View Full Version : Fire with Fire
IVIaedhros
07-10-2010, 11:44 PM
Summary: Our organization and doctrine plays into the enemy's hands. We can counter this by creating a force patterned after classical eastern forces, while still retaining many of our greatest advantages.
***First of all, let me give a general disclaimer: while in the infantry, I am still only a newly minted 2LT with no prior service, waiting to go to Ranger School. I make no claims to being anything close to an expert. Now that that's out of the way...
It seems to me that, despite the fact that we routinely come out on top of direct engagements, we're playing into the enemy's game so far as kinetic operations are concerned. Simply put, the experienced insurgent's strategy and tactics put him at an inherent advantage to our classically western forces.
The Afghan's follow the general eastern model that's been around for thousands of years. This assumes you're outnumbered, you strike where it's advantageous, operate mostly at the small level, etc. Their TTP's and "unit" organization are geared towards the small unit fight, especially in regards towards the ambush and the defense. Their "unit" organization and training (almost all command power with TL/SL equivalents, doesn't train rigid battle drills, but most successful TTP's), etc. allow them to adapt the fastest when adaptation is key. In a straight fight, they have an immense advantage in maneuverability due to a lighter load.
Our doctrine creates a large, concentrated force (especially with vehicles) that's easy to spot and hit (though admittedly very difficult to destroy), his heavily dependent on supporting fires and thus severely handicapped in fulfilling the light infantryman's job of closing with destroying the enemy. This creates several problems:
*We spend a massive amount of money to achieve relatively little effect, thus giving an already reluctant nation further incentive to back out
*We are more likely to cause civilian casualties
*It is much harder for us to fully pursue/destroy the enemy and hold the rugged terrain in which he operates.
The solution I propose is to create an eastern style kinetic force. Note that this is not SF. It is a bridge, of sorts. The ultimate goal would be a brigade size element that is capable of successfully conducting sustained ground combat operations in the squad/fire team level. While they could indeed engage in local training operations or SF/Ranger style raids, their primary task would be to act as hunter/killers in order to successfully clear and hold terrain.
How To Raise the Force
1) Appoint an officer with a minimum rank of COL as CO. Should have a track record of thinking outside the box and good coordinator/trainer IE he knows how to teach. Primary task is to get necessary support from chain of command.
2) Recruit enough seasoned NCO's and field grade officers to make a platoon or at least a section. Guys from NTC/JRTC would be very useful here since they are already trained to act as the insurgents.
3) Using studies of current and past insurgent TTP's, wargame and refine the force at home, then deploy it for 4-9months to get the kinks out.
4) Return home. The previous members of the platoon now become trainers. Recruit lower level enlisted (PFC-Sergeant) who have either qualified Ranger or have had some combat experience. The rational for not going only for more experienced men is twofold. First, it would be too great a draw on other units. Second, these men are basically going into a new MOS, like 11B to 11C or 11X. They've proven themselves enough to be relied on, but they still need to be sponges to adapt rapidly. People might argue that they're not mature enough, but the insurgents regularly use very young men with basically no combat experience and turn them into experts. Granted, their life expectancy is horrid and they've most likely grown up in harsh 3rd world conditions. This is countered by the recruit's prior training/experience and by the superior training he will receive through the returned senior NCO's and officers. Recruiting should not be difficult. Just say: it's hard, no one's done it before, and you get to wear civies+grow out your hair in the field SF style. Sold, hook, line and sinker.
Tactics
*Basically the same as the insurgents, except they're not going to be terrorizing or really interacting with the populace any more than a normal infantry platoon. That would require more maturity and experience than we can give and is already being filled by other organizations.
*Conducts continuous, small unit actions and patrols in an AO where they can become very familiar with the terrain.
*Is entirely on foot. Avoids the roads and towns.
*Heavy emphasis on marksmanship
*Civilian clothes and haircuts to help blend in from a distance.
Potential Problems & Solutions
*Supply: traditionally such forces have relied upon the populace. This will be solved through the use of caches, distributed from a central FOB or aerially dropped.
*Not Enough Firepower: I disagree. This force will be trained and mobile in feigned and tactical retreat to not be overwhelmed. Also, the insurgents manage to hold their own against us. Why cannot we do better with our training and technology?
*Maturity of Soldiers: Again, I believe that, if the insurgents can do it, so can we. Initially, success will totally hinge upon careful selection. However, as the training process improves and the unit gains more experience, the implementation should become no more difficult than Ranger Bat or SF.
Well, that's a rough summary of the ideas I've got bouncing around. Anyone got anything to add, critiques, etc. I'd love to hear some thoughts on how this could be done better or why it can't be done at all.
Rifleman
07-11-2010, 12:03 AM
It sounds like you are advocating a form of distributed or de-centralized squad and platoon ops, except that you want to raise another unit to do it instead of training and using existing assets.
Maybe that's a good idea and may be it isn't. But it seems like both the SOF and conventional infantry communities will be screaming about using manpower that they need.
I'm going out on a limb here but.....if this idea has merit maybe it should be a PMC operating with more oversight from the military or intelligence community than companies like Blackwater have had up until now?
IntelTrooper
07-11-2010, 12:14 AM
You may be interested in this book:
CAP Mot: The Story of a Marine Special Forces Unit in Vietnam, 1968-1969 (http://www.amazon.com/CAP-Mot-Special-1968-1969-Southwest/dp/1574410040/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1278807006&sr=8-1)
Xenophon
07-11-2010, 12:38 AM
It seems to me that, despite the fact that we routinely come out on top of direct engagements, we're playing into the enemy's game so far as kinetic operations are concerned. Simply put, the experienced insurgent's strategy and tactics put him at an inherent advantage to our classically western forces.
Absolutely correct.
Our doctrine creates a large, concentrated force (especially with vehicles) that's easy to spot and hit (though admittedly very difficult to destroy), his heavily dependent on supporting fires and thus severely handicapped in fulfilling the light infantryman's job of closing with destroying the enemy. This creates several problems:
*We spend a massive amount of money to achieve relatively little effect, thus giving an already reluctant nation further incentive to back out
*We are more likely to cause civilian casualties
*It is much harder for us to fully pursue/destroy the enemy and hold the rugged terrain in which he operates.
The solution I propose is to create an eastern style kinetic force.
Also correct. However, I would submit that we CAN'T create an "eastern" style force due to the simple fact that we are not eastern. Militaries reflect the culture from which they arise. Our military reflects our culture, theirs reflects theirs. We can learn their lesson, but we can't be them.
Two things about your proposed force. One good thing, one bad thing.
The good thing: It's a fantastic idea. We need a force like that.
The bad thing: You're almost 235 years too late. You have heard of the Marine Corps, right? That's exactly how we're supposed to be operating, and have operated in the past. Lately, we've just forgotten it.
Ken White
07-11-2010, 02:05 AM
I'm the Official Rainer Upon Parades... :o
However, good news -- the forecast is for only light and scattered showers. As Xenophon said, you have a great idea. Not only the Marines but the Army used to operate in that mode. We all forgot how in the relentless pursuit of safety and mediocrity...
I see some problems with your good idea. Cued to "How to raise the force:"
(1) Get a LTC. COLs are the guardians of the Institution that is the Army. Most -- not all -- are able to think outside the box but know better than to do it out loud. LTCs will throw over the traces now and then.
(2) Good on the size but don't get OCs (they may act as insurgents but it's scripted...). Get people from the 10th, 82d and 101st -- they're used to operating on foot. Why Field Grades? Makes no sense. I understand the Cadre aspect but many -- not all -- Field Grades will believe your effort is beneath their dignity. Cap your NCOs at SFC / PSG. There are MSGs and above that can and would do that but HRC will not let you pick and choose, they will force you to take what the pipeline offers, period. With SFCs and below, you've got a larger population and more flexibility. HRC might be told by someone at Vice Chief level or higher to especially man your unit on a trail basis but when that Godfather leaves, you'll be forced to revert to the pipeline for fills. I've seen almost a dozen 'special' fill units over the years -- only two or three have lasted more than two fill cycles (and they are constantly under threat). Makes HRC's job harder...
(3) Good idea.
(4) Why Rangers? Ranger school graduates prove they can tough out things and survive mind games, be good M240 gunners and not a lot more. Combat experience is good -- provided it's mostly Infantry experience (that foot mobile thing again...). You're right on the age aspect. You want motivated folks regardless of 'qualifications.' Those are often a promise that goes unfulfilled. Motivated people OTOH will keep going. You can train most anyone who's motivated -- sometimes it is impossible to motivate the most highly trained or qualified individuals...
Your Tactics are okay. Careful with the civilian clothes bit, you might have a PR problem there and it's not really necessary. Caches will work. Firepower is adequate. Maturity is vastly overrated as a direct combat attribute. For SF and some jobs / units it has merit, for what you propose, combat go-getters, not so much. The immortality of 19-20 year olds is a better combat multiplier than the maturity of old married guys who want to go home to Momma.
What you have suggested is what ALL the maneuver battalions should be doing.
They are precluded from doing that due to excessive concern for casualties (all types, both sides), inadequate number of Troops for the area to be covered (hence the excessive use of vehicles in a typical US Army effort to substitute 'technology' for training and manpower), Marginally trained elements that knowledgeable commanders are afraid to trust out on their own. Plus a lot of other little things along that line. Most have some validity but are overdone due to excessive caution. Essentially, the ability to train and do what you suggest and I have written here and to do those things reasonably well exists in every BCT in the Army -- so the capability is there. The will to do it is an entirely different issue. :rolleyes:
That's the sort of thing maneuver units were doing in Viet Nam for the first couple of years, after that, excessive caution took over. After Viet Nam, those really elementary skills you cite that should be prevalent in any decent Infantry Battalion -- any competent Infantryman -- migrated, in the US Army, to the Special Warfare community (it's a long, sad and not pretty story :( ) and, as Xenophon said, we forgot how to what we get paid to do...
