact and kill rates claimed for the RLI accurate.

As far as I can see, those are the three logical possibilities--and working out which apply is the purpose of the thread.

Rex: These are the million-dollar questions. Let me try to investigate the RLI and Zimbabwe and find out.

Starbuck
06-28-2010, 08:41 PM
Question here for the peanut gallery: Does the difference between insurgents in Rhodesia and those in Afghanistan depend on scale? Are we picking the right battles?

A typical Rhodesian TTP, from what I have seen, involved massing for raids against White settlements. Questions:

1.) How often were the insurgents detected and acted upon?
2.) What was the terrain like around these settlements? How close were they to villages?
3.) How does the "body count" compare to Taliban raids against, say, COP Keating and Wanat?

jcustis
06-28-2010, 08:48 PM
3.) How does the "body count" compare to Taliban raids against, say, COP Keating and Wanat?

If I remember correctly, either Wanat or Keating involved 30 5-man teams. No gang of ZANLA or ZIPRA was that large at the point of attack on a settlement. those number were encountered on external ops in home camps, but I have never seen a number that high mentioned in the Operational Areas of Rhodesia.

davidbfpo
06-28-2010, 08:57 PM
Question here for the peanut gallery: A typical Rhodesian TTP, from what I have seen, involved massing for raids against White settlements. Questions:

1.) How often were the insurgents detected and acted upon?
2.) What was the terrain like around these settlements? How close were they to villages?
3.) How does the "body count" compare to Taliban raids against, say, COP Keating and Wanat?

Starbuck,

There is too often a focus on the external operations which were against camps of fighters and civilians, seen as containing hundreds plus of potential and actual guerillas who in due course would infiltrate across the border and commence operations in the African TTL and sometimes the white farming areas. In reality the main focus of the Rhodesian war was internal and as Cilliers observed without much strategic thought till near the end.

From my little "armchair" understanding and visiting in 1985 the white farming areas always had Africans nearby, sometimes in the crowded TTL, but you need a map to see the reality. JMA and other Rhodesians know better.

If you extract the kill rate in external operations, where sometimes thousands were killed, the internal kill rate IMHO would plunge, but for a white community each dead / other causes guerilla was a gain.

Fuchs
06-28-2010, 09:32 PM
Maybe kill rate is a poor metric.

I for one would prefer to have a "weapons looted from dead bodies" vs. "own KIA" statistic.

That war wasn't even close to being a clean one, and statistics can be ugly things.

JMA
06-28-2010, 09:46 PM
I hate to sound like a broken record with this, but the current ROE cannot facilitate the employment of firepower and supporting arms that made FF ops successful. Everything else is totally feasible, save that one issue. In fact, it isn't even so much a question about the ROE in total, but the element of positive identification (PID) that is required. We are fighting a population-centric fight, and I'll go out on a limb in doing so, but I think I can state unequivocally that the RSF were fighting a counterinsurgent fight. Means to the ends then would not nest with the options we are employing today. Unfortunately, FF was born out of that counterinsurgent strategy, and would have limited applicability if used by main force units.

Hi John perhaps you have pared the issue down to the basics.

It seems that the ROE as applied in terms of the pop-centric approach to operations in Afghanistan serves to prevent a quick, short, sharp military action being carried out. My assumption is that the restrictions are out of fear of the potential for civilian collateral damage, yes?

The assumption further then is that the efforts to separate the Taliban from the local population has not been a success as they remain intermingled and it is the ISAF forces who are then effectively separated from the local population, yes?

That all said are there any situations when the Taliban operate outside the protective cocoon of the local population footprint? If contact were to be made in these situations would the absence of civilians allow for a relative free-fire-Zone?

The example of an ambush of ISAF troops or vehicles is worth consideration. If gunship support was immediately available would their use be restricted? Restricted but able to be effective or restricted to the point of not being worth calling? The bottom line I guess is that would the air strikes be able to cause the Taliban to break off the ambush and attempt to withdraw from the scene?

Can we get to this point please.

JMA
06-28-2010, 10:54 PM
Like Jon C. I have delved into the Rhodesian War and so from my "armchair" the big difference is the lack of intelligence to identify and fix the farmer, sorry Taliban fighter.

In the early days the police Special Branch (SB) had an effective network of informers across the country. Once the insurgents arrived in the populated areas they immediately started executing anyone suspected of being an SB source. Most of these killings were horrific mutilations and not surprisingly the intel from the field started to dry up.

Facing a desperate situation where usable intel from the local population was drying up the use of pseudo gangs (based on the Kenya experience) was attempted. This proved to wildly successful beyond our wildest dreams. This intel coming now front people with military training was markedly more accurate in all respects than what had been previously received from SB alone. By the end I think we were making contact on 8 out of 10 call outs and had the suspicion that the other two were ruses used by the Selous Scouts to try to authenticate themselves as insurgents to the local people. We lived with this.

So the end result is the receipt of accurate, clear and regular intel we were able to deploy on and get talked onto the target by pseudo team on the ground by then in an Op position.


The Rhodesians had a variety of methods to get their intelligence and I suspect some is still not known. Whatever the criticism of the Rhodesian war effort for not understanding their Africans, they found alternatives - notably informants at the start, later on covert observations and the Selous Scouts in their recce role.

Actually David as a city boy from Cape Town (who had grown up among but separate to non-black brown people from a different genealogy line with different, language, culture, history and religions) I found the Rhodesian understanding of the Africans to be spot on. (This contrary to Roger Marstons book). Of course this understanding was never politically correct hence the criticism from certain quarters but perhaps for another thread)

The key to the intel war was that the cities remained under control of the government until the end.


In Afghanistan we appear to have a mass of information and little intelligence. As Ken W. has posted there are successful operations that have identify and fix, they are the exception IMHO. All too often we appear to know little beyond a few hundred metres (as I have remarked before).

This is the last thing that will be changed it seems as some of these FOB's have found a place in Brit military history.


It is important to note that when the Rhodesians mounted external operations it removed almost all air assets for up to a week and in that time the internal kill rate slumped. Probably not an issue in Afghanistan air assets, where it is an issue is having "boots on the ground" that as RR says are simply not there.

Well as said by John Custis it was only when we concentrated the available resources in what was for Rhodesia a "Jumbo Fire Force" comprising 8-10 choppers, Lynx (Cessna 337) or two and a Dak.

So by concentrating troops at the right place and the right time for certain ops (internal and external) was in good military planning rather than anything negative which really only happened when there was no chopper available for a casevac (for example).

The boots on the ground thing remains interesting in that This Marston character and others say about force levels on the ground. Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is a bout the size of Montana. The claims are that 25,000 forces were on the ground at any time. Nonsense Professor Woods believes that the level of trained infantry soldiers deployed on average were 15 almost always understrength companies. He would say 1,500 but add another 300 if at full strength. That would leave the balance to be made up of police at police stations in Op areas, para-military police units, Armed Internal Affairs guards and Guardforce who guard the protected villages.

The decision was made out of necessity to use the best soldiers to the maximum effect. And for better or for worse that was down by some pretty resourceful senior officers.


Thinking and remembering now. The tactics used in South West Africa, now Namibia, by the Koevoet (a police unit), did not involve air assets, but armoured trucks, tracking and more.

If the Taliban have to move across large expanses of similar to the terrain found in northern Namibia then there is some potential for considering Koevoet tactics which led to the insurgents being run down by vehicle bourne troops using a combination of tracking, intel collected along the way and by leap-frogging tracking teams forward to cut for spore ahead to speed up the process. These guys kills 3,681 insurgents at a cost of 155 at a 1:24 ration.

JMA
06-28-2010, 10:57 PM
Maybe kill rate is a poor metric.

I for one would prefer to have a "weapons looted from dead bodies" vs. "own KIA" statistic.

That war wasn't even close to being a clean one, and statistics can be ugly things.

To be classed as a gook he had to have a weapon. No weapon, not a gook.
We collected them and the equipment and stuff in the pockets and sent it back for probably later use by pseudo teams.

JMA
06-28-2010, 11:12 PM
If I remember correctly, either Wanat or Keating involved 30 5-man teams. No gang of ZANLA or ZIPRA was that large at the point of attack on a settlement. those number were encountered on external ops in home camps, but I have never seen a number that high mentioned in the Operational Areas of Rhodesia.

Never would they dare move in those numbers in areas where fire force could respond. They had their attempts when ammo resup had to be done and then they might try it. If such groups were found the air support would be increased to jets. Find them, fix them, kill them.

Attacks on settlements were few and far between. Seemingly for propaganda value about which they could exaggerate the numbers of security forces killed.

JMA
06-28-2010, 11:25 PM
Question here for the peanut gallery: Does the difference between insurgents in Rhodesia and those in Afghanistan depend on scale? Are we picking the right battles?

A typical Rhodesian TTP, from what I have seen, involved massing for raids against White settlements.

Not the typical Rhodesian, rather the typical insurgent. They would gather a bunch together to take on lone homestead which were pretty well secured, seldom press home an attach and disappear to fight another day. They disappeared because they knew that by first light there would be trackers dropped to follow up put some distance between them and the contact area by morning.


Questions:

1.) How often were the insurgents detected and acted upon?

The commanders had to analyse the intel and see where their best efforts were to deploy troops. If the Selous Scouts were in your area there was a certainty there would be intel coming on which deploy and kill.


2.) What was the terrain like around these settlements? How close were they to villages?

They lived close to the villages for food and sex. Moving around to spread the foot load across all the villages in the area. The distance depended on the lie of the land. 200, 300, 400m?


3.) How does the "body count" compare to Taliban raids against, say, COP Keating and Wanat?

I don't know these raids. Were they Taliban raids against your COPs?

JMA
06-28-2010, 11:50 PM
The Soviets lost approximately a helicopter a week in Afghanistan, although I'm not sure what proportion of those were MANPADs versus other things. There's some discussion of both hiliborne operations and mujahiddin counters in Lester Grau et al, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War.

Worth a little in depth study I see what exactly went down there. Remember we are looking for strikes of low level flying and landing choppers.


As I remember it, the RLI also suffered its largest single losses of the war when a SAAF Puma was hit--by an RPG 7, I think--in Mozambique in 1979, during Ops Uric/Bootlace.

Well we don't know as it flew over a hitherto unknown camp and some of their mates on only found the crash site 30 years later. Probably just a likely small arms fire. 17 dead.


None of this, of course, is a reason not to use a modified Fire Force technique in Afghanistan. However, as several have pointed out, it is important to identify how conditions may differ there from southern Africa (or, for that matter, Vietnam).

Analyse, this is what soldiers do. What's with the terrain.: no real problem if you look at how it benefits them in terms of shooting at aircraft and with what. Won't take long before a group of pilots and gunners figure up the best way to handle this. Handle this effectively in terms of the current ROE is another thing though.

JMA
06-28-2010, 11:57 PM
I've read about the "Fire Force" tactics again and again, but I simply don't get what's special about it.

Enemies on foot are detected, airborne encircles the enemy (or blocks at least some escape routes), slow-movers do some air/ground attacks, airborne keeps fighting.

So what's special? Didn't the same fail to meet the hopes thousands of times in VN?

Simple it was indeed. Find, encircle, attack, kill.

If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there. There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s. There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.

JMA
06-29-2010, 12:14 AM
Afghanistan is four times larger than Viet Nam with about twice the population and has about one fourth the number of friendly troops that were serving in VN at the peak. Populace attitudes are antithetical and the enemy contrasts in many respects. If all that weren't difference enough, the terrain is almost diametric and is far more troublesome for military purposes. The altitude alone has a significant impact on operations for humans, vehicles and especially for aviation...

That said, many of the same TTP can still be and are being applied with environmental modifications.

Rhodesia is the size of Montana while Afghanistan is the size of Texas.

Afghanistan has over the 100,000 number of foreign troops while in Rhodesia while Rhodesia could put 1,500-2,500 properly trained soldiers in the field at any time.

In both countries there increasing numbers of private contractors, militias, guards, local half a**ed army guys etc etc. Terrain remains a challenge only in so far as there is a refusal to deploy troops in country long enough to get near a level of where they even near matching the Taliban in therms of terrain knowledge and comfort.

Altitude issues for aircraft is an issue 9 years into the war in Afghanistan that should have been resolved.

Rex Brynen
06-29-2010, 12:47 AM
If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there. There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s. There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.

JMA, I think that one of the questions that is being asked is how frequently RLI Fire Force missions engaged ZIPRA/ZANLA forces armed almost solely with SKSs and AK47s, and how often a contact resulted in encounters with groups fielding (and using) anything heavier. I'm not thinking of missions outside Rhodesia (where presumably you ran into the occasional ZPU-2, etc), but the routine QRF-type missions inside the country.

Were there any cases of FF being lured into AA or LZ ambushes, or similar? Or did terrain and ZIPRA/ZANLA competence make that unlikely?

What was the comms status of ZIPRA/ZANLA units? Presumably, they didn't have advance warning of missions departing (which has sometimes been a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it can be reasonably easy to put a spotter in communications eyes-on a FOB).

I'm not raising this because I think it makes the FF/QRF model untenable, but rather because we need a much better sense of the threat profile associated with a typical RLI contact, and what would be expected in other theatres.

Ken White
06-29-2010, 02:37 AM
If you listen to those with VN experience that talk much about LZs because they were a problem there.Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.

Hot LZs are a problem anywhere and there are degrees of hot; AKs don't do as much damage as RPGs and they in turn aren't as dangerous as a Dushka or two, much less a ZSU 23. The Talibs have all those less the ZSU 23 (so far...).
There are those without Afghanistan experience who see to be greatly concerned about RPG7s.Probably because most of the US helicopters downed in Afghanistan by enemy action were hit with RPGs and the reports make the US newspapers...
There are terrain concerns what for I not sure being more open than VN certainly assists the attacker.You aren't sure why the terrain in Afghanistan is a problem?

First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.

Picture 1 is typical operational area. Open space for the birds -- but it is dominated by the high ground which is where the bad guys will be...

Picture 2 is also typical, open area to land in but no sense in doing so because there's nothing there. The mountains are steep enough that few if any enemy will be there...

Picture 3 offers lower hills -- but still dominating the open ground. If you believe that landing a helicopter in any of that open ground against a known enemy "favors the attacker" you and I fought in very different wars.

Not to mention that if one landed far enough away to avoid being hit, one would have to walk or fight across a lot of open ground to get to the objective...:rolleyes:

Ken White
06-29-2010, 04:08 AM
Rhodesia is the size of Montana while Afghanistan is the size of Texas.Well if you dug that out of the CIA FactBook, you could also have noted that the former is about 391 sq km while the latter is about 652 sq m -- almost twice as big. And four times larger than South Viet Nam as I said in the first place.
Afghanistan has over the 100,000 number of foreign troops while in Rhodesia while Rhodesia could put 1,500-2,500 properly trained soldiers in the field at any time.I did not mention Rhodesia, I mentioned Viet Nam because the post to which I was responding mentioned Viet Nam. There were over one and a quarter million Allied troops in Viet Nam -- and they could not control the country, small as it was. That was the point. Even 100K plus a like number of ANA are not going to be able to control Afghanistan; too big, too many people...

I wasn't in Rhodesia and don't know enough to comment on the quality of your opposition and thus on what the Rhodesian strength might mean. I can comment on Afghans and on the VC / NVA qualitatively and quantitatively.
In both countries there increasing numbers of private contractors, militias, guards, local half a**ed army guys etc etc. Terrain remains a challenge only in so far as there is a refusal to deploy troops in country long enough to get near a level of where they even near matching the Taliban in therms of terrain knowledge and comfort.You'll have to speak to the politicians about that. The armies involved agree with you but have little to no say in it.

You'll also have to speak to those Politicians about their imposition of the requirement to wear armor, adding about 14kg to soldier load and depriving them of the agility required to fight properly as well as making operation in some large mountains physically difficult. Before you go on about that, search the threads here -- that subject has been beaten to death and there is no easy solution to the Political requirement.
Altitude issues for aircraft is an issue 9 years into the war in Afghanistan that should have been resolved.Resolved? How? Lowering the land mass? Or perhaps you know a way we could change the laws of Physics. If you do, I'm sure the airplane drivers would be most appreciative. Or perhaps you meant buying more high altitude capable helicopters for a war that will likely end soon? A war that is not an existential war -- I find it difficult to believe you fail to comprehend the significant difference that one little fact makes....

William F. Owen
06-29-2010, 04:35 AM
Taking the old T4 model of Tactics, Terrain, Threat and Technology, I'm finding it pretty hard to see the read across.
Is an Airmobile reserve a good thing to have in Irregular Warfare? - probably better to have it than worse.
After that I think we rapidly get into theatre specifics.

- Can't speak for Ken's extensive experience, but having spend 2 years researching CCC/SOG, the NVA counter-air complex in Laos (not RVN) was scary. IIRC in 1968, a CCS team (RT Hammer?) went in on the back of B-52 strike. LZs were not a problem that day, but dust and smoke made it almost impossible to get in!!!

JMA
06-29-2010, 09:32 AM
JMA, I think that one of the questions that is being asked is how frequently RLI Fire Force missions engaged ZIPRA/ZANLA forces armed almost solely with SKSs and AK47s, and how often a contact resulted in encounters with groups fielding (and using) anything heavier. I'm not thinking of missions outside Rhodesia (where presumably you ran into the occasional ZPU-2, etc), but the routine QRF-type missions inside the country.

Were there any cases of FF being lured into AA or LZ ambushes, or similar? Or did terrain and ZIPRA/ZANLA competence make that unlikely?

What was the comms status of ZIPRA/ZANLA units? Presumably, they didn't have advance warning of missions departing (which has sometimes been a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it can be reasonably easy to put a spotter in communications eyes-on a FOB).

I'm not raising this because I think it makes the FF/QRF model untenable, but rather because we need a much better sense of the threat profile associated with a typical RLI contact, and what would be expected in other theatres.

We have one incident where it was assumed that a Lynx (Cessna 337) was lured into attacking a ground target running in parallel to a ridge line on which gooks were sitting and the aircraft was shot down. They have been given the benefit of the doubt on that one. Other problems we caused when one suddenly overflew a hitherto unknown camp and all hell broke out.

In bush where the vegetation is head height and above the RPG is less of a problem to low flying choppers than one at first thinks. There were quite a few RPGs around but thanks to the high kill rates achieved in fire force actions not too many of them survived long enough to be start to reach a level of proficiency where they were shooting down aircraft. RPDs and RPKs were coming in and when we heard one of them start firing we targeted them for special attention. AAA was there outside the country as was SAM7-Strela. The Rhodesians defeated the Strela risk with special paint and exhaust modifications after loosing two small piston engined recce aircraft early on there after it was never a problem other than they shot down two civilian aircraft.

As to ambushes. One has to learn to read the terrain. Pilots do because their lives depend upon it. Its where a contact has been staged ie vehicles ambushed where one needs to look for the bait and trap routine. While flying in look carefully at the maps and decided whether some threatening high ground needs to be cleared before the ambush business can be dealt with. You must remember that quite often the pilots would fly over a suspect area to try and draw fire. I was in the gunship one day when a chopper deliberately flew down a river line while we shadowed at 1,000 ft and when the opened up on him we returned the favour. So what I'm saying to you is that being fired on in an aircraft is not necessarily the end of the world. Not easy to hit aircraft on places that matter. At 1,000 ft when you see the tracer coming directly at you they will miss. Its when the tracer appears aimed in front of the chopper that its a different story. For example on Op Dingo there were 10 gunships up that day and every one was hit by small arms fire. These guys are trained to watch each others backs and deal with pockets of small arms and other fire. These guys also took out the AAA. No pilots resigned after that experience.

Of course where the initiative lies with you and the call-out is based on intel that the insurgents don't know you are on the way then no such problem exists. Again this stuff is why proper interrogation of ALL prisoners is so necessary. What is their training, what are their tactics, what are their weapons?

As to sign posting air activity as early warning. Yes one must consider deception if needed and vary the routes. We would also plan approach routes to each target based on hiding the sound of the approaching choppers for as long as possible. When your callsign on the ground says they can hear you then you assume the insurgents have too.

I would say that a lot of the concerns getting raised seem to be about air vulnerability. I suggest that pilot perspective must be brought in to respond to these issues as there is a natural fear among soldiers that they could be shot in an aircraft or have their air craft shot down. As I have said repeatedly now what are raised as serious concerns would be dealt with quite simply by any competent combat pilot who as a team work through these issues most everyday in training, discussions and on ops.

What do you mean by the threat profile?

I would suggest you apply the same risks to this form of helicopter usage as you would to CASEVAC / MEDEVAC / AIR RESCUE choppers. The risk of a ambush of an CASEVAC chopper is probably the biggest there is. I believe some LZs have been IED'd (don't know for the troops or the chopper though). So speack to the CASEVAC pilots and ask them what their daily concerns are and find out how many of these choppers have been shot down in Afghanistan.

JMA
06-29-2010, 10:19 AM
In relation to altitude issues for helos I said:"Altitude issues for aircraft is an issue 9 years into the war in Afghanistan that should have been resolved."


Resolved? How? Lowering the land mass? Or perhaps you know a way we could change the laws of Physics. If you do, I'm sure the airplane drivers would be most appreciative. Or perhaps you meant buying more high altitude capable helicopters for a war that will likely end soon? A war that is not an existential war -- I find it difficult to believe you fail to comprehend the significant difference that one little fact makes....

Ken, think Operating Ceilings, temperatures and densities, "hot and high". There are many changes that could have been made to address or partially address the altitude issue relating to for example helicopters. Some probably have been and now the Brits accept they will probably be there for 5 more years maybe they will be able to address some issues they been delaying for some time now.

JMA
06-29-2010, 11:07 AM
According to James Corum, approximately 20-30 RLI troops would be dispatched at any given time against insurgent bands (numbering anywhere from 6-30 men). Their primary mission would be to defend white homesteads against insurgent attacks. Thus, they were to hold ground. Their air support would be a Alouette helicopters with aerial munitions.

