Restrepo and The Battle of Algiers

[MikeF]

All,

Saw Restrepo last week. IMO, hands-down the best post-9/11 film to date, but they lost a wonderful opportunity to do it better given some space, time, and reflection. In the coming month, I am looking at doing a Point-Counterpoint style review with a journalist friend of mine, and I wanted to test out one analogy with the group before I proceed.

This attempts to drive towards the greater issue of how we perceive external interventions in small wars. Thanks in advance for your thoughts and time.


When I first watched The Battle for Algiers (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0058946/) in late 2005, I had just returned from my third deployment from leading a tank platoon to serving on a Special Forces staff. At the time, I thought that I knew a lot about combat. I had done the high intensity fights of the Thunder Runs, I was immersed into the indirect methods of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), but I still had no idea about how to comprehend the chaos of failure in Iraq much less any understanding on how to preceed.

Watching Battle for Algiers, I thought the lessons were simple. If, on the tactical level, one is too aggressive with violence, population control measures, and, in the most aggregious failings, resorting to torture, then one is apt to win the battle but lose the war. This film was regarded as the best comprehensive, neutral film of its genre. That's what I walked away with.

Going back to Iraq in 2006 changed everything for me. As the situation deteriorated into a civil war, we forced very violent measures to attempt to regain control and force arbitration. With exception to torture, my actions were reminiscent to LTC Mathieu. In some ways, I was much more violent than his paratroopers. I returned to the United States to continue studying these type of conflicts at the post-graduate level. I wondered about the disconnect between my thoughts of the theory versus my actions in practice.

Finally, I realized the gap. The neutrality of the movie became it's biggest failure. There is no such thing as a neutral narrative. What is missing is the French counter-guerrilla effort was doomed to fail because ultimately, colonialism is doomed to fail. The military effort is extraneous to this discussion. The actions of the French paratroopers could only prolonge or shorten the length of the conflict. They could not influence the outcome. The native Algerians simply wanted their own independence.

Restrepo falls into a similar trap. The lack of context fails to inform the viewer of the overarching struggles in the nearly nine-year old conflict. Through ommision, the producers show a tragic failure to understand insurgency theory. While the film depicts the war for the soldier, it fails to capture the essence of the fight. In doing so, it fails on a very deep fundamental level.

[MikeF]

200 views and no discontent? I guess that I assumed my thoughts would be contreversal. Again, what say you?

[jmm99]

Maybe, no one else watched Restrepo. :D

Cheers

Mike

PS: I could make some comments on the Battle of Algiers and on Charlie Gallstone pulling the plug on Algeria because France's greater political interests lay in disengament; but it's too darn late. Sorry.

[MikeF]

Maybe, no one else watched Restrepo. :D

Cheers

Mike

PS: I could make some comments on the Battle of Algiers and on Charlie Gallstone pulling the plug on Algeria because France's greater political interests lay in disengament; but it's too darn late. Sorry.

sadly seeking affirmation or discord. I'm about to just go about the business of pushing onward. And yes, Michael, I owe you a PM uupdate.

[marct]

Hi Mike,

Well, I haven't seen the movie, but one thing you said really stood out for me


There is no such thing as a neutral narrative.

Yup. Not only that, I am increasingly persuaded that a "neutral narrative" is impossible because of the way our (HSS) brains work. I do, however, see some potential from another quirk of our brains - the ability to hold mutually opposing and contradictory narratives so, even if we can't create a "neutral narrative", we may be able to create multiple narratives that can act as triangulation points towards a larger vision (as opposed to neutrality).

[Bob's World]

"Neutrality" is inherently dishonest, and makes everyone equally nervous of what ones true intentions might be.

If you don't believe me, next time your wife asks you what you want for dinner just say "I don't care." You think you just made things simple for her, in fact you created complexity and hard feelings.

[marct]

Hi Bob,


"Neutrality" is inherently dishonest, and makes everyone equally nervous of what ones true intentions might be.

If you don't believe me, next time your wife asks you what you want for dinner just say "I don't care." You think you just made things simple for her, in fact you created complexity and hard feelings.

LOLOL - Too true! Hades, you might end up with rat brains sauteed with cockroaches!