Good thinking. Don't stop! ;)
William F. Owen
07-11-2010, 04:42 AM
The solution I propose is to create an eastern style kinetic force. Note that this is not SF. It is a bridge, of sorts. The ultimate goal would be a brigade size element that is capable of successfully conducting sustained ground combat operations in the squad/fire team level. While they could indeed engage in local training operations or SF/Ranger style raids, their primary task would be to act as hunter/killers in order to successfully clear and hold terrain.
More rain, and the devil in the detail.
What is this "Eastern Style?" ...and has it ever worked? Also I am very wary of operating at the squad/fire team level. Why? It creates no benefit - that I can see.
Infanteer
07-11-2010, 07:05 AM
Well, where to start. I won't be as gentle as Ken or Wilf:
Summary: Our organization and doctrine plays into the enemy's hands. We can counter this by creating a force patterned after classical eastern forces, while still retaining many of our greatest advantages.
An "Eastern Force"? Sounds like a bit of the H John Poole kool-aid. Victor Davis Hanson tried to run with the "meta-cultural conflict" ball and, as far as I am concerned, it was debunked by John Lynn. I had a run at this with a fellow I worked with - the Afghan and his "Eastern Way of Warfare", drawing obscure links between Pashtun irregulars and Sun Tzu. Sorry, but the Pathan has more in common with the Scottish Highlander than with the People's Liberation Army.
Simply put, the experienced insurgent's strategy and tactics put him at an inherent advantage to our classically western forces.
The Afghan's follow the general eastern model that's been around for thousands of years. This assumes you're outnumbered, you strike where it's advantageous, operate mostly at the small level, etc. Their TTP's and "unit" organization are geared towards the small unit fight, especially in regards towards the ambush and the defense. Their "unit" organization and training (almost all command power with TL/SL equivalents, doesn't train rigid battle drills, but most successful TTP's), etc. allow them to adapt the fastest when adaptation is key. In a straight fight, they have an immense advantage in maneuverability due to a lighter load.
I think you're buying a little too much into the Quetta Shura's press releases. Afghan insurgents really are ####ty tactical fighters. They have three things going for them - they know their turf, their determined and they know kill zones. Other than that, I wouldn't put them on such a lofty "small unit fighter" plane as you do. They tend to die fast and hard if they haven't beat a hasty retreat once the initial surprise comes to an end.
Our doctrine creates a large, concentrated force (especially with vehicles) that's easy to spot and hit (though admittedly very difficult to destroy), his heavily dependent on supporting fires and thus severely handicapped in fulfilling the light infantryman's job of closing with destroying the enemy. This creates several problems:
*We spend a massive amount of money to achieve relatively little effect, thus giving an already reluctant nation further incentive to back out
*We are more likely to cause civilian casualties
*It is much harder for us to fully pursue/destroy the enemy and hold the rugged terrain in which he operates.
I agree that "close with and destroy" sometimes gets turned into "standoff and pummel (even if he's not there)", but that is another issue.
The solution I propose is to create an eastern style kinetic force. Note that this is not SF. It is a bridge, of sorts. The ultimate goal would be a brigade size element that is capable of successfully conducting sustained ground combat operations in the squad/fire team level. While they could indeed engage in local training operations or SF/Ranger style raids, their primary task would be to act as hunter/killers in order to successfully clear and hold terrain.
Sounds like patrolling - who's to say the Infantry don't (or can't) do this now?
Guys from NTC/JRTC would be very useful here since they are already trained to act as the insurgents.
Tsk, tsk - your forgetting your Galula. Read page 51 (PSI edition).
People might argue that they're not mature enough, but the insurgents regularly use very young men with basically no combat experience and turn them into experts.
Expert? You mean like the guy whos limbs we fished out of the tree when he tried (and failed) to put the IED on one of our routes or the guys who fired RPGs 25 feet over my section's heads, getting the attention of the gunner and a nearby Apache. Again, I think you give too much to the Afghan insurgent's tactical prowess.
*Conducts continuous, small unit actions and patrols in an AO where they can become very familiar with the terrain.
Who's to say this isn't being done. I know my Platoon conducted 125+ patrols that match this description.
*Is entirely on foot.
See above.
Avoids the roads and towns.
Why - that's where the insurgents are. What would your hunter/killer force do; roam around the desert and chit chat with the odd Kuchi on a camel?
*Heavy emphasis on marksmanship
Agreed, but finding someone once they've shot at you is very hard in this area.
*Civilian clothes and haircuts to help blend in from a distance.
Careful with this one. Your force is liable to get shot up by the closest ANSF patrol. As well, local garb and a beard don't fool the locals for too long. Read the assessment of the first CIA officer in country (I can't remember the book name) - people kept figuring him for an Arab due to his foreign mannerisms and local dress. Little things like how you take a piss give you away from a mile - seriously.
*Supply: traditionally such forces have relied upon the populace. This will be solved through the use of caches, distributed from a central FOB or aerially dropped.
Who needs caches and air drops - just give them money. I know I used money to "stimulate the local economy" and offer up a fresh alternative to rations (ANA goat and rice - yum). Be careful with water - some of the stuff is so bad that even after run through some sort of filtration, guys still go down; some of the bugs in Afghanistan are permanent.
Caches will be found and plundered. Careful with air drops - a fellow Pl Comd had his air drop land on the insurgent compound a bit down the road from his COP.
*Not Enough Firepower: I disagree. This force will be trained and mobile in feigned and tactical retreat to not be overwhelmed. Also, the insurgents manage to hold their own against us. Why cannot we do better with our training and technology?
If your unit can throw its weapons in the field and blend in with the locals, then I guess you can do it. How you could expect this to happen is beyond me.
Well, that's a rough summary of the ideas I've got bouncing around. Anyone got anything to add, critiques, etc. I'd love to hear some thoughts on how this could be done better or why it can't be done at all.
Nice presentation with smooth flow, but I don't buy any of the assumptions you've based your proposal on. Have fun on Ranger Course though!
jcustis
07-11-2010, 07:53 AM
You've got the right passion to try to identify the problems and drive solutions, so good on you for invigorating us old coots.
The longstanding issue with your recommendations is that the US military has some pretty heavy baggage it would need to drop in order to implement much of what you mention.
A degree if the other functions you have addressed comes from Asymmetric Warfar Group and their assessment/training/employment methodology.
As Ken said, keep thinking and never settle for the status quo.
GI Zhou
07-11-2010, 07:56 AM
Which 'eastern style armies' are you looking at? The ones I study are all Western style armies, and the others are following suit after following Soviet style tactics and TO&Es.
Fuchs
07-11-2010, 08:26 AM
Well, if this "Eastern"/Western thing comes from Poole, then I've got a few words to say about this smoke grenade.
Overall, it reminds me a lot of German tactics against Soviet partisans. Specifically the early Jagdkommando tactic.
Actually, it's pretty much the same.
IVIaedhros
07-11-2010, 04:17 PM
Wow, actual replies, and very thoughtful ones. I certainly wasn't expecting that...thanks to everyone, whether you disagreed or not, for the insightful input. I'll go ahead and just address Infanteer's strikes, since they all at least sound spot on to my untrained ear and he echoes almost everyone else.
An "Eastern Force"? Sounds like a bit of the H John Poole kool-aid. Victor Davis Hanson tried...but the Pathan has more in common with the Scottish Highlander than with the People's Liberation Army.
Hehe, always good to see I'm not the only avid reader and, in this case, I'm probably going to have to say that I jumped the gun early. Yes, reading Poole (Tactics of the Crescent Moon, to be specific) was a big influence in this since he painted such a grim picture, but offered little in the way of what I saw as true solutions. I wanted to see if I could think up at least the semblance of a practical response to this and other issues that have been raised.
From reading Poole and others, I define "Eastern Force" in this case as
*Operates in very small, independent cells with the same intent
*Does not depend on vehicles or non-organic supporting fires and is very light weight (EX: has kevlar vest like cops, not IBA variants)
*Stays out in terrain (I acknowledge that avoiding towns is probably very foolish) and relies heavily on ambush
My main thought is that this force is to be used to deny enemy access to the backcountry and be able to more effectively shut down their suspected ratlines and areas of travel. For example, we know they like to ambush a lot along a certain road. Well, a conventional infantry unit wouldn't be able to deny the insurgents the same amount of area as this one would simply because it would be more dispersed.
I think you're buying a little too much into the Quetta Shura's press releases. Afghan insurgents really are ####ty tactical fighters. They have three things going for them - they know their turf, their determined and they know kill zones. Other than that, I wouldn't put them on such a lofty "small unit fighter" plane as you do. They tend to die fast and hard if they haven't beat a hasty retreat once the initial surprise comes to an end.
Likely enough, I say, however, many more people than Poole acknowledge that the best of the insurgents are excellent tactical fighters. The thing is, unlike us, they're not all coming from the school house and don't have the luxury of NCO mentors. I believe that, in terms of "doctrine" (if you can really call it that), they're operating methods are superior, at least for certain situations.
On the patrolling comment: it is patrolling, I think I even said it was at some point. The difference is there would be even more emphasis on avoiding built up FOB's and the like + you break up the action down even further so that fire to buddy teams are the primary fighters, not squad and platoon level.
On marksmanship and loosing the enemy: very true I imagine. I like that that there is an increased emphasis in getting squad designated marksmen (I think that's the proper name...). I'd then add that we should properly outfit this hypothetical unit with more distance oriented weapons than the standard M4's or at least make excellent scopes the rule...no idea if ya'll have already been doing this in-country.
On uniforms: good points by all. My original was, at least, in the backcountry you wouldn't be operating with friendly fire risks. And while it's only a superficial veneer, I thought that it could at least fool the casual glance.