OK, we have a problem here. With respect to James Corum there was not "white homestead protection" as a primary mission. The primary role of the Fire Force was to kill the enemy. Farmhouses were in the main attacked at night the helos in Rhodesia had no night flying capability.


Dropping paratroopers in to combat--sometimes at 300' AGL--was a risky proposition. Certainly, based on experience in airborne units, this would be about as dangerous as the enemy.

The aim was to drop them at 90 knots from 500' and the ground height was normally measured by a touch landing by a helo and the tossing of a smoke generator. There were some accidents, not too many considering the number of jumps. There are chutes now available which make jumping at lower heights safe and should be used as it is in the air that the para is most vulnerable to enemy fire and wind etc. The injury statistics were not of the magnitude that gave rise to any concern so why your airborne contacts should be concerned is open to question. Maybe if you only have jumped at 800' with boots and not sneakers any other option seems a little risky, yes?


The RLI's air units were often tipped off by the Selous Scouts or horse-mounted scouts, many of whom might perform the same roles as UAVs.

Call-outs by Selous Scouts pseudo groups were responsible for 68% of all internal kills by the various Fire Forces. The Grey's Scouts (horse guys) played a small role in this regard.


Modern QRFs might consist of a platoon on alert with some UH-60s and AH-64s for fire support--not at all unlike the RLI's concept. Indeed, it appears we have a very similar set of TTPS, at least superficially.

The key would be under what ROE would this QRF deploy and the operational procedures once in combat.


The difference might be in the kill ratios, which would be interesting to examine. The RLI killed over 1600 insugents, with minimal losses, according to Corham. Why might this be so? It's worth looking in to.

The idea was to kill as many of each group contacted as possible. There were three tactical rules on the use of ground forces on such ops. 1) Never "sweep" uphill, 2) Never 'sweep' into the sun, 3) never 'sweep' from open ground into cover. (For others here: this probably accounts for my aversion for seeing toops moving over open ground.)


It should also be noted that, despite the RLI's professionalism, they were ultimately voted out of power in the early 1980s, giving rise to modern Zimbabwe. Tactics are important, no doubt, but strategy and politics always win.

Point taken but how this applies to the Fire Force concept and its TTPs is less obvious?

JMA
06-29-2010, 11:38 AM
Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.

Glad you dispelled the myth that many believe about LZs in VN being a massive problem. I hope due note is taken.

The fire force was very like how you explain Eagle Flights in the last four lines. On the arrival overhead of the fire force the insurgents would become disorientated by the noise and firing and be looking for a way out. Insurgent fire was then less about aimed shots and more about the actions of increasingly desperate men.


Hot LZs are a problem anywhere and there are degrees of hot; AKs don't do as much damage as RPGs and they in turn aren't as dangerous as a Dushka or two, much less a ZSU 23. The Talibs have all those less the ZSU 23 (so far...).Probably because most of the US helicopters downed in Afghanistan by enemy action were hit with RPGs and the reports make the US newspapers...You aren't sure why the terrain in Afghanistan is a problem?

Would you find enemy in any of those three photos? Discard the two where there are no soldiers. If you catch the enenmy out in the open there you don't need troops your just send out a few gunships to wrap that up.

On the third photo I assume there would only be day sniping or night attacks, yes? Rule 1: never seep uphill. So if the enemy are on the slopes of the hills and they survive the bombing runs then you drop troops on top and they work their way down. as maybe required.


First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.

Thanks for posting those.

Are there really insurgents out there (on terrain like the photos)? Where to the hide out? There is no cover. Thermal would pick them up at night, yes? If they are out there by day don't send the fire force send a shrink.


Not to mention that if one landed far enough away to avoid being hit, one would have to walk or fight across a lot of open ground to get to the objective...:rolleyes:

As said elsewhere: Rule 3: Never sweep from open ground into cover. There is no chance in hell that I would land on the flat and then fight up the hill. And then Rule 1: Never 'sweep' uphill. Double no-no that.

JMA
06-29-2010, 11:42 AM
I hate to sound like a broken record with this, but the current ROE cannot facilitate the employment of firepower and supporting arms that made FF ops successful. Everything else is totally feasible, save that one issue. In fact, it isn't even so much a question about the ROE in total, but the element of positive identification (PID) that is required. We are fighting a population-centric fight, and I'll go out on a limb in doing so, but I think I can state unequivocally that the RSF were fighting a counterinsurgent fight. Means to the ends then would not nest with the options we are employing today. Unfortunately, FF was born out of that counterinsurgent strategy, and would have limited applicability if used by main force units.

John as a matter of interest if you had for example a downed helo with life on board in the middle of Indian Territory what ROE apply to rescue ops on their behalf?

JMA
06-29-2010, 11:44 AM
IMO, When and if you do not have an un-committed reserve, you have become "fixed." If that is a permanent state, you can do nothing which is effective.

I agree. This is why all the FOBs and PBs serve in the main to restrict mobility and tie forces down.

William F. Owen
06-29-2010, 11:53 AM
I agree. This is why all the FOBs and PBs serve in the main to restrict mobility and tie forces down.
That is certainly true, IF the FOBs and PBs are under-manned, too widely dispersed and no higher reserve force is held.
EG: Like the Mike Force Battalions held by each US Corps in RVN.

JMA
06-29-2010, 12:09 PM
What was the balance between the FireForce being Proactive and Reactive? I have never done airmobile but the FireForce concept sounds like Combined Arms (Air) Manoeuvre in concept, I am intrigued by the tasking of it however. In UK doctrine a QRF or ARF (Airborne Reaction Force) is reactive, whereas I get the impression that that distinction was not necessarily the case with the FireForce.

IMHO part of the problem, certainly for UK elements in AFG, is that they are essentially fixed in ground holding roles and have very little capability at BG and Bde level to manouevre. Whether it is done by air, land (or sea ;)) the ability to maintain an uncommitted reserve and manoeuvre force at the time and place of your chosing is one of the fundamentals.

Suddenly there were three pages, sorry.

I can say that somewhere between 80-90% were proactive if that means a fire force call out being initiated from a sighting from an OP, camp identification by air recce, or by pseudo gang all unbeknown to the insurgents. The balance would be responding to troops in contact, vehicles being ambushed etc.

Are you familiar with the JOC system we used? Each Brigade HQ was a JOC (Joint Operations Command) which had Army, police, Air Force and Internal Affairs reps. These JOCs normally sat at airfields where the FF sat.

Siren would sound and Officers and pilots to the Ops room. Briefing held (shorter or longer depending on the circumstances) and then tally-ho the fox.

Sometimes when there was something brewing we would get called for regular updates until the word GO was given.

Troops wise we used a RLI Commando (company strength in Rhodesia) on a fire force (normally) who based at the airfield. From this force certain patrolling tasks (mostly external) were given to best utilize the troops.

IMHO opinion in a fire force type operation it is as important to train and special the troops as it is for same with the Airborne Commanders and pilots.

William F. Owen
06-29-2010, 01:10 PM
Suddenly there were three pages, sorry.
Why sorry? There is actually some useful stuff here.

IMHO opinion in a fire force type operation it is as important to train and special the troops as it is for same with the Airborne Commanders and pilots.
I can agree with that for parachuting but I don't see why if you are just using helicopters.
I locked horns with Parachute Regiment Major a few years back who tried to convince me that working with helicopters "was not a pick-up and run game." I cannot see how?
It takes about an hours to do an aircraft safety brief, and practice emplaning and deplaning. - and all infantry do it.
IF needed:
Fast roping can be done in a day. Ground to air signalling brief in another. - 2.5 days worth of skills and drills. Sound right?

Steve Blair
06-29-2010, 01:40 PM
Huh? not so -- I probably made somewhere betwen 40 and 60 combat assaults, only two were into hot LZs and only one was really bad. By far the vast majority of LZs were not hot, at a guess, I'd say 90+% were clean, a simple product of decent planning. More could've been with better planning and the trendline on hitting hot LZs was generally downward from 1962 until 1972 as we developed the process. Eagle Flights were often hot due to landing close to prevent an escape but they were opposing an enemy element that was generally trying to escape so LZ fire was usually not overpowering.

First, Viet Nam is mostly scrub and agricultural land, the real jungle isn't all that prevalent. It is generally open and the few mountains that exist are generally small, isolated and few in south topped 1,200 meters. Secondly, in Afghanistan, the vast open spaces aren't a problem, they're in the north and the southwest. The primary operational areas for most of ISAF is in the south and east -- dominated by the Hindu Kush where mountains typically run in the 3-6000 meter range and many ridges are 500 to 1,000 meters above their associated valleys. Look at the pictures below.

LZs weren't much of an issue in the III Corps and IV Corps areas, but they did become problematic in some parts of II Corps (especially the Central Highlands) and I Corps (mainly as you got away from the coast). Eagle Flight type stuff worked really well in the first two CTZs, but not so well in II Corps or I Corps (at least away from the coast and much of the DMZ).

Not trying to quibble, but just pointing out how terrain can influence operational techniques.

Ken White
06-29-2010, 02:06 PM
LZs weren't much of an issue in the III Corps and IV Corps areas, but they did become problematic in some parts of II Corps (especially the Central Highlands) and I Corps (mainly as you got away from the coast). Eagle Flight type stuff worked really well in the first two CTZs, but not so well in II Corps or I Corps (at least away from the coast and much of the DMZ).the most Afghan-like. Both also offered far greater enemy force density than did the other two CTZs, mostly due to proximity to Laos and the narrowing of the country placing the Annamite Range of minor mountains into play and offering concealed route for movement of the NVA to the populated coastal areas. The generally rougher terrain also offered fewer hearts and minds for gathering and thus offered opposing forces more maneuver and fire capability for larger units. A lot of the I Corps problem CAs were incurred during the Khe Sanh and A Shau campaigns -- both of which were wars within a war... :wry:

Problems with Eagle Flight success in those areas were range / time and available concealment...

Proving that clean living pays, I spent most of '66 in II Corps, '68 in I Corps. :D

Steve Blair
06-29-2010, 02:13 PM
the most Afghan-like. Both also offered far greater enemy force density than did the other two CTZs, mostly due to proximity to Laos and the narrowing of the country placing the Annamite Range of minor mountains into play and offering concealed route for movement of the NVA to the populated coastal areas. The generally rougher terrain also offered fewer hearts and minds for gathering and thus offered opposing forces more maneuver and fire capability for larger units. A lot of the I Corps problem CAs were incurred during the Khe Sanh and A Shau campaigns -- both of which were wars within a war... :wry:

Problems with Eagle Flight success in those areas were range / time and available concealment...

Proving that clean living pays, I spent most of '66 in II Corps, '68 in I Corps. :D

Good tour placement....;)

That was why I pointed out the differences. The 101st had a fair amount of trouble finding good LZs when they hit I Corps, and the lack of suitable LZs also allowed the NVA to make good plans for dealing with any airmobile assault. II Corps had the same problems, coupled with a lack of organic lift on the part of the 4th ID (although in fairness they were better off that the Marines before 1969 and the 23rd ID/Americal in that regard). The 173rd had adequate lift, but still had trouble overcoming the lack of good LZs and ran into the same sort of ambushes that the 101st faced later on.

And before anyone points out the 1st CD, I know the Cav operated in both CTZs, but there were important differences. The Cav's time in I Corps was relatively limited, and they conducted mostly raid-type operations as opposed to the sustained campaigns of the 101st during 1969. And their time in II CTZ was also somewhat limited and didn't face the level of NVA opposition that the 4th ID or 173rd Abn Bde did operating closer to the Cambodian border. And even with that said the Cav did have issues operating here. They were at their best in III Corps, where the terrain really favored their style of operations.

Ken White
06-29-2010, 02:40 PM
Would you find enemy in any of those three photos? Discard the two where there are no soldiers. If you catch the enenmy out in the open there you don't need troops your just send out a few gunships to wrap that up.True on the gunships. Yes, you would find enemy in all three of the photos. The two without troops were taken by my son on one of many vehicle patrols in the area south of Kandahar to interdict Talib travel routes -- the enemy found in those two would be moving through the area to reach an objective elsewhere.
Are there really insurgents out there (on terrain like the photos)? Where to the hide out? There is no cover. Thermal would pick them up at night, yes? If they are out there by day don't send the fire force send a shrink.By day they hole up, by night they move. Thermal cannot be everywhere at all times. There is a great deal of cover in small wadis which are the movement routes. All three pics were reduced significantly to be embedded in the post, at full size the folds in the ground are more evident. In the one with the Troops you can see the military crest of the hill about 400 meters in front of the sandbags; there's a drop down to a fair sized valley.

Below are two more showing a typical river valley and a vehicle parked in front of compound wall -- those walls are thick and around every inhabited area or dwelling. There's plenty of cover and concealment if one knows how to use it -- and the Talibs do...

Entropy
06-29-2010, 02:56 PM
Interesting discussion - I've certainly learned a lot. Just to give you a quick overview of my background, I supported rotary wing ops in Afghanistan and I currently work with UAV's in both theaters.

This, I think, says it all though:


On the arrival overhead of the fire force the insurgents would become disorientated by the noise and firing and be looking for a way out. Insurgent fire was then less about aimed shots and more about the actions of increasingly desperate men.

Well, that's a huge difference with Afghanistan. A lot of fighters in Afghanistan have a hard-on for bringing down helicopters. They've used IED's with the specific intent of luring medevac/qrf helos into a kill zone. They sometimes lurk near FOBs and try to take out helos that way. In short, for the most part (it's hard to generalize about Afghanistan -circumstances vary widely depending on location) these are not fighters who become disoriented and desperate when helicopters arrive.

Besides that, a combination of factors make employment of those tactics difficult in Afghanistan. Altitude and air density has already been mentioned, but there is also distance. Engagements are usually over long before a QRF would arrive. They've seen nine years of our CAS capabilities, they have a pretty good idea how long it takes for CAS to arrive on station, and they often (though not always) bug-out before it arrives.

We also don't have native "scouts" with intimate local knowledge to find targets for us. UAV's are a poor substitute.

As a result, it's pretty rare to find a group of insurgents loitering in a place where such tactics would work. Most fighters are part of the population and stay close to the population. The exceptions are in areas most hostile to helo operations - the mountainous border especially.

So, it doesn't make much sense (to me at least) to devote limited rotary-wing capability for the relatively rare circumstances where these specific tactics would work. And if we did, the enemy would soon adapt and set up ambushes for our helicopters as they have done before.

JMA
06-29-2010, 03:51 PM
For those who may be interested in some stuff on the 1976 3 Command call-out where 30 kills were made for the first time in a FF op.

If comes from the RLI Association website and is followed by the actual wording of the written contact report and includes some relevant bits and pieces about other stuff.

Hill 31 - Honde Valley (http://www.therli.com/iframe/HIS_WE_Honde_Valley.asp)

Some translations:

Lynx: Cessna 337
K-Car: Alouette III gunship with side-mounted 20mm cannon
G-Car: Alouette III trooper (4 men) - twin .303 Browning side mounted MGs
A63: VHF radio carried by stick comdrs (1 in 4)
4th Bat: Reserve Battalion on call-ups (were doing 6 weeks on ops & 6 wks at their civvie jobs. Also known as 4RR - RR = Rhodesia Regiment)
Bailiff Acorn: Police Special Branch
Intaf: Internal Affairs.
CB: Confined to Barracks
Frantan: Rhodesian made naplam - for the Lynx came is 18 gallon version.
SNEB: 37mm rocket for the Lynz - (French: Societe Nouvelle des Etablissements Edgar Brandt)
20mm canon: French Matra MG151 with floor mount.

Note that in this particular contact comment was made on near miss by RPG7, troops wounded in helo by ground fire and the general great deal of small arms fire throughout the day. and a helo was forced to land due to hits received from small arms fire. No need to panic though... the pilots were up and at again the next day with us as a captive audience in the passenger seats.

Enjoy!

Ken White
06-29-2010, 04:27 PM
Well, that's a huge difference with Afghanistan. A lot of fighters in Afghanistan have a hard-on for bringing down helicopters.They also wear dusty and dirty clothing that blends into the background and just lay low -- if a chopper flies over too fast, he won't spot 'em. If he flies too slow, he's subject to get an RPG launched at him. Speaking of RPGs:
...The remainder, continuing on to Mapai, suddenly overflew a big enemy camp spread over a large area, and one of the Pumas, Hotel Four, was hit by an RPG-7 as it headed for its dropping zone. The result was the worst single disaster of the Rhodesian war.LINK (http://www.rhodesia.nl/uric1.htm) -- they can hurt.
As a result, it's pretty rare to find a group of insurgents loitering in a place where such tactics would work. Most fighters are part of the population and stay close to the population. The exceptions are in areas most hostile to helo operations - the mountainous border especially.And there are plenty of places to hide there. See the two mini 'caves' below.

The other picture below is the view from the top of mountain in Picture 2, Post 46 above. Note the greenery -- and the villages around and therein. The Talibs travel to get to the villages, they're vulnerable when traveling so they're very cautious in doing that. In the villages, they have protection in the form staying close to civilians where they are less likely to be attacked.

So, it doesn't make much sense (to me at least) to devote limited rotary-wing capability for the relatively rare circumstances where these specific tactics would work. And if we did, the enemy would soon adapt and set up ambushes for our helicopters as they have done before.Very true. There's a time and place for it but in Afghanistan, broadly, there are not many...

Steve Blair
06-29-2010, 04:36 PM
Well, that's a huge difference with Afghanistan. A lot of fighters in Afghanistan have a hard-on for bringing down helicopters. They've used IED's with the specific intent of luring medevac/qrf helos into a kill zone. They sometimes lurk near FOBs and try to take out helos that way. In short, for the most part (it's hard to generalize about Afghanistan -circumstances vary widely depending on location) these are not fighters who become disoriented and desperate when helicopters arrive.

They may have learned from (or simply come up with similar procedures to) the old NVA, then. The lads from the North got pretty good at "sucking in" birds, only to lob RPGs at them with great abandon. Tree-mounted booby traps (to include Chinese copies of the Claymore) were not uncommon, especially after 1968 or so. NVA (and many VC for that matter) were often noted for their lack of fear when helicopters arrived. They were also known for letting one or two birds land and then blowing the next one to close the LZ and trap a limited force on the ground.

JMA
06-29-2010, 07:49 PM
Can this be said:

* Due to the ROE the Taliban when in close proximity to locals are effectively untouchable.

* When moving between areas of population the Taliban do so at night thus effectively neutralising the potential to be caught out in the open in daylight.

* Urgent need of Intel in respect of routes traveled by TB and location of most used day hides/LUPs.

Pete
06-29-2010, 08:07 PM
If contact were to be made in these situations would the absence of civilians allow for a relative free-fire-Zone?
Just a brief clarification--the Free Fire Zone is a fire support coordination term that was warped far beyond its original meaning by news reporting in Vietnam and in some of the memoirs of that war. Its true meaning is an area where artillery or air ordnance can be fired or dropped without the requirement to coordinate the fires with any headquarters. Usually a Free Fire Area is a place out in the middle of nowhere. It is one of several fire support coordination measures established to prevent friendly fire casualties by regulating what fires can be delivered in an area of operations. During Vietnam it gained an "anything goes" connotation, a kind of hell-on-earth sort of place straight out of Dante devised by a nefarious U.S. military.

Ken White
06-29-2010, 09:49 PM
JMA Re: your three questions. IMO:

No, just makes it slightly more difficult.

Not universally at night, it's a very large country and the decision has been made to try to not interfere with civilian traffic so a bunch of Talibs on motorcycles and in pickup trucks away from coalition forces can and do travel in daylight. By using scouts and watchers, they can usually avoid Checkpoints. Sometimes they get spotted, sometimes not. That applies day and night.

Many routes and hides are known and interdicted or watched. That number is growing constantly. However, many more are not known due to difficult terrain, a long poorly marked, even disputed, border in a very large country and inadequate troop strength and density for saturation.

Pete True, 'free fire' as a term got totally confused with all sorts of things. The use of H&I in Viet Nam was dumb and counterproductive and it at least partially led to that (deliberate?) misunderstanding. H&I was also used in Afghanistan and Iraq for a while but I heard that it was -- wisely -- stopped. Hopefully, that's correct.

Infanteer
06-30-2010, 04:29 AM
This certainly is an interesting conversation. I'll add my two bits.

A disclaimer - my view comes from campaigning in the south - where the battle largely revolves around the greenspaces that border the Arghandab and Helmand River systems. This is where the southern insurgency is rooted and where almost all the people of Southern Afghanistan live. There is pretty rugged ground to the north and south of these areas with obvious insurgent presence, but these areas are not where a majority of the stuff goes on. This is completely different from the East. The Eastern Pashtun are, largely, a separate insurgency and mountainous terrain of the East (and the mountain villages) offer a much different scenario. I will not offer any comment on this area as I have not been there.

Point 1.
The biggest thing to remember is that, relatively speaking, the areas where fighting in the Greenzones takes place are actually quite limited. You can get the whole Kandahar Greenzone - From the Dhala Dam in the north, through Arghandab, Zharei, Panjwayi and Maywand districts in the southwest with Kandahar City in the southeast - pretty much on a single workable 1:50,000 map. We have training areas in Canada that have maps larger then the Kandahar AO. Things are a little more stretched in Helmand, but not by much. Most of the area in the south is either very sparsely inhabited mountains or uninhabited desert (the Reg).

So any airmobile force doesn't have far too travel. If it's prowling for TICs, it ain't going to go very far before it turns around and heads the other way.

Point 2.

They've seen nine years of our CAS capabilities, they have a pretty good idea how long it takes for CAS to arrive on station, and they often (though not always) bug-out before it arrives.

This is a huge one and, in my view, decisive. The insurgents do know CAS times and will bug out when aviation/air gets on station. Bugging out is quite easy for them. As well, there is usually something always overhead. Near permanent air coverage is largely a reality and the enemy is used to it. One only has to look up to figure that one out. He is adept at hiding as highlighted by this:


As a result, it's pretty rare to find a group of insurgents loitering in a place where such tactics would work. Most fighters are part of the population and stay close to the population.

