PDA

View Full Version : Drugs & US Law Enforcement (2006-2017)



Pages : [1] 2

SWJED
08-14-2006, 01:30 PM
Joint Force Quarterly 3rd Quarter 2006 - JIATF - South: Blueprint for Success (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4212.pdf) by Richard M. Yeatman.


Over the last 17 years, the Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–S) has built an unparalleled network of law enforcement, intelligence, and military assets to focus on detecting the movements and shipments of narcoterrorist organizations.

With this evolving structure, JIATF–S serves as a model for bringing the most effective assets to bear on complex national policy issues, whether it be illegal drugs, weapons proliferation, or international terrorism. Fundamental to any task force is a clear mission statement. If the statement, and thus the mission itself, lacks specific goals, agencies may be reluctant to participate for fear they have little to gain. Therefore, JIATF–S must target specific missions and clearly define their objectives, to include detecting, monitoring, and targeting narcoterrorists and the drugs they profit from. Since law enforcement agencies have a vested interest in achieving these objectives, the application of an interagency partnership has been successful.

JIATF–S serves as a model that other interagency organizations can tailor to their specific goals. For example, an interagency effort to track military equipment destined for terrorist organizations could include individuals from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). For task force participants to feel connected to results, they must be part of the command. Within the JIATF–S organizational structure, representatives from DOD, Homeland Security, and the Justice Department, along with U.S. Intelligence Community liaisons and international partners, work as one team. Interagency personnel are fully integrated within the command structure and serve in key leadership positions. This integration promotes trust and facilitates the sharing of law enforcement investigative information, which is critical for any intelligence-driven organization.

While traditional joint operations focus on efforts among the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, JIATF–S has gone past these traditional boundaries, becoming a fully integrated interagency command. Whereas most organizations count on liaison officers to represent them, JIATF–S takes this concept much further. The top command structure demonstrates total integration, with the Director being a Coast Guard rear admiral and the Vice Director coming from Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Integration also exists through the lower levels of the command: both the Directors for Intelligence and Operations are military officers, but their Deputies are from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Customs and Border Protection. Intelligence analysts from the DEA, CBP, and FBI are located in the Joint Intelligence Operations Center to ensure that law enforcement agencies are involved in daily operations and that information is not stovepiped…

Strickland
08-18-2006, 12:41 PM
At the risk of throwing a turd in the punchbowl over this report, how would we grade our progress in the war on drugs, and by extension JIATF South? The FARC reportedly receives $600 million a year in drug profits.

Scenario - JIATF South has intelligence that 100 speedboats full of cocaine are preparing to leave the coast of Colombia for multiple destinations. During this period, they get further intelligence on 10 of the 100 which confirms that they have cocaine. They have no further intell on the remaining 90, but still believe these to be drug shipments. Out of these 10 boats, they decide that the glacial process of interagency coordination will allow them to target 3 of the 10. Out of these three, they interdict one, and seize a large amount of cocaine. Question - what percentage of drug shipments did they stop? Did they stop 1 of 100? 1 of 10? 1 of 3? of 1 of some unknown number? Answer - they would report that they interdicted 33% of drug shipments or 1 of 3.

pcmfr
09-15-2006, 11:52 PM
JIATF S is in the business of identifying drug routes and keeping their various interagency stakeholders happy with bureaucratic churn. Very little of their work actually involves intercepting drugs. Take a look at their record of vessels and a/c detected vs. intercepted over the past few years, and you will be shocked. Of course, some of the blame can be placed on the lack of assets available to them, but a large part goes to the ridiculous ROE we place on the forces doing the interceptions. The war on drugs is a joke. As long as we treat these vessels as a law enforcement problem rather than a threat to national security, the joke will endure.

slapout9
09-17-2006, 02:24 AM
1-If you read the next to the last paragraph in the article you will find it is arrest that count not boats or shipments seized. This is part of a three pronged DEA strategy of get the kingpin,get the money,get extradition to the USA. And it is highly successful!!!Relative to Columbia.

2-For some time the DEA has warned that the major high drug traffic route is through MEXICO!!!!! not by air or sea.

3-600 million is a lot but it is far,far less than they were getting. It will be hard to replace to, with the new extradition treaty with Columbia many of those financial sources are gone for good. Especially when those Mother FARCers get a lot of help from uncle Hugo in Venezuela.

For details you can read the DEA 2006 report at the white house website office of drug control strategy. Not sure of the link, I read a hard copy from a friend.

pcmfr
09-17-2006, 10:43 PM
2-For some time the DEA has warned that the major high drug traffic route is through MEXICO!!!!! not by air or sea.

It still goes from air or sea to get to Mexico. Most of the drugs are offloaded in Central America (especially Guatemala) then go overland to Mexico.

slapout9
09-18-2006, 11:16 PM
Here is a link about Mexico and the drug problrm and the Patriot act.

www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14817871

SWJED
09-22-2006, 08:08 PM
22 September American Forces Press Service - Joint Interagency Group Working to Stop Flow of Drugs Into U.S. (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=1128) by Kathleen Rhem. Posted in full per DoD authorization...


Agents and experts from many different government agencies are working together out of a headquarters in Key West, Fla., to stem the flow of drugs and other contraband into the U.S. from Latin America.

The Joint Interagency Task Force South is “a model for interagency cooperation,” Army Gen. Bantz J. Craddock told Pentagon reporters here Sept. 20. Craddock is the outgoing commander of U.S. Southern Command, which maintains operational control of the task force.

Military assets are often best suited for finding and tracking means by which criminal gangs move drugs, weapons and illegal immigrants into the United States. However, the military can’t arrest people in domestic operations. This is where interagency cooperation is vital.

Craddock explained that military assets within JIATF South detect and monitor drug traffickers moving from Latin America into the U.S. That’s the point in the process where representatives of law enforcement agencies step in.

“Every time there is an end game on the high seas or on land, there has to be a duly-authorized law enforcement detachment there,” Craddock said.

Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Agency, or Customs and Border Protection agents work closely with the military to be on hand to make arrests. “JIATF South has a very mature, established process to be able to ensure that out on the seas, where we have grey-hulled Navy ships that can’t do arrests, there is a law enforcement detachment consisting of one or more of those agencies on board,” Craddock said.

In addition to the Defense Department, Coast Guard, DEA and Customs, other agencies represented at JIATF are: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Interagency cooperation is the only way to bring well-funded drug traffickers to justice, Craddock said. The key to that is to figure out what tactics they’ll use next. “These narcotrafficking organizations are very smart, obviously well-funded, (and) they watch closely what we do,” he said. “They respond; they’re agile; sometimes they can get inside of our response cycle.”

In 2004, U.S. officials interdicted 220 tons of cocaine coming into the U.S. In 2005, that figure went up to 252 tons. But the pace is down so far in 2006, Craddock said, explaining that narcotraffickers lost so much that they changed the way they do business.

Craddock explained that drug runners used to carry their loads in large boats, but these were easy for U.S. government assets to find and catch. Several years ago, narcotraffickers began using hard-to-find, faster boats -- 40-foot boats with four 240-horsepower motors. “They move across the calm seas of the eastern Pacific or Caribbean at 60 knots,” Craddock said.

“So we changed some techniques,” he added. JIATF began using helicopters on Coast Guard ships as a way to keep up with the drug traffickers. This way of doing business is very effective in finding and catching these fast boats, he said.

“Now, we think, based upon what we’re seeing, that because of our effectiveness in the maritime arena, they may be going back to more air transport,” Craddock said.

“The challenge we’ve got is not to catch them. We’ll catch them,” the general said. “The challenge is to get in front of their next step and be waiting to make sure that their changed mode of operation isn’t effective and we keep them off balance. When they’re taken out of their game plan, they’re very vulnerable.”

Another reason the mission of the Joint Interagency Task Force South is vital to the U.S. is because it helps Latin American nations better police their own waters and airspace and cuts down on ungoverned areas in the Western Hemisphere. The task force has forged relationships with the governments of several nations and has many interdiction and information-sharing agreements throughout the region. Eleven foreign officers are permanent members of the JIATF South staff.

The United States is concerned about ungoverned areas because they can become breeding grounds for extremism or safe havens for terrorists, Craddock said. “It’s the hole-in-the-wall gang,” he said. “If one’s safe, a bunch more are going to show up because they feed off each other.”

Officials also are concerned that narcotrafficking funds terrorism. “Narcotrafficking is extremely lucrative. Look at Afghanistan, at the poppy cultivation there; it feeds al Qaeda,” Craddock said. “We believe that there are inroads, contacts, relationships, funds being raised in Latin America from the narcotraffickers that are moving into extremist organizations and migrating out of the region.”

SWJED
09-27-2006, 11:18 PM
28 September Christian Science Monitor - Plan Colombia: Big Gains, But Cocaine Still Flows (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0928/p01s03-woam.html) by Danna Harman.


... The US Embassy in Bogotá, since the launch of the $4.7 billion Plan Colombia in 2000, has grown into the second largest US diplomatic mission in the world, after Baghdad. It employs over 2,000 people, including some 350 US military personnel and 750 contractors.

