Drugs & US Law Enforcement (2006-2017)

[davidbfpo]

Slap,

That SSI paper is a good catch. Apart form the content and arguments made, it was the author's background that is noteworthy:
...served most recently as the Director of he National Drugs Intelligence Centre.

He overturns quite a few DoD and other agency programmes as worthless, notably crop destruction and interdiction.

Alas I fear few on capitol Hill will be reading or listening to such arguments.

[bourbon]

US judge receives 28-year jail term for his role in kids-for-cash kickbacks. (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-judge-receives-28year-jail-term-for-his-role-in--kidsforcash-kickbacks-8598147.html) The Independent, 30 April 2013.

An American judge known for his harsh and autocratic courtroom manner was jailed for 28 years for conspiring with private prisons to hand young offenders maximum sentences in return for kickbacks amounting to millions of dollars.

Mark Ciavarella Jnr was ordered to pay $1.2m (£770,000) in restitution after he was found to be a “figurehead” in the conspiracy that saw thousands of children unjustly punished in the name of profit in the case that became known as “kids for cash”.
Of course it is illegal for judges to receive kickbacks from private prison companies; however it is completely legal for private prison companies to dump money into legislative campaigns across the country. No doubt many of the cases that came into his courtroom were drug related.

If I had it my way, this man would receive the death penalty.

[Kiwigrunt]

If I had it my way, this man would receive the death penalty.

He may get that anyway....depending on how many of those kids will become his new room-mates.

[Bill Moore]

US judge receives 28-year jail term for his role in kids-for-cash kickbacks. (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-judge-receives-28year-jail-term-for-his-role-in--kidsforcash-kickbacks-8598147.html) The Independent, 30 April 2013.

Of course it is illegal for judges to receive kickbacks from private prison companies; however it is completely legal for private prison companies to dump money into legislative campaigns across the country. No doubt many of the cases that came into his courtroom were drug related.

If I had it my way, this man would receive the death penalty.

I suspect this is the tip of the iceberg and it should be bigger news, but of course media stations that argue that more and more government functions should be privatized will do their best to keep this important story out of the headlines.

[Firn]

This criminal scheme organized by a judge was arguably one of the news bits which made the biggest impression on me. Maybe because it perverted something so incredibly important. 28 years and 1200000 $ seem not much for what he has done.

In any case I think it should kickstart a debate about the role of private prisons and the bad (terrible) incentives it creates. I'm not quite up to date but the US prison business is huge, with practical no counterpart in the rest of the world. It is of course no normal business which can happily left mostly to our dear efficient markets as the supply-side is completely controlled by state, with the profits of private prisons obviously getting financed by the taxpayer. Everything is set up to have the scope of the rule of law getting distorted into a very narrow direction. A good citizen tends to a be a bad citizen or 'private good' from the prison investor's point of view even if it is obviously excellent for the state as a whole.

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2009/03/28/us/0328-nat-webJUDGES.jpg


The lack of lawyers for those kids is just amazingly disgusting, the arrogance of the rogue judges and the especially silence around them is shocking. The mafia has little on them. The US is a very wealthy nations can take sustain a lot of damage inflicted by such criminal behaviour and ideological idiocy. The war on drugs would have been long given up by not so wealthy nations which would have been unable to continue to throw more and more money at the problem and into the drain. Sometimes less ressources force more and better thinking.

Bourbons argument about the legal lobby is perfectly valid and reminds me of an old saying which roughly goes 'The scandal is not so much what gets done illegally, but what can be done legally'.

[slapout9]

What Happens When The CIA goes up against Wall Street?.......They loose!!

H/T to zenpundit for finding this!

http://scholars-stage.blogspot.com/search/label/Mexico

[Mike Burgoyne]

Looking for thoughts and references on successful transformations of militaries after a successful negotiated peace or demobilization of an insurgent force.

Looking at the future of the Colombian military, either the FARC will come to terms at the negotiating table or will be reduced through military action in the coming years. I'm interested in best practices and earlier blunders in this type of situation.

What worked and didn't work in El Salvador and other places?

[davidbfpo]

Created to assist Mike Burgoyne's quest.

[davidbfpo]

Mike,

The cogs in my memory are now working; you asked:
Looking for thoughts and references on successful transformations of militaries after a successful negotiated peace or demobilization of an insurgent force.

The Lancaster House Agreement 1979, that ended the rebellion by Rhodesia and the insurgency conducted by the nationalists, was often cited in the 1980's as an example. In particular the process by which the insurgents largely moved into camps within Rhodesia, assembly points IIRC, watched over by a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF, from Australia, NZ, Kenya and the UK). Then after the elections the integration of the guerillas into new Zimbabwe's armed forces and the police. With a British team assisting (known as BMATT).

Less well known is the peace accord for Namibia, with South Africa's decision to withdraw, a period of UN rule (UNTAG) and the integration of SWAPO's armed wing into the new armed forces - again with a BMATT. There was an early upset when SWAPO insurgents crossed the Angolan border and were repulsed bloodily - several books cover that time. Incidentally a number of black Namibians or South-Westers who had fought against SWAPO left for South Africa; as recorded in one book by Jim Hooper on the para-military Koevoet. Check the thread on these small Southern African small wars:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10859

Then there is Africa's giant, South Africa and the national agreement on ending apartheid, which involved the SADF being reformed, taking in numbers of externally based insurgents and others who had been within. My interest remain in the country, but not to the extent of buying books! There must be a plethora of articles on that process, some of which will feature 'security sector reform' and the variety of overseas advisers who participated.