Far better to state your biases and build a narrative around that......

[Steve Blair]

If you don't believe me, next time your wife asks you what you want for dinner just say "I don't care." You think you just made things simple for her, in fact you created complexity and hard feelings.

Being the cook in the house, I can testify to the truth of Bob's statement.

[sabers8th]

Mike,
I did see the movie here in Fayettenam when it came out. A good film but at the end of it I was like was that it? Seriously for 15 months of filming I think they could have gotten more out of it. The film does bring to the forefront even more the subject of PTSD. the one question that sticks out in my is when the camera man asks the one SPC "What are you going to to do when you get back after going through this?" (paraphrase) That is the million dollar question that they didnt answer.

Kelly

[MikeF]

Mike,
I did see the movie here in Fayettenam when it came out. A good film but at the end of it I was like was that it? Seriously for 15 months of filming I think they could have gotten more out of it. The film does bring to the forefront even more the subject of PTSD. the one question that sticks out in my is when the camera man asks the one SPC "What are you going to to do when you get back after going through this?" (paraphrase) That is the million dollar question that they didnt answer.

Kelly

Hi Kelly.

I had a similar reaction. Half way through the movie, I distinctly remember feeling underwhelmed; however, many of my civilian friends that have seen it were blown away. That's why I want to do a point-counterpoint review so that all of us can get a better perspective given two completely different points of view.

Mike

[Backwards Observer]

"Neutrality" is inherently dishonest, and makes everyone equally nervous of what ones true intentions might be.

If you don't believe me, next time your wife asks you what you want for dinner just say "I don't care." You think you just made things simple for her, in fact you created complexity and hard feelings.

A girl sat me down once for a talk about the direction she thought the relationship should go and some of things she wanted to happen. I listened and said it all sounded fine or within the bounds of possibility given where things were headed.

She then asked if there was anything I wanted to say about the future of the relationship. I said, "Don't get fat." You'd be surprised how well this was not taken.

(Sorry, I haven't seen Restrepo, either.)

[John T. Fishel]

I had to look up Restrepo to have any idea of what you were talking about.:o

As far as Battle of Algiers is concerned, don't make the mistake that any of the film makers sought neutrality. Saadi Yacef - who wrote the orignial story & starred in it - was playing himself almost without amplification. Gillo Pontecorvo, the Director, was a committed Italian communist and anti-colonialist. The film is very, very pro Algerian independence and anti-French colonialism. It is, however, honest in its portrayal of the players and treats each of the human beings involved with sympathy.

Cheers

JohnT

[jmm99]

except I would have had to look up the names, etc., for the Battle of Algiers.

For a communist (small "c") film, it has much less agitprop than one would have expected - and, of course, the Algerian insurgency was not Marxist in ideology (though it used many of the then common tactics used by Marxist insurgentsl), many French officers to the contrary.

See, Mike, great minds run in the same channels - and are sometimes joined by rugby players from That Place on the Hudson. :D

Cheers

Mike

[tequila]

Liked it quite a bit, but was also somewhat underwhelmed compared to the overall rapturous reviews:

http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/restrepo/

Another excellent film which I actually liked more and which felt more visceral was an A&E film called Combat Diary: Marines of Lima Company (http://www.amazon.com/Combat-Diary-Marines-Lima-Company/dp/B000GJ0LG8) about Lima 3/25 in Iraq in 2005. Most of the footage in that was actually shot by the Marines themselves rather than an embedded journalist.

[MikeF]

See, Mike, great minds run in the same channels - and are sometimes joined by rugby players from That Place on the Hudson. :D


The key is sometimes. What's that saying? A broke clock is right twice a day :eek:.

John T Fishel is right on that Battle for Algiers is not neutral. Restrepo is supposed to be, but what is left out takes so much away from the story. The biggest thing is that they talk about how important OP Restrepo is, yet, they never explained why it is important and to what value. That's just a disservice in my book.

I watched the movie with my old JTAC (Joint Tactical Air Controller) who had also served in the Korengal in 2005 with the Marines so he was able to fill me in on some of the rest of the story.

[CloseDanger]

I thought his take was interesting: http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3356

[jmm99]

I picked up a DVD player (re-manufactured 2008 combo VCR & DVD - so I can copy old tapes to discs). I'm slow (a year tardy) but sure.