You don't really see armed bands of Taliban just roaming around in the south. If there was, they'd be dead fast. Cache, hit, run, cache, blend is usually how things work. Afghan insurgents will only fight if they have an advantage or they are caught off-guard. Any shift in that and they usually just cache and farm. Anyone in the south expecting to mount a helo to roam around looking for bands of 50 insurgents to pin down and destroy will, unless he has a time machine to 2006, likely cruise around waving at farmer-insurgents in their fields.

Point 3.
Someone else mentioned local forces "beating the bushes" to push insurgents out of inhabited areas. This is hard to do largely due to cultural reasons. Unlike Africa, every Afghan's home is, quite literally, a castle. Access behind the high walls is limited. Afghan soldiers and police are usually not very comfortable going into the compounds of locals (they usually make searches as brief as possible) and everybody goes bananas if Westerners move in (Karzai has forbidden it unless absolutely necessary). Compounds usually have 20-30 people occupying them, so finding 5 fighting age males isn't going to do much for your cause anyways. Not discounting the value of local intelligence, just saying the "beating the bush" technique in the unique environment of Afghanistan would be hard (I know this from personal experience).

So, in my view a "Fire Force" concept would be handy if it could be used to provide rapid cut-off insurgents in the two situations mentioned above (advantage/off-guard) but I'm unsure of whether this tactical advantage would justify the expenditure of resources for a "Fire Force". I find myself largely agreeing with Entropy on this one


So, it doesn't make much sense (to me at least) to devote limited rotary-wing capability for the relatively rare circumstances where these specific tactics would work. And if we did, the enemy would soon adapt and set up ambushes for our helicopters as they have done before.

That being said, if they asked for volunteers, I'd be the first to stick my hand up....:D

My 2 Cents,

Infanteer

PS - Much of the discussion seems focused on the terrain. Here are pictures of the greenspace of Southern Afghanistan where most of the fighting takes place for those unfamiliar with the area to get a perspective.

William F. Owen
06-30-2010, 06:31 PM
How long are you going to make me drive around in a snatch landrover, or patrol with no expectation of an air-strike within 45 minutes, nor have any chance of a quick uplift in the event that I get hurt?
Not sure of the question here. CAS was on call until the ROE change and my current understanding is different ROE may apply in different areas. CASEVAC is very likely to be very prompt - heard no complaints

When can I expect to be able to direct 20mm canon fire to within 5 meters of my own position if needed and on very short notice?
You can 30mm cannon as close as required in the Army Air Corps or a similar organisation is flying in support.

When will I be able to call in an air-strike from a light aircraft that goes everywhere I go, buzzes around for hours, and attacks within minutes of my request being made?
Depends on ROE. Light Aircraft are actually very poor close air support platforms compared to other means around today. A-10 and AH-64 are vastly more capble than on old Cessna 337.

When can we expect Terrence to discover that fighting aggressively merely gives his position away, and that he will be quickly surrounded and so severely smacked from all directions that he thinks twice about being naughty again?
Dunno. I guess it depends on him. Less ambushes, more IEDs?

When, God forbid, can I expect to be Medevacked (Casevacked) and flown off to see a pretty nurse within 7 minutes of receiving my injury?
Again, not aware that CASEVAC is an issue. Today, with the RAF, chances are the Pretty nurse may well be in the helicopter keeping you alive. I recently met one who got a gallantry award for jumping 4m off the ramp of Chinook to render assistance to troops in contact. Not bad for 5'3 24 year-old girl.

And when will some of the Big Ants accept that Rhodesians fixed many of YOUR obvious problems just with what they had, without over-engineering the solution, without fancy kit, and all of this well over 30 years ago?
That's simplistic. The Rhodesian Army was operating in isolation within its own country, with a mostly joined up CIV-MIL command structure, from logistically internal lines of communication.
ISAF has none of those substantial advantages. This is the problem in trying to create read across from conflicts with little operational similarity. A great deal (not all) is irrelevant. Context, context and context.
Always good to hear about the old days though.

Rhodesian
06-30-2010, 11:25 PM
Thank you for the replies.

Arrogant? Yes, came with the territory, an absolute must in the RLI, we know who we are, and our limits, and we fight accordingly.

30mm? Yes very nice, but I need close support on a cheap aircraft that won't kill me too. And anything closer than 5 meters and I presume the Techie is now shooting at me . . . I don't like the quad on a K-car, its a great shredder, it mows everything, very nice when mowing is required, otherwise a pin point 20mm shell will do.


A10? A fabulous aircraft, lovely canon. My point though is this: Too high tech, requiring too much support, and too expensive. Budget limits mean we cant get enough of them up in the air at any one time. Old 337 (not my suggestion) cheap, does the job, doesn't need the high tech support (relatively speaking), lurks for hours. Find something “new” and cheap that does the job without requiring all the high tech back up, and put lots and lots of them up there.


And I still want my K-car, with someone in it who knows what he's doing. I get twitchy if a pilot runs the show . . . Pilots have been known to order me to do things they never do themselves. I wasn't happy, my OC might have been a prig sometimes but I know he's walked through the grass himself.


Casevac: No complaints about casevac times? . . mmmmm . . . probably because the comparison has never been made. I still go for 7 minutes and out, with a fully trained combat medic from my own Stick (but bring the nurse too if I need kissing better) :)


I think we've already highlighted a problem: A tendency to want “tools” that go far beyond our requirements – too expensive, to costly to run, too high maintenance, over-kill. Keep it simple.

baboon6
06-30-2010, 11:49 PM
Thank you for the replies.


30mm? Yes very nice, but I need close support on a cheap aircraft that won't kill me too. And anything closer than 5 meters and I presume the Techie is now shooting at me . . . I don't like the quad on a K-car, its a great shredder, it mows everything, very nice when mowing is required, otherwise a pin point 20mm shell will do.

He means the 30mm cannon on the Apache not that on the A-10. Which I would think is more accurate than the hand-aimed 20mm on an Alouette. They do apparently though often have problems penetrating compound walls.





Casevac: No complaints about casevac times? . . mmmmm . . . probably because the comparison has never been made. I still go for 7 minutes and out, with a fully trained combat medic from my own Stick (but bring the nurse too if I need kissing better) :)

AFAIK all or at least most ISAF ground patrols have a medic with them. Casevac is (in Helmand at least) typically by RAF Chinook or USAF HH-60, both of which when used in that role carry very highly-trained medical teams with them. As for times I couldn't comment.


I think we've already highlighted a problem: A tendency to want “tools” that go far beyond our requirements – too expensive, to costly to run, too high maintenance, over-kill. Keep it simple.

Yes there is certainly a tendency to unnecessarily "gold-plate" kit these days. There has been talk of the USAF acquiring a turboprop light attack aircraft, possibly the Super Tucano. I believe it has gotten as far as suppliers being asked to submit proposals. There have been various arguments for and against this idea...it remains to be seen whether it happens or not.

Rhodesian
07-01-2010, 12:18 AM
AFAIK all or at least most ISAF ground patrols have a medic with them. Casevac is (in Helmand at least) typically by RAF Chinook or USAF HH-60, both of which when used in that role carry very highly-trained medical teams with them. As for times I couldn't comment.

Understood on the Apache, I was thinking more of schrapnel coverage if the shell strike is in trees etc, or what the coverage is for a single modern 30mm striking hard or soft ground? Our quad was good for wooded areas where pin-pointing a target wasn't possible anyway.

We had one medic per four man stick, but actually it would interesting to hear how the Chinooks or whatever are kitted out and what they can do for someone with say a gun-shot wound, while still airbourne and RTB?

Ken White
07-01-2010, 12:55 AM
Arrogant? Yes, came with the territory, an absolute must in the RLI, we know who we are, and our limits, and we fight accordingly.That trait is IMO a must for anyone who's going to fight halfway well, so I've no problem with arrogance. Indulge in it myself -- and often. Got no problem with ignorance either, it happens, one tries to correct it. Willful ignorance OTOH -- like ignoring the political realities we and the British have to cope with is another thing...
Casevac: No complaints about casevac times? . . mmmmm . . . probably because the comparison has never been made. I still go for 7 minutes and out, with a fully trained combat medic from my own Stick...Did that time apply just to the Fire Force folks or to the entire Police and Military effort? If the former, most of our SOF raids can match or beat it; if to the total force involved, obviously we can't match it. Question of numbers, I suspect. As for Medics, we got bunches of 'em -- and we have the Combat Lifesaver program wherein Joe (your Johnny Bravo) gets to learn how to do IVs and other neat stuff -- stuff that 30 years ago, Medics weren't even doing. He gets the gear to go with the knowledge as well. That's not just SOF or hotshot units, that's everyone.
I think we've already highlighted a problem: A tendency to want “tools” that go far beyond our requirements – too expensive, to costly to run, too high maintenance, over-kill. Keep it simple.Wise words. I agree. However, while the guys out there doing the job would really like to keep it simple (and would really like different ROE...), they don't get the simple reliable tools they want, they get the overly expensive and not always reliable tools Congress buys. In the US, the Army doesn't get to buy what it wants, it gets to buy what Congress tells it to. Dumb system but it's reality. :mad:

If we cut down to essentials and keep it simple, it will cost US jobs -- our Congress doesn't like that idea. They never found a piece of exotic hardware they wouldn't buy, particularly if it's big and expensive enough to have parts made in multiple electoral districts. You folks in Rhodesia had to use what you had. We have to do the same thing, it's just bass ackwards.

Baboon 6 mentioned the USAF might buy a low cost turboprop. Likely won't be the Brazilian Tucano in other than 'trial' quantities. IF we buy one, it'll be made in the US (even if it's less capable) and that's a big 'if.' Buying it will cut into other 'more important' (Congressionally liked) programs...:rolleyes:

Everyone has problems of one kind or another. Your Johnny, their Tommy and our Joe just suck it up and keep on going...:wry:

baboon6
07-01-2010, 12:56 AM
Understood on the Apache, I was thinking more of schrapnel coverage if the shell strike is in trees etc, or what the coverage is for a single modern 30mm striking hard or soft ground? Our quad was good for wooded areas where pin-pointing a target wasn't possible anyway.

Afraid I don't know much about that. Suppose it depends on the ammo being used. Some basic info here:

http://www.wk2ammo.com/showthread.php?p=20484


We had one medic per four man stick, but actually it would interesting to hear how the Chinooks or whatever are kitted out and what they can do for someone with say a gun-shot wound, while still airbourne and RTB?

Some articles here:

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-1248526/The-flight-angels-saving-lives-Afghanistans-airborne-A-E.html

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article6807058.ece

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/airborne_emts_in_astan/

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/pedros.htm

Ken White
07-01-2010, 01:01 AM
... actually it would interesting to hear how the Chinooks or whatever are kitted out and what they can do for someone with say a gun-shot wound, while still airbourne and RTB?LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/uh-60q.htm).

The Air Force MH 60 birds are equipped somewhat similarly, the Chinook with the Med treatment load has more, the pure Medevac a little less.

Ken White
07-01-2010, 01:13 AM
Understood on the Apache, I was thinking more of schrapnel coverage if the shell strike is in trees etc, or what the coverage is for a single modern 30mm striking hard or soft ground? LINK (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=287_1245850395). They look less far away from the Apache in some parts of the video than they actually are due to the magnification of the stabilized sight.

SethB
07-01-2010, 01:17 AM
4M against soft targets.

Entropy
07-01-2010, 01:33 AM
I can speak to the USAF HH-60's. Typically they carry 2-3 PJ's (Pararescuemen (http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4486)) who are, at a minimum, qualified advanced trauma paramedics. They carry a variety of medical and other equipment depending on theater, likely mission, etc. The HH-60 isn't as roomy as the UH-60, mainly because they usually carry an extra gas tank in the cargo area for extended range. They also have a lot of armor, weapons and gizmos because they were originally created to penetrate air defenses to rescue personnel in the enemy's rear. In some cases they've been opcon'd to the ground force and carry medics instead of PJ's. I'm not sure if that happens anymore.

William F. Owen
07-01-2010, 04:58 AM
A10? A fabulous aircraft, lovely canon. My point though is this: Too high tech, requiring too much support, and too expensive. Budget limits mean we cant get enough of them up in the air at any one time.
Really? An A-10 costs less in maintenance than a lot of business jets.

Old 337 (not my suggestion) cheap, does the job, doesn't need the high tech support (relatively speaking), lurks for hours. Find something “new” and cheap that does the job without requiring all the high tech back up, and put lots and lots of them up there.
The problem with something cheap and low-tech is a very limited capability.
I fully concur there are issues with overly capable "gold plated solutions," but that isn't a call the men on the ground get to make.

Casevac: No complaints about casevac times? . . mmmmm . . . probably because the comparison has never been made. I still go for 7 minutes and out, with a fully trained combat medic from my own Stick (but bring the nurse too if I need kissing better) :)
But the comparison has to be put in context. You cannot compare the two conflicts in any useful way. Just time span wise, how could you compare the Spanish Civil War with Vietnam - 30 years later???

I think we've already highlighted a problem: A tendency to want “tools” that go far beyond our requirements – too expensive, to costly to run, too high maintenance, over-kill. Keep it simple.
Agreed, but you have to turn that into an argument and a solution. A lot of modern military kit is vastly more capable and actually cheaper to run. Yes we do suffer from Voodoo economics but again comparison has got to me made in context.

JMA
07-01-2010, 07:28 PM
LINK (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=287_1245850395). They look less far away from the Apache in some parts of the video than they actually are due to the magnification of the stabilized sight.

A six step process before they could open fire?

Yes indeed, can't use a fire force under those conditions.

...then again if the gunship is that effective maybe you don't need a fire force anyway. Wow, we could have done with a couple of those.

JMA
07-01-2010, 08:23 PM
So by 1978, were the insurgent zones of control expanding or fading? Sure, perhaps they could not or did not contest RLI or Fire Force incursions, but since the RLI did not bother to contest control of the population, what did it matter?

Well the RLI fire force wasn't the only game in town. The areas fell under various Brigade HQs and they had other troops at their disposal. They no doubt did what they could with the resources available to them. Wasn't my area of the war.

But to deal with your question.

When we were there it was ours, after we left it was theirs... sound familiar? Just like in Helmand.

JMA
07-01-2010, 08:32 PM
True enough, but you also need to consider which ratio you're looking at.

I use word "ratio" when comparing the number of own forces KIA with those of the insurgents.

I use the term "kill rate" to explain the % of those insurgents killed against those contacted. (contact 20, kill 16 and you have a 80% "kill rate".)

Note: You needed to verify a kill with a body and a weapon. A body without a weapon even with bits and pieces of uniform doesn't cut it. (added as an edit for clarity)

Steve Blair
07-01-2010, 08:41 PM
Got ya. My comment was more directed at the Vietnam mindset of just comparing piles of bodies versus weapons or other indicators that the bodies were actually insurgents and not folks caught in the middle. There was a great deal of discussion centered around the 9th ID's practice of just shooting and piling up bodies without any real distinction. Other units used a ratio of weapons captured against friendly losses to judge a mission's actual success.

It was a different matter up close to the DMZ or in parts of the Central Highlands where there weren't many innocent bystanders (either due to resettlement projects or people simply leaving the area). But down in the Delta it did (to quote the general from Apocalypse Now) "get confused out there." And when commanders found themselves pressured by higher to produce bigger piles of bodies, some did so.

davidbfpo
07-01-2010, 09:07 PM
I shall refrain from commenting on Rhodesian UDI, a "pet" subject of mine.

Anyway this thread has rapidly grown, in posts and views. Some posts have strayed a distance from the Fire Force theme and one day I will move them to the main Rhodesian COIN thread.

Now back to 'Fire Force' which from my "armchair" appears unlikely to be adaptable for Afghanistan now - for all manner of reasons and I exclude political and military will.

Would the 'Fire Force' concept fit an earlier stage or period in an insurgency and staying with the Afghan context - when the Taliban were returning. Even in those northern provinces now where they have taken hold.

JMA
07-01-2010, 09:38 PM
I shall refrain from commenting on Rhodesian UDI, a "pet" subject of mine.

Anyway this thread has rapidly grown, in posts and views. Some posts have strayed a distance from the Fire Force theme and one day I will move them to the main Rhodesian COIN thread.

Now back to 'Fire Force' which from my "armchair" appears unlikely to be adaptable for Afghanistan now - for all manner of reasons and I exclude political and military will.

Would the 'Fire Force' concept fit an earlier stage or period in an insurgency and staying with the Afghan context - when the Taliban were returning. Even in those northern provinces now where they have taken hold.

I guess you follow the ROE and then the restrictions on air support. But here's a group that good work on flat dessert like terrain.

Koevoet Tactics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koevoet#Tactics)

Koevoet operations were devoted to tracking groups of SWAPO fighters who were on foot. Their tracks were picked up in various ways, but most often from:
Patrols of areas favoured for crossing by SWAPO fighters.
Information from local inhabitants.
From areas surrounding a recent attack.
Once a suspicious track was found, a vehicle would leap-frog ahead a few kilometres to check for the same tracks, and once found, the other vehicles would race up to join them. Using this technique they could make quickly catch up with the guerillas who were travelling on foot. The technique borrows strongly from experience gained during the Rhodesian Bush War.
The trackers were so skilled at their art that they could provide very accurate estimates on the distance to the enemy, the speed at which they were travelling and their states of mind. They were able to do this by "reading" factors such as abandoned equipment, changes from walking to running speed, reduced attempts at anti-tracking or splintering into smaller groups taking different directions ("bomb shelling").
Once the trackers sensed that the SWAPO fighters were close, they would often retreat to the safety of the Casspir armoured personnel carriers to face an enemy typically armed with RPG-7 rocket launchers, rifle grenades, AK-47s, SKS carbines and RPK and PKM machine guns.
Koevoet members were financially rewarded through bounty system, which paid them for kills, prisoners and equipment they captured. This practice allowed many of the members to earn significantly more than their normal salary, and resulted in competition between units.[6]

Ken White
07-02-2010, 12:54 AM
I suggest what I am saying is how close the CAS target actually was. Not necessarily narrow escapes from off target ordinance.So was I, no off target about it. Well trained and experienced troops did, can, will and do today put that stuff right on top of themselves (not a good plan for 8" / 203mm Arty). :cool:
The Cessna 337 was good for us in that it carried light ordinance that allowed effective delivery at very close safety tolerances.Really? :eek:

LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cessna_O-2_Skymaster)

Ken White
07-02-2010, 01:44 AM
Here are the predecessor (the O-1, LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O-1_Bird_Dog), the successor (the OV-10, LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Rockwell_OV-10_Bronco) and the current replacement (the OA-10 CLINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairchild_Republic_A-10_Thunderbolt_II) for that O-2 / 337.

Just as point of interest, that current jobby, serving in Afghanistan, is almost as maneuverable down low as the two Cessnas thanks to those huge wings and the big fans, is capable of carrying a far larger and more diverse weapon load and has all the mod cons including a titanium armor tub for the pilot and about twice the speed and range or endurance...;)

The Troops love it -- I mean the grunts, the infantry. It is the favored CAS bird, followed by the Apache, followed by the Harriers of the UK and USMC, then by all others.

Mark O'Neill
07-02-2010, 04:25 AM
I guess you follow the ROE and then the restrictions on air support. But here's a group that good work on flat dessert like terrain.

Koevoet Tactics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koevoet#Tactics)

Koevoet operations were devoted to tracking groups of SWAPO fighters who were on foot. Their tracks were picked up in various ways, but most often from:
Patrols of areas favoured for crossing by SWAPO fighters.
Information from local inhabitants.
From areas surrounding a recent attack.
Once a suspicious track was found, a vehicle would leap-frog ahead a few kilometres to check for the same tracks, and once found, the other vehicles would race up to join them. Using this technique they could make quickly catch up with the guerillas who were travelling on foot. The technique borrows strongly from experience gained during the Rhodesian Bush War.
The trackers were so skilled at their art that they could provide very accurate estimates on the distance to the enemy, the speed at which they were travelling and their states of mind. They were able to do this by "reading" factors such as abandoned equipment, changes from walking to running speed, reduced attempts at anti-tracking or splintering into smaller groups taking different directions ("bomb shelling").
Once the trackers sensed that the SWAPO fighters were close, they would often retreat to the safety of the Casspir armoured personnel carriers to face an enemy typically armed with RPG-7 rocket launchers, rifle grenades, AK-47s, SKS carbines and RPK and PKM machine guns.
Koevoet members were financially rewarded through bounty system, which paid them for kills, prisoners and equipment they captured. This practice allowed many of the members to earn significantly more than their normal salary, and resulted in competition between units.[6]

Whilst Koevoet were a SAP unit, the trackers, and a lot of the troops, were not White South African. They were either indigenous SW Africans recruited directly, or captured and turned terrorists / insurgents. For this 'idea' to ahve any utility for AFG one needs to explain :

1. What 'police force' ISAF are to use; and'
2. How and why indigenous people will join and be effective in this initiative, given ISAF is having enough difficulties getting them to participate effectively as 'normal' police.

I am reminded of Sir Michael Howard's description of the use of military history without context as being akin to pornography... I believe that selective cherry picking of 'examples' is just as gratuitous and possibly even less useful.

JMA
07-02-2010, 07:31 AM
So was I, no off target about it. Well trained and experienced troops did, can, will and do today put that stuff right on top of themselves (not a good plan for 8" / 203mm Arty). :cool:Really? :eek:

LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cessna_O-2_Skymaster)

Thanks for the clarification. Which of the fixed wing were able to provide the closest CAS?

