The New (and Old) Classics of Counterinsurgency

[Rex Brynen]

The New (and Old) Classics of Counterinsurgency (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer255/khalili.html)

Laleh Khalili

Middle East Report 255 (Summer 2010)

...


In the 1930s handbook for British imperial officers, Imperial Policing, Maj. Gen. Charles Gwynn, who had seen action in both West Africa and Sudan, writes:

When armed rebellion occurs, it presents a very different military problem from that of a deliberate small-war campaign. There is an absence of a definite objective, and the conditions are those of guerrilla warfare, in which elusive rebel bands must be hunted down and protective measures are needed to deprive them of opportunities. The admixture of rebels with a neutral or loyal element of the population adds to the difficulties of the task. Excessive severity may antagonize this element, add to the number of the rebels and leave a lasting feeling of resentment and bitterness. On the other hand, the power and resolution of the government forces must be displayed. Anything which can be interpreted as weakness encourages those who are sitting on the fence to keep on good terms with the rebels.

Gwynn distinguishes the policing role of occupying powers from conventional warfare and even from asymmetric “small wars” against irregulars, which he defines as “deliberate campaigns with a definite military objective, but undertaken with the ultimate object of establishing civil control” and in which “[no] limitations are placed on the amount of force which can be legitimately exercised, and the Army is free to employ all the weapons the nature of the terrain permits.”[1] Pitched closer to civil governance, policing occurs where the government expects to continue ruling a population after hostilities have ended and, as such, wishes to avoid antagonizing the civilians from whom nascent rebel groups can recruit members and receive logistical and moral support.

The precise calibration of lethal force advocated in Imperial Policing is embraced as the primary tactic of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine in the United States, as most clearly set out in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2006),[2] whose free Army-published online version has been downloaded by over 2 million people.[3] Since the Manual’s dissemination, which roughly coincided with the 2007 “surge” in Iraq, counterinsurgency doctrine has become a cottage industry with numerous admirers in the press corps. A key achievement of counterinsurgency doctrine, in fact, has been to bring the majority of American foreign and military affairs reporters back on board the careening bandwagon of Washington’s post-September 11 wars.

...

Also of possible SWC interest in this MER special issue on "Weapons of the Strong":


Iraq Moves Backward (http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/035028AE24BF9D81C1257742004384E7/$file/visser255.pdf)
Reidar Visser

“Culture as a Weapon System” (http://www.merip.org/mer/mer255/davis.html)
Rochelle Davis

The Problem with “Hearts and Minds” in Afghanistan
B. D. Hopkins

Drawing the Wrong Lessons from Israel’s 2006 War
Steve Niva

You'll need a print subscription to read most of the others.

[William F. Owen]

If Laleh is going to quote Gwynn, then reading the WHOLE BOOK will help.

Revolutionary movements, again, may be divided into violent and, professedly, non- violent movements. The former may be on a scale which amounts to fully organised rebellion, necessitating operations in which the Government forces employ all the ordinary methods of warfare.
and,
Before closing this chapter my non-military readers may wish me to say a little about the use of modern weapons and equipment in connection with police duties.When armed rebellion is encountered, the only limitations to their use, as I have said, are those imposed by the nature of the terrain and the characteristics of the enemy.

Gwynn was a sound thinker, and not part of the "Oprah Winfrey Way of War." I have the 1934 Edition.

Interested in some of the other articles though. One writer in particular has a reputation for mostly completely wrong, when writing on military matters. :mad:

[Dayuhan]

Gwynn was a sound thinker, and not part of the "Oprah Winfrey Way of War."

If we're going to apply Gwynn's thoughts to today's rebellions, we need to ask a question that may not have occurred to him: in any given case, do we really want to commit ourselves to oppose a rebellion?

From the perspective of a Briton of the imperial age, the need to oppose rebellion may have been self-evident. Today it is anything but. If we're going to involve ourselves in rebellions against others, the first need is to determine whether we must and whether we should. If our opposition to rebellion is based on support for a government that cannot stand without us, we're putting ourselves in a very bad position from the start.