The cornerstone of Plan Colombia is the massive effort to eradicate Colombia's coca plants before they are processed into cocaine. Some 20 aircraft, piloted by contractors with DynCorp International, headquartered in Falls Church, Va., take turns carrying out daily spray missions. Army and police units assist these efforts by clearing the ground of coca farmers, guerrillas, or traffickers below, and by protecting the spray mission from above - with a fleet of 71 US provided helicopters. The majority of the State Department's counternarcotics and law enforcement budget in Colombia is dedicated - directly or indirectly - to these endeavors.

In 2005, a record-breaking 170,000 hectares (419,000 acres) of coca were destroyed: 138,000 sprayed and 32,000 pulled out by hand or plowed under.

In total, since the program began in 1994 (and particularly since it was ramped up in 2000), 986,925 hectares of coca plant and opium poppy have been eradicated - an area almost equivalent to the size of the states of Rhode Island and Delaware combined.

Drug seizures are another pillar of the plan, and here too, there are results. Two hundred and twenty-five tons of cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base were seized in 2005, up from 125 tons in 2002, and the number of clandestine drug labs destroyed soared to nearly 2,000 last year from 317 in 2000, according to a July study by Colombia's National Narcotics Directorate (DNE). Meanwhile, the number of traffickers extradited to the US in the last four years is climbing toward 400.

"We are squeezing them. We are forcing them to change their drug trafficking routes and their methods," says Walters.

A better-trained and -equipped military and police, meanwhile, has meant that overall security in Colombia has vastly improved, especially in the urban areas. From 2002 to 2005, the murder rate fell 35 percent - from 28,837 murders to 18,111 - and kidnappings have dropped from nearly 3,000 in 2002 to 800 last year, according to Uribe's office. As a consequence, nearly 1 million foreigners visited last year, a 21 percent jump compared with 2004, and foreign investment hit $10 billion last year, a fivefold increase since 2002...

But even Plan Colombia advocates admit the impressive statistics do not a complete victory make.

"We're making first downs," US Ambassador to Colombia William Wood is fond of saying, "...but we're not sure how long the football field is."

President Uribe is often even more circumspect. "It is clear we cannot abandon Plan Colombia," he said while in New York last week."But it is also clear that, in comparison to our efforts, we should be seeing better results."

Sometimes, it seems the harder Colombians and Americans fight, the more the drug lords push back and the coca fields reproduce...

slapout9
09-28-2006, 11:58 AM
Here is a link about the breakup of the Cali cartel and forfeiture of over 2 Billion dollars to the US from Columbia. I don't why we keep spraying weed killer everywhere when we know putting them in jail and taking their money works.


But the big news is the DEA is finally stating in public that most of Columbia's cocaine industry is controlled by MEXICO!!!!!! no need to fly or swim to get across the border. Here is the link.


http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13415616

SWJED
09-30-2006, 02:21 PM
All three articles from the CSM series and an article from the LAT:


Doubts Aside, U.S. Set to Boost Colombia Aid (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-colombia29sep29,1,7901434.story?coll=la-headlines-world) - Los Angeles Times
War on Drugs: Ambushed in Jamundí (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0927/p01s04-woam.html)- Christian Science Monitor
Plan Colombia: Big Gains, But Cocaine Still Flows (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0928/p01s03-woam.html) - Christian Science Monitor
Rethinking Plan Colombia: Ways to Fix It (http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0929/p01s03-woam.html) - Christian Science Monitor

Strickland
10-03-2006, 11:01 PM
1-If you read the next to the last paragraph in the article you will find it is arrest that count not boats or shipments seized. This is part of a three pronged DEA strategy of get the kingpin,get the money,get extradition to the USA. And it is highly successful!!!Relative to Columbia.

2-For some time the DEA has warned that the major high drug traffic route is through MEXICO!!!!! not by air or sea.

3-600 million is a lot but it is far,far less than they were getting. It will be hard to replace to, with the new extradition treaty with Columbia many of those financial sources are gone for good. Especially when those Mother FARCers get a lot of help from uncle Hugo in Venezuela.

For details you can read the DEA 2006 report at the white house website office of drug control strategy. Not sure of the link, I read a hard copy from a friend.

Are you suggesting that we are winning the war on drugs?

slapout9
10-03-2006, 11:43 PM
Major Strickland,
No! I am not suggesting we are winning the war on drugs. I do think Columbia is one of the more successful operations. And the final success of Columbia is in the vital interest of the US. Here is why?

1-At the Strategic effects level non-drug related employment is up.
2-Tourism is up over 21%, people don't vacation in high crime areas.
3-Arresting drug king pins and asset seizure is the most effective TTP that LE has. Just recently one drug conviction resulted in over 2 Billion dollars being returned to the US Gov.
4-Mexico is a big problem and it is not just drugs. Strategypage.com just ran an article a few days ago about Cubans switching ID's with Mexicans and crossing the border into the US.
5-So much pressure is being put on Columbia that they are moving to Mexico, displacement at it's worst.
6-FARC may be the x factor that upsets the progress that has been made in Columbia.
7-Finally Columbia is critical because it has one of the largest undeveloped oil reserves in our hemisphere. With drug activity on the decrease it raises the chances of oil company investment and produce a much needed near by source of petroleum.
8- As for Mexico we should have closed the border along time ago.

Wildcat
02-25-2007, 09:31 PM
Moderator's Note: On 18th April 2011 seven threads merged to this re-named thread Colombia, FARC & insurgency (merged thread). Seeven SWJ Blog threads merged in today. Six threads merged in 8th October 2016 (ends).

I posted this AAR on SOCNET after several of the guys there gave me help prior to my trip, and Jedburgh suggested I post it here as well.

Last semester I took a polisci seminar entitled "Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies," and had the good fortune of traveling to Colombia with my classmates and our professor for a weeklong research trip. Most of our time we spent going to meetings all over Bogota, but we also spent two days and two nights in the Eje Cafetero, going canopying, whitewater rafting, and horseback riding. In the interests of time and space, I'll limit this AAR to the more relevant aspects of the research trip.

We flew into Bogota on the 12th of December and had our first meetings on the 13th. Spread out over the course of the week were meetings with several NGOs and other organizations, including:
- CODHES
- Fundacion Seguridad y Democracia (FSD)
- National Democratic Institute (NDI)
- Transparencia por Colombia
- Corporacion Nuevo Arco Iris
- OAS mission in Colombia
- Professors at Universidad de los Andes and Universidad del Rosario
- Former mayor of Bogota Enrique Penalosa

Our discussions with those largely revolved around internally displaced persons (IDPs) and demobilization of paras and guerrillas. The most interesting of those, in my opinion, was the Corporacion Nuevo Arco Iris, as it was headed up by two former guerrillas who demobilized and were involved in promoting peaceful DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) for guerrillas and paras. I'll go into more detail on the bigger meetings, however.

We started off meeting with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 13th, discussing not just HR, but also the dimensions of narcotrafficking and historical ties b/w guerrillas and peasants in rural departments. The afternoon of the 14th we met with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, discussing many of the same issues. We had a meeting with Juan Forero, who is the Washington Post's correspondent in Colombia. He had interviewed our professor before for an article, and he turned out to be one of the most interesting people on our trip; urbane, witty, articulate. He even met us for dinner the next night at a nice restaurant, where we talked about Colombia's security situation over mojitos and Club Colombia beers.

The 15th was our biggest day. We began with a meeting with ARD, the Agency for Rural Development, which was contracted by USAID. Our next meeting was with some of the editorial board of El Tiempo, Colombia's most circulated newspaper and, arguably, its most controversial, seeing as the director of the investigative unit, Martha Soto, with whom we talked for a while, was working on uncovering ties between members of the Colombian Congress and the paras/guerrillas. Their office (or compound, rather) had incredibly tight security because their previous office was hit by a car bomb a few years back. Rafael Santos, the adjunct director of the paper, was among the people talking with us. For those not familiar with Colombia's domestic politics, he belongs to THE Santos family, one of the most prominent families in the country.


Next we were off to the US Embassy, where first we met with representatives from USAID (US Agency for International Development). One lady wasn't too pleased when I posed a question to her about the perceived failings of Plan Colombia and the effects the aerial spraying of supposed coca fields has had on rural peasants. She seemed to be pretty much spitting out the "party line" the whole time we were there. We also met with a Foreign Service pol-mil officer, but before that we met with two Army SF officers with the PATT (Planning-Assistance Training Team) and two of their NCOs; the LTC was the PATT chief, the MAJ his deputy. I won't mention names in the interest of PERSEC. The two NCOs (I didn't see their rank insignia clearly from where I sat) had apparently just returned that day from training CAF troops. We got them to address issues like the current troop cap in Colombia, ROEs, force protection, et cetera. That was, of course, the most fun for me.

Findings
There are many differing opinions (of course) on the current nature of the guerrilla war. Because of FARC's extensive ties to the drug trade, most people believe they've shed their Marxist/Maoist roots and become opportunistic businessmen in some way, and that the only reason the FARC still exists is its revenues from the drug trade which it uses to buy weapons and support itself. Some of our speakers suggested, however, that the ideological roots were still there because the FARC still maintained power primarily through wielding weapons, not through narcotrafficking.

