Military Review: July - August Issue Now Posted

[SWJED]

Featured Articles:

Advising Iraqis: Building the Iraqi Army (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Grunow.pdf) by Lieutenant Colonel Carl D. Grunow, U.S. Army.

Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Hammes.pdf) by Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, Retired.

Responding to Bolivian Democracy: Avoiding the Mistakes of Early U.S. Cuban Policy (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Morales.pdf) by Waltraud Queiser Morales, Ph.D.

Full-Spectrum Analysis: A New Way of Thinking for a New World (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Wolfberg.pdf) by Adrian Wolfberg.

USAF Relevance in the 21st Century: A First-Quarter Team in a Four-Quarter Game (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Kovich.pdf) by Major Andrew S. Kovich, U.S. Air Force.

Writing Competition Winners

1st Place (COIN Competition)

Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN Operations (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Ollivant-Chewning.pdf) by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Ollivant, U.S. Army and First Lieutenant Eric D. Chewning, U.S. Army.

2nd Place (COIN Competition)

Unit Immersion in Mosul: Establishing Stability in Transition (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Stanton.pdf) by Major Paul T. Stanton, U.S. Army.

1st Place (DePuy Competition)

Hezbollah’s Employment of Suicide Bombing during the 1980’s: The Theological, Political, and Operational Development of a New Tactic (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Helmer.pdf) by Captain Daniel Isaac Helmer, U.S. Army.

Latin America

A Dragon in the Andes? China, Venezuela, and U.S. Energy Security (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Erikson.pdf) by Daniel P. Erikson.

Castro’s Tactics of Control in Cuba (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Ponce.pdf) by José Ramón Ponce Solozábal.

Stand Alone

The All-Volunteer Army: Can We Still Claim Success? (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Stewart.pdf) by Major General Walter L. Stewart Jr., U.S. Army National Guard, Retired.

Cultural Awareness and Irregular Warfare: French Army Experience in Africa (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/Bore.pdf) by Colonel Henri Boré, French Army, Retired.

Insights

Our Strategic Intelligence Problem (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/BoB_Insights_Reviews_Letters_JA06.pdf) by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters, U.S. Army, Retired.

Book Reviews: Contemporary Readings for the Professional (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/BoB_Insights_Reviews_Letters_JA06.pdf) (Scroll down past the Peters article - also contains letters to the editor).

[Steve Blair]

Coucil members may be interested to know that Air Force ROTC removed the one class period devoted to MOOTW in its most recent course sylabus revisions. This is in relation to the Air Force article linked above.

[Sonny]

Steve, et al,

My two cents on the Air Force article.

When I went through ROTC (back in 95-96, I was a "six-weeker"), they had a block of instruction for MOOTW; it was a short lesson, but at least it was an introduction. I am sad to hear that even that is going away, which runs counter to what you would expect considering our current operations. There must be a disconnect down at Maxwell.

Sad to say that IMHO the USAF pays little attention to small wars and MOOTW in its educational system (ROTC, SOS, ACSC, various FTU's, etc.)and published doctrine. To me this is a problem considering that we are more likely to be involved in a MOOTW or small war than in a major theater war. Somehow we need to balance what we teach and our doctrine so that we can better address operations at the lower end of the spectrum. We are the best when it comes to addressing conventional and nuclear war, but we need to do a better job in the realm of MOOTW, COIN, etc.

The good news is that I think we are actually doing a good job supporting real world ops (OIF, OEF, etc, etc); we are learning as we go and through OJT. Somehow, all this knowledge and experience needs to make it back to Maxwell and our tech schools.

When it comes to MOOTW and COIN most of what we bring to the fight in terms of airpower mission comes in the form of airlift, ISR, special ops support assets, some CAS (urban CAS as in Iraq, or "rural" CAS as in Afghanistan) and TST prosecution (as when we schwacked AMZ and hundreds of others). Sortie wise, the fight is mostly non-kinetic. Not a whole lot of traditional "strategic bombing" going in stability operations. But like I said, out in the field our people have adapted superbly to supporting the troops on the ground and we actually have a lot of USAF people doing jobs traditionally done by the Army like convoy duty, interrogations and PRT.