I am pretty certain that the individual independence agreements for the Portuguese African colonies in 1974 are not so well documented. My recollection is that the insurgent forces became the military, even though a large part of the Portuguese military was black African. Maybe the SWJ author, Miguel Silva can help? See:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/book-review-counterinsurgency-in-africa-the-portuguese-way-of-war-1961%E2%80%931974

One hesitates to mention Algeria, but the Evian peace agreement must have dealt with the insurgents becoming the state. We know that many of those who served France, often called the harkis, were betrayed and paid a high price. I have just found only 15k were allowed to leave and 100k killed (inc. families). Not to overlook 1.5m 'pied noir' or white settlers left abruptly. See various links on:http://africanhistory.about.com/od/algeri1/qt/EvianAccords.htm

As Algeria marked its 50th anniversary of independence in 2012 there were numerous conferences held, so maybe far more is available now. The wider thread on France's war in Algeria may help:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15864

I have a small pile of books on Zimbabwe and Namibia if you need references; most of them date back to the 1980's.

Try the old threads Policies in Post-Conflict Countries:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3957 and the great RFI thread started by Colin Robinson, a Kiwi doing a Ph.D. 'Tentative Guidelines for building partner armies post conflict':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10049

Finally, leaving Africa how about Nepal? Where there is peace agreement, with a planned integration of the 32k insurgency, Communist army:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5236

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Mike--

The 1992 El Sal peace accords called for the reduction in size of the ESAF and teh creation of a new Policia Nacional Civil separate from the MOD. More on the PNC in a minute as it is the more complex part.

During the 12 year war the ESAF grew from under 10,000 to over 56,000 but the officer corps barely grew at all. So, demobilization essentially involved letting the conscripts go home. One result of the US effeort was to leave El Sal with a record of who had been trained in a national computer database. this allowed the ESAF to retain a reserve military force that was called up for duty during Hurricane Mitch.

The PNC was to replace the 3 police forces that had previously existed under the MOD (Vice Min for Public Security). These were (1)the National Police (PN), (2) the Guardia Nacional (GN), and (3) the Policia de hacienda (PH). PN had mainly urban duties, GN mainly rural, and PH focused on white collar crime. The PNC was to incorporate as 20% of its number former PN, 20% former FMLN guerrillas, and 40% new recruits all under a civilian minister.

The new ESAF has become quite professional. The PNC has been a problem and relatively unable to control crime particularly from gangs like MS-13 which grew from the US deportation program of the 1990s.

Email me and I'll give you some addtional detail.

Cheers

JohnT

[Mike Burgoyne]

Excellent stuff. Thank you very much.

The attached is an info paper I found discussing SLV lessons learned.

I would think in these situations where you have a criminal element waiting to recruit ex-soldiers that keeping your army actively employed and slowly downsizing is the right answer.

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

but ex guerrilla combatants as well.

Issue is always what are you going to do with trained military manpower after the war ends and the civilian economy can't absorb them easily.

Cheers

JohnT

[SWJ Blog]

Drug Cartels in Oregon: Violence in the Northwest (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/drug-cartels-in-oregon-violence-in-the-northwest)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/drug-cartels-in-oregon-violence-in-the-northwest) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[bourbon]

Excerpts from Radley Balko's recently released Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Police Forces:

“Why did you shoot me? I was reading a book (http://www.salon.com/2013/07/07/%E2%80%9Cwhy_did_you_shoot_me_i_was_reading_a_book _the_new_warrior_cop_is_out_of_control/)”: The new warrior cop is out of control - SWAT teams raiding poker games and trying to stop underage drinking? Overwhelming paramilitary force is on the rise

Militarized police overreach (http://www.salon.com/2013/07/10/militarized_police_overreach_oh_god_i_thought_they _were_going_to_shoot_me_next%E2%80%9D/): “Oh, God, I thought they were going to shoot me next” - Local law enforcement's often using SWAT teams to do regular police work. The results are frightening -- and deadly

[Bill Moore]

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=147511&postcount=3

related


Think of mass surveillance, of drones, secret courts, the militarisation of the police, detention without trial.

Hannah Arendt identified "the boomerang effect of imperialism on the homeland" in The Origins of Totalitarianism, but the academic Douglas Porch has used the history of Britain, France and America to demonstrate that all the rhetoric about bringing, respectively, Britishness, libert and freedom and democracy to the "little brown people who have no lights" is so much nonsense and that these brutal adventures almost never work and degrade the democracies that spawned them in the first place.

[gute]

This is my opinion and only opinion, but it is based on 21 years as a federal narcotics agent. The Drug War is a misnomer because one fights a war they want to win - I think. But, the fact that it has not been won or we are lsoing is not just the fault of law enforcement - society bears a lot of the blame too.

The militarization of law enforcement is a valid point and I believe law enforcement has lost sight of the fact they are here to serve and not rule. From my experience police departments and sheriff's offices are using SWAT teams or SWAT like teams to do all warrants because of the public bitching. Officers show up to knock on a door to ask someone questions and he throws rounds at em. The officers throw rounds back and an innocent bystander gets hurt or killed and now the public is asking why were these officers not "specialists"?

I'm amazed at the amount of crap that guys carry for simply narcotics search warrants. And the guns, everyone has an AR - who the hell is gonna be the "contact" person?

Don't get me I believe that law enforcement should always be in zone red - prepared and ready to react, but if guys want to run around with ARs, fatigues, etc then join the service.

[Bill Moore]

This is my opinion and only opinion, but it is based on 21 years as a federal narcotics agent. The Drug War is a misnomer because one fights a war they want to win - I think. But, the fact that it has not been won or we are lsoing is not just the fault of law enforcement - society bears a lot of the blame too.