Who needs caches and air drops - just give them money.
Excellent points on the weaknesses of the cache. I do think it's still a viable method, but I no longer believe it can be a primary one. From what I've heard from a recent newsletter, using our money to "stimulate" the local economy works well so that's definitely a viable option.
If your unit can throw its weapons in the field and blend in with the locals, then I guess you can do it. How you could expect this to happen is beyond me.
Obviously throwing weapons isn't going to fly. However, as you pointed out, it's very easy to loose people in the terrain so trying to blend into the local population is necessary, nor would I expect us to be able to. Instead, I would either make the common to tactic to be a baited ambush where you retreat into a fire sack of some sort or you go back to your neighborhood conventional unit or you simply fade into the terrain.
Nice presentation with smooth flow, but I don't buy any of the assumptions you've based your proposal on. Have fun on Ranger Course though!
Hehe, well at least I know I'll be able to wow the fobbits with my PowerPoint. Not sure how much "fun" is possible to be had in Ranger School, but I'm definitely anxious to begin.
Again, thanks to everyone for the helpful comments. I had no idea about the old Marine Corp and Army operating methods so I'll definitely be checking those links out.
IVIaedhros
07-11-2010, 04:26 PM
Well, if this "Eastern"/Western thing comes from Poole, then I've got a few words to say about this smoke grenade.
Overall, it reminds me a lot of German tactics against Soviet partisans. Specifically the early Jagdkommando tactic.
Actually, it's pretty much the same.
I'd definitely want to hear more then. Also, you're going to have to fill me in on the Jagdkommando's, as a quick google search reveals only that they're similar in concept to our (the USA's) SF teams, which is horribly broad b/c they mean SF as a whole and not just the Green Berets.
IVIaedhros
07-11-2010, 04:27 PM
Also, this would be distinct from any SF that I know of simply because it'll be using more men and it's not relying so heavily on extremely experienced NCO's to provide the bulk of the manpower.
jmm99
07-11-2010, 07:13 PM
from IVI
While they could indeed engage in local training operations or SF/Ranger style raids, their primary task would be to act as hunter/killers in order to successfully clear and hold terrain.
self-conflicting ?
It would seem that the emphasis for hunter/killers would be to "clear" enemy personnel (esp. military and political cadre infrastructure), and "hold" local population groups ("holding" in the sense of exercising indirect control via popular mobilization). Holding terrain seems contrary to your basic concept.
You may find the discussion in this thread, Is it time for psuedo operations in A-Stan?... (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7332&highlight=pseudo) (started by who else than Jon Custis), useful in developing your hunter/killer concept (whether "Eastern", "Western" or whatever works in the end).
Be forewarned that when you get into unconventional direct action operations, the legal intensity increases. So, you had best plan on learning some applicable operational law along the way. There are legal pitfalls in these operations (and what clothes you wear is only one of them). A risk-averse SJA will kill your plan in a hurry.
Regards
Mike
Fuchs
07-11-2010, 07:23 PM
I sent a PM about Poole.
About Jagdkommandos:
The German army had a successful recipe against Eastern European partisans, but it usually lacked the right (young) men for it.
The concept included area sweeps (such as 3 divisions sweeping a 30x50km area, with all men in units of less than 80 men each (combat troops and support troops) if the area was too infested with partisans. No heavy weapons (apparently not even 81mm mortars).
The more regular concept for average partisan problems included - besides security troops for infrastructure protection - two components:
1) Patrols on horse or off-road vehicles
2) Jagdkommandos
The latter were meant to be 40-60 men strong and supposed to live, hunt, ambush, recce and destroy the enemy like partisans.
The leaders had to meet special requirements. The most successful ones were so-called "outsiders", soldiers whose personnel files included remarks such as "difficult subordinate".
The focus wasn't on combined arms, but on "nature people" instinct - preferred were apparently civilian hunters, forest workers and such.
The equipment was limited to (assault) rifles, submachineguns, hand grenades, food for several days, backpacks. Machine guns and mortars were usually not necessary. Light radios and recce riders were the means of communication.
The patrols (Jagdstreife) were meant to find the enemy, then the hunting teams (Jagdkommando) were supposed to intercept the hostiles and ambush them.
The effect was that their combined employment took away the freedom of action from partisans and turn them into hunted ones.
This all is from one book published in the mid-50's by an ex-officer (with help of others) who was responsible for German Army tactical lessons learned in the general staff (OKH); Eike Middeldorf.
The problem with this Jagdkommando concept was of course that suitable personnel was short in '42-'45 even in front-line units, and rear area security units were typically manned with old (35+ years) or foreign soldiers, often with captured equipment.
The only infantry divisions available for sweeps were typically second-rate allied divisions.
Summary: Our organization and doctrine plays into the enemy's hands. We can counter this by creating a force patterned after classical eastern forces, while still retaining many of our greatest advantages.
If you read the replies below you will note that some people fear change and new ideas more than they fear the Taliban. So be careful of using words which can be used as a means of distracting from the real meaning behind your post. This being the use of "eastern". Think of another more generic name to describe your concept.
***First of all, let me give a general disclaimer: while in the infantry, I am still only a newly minted 2LT with no prior service, waiting to go to Ranger School. I make no claims to being anything close to an expert. Now that that's out of the way...
A lot of us here were a 2LT at some point in time. Some just went with the flow while others put their hand up. I see a lot of myself (35 years ago) in your post and am happy to see there are still thinking 2LTs out there. For heavens sake don't let anyone pee on your battery.
Looking back at me at your stage I would say I needed to learn to sell my ideas better (they call it marketing these days). So learn from the responses both positive and negative and maybe even rewrite your piece to maintain your essential idea but deal with the questions and negatives so as to close those doors.
Now here is the killer. If you couldn't be bothered to rewrite and refine your idea then you have a problem. Anyone can throw bright ideas into the air and then walk away. If you are serious you will realise this piece of yours is merely version 0.1 of a number of versions to come. So take your piece you posted here and save it somewhere under FireWithFireV0.1. The journey has begun.
And remember too that 2LTs don't make the massive changes, they merely provide the spark that lights the fire. So this is only your first idea (of many to come) at the beginning of a long career so accept that some LtCol, Maj, Capt may actually run with this idea and just be happy that you were the spark.
It seems to me that, despite the fact that we routinely come out on top of direct engagements, we're playing into the enemy's game so far as kinetic operations are concerned. Simply put, the experienced insurgent's strategy and tactics put him at an inherent advantage to our classically western forces.
They are only at an advantage because we rotate troops through at a speed too rapid to allow them to understand METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available—Time available, Civilians) and thereby don't become ruthlessly efficient in killing the enemy.
The rotation issue and the use of semi-permanent troops has been discussed before here and it near frightened most of the contributors here to death. PTSD they screamed, burn-out etc etc. 101 reasons why the same failed rotation systems needed to be maintained. You will face the same response from many quarters. Be prepared for that.
The bottom line is that you either flood the battle field with your own troops at a ratio of 100:1 or you start to think and act smart.
I suggest that what is needed is to seize the initiative away from the Taliban and to achieve that the restrictions placed on ISAF forces need to be removed to set the military free. At the moment operations seem to be planned more on what they are not allowed to do than what options are available to be used. Its a desperate situation. You have identified it.
The Afghan's follow the general eastern model that's been around for thousands of years. This assumes you're outnumbered, you strike where it's advantageous, operate mostly at the small level, etc. Their TTP's and "unit" organization are geared towards the small unit fight, especially in regards towards the ambush and the defense. Their "unit" organization and training (almost all command power with TL/SL equivalents, doesn't train rigid battle drills, but most successful TTP's), etc. allow them to adapt the fastest when adaptation is key. In a straight fight, they have an immense advantage in maneuverability due to a lighter load.
Try Mao 101 : When the enemy advances, withdraw; when he stops, harass; when he tires, strike; when he retreats, pursue.
(And if you have more time read Mao's Basic Tactics (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_28.htm))
My belief is that soldiers with the best basic training have the best ability to innovate tactically. Warfare does not come naturally you have to work at it constantly to keep your men alive.
Learn the basics well and apply METT-TC properly and you stand a chance of outsmarting the Taliban.
Our doctrine creates a large, concentrated force (especially with vehicles) that's easy to spot and hit (though admittedly very difficult to destroy), his heavily dependent on supporting fires and thus severely handicapped in fulfilling the light infantryman's job of closing with destroying the enemy. This creates several problems:
*We spend a massive amount of money to achieve relatively little effect, thus giving an already reluctant nation further incentive to back out
*We are more likely to cause civilian casualties
*It is much harder for us to fully pursue/destroy the enemy and hold the rugged terrain in which he operates.
The solution I propose is to create an eastern style kinetic force. Note that this is not SF. It is a bridge, of sorts. The ultimate goal would be a brigade size element that is capable of successfully conducting sustained ground combat operations in the squad/fire team level. While they could indeed engage in local training operations or SF/Ranger style raids, their primary task would be to act as hunter/killers in order to successfully clear and hold terrain.
A large force is easy to avoid.
Small forces or small teams would need to rely on fire support other wise they risk being taken out piecemeal. Remember if they see you operating in smaller groups they will tend to concentrate to take you out and then melt away into the mountains.
Point 1: Read McCuen. His applicable 'golden rule' here is:
Winning and maintaining support for the war on the home front(s) and in the international community. Doing so means maintaining legitimacy and avoiding losses through incompetence. McCuen covered somewhat under this thread. (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10859&highlight=jma)
Point 2: To avoid unnecessary civilian casualties one has to separate the enemy from the civilians. Easier said than done. Through correctly applying METT-TC a way should be found.