According to FSD, there have been remarkable gains in security: kidnappings, homicides, and attacks on national infrastructure have significantly fallen in the past four years. But, to some people, a peaceful solution still feels over a decade away, if not further. The paras are easier to negotiate with because they are not as ideologically driven, but it's hard for the government to make its case because the paras originated as local militias to protect peasants from the guerrillas when the government forces could not adequately do the job. To this day, government presence in some of the rural departments is scarce, or even non-existent.

Security problems are exacerbated by the plight of IDPs, some of which results from the paras and guerrillas, some of which results from the aerial spraying program associated with Plan Colombia, which targets coca fields, but also often ends up destroying the livelihood of many peasants and galvanizing further support for the guerrillas.

Other stuff
We were saddled with so many meetings that we had very little downtime. Most nights I didn't get to bed until 1:00 or 2:00, and then we'd be back up at 5:00 or 6:00 to eat breakfast and get back on the road. I was sick for a few days as a result, and didn't get any decent sleep until we flew to the rural areas, then I felt fine. I'll say this: the coffee was amazing, and so was the food. The best meal I had was in the Eje Cafetero, the rural coffee-growing region of Colombia, at the finca where we stayed.

Our second night in Bogota we went to a bar known as the Bogota Beer Company (which was hit by a grenade a couple years ago) and proceeded to drink, including my professor. We suddenly started arm-wrestling after several drinks, and after I beat a friend of mine, my professor challenged me and, after a minute-long battle, finished me off to howls of laughter and cheering. It was a great night. And, yeah, the women are gorgeous. We played a drinking game with a group of girls from the Universidad de los Andes.

In the Eje Cafetero we went whitewater rafting the first morning, then canopying in the afternoon. As we were doing the last quarter-mile stretch of water, our Colombian guide slapped his paddle on the water with a loud BANG and our professor ducked and went, "Oh, ####!" When he looked up and saw us laughing, he admitted for a moment he thought we were taking small arms fire. He gave one piece of standing advice: if we ran into trouble, we were not to surrender to, but to run without stopping. Methods the guerrillas used on captives including tying them to trees and letting fire ants eat them, so it's supposedly better to take a 7.62mm slug to the back of the head while running away than to risk capture.

Armed soldiers were everywhere. Nothing makes you feel secure like a CAF soldier in full combat kit standing on a street corner with a Galil slung across his chest.

Last week we gave a presentation at the college on the trip, and I discussed the security situation. Afterwords, a Colombian student at our school came up and thanked us, saying we seemed to have a better grasp of her country than she did.

That's my summary. Feel free to comment. I'd be more than happy to elaborate on certain parts of the trip if anything was too vague, or if people might like to know more specifics. If anyone has questions about individuals, particularly embassy personnel with whom we met whose names I didn't want to put in this public forum, please PM me.

goesh
02-26-2007, 04:17 PM
When I saw the 4 troopers bunched up, wearing no Kevlar and looking all togather in one direction most likely smiling at a woman passing by, I couldnt' help but think of FARC doing a drive-by with a silenced Uzi. FARC has made alot of hits on police and security forces.

Wildcat
02-26-2007, 05:49 PM
When I saw the 4 troopers bunched up, wearing no Kevlar and looking all togather in one direction most likely smiling at a woman passing by, I couldnt' help but think of FARC doing a drive-by with a silenced Uzi. FARC has made alot of hits on police and security forces.

Some were more attentive than others. When we got into the area around the presidential residence in Bogota, they were all-business. Magazines were inserted, though I doubt they had racked rounds into the chambers yet. There were even quite a few plain-clothes security folk around with earpieces and probably concealed sidearms, and no pictures were allowed. It was intimidating, to say the least.

Jedburgh
03-07-2007, 11:13 PM
Thanks for the AAR. I really appreciate your on-the-ground insights.

To expand on Columbia, here's an article from the current (Mar-Apr 07) Military Review:

A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe's Columbia (2002-2006) vs FARC (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr07/Marks_Colombia.pdf)

...What bears repeating is the point to which this analysis has returned often: the present effort is both correct and sustainable; it is the right strategic posture required for progress and popular security. Hence, continued care must be exercised to ensure that Democratic Security remains a multifaceted approach—a strengthening of the state’s governance, finances, and democratic capacity enabled by the ever more powerful and capable shield provided by the security forces. By themselves, these facets are not the solution—that lies in the use of legitimacy to mobilize response against those using political violence for illegitimate ends—but they will certainly enable it.
..and older background from SSI:

Columbian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB18.pdf) (Jan 02)

The Past as Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66 (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB17.pdf) (Mar 02)

tequila
03-08-2007, 12:22 AM
Is there any analysis available about the impact of the AUC militias on FARC? I think any analysis that focuses exclusively on FARC vs Colombian Army is very incomplete.

SWJED
04-17-2007, 03:40 AM
Recent release by the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute - Colombia and the United States--The Partnership: But What Is the Endgame? (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=762) By Ambassador Myles R. R. Frechette (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?q=645).


American Ambassador to Colombia, 1994-97, Myles R. R. Frechette provides authoritative, eloquent, and impassioned perspectives on both the achievements and failures of American and Colombian efforts. He argues that American policy made analytical errors that need to be rectified, including underestimating the long-term complexity and interrelated nature of the problem, while both nations overestimated the amount of support that Colombia would receive from the international community. Moreover, nation-building and the rule of law are strategic imperatives which American policy must take seriously. Finally, it is critical to appreciate that Colombian cultural characteristics sharply influence what Colombians will do on their own behalf.

CSC2005
05-09-2007, 05:46 PM
I am working on a study of international training cultures. We are looking for people who have spent a fair amount of time training the Colombian military during the past 10 years. If you would like to share your knowledge or know of anybody, please let me know.

_Art
Quantico, VA

NDD
05-09-2007, 08:10 PM
Wildcat, are you the dude that promised me beer, then blew me off?:) Nice AAR.

goesh,
It don't work that way.

NDD
05-09-2007, 08:11 PM
Is there any analysis available about the impact of the AUC militias on FARC? I think any analysis that focuses exclusively on FARC vs Colombian Army is very incomplete.

Do you read Spanish? There is some material, but I don't think it's been translated.

NDD
05-09-2007, 08:33 PM
Since 1985 in LATAM.

Last 4 years, 6 days a week, 50 weeks a year, from LTCs to privates, military and police, everything from classroom theory to high risk practical do ya?

Will work for Copenhagen and beer.

Wildcat
05-10-2007, 12:35 AM
Wildcat, are you the dude that promised me beer, then blew me off?:) Nice AAR.

Affirmative, sir. That was me. Sorry again, but as you can tell from the AAR, we were slammed with wall-to-wall meetings. The only break we had while in Bogota was the night we went to the BBC to get smashed and armwrestle each other and play drinking games with hot Colombian university chicas. Good times...

If I ever return to Bogota, or you get back to the States, you may have some beer (or some Cope) inbound.

P.S.: Dectac03 over at MarineOCS.com just gave me a heads-up on your post here (I believe his handle here is "jcustis"), which is good because I didn't have email notifications turned on at the SWC, and I haven't been here in weeks, so your post would have gone unnoticed for a long time if he hadn't made me aware of it.

SWJED
05-10-2007, 08:59 AM
10 May Washington Post commentary - How to Lose an Ally (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/09/AR2007050902448.html) by Robert Novak.


Colombia's president, Alvaro Uribe, returned to Bogota this week in a state of shock. His three-day visit to Capitol Hill to win over Democrats in Congress was described by one American supporter as "catastrophic." Colombian sources said Uribe was stunned by the ferocity of his Democratic opponents, and Vice President Francisco Santos publicly talked about cutting U.S.-Colombian ties.

Uribe got nothing from his meeting with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other Democratic leaders. Military aid remains stalled, overall assistance is reduced, and the vital U.S.-Colombian trade bill looks dead. Uribe is the first Colombian president to crack down on his country's corrupt army officer hierarchy and to assault both right-wing paramilitaries and left-wing guerrillas, but last week he confronted Democrats wedded to outdated claims of civil rights abuses and rigidly protectionist dogma.

This is remarkable U.S. treatment for a rare friend in South America, where Venezuela's leftist dictator, Hugo Chavez, can only exult in Uribe's embarrassment as he builds an anti-American bloc of nations. A former congressional staffer, who in 1999 helped write Plan Colombia to combat narco-guerrillas, told me: "President Uribe may be the odd man out, and that's no way to treat our best ally in South America."...

tequila
05-10-2007, 09:39 AM
Uribe is the first Colombian president to crack down on his country's corrupt army officer hierarchy and to assault both right-wing paramilitaries and left-wing guerrillas

Amnesty and "demobilization" (light or nonexistent prison sentences) for the paramilitaries is an interesting way to define "assault." Novak also omits the fact that the AUC funds itself almost exclusively through drug trafficking to the United States --- that is, they are the problem, at least as much as the FARC, in terms of U.S. interests in Colombia.