The militarization of law enforcement is a valid point and I believe law enforcement has lost sight of the fact they are here to serve and not rule. From my experience police departments and sheriff's offices are using SWAT teams or SWAT like teams to do all warrants because of the public bitching. Officers show up to knock on a door to ask someone questions and he throws rounds at em. The officers throw rounds back and an innocent bystander gets hurt or killed and now the public is asking why were these officers not "specialists"?

I'm amazed at the amount of crap that guys carry for simply narcotics search warrants. And the guns, everyone has an AR - who the hell is gonna be the "contact" person?

Don't get me I believe that law enforcement should always be in zone red - prepared and ready to react, but if guys want to run around with ARs, fatigues, etc then join the service.

Gute, appreciate your insights based on your experience. I have always found it comical to see police officers switching into camouflage fatigues to conduct a raid. The value of doing so compared to putting on a vest that clearly identifies you as a police officer in an urban environment is questionable and maybe even counterproductive because of the mindset that may create. Great you look like a bush inside the crack house you just raided, and when you come outside and people see you look like a militarized police force reminiscent of Well's "1983." If you were doing a reconnaissance mission in the bush looking for signs of illicit activity that would make sense, and ideally the public for the most part wouldn't detect your activities.


I believe law enforcement has lost sight of the fact they are here to serve and not rule. Agreed, and admittedly when you're dealing with a lot of low lifes on daily basis it must be extremely hard, but militarizing the force isn't the answer IMO. We just put more energy into the problem instead of diffusing it.


From my experience police departments and sheriff's offices are using SWAT teams or SWAT like teams to do all warrants because of the public bitching.

Is a possible solution to ensure all police are better trained, not just SWAT officers. Mandatory range time each month, mandatory stress drills, etc.? Never been a cop, but based on my limited reading I get the impression that many police never develop, or if they do develop, don't maintain their weapon skills or for that matter an acceptable level of fitness. Maybe I'm off base it seems like every cop should be able to subdue a suspect, issue a warrant, and shoot straight under stress, in addition to a thousand other skills they need to maintain.


The Drug War is a misnomer because one fights a war they want to win - I think. But, the fact that it has not been won or we are losing is not just the fault of law enforcement - society bears a lot of the blame too.

Is it even possible to wage a war on drugs? Assuming war is a form of political action, what political objective are we trying to achieve, or is just waging the war (being tough on drugs and crime) the objective? Looking at what the current strategy (ends, ways and means) seems to consist of a illicit drug free society (end), pursued by aggressive action against the pushers and sources both in the U.S. and globally (ways), using the legal system (means). No matter how tough the laws the reward versus risk ratio apparently weighs in favor of reward for several criminals moving the drugs. Our expensive focus on the sources (Columbia, Afghanistan, Mexico, SE Asia, etc.) is not only ineffective, but it harms our relationship with those nations, because we're increasing the level of violence in their society to get at the source while ignoring the demand on our end.

I'm not opposed to actions to help mitigate the flow, but cost versus gain needs to be assessed, and the cost can involve more than dollars. I'm all for rolling up the pushers to sell the stuff in our streets, but that only changes the sellers, the market adapts quickly. Joey will be still be able to find his next fix.

The real issue as you pointed out is societal issue (demand), and I haven't a clue how to address it, but we better figure it out and dedicate some resources to reduce our demand.

Definitely like to hear your counter arguments to my layman's observations on the problem.


Don't get me I believe that law enforcement should always be in zone red - prepared and ready to react

I was a taught a different color system, but regardless it serves the same purpose and strongly agree. This must be ingrained in training and reinforced by police leadership on a daily basis. I suspect the cops that work in the bad neighborhoods don't need a lot of reminders, it those that don't see that level of violence on a frequent basis that are probably most at risk.

[Dayuhan]

I have always found it comical to see police officers switching into camouflage fatigues to conduct a raid. The value of doing so compared to putting on a vest that clearly identifies you as a police officer in an urban environment is questionable and maybe even counterproductive because of the mindset that may create. Great you look like a bush inside the crack house you just raided, and when you come outside and people see you look like a militarized police force reminiscent of Well's "1983." If you were doing a reconnaissance mission in the bush looking for signs of illicit activity that would make sense, and ideally the public for the most part wouldn't detect your activities.

Blending in may not be the point.

Back in the days when Philippine Army "Scout Rangers" wore all black with black berets (maybe they still do, haven't seen any in a while, mostly we get the regular units up here) I once asked what the point of it was, as it didn't seem very useful for concealment. I was told quite frankly that it wasn't about concealment, it was about intimidation: the "men in black" image and the identification of an elite unit wasn't meant to hide anyone, it was meant to scare the antagonists.

[gute]

Is it even possible to wage a war on drugs? Assuming war is a form of political action, what political objective are we trying to achieve, or is just waging the war (being tough on drugs and crime) the objective? Looking at what the current strategy (ends, ways and means) seems to consist of a illicit drug free society (end), pursued by aggressive action against the pushers and sources both in the U.S. and globally (ways), using the legal system (means). No matter how tough the laws the reward versus risk ratio apparently weighs in favor of reward for several criminals moving the drugs. Our expensive focus on the sources (Columbia, Afghanistan, Mexico, SE Asia, etc.) is not only ineffective, but it harms our relationship with those nations, because we're increasing the level of violence in their society to get at the source while ignoring the demand on our end.

I'm not opposed to actions to help mitigate the flow, but cost versus gain needs to be assessed, and the cost can involve more than dollars. I'm all for rolling up the pushers to sell the stuff in our streets, but that only changes the sellers, the market adapts quickly. Joey will be still be able to find his next fix.

The real issue as you pointed out is societal issue (demand), and I haven't a clue how to address it, but we better figure it out and dedicate some resources to reduce our demand.