[William F. Owen]

If we're going to apply Gwynn's thoughts to today's rebellions, we need to ask a question that may not have occurred to him: in any given case, do we really want to commit ourselves to oppose a rebellion?

From the perspective of a Briton of the imperial age, the need to oppose rebellion may have been self-evident. Today it is anything but. If we're going to involve ourselves in rebellions against others, the first need is to determine whether we must and whether we should. If our opposition to rebellion is based on support for a government that cannot stand without us, we're putting ourselves in a very bad position from the start.
I agree a 100%, but in both Iraq and A'Stan the US/NATO is suppressing armed rebellions in support of Government they put in place.

[Bob's World]

I agree a 100%, but in both Iraq and A'Stan the US/NATO is suppressing armed rebellions in support of Government they put in place.

All French, British, Belgian, Italian, German, etc "COIN" conducted in their colonies around the globe were to suppress armed rebellions in support of governments they put in place. No?

If anything, the Europeans (though obviously they all approached the mission differently) were more intellectually honest in their approach. They were there to subjugate a land and its people to their ends; to reap profits personally, corporately, and for their home nations; and didn't delude themselves so completely as America does that they are "the good guy" bringing modernity and democracy and "universal values" (as created and determined in current US culture) and rule of law to those who are currently oppressed and denied the same by their leadership, culture and/or religion.

A little objectivity would go a long way in cleaning up the policy of US approaches to such places, and in turn US strategy and tactics for managing our national interests there as well.


As I look at this, I cannot help but see the parallels with my own experience as an earnest, motivated, but hopelessly untrained and unprepared 2LT of Field Artillery making well intended, but tragic all the same, mistakes at Ranger School while a burly Ranger instructor loomed over me screaming "Ranger! Are you as F#%&*D up as you want to be??!"

There's no good answer to that question, (which even my malnourished, sleep-deprived brain could appreciate the irony of as my equally malnourished, sleep-deprived skinny frame attempted to sustain a front leaning rest position in full kit with my rifle across the backs of my hands). This is where we are today as a nation. We know we can't hold this position forever, we feel the tremors beginning to build even now. We appreciate that the question is rhetorical (ok, now I do), and that quitting is not an (acceptable) option, we can't go back, and can only go forward.

The question is simply what must we change as we go forward from here? A change of tactics is less than a half-measure. A change of Generals even less so. This is why I argue for a change of perspective. We must first change how we see ourselves, only then will be be able to achieve a clearer vision of how others see us, and in turn how we must see them. I'm optimistic, now as then, but the only guarantee is that succeed or fail, it won't be easy.

[William F. Owen]

All French, British, Belgian, Italian, German, etc "COIN" conducted in their colonies around the globe were to suppress armed rebellions in support of governments they put in place. No?
No. In terms of the Colonies functioning as colonies, the French, British, Belgian, Italian, and Germans, were the Governments. The men running India, were British, not Indian. The Government of India was the British Government. It was a joined up as you can get.

Iraq and A'Stan are VERY different. Different political dimension, so very different conflict.

[Bob's World]

no. In terms of the colonies functioning as colonies, the french, british, belgian, italian, and germans, were the governments. The men running india, were british, not indian. The government of india was the british government. It was a joined up as you can get.

Iraq and a'stan are very different. Different political dimension, so very different conflict.

This is, perhaps, a nuance that was, and is, lost on the populaces of those fair lands...

[William F. Owen]

This is, perhaps, a nuance that was, and is, lost on the populaces of those fair lands...
It's not a uniquely American problem. :eek:

[Red Rat]

This is, perhaps, a nuance that was, and is, lost on the populaces of those fair lands...

The perspective from the bottom might be the same, in looking up at an imposed government as opposed to a supported government. But from a COIN strategy point of view it meant there was one government running the show, and not one (foreign) government supporting another (indigenous) in running its show - especially when the indigenous government might have very different views of what lies in its short, medium and long term interests!

[Bob's World]

The perspective from the bottom might be the same, in looking up at an imposed government as opposed to a supported government. But from a COIN strategy point of view it meant there was one government running the show, and not one (foreign) government supporting another (indigenous) in running its show - especially when the indigenous government might have very different views of what lies in its short, medium and long term interests!