[Tom Odom]

There are beliefs and practices below the cultural surface that many Westerners miss or find difficult to fathom: a company commander in Chad shooting one of his lieutenants in the head for lack of respect in front of the unit; a captain, native of the south of Mauritania, paying obedience to his second lieutenant, who was a member of a dominant northern tribe; regular soldiers killing women and children execution-style in Rwanda. Despite these disturbing occurrences, our training allowed us to continue to walk down these less traveled roads and to continue functioning effectively; we found mission success by strengthening relationships with the local military and the population.:rolleyes:

I must say that only a French colonel could say that and not choke on his snails. Execution-style was considered 1st class treatment in the genocide, especially for women who were typically raped until they were bleeding and then hacked up. Much of this happened inside the French protective zone and the French got by such "disturbing occurences" by looking the other way. "Strengthening relationships with the local military?" Hell the French trained the ex-FAR and at least part of the Interahamwe. As for the RPA, they despised the French, even more so after the genocide.

I am not a Francophobe. I generally respect the French military and I liked working with them in UNTSO and even in Goma although we did have our conflicting agendas. I even wrote about their ops in Kolwezi quite favorably. But their actions in Rwanda and their support of a killer regime and murderous army are stains that just don't wash away with crap like this.

best
Tom

[jcustis]

Grunow's article is an excellent read, and again something that should be inserted into the curriculum of every advisor cadre spin-up program. Sadly though, his year of observations (which appear to have recently ended) is similar to my observations back in late 2004.

What I did find interesting and refreshing was the observation that advisors must develop a bridge to partner coalition formations, and invest time in fostering a good working relationship through education and open lines of comm. I also liked the practical words of advice that bring Lawrence into the current age - do not levy the same reporting requirements on the IA that we do ourselves.

The article reinforced my firm belief that if we are to succeed in the advisory role, the screening and selection of advisors must be taken seriously. That is only the first step, well in advance of any training regimen to prepare them for the duty. In the Marine Corps' case, the cadre must be applied for at least a year, not seven months.

[Steve Blair]

Steve, et al,

My two cents on the Air Force article.

When I went through ROTC (back in 95-96, I was a "six-weeker"), they had a block of instruction for MOOTW; it was a short lesson, but at least it was an introduction. I am sad to hear that even that is going away, which runs counter to what you would expect considering our current operations. There must be a disconnect down at Maxwell.

Sad to say that IMHO the USAF pays little attention to small wars and MOOTW in its educational system (ROTC, SOS, ACSC, various FTU's, etc.)and published doctrine. To me this is a problem considering that we are more likely to be involved in a MOOTW or small war than in a major theater war. Somehow we need to balance what we teach and our doctrine so that we can better address operations at the lower end of the spectrum. We are the best when it comes to addressing conventional and nuclear war, but we need to do a better job in the realm of MOOTW, COIN, etc.



Yeah, they yanked the MOOTW portion of the AS400 (senior year) lesson plan, and cut back on the AEF section as well. They are trying to add a bit more "glitz" to the cultural section, as well as a language component (finally, but it's not especially realistic in my view), but it's more Air Force theory and not reflective of the realities we currently face.

I'm trying at my Det to get some joint training stuff added, and do have the support of our current Det commander. I'm also working where I can to get some Small Wars considerations put into the one elective course we have, but it's a struggle at times.

[SWJED]

Steve and Sonny,

What I find a bit ironic is that the Air Force has one of the best 'open source' online resources for Small Wars research (excepting the SWJ of course :) ). I have used the Air War College's Gateway to the Internet (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awcgate.htm) for years and have traded material with its web master. Moreover, I have run across many a great Small Wars related thesis / research paper authored by Air Force students at the various Air War College schools. Go figure...

Dave

[Steve Blair]

Steve and Sonny,

What I find a bit ironic is that the Air Force has one of the best 'open source' online resources for Small Wars research (excepting the SWJ of course :) ). I have used the Air War College's Gateway to the Internet (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awcgate.htm) for years and have traded material with its web master. Moreover, I have run across many a great Small Wars related thesis / research paper authored by Air Force students at the various Air War College schools. Go figure...

Dave

It is interesting, and it's something that I've noticed as well. I wonder if it's a reaction on the part of the students to a lack of information they got when they were younger officers. But from what I'm seeing, this Small Wars thinking isn't really getting through to the lower levels of their education system.