Definitely like to hear your counter arguments to my layman's observations on the problem.

Bill,

I don't know if it is possible wage a war on drugs. Must not be because we have been at for years and we seem to be getting no where. Kind of like a war on terror.

We do spend a lot of money enforcing drug laws. I believe DEA's budget is in excess of one billion annually. Amazing.

It is difficult to deal with demand in a democratic society. Heroin has always been a problem, but now we are seeing it in amounts that I could never had imagined. High schoolers getting hooked on it because it's cheaper than pills. Methamphetmine seizures in the hundreds of pounds. Not seeing much coke where I'm at. Marijuana is the state plant - for every state. Anyone who believes that marijuana traffickers are not violent needs his head gear flushed out. Obviously medical marijuana is the big deal. Here in Oregon and I will go out on a limb and say it is probably true for the other states with similar laws, the number of people who have actual medical conditions is very low. It was just a way for the pot heads to make it legal - complete farce. A lot of money being made on it.

Lowering demand is about education - I guess.

Supply? Invade Mexico.

My biggest issue with enforcement of drugs laws is we are always playing catch-up. We, DEA, are not flexible enough, but at the same time we have to work within the confines of the law. We spend a lot of time writing affidavits for EVERYTHING. Bad guy communications is a major point of focus, but we have to do a lot of stuff before we get to that point when we should starting there in the first place.

[gute]

I apologize for posting here but I'm having a problem singing in and posting on the blog page. I think remarking about this article works with this thread since the article opens with a drug search warrant. I wasn't there so I don't know all the facts, but it doesn't look good.

The author writes that SWAT came about to counter preceived threats and I would argue that SWAT came about because of real threats.

IMO LE has too many gear queers and barrel suckers, but I think the guys are a product of the times. Many cops are former military and these guys tend to gravitate toward the SWAT/HRT thing - which I think is good. Some never served in the military so they do the SWAT thing to run around in camo and shoot stuff. All like the hell out of it and that's cool with me. Big city police departments have full time teams while smaller departments go the part time route or intra-agency. SWAT teams give a police chief, city manager, mayor a little CYA. A group of officers who train together on a regular basis. It's all about liability. I don't think the group in Utah was a SWAT team. As I've written before not everything needs to be a hard, flash bang entry, but due to liability many departments have their SWAT teams do all the entries.

I believe there is a growing schism between LE and the public, much like the military and the public. The public doesn't like to see the dirty work getting done. Again, many in LE have lost sight of the fact that they are providing a service to the public and not the other way around. Self-aggrandizing by LE gets on my nerves - I picked the job, nobody made me do it.

The author writes at the end of the article about community policing and I think he is writing how we need to return to community policing from SWAT. Community policing is a strategy, SWAT is tactics. Police Departments everywhere engage in community policing every day. IMO the pendulum has just swung too one way and needs to come back to the middle.

[jcustis]

Watching the response of multiple agencies when Christopher Dorner was isolated in Big Bear was laughable, in a sad way. It was painful to watch so many officers laboring under helmets, kneepads, body armor and belt/chest rigs at elevation and in the freezing cold.

They looked like a US troop on patrol in the orchards of Afghanistan--out of place and outmatched due to immobility.

[gute]

Watching the response of multiple agencies when Christopher Dorner was isolated in Big Beat was laughable, in a sad way. It was painful to watch so many officers laboring under helmets, kneepads, body armor and belt/chest rigs at elevation and in the freezing cold.

They looked like a US troop on patrol in the orchards of Afghanistan--out of place and outmatched due to immobility.

Are you talking about the guys who responded first or the SWAT guys who showed up later?

I remember when I first came on we were gearing up for an operation and one of the old timers walks into the room with a soft vest on that looked like he was wearing a bib. I'm was thinking, "what happens if this guy goes down in a hallway, doorway, any fatal funnel?".

The L.A. shootout and Waco (not taking a position on Waco other than it was FUBAR) I believe had a lot to do with how cops are armed today.

[Bill Moore]

I apologize for posting here but I'm having a problem singing in and posting on the blog page. I think remarking about this article works with this thread since the article opens with a drug search warrant. I wasn't there so I don't know all the facts, but it doesn't look good.

The author writes that SWAT came about to counter preceived threats and I would argue that SWAT came about because of real threats.

IMO LE has too many gear queers and barrel suckers, but I think the guys are a product of the times. Many cops are former military and these guys tend to gravitate toward the SWAT/HRT thing - which I think is good. Some never served in the military so they do the SWAT thing to run around in camo and shoot stuff. All like the hell out of it and that's cool with me. Big city police departments have full time teams while smaller departments go the part time route or intra-agency. SWAT teams give a police chief, city manager, mayor a little CYA. A group of officers who train together on a regular basis. It's all about liability. I don't think the group in Utah was a SWAT team. As I've written before not everything needs to be a hard, flash bang entry, but due to liability many departments have their SWAT teams do all the entries.

I believe there is a growing schism between LE and the public, much like the military and the public. The public doesn't like to see the dirty work getting done. Again, many in LE have lost sight of the fact that they are providing a service to the public and not the other way around. Self-aggrandizing by LE gets on my nerves - I picked the job, nobody made me do it.

The author writes at the end of the article about community policing and I think he is writing how we need to return to community policing from SWAT. Community policing is a strategy, SWAT is tactics. Police Departments everywhere engage in community policing every day. IMO the pendulum has just swung too one way and needs to come back to the middle.