Yes the little Cessna 337G which we called the Lynx was a sweetheart. .303 Browning Guns on top, 37mm SNEB and 18 gal Frantan (napalm) under each wing and we mostly had two of them around was all we really needed.

http://ace_foto.users.photofile.ru/photo/ace_foto/3271620/xlarge/70266032.jpg

http://www.combatreform.org/cessna337napalmdrop.jpg 18 gal Frantan strike

JMA
07-02-2010, 07:46 AM
Here are the predecessor (the O-1, LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O-1_Bird_Dog), the successor (the OV-10, LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_Rockwell_OV-10_Bronco) and the current replacement (the OA-10 CLINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairchild_Republic_A-10_Thunderbolt_II) for that O-2 / 337.

Just as point of interest, that current jobby, serving in Afghanistan, is almost as maneuverable down low as the two Cessnas thanks to those huge wings and the big fans, is capable of carrying a far larger and more diverse weapon load and has all the mod cons including a titanium armor tub for the pilot and about twice the speed and range or endurance...;)

The Troops love it -- I mean the grunts, the infantry. It is the favored CAS bird, followed by the Apache, followed by the Harriers of the UK and USMC, then by all others.

With aircraft like that and laser guidance there would have been much less need for a fire force. The recce guys or the pseudo team just sit off on a hill and mark the target and then sit back and watch the fireworks. The greatest improvement over what we had access to was the night flying and fighting ability. We could have done with that.

JMA
07-02-2010, 08:21 AM
Whilst Koevoet were a SAP unit, the trackers, and a lot of the troops, were not White South African. They were either indigenous SW Africans recruited directly, or captured and turned terrorists / insurgents. For this 'idea' to ahve any utility for AFG one needs to explain :

1. What 'police force' ISAF are to use; and'
2. How and why indigenous people will join and be effective in this initiative, given ISAF is having enough difficulties getting them to participate effectively as 'normal' police.

I am reminded of Sir Michael Howard's description of the use of military history without context as being akin to pornography... I believe that selective cherry picking of 'examples' is just as gratuitous and possibly even less useful.

Not at all.

The Koevoet style of operation was a classic intelligent application of what Hans Dreyer saw the Portuguese and the Rhodesians were doing. He was operating on largely flat ground so he used vehicles for greater mobility. He needed to track the insurgents so he used the best he could find among the Ovambo and Koi San (Bushmen). And the rest is history. Absolutely outstanding from a military point of view and coming from a policeman too.

Why introduce the race angle?

In Rhodesia 80% of the government troops were black. And the RAR (Rhodesian African Rifles) did well by any standard.

In South West Africa (Namibia) the South Africans raised battalions from each of the ethnic groups and obviously the police recruited locals for their station areas for language, cultural awareness etc etc. Koevoet was about 25% white and together they fought against SWAPO / PLAN. That mix of black and white policemen achieved the best results of all forces in SWA/Namibia.

So if there is anything to take out of the Southern African wars that is worthy of study it is the Rhodesian Fire Force and the South West African Koetvoet operations.

And for either of these concepts to have any potential value for Afghanistan it needs some like a Hans Dreyer (who knows Afghanistan) to study both concepts in detail and come up some hybrid that would be useful in Afghanistan.

Pete
07-02-2010, 01:59 PM
Mao was a Clausewitian!
He was? I didn't see anything about fish swimming in the sea in this book (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/VomKriege1832/TOC.htm). Maybe Fuchs could help me because my German isn't that good.

Steve Blair
07-02-2010, 02:30 PM
He was? I didn't see anything about fish swimming in the sea in this book (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/VomKriege1832/TOC.htm). Maybe Fuchs could help me because my German isn't that good.

Try reading this book (http://www.amazon.com/Masters-War-Classical-Strategic-Thought/dp/0714681326/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1278080890&sr=8-4). Handel makes some very specific comparisons between old Karl, Sun Tzu, and others, and he finds some very direct links between Clausewitz and Mao. Just because Mao doesn't admit to having read Clausewitz doesn't mean that he didn't (or wasn't familiar with his ideas).

William F. Owen
07-02-2010, 02:34 PM
He was? I didn't see anything about fish swimming in the sea in this book (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/VomKriege1832/TOC.htm). Maybe Fuchs could help me because my German isn't that good.

Well the Fish thing was just an analogy. Mao read Clausewitz in Chinese in 1938, and mirrored Clausewitz's arguments in his own work "On Protracted Warfare." Giap was also a Clausewitian, thus his comment to Harry Summers!

Ken White
07-02-2010, 11:22 PM
Thanks for the clarification. Which of the fixed wing were able to provide the closest CAS?and only did CAS in an emergency. Of the two, the 0-1 was slower and thus able to do closer strikes. The OV-10 was a super aircraft, was also assigned as a FAC bird but had a useful load, was really maneuverable and was able to take care of many tasks with out calling in the big guys. Depending on the type rocket they had available, they could and would put some 2.75" warheads about 5 meters out.
Yes the little Cessna 337G which we called the Lynx was a sweetheart. .303 Browning Guns on top, 37mm SNEB and 18 gal Frantan (napalm) under each wing and we mostly had two of them around was all we really needed.Was a good bird, yours were made by Reims in France under Cessna license. A few years later, when the US would not sell the Shah of Iran some O-2s for some obscure reason, he went to Reims and bought a dozen Lynx copies...:wry:

Rifleman
07-03-2010, 03:00 AM
Modern QRFs might consist of a platoon on alert with some UH-60s and AH-64s for fire support--not at all unlike the RLI's concept. Indeed, it appears we have a very similar set of TTPS, at least superficially.


FWIW, it's also not at all unlike the Viet Nam era air cavalry. When I say air cavalry, I don't mean airmobile infantry battalions but the cavalry squadrons made famous (infamous?) by Apocolype Now's portrayal of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1/9 Headhunters) of the 1st Cavalry Division.

Supposedly 1/9 was responsble for more kills than all the airmoble infantry battalions in the 1st Cavalry Division?

The squadron had three troops with each troop having a red, white, and blue platoon. I think red was aero-guns, white was aero-scouts, and blue was aero-rifles?

Does the Army still use that particular organization?

slapout9
07-03-2010, 02:26 PM
FWIW, it's also not at all unlike the Viet Nam era air cavalry. When I say air cavalry, I don't mean airmobile infantry battalions but the cavalry squadrons made famous (infamous?) by Apocolype Now's portrayal of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1/9 Headhunters) of the 1st Cavalry Division.

Supposedly 1/9 was responsble for more kills than all the airmoble infantry battalions in the 1st Cavalry Division?

The squadron had three troops with each troop having a red, white, and blue platoon. I think red was aero-guns, white was aero-scouts, and blue was aero-rifles?

Does the Army still use that particular organization?


You got it man:) and what is that book I can never remember the correct name of? "Brannon'sWar???? or something like that"

baboon6
07-03-2010, 03:36 PM
You got it man:) and what is that book I can never remember the correct name of? "Brannon'sWar???? or something like that"

Brennan's War by Matthew Brennan, there is also an anthology of other personal stories from 1/9 edited by him entitled Headhunters.

The "Blue" (aero-rifle) platoons don't exist anymore, haven't since sometime in the 1980s. AFAIK divisional Air Cav squadrons today are equipped only with OH-58s; other battalions within the aviation brigade have AH-64s and UH-60s. However the 3rd ACR's aviation squadron has all three types of helicopter.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/4-3acr.htm

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/2-17cav.htm

baboon6
07-03-2010, 06:04 PM
FWIW, it's also not at all unlike the Viet Nam era air cavalry. When I say air cavalry, I don't mean airmobile infantry battalions but the cavalry squadrons made famous (infamous?) by Apocolype Now's portrayal of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1/9 Headhunters) of the 1st Cavalry Division.

Supposedly 1/9 was responsble for more kills than all the airmoble infantry battalions in the 1st Cavalry Division?

The squadron had three troops with each troop having a red, white, and blue platoon. I think red was aero-guns, white was aero-scouts, and blue was aero-rifles?

Does the Army still use that particular organization?

Air Cavalry squadrons in Vietnam also had a fourth troop which was a ground troop mounted in jeeps and 3/4 ton trucks. As regarding the three other troops you are correct, the "Blues" also included its own lift element of Hueys. Each of the divsional armoured cavalry sqns also had an air cav troop organised the same as the ones in air cav sqns. Today as I wrote above most air cav sqns have several troops of Kiowas and nothing else; 3rdACRs sqn has Apaches, Blackhawks and Kiowas in separate troops. None have an infantry element. Here are a few good sites on Air Cav in Vietnam:

http://northwestvets.com/spurs/spurs.htm

http://www.ruthlessriders.net/

http://www.eleven-bravo.co.uk/the-war/organisation/air-cav-troop.php

JMA
07-04-2010, 06:43 AM
FWIW, it's also not at all unlike the Viet Nam era air cavalry. When I say air cavalry, I don't mean airmobile infantry battalions but the cavalry squadrons made famous (infamous?) by Apocolype Now's portrayal of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (1/9 Headhunters) of the 1st Cavalry Division.

Supposedly 1/9 was responsble for more kills than all the airmoble infantry battalions in the 1st Cavalry Division?

The squadron had three troops with each troop having a red, white, and blue platoon. I think red was aero-guns, white was aero-scouts, and blue was aero-rifles?

Does the Army still use that particular organization?

Ok, let just make a comment here.

What made fire force was not that the use of helicopters to carry the troops into battle and as a gun platform but rather how the the troops and the firepower were deployed. Airmoble does not mean fire force (in the Rhodesian sense). How to survive a fire force action was to either show incredible land speed ability and get out of the area before the troops could be placed in stop positions or crawl into a cave or something like that and lie low and hope not to be found.

Koevoet (the police reaction force) in SWA/Namibia used mainly vehicles as their mode of transport and had a different MO as they followed-up insurgents after an incident until contact as opposed to what we in Rhodesia did was react to a specific report of presence of insurgents probably without the insurgents knowing. Their trick was to leap-frog ahead to cut for spoor so as to speed up the whole follow-up process. How to survive a Koevoet follow-up was either to anti-track to such a high degree that the spoor was lost, get in front of a herd of cattle and let them walk all over their spoor or just plain find a hole somewhere and hide until the men and vehicles had gone.

It was a kind of natural selection, the fleet of foot and the cunning survived and those who wanted to make a fight of it had not chance of survival even if they did take some soldiers with them.

Rifleman
07-04-2010, 07:51 AM
Ok, let just make a comment here.

What made fire force was not that the use of helicopters to carry the troops into battle and as a gun platform but rather how the the troops and the firepower were deployed.

Understood, I didn't mean to suggest that the air cav operated exactly like the fire force. I'm sure the tactical situations and operational requirments faced by each unit were unique to time and place.

It just stuck me that there was a similarity in that both deployed (and redeployed) rapidly, often making multiple combat assaults the same day.


Airmoble does not mean fire force (in the Rhodesian sense).

Understood again. I also tried to point out that in the U.S. sense the air cavalry squadrons were unique from the airmobile infantry battalions, even though the airmobile infantry battalions were also sometimes called air cavalry when they were part of the 1st Cavalry Division.


...what we in Rhodesia did was react to a specific report of presence of insurgents probably without the insurgents knowing.

The air cav sometimes reacted to information from LRRPs. Other times they found the enemy (picked a fight) themselves. If it developed into a big enough fight infantry took over. If infantry units lost contact they could request combat tracker teams to help them regain contact.

I've enjoyed your comments about the RLI and the fire force. I hope you don't mind a curiosity question: How many operational parachute jumps did you make?

Fuchs
07-04-2010, 09:42 AM
Other times they found the enemy (picked a fight) themselves.

I'm in the mood to offer an anecdote:

According to a report I read years ago, some pilot with hunting experience was capable of hovering very low over paths and count the footprints per meter and their distance. He was then able to report the direction, guess the age, estimate the strength and speed of the group.

Me thinks this was worth to be mentioned in the age of Longbow radars and eight kilometer thermals.

baboon6
07-04-2010, 09:59 AM
and only did CAS in an emergency. Of the two, the 0-1 was slower and thus able to do closer strikes. The OV-10 was a super aircraft, was also assigned as a FAC bird but had a useful load, was really maneuverable and was able to take care of many tasks with out calling in the big guys. Depending on the type rocket they had available, they could and would put some 2.75" warheads about 5 meters out.Was a good bird, yours were made by Reims in France under Cessna license. A few years later, when the US would not sell the Shah of Iran some O-2s for some obscure reason, he went to Reims and bought a dozen Lynx copies...:wry:

The OV-10 was used in the dedicated attack role by the US Navy squadron VAL-4 in the Mekong Delta:

http://www.blackpony.org/

JMA
07-04-2010, 01:29 PM
I'm in the mood to offer an anecdote:

According to a report I read years ago, some pilot with hunting experience was capable of hovering very low over paths and count the footprints per meter and their distance. He was then able to report the direction, guess the age, estimate the strength and speed of the group.

Me thinks this was worth to be mentioned in the age of Longbow radars and eight kilometer thermals.

You want to work with indigenous people who have lived in the bush all their lives to see tracking skill at its best. I often wonder how much use of tracking is made of in wars these days and who does it.

Just a point on this you do realise that the downdraft of the the rotors would obliterate any tracks or sign on the ground?

There was a problem we faced in Rhodesia. First use was made of indigenous trackers from the Game Department who did an outstanding job. With time it became apparent that spoor seemed to get lost just when it seemed contact was imminent. Obviously the Game Department trackers did not want to die in the war. The Rhodesians over reacted and started training (black and white) soldiers as trackers with some success but never to reach the skills level of the real born and bread trackers. The solution in my opinion would have been IMHO to integrate the military and Game Department trackers on the basis that the game department guys did the real tracking with the soldiers out on the flanks until they assessed that the quarry was very close then the Game Department trackers would pull back and the soldiers would take over fully together with the follow up troops. As the Selous Scouts were getting a bounty for kills we made on their call outs they could have offered the same to these trackers.

I always remember from the movie Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid when they couldn't shake off the posse and kept asking each other "Who are those guys?". That's the way it should be. Run them down.

Fuchs
07-04-2010, 02:35 PM
Just a point on this you do realise that the downdraft of the the rotors would obliterate any tracks or sign on the ground?

It depends. he had a small helicopter and some people have amazing eyesight.

My father is still able to read highway signs at a distance where I barely notice them. Sadly, i got the eyes from my mother; nothing special except that many optical tricks (some 3D tricks and such tricks as exploited by certain weapon sights) do not work on me.
My father could easily have read footsteps in mud while hovering in a Bell 47 at 50m.

Ken White
07-04-2010, 03:37 PM
The OV-10 was used in the dedicated attack role by the US Navy squadron VAL-4 in the Mekong Delta:However, IIRC, they lost almost half the Squadron's birds to ground fire or accidents and had to buy replacements. Plus that was only one Squadron, 18 birds IIRC.. The Marines were the first to buy and they had two Squadrons, half OV-10A, half OV-10D, a dedicated night 'observation' variant with a 20mm M61 turret slaved to the FLIR. The Marines split the difference and used the OV-10A as a FAC bird that could do light strike and the 10D as a night attack plane.

The Air Force bought almost 200 and initially used the Bronc solely as a FAC Bird. Some FACs were more aggressive than others and those guys convinced a reluctant AF to let them to CAS missions. I think they ran a test of a dedicated squadron but ended up with most assigned as FAC aircraft. The hard charger FACs did more. People thing...:wry:

jcustis
07-04-2010, 04:30 PM
I often wonder how much use of tracking is made of in wars these days and who does it.

We absolutely do use tracking techniques today, and in fact we took three knuckleheads in after tracking them across about six klicks from the point where they ditched their pickup truck carrying a metric buttload of opium. Now, it wasn't a fair track, as they were on foot, high on dope, and dehydrated, and our boys were in LAV-25s and dashing across open desert where the tracks were fresh and easier to follow, but the fact that the intel summary referred to the track as "spoor" warmed me a bit.

The Marine Corps has embraced mantracking concepts in its Combat Hunter program, and although it is not a overly detailed or wholly comprehensive approach to the business of tracking, it does the task enough justice to get the boys to thinking and acting in the right direction.

Basic tracking TTPs were taught when I was attending basic infantryman training as a PFC 18 years ago, and at some point it died out. Iraq and Afghanistan brought that back into vogue.

JMA
07-04-2010, 07:02 PM
However, IIRC, they lost almost half the Squadron's birds to ground fire or accidents and had to buy replacements. Plus that was only one Squadron, 18 birds IIRC.. The Marines were the first to buy and they had two Squadrons, half OV-10A, half OV-10D, a dedicated night 'observation' variant with a 20mm M61 turret slaved to the FLIR. The Marines split the difference and used the OV-10A as a FAC bird that could do light strike and the 10D as a night attack plane.

The Air Force bought almost 200 and initially used the Bronc solely as a FAC Bird. Some FACs were more aggressive than others and those guys convinced a reluctant AF to let them to CAS missions. I think they ran a test of a dedicated squadron but ended up with most assigned as FAC aircraft. The hard charger FACs did more. People thing...:wry:

What makes for a "hard charger" pilot? Those are the boys you need.

JMA
07-04-2010, 07:20 PM
We absolutely do use tracking techniques today, and in fact we took three knuckleheads in after tracking them across about six klicks from the point where they ditched their pickup truck carrying a metric buttload of opium. Now, it wasn't a fair track, as they were on foot, high on dope, and dehydrated, and our boys were in LAV-25s and dashing across open desert where the tracks were fresh and easier to follow, but the fact that the intel summary referred to the track as "spoor" warmed me a bit.

The Marine Corps has embraced mantracking concepts in its Combat Hunter program, and although it is not a overly detailed or wholly comprehensive approach to the business of tracking, it does the task enough justice to get the boys to thinking and acting in the right direction.

Basic tracking TTPs were taught when I was attending basic infantryman training as a PFC 18 years ago, and at some point it died out. Iraq and Afghanistan brought that back into vogue.

Good to hear some guys out there are hungry to "close and kill". Well I hope it does not take long before the USMC at least has a healthy combat tracking ability up and running (their moto should be "who are those guys?" ;)

And yes "sign" and "spoor" is what tracking is all about.

Heres some (very) old stuff on RURAL TRACKING OPERATIONS (http://selousscouts.tripod.com/rural_tracking_operations.htm) with some formations at the Appendices

Note: The referred 32Z was a rifle grenade. The idea of the trackers and their flank guards loading these fell away with time.

And some general stuff on combat tracking (http://selousscouts.tripod.com/combat_tracking.htm)

JMA
07-04-2010, 07:51 PM
Understood, I didn't mean to suggest that the air cav operated exactly like the fire force. I'm sure the tactical situations and operational requirments faced by each unit were unique to time and place.

It just stuck me that there was a similarity in that both deployed (and redeployed) rapidly, often making multiple combat assaults the same day.

Understood again. I also tried to point out that in the U.S. sense the air cavalry squadrons were unique from the airmobile infantry battalions, even though the airmobile infantry battalions were also sometimes called air cavalry when they were part of the 1st Cavalry Division.

The air cav sometimes reacted to information from LRRPs. Other times they found the enemy (picked a fight) themselves. If it developed into a big enough fight infantry took over. If infantry units lost contact they could request combat tracker teams to help them regain contact.

I've enjoyed your comments about the RLI and the fire force. I hope you don't mind a curiosity question: How many operational parachute jumps did you make?

No offence meant. Just wanted to make sure that we were all aware of the difference. I would also say that the fire force worked on irregular troops of about up to 30 odd. Where we knew they were in prepared positions we took a more convention approach.

Don't have my Rhodesian log book anymore. It was 8 or 9 so lets say 8. Add to that one into Angola when with the South African paras. We had a Corporal (Des Archer) who did a staggering 73 Op jumps (a world record I believe). Also had a youngster in my troop who had only ever flown in a Dak. By the end of his service had taken off 30 odd times but never landed in an aircraft.

Archer and some guys from 1 Commando did 3 Op jumps in one day. We had a problem with parachutes. We had to recover them and send them back for repacking in Salisbury. If we had chutes that had be fitted a few times but not used we used to jump them anyway as a safety precaution using guys who hadn't jumped for a while.

Ken White
07-04-2010, 08:25 PM
What makes for a "hard charger" pilot? Those are the boys you need.one Air force and one old Marine Aviator -- both fighter pilots -- agree that selection can only tell part of it; that combat experience (good or bad) can have impacts that are difficult to foretell; current in which one is serving Squadron leadership can make a difference either way; the aircraft being flown is important (the OV-10, for example was woefully underpowered and thus couldn't get out of trouble as easily as the O2/Cessna 337; and that the type of airplane one first flew operationally has a big impact. The Marine thinks that last two are by far the most significant, he contends there was a major difference in attitude (as opposed to capability, which was pretty much a wash) between Navy F8 and F4 pilots and between Marine F8 or A4 pilots and their F4 counterparts.

He also contended it was hilarious to watch an ex A4 pilot get the stick of a big fat F4 for the first time...:D

An even older Marine Aviator agreed and said he'd noticed a slight difference in attitudes and aggressiveness between Marine F4U Corsair pilots and AD Skyraider pilots during the Corps brief possession of a single Squadron of the latter in Korea. Both were great aircraft and really good for CAS but they had very different flying characteristics.

Today, there are significant political constraints in the US. Our Congress, to avoid having to respond to complaints about process, is insistent that all military selection processes be 'objective' and 'fair' -- both to the point of overruling operational capability if of not sheer idiocy. Aggressiveness today as a characteristic is more likely to be frowned upon than to find favor (We're in one of our 'nice guy' phases -- those come and go :rolleyes:). It will stay that way unless we get in a big war, then it'll go away totally until peace returns... :wry:

Probably one of the Board's airplane driver types can add more (certainly more current than the views of four ORFs, one of whom is dumb grunt :rolleyes:) and far better info.