That the paramilitaries/narcotraffickers enjoy widespread connections through Colombia's security hierarchy and with President Uribe's administration, up to (at least) President Uribe's brother, is worth some concern. Uribe remains, for instance, unwilling to sanction extradition of any of his paramilitary/narcotrafficker allies to the U.S. You'd think that a free trade deal would be worth sacrificing one or two drug kingpins.

120mm
05-10-2007, 11:00 AM
Or, alternatively, we could be seeing a return to the Jimmy Carter-era "punish your friends and reward your enemies" form of foreign relations.

We've been hearing for years how much more sophisticated and astute the Democratic foreign relations would be, if we only gave them the chance. Without any concrete details of what they WOULD do, of course. It will be interesting to see, going forward, how foreign policy develops.

It seems that Bush & Co. aren't the only Idealogues in D.C....

tequila
05-10-2007, 11:06 AM
Who says President Uribe is a friend given his refusal to do anything about narcotrafficking? Because he can give us a verbal massage for his $5 billion while cocaine purity increases and prices drop (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/sns-ap-colombia-us-cocaine,1,1518076.story?coll=sns-ap-world-headlines)?

Some results would be nice for $5 billion.

zenpundit
05-10-2007, 04:06 PM
The rollback of FARC and the ELN, which was the primary intent behind the Clinton administration's Plan Colombia, adopted and ramped up by the Bush administration. Drug issues were secondary though the pro forma and de jure justifications.

Everyone on the Hill at the time ( which includes Pelosi) understood that military aid to Colombia disguised as " drug interdiction" assistance was handed over to Bogota with a straight face but a wink and a nod. Toward the end of blunting a narco-Marxist takeover of Colombia, it was an effective and wise policy in my view, if a costly and risky one.

Let's be blunt. The left-wing of the left-wing of the Democratic Party in the House sympathizes with FARC and were bitterly opposed to aiding Colombia against Communist guerillas from the inception. Unlike with Clinton, more moderate Democratic House leaders feel no obligation to carry water for George Bush on Colombia policy. They have enough headaches with their leftist wing over Iraq.

tequila
05-10-2007, 05:04 PM
Toward the end of blunting a narco-Marxist takeover of Colombia, it was an effective and wise policy in my view, if a costly and risky one.
The danger of a "narco-Marxist" takeover of Colombia has always been zero. This is due to FARC's total lack of a program that appeals to any of Colombia's urban educated classes, as well as its general inability to appeal to anyone beyond a narrow band of the impoverished peasantry. FARC only exists because of the structural weakness of the Colombian state in the countryside, not due to any genuine popular support of its own.

It seems to me rather odd that we are subsidizing a domestic government's ties to paramilitaries whose main sustenance is the export of illegal drugs to the U.S. It's almost as if we are prioritizing the welfare of certain factions of the Colombian government (which is hardly in existential danger) over that of American citizens.

zenpundit
05-10-2007, 05:48 PM
"The danger of a "narco-Marxist" takeover of Colombia has always been zero. This is due to FARC's total lack of a program that appeals to any of Colombia's urban educated classes, as well as its general inability to appeal to anyone beyond a narrow band of the impoverished peasantry"

Prior to Plan Colombia, FARC ruled over a significant section of Colombia. If they could have maintained or expanded that base while pushing the rest of Colombia into state failure a different dynamic would have emerged. That in my book is a tipping point scenario that effects foreign investment, currency flows, emigration.

Agree with you on the narrowcasting nature of the ideological appeal of FARC but that doesn't mitigate their ability to disrupt, only to attract.


"It seems to me rather odd that we are subsidizing a domestic government's ties to paramilitaries whose main sustenance is the export of illegal drugs to the U.S."

The paras and FARC rely on drug money to pay for their operations ( or at least defray costs. So do many other non-state actors. Our domestic policy on drug use seriously boomerangs against the U.S. on a strategic level.

John T. Fishel
05-10-2007, 07:38 PM
I usually have little use for Robert Novak but this time he is right on the money. I have been engaged in Latin America for the past 45 years, I am a LATAM FAO and served as the Chief of Policy & Strategy in the USSOUTHCOM J5. Until I retired from government service last summer, I was on the faculty of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies where we taught Latin American civilians and military from the defense sector of their countries about the management of the defense sector. Among my students was the former Vice-Minister of Defense for Colombia and the current deputy chief of the DAS (intel service) was my immediate subordinate while I was research director. I am putting this out only to establish that I have some bona fides on this subject.

The Colombian civil war is one of the most complex insurgencies I have ever come across. Most scholars suggest that it dates from the founding of the FARC in the 1960s. They are wrong. This war began in 1946 and evolved into the Violencia of 1948 - 54 +/- and after a short truce began again and seriously heated up in the 60s. Central to both periods is the figure of manuel Marulanda (Tiro Fijo) who emerged in the 80s as the major leader of the FARC.

It should be pointed out that the AUC (commonly called the paramilitaries) were founded in the 80s by members of the Medellin and Cali drug cartels AND, independently, by the cattle ranchers to defend against the depredations of the FARC, ELN, and M-19 guerrillas. As an aside, it should be pointed out that Colombia has perhaps the best record in South America of continued democracy while at the same time the worst record of political violence. Indeed, the only period of relative peace since independence was from 1902 when the War of 1000 Days ended until 1946 when La Violencia began.

Perhaps, the best way to describe Colombia's troubles is to use COL Joe Nunez' term, the Hobbesian Trinity, as a metaphor for the war among the government, FARC, and the AUC. Note that one past president of Colombia was so involved in drug trafficking that the Clinton Administration cut all support to his government. Only when Andres Pastrana was elected was Plan Colombia put forward. This was an international plan with both security and developmental components to it - a majority was financed by Colombia itself; the second largest increment (mostly development funding) was to come from the EU; the smallest amount from the US was mainly security assistance. Only the EU never met its goals.

The situation was complicated when President Pastrana ceded a significant part of the country (on the plains) to the FARC under a ceasefire. Referrred to as the despegue, it provided the FARC a sanctuary to regroup, grow coca, and make cocaine. Much of the debate over the FARC consists of whether they retain any revolutionary ambitions or are simply another cocaine cartel. Journalist Linda Robinson, of US News, who has interviewed FARC leaders believes they are still very much interested in overthrowing the government.

In turn, this sort of brings us to the Uribe government - which inherited the situation left by Pastrana. The latter, at the end of his term, did recognize the error of the despegue and rescinded the agreement. But it was up to Uribe to dismantle the depegue which he has done. Uribe has had success in getting the AUC to both demobilize and disarm and most have been reintegrated. Some, however, have refused and remain outside the agreement. So, while the Hobbesian Trinity is no longer quite the problem it once was, it does remain. Uribe's most successful COIN effort is a program known as CCAI (the Combined Center for Integrated Action) which brings together military, police, and civilian agencies to provide security and development in the conflict zones. CCAI's major weakness is that Uribe has not institutionalized it and it is likely to disappear when he leaves office. But, in the meantime, it has achieved much success along with AUC demobilization and efforts to defeat and destroy the FARC.

Finally, it is worth noting that the Uribe Administration has been prosecuting those who are tied in with death squads and drug traffickers and is the source of the media's stories on the links between high placed individuals and nefarious actors.

tequila
05-10-2007, 08:32 PM
The situation was complicated when President Pastrana ceded a significant part of the country (on the plains) to the FARC under a ceasefire. Referrred to as the despegue, it provided the FARC a sanctuary to regroup, grow coca, and make cocaine. Much of the debate over the FARC consists of whether they retain any revolutionary ambitions or are simply another cocaine cartel. Journalist Linda Robinson, of US News, who has interviewed FARC leaders believes they are still very much interested in overthrowing the government.


Agreed on all aspects of this, including FARC's continued delusions. Nonetheless FARC did not win the safe zone militarily - it was ceded by the Pastrana government in a failed attempt to see a political solution, an attempt that foundered again on FARC's delusion that it can win a military victory.


In turn, this sort of brings us to the Uribe government - which inherited the situation left by Pastrana. The latter, at the end of his term, did recognize the error of the despegue and rescinded the agreement. But it was up to Uribe to dismantle the depegue which he has done. Uribe has had success in getting the AUC to both demobilize and disarm and most have been reintegrated. Some, however, have refused and remain outside the agreement.

I think you are a little bit over-optimistic with regards to the success of the "demobilization" program and also with regards to the non-state nature of the paramilitaries' origins. AUC originally formed out of the narcotraffickers and their private armies, in alliance with the cattle barons, but also with the assistance of state interests, namely the Convivir militia which were famously backed by Uribe when he was governor of Antioquia, and which proved key in the recent indictment of Chiquita for its collusion with the AUC. Uribe has admitted meeting with AUC leaders like Salvatore Mancuso when he was governor of Antioquia, though he has declined to specify why.