I agree SWAT formed for valid reasons and have proved their worth multiple times; however, that doesn't justify the inappropriate use of SWAT. Not every target is a hard target, but what happened in this story is inexcusable. If cops are to risk adverse to knock on the door and serve a search warrant without a SWAT team then it seems there are other options. Call the guy on the phone and tell him to open the door you have a search warrant. I guess he could flush his six plants down the toilet, but in the end so the f*&# what? He was vet, he had six marijuana plants, was it really worth getting an officer killed and destroying multiple lives? Hell they could have posted a stake out until he left the house and arrested him outside and served the warrant. Like you said guys like doing this, it is what they train for, but when they lose perspective on what they're there for then mature leaders need to reel them in.

[jcustis]

I was thinking of some of the responding officers who were not rolling around in/on a an armored vehicle, and probably had the gear in the trunk of their ride.

I peeped a lot of them trying to stay warm with coats drawn over their ammo pouches, or no warming layers at all.

[slapout9]

I was thinking of some of the responding officers who were not rolling around in/on a an armored vehicle, and probably had the gear in the trunk of their ride.

I peeped a lot of them trying to stay warm with coats drawn over their ammo pouches, or no warming layers at all.

I thought the response to the Boston Bomber situation was way over the top to. You guys would laugh if I told you what I was issued when I started in LE. Vests....what are vests. The radio was in the car not on my belt.....used to carry a thing called a revolver and your extra bullets were carried in a spill pouch because that is what usually happened when you tried to use them. Most important thing I carried was my notebook and flashlight and my brains.

[gute]

I thought the response to the Boston Bomber situation was way over the top to. You guys would laugh if I told you what I was issued when I started in LE. Vests....what are vests. The radio was in the car not on my belt.....used to carry a thing called a revolver and your extra bullets were carried in a spill pouch because that is what usually happened when you tried to use them. Most important thing I carried was my notebook and flashlight and my brains.

Brain, what's that? I think I had one when I entered the academy years ago. No, wait that was balls.

[bourbon]

Taken: Under civil forfeiture, Americans who haven’t been charged with wrongdoing can be stripped of their cash, cars, and even homes - Is that all we’re losing? (http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/08/12/130812fa_fact_stillman?currentPage=all), by Sarah Stillman. The New Yorker, August 12, 2013.

Whether this should be the law—whether, in the absence of a judicial finding of guilt, the state should be able to take possession of your property—has been debated since before American independence. In the Colonial period, the English Crown issued “writs of assistance” that permitted customs officials to enter homes or vessels and seize whatever they deemed contraband. As the legal scholars Eric Blumenson and Eva Nilsen have noted, these writs were “among the key grievances that triggered the American Revolution.” The new nation’s Bill of Rights would expressly forbid “unreasonable searches and seizures” and promise that no one would be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process.” Nonetheless, Congress soon authorized the use of civil-forfeiture actions against pirates and smugglers. It was easier to prosecute a vessel and seize its cargo than to try to prosecute its owner, who might be an ocean away. In the ensuing decades, the practice fell into disuse and, aside from a few brief revivals, remained mostly dormant for the next two centuries.

Forfeiture in its modern form began with federal statutes enacted in the nineteen-seventies and aimed not at waitresses and janitors but at organized-crime bosses and drug lords. Law-enforcement officers were empowered to seize money and goods tied to the production of illegal drugs. Later amendments allowed the seizure of anything thought to have been purchased with tainted funds, whether or not it was connected to the commission of a crime. Even then, forfeiture remained an infrequent resort until 1984, when Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act. It established a special fund that turned over proceeds from forfeitures to the law-enforcement agencies responsible for them. Local police who provided federal assistance were rewarded with a large percentage of the proceeds, through a program called Equitable Sharing. Soon states were crafting their own forfeiture laws.

Revenue gains were staggering. At the Justice Department, proceeds from forfeiture soared from twenty-seven million dollars in 1985 to five hundred and fifty-six million in 1993. (Last year, the department took in nearly $4.2 billion in forfeitures, a record.) The strategy helped reconcile President Reagan’s call for government action in fighting crime with his call to reduce public spending. In 1989, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh boasted, “It’s now possible for a drug dealer to serve time in a forfeiture-financed prison after being arrested by agents driving a forfeiture-provided automobile while working in a forfeiture-funded sting operation.”
A long, but important – if not infuriating – article on civil asset forfeiture. Asset forfeiture has gone from being an important law enforcement tool to an important revenue stream for law enforcement.

[gute]

Taken: Under civil forfeiture, Americans who haven’t been charged with wrongdoing can be stripped of their cash, cars, and even homes - Is that all we’re losing? (http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/08/12/130812fa_fact_stillman?currentPage=all), by Sarah Stillman. The New Yorker, August 12, 2013.

A long, but important – if not infuriating – article on civil asset forfeiture. Asset forfeiture has gone from being an important law enforcement tool to an important revenue stream for law enforcement.

There are many extreme cases in the article - outright abuse, but in my experience civil forfeiture works - especially with airport interdiction where you get people transporting thousands of dollars for no apparent reason. Not to sound like an a-hole, but it's all about the money & stuff and when you take it away it hurts the bad guys. Criminally indicting assets does gum up the works, but it's the price of doing business. I believe in the Constitiution and our rights and hope that I have not violated someone's rights while enforcing federal drug laws - I would be disappointed in myself.

[Steve Blair]

I think the point here is more one of it being possibly a proper technique when used correctly, but also being aware that it is open to abuse and there need to be ways to deal with that abuse. Airport interdiction isn't the same as pulling someone over for being in the left lane for over ten seconds and then taking everything they own. The PBS NewsHour had an interview with the article's author last night and it was interesting, although not in the same detail as the article.

[gute]

I think the point here is more one of it being possibly a proper technique when used correctly, but also being aware that it is open to abuse and there need to be ways to deal with that abuse. Airport interdiction isn't the same as pulling someone over for being in the left lane for over ten seconds and then taking everything they own. The PBS NewsHour had an interview with the article's author last night and it was interesting, although not in the same detail as the article.