BLUF: I picked up Restrepo & have watched it more than once. The theme that I saw running through it (common to WWII, Korea and Vietnam - from the folks I've known well) are the deaths of the people to the right and left of the infantrymen who were there. I don't know if my dad would have liked it; but he would have understood it - far better than I.

Regards

Mike

[ganulv]

BLUF: I picked up Restrepo & have watched it more than once. The theme that I saw running through it (common to WWII, Korea and Vietnam - from the folks I've known well) are the deaths of the people to the right and left of the infantrymen who were there. I don't know if my dad would have liked it; but he would have understood it - far better than I.

I liked that it really was a movie rather than cut-and-pasted pieces of footage. Heart of Darkness is impossible to miss in the early sequence with the footage shot from the helicopters, and the image quality overall is excellent.

I have to say that I slept very poorly the night after my initial viewing of the film. I just had thought things were going better than that for the US effort in Afghanistan. I know that it was a selectively edited view of one small part of things, but still. One scene that seemed particularly telling was the increasing frustration on the young officer’s face as the older fellow keeps haranguing him and he can’t manage to produce the first non-English word to try and calm the situation.

[jmm99]

I didn't see Conrad in the opening heliochopter sequence - so I'm living proof that it's not impossible to miss that Congo classic as a model. :D

No doubt that the Korengal was Astan's "heart of darkness" then (now ?) - a hard-headed Pashtun mountaineer area; where lowlanders and outsiders have a tough time fitting in. Cf., Dayuhan's present environs.

Anyway, after one run through the film, I saw I was not going to add anything to a "DIME" review of it. And, in any event (as with most films), I got caught up in the characters - primarily the young men of the 2nd Plt. (the residents of OP Restrepo).

What came across to me was the impact that the deaths (e.g., Vimoto, Restrepo, Rougle) had on them. Which made me think of one WWII survivor I knew well (my dad) and two Vietnam survivors and close friends (both now dead) - and the impact that combat deaths had on all of them.

Of course, all is not morbid - e.g., the scene where Elliott tells of his 80-year old grandpa and the Bikini Car Wash (one of the outtakes). I can attest; the spirit is willing even if the flesh has become weak. :)

--------------------------

Heart of Darkness was assigned in an honors class in 1962; but I re-read the thing together with Peter Forbath's The River Congo and Mike Hoare's Mercenary within the last 12 months.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

I watched Restrepo yesterday.

This is a story of soldiers dropped into an impossible situation, over which they have little control, and throughout which they can all sense that what they do is not apt to produce the larger effect that led to them being placed into such a situation to begin with. The result is that "bubble", reducing each soldier's world to him, the few men around him, the faceless enemy that oppose them, and the daily contest to stay alive.

This is a powerful story, but it offers little insights on insurgency or how to best deal with the situation in Afghanistan.

The irony of a group of foreign soldiers dropping into a region so self-governing and disconnected from anything in Kabul in order to convince the populace there to support something so irrelevant to their daily lives being "sold" to them by a foreign army bringing them promises that cannot be comprehended, wrapped in death and violence that are all too real is huge.

This is a microcosm of the application of foreign military power to defeat a resistance that is supported by a revolution. We attempt this all over Afghanistan. The Korengal Valley of Restrepo is a microcosm of the Helmand River Valley. One can, as the company commander does, draw a very real sense of accomplishment from establishing a small outpost such as Restrepo and holding it through hard effort; or in Clearing the Sangin district of Helmand as Gen Petreaus did; both efforts being equally valorous and honorable, and both efforts being equally moot and inappropriate to problem at hand.

The producers of the movie Restrepo have little understanding of the nature of insurgency, that is to be expected, they are just telling a story of human drama. Sadly, those who craft our efforts in Afghanistan tend to seem equally unable to see past the human drama to the greater elements behind the same.

[TDB]

I watched Restrepo yesterday.

This is a story of soldiers dropped into an impossible situation, over which they have little control, and throughout which they can all sense that what they do is not apt to produce the larger effect that led to them being placed into such a situation to begin with. The result is that "bubble", reducing each soldier's world to him, the few men around him, the faceless enemy that oppose them, and the daily contest to stay alive.