Moreover the "reintegration" program (http://hrw.org/reports/2005/colombia0805/)has succeeded mainly in enabling the paramilitaries to consolidate areas under their control. Paramilitaries were not required to divulge or return any assets that came about from drug trafficking, confess their crimes including participation in massacres, or even to give their aliases. Indeed, while large-scale massacres at the hands of the AUC have largely stopped, the selective killings of trade unionists, journalists, and witnesses against it go on at the same level as they have since the 1990s.


Finally, it is worth noting that the Uribe Administration has been prosecuting those who are tied in with death squads and drug traffickers and is the source of the media's stories on the links between high placed individuals and nefarious actors.

I really doubt that Uribe is the driving force behind the parapolitics scandal. Firstly, the scandal only kicked off when an opposition politician revealed connections between paramilitaries and certain Uribe supporters in the Colombian Congress in 2005. Also if he was so aggressive in rooting out paramilitaries, I doubt that he would be so critical (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/04/17/colomb13196.htm) of the Colombian news media for divulging things like the connections of the DAS, which reports directly to him, with paramilitaries and death squad murders, or have been so conciliatory or employed Jorge Noguera as his head of DAS for so long.

John T. Fishel
05-10-2007, 08:58 PM
Hi Tequila--

My former colleague at the Center, COL (Ret.) Bill Spracher was the DATT in Colombia during the Convivir period. He is of the opinion that it was a pretty successful program that should not have been disbanded. That said, I find it interesting that every insurgency I have ever encountered demands the disbanding of the civilian defense groups and accuses them of of atrocities.

It is clear that these organizations work - they are effective in dealing with insurgents, if backed up by the regular military. I am also suspicious of research that fails to identify more specifically than interviews with demobilized AUC members, government officials, etc. I know that it is sometimes difficult to reveal sources but somewhat greater precision is possible than HRW used. I was also looking for the author of the report and found no names which also concerns me when citing those sources - as well as similar ones on the other side of this/other issue(s). HRW has a political agenda as does, say Heritage Foundation, and I take that into account when I read their stuff. However, if it is Heritage on Latin America, then it was written by Steve Johnson (who is identified as the author) who has pretty good credentials developed over a long period.

Cheers

John

tequila
05-10-2007, 09:37 PM
Hi Tequila--

My former colleague at the Center, COL (Ret.) Bill Spracher was the DATT in Colombia during the Convivir period. He is of the opinion that it was a pretty successful program that should not have been disbanded. That said, I find it interesting that every insurgency I have ever encountered demands the disbanding of the civilian defense groups and accuses them of of atrocities.

It is clear that these organizations work - they are effective in dealing with insurgents, if backed up by the regular military. I am also suspicious of research that fails to identify more specifically than interviews with demobilized AUC members, government officials, etc. I know that it is sometimes difficult to reveal sources but somewhat greater precision is possible than HRW used. I was also looking for the author of the report and found no names which also concerns me when citing those sources - as well as similar ones on the other side of this/other issue(s). HRW has a political agenda as does, say Heritage Foundation, and I take that into account when I read their stuff. However, if it is Heritage on Latin America, then it was written by Steve Johnson (who is identified as the author) who has pretty good credentials developed over a long period.

Cheers

John

Convivir involvement with death squads has been pretty well documented, for instance in this embassy cable (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB217/doc17.pdf) listing the involvement of a convivir local president in the massacre of 14 peasants in La Horqueta in 1997. There is also the indictment of Chiquita where Carlos Castano explicitly instructs (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB217/indictment.pdf) Chiquita execs to pay the AUC through the local convivir. Is it your contention that they did not commit atrocities? Note that effectiveness vs guerrillas using similar tactics does not necessarily rule out the use of massacre and atrocity. Indeed, similar tactics in Iraq used by the Mahdi Army against Sunnis are largely behind its popularity in Baghdad, for instance.

Also, what do you mean when you say you need more specificity from HRW with regards to the status of demobilized paramilitaries? Given the very nature of such groups, which principally traffick in drugs and homicide, one of the best ways to gain an understanding of them is to interview former members, especially those recruited as children who served as "foot soldiers" and may not have benefited in the same way as commanders did in the wake of "demobilization."

zenpundit
05-10-2007, 11:30 PM
What is the substantive moral difference between guerillas and paramilitaries?

tequila
05-11-2007, 12:55 AM
Not much of one. Both traffick drugs and use terror to cow the civilian populations. The paramilitaries tend to specialize in brute terrorization of civilians, though, and spend much less time fighting the FARC than the FARC does the Colombian Army.

The Colombian government in general, of course, is a far worthier cause and represents the Colombian people far better than the bloody dreams of the FARC high command. That doesn't mean they necessarily deserve $5 billion, not with the people they're in bed with.

NDD
05-11-2007, 01:09 AM
Perhaps someone should remind the new Congress that Plan Colombia is a Clinton initiative. And that Colombia is not in the ME.

The problem could be they are so focused on getting the POTUS, they can't find Colombia on a map.

NDD
05-11-2007, 01:23 AM
Not much of one. Both traffick drugs and use terror to cow the civilian populations. The paramilitaries tend to specialize in brute terrorization of civilians, though, and spend much less time fighting the FARC than the FARC does the Colombian Army.

The Colombian government in general, of course, is a far worthier cause and represents the Colombian people far better than the bloody dreams of the FARC high command. That doesn't mean they necessarily deserve $5 billion, not with the people they're in bed with.

This is basically a gross over-simplification and simply not true.

NDD
05-11-2007, 01:26 AM
Amnesty and "demobilization" (light or nonexistent prison sentences) for the paramilitaries is an interesting way to define "assault." Novak also omits the fact that the AUC funds itself almost exclusively through drug trafficking to the United States --- that is, they are the problem, at least as much as the FARC, in terms of U.S. interests in Colombia.

That the paramilitaries/narcotraffickers enjoy widespread connections through Colombia's security hierarchy and with President Uribe's administration, up to (at least) President Uribe's brother, is worth some concern. Uribe remains, for instance, unwilling to sanction extradition of any of his paramilitary/narcotrafficker allies to the U.S. You'd think that a free trade deal would be worth sacrificing one or two drug kingpins.

You've never been to Colombia have you.

NDD
05-11-2007, 01:27 AM
The danger of a "narco-Marxist" takeover of Colombia has always been zero. This is due to FARC's total lack of a program that appeals to any of Colombia's urban educated classes, as well as its general inability to appeal to anyone beyond a narrow band of the impoverished peasantry. FARC only exists because of the structural weakness of the Colombian state in the countryside, not due to any genuine popular support of its own.

It seems to me rather odd that we are subsidizing a domestic government's ties to paramilitaries whose main sustenance is the export of illegal drugs to the U.S. It's almost as if we are prioritizing the welfare of certain factions of the Colombian government (which is hardly in existential danger) over that of American citizens.
GEEZUS! Where do you get this stuff?

NDD
05-11-2007, 01:31 AM
Hi Tequila--

My former colleague at the Center, COL (Ret.) Bill Spracher was the DATT in Colombia during the Convivir period. He is of the opinion that it was a pretty successful program that should not have been disbanded. That said, I find it interesting that every insurgency I have ever encountered demands the disbanding of the civilian defense groups and accuses them of of atrocities.

It is clear that these organizations work - they are effective in dealing with insurgents, if backed up by the regular military. I am also suspicious of research that fails to identify more specifically than interviews with demobilized AUC members, government officials, etc. I know that it is sometimes difficult to reveal sources but somewhat greater precision is possible than HRW used. I was also looking for the author of the report and found no names which also concerns me when citing those sources - as well as similar ones on the other side of this/other issue(s). HRW has a political agenda as does, say Heritage Foundation, and I take that into account when I read their stuff. However, if it is Heritage on Latin America, then it was written by Steve Johnson (who is identified as the author) who has pretty good credentials developed over a long period.

Cheers

John

He is correct, your friend. The CONVIVIR program worked very well. The problem came IMO because of a lack of management, mostly on the part of the military. That, and external pressures. The political power of insurgent groups in Colombia and their ability to influence world opinion is often under-rated.

NDD
05-11-2007, 01:51 AM
The thing is, you can't say "The AUC is this..." or "The FARC is that..." It doesn't work that way. These are fairly large organizations with hundreds of splinter groups with their own agendas. They all also have fringe elements hovering around them and doing things in their names. They have all evolved far beyond the ideals of the initial members and any central control. There are few policies and no way to enforce any of them.

The situation is in a state of flux and with that chaos.

The CONVIVIR were not part of the paras - but members do change organizations. There are many people that switch back and forth between Gs and paras depending on what is most viable at the moment and how bad they want to stay alive.

To say that there is institutional involvement between the Colombian military and paras is not correct. In those days, battalion commanders were put out in an area and told to survive as best they could. Yes, some or even many crossed the line and supported the paras. They had a resource without constraints moving in their direction. They were short-sighted. But in their defense, there was a time when the paras were not so tied to drugs as an organization.

Yes, some of the para units evolved from organizations formed by cartels. Others came from better sources. Some CONVIVIRS evolved into para units. Some para units were dirty and others did great things in their areas.