JMA
07-04-2010, 09:00 PM
one Air force and one old Marine Aviator -- both fighter pilots -- agree that selection can only tell part of it; that combat experience (good or bad) can have impacts that are difficult to foretell; current in which one is serving Squadron leadership can make a difference either way; the aircraft being flown is important (the OV-10, for example was woefully underpowered and thus couldn't get out of trouble as easily as the O2/Cessna 337; and that the type of airplane one first flew operationally has a big impact. The Marine thinks that last two are by far the most significant, he contends there was a major difference in attitude (as opposed to capability, which was pretty much a wash) between Navy F8 and F4 pilots and between Marine F8 or A4 pilots and their F4 counterparts.

He also contended it was hilarious to watch an ex A4 pilot get the stick of a big fat F4 for the first time...:D

An even older Marine Aviator agreed and said he'd noticed a slight difference in attitudes and aggressiveness between Marine F4U Corsair pilots and AD Skyraider pilots during the Corps brief possession of a single Squadron of the latter in Korea. Both were great aircraft and really good for CAS but they had very different flying characteristics.

Today, there are significant political constraints in the US. Our Congress, to avoid having to respond to complaints about process, is insistent that all military selection processes be 'objective' and 'fair' -- both to the point of overruling operational capability if of not sheer idiocy. Aggressiveness today as a characteristic is more likely to be frowned upon than to find favor (We're in one of our 'nice guy' phases -- those come and go :rolleyes:). It will stay that way unless we get in a big war, then it'll go away totally until peace returns... :wry:

Probably one of the Board's airplane driver types can add more (certainly more current than the views of four ORFs, one of whom is dumb grunt :rolleyes:) and far better info.

Thanks for the reply. I would have thought that they could somehow devise an assessment of the actual pilots to see how they measure against actual performance. meaning you know who the "hard chargers" are and now are looking for common characteristics. Once in possession of these they could be applied to selecting pilots to fly certain aircraft types. Don't need a "hard charger" to fly an air refueling tanker, for example, but sure need them for CAS aircraft and gunships.

Rifleman
07-05-2010, 12:45 AM
This is a little bit of a thread hijack but I think most people will enjoy this:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8r9EOruBT8k&feature=related

It's not about applying the Rhodesian fire force concept to Afgahnistan but it is about a "fire force" of sorts, and it relates to some of the things brought up in this thread.

Ken White
07-05-2010, 01:27 AM
...they could somehow devise an assessment of the actual pilots to see how they measure against actual performance. meaning you know who the "hard chargers" are and now are looking for common characteristics.However, two things intrude:

Number of type pilots needed and desires of would be (and serving) pilots. Sometimes people have to do things they do not want to do and they get annoyed and leave as soon as they can legally do so -- and while they're in that job they didn't want, they will not do as good a job as might otherwise be possible.

The previously mentioned statutory requirement for 'fairness' in all things means that occasionally a marginal type must be allowed to do a job he or she may not be totally suited for. Don't read that as a slam on female pilots, some of them are more Tiger like than a lot of guys.

Add the fact that a bad combat experience can breed excessive caution, a risk averse Commander can insist on strict obedience to the 'rules.' All sorts of thing intrude during and after a really effective selection process. Selection for a specific quality is easy, maintaining that in the face of diverse requirements and situations is less so. In this case, there is an easy answer -- but the solution is not so easy. Happens when you deal with people, the pesky creatures will not always stay the way you wish them to.....

slapout9
07-05-2010, 02:52 AM
This is a little bit of a thread hijack but I think most people will enjoy this:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8r9EOruBT8k&feature=related

It's not about applying the Rhodesian fire force concept to Afgahnistan but it is about a "fire force" of sorts, and it relates to some of the things brought up in this thread.

Wow, that's good stuff. Much closer to General Gavin's concept of "Sky Cavalry" and what they should do......"Shoot...Move....and Communicate" damn all this walking everywhere carrying 200 pounds on your back.

Rhodesian
07-06-2010, 11:52 PM
Sirs, Corporals, Privates and whatever. Hopefully that covers everyone :)

Sorry the slow reply.



Wilful ignorance OTOH -- like ignoring the political realities we and the British have to cope with is another thing.


lol! Oh goody, a roasting. Er . . . I'm Rhodesian, yes we're rebellious and proud, and frequently we upset a lot of folks generally - especially the British who are my kith and kin. As it goes, our own political realities were ignored decades ago when we were invaded by Russian and Chinese proxies - Have a look at my country now, the population hasn't grown in 20 years, 20 000 Matabeles are "missing," and Bob The Terrible will burn the place to the ground if he thinks it will aid his own personal cause. No offence intended.



(Casevac uplift in 7 minutes) Did that time apply just to the Fire Force folks or to the entire Police and Military effort?


Hell no, IN CONTEXT, FF only! - Just trying to impress Wilf even further ;) One of the many complaints from other Rhodesian units was that the RLI had “stolen” all of their air support. On the other hand when reacting to calls for assistance from the same units, they then had it back in a big way, but this was certainly not the norm. My father, a member of PATU, hated the fact that while he patrolled one area with nothing, the RLI was next door busy putting on an air show. He knew of course that they were pushing the naughty ones in his direction, and that if he screamed loud enough someone would jolly over and help him out too, but that wasn't a granted. In talking to Johnny and Joe, I've often found them complaining of the same things in Afghanistan, in the sense of a lack of air support in a time frame that renders it really effective, and they frequently have to withdraw from contact as a consequence of its absence, or because what eventually shows up is dropping stuff too big for them to hang around and maintain the pressure. Are we bombing empty cover?

Baboon6 et al, thank you for the excellent Links, much appreciated, and very interesting! Also, nice toy that Apache has! I presume that the Apache 30mm can be set to fire just one shell as well?



Really? An A-10 costs less in maintenance than a lot of business jets.


Yes, but why think "Jets" or anything more expensive than it needs to be? We all know the UK, for example, can't afford the ideals, and in the vacuum that this has created we have provided little else to take their place. Why not provide tools that can do a relatively good job, are cheaper to buy and maintain, can hang around for long periods of time overhead, and then have lots more of them? If it's not called on, it loiters for whoever needs it. Less capability absolutely, but more availability for Johnny Bravo and GI Joe?

In one contact over open ground, for example, 20 (24?) Brits, without any provided real-time air-support, bumped into a large number of Taliban (estimated at 100). The Brits believe 20 of these were killed, but the bodies were removed by the others, so presumably “80” got away, no doubt with many wounded. The Brits knew from intel intercepts they were going to get hit imminently, and the civvies had bugged out as well because they knew it too. So why not provide these men not only with a system that transports even more of their mates “behind/around/wherever” the Taliban so that the 80 can't just run off, but also some sort of cheap real-time air support that gets put up and is in position BEFORE the attack? 20 percent in any fire-fight is excellent, Rhodesia averaged less against an apparently less capable enemy, but it increased to 80 percent plus with FF. Find a means of increasing our patrols damage capability to 80 percent (or whatever) too, in a way that fits current ROE, and which we can easily apply and afford. The UK is now broke, but then so were we in Rhodesia, we thought outside the box and with trial and error, FF was one of the answers. “We” in the UK can't seem to re-engineer a Snatch Landrover for use in mine country after years of use, deaths and debate - I'm not really hopeful of anything as cute as FF. And dare I even suggest a look at what Rhodesia did with our Landrovers, in context, “in the good old days”?


I think we've already highlighted a problem: A tendency to want “tools” that go far beyond our requirements – too expensive, to costly to run, too high maintenance, over-kill. Keep it simple.



Agreed, but you have to turn that into an argument and a solution.


An Academic designs a Race Horse, its a fabulous Race Horse, and the board of Academics agree to fund it, but Jonny really only needed a Donkey. Instead of buying lots of cheaper Donkeys, we start tinkering with the Race Horse and it turns into a very expensive Camel. Johnny still just needs a Donkey, but no one asked Johnny, or respected his opinion, and no one listened because the Academics really love their Race Horses. That one Horse has prevented many other Johnnies from getting their Donkeys too. How many light strike aircraft can one Jump Jet/Hornet buy, yes the capabilities are limited, but we're not trying to shoot down Russian Migs, or obliterate squadrons of T72 tanks . . . just yet. The Race Horse is the wrong animal, on the wrong race track, but until someone listens to Johnny and finds out what he needs, then we'll keep trying to apply conventional kit, to a coin problem.

William F. Owen
07-07-2010, 05:07 AM
An Academic designs a Race Horse, its a fabulous Race Horse, and the board of Academics agree to fund it, but Jonny really only needed a Donkey. Instead of buying lots of cheaper Donkeys, we start tinkering with the Race Horse and it turns into a very expensive Camel.
Well that's why most of us here come from the Donkey doctrine, and have no interest in race horses. I actually spend most of my time killing sacred cows.

One sacred cow is the myth of the bug-basher COIN aircraft. Sorry, but the Lynx was incredibly limited. The UK has Apache, so we should use Apache. IMO, fighting men in sandals is pretty much what the Apache should do. It's the weapon on target, not the platform that got it there.

Rhodesian
07-07-2010, 07:19 AM
but the Lynx was incredibly limited. The UK has Apache


Yes, but someone in trouble who gets only a snatch, or worse, nothing, would settle for a crappy Lynx, or even a Mad Max Cessna float plane with an GPMG in the back. We haven't remotely got enough Apaches. That's the problem, and the point.

I.R

William F. Owen
07-07-2010, 07:24 AM
We haven't remotely got enough Apaches. That's the problem, and the point.

Sorry, but the UK has over 50 Apaches available. They can only deploy 8-12, because they have no money and a man-power ceiling.
Given more money, and manpower, I suggest deploying the available existing Apache and not investing in a new type of A/C that is less capable.

Chris jM
07-07-2010, 07:54 AM
In reference to both Wilf and Rhodesian on the expense/ capability debate (expressed in regards to aircraft, but I imagine it applies equally to AFVs and even the lowest-level infantry capability) - there is substantial benefit to platforms based off the environment we are in. A turbo-prop aircraft, ala a A-1 Skyraider or even an old Mosquito type of WW2 vintage, would be more beneficial in delivering CAS than an F15E, and far cheaper to procure and easier to maintain than the likes of the F-15s or AH-64s.

Inevitably the opportunity cost for a force fielding equipment intended for low-intensity conflict (i.e. a turboprop meant to hammer enemy positions 'low and slow' that is unable to deal with enemy AD or enemy aircraft) will not be as effective in fielding a high-tech force intended to fight against an equivalent force.

Perhaps the answer, then, is that the effort should be on creating an Afghani air arm able to fight their war, the way it suits them. Instead of creating a RAF or USAF air-wing-lite, as we seem to be doing in focussing on their rotary wing capability, we should be worrying about their ability to beat the Taliban their way (not that I'm being original here, this is obviously Kilcullen's 23rd article - Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves). Do we need the ANA to be able to conduct expensive helo ops, or is it better for us and for them if they were able to sustain economical infantry/ light armour operations with effective fire support from a suitable CAS air wing?

We don't have to field and deploy the COIN-specific platforms ourselves. We can procure and deploy them to the host nation forces, thus getting the best of both worlds.

William F. Owen
07-07-2010, 08:13 AM
- there is substantial benefit to platforms based off the environment we are in. A turbo-prop aircraft, ala a A-1 Skyraider or even an old Mosquito type of WW2 vintage, would be more beneficial in delivering CAS than an F15E, and far cheaper to procure and easier to maintain than the likes of the F-15s or AH-64s.
The A1 Skyraider was the A-6 intruder or JSF of it's day - and you actually have to compare like with like as concerns weapons. An AH-64 can deliver all the same weapons as turbo-prop COIN-aircraft, and do it more accurately, in worse weather and/or at night.
No COIN bug basher can track and kill an RPG-team on motorcycle through a village, at O-dark-thirty on a stormy night, unless it has a remote weapons station, with an EO sensor. The OV-10D -Dog model is about the closest candidate, and they are all, IIRC, long gone.
Can you do that with a cheaper helicopter? Yes. Maybe the AH-1, or similar.
If you want the performance, it costs what it costs.

We don't have to field and deploy the COIN-specific platforms ourselves. We can procure and deploy them to the host nation forces, thus getting the best of both worlds.
Concur. As the UK did with Oman and the Strikemasters.

JMA
07-07-2010, 09:04 AM
Sorry, but the UK has over 50 Apaches available. They can only deploy 8-12, because they have no money and a man-power ceiling.
Given more money, and manpower, I suggest deploying the available existing Apache and not investing in a new type of A/C that is less capable.

Sorry William but that sounds like the Brit NHS (National Health Service). Sounds wonderful until you hear about the long waiting lists.

There is quite frankly no point in mentioning that there are 50 if only 8 can be on ops in Helmand at any time.

There was some talk a while back of outsourcing the helo lift capability to an outside contractor. I heard the Air Force nearly had a collective heart attack at the thought.

Now that the Brit are leaving Sangin it may well be important to reassess what he actual need for Apache support will be after this "consolidation of British forces".

JMA
07-07-2010, 09:21 AM
PS - Much of the discussion seems focused on the terrain. Here are pictures of the greenspace of Southern Afghanistan where most of the fighting takes place for those unfamiliar with the area to get a perspective.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=1135&stc=1&d=1277872106

OK, I'm looking at this one. What exactly is the problem with this terrain?

JMA
07-07-2010, 10:06 AM
This certainly is an interesting conversation. I'll add my two bits.

[snip]

Point 1.
The biggest thing to remember is that, relatively speaking, the areas where fighting in the Greenzones takes place are actually quite limited. You can get the whole Kandahar Greenzone - From the Dhala Dam in the north, through Arghandab, Zharei, Panjwayi and Maywand districts in the southwest with Kandahar City in the southeast - pretty much on a single workable 1:50,000 map. We have training areas in Canada that have maps larger then the Kandahar AO. Things are a little more stretched in Helmand, but not by much. Most of the area in the south is either very sparsely inhabited mountains or uninhabited desert (the Reg).

So any airmobile force doesn't have far too travel. If it's prowling for TICs, it ain't going to go very far before it turns around and heads the other way.

That's good because the response time to any incident would be minimal. The problem is that these helos could not be airborne all the time and would have to park off somewhere to provide the best response time. Where would that be and would it be secure?


Point 2.
This is a huge one and, in my view, decisive. The insurgents do know CAS times and will bug out when aviation/air gets on station. Bugging out is quite easy for them. As well, there is usually something always overhead. Near permanent air coverage is largely a reality and the enemy is used to it. One only has to look up to figure that one out. He is adept at hiding as highlighted by this:

You don't really see armed bands of Taliban just roaming around in the south. If there was, they'd be dead fast. Cache, hit, run, cache, blend is usually how things work. Afghan insurgents will only fight if they have an advantage or they are caught off-guard. Any shift in that and they usually just cache and farm. Anyone in the south expecting to mount a helo to roam around looking for bands of 50 insurgents to pin down and destroy will, unless he has a time machine to 2006, likely cruise around waving at farmer-insurgents in their fields.

This all depends on the CAS response time and how quickly you could get a gunship or QRF overhead.

The principle that should be explored is to maintain contact with the TB so as to inflict maximum number of casualties per contact.

Are they managing to "bug out" because the ground troop they make contact with can't close with them and they leave before the fast air can arrive. Yes then it is good to use the ground troops as a decoy to draw the TB into making contact when you have the gunships and men of a QRF just over the next hill about 5 mins (or less) out.

Then they will try to set up air ambushes. So having analysed the ground carefully and identified the most likely areas for these air ambushed you figure out a countermeasure. Its a game of chess and the TB are figuring that the US and NATO will get tired of playing long before they do.


Point 3.
Someone else mentioned local forces "beating the bushes" to push insurgents out of inhabited areas. This is hard to do largely due to cultural reasons. Unlike Africa, every Afghan's home is, quite literally, a castle. Access behind the high walls is limited. Afghan soldiers and police are usually not very comfortable going into the compounds of locals (they usually make searches as brief as possible) and everybody goes bananas if Westerners move in (Karzai has forbidden it unless absolutely necessary). Compounds usually have 20-30 people occupying them, so finding 5 fighting age males isn't going to do much for your cause anyways. Not discounting the value of local intelligence, just saying the "beating the bush" technique in the unique environment of Afghanistan would be hard (I know this from personal experience).

This "beating the bushes" is a job for the AMA I believe. Let them go in and stir it up and when the TB respond your QRF is ready and waiting.

One just needs to read up on the counter measures used against Soviet "Cordon ans Search" operations to see what to possibly expect as a response.


So, in my view a "Fire Force" concept would be handy if it could be used to provide rapid cut-off insurgents in the two situations mentioned above (advantage/off-guard)


It all depends on the nature of the firefight/contact you are responding to. You can drop off cut-off groups at likely places but should always maintain a mobile reserve in case of a breakout. The principles remain the same it is just the deployment by helo is rapid and effective.

baboon6
07-07-2010, 11:13 AM
Sorry William but that sounds like the Brit NHS (National Health Service). Sounds wonderful until you hear about the long waiting lists.

There is quite frankly no point in mentioning that there are 50 if only 8 can be on ops in Helmand at any time.

There was some talk a while back of outsourcing the helo lift capability to an outside contractor. I heard the Air Force nearly had a collective heart attack at the thought.

Now that the Brit are leaving Sangin it may well be important to reassess what he actual need for Apache support will be after this "consolidation of British forces".

All or most ISAF countries including both the US and UK use civilian contractor helicopter support to an extent, for resupplying forward operating bases. These are mainly Eastern European companies using Mi-8 and Mi-26 aircraft. They do not carry troops.

William F. Owen
07-07-2010, 12:17 PM
There is quite frankly no point in mentioning that there are 50 if only 8 can be on ops in Helmand at any time.
Well you'd be wrong. There is every point in holding up to the light the reality of having the world's 2nd largest Apache fleet, "sitting on bricks" because the constraint in deploying them is funding, yet have you any idea of the cost of just "storing" an Apache?

This is one of the issues that strikes to the heart of the UK's mismanagement of defence issues, and has a direct impact on operational effectiveness. I'd actually have thought this would be something you'd understand.

JMA
07-07-2010, 01:49 PM
Well you'd be wrong. There is every point in holding up to the light the reality of having the world's 2nd largest Apache fleet, "sitting on bricks" because the constraint in deploying them is funding, yet have you any idea of the cost of just "storing" an Apache?

This is one of the issues that strikes to the heart of the UK's mismanagement of defence issues, and has a direct impact on operational effectiveness. I'd actually have thought this would be something you'd understand.

Don't get me wrong, I think it is a disgrace and there should be a massive stink kicked up about this waste of resources.

That said, if there really is no chance in their being used in Afghanistan because of cost constraints and a shortage of pilots then they should not be brought into these discussions.

JMA
07-07-2010, 01:51 PM
All or most ISAF countries including both the US and UK use civilian contractor helicopter support to an extent, for resupplying forward operating bases. These are mainly Eastern European companies using Mi-8 and Mi-26 aircraft. They do not carry troops.

Thanks but I was talking about hearing about troop lift helos, did I hear wrong then?

jcustis
07-07-2010, 03:31 PM
Ok, let just make a comment here.

What made fire force was not that the use of helicopters to carry the troops into battle and as a gun platform but rather how the the troops and the firepower were deployed. Airmoble does not mean fire force (in the Rhodesian sense). How to survive a fire force action was to either show incredible land speed ability and get out of the area before the troops could be placed in stop positions or crawl into a cave or something like that and lie low and hope not to be found.

This is an excellent point that I think is often lost on the casual observer of Fire Force ops. There was usually a considerable ballet involved, that started with the sensor (OP, Selous Scout element, etc.) calling in a spotrep. That sensor provided continuous updates to the C2 nodes to fill in details as the call-out proceeded and the shooters (Fire Force) got aloft and on its way to the obj area. The sensor provided critical terminal control of sorts, and once it got the K-car in the area and the battle was joined, the Fire Force commander performed the unique job of controlling all ground movement. There are new sensors that could be use in lieu of the standard OP of that day - but only to a point. I have not been aloft over the green zones down my way, but I have watched plenty of UAS feed, and it is like watching a firefight through a soda straw. That does not give us the sensory perception and depth required to coordinate heavily synchronized ground effort in the same fashion as Fire Force elements of old, in my opinion.

We do not train to a typically high enough standard to control battlefield geometry all that well, and I fear we have simply lost the art of commanding heliborne inserts and follow-on maneuver from an aerial platform. That's another matter I think we would have a hard time overcoming.

slapout9
07-07-2010, 03:51 PM
This is an excellent point that I think is often lost on the casual observer of Fire Force ops. There was usually a considerable ballet involved, that started with the sensor (OP, Selous Scout element, etc.) calling in a spotrep. That sensor provided continuous updates to the C2 nodes to fill in details as the call-out proceeded and the shooters (Fire Force) got aloft and on its way to the obj area. The sensor provided critical terminal control of sorts, and once it got the K-car in the area and the battle was joined, the Fire Force commander performed the unique job of controlling all ground movement. There are new sensors that could be use in lieu of the standard OP of that day - but only to a point. I have not been aloft over the green zones down my way, but I have watched plenty of UAS feed, and it is like watching a firefight through a soda straw. That does not give us the sensory perception and depth required to coordinate heavily synchronized ground effort in the same fashion as Fire Force elements of old, in my opinion.
We do not train to a typically high enough standard to control battlefield geometry all that well, and I fear we have simply lost the art of commanding Claiborne inserts and follow-on maneuver from an aerial platform. That's another matter I think we would have a hard time overcoming.

Absolutely. Fire Force was an integrated combat system that could shoot,move and communicate in order to destroy the enemy. The Marines did it in the pacific by using battleships as floating artillery to support the ground force. Air,land,Sea are simply mediums to be crossed to get to the right place at the right time. Getting hung up on a specific platform to do this will just get us into trouble, it is more important to combine all of them based upon the situation and terrain.