Is the point proper technique or civil forfeiture is bad? I'm not defending the egregious seizures written about in the article. I can't imagine a cop telling a couple you can keep your kids if you abandoned your money. IMO very extreme cases and I would venture that not all quoted in the article were telling the truth. Airport interdiction (not customs searches, but consensual encounters, walk & talks) pulling someone over are not much different. Instead of using a vehicle one utilizes their person, asks for consent to search their property, but pc is required for the seizure. The ten seconds in the left lane is a little ticky tack.

[SWJ Blog]

Translating Lessons Learned in Colombia and Other Wars Among the People: Confronting the Spectrum of 21st Century Conflict (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/translating-lessons-learned-in-colombia-and-other-wars-among-the-people-confronting-the-spe)

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[davidbfpo]

A new IISS Strategic Comment:
Colombia is reassessing its approach to its decades-long struggle against guerrillas and criminal gangs. It is embarking on reforms of its security services and legal system as part of its efforts to tackle a new hybrid threat: groups with the military know-how of insurgents and the adaptability of criminal actors..

Link:http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments%20-%20update%20v2/sections/2013-a8b5/colombia--new-approach-to-guerrilla-threat-635f

[SWJ Blog]

Covert Action in Colombia (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/covert-action-in-colombia)

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[AdamG]

Illicitly ‘homemade’ submachine guns feature very prominently in firearms seizures by police across South America, Brazil in particular. These weapons vary in their level of sophistication though a large number appear to be semi-professionally produced. In a recent study of over 14,488 firearms seized between 2011 and 2012 in Sao Paulo alone, 48% of submachine guns analyzed were reportedly homemade. Given the decent quality of many SMG clones, even that high statistic is probably significantly under reported.

www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2014/01/22/common-illicitly-homemade-submachine-guns-brazil

[AdamG]

The Armed Forces of Colombia commissioned a pop song that included a Morse code message to kidnapped military personnel, "19 people rescued, you're next. Don't lose hope", because the kidnappers would let their captives listen to radio.

http://www.coloribus.com/adsarchive/casestudy/armed-forces-support-the-code-17518455/

[SWJ Blog]

BACRIM in Colombia (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/bacrim-in-colombia)

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[SWJ Blog]

Persistent Engagement in Colombia (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/persistent-engagement-in-colombia)

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[SWJ Blog]

The Intractable Conflict: Why Colombia’s War Against the FARC Eludes Resolution (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-intractable-conflict-why-colombia%E2%80%99s-war-against-the-farc-eludes-resolution)

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[davidbfpo]

From Kings War Studies blog, Strife, a short article that could fit elsewhere, but it uses Colombia as the focus. The full title is: Colombia and the ‘Small footprint’ intervention illusion:http://strifeblog.org/2014/11/25/colombia-and-the-small-footprint-intervention-illusion/

It opens with:
The challenge posed by ISIS has intensified debates in the West over the possibility of dispatching “boots on the ground” and has, yet again, brought to the forefront the search for alternative modes of military intervention following the recent disillusionment with “Big footprint” counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[SWJ Blog]

Colombia, FARC Announce Breakthrough in Peace Talks (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/colombia-farc-announce-breakthrough-in-peace-talks)

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[davidbfpo]

A new book available for pre-order from Hurst (London-based) on Colombia, with an impressive line up of authors: Davis, Kilcullen, Mills and Spencer:http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/a-great-perhaps/

There is a 33% discount if you register with Hurst, with free P&P.

From the publishers notice:
No country has managed as rapid and positive a turnaround in governance and security conditions this century as Colombia. In 1999, FARC and ELN rebels were literally at the gates of Bogot, and Colombia was a country synonymous with the antics of Pablo Escobar, known primarily for rapacious corruption, weak government, drug smuggling and criminality. Fifteen years later the guerrillas, seriously weakened, have been persuaded to attend peace talks in Havana, and the Colombian economy has been a top performer in Latin America.

To date, however, there has been no comprehensive examination of the different elements employed by the government to combat the guerrillas, win local and international political and military support, extend government authority to the 75 per cent of the countryside where it was seldom felt, and turn the Colombian economy around. How the Colombians did all of this is the subject of this book by four international specialists with unrivalled policy and practical expertise in counterinsurgency campaigns in Colombia and elsewhere, bringing a unique comparative perspective.


Based on fieldwork in Colombias regions, the study provides a history of the conflict, compares it to other case studies, examines the war from the perspectives of the government and the guerrillas, delves into the development of special Colombian capabilities (notably in intelligence and the use of airpower and special forces), and explains the economic dimension in terms both of historical exclusion and ongoing attempts at growth and inclusion. Finally, it concludes with an assessment of the countrys prospects: can the combination of improved security, a flourishing economy and the peace process offer an opportunity to finally translate Colombia from, in Gabriel Garcia Marquezs words, a great perhaps into something more permanent?