Colombia is indeed a very complex situation. People are often forced to accommodate in order to stay alive or to keep those in their charge alive.

But make no mistake about it, the tide is turning. And Uribe is a big, big part of that. He has taken on a military in a country where a coup is always just under the surface (like most of LATAM) several times. He has had over 20 assassination attempts on his life. He has fought corruption and nepotism that had to be seen to be believed. And he is a friend to the US. About the only one left in the region. He is fighting the world's longest running insurgency without any support from anyone in the region or Europe. In fact, he is surrounded by enemies on all sides. They provide safe haven for those that would destroy the country on every border he has. He is attacked for everything he does.

He needs to be supported.

It is very easy to criticize a lack of demonstrable progress from thousands of miles away. It is another thing entirely to be The Man in the Arena.

slapout9
05-11-2007, 04:04 AM
NDD, glad to see you posting. I used to post about the successes in Columbia and generally got a lot of flak about it. I am retired LE and have been out of the loop for several years so I really enjoy getting some current ground truth from that area.

tequila
05-11-2007, 11:19 AM
NDD, thanks for the clarifications and info.


To say that there is institutional involvement between the Colombian military and paras is not correct.

Is this strictly true, given what we now know about Noguera's ties (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6388347.stm)to the paramilitaries, and also recent information publicized about Operation Orion which implicates top Colombian Army officers (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-colombia25mar25,0,776514,print.story?coll=la-home-headlines)?

On topic: ICG report on Colombia's New Armed Groups (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/20_colombia_s_new_armed_groups.pdf). This report is much more favorable towards the progress of "demobilization" than my posts have been and has a lot of good info about how the paramilitaries have evolved.

edit: Also, I have been to Bogota twice as a guest of a friend from my old job at Goldman Sachs. I actually was carjacked once two blocks from a police station, which certainly gave me some flashbacks to the good old days in Brooklyn, but Colombian women more than made up for that - they are truly awesome to behold! (though my friend says this situation only exists in Bogota). His family is relatively well off and his grandfather was briefly kidnapped once; they are 100% pro-Uribe through and through.

John T. Fishel
05-11-2007, 11:25 AM
Excellent discussion of the complexity of the Colombian environment. The only point I would quibble with you about is the threat of a coup. Since 1902 Colombia has had only one extra-constitutional change of government and that was in 1954 when General Rojas Pinilla was asked by a large group including members of both political parties who were then engaged in the civil war called La Violencia to seize power. He did. Four years later the parties agreed on the National Front power sharing government that alternated them in power for 20 years but guaranteed constitutional transitions. The Colombian military generally has chosen not to participate as a typical political actor - it is not coup prone.

A note on drug corruption: Good people can easily get caught up in it, especially in Colombia. This includes Americans like COL J. C. Hiett who was MILGP commander, and DEA Agent Rene de la Cova who headed the office in Bogota. Both have done time but some might well suggest that their sentences were mere slaps on the wrist.

Jedburgh
05-11-2007, 02:22 PM
ICG, 10 May 07: Columbia's New Armed Groups (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/20_colombia_s_new_armed_groups.pdf)

....Since early 2006, the Organization of American States (OAS) Peace Support Mission in Colombia (MAPP/OEA), human rights groups and civil society organisations have insistently warned about the rearming of demobilised paramilitary units, the continued existence of groups that did not disband because they did not participate in the government-AUC negotiations and the merging of former paramilitary elements with powerful criminal organisations, often deeply involved with drug trafficking. Worse, there is evidence that some of the new groups and criminal organisations have established business relations over drugs with elements of the insurgent Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN). At the same time, the government’s plan for reintegrating demobilised paramilitaries has revealed itself to be deeply flawed.

These alerts have to be taken seriously since conditions now exist for the continuity or re-emergence either of oldstyle paramilitary groups or a federation of new groups and criminal organisations based on the drug trade. The military struggles with the FARC and the smaller ELN are ongoing, and drug trafficking continues unabated. Massive illegal funds from drug trafficking help fuel the decades-long conflict, undermine reintegration of former combatants into society and foment the formation and strengthening of new armed groups, as occurred with the AUC and the FARC more than a decade ago....

NDD
05-12-2007, 04:42 AM
NDD, thanks for the clarifications and info.



Is this strictly true, given what we now know about Noguera's ties (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6388347.stm)to the paramilitaries, and also recent information publicized about Operation Orion which implicates top Colombian Army officers (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-colombia25mar25,0,776514,print.story?coll=la-home-headlines)?

On topic: ICG report on Colombia's New Armed Groups (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/20_colombia_s_new_armed_groups.pdf). This report is much more favorable towards the progress of "demobilization" than my posts have been and has a lot of good info about how the paramilitaries have evolved.

edit: Also, I have been to Bogota twice as a guest of a friend from my old job at Goldman Sachs. I actually was carjacked once two blocks from a police station, which certainly gave me some flashbacks to the good old days in Brooklyn, but Colombian women more than made up for that - they are truly awesome to behold! (though my friend says this situation only exists in Bogota). His family is relatively well off and his grandfather was briefly kidnapped once; they are 100% pro-Uribe through and through.
Yes it is true. Noguera is a man, not the institution. The DAS is not part of the Colombian military and Noguera has not been convicted of anything that I know of.

You need to tone down the rhetoric a bit.

NDD
05-12-2007, 04:48 AM
Excellent discussion of the complexity of the Colombian environment. The only point I would quibble with you about is the threat of a coup. Since 1902 Colombia has had only one extra-constitutional change of government and that was in 1954 when General Rojas Pinilla was asked by a large group including members of both political parties who were then engaged in the civil war called La Violencia to seize power. He did. Four years later the parties agreed on the National Front power sharing government that alternated them in power for 20 years but guaranteed constitutional transitions. The Colombian military generally has chosen not to participate as a typical political actor - it is not coup prone.

A note on drug corruption: Good people can easily get caught up in it, especially in Colombia. This includes Americans like COL J. C. Hiett who was MILGP commander, and DEA Agent Rene de la Cova who headed the office in Bogota. Both have done time but some might well suggest that their sentences were mere slaps on the wrist.

While what you say is true, the threat of coup is always there in any LATAM country. It runs deeper in some than others, but it is always there. The lack of it in Colombia is, IMO, as much to do with politicians accommodating the military because they know it is there as it is with the military not doing it. Until Uribe, there weren't a lot of Presidents with the huevos to fire a general, much less 3-4 on the same day. But they know he is leading from the front. I doubt they would be that forgiving of a lesser man.

The Rojas Pinilla coup, if you have to have one, wasn't a bad way to do it. His daughter is now in politics, or trying to be.

John T. Fishel
05-12-2007, 03:08 PM
Hi NDD--

While you may be correct as to the reason the Colombian military is coup averse, I suspect that it is only one of many reasons. Among those are an internalization by Colombians, civilian and military alike, of the democratic norm of elected government along with greater internalization of the difficult in Spanish concept of the English word "compromise." (Reflected in the National Front.)

As to the rest of LATAM, more complex still. First, there are the countries that have disolved their militaries - Costa Rica, Panama, and Haiti. They face no coup threat although that does not eliminate the threat of other politcal violence, eg Haiti. Costa Rica has internalized democratic norms; it has a democratic political culture. Panama, IMO, is well on its way there as well.

My experience with El Salvador suggests that its military faced its crisis in 1989 with the last major FMLN offensive and its reaction to the murder of the Jesuits ordered by a member of the Tandona resulted in a change of institutional culture that helped the ESAF internalize democratic norms. I have seen similar behavioral and norm change in the Argentine military as a result of its failure as a military in the Falklands/Malvinas war and the revelations of the dirty war.

Where I have not seen this kind of norm change is in Chile, usually upheld as the model Latin American democracy. I would note that Chile and Uruguay shared that same evaluation until the military coups that overthrew their respective civilian governments in 1973 and 1974. I would suggest that your blanket analysis needs to be revised to take account of the changes in the norms of the individual countries and their militaries as well as the change in the norms region wide. The latter are, of course, not as strong in some countries as in others but there has been such a change throughout the region and it is reflected in Guatemala and Peru although not as strongly as Argentina and El Salvador or, even, Colombia.

Cheers

John

NDD
05-13-2007, 02:54 AM
Hi NDD--

While you may be correct as to the reason the Colombian military is coup averse, I suspect that it is only one of many reasons. Among those are an internalization by Colombians, civilian and military alike, of the democratic norm of elected government along with greater internalization of the difficult in Spanish concept of the English word "compromise." (Reflected in the National Front.)

As to the rest of LATAM, more complex still. First, there are the countries that have disolved their militaries - Costa Rica, Panama, and Haiti. They face no coup threat although that does not eliminate the threat of other politcal violence, eg Haiti. Costa Rica has internalized democratic norms; it has a democratic political culture. Panama, IMO, is well on its way there as well.

My experience with El Salvador suggests that its military faced its crisis in 1989 with the last major FMLN offensive and its reaction to the murder of the Jesuits ordered by a member of the Tandona resulted in a change of institutional culture that helped the ESAF internalize democratic norms. I have seen similar behavioral and norm change in the Argentine military as a result of its failure as a military in the Falklands/Malvinas war and the revelations of the dirty war.