JMA
07-07-2010, 06:28 PM
This is an excellent point that I think is often lost on the casual observer of Fire Force ops. There was usually a considerable ballet involved, that started with the sensor (OP, Selous Scout element, etc.) calling in a spotrep. That sensor provided continuous updates to the C2 nodes to fill in details as the call-out proceeded and the shooters (Fire Force) got aloft and on its way to the obj area. The sensor provided critical terminal control of sorts, and once it got the K-car in the area and the battle was joined, the Fire Force commander performed the unique job of controlling all ground movement. There are new sensors that could be use in lieu of the standard OP of that day - but only to a point. I have not been aloft over the green zones down my way, but I have watched plenty of UAS feed, and it is like watching a firefight through a soda straw. That does not give us the sensory perception and depth required to coordinate heavily synchronized ground effort in the same fashion as Fire Force elements of old, in my opinion.

We do not train to a typically high enough standard to control battlefield geometry all that well, and I fear we have simply lost the art of commanding heliborne inserts and follow-on maneuver from an aerial platform. That's another matter I think we would have a hard time overcoming.

On the route in as Airborne Cmdr one would try to get a briefing from the OP as to where they thought the likely escape routes would be (as our maps were basic 1:50,000 with no photogramatic overlay to show accurate vegetation cover). Mostly there would be a preplanned set of individual (an separate) drop-offs for the first wave sticks. So if the gunship came overhead and engaged the insurgents a simple "go with plan A" instruction could be given. When a pilot has to find his own LZ, get in and out quickly on his own its amazing quick and slick the whole operation becomes. The flaring before landing in just enough and not a moment is wasted. Everybody gets "slick and quick". The troopies want on the ground ASAP.

My question re the photo (in post #124) was because that was a lot like a view from an OP or from the gunship as one started lifting on arrival at the target. Every contour ridge (or bund) is a massive potential problem for infantry on the ground as are the mud walls but are nothing from the air.

John you must get yourself at least 30 mins in a helo to get the picture of the ground from 1,000 ft over various terrain types. What kind of lens to the UAS have. The US can put a man on the moon, they can give you the right lens.

The problem with the air mobile stuff in this context is that all that is happening is the unit/sub-unit is being delivered on to the ground together so as to act like normal infantry (think Ia Drang). That is good for many more conventional applications but not for small groups who can be encircled and dealt with accordingly. (Suggest the use of encircled rather enveloped as enveloped has existing connotations.)

Rhodesian
07-07-2010, 09:19 PM
Someone mentioned 30mm canon shells struggle to go through those walls, how thick are the ceilings etc, would they be as difficult?

jcustis
07-08-2010, 04:58 AM
Someone mentioned 30mm canon shells struggle to go through those walls, how thick are the ceilings etc, would they be as difficult?

The ceilings are even more stout, as they are made from reinforcing timber laid across to support the layer of mud that forms the actual cover.

JMA
07-08-2010, 06:55 AM
Someone mentioned 30mm canon shells struggle to go through those walls, how thick are the ceilings etc, would they be as difficult?

If its an HE round it will explode on impact with very little if any penetration.

But unless its the walls of a house the gunship can take out someone hiding behind such a wall from a different angle or part of the orbit.

As to the buildings, if there is someone inside who needs killing then either pull the troops back and bomb the place or get at them using the modern equivalent of our bunker bombs then go in through the door.

We had the same problem with our 20mm in that on soft ground where penetration of the round happened the spread of shrapnel was much reduced and when firing through tree cover many rounds detonated on the branches with the resultant failure to penetrated the cover. Thats why the quad .303 guns was such a success with the only drawback being the number of stoppages on individual guns. The current miniguns are certainly a great improvement.

davidbfpo
12-06-2010, 10:14 PM
In a wide ranging review of what is happening in Nimroz Province FRI ends with a comment that could re-open this thread:
I ask one of my brother Marines what he would do were he given this problem to solve under the historical constraints normally faced by Marine commanders fighting a small war. He replied immediately ; Q-cars, fire force and pseudo operators.

(my inserted break)Which is exactly the same thing I would say as would all of my friends who are in the business. But the only way a regimental or battalion commander could even think of doing that now would be if we sent a vast majority of the troops deployed here (along with every colonel and general not in command of troops) home. There are legitimate, very good reasons to see this thing through but we don’t have to spend billions we don’t have to do it.

Link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3805

FRI are well aware of OPSEC, as are SWC members; it is just that I as an observer do not know if such tactics are being used and after eight years of direct Western intervention I simply do not think we are.

A leaner, thinner and cheaper strategy IMHO is required and maybe such options the USMC officer sought are components?

carl
12-07-2010, 04:09 PM
Probably one of the Board's airplane driver types can add more (certainly more current than the views of four ORFs, one of whom is dumb grunt :rolleyes:) and far better info.

I've been thinking about "what makes a hard charger pilot?" I have no military flying experience but a lot of plain old flying experience. It is probably well to consider this. Most pilots get into the game because they want to fly and zoom around the sky. Everything else is secondary. Perhaps you should be looking for a pilot whose desire to fight is as strong or stronger than the desire to fly.

Fuchs
12-08-2010, 12:28 PM
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=1135&stc=1&d=1277872106

OK, I'm looking at this one. What exactly is the problem with this terrain?

I just looked again at the photo.

It does now remember me of Normandy, with all those walls (~bocages).


It seems as if somehow walls play a larger than normal role in countries which were visited by Mongols a lot.

Ken White
12-08-2010, 04:29 PM
OK, I'm looking at this one. What exactly is the problem with this terrain?You miss that?

That's a small hill from whence the picture of that nice level easy in which to operate terrain was taken. Said hills are the principal problem and, as Fuchs says, the bocage like walls aren't helpful. Nor are the long range fields of fire offered by said hills or in the relatively flat valleys where there is no farming..:rolleyes:

Terrain is, as always, what one makes of it.

TYR
12-08-2010, 05:44 PM
and no picture does Afghanistan any justice untill you've had to move from 3000 ft to 1200 ft to get to where you have to go. Also Helicopters are easy targets in that terrain.

slapout9
12-08-2010, 06:02 PM
That is why we need one of these!


http://www.fantastic-plastic.com/Convair49CatalogPage.htm

TYR
12-08-2010, 06:13 PM
It looks kind of like and Army mop bucket.

slapout9
12-08-2010, 07:06 PM
It looks kind of like and Army mop bucket.

Yes it does, but the add says it includes Marine Corps Decals.

JMA
12-08-2010, 11:45 PM
You miss that?

No, post #132 contained the following (which you obviously missed)


My question re the photo (in post #124) was because that was a lot like a view from an OP or from the gunship as one started lifting on arrival at the target. Every contour ridge (or bund) is a massive potential problem for infantry on the ground as are the mud walls but are nothing from the air.

Think enemy and terrain (or METT-TC if you prefer). If you have air effort and there are TB in that village area then you should be able to get them all.


That's a small hill from whence the picture of that nice level easy in which to operate terrain was taken. Said hills are the principal problem and, as Fuchs says, the bocage like walls aren't helpful. Nor are the long range fields of fire offered by said hills or in the relatively flat valleys where there is no farming..:rolleyes:

Terrain is, as always, what one makes of it.

Not quite, terrain is how you use it.

JMA
12-08-2010, 11:58 PM
I just looked again at the photo.

It does now remember me of Normandy, with all those walls (~bocages).


It seems as if somehow walls play a larger than normal role in countries which were visited by Mongols a lot.

Yes the walls are an obstacle to infantry. So what do you suggest to overcome this?

Fuchs
12-09-2010, 12:29 AM
Yes the walls are an obstacle to infantry. So what do you suggest to overcome this?

First of all they're an obstacle to vision (concealment), then they're an obstacle to projectiles (cover), then to men and finally to vehicles.

An area full of obstacles can be useful and detrimental - depending on what you want to do.

Area control certainly becomes more difficult (unless you have OPs at an elevated position). Off-road movements become at the very least canalized - this sucks in regard to IED evasion.

Infantry becomes canalized as well as long as the walls are too high for climbing over one every few minutes.


Bocages were in part a problem in 1944 because they were almost like prepared fighting positions for infantry (and there was enough infantry to man the positions after the first two days) and because of the mobility impairment. The former is probably not such a problem in AFG because of the low force density even in population centres.


Well, and finally I'm simply too tired right now. 0127 ... too late for writing an epic article full of thoughts about some specific, unique terrain. The terrain is complicated enough to lead to dozens of conclusions.

Ken White
12-09-2010, 12:46 AM
No, post #132 contained the following (which you obviously missed) I didn't miss it, I responded to the post I quoted. Not to 132. However, since you bought 132 into the conversation:
My question re the photo (in post #124) was because that was a lot like a view from an OP or from the gunship as one started lifting on arrival at the target. Every contour ridge (or bund) is a massive potential problem for infantry on the ground as are the mud walls but are nothing from the air.The obvious, well stated...

The only possible response to that is "Well, yeah..." The rest of 132 is all equally valid but doesn't address the question you raised in Post 124 to which I responded, to wit, "What exactly is the problem with this terrain? " So, I answered that with an obvious statement. ;)

See, two can do that.

Incidentally, jcustis is Jon, not John.
Think enemy and terrain (or METT-TC if you prefer). If you have air effort and there are TB in that village area then you should be able to get them all.Umm, perhaps. Except for the ones that pretend to be -- or are -- local farmers or who have hidey holes constructed or who can out run their pursuers. IF you have air...

If you don't that hill mass and others like it pose a bit of a problem.:wry:
Not quite, terrain is how you use it.Er, well yeah. I deeply regret not choosing the precise phraseology you specify. :o

However, I sort of meant the same thing. "What one make of it" also puts the onus on the user not the terrain. ;)

Infanteer
12-09-2010, 02:17 AM
OK, I'm looking at this one. What exactly is the problem with this terrain?

I simply posted this picture along with others to highlight what the average piece of "greenspace" in Afghanistan looks like. Typical engagements in Afghanistan aren't over the ranging veldt, they are fought from small hamlets like this; the insurgents love to scoot-and-shoot from these little greenspaces and slide back into them, caching their weapons in the fields or farm buildings and saying "no taliban here!"

As well, those ridges in that picture are usually 4-8 feet deep and, at certain times of the year, flooded to some extent. Moving through them by foot is extremely taxing, especially with enforced loads and 50 degree heat. The only other way is to create a breach with an Armoured Engineer Vehicle, which causes other problems. In the summer, the cover in most of these areas from the air is very good as the vines and trees sock in - the picture after that one clearly shows this. Aviation can quickly lose guys amongst grapehuts and pomegranate groves.

My point on helicopters is that you could fly all over the place with them, but these areas are quite condensed and most are within mortar range of some form of NATO outpost. The floodplains in Kandahar and Helmand are very small, densly populated areas - some of our training area maps are bigger than a Brigade AO in Afghanistan. "Fireforce mobility" may not be necessary here.

Finally, the hills in the south aren't usually much of a tactical feature - they are randomly spread about but are steep and bare of any cover. These aren't the mountains of RC(E) but rather small craggy outcroppings that pop out of the flood plain. I only saw them used twice by the insurgents; the first time a sniper picked the guy off and the second time an A-10 "moved" the guy off.

davidbfpo
12-09-2010, 08:48 AM
Albeit we are moving away from the original theme onto the impact of terrain and in particular cover for insurgents.

I recall a clip on the BBC or C4 about fighting in Sangin, where the emphasis was on the local passion for building walls around patches of land, hundreds of metres long and about 12' high. The UK Army were using demolition charges and an adapted bulldozer to reduce lengths of them. Mention was made of snipers using "murder holes".

Earlier a post referred to the bocage of Normandy. From this "armchair" it appeared then, possibly a year ago, that the local tactical solution was very limited - as UK capabilities / resources were - and simply telling the Afghans to stop building walls - by the Afghan government - was not used.

TYR
12-09-2010, 05:02 PM
The Marine who made the comment probably read something about the Fire Force technique and was impressed with the technique as it pertained to that specific conflict. The Fire Force concept was a fantastic tactic given the situation at that particular time in Rhodesia. However, I honestly can’t see where moving the Rhodesian Fire Force “Concept” to Afghanistan would work. There are too many variables that create problems for implementation, the biggest one being surprise. As someone who has fought in Afghanistan, IMHO that concept could not be replicated. In a lot of instances something similar has and does take place with very poor results. The best strategy we employed were typical Light Infantry types of operations away from the FOB for 10-20 days. Inserting several elements further from the target area and maneuvering on foot using the ridge lines as a way to the target area. When we did this we had better results than flying in and dropping down on top of them or driving on the roads and getting IED'd. Again just my opinion for where I was at.

JMA
12-10-2010, 06:43 PM
Albeit we are moving away from the original theme onto the impact of terrain and in particular cover for insurgents.

I recall a clip on the BBC or C4 about fighting in Sangin, where the emphasis was on the local passion for building walls around patches of land, hundreds of metres long and about 12' high. The UK Army were using demolition charges and an adapted bulldozer to reduce lengths of them. Mention was made of snipers using "murder holes".

Earlier a post referred to the bocage of Normandy. From this "armchair" it appeared then, possibly a year ago, that the local tactical solution was very limited - as UK capabilities / resources were - and simply telling the Afghans to stop building walls - by the Afghan government - was not used.

Not off topic at all.

Horizontal vision is most always more difficult than the vertical except when there is total tree cover. So it is all about that basic of basics "selecting lines of advance".

We had three rules on fireforce,


1. Don't sweep (approach the objective) uphill.
2. Don't sweep (approach the objective) into the sun.
3. Don't sweep (approach the objective) across open ground.

The Afgan walls issue is very difficult for dismounted infantry... but a cinch for a helicopter and probably a UAV preferably armed.

And you are correct, over time, certainly in Sangin, the combat engineers should have systematically dealt with the death trap defiles foot patrols were sucked into.

JMA
12-10-2010, 07:12 PM
The obvious, well stated...

OK, progress.

So lets play the "so what" game shall we?

So if it is difficult to see the object from the ground yet easy from the air then... so what?

That would tell you to clear ground from the air where possible and make maximum use of air observation and CAS on the objective, yes?


Except for the ones that pretend to be -- or are -- local farmers or who have hidey holes constructed or who can out run their pursuers. IF you have air...

If you don't that hill mass and others like it pose a bit of a problem.

As one of the Brit brigade commanders is on record as saying that they were forced down a certain tactical path due to lack of availability of helicopters.

It is very sporting of the Brits to impose ridiculous rules of engagement on their troops but insane to deny them the edge in battle.

Not sure of this but I heard that the USMC now have a 10x the helos the Brits had in Helmand. If this is so then I can't see what the problem is.

JMA
12-10-2010, 07:25 PM
First of all they're an obstacle to vision (concealment), then they're an obstacle to projectiles (cover), then to men and finally to vehicles.

Obstacles to aircraft and view from the air?


An area full of obstacles can be useful and detrimental - depending on what you want to do.

The role of the infantry is to close with and kill the enemy.


Area control certainly becomes more difficult (unless you have OPs at an elevated position). Off-road movements become at the very least canalized - this sucks in regard to IED evasion.

That's my point, you can dominate ground with observation (from the ground or air) and supporting fire by day and night.


Infantry becomes canalized as well as long as the walls are too high for climbing over one every few minutes.

And traps the troops in the "canal" if the Taleban toss a grenade over the wall.


Bocages were in part a problem in 1944 because they were almost like prepared fighting positions for infantry (and there was enough infantry to man the positions after the first two days) and because of the mobility impairment. The former is probably not such a problem in AFG because of the low force density even in population centres.

Its all about making the terrain work for you, I suggest. Then the other side adapts accordingly...


Well, and finally I'm simply too tired right now. 0127 ... too late for writing an epic article full of thoughts about some specific, unique terrain. The terrain is complicated enough to lead to dozens of conclusions.

It is the response to the terrain and how the Taleban uses it that is the critical success factor.

JMA
12-10-2010, 07:34 PM
I honestly can’t see where moving the Rhodesian Fire Force “Concept” to Afghanistan would work.

That comment presupposes that you actually understand the fireforce concept?

It seems that a number of those who state with certainty that it won't work don't have a working knowledge of how the fireforce worked in Rhodesia.

Then there are those who have some or a good idea of how it works and state that the principle barrier to implementation are the ROE.

This subject is a little like the debate over the use of armour. The detractors seem to cite the Soviet experience as why it won't work. Not sure the US armour are happy to be compared with the soviets.

Fuchs
12-10-2010, 07:36 PM
The role of the infantry is to close with and kill the enemy.

I know that this is being used as role description in commonwealth countries (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/09/role-of-infantry-branch.html), but it's stupid.

"To close with and kill the enemy" is a rare mission, not the role.

JMA
12-10-2010, 08:09 PM
I simply posted this picture along with others to highlight what the average piece of "greenspace" in Afghanistan looks like.

A valuable contribution to the debate, thank you.


Typical engagements in Afghanistan aren't over the ranging veldt, they are fought from small hamlets like this; the insurgents love to scoot-and-shoot from these little greenspaces and slide back into them, caching their weapons in the fields or farm buildings and saying "no taliban here!"

Shoot and scoot?

And you do a GS residue test and then you got them.

There are some Israeli tactics which could be used under these circumstances but as long as the strategy has got the pop-centric thing so completely screwed up nothing will be achieved.


As well, those ridges in that picture are usually 4-8 feet deep and, at certain times of the year, flooded to some extent. Moving through them by foot is extremely taxing, especially with enforced loads and 50 degree heat.

Have any Taleban ever been found hiding out in the pools of water?

The enforced loads are self inflicted.

I mentioned some time ago in another thread something along the lines of when as a young troop commander I spent weeks on end clearing areas of bush on foot on (I think) a 5 day out, 2 day back rotation. A young recce pilot friend of mine on being told what I had been doing stated that what had taken me 5 days to clear would take him about three hours by air.

I still for the life of me can't see the point of patrolling over open ground. The Brits have guidelines but don't seem to apply them.


The only other way is to create a breach with an Armoured Engineer Vehicle, which causes other problems. In the summer, the cover in most of these areas from the air is very good as the vines and trees sock in - the picture after that one clearly shows this. Aviation can quickly lose guys amongst grapehuts and pomegranate groves.

Nobody said it would be easy, did they? You need to adapt as the situation changes. Sadly the lack of continuity is a big problem. Things seem to change fast out there. So a year or 18 months out of theatre means one has a lot of catching up to do.


My point on helicopters is that you could fly all over the place with them, but these areas are quite condensed and most are within mortar range of some form of NATO outpost. The floodplains in Kandahar and Helmand are very small, densly populated areas - some of our training area maps are bigger than a Brigade AO in Afghanistan. "Fireforce mobility" may not be necessary here.

Vision and firepower from the air is not an advantage? The ability to overfly the open fields and land troops on the roof of a building is not a potential advantage? Fly in stop groups to conduct a deliberate cordon and search of a village is not a valuable tool?

Mobility is not the only factor to consider... remember flexibility and concentration of force.


Finally, the hills in the south aren't usually much of a tactical feature - they are randomly spread about but are steep and bare of any cover. These aren't the mountains of RC(E) but rather small craggy outcroppings that pop out of the flood plain. I only saw them used twice by the insurgents; the first time a sniper picked the guy off and the second time an A-10 "moved" the guy off.

So if you have little opportunity to observe using mark 1 eyeball then you need to consider air observation from fixed wing/rotary/UAV more seriously, IMHO.

JMA
12-10-2010, 08:14 PM
I know that this is being used as role description in commonwealth countries (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/09/role-of-infantry-branch.html), but it's stupid.

"To close with and kill the enemy" is a rare mission, not the role.

You say:


"The infantry's tasks are therefore almost all of those (line-of-sight) combat missions which can better be accomplished dismounted than mounted."

Care to provide some examples?

The Canadian Infantry Battalion in Battle has the following:


ROLE

6. The role of the infantry is to close with and destroy the enemy.

7. Well armed individuals with fighting spirit and dogged determination constitute the backbone of the infantry battalion. All the rest - vehicles, stores and equipment - merely exist to assist the infantry soldier to carry out the mission. It is by determination and the skillful use of weapons and ground that the battalion succeeds in battle.

TASKS

8. The infantry battalion may be assigned the following tasks:
a. to destroy the enemy in close combat;
b. to defend a position by the holding of ground;
c. to fight as covering force troops;
d. to act as all or part of a reserve to counter-attack or block;
e. to participate in airmobile, airborne or amphibious operations;
f. to establish surveillance and conduct patrols;
g. to conduct security tasks, including rear area security; and
h. to exploit the effects of NBC weapons.

Fuchs
12-10-2010, 08:54 PM
6/8 tasks are not about that supposed "role" at all.


The "role" description for infantry in commonwealth armies is mostly about morale boost, confidence or esprit de corps-building. It's useless as doctrine.
Utterly useless.

"To close with and destroy" isn't even the point of many infantry attacks. It's 100% obviously not relevant to tactical defence (I count counter-attacks as tactical offence, yet even counter-attacks on Coy level are often more about ground than about attrition).


And then there's the problem that some write "kill" instead of "destroy" - which is even more stupid. It is often much easier and more desirable to take prisoners than to kill.

Fuchs
12-10-2010, 10:42 PM
role (rl)
n.
1. also rôle A character or part played by a performer.
2. The characteristic and expected social behavior of an individual.
3. A function or position. See Synonyms at function.
4. Linguistics The function of a word or construction, as in a sentence.
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/role


(3) seems to apply.

The described action is not THE role of the artillery. It's merely one niche activity that serves a function.

Ken White
12-11-2010, 03:20 AM
OK, progress.Where? I missed it... :D
That would tell you to clear ground from the air where possible and make maximum use of air observation and CAS on the objective, yes?Yes. If you have that support available. Not always the case.
Not sure of this but I heard that the USMC now have a 10x the helos the Brits had in Helmand. If this is so then I can't see what the problem is.Numbers prove little. The Marines also have considerably more troops there and a much heavier support package (which uses more aircraft...). Thus the aircraft : troop ratio may not be much changed. In any event, the raw number of helicopters is slightly important, when, where and how they're used is far more important...

And we do not know those things.

If:
The role of the infantry is to close with and kill the enemy.they're probably going to have to do that on foot. With or without air support.