[davidbfpo]

A short five minute video clip; explained as:
With rare and exclusive access, the Guardian joins one of the Farc’s remaining rebel cells deep in the Colombian jungle as guerrillas contemplate the final days of their dying revolution. After 51 years of armed struggle and numerous attempts at peace, the revolutionaries’ rapidly dwindling numbers have resolved into a hard core of hold-out cells, still on the run and deeply reluctant to give up their guns
Link:http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/nov/27/farc-guerrillas-last-days-of-blood-in-colombia-video

[SWJ Blog]

Event: Lessons for Africa from Colombia’s Counter-Insurgency Experience (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/event-lessons-for-africa-from-colombia%E2%80%99s-counter-insurgency-experience)

The events two hour podcast is now available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AY2T_kKHF2o&feature=youtu.be

[SWJ Blog]

‘Bandas Criminales’ and a Post-accord Colombia (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/%E2%80%98bandas-criminales%E2%80%99-and-a-post-accord-colombia)

[SWJ Blog]

Bullets for Ballots: A History of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration in Colombia (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/bullets-for-ballots-a-history-of-demobilization-disarmament-and-reintegration-in-colombia)

[davidbfpo]

The Colombian government and the Farc rebels have signed a historic ceasefire deal, bringing them closer to ending more than five decades of conflict.The agreement is expected to pave the way for a full peace deal.
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and Farc leader Timochenko shook hands at a ceremony in the Cuban capital.Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-36611952


Three other items in support.

[davidbfpo]

An excellent Military Review (latest issue) article on the prospects for peace:http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160831_art010.pdf

[SWJ Blog]

Colombia and FARC Announce Deal to End the Americas’ Longest War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/colombia-and-farc-announce-deal-to-end-the-americas%E2%80%99-longest-war)

[AdamG]

Colombia’s government and the largest rebel group in the country have reached a deal to end more than 50 years of conflict, the two sides announced Wednesday, paving the way for an end to the longest running war in the Americas.

For four years, the Colombian government and the rebels have been locked in negotiations to end the conflict. Time and again, they have emerged from the negotiating table to assure a weary public that another impasse had been eliminated, another hurdle cleared.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace-deal.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0

[AdamG]

So why did a slim majority of the population vote “no” in a national referendum to end the war once and for all?
Because the peace deal was too nice to the FARC.
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/what-just-happened-colombia

[davidbfpo]

I don't follow events in Colombia closely, although the UK has some interest there.

So I found these two commentaries of use. First from The Soufan Group, which ends with:
The outcome of the October 2 referendum demonstrates the challenge inherent to resolving a conflict with a myriad of domestic and international dimensions. Nonetheless, the peace process in Colombia remains a hopeful example that a solution is attainable in the long-run; the incentives for peace are in place, even if the public remains wary or unsatisfied with the current deal. The grievances wrought by civil conflict endure beyond the issuance of a ceasefire or even the laying down of arms; the scars of war will remain in Colombia for years to come, as will the international security implications stemming from over five decades of civil war.Link:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-farc-and-the-implications-of-the-peace-deal/

An earlier post refers to a book by Kilcullen, Mills and others so from RUSI provide a detailed explanation:https://rusi.org/commentary/winning-colombia%E2%80%99s-peace-try-try-and-try-again

[SWJ Blog]

Pangas, Trickery, Intimidation, and Drug Trafficking in California (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/pangas-trickery-intimidation-and-drug-trafficking-in-california)

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[SWJ Blog]

FARC Plays Dominoes as Drug Cartels Occupy Colombian Villages (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/farc-plays-dominoes-as-drug-cartels-occupy-colombian-villages)

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[Bill Moore]

Narconomics: How to Run a Drug Cartel
by Tom Wainwright

https://www.amazon.com/Narconomics-How-Run-Drug-Cartel/dp/1610395832/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1494731480&sr=1-1-spell

After reading this book, I feel fully qualified to run a drug cartel now. O.K., maybe not, but a fascinating read nonetheless that provides great insights not only into the cartel business from production to distribution, but provides great analysis based on economics on why are expensive drug war (globally, not limited to the U.S.) is failing miserably.

I would love to see this type of analysis conducted for COIN, and instead of listening to the same old tired theories being repeated, actually pull the data and analyze it objectively. It provides a very different, as it did for this study of cartels.

Not surprising, he explains how the DEA's focus for marijuana and cocaine coming from Mexico missed the shift to Meth and now Heroin. His point was the drug market changes frequently based on fads, yet law enforcement has been slow to adapt. He also points out that the crackdown on illegal immigration under Obama (yes its true) on the U.S. southern border, resulted in the Cartels moving into the human trafficking business and professionalizing it. It is a major paradigm shift from the coyotes leading people across the Arizona desert on a high risk crossing. Instead, the cartels move them to holding areas where they get three meals a day, medical care, and access to an internet caf so they can stay in contact with their families. The agreed upon prize to move them into the U.S. (roughly $1,500.00) comes with a guarantee. The traffickers will conduct as many attempts as required to get them into the U.S.

His analysis on the legalization of marijuana in Washington and Colorado was interesting. As one law enforcement explained, there is nothing stopping people from buying it legally, and then driving across the border and selling it illegally. You're average Joe Blow is creating a new gray market. They did a cost analysis on how this will impact the cartels who still move marijuana and the cartels will be less competitive in most places outside of Texas (even more so that more states have legalized it). However, if the legalization trend continues, there is no reason Mexico won't grow it legally at a cheaper price and put the U.S. growers out of business eventually. Darn NAFTA.

He covered the drug trade in New Zealand, somewhat surprising to me, but a local music star Matt Bowden in NZ established a multimillion dollar business producing synthetic drugs for legal highs, always changing the formula to stay one step ahead of the law (until he couldn't). The author points out that relative safe drugs became more dangerous over time because they safer ones were outlawed. Interesting point, considering in other countries, certain drugs like ecstasy that were relatively safe, but the crack down on it, pushed the crowd into more dangerous drugs (supply and demand).

He didn't take easy on the cartels, he provided good coverage on the violence and what drives it and what tends to bring it down. At the end of the book he cited four mistakes we are making in the war on drugs:

1. The obsession with supply: He points out that the demand for drugs is inelastic, so even if we force the price of drugs up that will simply result in more money for the cartels. The producers get paid pennies anyway and that won't change. Obviously his point is to focus on demand, but we all know that is easier said than done.