Where I have not seen this kind of norm change is in Chile, usually upheld as the model Latin American democracy. I would note that Chile and Uruguay shared that same evaluation until the military coups that overthrew their respective civilian governments in 1973 and 1974. I would suggest that your blanket analysis needs to be revised to take account of the changes in the norms of the individual countries and their militaries as well as the change in the norms region wide. The latter are, of course, not as strong in some countries as in others but there has been such a change throughout the region and it is reflected in Guatemala and Peru although not as strongly as Argentina and El Salvador or, even, Colombia.

Cheers

John
We can agree to disagree. I will only had that in my opinion this threat of insurgency, I believe exacerbated in some cases by this very changing of the uniform of the military to police (and that's what it is) is often the trigger to the coup or threat of same. And the key issue will probably, once again, be land reform.

John T. Fishel
05-13-2007, 02:35 PM
Hi NDD--

I am somewhat confused by your last post. Can you elaborate?

My own sense is that we tend to agree on parts of the picture and disagree over nuances.

Cheers

John

tequila
05-16-2007, 08:17 AM
Death Squad Scandal Circles Closer to Uribe (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/world/americas/16colombia.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print)- NYTIMES.


President Álvaro Uribe (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/u/alvaro_uribe/index.html?inline=nyt-per), the Bush administration’s closest ally in Latin America, faces an intensifying scandal after a jailed former commander of paramilitary death squads testified Tuesday that Mr. Uribe’s defense minister had tried to plot with the outlawed private militias to upset the rule of a former president.

Speaking at a closed court hearing in Medellín, Salvatore Mancuso, the former paramilitary warlord, said Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos had met with paramilitary leaders in the mid-1990s to discuss efforts to destabilize the president at the time, Ernesto Samper (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/ernesto_samper/index.html?inline=nyt-per), according to judicial officials.

Mr. Mancuso also said that Vice President Francisco Santos had met with paramilitary leaders in 1997 to discuss taking their operations to the capital, Bogotá.

...

These revelations followed the disclosure this week of an illegal domestic spying program by the national police force and additional arrests of high-ranking political allies of Mr. Uribe on charges of ties to the paramilitaries.

...

Mr. Uribe tried to contain the newest scandal by forcing 12 generals in the national police to resign Monday over illegal wiretaps of political opponents, government officials and journalists.

Among those whose phones were tapped was Carlos Gaviria, an opposition leader who ran for president against Mr. Uribe last year. “This cannot happen under a democratic government,” Mr. Gaviria said.

The purge of the generals came after the newsmagazine Semana published transcripts of cellphone calls from imprisoned paramilitary leaders in which they orchestrated murders and cocaine deals. It was not clear whether these intercepted phone calls were part of the police surveillance program.

Mr. Santos, the defense minister, said neither he nor Mr. Uribe knew of the police wiretapping operation. Still, the report has hurt the credibility of Mr. Uribe’s government, already suffering from a perception of being soft on the paramilitaries ...

NDD
05-18-2007, 03:46 AM
Hi NDD--

I am somewhat confused by your last post. Can you elaborate?

My own sense is that we tend to agree on parts of the picture and disagree over nuances.

Cheers

John

Mostly that coup does not lie under the surface.

NDD
05-18-2007, 03:49 AM
Death Squad Scandal Circles Closer to Uribe (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/world/americas/16colombia.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print)- NYTIMES.

Sensationalist rhetoric at it's finest. There are so many inaccuracies in that article it is hard to believe they are even talking about the same country.

tequila
05-18-2007, 07:29 AM
Sensationalist rhetoric at it's finest. There are so many inaccuracies in that article it is hard to believe they are even talking about the same country.

Could you clarify?

NDD
05-19-2007, 04:45 AM
Just a couple:

Not a "domestic spying program" - there was no program. Some people wandered off the reservation - and they will go to jail for it.

He didn't fire them to "contain the scandal" - a couple of them weren't even fired, they didn't have to be. He asked for two resignations. When he named Naranjo Chief - the rest of them had to go by custom. It looks like the thing was done by a Sergeant with the knowledge of a Major and a Colonel.

The implication that Gaviria's phone was tapped because he was a political opponent of Uribe's is incorrect in my view - they are implying that Uribe ordered the tap, as he would be the one to benefit. They neglect to mention the other recent event that could have been the motive for the tap (among others).

The whole thing was apparently done to prove that the paras were still running their illegal operations from inside jails. If Uribe is tied to the paras, why would he do such a thing?

Mancuso has yet to prove any of his accusations regarding Santos.

SWJED
06-05-2007, 09:03 AM
5 June LA Times - Colombia Begins Freeing Rebels (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-colombia5jun05,1,2842539.story?coll=la-headlines-world) by Chris Kraul.


President Alvaro Uribe on Monday began releasing 193 jailed rebels, including a leader who was kidnapped in Venezuela in 2004 and turned over to Colombian authorities.

For nearly five years, Uribe had refused to swap any of the hundreds of guerrillas in Colombian prisons for the estimated 3,000 hostages held by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and other groups.

But Uribe has launched a bold — some say desperate — gambit to appease national and international critics who say he isn't doing enough to ease the hostages' plight. During this country's four-decade-long civil war, previous Colombian presidents exchanged prisoners for hostages...

sgmgrumpy
06-05-2007, 05:24 PM
And then this happens:wry:


Colombia rebels kidnap local police commander (http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N05258285.htm)


BOGOTA, June 5 (Reuters) - Colombian guerrillas kidnapped a local police commander even as President Alvaro Uribe announced he had freed a jailed rebel leader to try to broker the release of rebel-held hostages, authorities said


The kidnapping took place as Uribe was announcing the release of Rodrigo Granda, a top guerrilla commander who the government freed to act as a negotiator to try to broker an agreement between the government and the FARC.

SWJED
07-08-2007, 12:09 PM
8 July Washington Post - Calderón's Offensive Against Drug Cartels (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/07/AR2007070701280.html) by Manuel Roig-Franzia.


... Calderón is betting his presidency on a surge of Mexican troops -- one of the country's largest deployments of the military in a crime-fighting role -- to wage street-by-street battles with drug cartels that are blamed for more than 3,000 execution-style killings in the past year and a half. Sending more than 20,000 federal troops and police officers to nine Mexican states has made Calderón extremely popular; his latest approval ratings hit 65 percent.

But as the campaign drags into its eighth month and the death toll mounts, Calderón is facing a growing cadre of critics, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights representative in Mexico, who opposes the use of the military in policing. Calderón is also contending with foes in Mexico's Congress who want to strip him of the authority to dispatch troops without congressional approval. The Washington Office on Latin America, a human rights organization, has faulted him as quick to use the military but slow to reform Mexico's corrupt police...

SWJED
07-26-2007, 06:26 AM
26 July Washington Post - Report Cites Rebels' Wide Use of Mines In Colombia (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/25/AR2007072501093.html) by Juan Forero.


Colombia's largest rebel group, already accused of executing 11 civilian hostages last month, faced a new allegation Wednesday: A report by Human Rights Watch said the group has dramatically escalated its use of land mines, to the point that more people are killed or maimed by the devices here than in any other country in world.

The report, nearly a year in the making, said the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, which has been fighting the state since 1964, has sown antipersonnel mines throughout the country to slow an increasingly offensive-minded army. The impact of FARC mines, as well as those laid by a smaller rebel group, the National Liberation Army, or ELN, has been devastating: The devices killed or hurt 1,113 people last year, nearly a third of them civilians, according to government tallies based on reported incidents...

Jedburgh
09-04-2007, 01:33 PM
ISN Security Watch, 3 Sep 07: Colombia, Israel and Rogue Mercenaries (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18064)

Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos has acknowledged that Bogota had quietly hired a group of former Israeli military officers to advise local defense officials on their counter-insurgency tactics against leftist Fuerza Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) guerrillas...

....Israeli advisors - reportedly consisting of three senior generals, a lower ranking officer, an unnamed Argentinean officer and three translators - were hired under a reported US$10 million contract by the Colombian Defense Ministry to advise on how to improve the army's intelligence gathering capabilities. Santos reportedly approached former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami last year about the deal.

The Israeli group operates from Tolemaida in Cundinamarca Department, 240 kilometers from the capital Bogota, where the Colombian army runs its "Lancero" counterinsurgency training course, with Colombian army instructors being assisted by US military personnel.....

sgmgrumpy
09-04-2007, 04:24 PM
I was wondering this morning if you were going to post that JB. :D

Sarajevo071
09-15-2007, 04:25 AM
Diary secrets of Dutch woman fighting for FARC


COLOMBIAN forces have captured the intimate diary of a Dutch woman who joined the country's Marxist rebels, in which she gives a rare view of life with the guerrillas deep in the jungle.

In July, elite troops swept into the camp of a commander of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), known by the alias of Carlos Antonio Lozada.

He was wounded in the firefight and carried off by bodyguards, while women in the unit, who were bathing at the time, had to flee into the jungle in their underwear.