This is a powerful story, but it offers little insights on insurgency or how to best deal with the situation in Afghanistan.

The irony of a group of foreign soldiers dropping into a region so self-governing and disconnected from anything in Kabul in order to convince the populace there to support something so irrelevant to their daily lives being "sold" to them by a foreign army bringing them promises that cannot be comprehended, wrapped in death and violence that are all too real is huge.

This is a microcosm of the application of foreign military power to defeat a resistance that is supported by a revolution. We attempt this all over Afghanistan. The Korengal Valley of Restrepo is a microcosm of the Helmand River Valley. One can, as the company commander does, draw a very real sense of accomplishment from establishing a small outpost such as Restrepo and holding it through hard effort; or in Clearing the Sangin district of Helmand as Gen Petreaus did; both efforts being equally valorous and honorable, and both efforts being equally moot and inappropriate to problem at hand.

The producers of the movie Restrepo have little understanding of the nature of insurgency, that is to be expected, they are just telling a story of human drama. Sadly, those who craft our efforts in Afghanistan tend to seem equally unable to see past the human drama to the greater elements behind the same.

Very well put, not simply in terms of the film only showing the great struggle of a few men in what is a huge theatre. Also in terms of those who are crafting the strategy. I came across this in the book Dead Men Risen, everytime a brigade commander is told he is about to deploy he arrives upon some grand strategy for his tour. It is all about his deployment, even in the post FM:3.24/COIN buzzword world. I don't want to go as far as to say that they only care about climbing the greasy pole of promotion, but it's short sighted.

As for the original point of the thread. In The Battle For Algiers, as you have rightly said the commanders only care about the battle not the war. In terms of Restrepo, the men only care about getting home alive and so will do whatever they have to. If this means dropping massive amounts of HE on mountains then so be it. Even when civilians are killed, as much as it pains them, their response is still very matter of fact. No training soldiers to see the bigger picture is hard when all they can see/hear is amount of fire being rained down on them.

[JMA]

Very well put, not simply in terms of the film only showing the great struggle of a few men in what is a huge theatre. Also in terms of those who are crafting the strategy. I came across this in the book Dead Men Risen, everytime a brigade commander is told he is about to deploy he arrives upon some grand strategy for his tour. It is all about his deployment, even in the post FM:3.24/COIN buzzword world. I don't want to go as far as to say that they only care about climbing the greasy pole of promotion, but it's short sighted.

I would like to believe that every incoming brigade commander is not given carte blanche to 'do his own thing'. Amazingly it seems to be the case when one reads books like Dead Men Risen (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Dead-Men-Risen-Britains-Afghanistan/dp/1849164215) and Losing Small Wars (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Losing-Small-Wars-Military-Afghanistan/dp/0300166710/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1319248926&sr=1-1).

Yes it seems the successful brigade commanders get a CBE while the runners-up get a plain old DSO. It is an indefensible policy and begs the question as to what the Brit general at the 'Div HQ' was doing and what he was supposed to be doing.

To compound this problem the new brigadier armed with his new plan for Helmand would arrive with new troops (comprising at best an element who had done a 'short tour' 18 months previously). It is so amateur its like the boy-scouts. It absolutely boggles the mind that the Brit military has got itself into the state it has. This is early Boer War ineptitude.

Help may be at hand. You have probably noticed that a similar problem has developed with the top echelons of the Brit police. The government has hired a yank policeman (I think with gang experience from LA?) as an advisor (which has pissed the Brit police brass off) and are now considering introducing the US system of electing Chief Constables (Sheriffs). Watch this space. I believe there is a need for outside assistance to help 'fix' the crisis in the Brit military at ranks above Lt Col. There are various permutations possible to use outsiders in this process (all of which will be unacceptable to the current general staff of course) but whatever happens it needs to be on the scale of the Haldane Commission. It is the only hope as currently the cancer of incompetence and ineptitude is spreading down the rank structure at an alarming rate (and when it gets into and among the majors/captains it will be curtains for the military).


As for the original point of the thread. In The Battle For Algiers, as you have rightly said the commanders only care about the battle not the war.