Point 3: Hold terrain? That's the biggest current error. McCuen has told them (but they don't seem to hear) that instead of "clear, hold and build" it should be “clear, control, and counter-organize the population”. Smart guy this McCuen.
(Carried over to second post to reduce length)
How To Raise the Force
1) Appoint an officer with a minimum rank of COL as CO. Should have a track record of thinking outside the box and good coordinator/trainer IE he knows how to teach. Primary task is to get necessary support from chain of command.
I support Ken's comment.
This concept needs a champion. A general with a bunch of stars. Then you are looking for a "fire-ball" of a young officer. Lt Col or promote a Major if he is the right kind of guy.
2) Recruit enough seasoned NCO's and field grade officers to make a platoon or at least a section. Guys from NTC/JRTC would be very useful here since they are already trained to act as the insurgents.
I support Ken's comment.
Get the best instructor NCOs (the old and bold) for the training phase. Give them a bunch of young officers and sgts... they will know what to do. The basics, the basics, the basics.
3) Using studies of current and past insurgent TTP's, wargame and refine the force at home, then deploy it for 4-9months to get the kinks out.
Yes, by using the old and bold NCOs as instructors for as long as it takes. Then deploy to Afghanistan and continue the training there until operationally competent. Then go have a ball.
Note: Am I following you correctly here? Is this first deployment an all chiefs and no indians affair?
4) Return home. The previous members of the platoon now become trainers. Recruit lower level enlisted (PFC-Sergeant) who have either qualified Ranger or have had some combat experience. The rational for not going only for more experienced men is twofold. First, it would be too great a draw on other units. Second, these men are basically going into a new MOS, like 11B to 11C or 11X. They've proven themselves enough to be relied on, but they still need to be sponges to adapt rapidly. People might argue that they're not mature enough, but the insurgents regularly use very young men with basically no combat experience and turn them into experts. Granted, their life expectancy is horrid and they've most likely grown up in harsh 3rd world conditions. This is countered by the recruit's prior training/experience and by the superior training he will receive through the returned senior NCO's and officers. Recruiting should not be difficult. Just say: it's hard, no one's done it before, and you get to wear civies+grow out your hair in the field SF style. Sold, hook, line and sinker.
Why not by the time the "leader group" returns home the 'old and bold' Snr NCOs have men ready (and trained) to allow the unit to be properly formed.
Merely put it all together get familiar with the organisation and then ship the whole caboodle off back to Afghanistan. Same sort of familiarisation training in-theater for as long as it needs then off to war.
Ken's correct, don't get hung up on Rangers (as good as they may be) and don't expect combat experience. After the first flush of newbies to fill the unit let the unit grow by introducing a trickle of new guys who can be absorbed 10% at a time to maintain the levels of experience being built up as you go along. Promote from within where you can and if necessary send your NCOs and potential NCOs back for training.
And don't forget to send the stateside Snr NCO instructors out for the odd familiarisation trip and ask them to try to keep it down to 8 beers a night ;)
Tactics
*Basically the same as the insurgents, except they're not going to be terrorizing or really interacting with the populace any more than a normal infantry platoon. That would require more maturity and experience than we can give and is already being filled by other organizations.
*Conducts continuous, small unit actions and patrols in an AO where they can become very familiar with the terrain.
*Is entirely on foot. Avoids the roads and towns.
*Heavy emphasis on marksmanship
*Civilian clothes and haircuts to help blend in from a distance.
Let this evolve. Its hard work and a continuous process. Mistakes made by small teams normally translate into KIA.
For heavens sake you don't want your unit to become attractive for the wrong reasons i.e. growing a beard and wearing their kit and carrying their weapons. Watch out for this.
Potential Problems & Solutions
*Supply: traditionally such forces have relied upon the populace. This will be solved through the use of caches, distributed from a central FOB or aerially dropped.
*Not Enough Firepower: I disagree. This force will be trained and mobile in feigned and tactical retreat to not be overwhelmed. Also, the insurgents manage to hold their own against us. Why cannot we do better with our training and technology?
*Maturity of Soldiers: Again, I believe that, if the insurgents can do it, so can we. Initially, success will totally hinge upon careful selection. However, as the training process improves and the unit gains more experience, the implementation should become no more difficult than Ranger Bat or SF.
Well, that's a rough summary of the ideas I've got bouncing around. Anyone got anything to add, critiques, etc. I'd love to hear some thoughts on how this could be done better or why it can't be done at all.
Supply: Anything and whatever you can think of. Obviously you booby trap your caches or you can leave stuff you want them to find (dirty tricks stuff;)
Firepower: Carry light plus a few claymore mines to protect you when static and rely of fire support from air and arty and whatever is close by. You are right your tactics will save you and once you have been cornered once you tend to get damn clever at not being found again.
Maturity: We are talking about the maturity that counts on the battlefield (and not what mischief he can and often does get up to stateside when back amongst the civvies) There is nothing wrong with the "combat" maturity of a 18/9 year old who has 20 odd contacts under his belt involving a few hairy moments. In the end less about training and more about reaction under enemy fire. We are all different. You want to find the guys who get a buzz from being in combat.
You need to pick up the ball and run with it now. As I suggested rewrite your ideas into a version 0.2 and float that here too.
Look for a better way to rotate the troops to achieve better operational continuity. Pick up on the discussion on this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7644&page=9) from about post #165
Here is an effective 'stick' from the Rhodesian war days (I'm not in it) comprising two 18 year olds and two 19 year olds. The officer (standing right) was 18 at the time.
http://farm5.static.flickr.com/4030/4641190419_8051e0c033_z.jpg
William F. Owen
07-13-2010, 12:43 PM
Supply: Anything and whatever you can think of. Obviously you booby trap your caches or you can leave stuff you want them to find (dirty tricks stuff;)
There's a huge difference between inserting "Eldest Son" ammunition or "40 On/offs" into the enemy supply chain, and blowing the legs off an 11-year-old who went to steal some stuff from your cache.
Caches are something requiring quite a lot of thought and a good deal of planning. Usefulness is very context dependant. I'm not sure they are viable in the Green Zone, or anywhere near where you get population movement.
Firepower: Carry light plus a few claymore mines to protect you when static and rely of fire support from air and arty and whatever is close by. You are right your tactics will save you and once you have been cornered once you tend to get damn clever at not being found again.
Is lack of Firepower an issue??
howard
07-13-2010, 01:01 PM
one of the videos i saw in the last week was one taken by the Afghanistan Al Quaida forces as they assaulted a pro/US military base in the mountains.
it was a side and frontal assault up steep slopes with automatic weapons and RPG support. they were 'owned' as the video discussion mentioned because the US called in A-10 support as the battle progressed. quite a few of the militants were killed or wounded... you could see them being carried back from the front lines by their forces.
anyway...
due to the rugged territory and hills of that war front, they move almost exclusively on foot or in small fighting forces and carry their weapons on backpacks or in hand.
might i suggest the force multiplier WE need in this is a significantly larger air surveillance presence in AWACS , "Joint STARS" , or UAV flights. this is especially needed with IR system detection of such forces as they move in the terrain at night or by day.
with our air eyes, there is no reason to ever be surprised by an attack or by an ambush. we would have seen them as they moved, deployed, and
set up for assaults.
one of the other posters here mentioned;
================================================== ===
'...Afghan insurgents really are ####ty tactical fighters. They have three things going for them - they know their turf, their determined and they know kill zones. Other than that, I wouldn't put them on such a lofty "small unit fighter" plane as you do. They tend to die fast and hard if they haven't beat a hasty retreat once the initial surprise comes to an end....'
================================================== ====
they do not have the eyes over the battlefield, they have eyes on the ground. we have an advantage there and must use it to our purpose and also to defend our forces against local 'tactical' battles with high attrition rates.
we may not know the turf, but we surely can see it.
that's a major advantage.
and knowing where the enemy is and their movements to the battle field or attack points, we can avoid kill zones and ambush situations if we use these technologies before our troops move and after they are in an area.
and another thought. the terrain in those mountains provides few relatively travel routes, even for militants on foot. these foot routes are choke points and kill zones we can use against the enemy.
Rex Brynen
07-13-2010, 02:33 PM
How easily would a small foot force like this be able to operate at length in Afghanistan, where (depending on the location) it safe to presume:
unarmed Taliban spotters mixed in with (and largely indistinguishable from) the local population, on foot or motorcycle
Taliban spotters on very high ground (sometimes with vistas extending many km) equipped with some degree of optics
widespread use among local Taliban units and spotters of various HF/VHF comms, plus various non-RF signals and communications methods
... or is it presumed most movement would be at night?
Steve Blair
07-13-2010, 02:38 PM
Why reinvent the wheel?
Go look at how SOG was formed and fielded its teams, especially between 1967 and 1969. This was an organization that formed more or less on the fly, and conducted some amazing operations. They weren't all SF-qualified, and much of their training pipeline was improvised locally.
There's a huge difference between inserting "Eldest Son" ammunition or "40 On/offs" into the enemy supply chain, and blowing the legs off an 11-year-old who went to steal some stuff from your cache.
Caches are something requiring quite a lot of thought and a good deal of planning. Usefulness is very context dependant. I'm not sure they are viable in the Green Zone, or anywhere near where you get population movement.
OK. If you need to cache stuff (like leave your bergens somewhere while you trot over the ridge to do some mischief you need to make sure you don't come back to find your stuff gone or even booby trapped by the nasties.
What I am saying is that if you have to cache stuff (equipment, ammo, food, water) you want to make sure that if someone finds it it is so set up that they will get nothing of what is there. Yes and whoever finds it gets to be converted to gases at 3,000m per sec.
Clearly if a kid can find it it has not been properly cached.
Yes and as the man said the primary operations will be away from areas of population.
Is lack of Firepower an issue??
Personal firepower is an issue if there is no fire support immediately on call. If no fire support is available then the risk is that like the foot sloggers currently the temptation will be to overload and thereby forfeit mobility.
