Jedburgh
08-11-2006, 03:18 PM
...yet another worthwhile pub from RAND:
On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG482.pdf)
...The body of work generated from this study covers many aspects of COIN, from the most abstract theories of why insurgency takes place to tactical operations. It also covers a wide array of cases, varied in both geography and time, from the British experience in Malaya to the French in Algeria to the United States in El Salvador. However, the research is limited in that almost all of it is based on cases that occurred in the context of the Cold War. Some might question the continuing relevance of studies centered on conflicts that took place in such a radically different geopolitical context.
This study is based on the premise that, while many specific details do indeed vary greatly, insurgency and counterinsurgency is a more general phenomenon that is not a product of Cold War peculiarities. Further, many of the alleged differences between past and current COIN are overstated. For example, the fragmented nature of the insurgency in Iraq is often remarked on as almost without precedent. Yet many insurgencies during the Cold War were highly fragmented, with elements fighting each other as well as the counterinsurgent...
Contents
Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter Two: The Wizards of Less-Than-Armageddon: RAND and COIN
Chapter Three: Analogies and War: Are Theory and Empirics from Prior COIN Relevant?
Chapter Four: COIN Theory: What Are Insurgencies and How Does One Fight Them?
Chapter Five: The Social Scientists’ Wars: RAND and COIN Practice
Chapter Six: COIN Old and New
Appendix: RAND Counterinsurgency Publications, 1955-1995: Selected Annotated Bibliography
On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG482.pdf)
...The body of work generated from this study covers many aspects of COIN, from the most abstract theories of why insurgency takes place to tactical operations. It also covers a wide array of cases, varied in both geography and time, from the British experience in Malaya to the French in Algeria to the United States in El Salvador. However, the research is limited in that almost all of it is based on cases that occurred in the context of the Cold War. Some might question the continuing relevance of studies centered on conflicts that took place in such a radically different geopolitical context.
This study is based on the premise that, while many specific details do indeed vary greatly, insurgency and counterinsurgency is a more general phenomenon that is not a product of Cold War peculiarities. Further, many of the alleged differences between past and current COIN are overstated. For example, the fragmented nature of the insurgency in Iraq is often remarked on as almost without precedent. Yet many insurgencies during the Cold War were highly fragmented, with elements fighting each other as well as the counterinsurgent...
Contents
Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter Two: The Wizards of Less-Than-Armageddon: RAND and COIN
Chapter Three: Analogies and War: Are Theory and Empirics from Prior COIN Relevant?
Chapter Four: COIN Theory: What Are Insurgencies and How Does One Fight Them?
Chapter Five: The Social Scientists’ Wars: RAND and COIN Practice
Chapter Six: COIN Old and New
Appendix: RAND Counterinsurgency Publications, 1955-1995: Selected Annotated Bibliography