I don't like where is thought approach is going.

In a war the politicians draft the grand strategy (which essentially charts where they want to be at the end of the war). This Grand Strategy then controls what the lower level military strategy can be. Everyone works that their level in accordance with the applicable strategy and RoE. Part of the problem (or even the main part of the problem) is that this FM:3.24 has been interpreted incorrectly (or written in a manner to create confusion). The ludicrous expectation that foreign soldiers can/should be able to flip from a RoE restricted combat role to a 'hearts and minds' civil affairs role in an instant is the main problem. Secondly that there is no acceptable government and no acceptable government forces to hand over to after the 'clear' phase of a combat operation (in Afghanistan) effectively means ISAF is on a hiding to nothing. The good news is that Patreus is no longer in the military and now the damage can begin to be undone.

By all means intervene on the side of the legitimate representatives of the people to prevent a military solution being imposed through an insurgency and control this with RoE to prevent the kind of problems (which occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan) which serve to estrange the people further or push them into the opposing camp (like bombing wedding parties or shooting up families at check points). The kind of living with the people 'hearts and minds' stuff is not a line infantry role.


In terms of Restrepo, the men only care about getting home alive and so will do whatever they have to. If this means dropping massive amounts of HE on mountains then so be it. Even when civilians are killed, as much as it pains them, their response is still very matter of fact. No training soldiers to see the bigger picture is hard when all they can see/hear is amount of fire being rained down on them.

Restrepo was a deeply disturbing movie. They were not conducting military operations they were trying to survive. Pity soldiers had to die before they realised the futility of the presence there. The other aspect of the problem in Afghanistan it raised is that the connection between the people and the Taliban is not understood. It ends up with the US held up in a beau geste fort surrounded by hostile locals and Taliban. If those kids were used to clear the area of Taliban so the ANA could move in and pacify the locals then they would propably be able to understand that... but don't stick them on a hill top in a strange land for months on end and expect them to understand why they are there.

[davidbfpo]

Citing JMA:
..You have probably noticed that a similar problem has developed with the top echelons of the Brit police. The government has hired a yank policeman (I think with gang experience from LA?) as an advisor (which has pissed the Brit police brass off) and are now considering introducing the US system of electing Chief Constables (Sheriffs). Watch this space...

You are on the right track, but to clarify and before some think policing in the UK needs to learn from US policing!

For complex reasons the UK government has 'issues' with how policing is delivered and how much it costs. Before coming to power it was clear the Conservatives wanted to have in England and Wales, in each county, an elected person to oversee policing, called a Police & Crime Commissioner; which would replace the current unelected oversight body. The riots in several cities, notably London, with the perception the top echelons failed to get a grip, added to the government's resolve to push reform through.

In London the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police resigned before the riots and it was mooted that the Prime Minister would welcome Bill Bratton, ex-police chief in New York and Los Angeles applying for the vacancy. That came to nought as by a quick change the post was made UK citizens only may apply. Then it was mooted Bill Bratton would become a special adviser on gangs, that too came to nowt; just attending a conference last week.

[JMA]

Citing JMA:

You are on the right track, but to clarify and before some think policing in the UK needs to learn from US policing!

For complex reasons the UK government has 'issues' with how policing is delivered and how much it costs. Before coming to power it was clear the Conservatives wanted to have in England and Wales, in each county, an elected person to oversee policing, called a Police & Crime Commissioner; which would replace the current unelected oversight body. The riots in several cities, notably London, with the perception the top echelons failed to get a grip, added to the government's resolve to push reform through.

In London the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police resigned before the riots and it was mooted that the Prime Minister would welcome Bill Bratton, ex-police chief in New York and Los Angeles applying for the vacancy. That came to nought as by a quick change the post was made UK citizens only may apply. Then it was mooted Bill Bratton would become a special adviser on gangs, that too came to nowt; just attending a conference last week.

Thanks for clarifying that David (I was just lazy to get into the detail).

I do think that the threat of bringing in someone like Bratton served to jerk the chain of the complacent senior police officers. A good trick if that was the intention... which they should apply with a suitable variation to the military. Can you just imagine all those old farts in the senior officers mess choking on their G&Ts? (gin and tonics)