2. Saving money early on and paying for it later: Back to point one, we are cutting costs by reducing funding for prevention programs, but increasing funds for law enforcement. Our bloated prison system is very expensive (even more so that we privatized much of it). He claims we're spending enough on fighting drugs, but we're spending it on the wrong things.

3. Acting nationally against a global business: I found his comments on target in this area. The richest countries are funding the UN's efforts to eradicate the crops in poor countries, so the rich countries are happy with the way the war is being fought even though it isn't making a difference. The drugs are not valuable at the production end, they're not valuable until they're a finished product ready for distribution, but we don't focus on that. Instead we're burning bridges with countries and their citizens in multiple developing nations to protect our citizens from their own bad habits?

He does point out this is changing, because the lines between producer and consumer are blurring, as developing countries with larger middle classes are now consuming drugs at an increasing pace.

4. Confusing prohibition with control: He uses the term balloon squeezing and herding cockroaches to capture the futility of trying enforce prohibition. He suggests that the legalization of marijuana so far appears to be mostly positive compared to trying to enforce prohibition, which is a very expensive and ineffective effort. What about harder drugs, he doesn't claim to have an answer, but points out that England, Switzerland and other European countries have already legalized heroin in a very limited way. Some doctors have permission to prescribe heroin free of charge to addicts. The idea is addicts are gradually able to wean themselves off, and since it is free the government has reduced the number of robberies they committed by 90%.

I think you'll enjoy the book.

[SWJ Blog]

Hooked: Mexico’s Violence and U.S. Demand for Drugs (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/hooked-mexico%E2%80%99s-violence-and-us-demand-for-drugs)

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[davidbfpo]

A Pro-Publica report:
In March 2011 gunmen from the Zetas cartel, one of the most violent drug trafficking organizations in the world, swept through Allende and nearby towns like a flash flood, demolishing homes and businesses and kidnapping and killing dozens, possibly hundreds, of men, women and children.

(Shortly after) But unlike most places in Mexico that have been ravaged by the drug war, what happened in Allende didn’t have its origins in Mexico. It began in the United States, when the Drug Enforcement Administration scored an unexpected coup. An agent persuaded a high-level Zetas operative to hand over the trackable cellphone identification numbers for two of the cartel’s most wanted kingpins, Miguel Ángel Treviño and his ​brother Omar. Then the DEA took a gamble. It shared the intelligence with a Mexican federal police unit that has long had problems with leaks — even though its members had been trained and vetted by the DEA. Almost immediately, the Treviños learned they’d been betrayed.Link:https://www.propublica.org/article/allende-zetas-cartel-massacre-and-the-us-dea

[SWJ Blog]

Narco-Drones: A New Way to Transport Drugs (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/narco-drones-a-new-way-to-transport-drugs)

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[SWJ Blog]

Maritime Interdiction in the War on Drugs in Colombia: Practices, Technologies and Technological Innovation (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/maritime-interdiction-in-the-war-on-drugs-in-colombia-practices-technologies-and-technological-)

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[AdamG]

While MS-13 has been operating in neighboring Suffolk County for the past decade, its increasing infiltration of Nassau is alarming authorities — and terrifying residents more used to worrying about the traffic on the Long Island Expressway than gang warfare.
MS-13’s motto is “murder, rape, control.’’
Authorities consider it the world’s most dangerous street gang at the moment, and its heavily tattooed, machete-wielding members easily live up to the hype.
The gang was born in Los Angeles in the 1980s in the wake of deadly civil wars wracking the three countries forming the so-called “Northern Triangle’’ at the top of Central America: El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
Refugees from those countries fled to the United States, landing mostly in poor LA neighborhoods, leaving them vulnerable to Mexican street gangs already in power. The refugees banded together to fight back, taking cues from the Mexican gangs while forming their own version of a ruthless organization.
The new gang of street terrorists dubbed themselves Mara Salvatrucha 13, or MS-13 for short. The name is believed to be a combination of the Spanish word mara, or “gang,’’ Salva for Salvador and trucha, street slang for staying vigilant. The number 13 supposedly refers to M’s place in the alphabet — an homage to Mexico, the home country of the gangs that gave it its start.
About three decades after first hitting the US, the gang has now infiltrated more than 40 states with 10,000-plus known members, according to FBI estimates. Their numbers in New York are murky, but one thing is certain: Long Island has become one of the gang’s major East Coast strongholds after Washington, DC, and its surrounding areas, authorities say.
The gang follows work opportunities, officials say: Where there are wealthy areas in need of cheap immigrant workers, you will find MS-13.https://nypost.com/2017/12/12/scourge-of-savage-ms-13-spreads-from-suffolk-to-nassaus-tony-north-shore/

[AdamG]

A self-propelled semi-submersible vessel carrying more than 3,800 pounds of cocaine was stopped by the U.S. coast guard. According to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the incident happened on November 12th (off the coast of Texas).

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/12/11/u-s-coast-guard-intercepts-semi-submersible-vessel-packed-3-800-pounds-cocaine/939668001/

[AdamG]

The Islamist militant group Hezbollah exploded into a major cocaine trafficker for the United States over the past decade — and it happened under former President Barack Obama's watch to help score a nuclear deal with Iran, a report revealed Monday.
Project Cassandra, a campaign launched by the Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008, found that the Iran-backed military and political organization collected $1 billion a year from money laundering, criminal activities, and drug and weapons trade, according to Politico. Over the following eight years, the agency found that Hezbollah was involved in cocaine shipments from Latin America to West Africa, as well as through Venezuela and Mexico to the United States.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/hezbollah-smuggled-tons-cocaine-u-001923525.html