[snip]
might i suggest the force multiplier WE need in this is a significantly larger air surveillance presence in AWACS , "Joint STARS" , or UAV flights. this is especially needed with IR system detection of such forces as they move in the terrain at night or by day.
with our air eyes, there is no reason to ever be surprised by an attack or by an ambush. we would have seen them as they moved, deployed, and
set up for assaults.
[snip]
Good thinking. And as part of the training and operational monitoring the commander can use UAVs to shadow the troops as they move. I would suggest that a lot could be learned from watching our own as much as we look out for the Taliban. Comes down to resources I suppose.
Why reinvent the wheel?
Go look at how SOG was formed and fielded its teams, especially between 1967 and 1969. This was an organization that formed more or less on the fly, and conducted some amazing operations. They weren't all SF-qualified, and much of their training pipeline was improvised locally.
Do you have a source on this SOG you can direct attention to?
Where is jcustis? Isn't this work for the USMC Recon? (not saying that the army shouldn't get involved in this sort of thing.)
Steve Blair
07-13-2010, 07:35 PM
MACV/SOG is fairly well-covered by John Plaster's book (http://www.amazon.com/SOG-Secret-Americas-Commandos-Vietnam/dp/1581606761/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1279049246&sr=1-1) and (in a more scholarly manner) by Shultz's The Secret War Against Hanoi (http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/SearchResults?sts=t&tn=The+Secret+War+Against+Hanoi&x=46&y=14). Wikipedia also has a decent overview here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_Assistance_Command,_Vietnam_%E2%80%93_Stu dies_and_Observations_Group). Wilf has done some digging on them, as have I in the course of my studies. They ran recon in more isolated corners of South Vietnam, but their main focus was on the "denied areas" in Laos, Cambodia, and even parts of North Vietnam. Teams were typically a mix of US and indigenous personnel (3 US and 4+ Montagnards or Nungs with some SVN at times).
SJPONeill
07-14-2010, 12:11 AM
Possibly the key to the 'eastern style' is not so much that it is 'eastern' in origin but that it is the offensive philosophy in this conflict where are forces are on the defensive...if the western world was to decide to go on the offensive, in an irregular manner, against unnamed adversaries states (insert your pet hate nation here) then perhaps we could very much operate in the manner suggested in the opening post?
jmm99
07-14-2010, 01:28 AM
a very quiet professional - seriously (IMO). When his recon company led the 2003 East Side charge to Baghdad (with Fox's Rick Leventhal as embed, then and now, Thank You To The 1st L.A.R.), (http://onthescene.blogs.foxnews.com/2010/06/03/thank-you-to-the-1st-l-a-r/)I suspect that he would have as preferred to avoid the publicity and preserve his anonimity. Of course, his real expertise is in the area of sheep and goat husbandry. :D
Regards to Jon and others,
Mike
William F. Owen
07-14-2010, 05:40 AM
Wilf has done some digging on them, (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Blackfoot-Missing-William-F-Owen/dp/0099441543) as have I in the course of my studies. They ran recon in more isolated corners of South Vietnam, but their main focus was on the "denied areas" in Laos, Cambodia, and even parts of North Vietnam. Teams were typically a mix of US and indigenous personnel (3 US and 4+ Montagnards or Nungs with some SVN at times).
All Royalties gratefully accepted! :D
howard
07-14-2010, 05:00 PM
oh i'd assume Rex that they have the simpler gear to stay in touch. and i'd assume WE'D have a full snooping ability to intercept and listen in...wouldn't you?
the com traffic would be a good thing to plot and evaluate with one of those supercomputers the government has laying idle.
find out who's talking and where they are. lay down GPS guided bombs to everyone of them at the same time is what i'd suggest.
Fuchs
07-14-2010, 05:28 PM
find out who's talking and where they are.
lay down GPS guided bombs to everyone of them at the same
time is what i'd suggest.
Complication #1:
Half of the people on the phone sit on a moving motorcycle, shadowing a MRAP patrol.
Complication #2:
The others sit in villages, among civilians. You'd get one possibly quite unimportant guy with a mobile phone and kill also his family of ten.
There are reasons why the hundreds of thousands of soldiers who went to Afghanistan didn't solve the riddle yet.
Complication #1:
Half of the people on the phone sit on a moving motorcycle, shadowing a MRAP patrol.
Complication #2:
The others sit in villages, among civilians. You'd get one possibly quite unimportant guy with a mobile phone and kill also his family of ten.
There are reasons why the hundreds of thousands of soldiers who went to Afghanistan didn't solve the riddle yet.
The problem is that the Soviets (before) and the current US/UK approach to the war has been one characterised by the use of brute force and ignorance. Never going to work in a million years. I suggest that this thread is one about a recommended new approach where a more carefully targeted and precise tactical approach would be used.
William F. Owen
07-16-2010, 07:48 AM
The problem is that the Soviets (before) and the current US/UK approach to the war has been one characterised by the use of brute force and ignorance. Never going to work in a million years. I suggest that this thread is one about a recommended new approach where a more carefully targeted and precise tactical approach would be used.
That's not an accurate statement.
Maybe true for the Soviets. They've never been very good at warfare, but the stellar opposite is true of the UK. Has the UK predominantly failed in the post 2001 context? Yes, I think it has, but this is not the historical norm.
The UK is currently going through another "Crimea."
Fuchs
07-16-2010, 09:08 AM
Crimea, Khartoum, Boers, Somme, Dardanelles, Dunkirk, Western Desert, Malaya, Dieppe, Arnhem, Suez?
There's a bit more than just Crimea, Basra and Helmand on the list, Wilf!
jcustis
07-16-2010, 12:09 PM
Of course, his real expertise is in the area of sheep and goat husbandry. I heard that...:D
Of late, I've also developed a knack for understanding how the locals are able to "push water uphill". It is a remarkable and age old process, yet abuses the land over time.
And I never would have thunk that I would know that.
To the question about Force Recon and Recon Battalion doing that sort of semi- pseudo ops, that's in the movies I'm afraid. There may be some urban recce skills taught out there, but it is impractical to try to employ mirror-image efforts at a large scale. I think we have a hard enough time trying to employ covert camouflague techniques for small recce elements.
I heard that...:D
Of late, I've also developed a knack for understanding how the locals are able to "push water uphill". It is a remarkable and age old process, yet abuses the land over time.
And I never would have thunk that I would know that.
And they do this how? I have often thought how a very tall redwood tree "lifts" the water from below ground to the leaves. Easier to be told than to try and figure it out.
KenWats
07-16-2010, 01:10 PM
And they do this how? I have often thought how a very tall redwood tree "lifts" the water from below ground to the leaves. Easier to be told than to try and figure it out.
Oh! Oh! Something I can answer... somewhat. This is the danger of allowing engineers access to webboards. I can't answer how local folks would push water uphill.
Trees, I think I can answer. Capillary action. Essentially, if you create enough surface area and thin enough tubes, the water will have a natural tendency to cling to the sides of the tubes. Same principle as to why when you sip soda through a straw, the height of the soda inside the straw can be higher than the level of the soda in the cup, even after you stop sipping.
Additionally, with trees, they also aspirate water through the leaves. This creates a "pull" at the top of the tree (kinda like sucking on the straw). Combine that with capillary action at work inside the tree (and veins inside the tree that branch off and get smaller and smaller as you work your way up) and poof, watered tree. That's the gist of it, anyway.
Anyways... I'll stop playing Mr. Wizard and let you all get back to your regularly scheduled discussion on counterinsurgency type things.
davidbfpo
07-16-2010, 01:18 PM
Ken,
Thanks for the explanation, good to know engineers know their biology too:rolleyes:. Now how about the Afghans moving water uphill? No time limit set, just a wave of the wizard's wand;).
KenWats
07-16-2010, 01:22 PM
First guess... lots of buckets? :D
Fuchs
07-16-2010, 01:45 PM
The keywords for the trees is "Osmosis".
Oh! Oh! Something I can answer... somewhat.
Capillary action.
Man that takes me back to biology class 40 years ago. Thanks for the reminder.
jcustis
07-16-2010, 06:48 PM
It is essentially an optical illusion. What they have done is build an ad hoc da of sorts across the Helmand River. It is more like a gate of sorts, built of earthern and wood materials which cause the water to "stack up" behind the constriction and raise the level of the water. This allows them to push water into canal inlets that wouldnormally only receive water during the months when the river is high.
The Helmand is one of the few rivers in the world that simply dissipate into the desert.
slapout9
07-16-2010, 07:25 PM
It is essentially an optical illusion. What they have done is build an ad hoc da of sorts across the Helmand River. It is more like a gate of sorts, built of earthern and wood materials which cause the water to "stack up" behind the constriction and raise the level of the water. This allows them to push water into canal inlets that wouldnormally only receive water during the months when the river is high.
The Helmand is one of the few rivers in the world that simply dissipate into the desert.
Might be those Taliban Monkeys up to no good.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=103207#post103207
IVIaedhros:
As IntelTrooper suggested, this sounds an awful lot like the Mobile (Roving?) Combined Action Platoons from Vietnam, which is good.
I don't if I can express this question clearly, but I'll try. How much of an emphasis would your proposed unit put on pursuit? And if they were going to pursue for more than a few hours, how would they lighten their load? Body armor or no? etc.
There is a long thread about lightening the load.
might i suggest the force multiplier WE need in this is a significantly larger air surveillance presence in AWACS , "Joint STARS" , or UAV flights. this is especially needed with IR system detection of such forces as they move in the terrain at night or by day.
with our air eyes, there is no reason to ever be surprised by an attack or by an ambush. we would have seen them as they moved, deployed, and
set up for assaults.