And the first question one must ask is "what is the perception of this populace as to the legitimacy of the governance over them?" Do they recognize the source? Then break that down, perhaps some (say those from the old Northern Alliance) do, but others (say those expelled or not represented by the old Northern Alliance and its US partner) do not.

This is the first issue, IMO, that must be addressed. When I look at the history of failure, it almost always begins with a failure to honestly assess and address this essential issue.

Only once this has been done does one move on to the other three critical perceptions of Justice, Respect and Hope. Of those, Hope is probably the second most important. Does this populace have a certain, legal and trusted mechanism of affecting change of governance? (Again, do THEY perceive that they have such a mechanism, not is one written about in the official brochure). If they do not perceive this to be the case, and if they perceive the other causal factors to exist, it is merely a matter of when, where, and how; not if, they act out illegally to affect change.

[wm]

And the first question one must ask is "what is the perception of this populace as to the legitimacy of the governance over them?" Do they recognize the source? Then break that down, perhaps some (say those from the old Northern Alliance) do, but others (say those expelled or not represented by the old Northern Alliance and its US partner) do not.

This is the first issue, IMO, that must be addressed. When I look at the history of failure, it almost always begins with a failure to honestly assess and address this essential issue.

Only once this has been done does one move on to the other three critical perceptions of Justice, Respect and Hope. Of those, Hope is probably the second most important. Does this populace have a certain, legal and trusted mechanism of affecting change of governance? (Again, do THEY perceive that they have such a mechanism, not is one written about in the official brochure). If they do not perceive this to be the case, and if they perceive the other causal factors to exist, it is merely a matter of when, where, and how; not if, they act out illegally to affect change.

I suspect the question that needs to be addressed is connected to the legitimacy of a government, but it is not whether the populace views the government as legitimate. Logically prior to that question is determining whether the populace sees a need (or, in other words, has a desire) to be governed. If folks don't want governance, then any form of government placed upon them will be viewed as lacking in legitimacy.

In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes noted that people in the "state of nature" are in a constant state of warre[sic]. He asserts that warre is bad and therefore people have a duty to seek peace. This duty is best (perhaps only) met by establishing a government (the Leviathan) to protect the people from each other, thereby eliminating the constant state of warre.

Bob's World seems to share this Hobbesian view that governments are necessary. I'm not so sure that the various tribes in A-Stan subscribe to it though. If one does not view Hobbes' State of warre as bad, then the rest of the argument that justifies one's surrending one's liberty to an outside governance fails. (BTW, I submit that the two other great Western myths about the origin of governance, promulgated by Locke and Rousseau, share the Hobbesian assumption that warre is a bad.)

Another point of interest: Hobbes does not really argue that a state of warre is bad. In Part I, Chapter 13 of Leviathan, he asserts that certain things--like agriculture, navigation, and the building of big buildings--do not happen while in a state of war and concludes from this that famous Hobbesian assertion "the life of man [is] solitary, poore, brutish, nasty, and short." A poor induction to say the least.

[Dayuhan]

I agree a 100%, but in both Iraq and A'Stan the US/NATO is suppressing armed rebellions in support of Government they put in place.

I've thought from the start of this current round of conflict that it was not wise to run about trying to install governments in other countries.

[jmm99]

reason to have a resident philosopher on board - :)

Besides your overall look at "legitimacy" (I won't ask you to define what I can only exemplify), I was reminded from this point:

from wm
If one does not view Hobbes' State of warre as bad, then the rest of the argument that justifies one's surrending one's liberty to an outside governance fails.

of similar points by Marc Legrange re: the South Sudan and other "poore" African places where a state of "warre" (if not allowed to get out of hand) is relatively better in-security than the state of "security" promised by a government external to the population group.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

I wonder if we shouldn't be reading the Small Wars manual and do what it says instead of all this other stuff?

1-Invade with just cause.
2-Kill anybody that opposes us until they surrender.
3-Establish a US Military Government and make them pay for it.
4-Hold an election and turn the Military government over to the people.
5-Celebrate victory and come home.

It's more honest and forthright instead of all this build them a country and they will like us stuff?!.