As an aside, that described task is not the role, it is one of many tasks that Infantry perform. Saying it's the 'role' is good propaganda and psychological preparation of the Troops (some believe. The Troops don't...) but little else. That's why Armies say it's the role -- not because that's the reality today.

Air observation is handy, no question -- it also does not give the total picture of the ground from the perspective of a rifle platoon. No question CAS is helpful and solves many knotty tactical problems but it's not always available or usable. Even when available in quantity, neither of those things make much difference when two opposing ground elements close on each other.

If everyone just had your magic wand and all the answers, life and combat would be simple... :D

JMA
12-11-2010, 10:52 AM
6/8 tasks are not about that supposed "role" at all.


The "role" description for infantry in commonwealth armies is mostly about morale boost, confidence or esprit de corps-building. It's useless as doctrine.
Utterly useless.

"To close with and destroy" isn't even the point of many infantry attacks. It's 100% obviously not relevant to tactical defence (I count counter-attacks as tactical offence, yet even counter-attacks on Coy level are often more about ground than about attrition).


And then there's the problem that some write "kill" instead of "destroy" - which is even more stupid. It is often much easier and more desirable to take prisoners than to kill.

Ok, so you are telling what the role of infantry is not, now can you please tell me what you think the role of the infantry is?

Fuchs
12-11-2010, 11:08 AM
You already quoted it:
The role of the infantry in land forces (which are composed of more than only infantry) combat is to do this:


The infantry's tasks are therefore almost all of those (line-of-sight) combat missions which can better be accomplished dismounted than mounted.

It's general enough to do justice to the infantry's versatility (which is much more than only assaults) and still describes its specific relative strength and the demand for it that follows out of this relative strength.

JMA
12-11-2010, 01:15 PM
You already quoted it:
The role of the infantry in land forces (which are composed of more than only infantry) combat is to do this:

It's general enough to do justice to the infantry's versatility (which is much more than only assaults) and still describes its specific relative strength and the demand for it that follows out of this relative strength.

Not sure about that.

I accept the 'closing with and ...' does not include defensive actions.

I would therefore go with the insertion of the word primary, as in:


The primary role of the infantry is to close with and kill the enemy.

Then one can add a number of tasks which the infantry may be called upon to carry out.

Fuchs
12-11-2010, 01:48 PM
The infantry isn't primarily about offensive actions either. Your background may bias you.

Mechanised forces have superior speed, enough protection to accept a greater range of punishment by OPFOR and thus superior utility on the offence.

Infantry is more about defence than offence and that has been the case in most of history.

It has also much value beyond combat, especially exercising control and surveillance of terrain - something that even my description neglects because I focused on combat.

JMA
12-11-2010, 07:30 PM
The infantry isn't primarily about offensive actions either. Your background may bias you.

Mechanised forces have superior speed, enough protection to accept a greater range of punishment by OPFOR and thus superior utility on the offence.

Infantry is more about defence than offence and that has been the case in most of history.

It has also much value beyond combat, especially exercising control and surveillance of terrain - something that even my description neglects because I focused on combat.

All valid points but I would just go with current Brit thinking that:


INFANTRY

Roles. The Infantry’s mission is: ‘to close with and engage the enemy, in concert with other arms in all operational theatres and environments, in order to bring about his defeat’. The Infantry’s core capability is to conduct aggressive close combat in a combined arms context. All battalions, to a greater or lesser extent, and depending on the available mobility and firepower, are expected to perform the following tasks:

a. Close with and destroy the enemy.
b. Seize, control, and hold ground.
c. Breach and cross obstacles and establish bridgeheads.
d. Operations in built up areas, fighting in woods and forests (FIBUA and FIWAF).
e. Observe and patrol the battlefield especially in conditions of poor visibility and at night.
f. Destroy armoured vehicles.
g. Provide flank protection.
h. Provide integral direct and indirect fire support.
i. Protect vital installations, routes, and communication centres

I had to look this up... so thanks for prompting me into doing that.

Fuchs
12-11-2010, 09:57 PM
I could stand that, if it wasn't dumbed down to


The Infantry Mission is —
‘to defeat the enemy through close combat.’

on page 4 of the infantry company manual.

The unhealthy emphasis on close combat is about as intelligent as the French belief in some supposed 'gallic furor close combat infantry superiority' that almost defeated them themselves in 1914.

Close combat is one of the less preferable infantry actions, it's not a role - to write role descriptions with such a slant leads predictably to simplifications that kill people. The wrong people.

JMA
12-12-2010, 12:38 AM
Close combat is one of the less preferable infantry actions, it's not a role - to write role descriptions with such a slant leads predictably to simplifications that kill people. The wrong people.

Would you like to expand on that?

Fuchs
12-12-2010, 12:39 PM
Would you like to expand on that?

I see this "close in" overemphasis in a line with the 18th to 19th century faction of the pro-bayonet officers. These officers propagated that infantry is a shock force and should advance into close combat (with the bayonet) because this offensive behaviour would yield the best results. it did only so under certain conditions. The pro-bayonet extremists effectively reduced the 18th century musketeer to a 4th century BC hoplite without shield and armour - just a spear.

The pro-musket fire faction was prone to exaggerations as well; musket fire by itself rarely broke enemy ranks or killed whole battalions. It softened the enemy up, though. Especially quicker-loading musketeers such as the Prussian ones were able to quickly demoralize enemy infantry and THEN close in to turn them away.


Today's irregular infantry does not destroy or kill much even if it closes in with the enemy. A ambush/hit & fade tactic would be a much superior mantra than "close with and destroy".

Today's modern infantry has much more support than line-of-sight firepower. its small arms serve most of the time only one purpose; discourage the enemy enough to keep him from closing with you. The great support firepower can be exploited in the meantime - and the modern infantry itself can remain elusive, unseen.
Close combat is rarely desirable because casualties accumulate real quick in close combat between modern infantry forces. Send a battalion into a town or forest and soon thereafter two companies leave it. That's not sustainable. You cannot properly train your infantry quick enough to make up for such casualty rates. It was attempted very often and failed every time.

Close combat should be a niche activity, one that happens when it's being forced on you (when THEY close in or when you break out of an encirclement) or when the situation is very advantageous (demoralized OPFOR in pocket, close ambush or surprise effect available in a small & limited assault).

To tell infantry leaders that their role is to get into close combat turns high-casualty actions that happen in unfortunate conditions doctrine. That's stupid, for teaching this as doctrine means that some of the leaders will indeed seek such unfortunate actions instead of understanding that they're a mess which should usually be avoided.

Infanteer
12-12-2010, 05:56 PM
I'm tracking what you're saying Fuchs, and agree to a large extent.

The main reason "close with and destroy the enemy" sounds silly is because tanks do it too - drive towards the bad guy and shoot him. Some say only infantry hold ground; if I park a tank on a hill, am I going to be any less effective than a section of riflemen?

Your idea of "a maneuver force suited for dismounted tasks" is a good one and serves as the opposite to Armoured Forces which are "a maneuver force suited for mounted tasks". Both are combat maneuver forces in that their primary purpose is to shoot and move at the enemy in some fashion.

As well, we eventually have to "close with" the enemy to win; we just need to be smart about it and close with him after he's dead. Perhaps "destroy the enemy and close with him" is better....:D

Ken White
12-12-2010, 05:57 PM
Yes to both of ya...

JMA
12-12-2010, 09:47 PM
I'm tracking what you're saying Fuchs, and agree to a large extent.

The main reason "close with and destroy the enemy" sounds silly is because tanks do it too - drive towards the bad guy and shoot him. Some say only infantry hold ground; if I park a tank on a hill, am I going to be any less effective than a section of riflemen?

Your idea of "a maneuver force suited for dismounted tasks" is a good one and serves as the opposite to Armoured Forces which are "a maneuver force suited for mounted tasks". Both are combat maneuver forces in that their primary purpose is to shoot and move at the enemy in some fashion.

As well, we eventually have to "close with" the enemy to win; we just need to be smart about it and close with him after he's dead. Perhaps "destroy the enemy and close with him" is better....:D

You really need to study your doctrine. (should be similar to the Brits - see below)

Infantry is infantry, armour is armour they each have specific and separate roles and tasks.

Brit doctrine as follows:


Armour

4. Roles. The characteristics of armour demand that it be used aggressively if its full potential is to be exploited. Generally, it should be used in the greatest numbers possible, and employed on consecutive rather than concurrent tasks. Even in defensive operations, the tank will be used offensively to defeat an attacker. In offensive all arms operations, it will normally be armour that takes the lead in the break-in and exploitation of initial success.

The roles of armour are therefore:

a. Shock Action. Shock action is the effect of unexpected and concentrated fire on an enemy force at an unexpected place and from an unexpected direction. Armour’s ability to manoeuvre potent and protected direct fire weapons systems is of paramount importance in achieving this. The morale of the enemy is affected as much as his material well-being. Other arms contribute to shock action, but it is the primary role of armour in all phases of war.

b. Aggressive Mobile Action to Destroy Enemy Armour. The tank’s mobility, survivability, durability and flexibility combined with the firepower to destroy enemy armour accurately whilst on the move, gives it the leading role in the destruction of enemy AFVs during the advance and withdrawal at Bde level. Above this level it should be noted that increasingly armour is being supplemented by armed/attack helicopters. Tanks provide the mobile element of the anti-armour plan in defence and should be concentrated and used offensively in the support of the positional element.

c. Close Combat in Conjunction with Infantry. The presence of tanks in an infantry assault adds momentum and significantly enhances direct firepower. It is also an important factor in morale.

d. Exploitation. Increasingly in the Manoeuvrist Approach, exploitation is also considered a role in its own right rather than a task (see Paragraph 5c below).

5. Tasks. Specific tasks in conjunction with other arms are:

a. Advance in Contact. Once contact has been made with a static or mobile enemy (normally by reconnaissance), armour may be used to dislodge or destroy him. An envelopment or turning movement may negate the need for direct assault on a prepared position.

b. The Assault and Fight Through. An enemy that cannot be dislodged by fire or manoeuvred out of position must be removed by infantry assault if able to impede the successful outcome of operations. Armour will co-operate with the infantry providing supporting fire for the assault and intimate support to infantry fighting through the objective.

c. Exploitation. Once an enemy has been dislodged or is forced into a withdrawal, armour will normally be used to exploit the success by rapid follow up to prevent him regaining balance. Exploitation may develop into a pursuit when armour penetrates deep into enemy held territory, destroying his reserves, headquarters and logistic installations.

d. Ambush. An ambush involves the occupation of pre-selected, concealed fire positions before an enemy has reached the area. The purpose is to destroy enemy AFVs by bringing fire to bear on them unexpectedly, from a flank.

e. Blocking. This counter move is designed to block an enemy axis of movement, or to direct it into an area of our choosing. The destruction of the enemy is of secondary importance.

f. Counter Attack. Counter-attacks regain the initiative from an attacking enemy by attacking him in turn with reserve or echeloned forces. They will be conducted in close co-operation with infantry and artillery. Counter-attacks can be either immediate or deliberate, but in any event should be mounted before an enemy has consolidated his gains. Options will often be pre-planned to save time.

g. Sniping. Exceptionally, a few tanks may be sited in fire positions within or forward of a defended area to cause delay or attrition, or to deceive an approaching enemy

Infanteer
12-12-2010, 10:06 PM
You really need to study your doctrine.

I have, thank you.

Instead of telling me I'm wrong and simply cutting and pasting something you read on the internet, why don't you point out how I am weak in understanding doctrine.

By the way, you do realize that those 4 Roles and 7 tasks you posted as "armour's specific and separate roles and tasks" are all things that the Infantry do as well?

JMA
12-12-2010, 10:56 PM
I see this "close in" overemphasis in a line with the 18th to 19th century faction of the pro-bayonet officers. These officers propagated that infantry is a shock force and should advance into close combat (with the bayonet) because this offensive behaviour would yield the best results. it did only so under certain conditions. The pro-bayonet extremists effectively reduced the 18th century musketeer to a 4th century BC hoplite without shield and armour - just a spear.

The pro-musket fire faction was prone to exaggerations as well; musket fire by itself rarely broke enemy ranks or killed whole battalions. It softened the enemy up, though. Especially quicker-loading musketeers such as the Prussian ones were able to quickly demoralize enemy infantry and THEN close in to turn them away.


Today's irregular infantry does not destroy or kill much even if it closes in with the enemy. A ambush/hit & fade tactic would be a much superior mantra than "close with and destroy".

Today's modern infantry has much more support than line-of-sight firepower. its small arms serve most of the time only one purpose; discourage the enemy enough to keep him from closing with you. The great support firepower can be exploited in the meantime - and the modern infantry itself can remain elusive, unseen.
Close combat is rarely desirable because casualties accumulate real quick in close combat between modern infantry forces. Send a battalion into a town or forest and soon thereafter two companies leave it. That's not sustainable. You cannot properly train your infantry quick enough to make up for such casualty rates. It was attempted very often and failed every time.

Close combat should be a niche activity, one that happens when it's being forced on you (when THEY close in or when you break out of an encirclement) or when the situation is very advantageous (demoralized OPFOR in pocket, close ambush or surprise effect available in a small & limited assault).

To tell infantry leaders that their role is to get into close combat turns high-casualty actions that happen in unfortunate conditions doctrine. That's stupid, for teaching this as doctrine means that some of the leaders will indeed seek such unfortunate actions instead of understanding that they're a mess which should usually be avoided.

Are we entering the area of risk aversion here? Elsewhere we have spoken about the need for preparatory bombardment and supporting fire as part of any attack.

Having spent my time either having flown directly into battle to close with and kill the enemy or out patrolling with the intention of finding insurgents and then closing with and killing them I guess I am biased (or conditioned) to some extent.

In this I am fully aware of the risk of expending/wasting infantry on pointless assaults on defended positions without adequate prep and supporting fire. Remember too that I soldiered in an environment where we could not afford casualties but... somehow we managed to reduce the risk of casualties through good (often outstanding) ops planning (where with the right quantity and type of prep and supporting fire we were able to take on multiples of insurgents with fractions of own forces).

So really the infantry should ideally just mop up (but often there is a requirement to fight through the objective to a greater or lesser degree). It occupies the ground either to hold it or to account for insurgents/enemy and capture or destroy their war materials.

Most of the close with and kill the enemy activity is really merely minor tactics. But selecting and training the required aggressive men for this work is a massive task which means that they can never be squandered by reckless commanders. So these 1st tier infantry need to used with care and applied tactically astutely by competent commanders.

So I suggest the trick is that you avoid having to fight a losing battle by having to train up reinforcements by selecting and training the officers with care and diligence. And because your commanders will not be idiots they will understand exactly what is meant by close with and kill the enemy and when and how this should be attempted and achieved.

Elsewhere I raised the issue of old German structures catering for fewer officers at company level (sgts commanding some platoons) and also to get rid of poor performing company commanders and let the skilled commanders command 6 platoon companies.

Oh yes... and where there are crappy tasks requiring infantry troops then use 2nd tier troops (or as the Brits call them " fish and chip units").

Let me end by saying that one should never do anything that will blunt the end of your spear. When you need to close with and kill the enemy you need to be sure you have the men and units who are up to the task.

JMA
12-12-2010, 11:56 PM
I have, thank you.

Instead of telling me I'm wrong and simply cutting and pasting something you read on the internet, why don't you point out how I am weak in understanding doctrine.

By the way, you do realize that those 4 Roles and 7 tasks you posted as "armour's specific and separate roles and tasks" are all things that the Infantry do as well?

To be frank with you your original post was disjointed to the extent that a return to the basics was called for.

May I suggest that you read through the doctrine again and reassess your position on this matter.

JMA
12-13-2010, 12:40 AM
Air observation is handy, no question -- it also does not give the total picture of the ground from the perspective of a rifle platoon. No question CAS is helpful and solves many knotty tactical problems but it's not always available or usable. Even when available in quantity, neither of those things make much difference when two opposing ground elements close on each other.

Who said total picture? Air observation is a massive advantage which even the fire team should be able to use to its advantage.

Well CAS needs to be available and response times better than an hour or so. There are many circumstances when CAS may not be "usable" I accept. Where safety is the issue I learned that the more one trains with the CAS pilots (more needed if they do short tours) the closer and more accurate you or your corporals can bring in an air strike with less chance of a blue on blue. I'm just wondering how much of this training is actually done out in Afghanistan involving the troops on the ground and the actual CAS pilots?


If everyone just had your magic wand and all the answers, life and combat would be simple... :D

What I can share with you is that I have found out that in the last month or so that the "Brits" accept just about everything I have said here but they believe that for one reason or another it can't be implemented.

The one issue they are yet to accept as being a problem is the short length of tours. Give them time.

The weakness therefore is a sorry characteristic which has been identified where battalion level officers seem willing to take no for an answer. Worse still it is only once these officers leave the service that they find their voice.

The British soldier deserves better leadership. The penny is starting to drop in this regard but how does the officer corps reform itself?

JMA
12-13-2010, 07:44 AM
It goes that officers should get the facts correct, do the planning and then not take no for an answer (especially when soldiers lives are at risk.)

Infanteer
12-17-2010, 12:28 AM
JMA, here's a chew toy for you - Nimroz has been largely ignored in favor for the more populous greenspace provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.

Note the last para:

http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3805

davidbfpo
12-17-2010, 09:02 AM
Infanteer,

I posted the cited paragraph a week ago (Post No.136), I expect JMA has seen it, although it did not attract any direct response from others - especially as it came from a Marine on the ground.

SWC debates on Afghanistan often follow a logic / pattern that puzzles me.

Steve Blair
12-17-2010, 03:12 PM
SWC debates on Afghanistan often follow a logic / pattern that puzzles me.

Which is understandable, because at times both logic and pattern are missing...:wry:

Infanteer
12-17-2010, 08:05 PM
Infanteer,

I posted the cited paragraph a week ago (Post No.136), I expect JMA has seen it, although it did not attract any direct response from others - especially as it came from a Marine on the ground.

SWC debates on Afghanistan often follow a logic / pattern that puzzles me.

Damn - I owe you a pint.



Which is understandable, because at times both logic and pattern are missing...:wry:

Well, despite that, having been part of more than 1 mil/conflict forum, this ranks amongst the best.

JMA
12-18-2010, 09:58 AM
Infanteer,

I posted the cited paragraph a week ago (Post No.136), I expect JMA has seen it, although it did not attract any direct response from others - especially as it came from a Marine on the ground.

SWC debates on Afghanistan often follow a logic / pattern that puzzles me.

Yes David I did read that and was both chewing on a response and waiting to see what others would say.

I suppose the reason you posted that here was because of the following:


I ask one of my brother Marines what he would do were he given this problem to solve under the historical constraints normally faced by Marine commanders fighting a small war. He replied immediately ; Q-cars, fire force and pseudo operators. Which is exactly the same thing I would say as would all of my friends who are in the business.

I suggest that this sort of comment rises more from the frustration of current tactical approaches and RoEs in the area and the understanding of the need to adapt tactically to situation on the ground and not just carry out more of the same as in "mowing the grass" type sweep ops.

Very seldom do "brute force and ignorance" operations work against a wily and agile foe. So I interpret that as a soldier crying out to be allowed to innovate tactically so as to defeat the Taliban (if that is the mission).

The next point is that there is a perceived need to throw money at Nimroz Province (which is a very US approach). It will not take the locals long to figure out what intensity of Taliban activity is the right amount to loosen the purse strings to the maximum. And then when the money starts to flow the corruption will start in earnest and as such is almost self defeating.

Then this one:


The General sits on top of a massive military bureaucracy fighting a nasty insurgency with a coalition combat force and a dysfunctional host government. Despite this he has been able to turn his intent of getting off the FOB’s into action which is something his predecessors were unable or unwilling to do.

...and we shall all see how that works out in Helmand and especially in Sangin.

Then we learn the mission for the Nimroz Province (supposedly):


The Marines understand that the best way to accomplish reconstruction is not with large formations of combat troops and both the Governor and the other USG representatives who have surged in country with the Marines agree.

Is reconstruction the mission?

That brings me to a report of the Brit Paras activities in Nahr-e-Saraj (Helmand) from SkyTV last night. We were told that the Brit Paras (2 & 3) and 5 Scots cleared the Taliban out so that redevelopment can begin. A quote:


“The Tor Ghai community has embraced the Afghan government and is keen to receive the benefits.”

I'm sure they are and these "benefits" will come per kind favour of the US (and a little from the Brit) taxpayers. No battle for hearts and minds has been won, the locals have sold out to the highest bidder. This is a totally mercenary situation in Afghanistan... that (I must admit) is their culture.

Then he states the obvious with this gem:


We are spending billions of dollars we don’t have in order to accomplish a mission we can’t do because of self imposed constraints which do not reflect reality on the ground.

Followed by a plug for the use of "contractors" as a cost effective means of defeating the Taliban (along the lines of Executive Outcomes and I suppose Blackwater - now called Xe Services). He's right... its not going to happen no matter how much cheaper it will be.

I don't know how Free Range are operating there that they believe the Marines want to emulate them but I can assume that the Marines are frustrated at the constraints the RoEs place them under are long for the opportunity to innovate whether it is through the use of Q-cars, fire force and pseudo operators or something... anything else.

Does anyone know how Free Range are operating there... and is what they are doing degrading the Taliban?

davidbfpo
12-18-2010, 11:17 AM
JMA,

You asked:
Does anyone know how Free Range are operating there... and is what they are doing degrading the Taliban?

FRI do explain their non-military role in development work at the grass roots on their website, such as paying day labourers to clear ditches etc. Other schemes are under-way and are shown in articles. Funding appears to be a mixture of private, NGO and taxpayer funding.

Degrading? From this armchair I'd say yes. I expect the FRI day rate is not as good as the Taliban pay during the fighting season. Nevertheless providing work and development can degrade the Taliban. In the blogsite there are odd mentions of how the locals watch over them and the work of other independents, notably an EOD civilian.