People tend to overestimate the effectiveness of these aerial assets. The real high tech things like JSTARS do wonderous things but they are extremely expensive so there will never be very many of them. And they can't see through mountains.
The other platforms that use night or day vision cameras don't really see that much. The field of view isn't that big, relative to the size of the area you want to cover. They can be heard from the ground, which can be an advantage and a disadvantage. The bigger ones like the Predators cost more than you think and they require a surprising amount of manpower to operate. Aviation Week quoted a figure of about 120 people per Pred when everyone is included. They are much more affected by weather than a manned aircraft.
The drones are a great tool, but you will never have enough of them to provide the degree of overwatch you suggest, especially if there are a multitude of small units roaming the field.
William F. Owen
07-17-2010, 05:28 AM
Crimea
A war the UK bungled.
Khartoum, Boers, Somme, Dardanelles, Dunkirk, Western Desert, Malaya, Dieppe, Arnhem,
Those were battles or operations that occurred in wars we won. At best they were failed operations. ALL armies have those.
Suez? Nothing much wrong with the military conduct of that operation.
Fuchs
07-17-2010, 06:44 AM
Hmm, considering the war goals of September 1939, the UK lost the European WW2 in Jalta 1943 - and that can be attributed to Dunkirk.
With the same forgiving criteria that count WW2 as a UK win, you could also say that Irak was a UK win despite Basra - and the who knows how much the goals in AFG will be redefined...
William F. Owen
07-17-2010, 07:01 AM
With the same forgiving criteria that count WW2 as a UK win, you could also say that Irak was a UK win despite Basra - and the who knows how much the goals in AFG will be redefined...
WW2 was a "UK Win," albeit part of a coalition. All lost territory recovered. Unconditional surrender of the enemy. Yes, the strategic environment changed, but the UK was on the militarily successful side, and in the vast majority of cases UK formations destroyed the enemy formations it faced, both in Europe. Africa and Asia.
Fuchs
07-17-2010, 07:42 AM
All lost territory recovered.
The Poles beg to differ.
The UK declared war because it had guaranteed Polish sovereignty - a promise broken two weeks later when it didn't declare war on the Soviet Union for its invasion of Eastern Poland. Churchill traded away Polish sovereignty completely to Stalin in iirc Jalta 1943.
The UK had a mission creep away from the original goal and reason of WW2 - and there's a good reason to expect the same kind of "win" in AFG and Iraq. The Crimean War had a similar kind of "win" for the British.
Btw, I personally dislike the inflationary use of "victory" in history books.
How could a nation be a "winner" if it took more damage than it had advantages because of its involvement in a war? Most "victories" in war sound rather like "enemy defeated" to me, not like actual "winning".
The Poles beg to differ.
The UK declared war because it had guaranteed Polish sovereignty - a promise broken two weeks later when it didn't declare war on the Soviet Union for its invasion of Eastern Poland. Churchill traded away Polish sovereignty completely to Stalin in iirc Jalta 1943.
The UK had a mission creep away from the original goal and reason of WW2 - and there's a good reason to expect the same kind of "win" in AFG and Iraq. The Crimean War had a similar kind of "win" for the British.
Btw, I personally dislike the inflationary use of "victory" in history books.
How could a nation be a "winner" if it took more damage than it had advantages because of its involvement in a war? Most "victories" in war sound rather like "enemy defeated" to me, not like actual "winning".
Fuchs, its called a Pyrrhic victory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrrhic_victory)
Origin:
A Pyrrhic victory is so called after the Greek king Pyrrhus , who, after suffering heavy losses in defeating the Romans in 279 B.C., said to those sent to congratulate him, "Another such victory over the Romans and we are undone."
Yes and WW1 was such a Pyrrhic victory as well as the Germans and British had ripped the guts out of each other and as if that were not enough they had another go at it in WW2 which totally ripped out what was left out of each other.
A bankrupt Britain then had to borrow from the US to keep solvent (the debt having only been paid off in the last 5 years I think) and had to dismantle her empire post haste whatever the consequences and the end of rationing did not happen until 1954 when meat rationing was finally lifted. So yes some victory that was.
William F. Owen
07-18-2010, 04:33 AM
Btw, I personally dislike the inflationary use of "victory" in history books.
How could a nation be a "winner" if it took more damage than it had advantages because of its involvement in a war? Most "victories" in war sound rather like "enemy defeated" to me, not like actual "winning".
A bankrupt Britain then had to borrow from the US to keep solvent (the debt having only been paid off in the last 5 years I think) and had to dismantle her empire post haste whatever the consequences and the end of rationing did not happen until 1954 when meat rationing was finally lifted. So yes some victory that was.
"Lost territory" as in British Lost Territory. Remember the British WW2 included fighting Japan.
Victory? I have little opinion as to what you call it. Lets us says "Hamster Moment." In both WW1 and 2, the UK was reacting to German aggression, and an existential threat - in terms of the cost of "not winning." The same was true with Napoleon. "Hamster Moments" in 1815, 1918, and 1945 ensured - as war always should- that French and German Policy were not effectively set forth. Cost? Yes it costs. In neither case was there a choice.
"Lost territory" as in British Lost Territory. Remember the British WW2 included fighting Japan.
Victory? I have little opinion as to what you call it. Lets us says "Hamster Moment." In both WW1 and 2, the UK was reacting to German aggression, and an existential threat - in terms of the cost of "not winning." The same was true with Napoleon. "Hamster Moments" in 1815, 1918, and 1945 ensured - as war always should- that French and German Policy were not effectively set forth. Cost? Yes it costs. In neither case was there a choice.
Choice or no choice the eventual winner out of the WW2 bloodbath was... the Soviets.
William F. Owen
07-18-2010, 08:52 AM
Choice or no choice the eventual winner out of the WW2 bloodbath was... the Soviets.
Really? 8-10 million military dead. Probably 10-12 million civilian dead. 10-15% of the population, dead, wounded or starved to death. In comparison, the UK lost less than 1% of its population. The massive expansion in defence commitment meant the USSR was never able to match US prosperity and growth, and it eventually imploded.
The US in comparison, became a global super power, with a huge economy and a prosperous way of life - and at very low casualties comparative to almost everyone else. - less than the UK.
Really? 8-10 million military dead. Probably 10-12 million civilian dead. 10-15% of the population, dead, wounded or starved to death. In comparison, the UK lost less than 1% of its population. The massive expansion in defence commitment meant the USSR was never able to match US prosperity and growth, and it eventually imploded.
The US in comparison, became a global super power, with a huge economy and a prosperous way of life - and at very low casualties comparative to almost everyone else. - less than the UK.
The Soviets (who never gave a damn about their population anyway) were gifted half of Europe on a plate and they too became a global power. Merely the bad ideology (and economics) that led to their implosion 30 years before the USs own implosion started. But as for the Brits they were the real losers (more so than the Germans and the Japanese). But don't feel too bad about it, the US has to listen to what the Chinese boss has to say these days before doing anything.
Ken White
07-18-2010, 02:14 PM
Darn. That's at least the fourth occasion in my lifetime... :D
William F. Owen
07-18-2010, 03:07 PM
The Soviets (who never gave a damn about their population anyway) were gifted half of Europe on a plate and they too became a global power. Merely the bad ideology (and economics) that led to their implosion 30 years before the USs own implosion started. But as for the Brits they were the real losers (more so than the Germans and the Japanese). But don't feel too bad about it, the US has to listen to what the Chinese boss has to say these days before doing anything.
Well that's a very odd (poorly informed) view of Strategic history. To suggest that Germany and Japan were better off than the UK is palpable rubbish, as is the idea that the US listens to anything China has to say.
By any measure you care to choose, from a strategic stand-point the US benefited greatly more than the Soviets from WW2 - and at vastly less cost.
By 1960, the UK had the world's 2nd/3rd largest Navy, nuclear Weapons, the 2nd/3rd most powerful Army in NATO, a growing population, and was a G5 nation. - not bad of a country facing a solitary existential battle a mere 20 years early.
Yes, the German and Japanese economies did benefit from being rebuilt from scratch. So what? Part of a plan? No! Which of those nations could compete with France, the UK, or the US for strategic relevance, 20-or even 30 years after the end of war?
slapout9
07-18-2010, 03:28 PM
What is a "Hamster Moment"?
Fuchs
07-18-2010, 03:41 PM
Wilf, JMA; you both have very odd world views.
Example: A large army is a cost, not an achievement in my opinion.
To me, countries consist of many individuals who have needs and preferences. Security (this includes freedom/liberty), health and material consumption are indicators of a good life.
Being part of a powerful nation or a well-armed nation has yet to be proved to be a positive factor in average quality of life. In fact, both can very well be considered to be detrimental to material consumption and in some examples even to security and health.
Besides, Wilf; the Germans and Japanese did not benefit from rebuilding from scratch at all. That's a myth. It took hard work and privations to catch up and then both simply continued their superior economic development of the earlier decades. Post-1960 Germany was as clearly in a superior industrial development than the UK as it was in 1880-1914.
Darn. That's at least the fourth occasion in my lifetime... :D
Ken you want to do a little research into the Feb 2010 visit to the US by the Dalai Lama. The concessions made by the White House (no TV coverage, an explanation that they are only meeting him as religious leader etc etc) were not lost on the rest of the world to be sure.
What is of course interesting is that China obviously believes it "owns" enough of the US to dictate which world leaders the US should invite to the White House. Should be a source of major concern.
Fuchs
07-18-2010, 08:06 PM
...and a few days ago Washington gave Beijing its cold shoulder when they protested against U.S.-ROK navy manoeuvres in their backyard.
It takes much more to prove your point because you made a quite far-reaching statement, JMA.
Almost all states have major troubles and challenges, and almost all states have to consider the position of other governments in international issues.
That's life. Even Washington woke up and understood it's not really that much "exceptional" as it believed.