[jmm99]

You give its Long (5-step) BLUF. There was also a shorter one (my edit from yours):

1-Invade with just cause.
2-Kill anybody that opposes us until they surrender.
3-Celebrate victory and come home.

The shorter version (the punitive raid) was used much more often by the Corps; but the longer version (e.g, Carib islands & Cent America) was much better known cuz those interventions lasted longer.

So, the question boils down to the national command policy that drives the military (and perhaps political) intervention. Do the masters want something that can done in a a 10-day or 10-week "in and out"; or do they want something ("state building") that can only be done in 10 (or more) years ?

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

I suspect the question that needs to be addressed is connected to the legitimacy of a government, but it is not whether the populace views the government as legitimate. Logically prior to that question is determining whether the populace sees a need (or, in other words, has a desire) to be governed. If folks don't want governance, then any form of government placed upon them will be viewed as lacking in legitimacy.

In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes noted that people in the "state of nature" are in a constant state of warre[sic]. He asserts that warre is bad and therefore people have a duty to seek peace. This duty is best (perhaps only) met by establishing a government (the Leviathan) to protect the people from each other, thereby eliminating the constant state of warre.

Bob's World seems to share this Hobbesian view that governments are necessary. I'm not so sure that the various tribes in A-Stan subscribe to it though. If one does not view Hobbes' State of warre as bad, then the rest of the argument that justifies one's surrending one's liberty to an outside governance fails. (BTW, I submit that the two other great Western myths about the origin of governance, promulgated by Locke and Rousseau, share the Hobbesian assumption that warre is a bad.)

Another point of interest: Hobbes does not really argue that a state of warre is bad. In Part I, Chapter 13 of Leviathan, he asserts that certain things--like agriculture, navigation, and the building of big buildings--do not happen while in a state of war and concludes from this that famous Hobbesian assertion "the life of man [is] solitary, poore, brutish, nasty, and short." A poor induction to say the least.

(I have to confess, while I read Hobbes in the War College, I couldn't hold a 30 second conversation on what he's all about).

But I don't think that "government" is necessary, so much as I believe that "governance" is inevitable in some form. This may be very informal and tribal in nature; with little regard or care for Western concerns such as defining and defending hard borders, or having a single over-arching leader that can sign international treaties and speak for the whole.

But I also believe:

that whatever form governance takes, any form chosen by the governed is better that any form imposed upon the governed;

that when a populace perceives their governance as legitimate, they will forgive small sins, and even major ones (as TJ spoke to in the US Declaration of independence); and

that if this same populace has a trusted, certain, and legal means to shape governance they will employ it, staying away from drastic, illegal forms of changing governance unless forced to do so by that same governance; and

that the majority of the US's current challenges around the world with what we (inacurately, IMO) call "wars" in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the entire phenom of "Global Terror" are in fact related directly to the US taking policy positions that intercede in the "legitimacy of governance process" of many populaces around the world as we work to establish, promote, and protect governments that are willing to subjugate themselves to US interests over the interests of their own populaces (typically while serving the personal interests of a handful of elites at the same time); and then also turn a blind eye to the elimination of the processes of Hope because, while we know we wouldn't want that in America, its ok elsewhere so long as it increases the likelihood of our friendly government staying in power.


This really is not rocket science. In the most simple terms we just need to be a little less cavalier about how we go about serving our national interests around the globe. By accepting a little more risk in terms of having to continualy deal with new leaders and governments (just like the entire globe has to do with the US, btw), and getting out of the business of thwarting Popular Sovereignty and propping up of dictators who have lost their local legitimacy, we win.

[slapout9]

You give its Long (5-step) BLUF. There was also a shorter one (my edit from yours):

1-Invade with just cause.
2-Kill anybody that opposes us until they surrender.
3-Celebrate victory and come home.

The shorter version (the punitive raid) was used much more often by the Corps; but the longer version (e.g, Carib islands & Cent America) was much better known cuz those interventions lasted longer.

So, the question boils down to the national command policy that drives the military (and perhaps political) intervention. Do the masters want something that can done in a a 10-day or 10-week "in and out"; or do they want something ("state building") that can only be done in 10 (or more) years ?