JMA
12-18-2010, 04:56 PM
JMA,

You asked:

FRI do explain their non-military role in development work at the grass roots on their website, such as paying day labourers to clear ditches etc. Other schemes are under-way and are shown in articles. Funding appears to be a mixture of private, NGO and taxpayer funding.

Degrading? From this armchair I'd say yes. I expect the FRI day rate is not as good as the Taliban pay during the fighting season. Nevertheless providing work and development can degrade the Taliban. In the blogsite there are odd mentions of how the locals watch over them and the work of other independents, notably an EOD civilian.

I asked that because of the following piece:


Heavily armed internationals working in Nimroz Province will probably provoke a response by local Taliban. Lightly armed experienced international stability operations guys can work all over the province without provoking a response when they work with local shura’s, village elders and district government officials.

Bringing in heavily armed internationals may upset the delicate balance in the province rather like the Brit arrival in Sangin in 2006 did.

Then the contractors (like FRI) are obviously not upsetting any balance to the extent where the Taliban feel the need to jerk their chain.

Is Nimroz a hornets nest about to be upset or is it a low intensity area that needs a final push to rid itself of the Taliban?

My money is on the former.

davidbfpo
12-18-2010, 09:42 PM
IIRC in an earlier FRI post reference was made to a minimal Taliban presence in Nimroz Province, although some caution was needed when using private accommodation so as not to attract attention.

One recent post was:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3708 and another:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3018

MikeF
08-12-2011, 02:31 PM
Published this morning in the Journal

Securing and Holding Rural Terrain: (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/securing-and-holding-rural-territory)
Use of Pseudo Teams and Airmobile “Very-Light” Infantry Quick Reaction Forces in Rhodesia Counter-Insurgency Operations
by Timothy Bax and Steven Hatfill

JMA
08-12-2011, 05:21 PM
Published this morning in the Journal

Securing and Holding Rural Terrain: (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/securing-and-holding-rural-territory)
Use of Pseudo Teams and Airmobile “Very-Light” Infantry Quick Reaction Forces in Rhodesia Counter-Insurgency Operations
by Timothy Bax and Steven Hatfill

This is a good document and reflects accurately the Fireforce concept of my personal experience.

Infanteer
08-13-2011, 04:35 AM
An interesting article, if anything for the technical aspects. These pop-up once in a while - I have a MCG article explaining a similar approach taken by a Marine outfit in Iraq that apparently worked well. A few thoughts:

1. The article needs references. The authors are pulling out percentages of kills/contact in various conflicts and make no reference to where this information came from. How do they know that the percentages are accurate? How was the data collected? I can put up any numbers I want and say they are facts, but this doesn't make them true.

2. There is a bit of romanticism involved with the "Fireforce Concept" - let's get away from clumsy, slow patrols and have a fast-moving, roving squad that kills anything it catches. Sounds nice, but there is nothing that says "conventional COIN tactics" are any better or worse at killing insurgents; the authors don't make a case by throwing out figures with no primary sources. History certainly doesn't back this up, as Malaya isn't a communist country and Rhodesia can only be found in 30 year old atlases. To be fair, the authors do differentiate between the tactical aspects and the sociopolitical ones, but I still find it hard to take the "these are better tactics" argument at face value.

3. That being said, I found the authors did make numerous excellent points. Number 1 is that the hardest thing is cut-off. We studied and practiced cut-off before our deployment, but the difficulty in reality is something else. Having 4 "G-Cars" with 4-man sticks sitting in a FOB or roaming around the AO to be plunked out after a TIC occurs is an awesome idea.

4. The second really good point from the paper is the Pseudo-Teams as the primary method of locating insurgents. Indigineous irregular forces are the best at hunting bad-guys - the experience of the South Vietnamese PRUs is another example (and Mark Moyar's book gives the figures to back the claim). The two roadblocks in Afghanistan are the lack of a integrated efforts between the Afghan Forces (ANA, ANP, NDS) and the total barrier that exists between conventional and special operations forces. It's like two armies running two wars, and if this wasn't sorted out, the chances for blue on blue would be huge. Not saying this can't be sorted out in Afghanistan, but these two impediments need big-time political muscle to sort out if you want to employ pseudo-teams with a hunter-killer element such as a Fireforce.

5. I read somewhere, and JMA can confirm this, that the Para-dak was employed because there wasn't enough birds for G-Cars. I think putting 4-5 sticks in a CH-47 would be more flexible than trying to parachute soldiers into Afghan grapefields.

6. In a previous debate on this very thread, I questioned the appplicability of a "direct copy", such as the article suggests, of the Fireforce concept to Afghanistan. A very small, dense AO and the socio-political standing of the Afghan qala can make something like this tricky to pull off. As I said, going from Maiwand to Arghandab (covering most of the Kandahar insurgency) doesn't take long and Helmand has similar geography. Helicopters are likely to just see farmers unless they are already finding a TIC. Pursuit can be very difficult to almost impossible - I remember reading about the Koevoet (different bush war) bashing bushes and chasing spoor; you'd lose spoor pretty quickly as insurgents on the back of their bike make their way to a bazaar. As someone said previously, "context, context, context".

7. How to take elements of this? I still think the best element is the very quick airmobile cutoff. I was kicking this around in my mind the other day. 7 Birds in a bigger FOB would work (2 x Kiowa (K-Car), 4 x Utility (G-Car), 1 x Cargo (Reserve)). The key would be having a system which allowed the G-Cars to respond to TICs and employ cut-off immediately and for the Reserve to deploy, perhaps with Afghan special police, to sweep compounds once it was determined that cut-off was affected.

Anyways, my 2 cents.

jcustis
08-13-2011, 05:33 AM
Wed have to strip those Kiowa down to bare bones if we ever wanted to keep the commander aloft, and allow for a bit of armament. The power ratio of those things leave a lot to be desired, or so several pilots have told me here and there.

I dig the prospect of using them for follow-ups in constricting and complex terrain, which limits both vehicular and even dismounted movement at time. With the right tactics, we could do some harm, but again (as you remind infanteer) it's about context and the cost of the squeeze.

As you also mentioned, the cutoff is so difficult, and the insurgents often excel at ensuring their limited engagement window (in terms of both time and arc) is offset by well-planned egress routes that allow them to "gap it" either very quickly or efficiently as they blend into the background.

JMA
08-14-2011, 10:54 AM
In reply I will attempt to separate the historical Rhodesian Fire Force experience from any speculation on how or whether the concept could be adapted to Afghanistan or any other theatre.


A few thoughts:
1. The article needs references. The authors are pulling out percentages of kills/contact in various conflicts and make no reference to where this information came from. How do they know that the percentages are accurate? How was the data collected? I can put up any numbers I want and say they are facts, but this doesn't make them true.

The country no longer exists, what documentation was left behind is probably lost, what was sent out of the country is spread out all over the show and what was taken out by individuals remains in their private hands and not in the main publicly shared.

I have figures very similar from other sources (not published references) so effectively you are left with a take-it-or-leave-it option.

The source of the Brit SAS figures from Malaya, I don't know, but seem to be unchallenged by those who were there or have access to the Brit archives (other questioning is ignored).

The Rhodesian figures cited sound right to me and again have never been challenged by those in the know then (again speculative challenges are ignored). Perhaps for ease and simplicity Bax/Hatfill use the kill rate of the Jumbo Fire Force (more helicopters) as the overall average but then if they have access to the stats they could be correct. As I have it up to the end of 1976 the average kill rate was +70%. In 1977 it dropped (for a variety of reasons) to 50% or below and then from 1978 onwards with additional choppers (and other improvements) there was a steady climb up into the +80%.

I can't think of a reason why anyone 60 years old and over would want to inflate this percentage 30 years after the fact. Can you?

The data would have been available through the daily SITREPS issued from the various Bde/JOC/COMOPS sources which would include dare/time/place of contact, the originating call-sign, number of CTs contacted, Number of CTs killed/captured etc etc. I understand that a fair amount of this stuff is sitting in trunks in a military museum in the UK. (CT = communist terrorist)


2. There is a bit of romanticism involved with the "Fireforce Concept" - let's get away from clumsy, slow patrols and have a fast-moving, roving squad that kills anything it catches. Sounds nice, but there is nothing that says "conventional COIN tactics" are any better or worse at killing insurgents; the authors don't make a case by throwing out figures with no primary sources. History certainly doesn't back this up, as Malaya isn't a communist country and Rhodesia can only be found in 30 year old atlases. To be fair, the authors do differentiate between the tactical aspects and the sociopolitical ones, but I still find it hard to take the "these are better tactics" argument at face value.

How the Fire Force has been romanticised is that so few people outside a small group of Rhodesians (mainly RLI and Blue-jobs) understand what it was all about.

The Fire Force worked in conjunction with other more 'conventional' ground forces. The FF responded in support of troops in contact (firefights/ambushes/attacks/etc) and also as a result of intel relating to a confirmed presence of a group of CTs when the FF was deployed to attack this group - on the basis of the (seemingly no old-fashioned) to close with and kill the enemy.

The FF was a hugely successful tactical innovation of the Rhodesians which certainly had war winning potential (had it been correctly resourced from the early days and the government been able to fund the high cost (in comparison to normal infantry operations.))

Look at what Bax/Hatfill list as FF objectives:


Fire- Force Objectives
A deployed Fire-Force has two principle objectives:
To contain and eliminate terrorists by forcing them to retain weapons and fight, thus denying them opportunity to hide weapons, assume civilian disguise, and escape.
To deny terrorists the protective advantages of cover by thick walls, rock formations, river banks and multiple points of dispersion. This is done via ground encirclement by aggressive troops and steep-angled, heavy caliber fire from the air.
There are two secondary objectives:
1. To actively display to local tribal clans the strength of Government forces and thereby counter claims to the contrary initiated by insurgents.
2. To deter tribesmen from opting voluntarily to join the ranks of terrorists through visible successes and dead terrorist bodies.


The first two are to deny the enemy the ability to use hit-and-run tactics as the reaction to any contact will be rapid (time dependent of flying time from base or a pre-positioning location (somewhere central to the operational area and/or close to where recce troops are deployed or other troops involved in ops likely to make contact with the enemy). Important then but limited to day light as choppers had no night flying capability (1979).

The secondary objectives serve to off-set the collateral damage of a highly kinetic FF action where civilians were 'caught in the crossfire' and/or those civilians (contact men/scouts/guides/concubines/etc) who were deemed to be 'running with the CTs' got caught up in the contact.

The socio-political stuff did not come into it... and such considerations do not diminish from the success of the FF concept (as a tactical innovation).


3. That being said, I found the authors did make numerous excellent points. Number 1 is that the hardest thing is cut-off. We studied and practiced cut-off before our deployment, but the difficulty in reality is something else. Having 4 "G-Cars" with 4-man sticks sitting in a FOB or roaming around the AO to be plunked out after a TIC occurs is an awesome idea.

In the early days of FF the CTs were less aware of the importance of carefully siting their locations of temporary bases etc. Once they wised up and realised that there should be a number of different escape routes the importance of having enough G-cars to immediately close those routes (as opposed to waiting for the second wave to be lifted-in 15 min plus later) became evident. They looked towards rocky areas with caves where they could hide and escape detection or if discovered it became a major exercise to winkle them out (looking back can't for the life of me think why we did not use flame-throwers).

At ground level the appreciation of where to place cut-off groups (stop groups as we called them) is very difficult and almost impossible to deploy in time to contain the enemy within. On arrival overhead the FF commander took over and the call sign in contact normally marked its position then sat tight while the FF did the business. (This to prevent possible blue-on-blue incidents when troops unfamiliar with FF ops get involved) In addition there were always tracking teams on standby who could be flown in (not to do CSI type crap but) to get on the spoor ASAP. Follow up troops from the unit in whose area the contact took place could also be flown in and an aggressive follow-up (including leap-frogging trackers forward to cut for spoor) could be initiated by the local unit (and assisted by the FF for as long as they were in the area).


4. The second really good point from the paper is the Pseudo-Teams as the primary method of locating insurgents. Indigineous irregular forces are the best at hunting bad-guys - the experience of the South Vietnamese PRUs is another example (and Mark Moyar's book gives the figures to back the claim). The two roadblocks in Afghanistan are the lack of a integrated efforts between the Afghan Forces (ANA, ANP, NDS) and the total barrier that exists between conventional and special operations forces. It's like two armies running two wars, and if this wasn't sorted out, the chances for blue on blue would be huge. Not saying this can't be sorted out in Afghanistan, but these two impediments need big-time political muscle to sort out if you want to employ pseudo-teams with a hunter-killer element such as a Fireforce.

Use only same tribe/clan in any area (local knowledge is key) for that type of work. That's obvious.

You are 100 % correct with the latter comments.

One of the better Rhodesian FF Commanders who commanded a FF for fully the last three years of the war (on a six weeks on ops, two weeks R&R basis) has told me he believes that the FF was the end product of a philosophy that cut through the interservice rivalry, vested interests, convention, rank, petty rule books and personal agenda’s so prevalent in the behaviour of the modern military. I agree with him and believe that this aspect if not addressed would lead to the failure of any attempt to replicate a FF derivative anywhere else.


5. I read somewhere, and JMA can confirm this, that the Para-dak was employed because there wasn't enough birds for G-Cars. I think putting 4-5 sticks in a CH-47 would be more flexible than trying to parachute soldiers into Afghan grapefields.

Correct, paras were used because of a shortage of choppers and in an attempt to bring an additional 16-20 troops into the contact quicker than having to send G-cars back to fetch more or wait for the land-tail to catch up with the deployment.


6. In a previous debate on this very thread, I questioned the appplicability of a "direct copy", such as the article suggests, of the Fireforce concept to Afghanistan. A very small, dense AO and the socio-political standing of the Afghan qala can make something like this tricky to pull off.

I don't think anyone would suggest a direct copy as ground (terrain) and enemy are so different and there are many technological advances available today that were not available then.

Fuchs
08-14-2011, 11:10 AM
The whole thing differs considerably from the German approach in WW2 (Jagdkommandos).

The Germans attempted to do this in addition to guarding specific sites such as railway bridges and city centres, escorting trains, raiding known partisan locations and checking on railway lines:
# small teams (nowadays they would be called LRRP) patrolled in order to find partisans
# large platoon-sized small units (ideally led by very autonomous, unorthodox, almost undisciplined junior officers) patrolled the country for days or weeks, trying to establish contact with partisans in some advantageous way.
The small patrols would -if they found partisans- call for the large patrols as strike forces.

This was only a description of how it was meant to be close the end of the war; the actual counter-partisan effort in the East was mostly crude, employing men unsuitable for front service and utterly under-resourced.


The autonomous platoon-sized patrol evolved post-WW2 into a German-Austrian infantry tactic (Jagdkampf) for conventional warfare.

JMA
08-14-2011, 06:41 PM
Wed have to strip those Kiowa down to bare bones if we ever wanted to keep the commander aloft, and allow for a bit of armament. The power ratio of those things leave a lot to be desired, or so several pilots have told me here and there.

Consider this. The Rhodesian gunship had its 20mm cannon sticking out the left hand side.

http://a2.sphotos.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-snc6/251433_10150195990834671_570159670_7002086_6344585 _n.jpg

The FF Commander (FFC) sat on the seat forward of the cannon facing the port side. In a left hand orbit both the FFC and the gunner could observe the target area at all times (as could the pilot).

Now with the 'modern' choppers weapons firing forwards it would put the commander out of the game when a target was being engaged. Perhaps a modern FF version would place the FFC in a separate chopper which has a good loiter time and maybe a small pod of rockets to be used to indicate a target to the gunships or other aircraft. Then the gunships would be role specific and remain overhead unless one at a time leaving the area to refuel/rearm.

JMA
08-14-2011, 07:38 PM
The yanks have got it sorted already.

http://www.americanspecialops.com/images/soar/mh-6.jpg

MH-6j / AH-6j Little Bird Helicopter http://www.americanspecialops.com/images/soar/mh-6.jpg

Well a wild comment ;) without considering issues like lift capacity at altitude etc etc.

It seems that a chopper able to land 4-men on a dime getting in and out quick into a small LZ is in the US system and being used for just that task.

Seems good enough but I assume you need to dress for the weather as the chill factor sitting outside the chopper must be quite something.

Infanteer
08-14-2011, 09:08 PM
I can't think of a reason why anyone 60 years old and over would want to inflate this percentage 30 years after the fact. Can you?

I can think of a bevy of reasons. BH Liddell Hart frequently presented false or misconstrued historical data to back up his own belief on how things work. Perhaps these authors want to prove that their argument that "fireforce tactics are more effective than conventional COIN tactics".

Perhaps not - I am in no way insinuating that they made the figures up or pulled them out of thin air; perhaps they are going with "what they know", figures that were commonly accepted as fact back during the war that have persisted until know. Other common myths like the "3:1" rule persist under the same logic.

Fact is, nobody can say what it is because there is absolutely no reference at all to the Malayan or Rhodesian figures and the objective reader can't go off of the author's word only. There needs to be, at the very least, an explanation as too how such figures are derived or where they originated from.

When it comes down to it, this is an interesting piece that I enjoyed but it can only be taken as a matter of historical opinion rather than a concrete historical examination of tactics.

JMA
08-15-2011, 10:03 AM
I can think of a bevy of reasons. BH Liddell Hart frequently presented false or misconstrued historical data to back up his own belief on how things work. Perhaps these authors want to prove that their argument that "fireforce tactics are more effective than conventional COIN tactics".

The difference is though that Liddel-Hart was allegedly doing it to enhance his own personal reputation. (Like his alleged prompting of German gen
influenced by his writing) As the police would say there you have motive.


Perhaps not - I am in no way insinuating that they made the figures up or pulled them out of thin air; perhaps they are going with "what they know", figures that were commonly accepted as fact back during the war that have persisted until know. Other common myths like the "3:1" rule persist under the same logic.

For example I know that JRT Wood (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Counter-Strike-Sky-Rhodesian-Fireforce-1974-1980/dp/1920143335/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1313389236&sr=1-1) has stats from his time in RIC (Rhodesian Intelligence Corps) when he specifically studied Fire Force operations. I assume Bax has Selous Scouts stats to support his figures. So we are really at a take-it-or-leave-it situation.


Fact is, nobody can say what it is because there is absolutely no reference at all to the Malayan or Rhodesian figures and the objective reader can't go off of the author's word only. There needs to be, at the very least, an explanation as too how such figures are derived or where they originated from.

I will pass that on to the authors ;)


When it comes down to it, this is an interesting piece that I enjoyed but it can only be taken as a matter of historical opinion rather than a concrete historical examination of tactics.

I suggest that the only aspect subject to query is the claim to the 80% kill rate (and then only because the source is not a published document). For the rest the history as written by Bax/Hatfill is accurate. You can take my word for that and I could probably get 100 odd people who served to sign an affidavit to that effect. Their recommendations for the application of the FF concept in today's wars is what is open to debate (not the history).

What seems to be getting up your nose is the quote "fireforce tactics are more effective than conventional COIN tactics".

This what they said:


The conventional counter-insurgency tactics of foot patrols, ambushes, tracking, aerial reconnaissance and local interrogation/interdiction techniques have proven largely ineffective in locating and killing terrorists during past campaigns.

and this:


If the US Military is to become serious about winning the war on terror, it must abandon the shackles of past conventional tactics and become more adaptable at finding, engaging and killing an enemy that is ruthless, cunning, and fleet-footed.

As to the first comment I agree fully (from my personal experience). The productivity/reward/results/whatever from the type of operations mentioned is low. This low productivity may have become an accepted way things are but perhaps if one sat down and calculated the number of man hours used to find and kill/capture an insurgent one would find oneself on agreement with Bax/Hatfill on this. The game changer of course is good real-time intel to act upon. What percentage of these type of ops are mounted upon hard real-time intel? What could we say here... that most are speculative and based on guess work and worked around how many call-signs are available to deploy that must be deployed rather than let them sit around the base until good intel pops up.

So if a call-sign has a contact... eureka... you have found the insurgents. Now the trick is surely to do whatever you can to keep in contact with them so as to extract the maximum number of causalities. Now if there is a QRF (of some type) that can help you achieve this then surely you want to use them, yes? You need fresh troops and probably trackers to get right after them and keep the pressure on. The modern night imaging equipment allows all operations to continue through the night. Again more pressure.

The idea is surely to make contact, keep contact and extract the maximum casualties in the process, yes? Helicopters (to move troops rapidly, as gunships and as an airborne command platform) can be useful in this process.

As to the second comment it is up to the US military to respond to that.

...and from what I have heard these HVT hits are really very similar to a Fire Force action at night. They know where the bad guy is, the launch an airborne raid/attack against him/them... and they close with and kill him/them. Then they get into the aircraft and go home. Perhaps rather than try to adopt this from the 'bottom up' it is better to do like the Brits have done and attach a battalion (1 Para) to special forces and let them cut their teeth on easier targets and then expand the targets to any Taliban groups (not just HVT leadership) both day and night.

davidbfpo
08-15-2011, 11:58 AM
Just a thought on the Fire Force application in Afghanistan. What if someone is using the FF concept? Thankfully I hope that the media and others don't get the information.

Of course any FF application will be given a PPT-friendly title and no mention made of it's origin. Especially as we might just be leaving soon!:wry:

JMA
08-15-2011, 01:29 PM
Just a thought on the Fire Force application in Afghanistan. What if someone is using the FF concept? Thankfully I hope that the media and others don't get the information.

Of course any FF application will be given a PPT-friendly title and no mention made of it's origin. Especially as we might just be leaving soon!:wry:

Judging from the tenor of your post do I detect that the Fire Force has a negative connotation from the past and its origin?

davidbfpo
08-15-2011, 10:05 PM
In reply to Mark's question:
Judging from the tenor of your post do I detect that the Fire Force has a negative connotation from the past and its origin?

It might, but my emphasis would be on the "inventor" claiming the new application is all their own work! A historical concept and practice updated for the contemporary tactical situation Sir.