Nevertheless, some states are in greater troubles and especially in other forms of troubles than others. The predominant form of troubles are domestic troubles - that's good news, for domestic troubles can be addressed and solved with good policies.
Ken White
07-18-2010, 08:14 PM
Ken you want to do a little research into the Feb 2010 visit to the US by the Dalai Lama...What happened was quite obvious to all. OTOH, how some happen to wish to take it:
...The concessions made by the White House ... were not lost on the rest of the world to be sure.is only slightly less obvious. ;)
What is of course interesting is that China obviously believes it "owns" enough of the US to dictate which world leaders the US should invite to the White House. Should be a source of major concern.I'm not at all sure that conclusion is correct. The Dalai Lama for example is NOT a world leader, though he may have slightly more moral stature than does the Archbishop of Canterbury -- also not a world leader -- or Jean-Claude Duvalier -- also a former but deposed national leader. The Lama's 'constituency' is larger than that of the latter but is far smaller than that of the former. The Pope OTOH is a world leader and even if the Vatican is tiny, he's still in charge of it for now...
As for the "own," yep, they do own a lot of paper -- and they have a very strong interest in that paper being worth something. They also really like the US import market a bunch. Thus, they'll express their opinions and feelings but they won't push too hard. At the risk of stereotyping, Orientals are quite correctly noted for shrewd bargaining. So, come to think of it are Persians. :wry:
The amount of accord those Chinese opinions are given will vary. That's partly dependent on which US domestic lobby is ascendant in Washington at the time (pro or anti China) and partly on the collegiality quotient of the Administration in office. In the case of the Dalai Lama, both those aspects were in congruence for a minor, almost cost free kow-tow in China's favor.
Sort of like the bow to Hu -- or Abdullah. Don't read to much into bowing. Or kow-towing. Or into apparent economic demise; we've been there before. Disappointed all the wishful thinkers before, likely will this time and a few more times. Implosion will certainly eventually occur but not in my lifetime. I strongly doubt it will occur in your lifetime and probably not that of your children if any. :D
The recipient of the bow below is the Mayor of Tampa, Florida, a mid size city not in China. She also is not a world leader. She does lead a city whose MSA population is about on par with that of all Tibet... :cool:
William F. Owen
07-19-2010, 04:09 AM
Example: A large army is a cost, not an achievement in my opinion .
It's a cost if you cannot use it. Large armies are instruments of strategy. If you wish to the strategically relevant, you need a large army - and Navy.
Being part of a powerful nation or a well-armed nation has yet to be proved to be a positive factor in average quality of life. In fact, both can very well be considered to be detrimental to material consumption and in some examples even to security and health.
All of which is why I defer to Strategic history and not social history, but Strategic history does encompass cost. Having a big/capable Army and being able to fund it, is a requirement of being strategically relevant.
Besides, Wilf; the Germans and Japanese did not benefit from rebuilding from scratch at all. That's a myth.
It's not a myth. Yes both Germany and Japan were industrially capable nations prior to 1939, but there was massive benefits to zeroing the economy and having the vast majority of the infrastructure rebuilt. Yes, it did take a lot of hard work and privation, but at the material level it also had substantial benefits. Just look at the differences in power plants between German and the UK in the 1960's.
Worth the cost in the human life? Not in my opinion. As I said, it wasn't part of a plan.
SJPONeill
07-19-2010, 04:35 AM
Really? 8-10 million military dead. Probably 10-12 million civilian dead. 10-15% of the population, dead, wounded or starved to death. In comparison, the UK lost less than 1% of its population. The massive expansion in defence commitment meant the USSR was never able to match US prosperity and growth, and it eventually imploded.
Those figures are only relevant if the government in questioned cared - history before and after WW2 would suggest that the Soviet Government couldn't have given a fat rat's about its people so long as it had enough of them to soak up German momentum.
Further , one might argue that had the Soviet Government not played so fast and loose with its people i.e. not purged out anyone who could think for themselves, then it very much might have kept pace in the Cold War and the Reagan Doctrine would not have had much to get a foothold in...
Think you might be on a bit of a hiding to nothing on this one, Wilf...
William F. Owen
07-19-2010, 05:00 AM
Further , one might argue that had the Soviet Government not played so fast and loose with its people i.e. not purged out anyone who could think for themselves, then it very much might have kept pace in the Cold War and the Reagan Doctrine would not have had much to get a foothold in...
So when do the playing the fast and loose stop and start? So how does that make the Soviet Union the main beneficiary of WW2??
Think you might be on a bit of a hiding to nothing on this one, Wilf...
So you seriously wish to suggest that:
a.) The Soviet Union was not severely harmed by WW2?
b.) It strategically benefited from having fought it more than the US?
I fully concur the Soviet Union had no choice but to fight - because of its massive strategic errors, but to stop the clock in June 45, and state that the USSR was "better off," than say the US, is very far fetched. - especially as for the US it was a "discretionary war."
The US went from being an almost strategically irrelevant, barely post industrially depressed nation, to a world super power in 5 years. As a "beneficiary" of WW2, the USSR cannot make that claim.
By 1960, the UK had the world's 2nd/3rd largest Navy, nuclear Weapons, the 2nd/3rd most powerful Army in NATO, a growing population, and was a G5 nation. - not bad of a country facing a solitary existential battle a mere 20 years early.
Out of all that stuff being a G5 nation maybe counts for something.
So when do the playing the fast and loose stop and start? So how does that make the Soviet Union the main beneficiary of WW2??
So you seriously wish to suggest that:
a.) The Soviet Union was not severely harmed by WW2?
b.) It strategically benefited from having fought it more than the US?
I fully concur the Soviet Union had no choice but to fight - because of its massive strategic errors, but to stop the clock in June 45, and state that the USSR was "better off," than say the US, is very far fetched. - especially as for the US it was a "discretionary war."
The US went from being an almost strategically irrelevant, barely post industrially depressed nation, to a world super power in 5 years. As a "beneficiary" of WW2, the USSR cannot make that claim.
The Soviets picked up half of Europe as a gift from the Roosevelt and Churchill. That was really significant given where they were in 1939. That they made less of the opportunity than the US did through the Marshall Plan is another issue.
The US set about making money and the Soviets set about spreading their ideology. The US made zillions and the Soviets caused millions of deaths. Yalta was a disaster.
JMA said:
Yalta was a disaster.
If you watch this video 00:38, then there is 1 piece of art behind the shoulder of Russian president Medvedev.
http://www.1tv.ru/news/polit/156873
Does it remind this episode? Or am I too paranoid :)
http://en.wikipilipinas.org/images/1/1b/Yalta_Conference.jpg
William F. Owen
07-19-2010, 10:18 AM
The Soviets picked up half of Europe as a gift from the Roosevelt and Churchill. That was really significant given where they were in 1939. That they made less of the opportunity than the US did through the Marshall Plan is another issue.
They didn't "pick up half of Europe as a gift from the Roosevelt and Churchill." They got themselves a buffer zone that they had to maintain at great cost. Actually disproportionate cost, and they gained it disproportionate cost. You probably have to go back to the Gran Chaco find a war of greater national cost.
Soviets set about spreading their ideology.
A plan that ultimately failed and not one best enabled by WW2. Compare and contrast the world's most successful Communist Regime, - China!
Yalta was a disaster. It was a disaster when and for who?
The idea that the USSR benefited more from WW2 than the US is a very hard case to make.
The idea that the UK somehow "lost WW2" is even less convincing, especially when compared to the possible outcome of actually losing in 1940.
Fuchs
07-19-2010, 10:47 AM
.
It's a cost if you cannot use it. Large armies are instruments of strategy. If you wish to the strategically relevant, you need a large army - and Navy.
It's not a myth. Yes both Germany and Japan were industrially capable nations prior to 1939, but there was massive benefits to zeroing the economy and having the vast majority of the infrastructure rebuilt. Yes, it did take a lot of hard work and privation, but at the material level it also had substantial benefits. Just look at the differences in power plants between German and the UK in the 1960's.
a) You misunderstood "cost" and "net cost". A use of a tool cannot delete its costs.
b) Actually, power plant infrastructure did not take much damage in WW2 - the USAAF Strategic Bombing Survey Europe clearly understood this mistake in '45. We had a powerplant of 1912 running in Eastern Germany in 1990...it hadn't been modernised once.
Any modernity advantage of the German economy and infrastructure in the 1960's was the result of low consumption (and correspondingly high investment), not of the war itself.
Look at Spain, Eastern Europe, France - those countries took much damage and did not modernise as much as Germany, Italy (even higher growth rates than germany) and Japan did.
The Americans used the still extraordinary situation of 1945 to follow a low consumption path in the late 40's in order to reduce the extremely high New Deal+WW2 debt.
The British never seemed to recognise the necessity of such drastic saving for macroeconomic problem solving - neither when they lost industrial leadership around 1900 nor to pay off WW1 debt, nor to fend off the 29-33 crisis nor to pay back WW2 debt. And I assume they won't do it now even though the present economic and fiscal imbalances call for it.
JMA said:
If you watch this video 00:38, then there is 1 piece of art behind the shoulder of Russian president Medvedev.
http://www.1tv.ru/news/polit/156873
Does it remind this episode? Or am I too paranoid :)
http://en.wikipilipinas.org/images/1/1b/Yalta_Conference.jpg
You are probably correct. Anyway Yalta was probably the Soviet's greatest diplomatic victory, so from their perspective certainly worth remembering.
The Dalai Lama for example is NOT a world leader, though he may have slightly more moral stature than does the Archbishop of Canterbury -- also not a world leader -- or Jean-Claude Duvalier -- also a former but deposed national leader.