Regards

Mike

That will work just fine;)

[wm]

I was reminded . . .of similar points by Marc Legrange re: the South Sudan and other "poore" African places where a state of "warre" (if not allowed to get out of hand) is relatively better in-security than the state of "security" promised by a government external to the population group.

Regards

Mike

Could not have said it better. I think that Chinese might have a similar view as they emerged from the "Warring States" period (or the much more modern struggle between Mao and Chiang).

[jmm99]

Mao wrote two early pieces that reference the Qin and Han of the end of the "Warring States" period.

Mao on Legalism and Lord Shang - How Shang Yang established confidence by the moving of a pole (http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/China/Mao%20on%20Shang%20Yang.htm) (1912)

Laws and regulations are instruments for procuring happiness. If the laws and regulations are good, the happiness of our people will certainly be great. Our people fear only that the laws and regulations will not be promulgated, or that, if promulgated, they will not be effective. It is essential that every effort be devoted to the task of guaranteeing and upholding such laws, never ceasing until the objective of perfection is obtained. The government and the people are mutually dependent and interconnected, so how can there be any reason for distrust? On the other hand, if the laws and regulations are not good, then not only will there be no happiness to speak of, but there will also be a threat of harm, and our people should exert their utmost efforts to obstruct such laws and regulations. Even though you want us to have confidence, why should we have confidence? But how can one explain the fact that Shang Yang encountered the opposition of so large a proportion of the people of Qin?

The bolded sentence may be the germ of Mao's "from the people, back to the people" concept. The final question may have caused him to think less highly of Qin Legalism and more highly of Han Syncretism in the 1919 piece.

To the Glory of the Hans (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_03.htm) (1919)

It is not that basically we have no strength; the source of our impotence lies in our lack of practice. For thousands of years the Chinese people of several hundred millions have all led a life of slaves. Only one person - the 'emperor'- was not a slave, or rather one could say that even he was the slave of 'heaven'. When the emperor was in control of everything, we were given no opportunity for practice.

We must act energetically to carry out the great union of the popular masses, which will not brook a moment's delay. . . our Chinese people possesses great intrinsic energy. The more profound the oppression, the greater its resistance; that which has accumulated for a long time will surely burst forth quickly. The great union of the Chinese people must be achieved Gentlemen! We must all exert ourselves, we must all advance with the utmost strength. Our golden age, our age of brightness and splendour lies ahead!

So, Mao's early thoughts appear to support your theory:

I think that Chinese might have a similar view as they emerged from the "Warring States" period (or the much more modern struggle between Mao and Chiang).
Regards

Mike

[wm]

Mao wrote two early pieces that reference the Qin and Han of the end of the "Warring States" period.

Mao on Legalism and Lord Shang - How Shang Yang established confidence by the moving of a pole (http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/China/Mao%20on%20Shang%20Yang.htm) (1912)



The bolded sentence may be the germ of Mao's "from the people, back to the people" concept. The final question may have caused him to think less highly of Qin Legalism and more highly of Han Syncretism in the 1919 piece.

To the Glory of the Hans (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_03.htm) (1919)



So, Mao's early thoughts appear to support your theory:


Regards

Mike

Mike,

Nice pairs of quotations from the Chairman. Just shows to go you, the more things change, the more they stay the same.

As I recall the writings of Lord Shang, he was an early Chinerse equivalent of Hobbes--believed that people were basically bad and that they needed a government to keep them in line. That thread runs throughout the Legalist School of China, IIRC. The Legalists took the view, from Hsun Tzu, that people are basically bad and mixed in the principles of utilitarianism taught by Mo Tzu. This synthesis yielded the view that, to maximize happiness (true happiness, not selfish,egoistic hapiness), one must force people to act in certain ways through the stern hand of government. No wonder that Mao drew a teaching point from a Legalist. Stalin probably would have as well, had the Russians had an equivalent to the Chinese Legalist Philosphers.

[Backwards Observer]

...one must force people to act in certain ways through the stern hand of government.

As I learned growing up in a Hakka Chinese family concerning the carrot and the stick; one gets hit just as hard with the carrot. Usually harder, just so one doesn't get any funny ideas.