The Dalai Lama has magnificent moral stature... probably more that the combined total of all national leaders put together. The problem is when coming from a western culture where "everything is negotiable" we tend to elect slime-balls like us as presidents and prime ministers rather than men of moral stature and integrity. Britain has an excuse as the cream of Britain were killed off in the 1914-18 and 1939-45 wars. Some countries don't have this excuse.
Rex Brynen
07-19-2010, 03:25 PM
The Dalai Lama has magnificent moral stature...
This certainly isn't meant to refer negatively upon the current (very impressive) Dalai Lama, but it is perhaps somewhat easier to maintain your moral stature when you don't govern and have very few actual decisions to make.
Even the Dalai Lama, I suspect, sees the logic in the USG meeting with him quietly rather than poking China in the eye with a stick by doing so in a high-profile way (which would have no discernable effect on Chinese policy in Tibet).
This certainly isn't meant to refer negatively upon the current (very impressive) Dalai Lama, but it is perhaps somewhat easier to maintain your moral stature when you don't govern and have very few actual decisions to make.
Even the Dalai Lama, I suspect, sees the logic in the USG meeting with him quietly rather than poking China in the eye with a stick by doing so in a high-profile way (which would have no discernable effect on Chinese policy in Tibet).
Why would the US be worried about what China thought about the US president meeting with the Dalai Lama?
Boy how things are changing.
How did China get to control Tibet? To sell out the Tibetans is too easy.
North Korea commits and act of war by torpedoing a ROK navy ship. For heavens sake don't say or do anything that will upset China.
etc etc
Ken White
07-19-2010, 06:32 PM
North Korea commits and act of war by torpedoing a ROK navy ship. For heavens sake don't say or do anything that will upset China. Is it China or North Korea that is getting the softly softly treatment? Some would say the latter at the specific behest of South Korea who have some interest in how silly the North might become if their paranoia is aroused.
Easy for me or most Americans to say we think that's not a major problem but then we don't live there and our Capital is not 35 miles from the border with the north -- and in Artillery range of those Northeners. :eek: :wry:
Rex Brynen
07-19-2010, 06:53 PM
Easy for me or most Americans to say we think that's not a major problem but then we don't live there and our Capital is not 35 miles from the border with the north -- and in Artillery range of those Northeners. :eek: :wry:
What's more, Ken isn't going back there to save them again this time. (As for Chuck Norris... well, let's face it, he's just not Ken...)
SJPONeill
07-20-2010, 12:52 AM
By 1960, the UK had the world's 2nd/3rd largest Navy, nuclear Weapons, the 2nd/3rd most powerful Army in NATO, a growing population, and was a G5 nation. - not bad of a country facing a solitary existential battle a mere 20 years early.
A solitary battle? Oh, please...!! Solitary except for the support it got from the Dominions...you know...Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, plus India, and all the soldiers, sailors and airmen from Occupied Europe and the support that was already starting to trickle across the Atlantic...poor little England standing alone? Yeah, right...that's gratitude for you...
And if you take samples at every twenty years from 1940 i.e. 1960, 1980 and 2000, all you see is a steady decline to a nation with no (real) carriers, the shadow of an air force and an army that struggles to keep a brigade deployed on operations...
William F. Owen
07-20-2010, 05:12 AM
A solitary battle? Oh, please...!! Solitary except for the support it got from the Dominions...you know...Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, plus India, and all the soldiers, sailors and airmen from Occupied Europe and the support that was already starting to trickle across the Atlantic...poor little England standing alone? Yeah, right...that's gratitude for you...
Read what I wrote. "IF". So if Britain had been invaded and surrendered in 1940/41, the dominions would have fought on?
Didn't happen in France. Troops not in the UK would have been operationally irrelevant.
The dominions would have become de-facto independent nations with no interest in liberating the UK, and struggling for their own existence. Canada is the possible exception, but it lacked the means and manpower to do much.
And if you take samples at every twenty years from 1940 i.e. 1960, 1980 and 2000, all you see is a steady decline to a nation with no (real) carriers, the shadow of an air force and an army that struggles to keep a brigade deployed on operations...
Not arguing with that. Actually, you see a sharp rise and then a sharp decline, after about 1956. Yes the UK became less strategically relevant, relative to those in it's league (US,UK, USSR, France, and China).
WW2 substantially altered the world strategic map, but I fall of my chair open mouthed, if someone tries to convince me that the main benefactor of WW2 was the Soviet Union.
William F. Owen
07-20-2010, 05:17 AM
North Korea commits and act of war by torpedoing a ROK navy ship. For heavens sake don't say or do anything that will upset China.
Not an act of War. NK merely breached the cease fire. It is at War with the South. You may want to bring yourself up to speed on North Korean Chinese relationships.
In a wider strategic context look at how US actions in Vietnam were shaped by issues concerned with Chinese intervention. China is strategically relevant. What is so hard to understand about that?
A solitary battle? Oh, please...!! Solitary except for the support it got from the Dominions...you know...Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, plus India, and all the soldiers, sailors and airmen from Occupied Europe and the support that was already starting to trickle across the Atlantic...poor little England standing alone? Yeah, right...that's gratitude for you...
Yea, out here in the colonies we were taken somewhat for granted.
I see they have given a proper burial to some Brit and Digger bodies found recently in a mass grave in France. RIP brothers. See:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10679715
Not an act of War. NK merely breached the cease fire. It is at War with the South. You may want to bring yourself up to speed on North Korean Chinese relationships.
Exactly, they are still at war therefore sinking a naval ship of the other side with a torpedo is an act of that ongoing war.
In a wider strategic context look at how US actions in Vietnam were shaped by issues concerned with Chinese intervention. China is strategically relevant. What is so hard to understand about that?
Its a proximity issue. China certainly does not want the US navy (carriers and all) hovering around close to its territorial waters on navy maneuvers or patrols. Who can blame them (certainly after the US had the Monroe doctrine).
The question is to what extent the US will kowtow to China on this matter.
William F. Owen
07-20-2010, 10:48 AM
The question is to what extent the US will kowtow to China on this matter.
Never has to date. Why should that change?
Remember the P-3 collision? Same stuff still going on. In fact if talk to the Chinese one of their great concerns is how aggressive and confrontational US Aircraft and Warships tend to be.
IVIaedhros
07-22-2010, 07:42 PM
IVIaedhros:
As IntelTrooper suggested, this sounds an awful lot like the Mobile (Roving?) Combined Action Platoons from Vietnam, which is good.
I don't if I can express this question clearly, but I'll try. How much of an emphasis would your proposed unit put on pursuit? And if they were going to pursue for more than a few hours, how would they lighten their load? Body armor or no? etc.
There is a long thread about lightening the load.
Sorry this took so long to get back to. I've been rather distracted lately with getting fat and buying obscene amounts of gear for Ranger School *sighs*.
If I had to say anything, I would say there would be a greater emphasis on pursuit simply because you're going to be more mobile and because you'd have less opportunity to use fire support. I don't think the emphasis would change much, since so far as I can tell, pursuit ATM is largely based on the situation and the commander: if they think they can successfully pursue, then they do so. Ambush, would still be the primary form of attack and if the ambush goes well, there shouldn't be anything left worth pursuing.
I haven't read the load thread yet (will definitely check it out). The two main ways that the load is lightened and therefor pursuit capability increased is through removing the standard protective equipment and relying more upon caches and such, thus less sustainment required.
SJPONeill
07-22-2010, 10:40 PM
Agree re shedding protection as a means of enhancing mobility - the other area in which weight savings could be made is in shucking a good amount of the technology we rely on, same weight directly through having less to carry and indirectly in reducing the log burden on supplying the batteries etc for these systems. BUT like shedding protection, the key would be in determining the balance where less actually stops being more and starts to be really less in terms of overall capability and effectiveness.
Caching doesn't so much reduce the log burden as shift it elsewhere - someone still has to plant the caches, periodically check and maintain them and also ensure that the pursued adversary runs to where caches are...
Never has to date. Why should that change?
Remember the P-3 collision? Same stuff still going on. In fact if talk to the Chinese one of their great concerns is how aggressive and confrontational US Aircraft and Warships tend to be.
Lets just watch and see.
Lets just watch and see.
NKorea seizes SKorean fishing boat amid tension (http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jjz-1FsdSMQjYDWp3qoa60B4b_jwD9HFBE4G1)
Got to hand to to these guys. They know how to play the game "two steps forward, one step back".
Ken White
08-08-2010, 09:52 PM
Got to hand to to these guys. They know how to play the game "two steps forward, one step back".since 1953. With 57 years of practice, one should be fairly adept... :D
Note the US does not have 57 years of practice, we only have 14 Administration terms and each has to learn anew...:eek:
Which reminds me, we're overdue for another incident on land. No casualties since 1999 until the torpedoing of the Cheonan. That's an unusually long dry spell... LINK (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/dmz-list.htm) :rolleyes:
Yup, Korea has been a constant source of trouble, even before Ken was born, which can be seen by clicking here (http://www.homeofheroes.com/e-books/mohW_korea1871/index.html).
Now we add this to the cooking pot and see if this helps to tip these guys over the edge.
N.Korea Reports Heavy Damage from Floods (http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/08/06/2010080600294.html)
since 1953. With 57 years of practice, one should be fairly adept... :D
Note the US does not have 57 years of practice, we only have 14 Administration terms and each has to learn anew...:eek:
Too true. From out here in the colonies the lack of long term continuity in US foreign policy does not contribute long term stable relationships with allies and potential allies. Just about every player in every country realises that when the next batch of America's brightest gets into the White House they are likely to be left holding the baby. Little wonder that the Swiss bank account is the best fall back position for most US allies and that the US's last best friend is young David in No.10. The solution is quite simple... but the implementation is near impossible.
And now another attempt at attention seeking by the North...
North Korea Fires Artillery Near Disputed Waters (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/10/world/asia/10korea.html)
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