As the troops sifted through the camp, they came across two surprises. The first was Lozada's laptop computer, which held a treasure trove of intelligence, including confidential army plans of counter-guerrilla operations, revealing the extent of FARC infiltration into the military.

The second surprise was two battered notebooks, the journals of a guerrilla, written in Dutch.
...

http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=1460942007

Jedburgh
09-18-2007, 02:58 PM
IHT, 17 Sep 07: Mexican Drug Gang Attacks Government Intelligence Network (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/18/america/LA-GEN-Mexico-Drugs.php)

....Natividad Gonzalez, governor of the northern state of Nuevo Leon, said federal intelligence officers were tipped off that alleged members of Mexico's Gulf drug cartel "wanted to kidnap two or three agents" prior to the attack last Tuesday in the state capital of Monterrey. Two officers were killed and two more wounded in the ensuing shootout.

Federal police rounded up about a dozen members of a family believed to work for the cartel in connection with the shootout. The clan, dubbed "The Pedraza Dynasty" by Mexican newspapers, may have learned of the agents' identities from local policemen, Gonzalez said.

Intelligence agents have been targeted for assassination before, but the attack showed that traffickers not only knew who the agents were but also wanted to take the heavily armed officers alive, Gonzalez said....
It appears their police anti-corruption drive (http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20070626/news_1n26mexicops.html) isn't being too sucessful.....

“You can change the people and not change the institution,” said Ernesto López Portillo Vargas, executive director of the Institute for Security and Democracy, an independent group that studies police corruption issues. “This is the big risk.”

Jedburgh
09-26-2007, 02:42 PM
USIP, 25 Sep 07: New Hopes for Negotiated Solutions in Colombia (http://www.usip.org/pubs/working_papers/wp4_colombia.pdf)

This working paper analyzes recent peacemaking efforts between the Colombian government and two of the remaining armed guerrilla groups—the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces-Popular Army (FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). It evaluates the demobilization process with the paramilitary umbrella organization known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and current efforts to implement the Justice and Peace law that regulates the paramilitary process. The paper analyzes the roles of third-party actors—primarily the church, civil society more broadly, and the international community—in peace initiatives. In Colombia, these roles include pressuring for peace, setting the stage for peace accords, establishing spaces for dialogue and democratic discussion, creating the mechanisms for conflict resolution necessary for a sustainable peace, facilitating or mediating peace processes themselves, and implementing and monitoring peace agreements.

While in Colombia and elsewhere peace is usually negotiated between the government and one armed group at a time, this paper underscores that where there are multiple armed actors involved, it makes sense to approach peacemaking in a more comprehensive way. The paper underscores the need to be attentive to the ways that the dynamics within and between each set of armed actors impact the prospects for peace with other armed groups. The USIP conferences on which this paper is based for the first time brought together in Washington, D.C. participants in and analysts of current peace efforts with the AUC, FARC-EP, and ELN. This paper underscores the need to continue to put the experiences of each armed group into dialogue with each other and the need to anticipate the impact (and potential impact) that negotiations and agreements with one sector will have on the other groups and on the prospects for a sustainable and comprehensive peace....
Complete 42 page paper at the link.

Jedburgh
10-11-2007, 04:03 PM
ICG, 11 Oct 07: Columbia: Moving Forward with the ELN? (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/b16_colombia_eln.pdf)

....Due to its reduced military capability, many in Colombia believe the ELN is no longer a threat, will eventually disappear on its own, and hence the government is under no pressure to conclude the negotiations. This reasoning is flawed. While the ELN is more a “party in arms” than an insurgent army, it is not defeated. Insurgent groups rarely just go away. The ELN has shown a capacity to survive and revive after coming close to demise. In addition, a peace agreement would be highly beneficial, not only politically for Uribe but also for the ELN, which, however, must find answers to a number of serious questions.

Some of its fronts are in a more favourable situation than others. Some interact with other illegal armed groups, in particular the FARC, while others are at loggerheads with them; their financial solidity and grip on local communities differ a great deal. The movement risks implosion or fragmentation as well as the possibility that it could not fully implement a ceasefire, since its internal cohesion is weak. Since the death in 1998 of its leader, Spanish priest Manuel Pérez, Nicolas Rodríguez, alias “Gabino”, is responsible for political and military unity, but there are rifts within the COCE itself. Antonio Garcia is allegedly more hardline than Pablo Beltrán and Ramiro Vargas. The interests of Francisco Galán, who is not a COCE member and has spent a decade in prison, from where he has been working for a peace agreement, are not the same as those of the still active commanders.....

Wildcat
10-12-2007, 01:34 PM
Man, I love the ICG. And how appropriate that I'm sitting here at my desk reading this report while sipping on some fine imported Colombian café. Many thanks, sir. I'm finding it hard to stay abreast of what's happening in Colombia while also devoting most of my attention to OIF (and my job, and LSAT studying, and exercise, and the opposite sex...)

Jedburgh
11-16-2007, 03:37 AM
CSIS, 12 Nov 07: Back From the Brink: Evaluating Progress in Columbia, 1999-2007 (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071112-backfromthebrink-web.pdf)

....It is no secret that Colombia is beset by difficult problems. Illegal armed groups and powerful drug gangs, often working together, continue to challenge the rule of law in parts of the country. The presence of these violent elements fuels other problems: crime, human rights abuses, poverty, and a weakening of governance. Taken out of the context of Colombia’s history, these challenges might be seen as nearly insurmountable.

In fact, however, Colombia’s current situation represents a major improvement over what it had been only eight years ago. During the 1990s, a confluence of highly negative factors threatened to drag the country down. By 1999, Colombia’s stability was at stake, with guerrillas and paramilitaries threatening to overwhelm the weakened capabilities of the state, violence spiraling out of control, and the economy in free fall.

Colombia’s emergence from this grave crisis constitutes a success story. It is, however, a story that is not well known, despite the fact that billions of dollars in military and economic assistance from the United States helped bring Colombia “back from the brink.” Successful foreign policy initiatives normally have no shortage of executive branch or congressional leaders claiming authorship but, curiously, not in the case of Colombia. Despite strong bipartisan support for an emergency supplemental package for “Plan Colombia” approved during the Clinton administration in 2000 and vigorously continued during the Bush administration, assistance to Colombia, as well as approval of a trade promotion agreement with Colombia signed late last year, is now a topic of considerable debate.

This report by the CSIS Americas Program provides a timely and useful point of reference in understanding the difficult issues at stake in Colombia and the U.S.-Colombia relationship. It analyzes the factors that took Colombia to the verge of unraveling in the late 1990s and how the country began to make its way back from instability. Then the report evaluates the impressive progress made between 1999 and 2007 across a broad spectrum of difficult issues, as well as the thorny problems that persist.....

MattC86
12-06-2007, 06:01 AM
. . .I'm writing a research paper right now (or, perhaps, I should be writing) for my agricultural development class on counter-narcotics and development strategies in Colombia.

Most of the stuff I've seen from development groups is that they consider Plan Colombia a pretty big failure. The combined approach of alternative development and forcible eradication has alienated a lot of small farmers (whose marginalization over the last sixty years is the cause of the Colombian insurgency) and seriously undermined development. The guerillas are on the run, but coca production is not down, and the development people are even more wary than ever of working with the Colombians, and charge the US with putting too much pressure on Colombia to attain coca crop reduction targets, and too little emphasis on sustainable long term development. Simple eradication is not sustainable, and unsustainable "development" is really just relief. . .

Matt

Sergeant T
12-07-2007, 05:38 PM
Very long article in Rolling Stone (http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/17438347/how_america_lost_the_war_on_drugs). They definitely went for quantity over quality, but an interesting read nonetheless. From the end of the article:


The drug war, in the end, has been undone in no small part by the sweeping and inflexible nature of its own metaphor. At the beginning, in the days of Escobar, the campaign was a war as seen from the situation room, a complicated assault that spanned multiple fronts, but one which had identifiable enemies and a goal. Today, the government's anti-drug effort resembles a war as seen from the trenches, an eternal slog, where victory seems not only unattainable but somehow beside the point. For the drug agents and veterans who busted Escobar, the last decade and a half have been a slow, agonizing history of defeat after defeat, the enemy shifting but never retreating. "You get frustrated," Joe Toft, a former DEA country attache in Colombia, tells me. "We've never had a true effort where the U.S. as a whole says, 'We're never going to crack this problem without a real demand-reduction program.' That's something that's just never happened."

davidbfpo
12-08-2007, 01:41 PM
A long read and of course focussed on just the USA. Lots to learn and beware of "special interests", lobbyists and easy solution salesmen. Are there lessons to be learnt beyond the USA and places like Colombia & Mexico? Afghanistan has been a thread on SWJ before.

The film 'Traffic' is a very graphic, if slightly dated similar account.

I'd also recommned (again) the book 'From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies and Competitive Adaptation' by Michael Kenny, Pub. Penn State Univ Press 2007.

davidbfpo

Tom OC
12-09-2007, 11:49 AM
I think the best criminological exposition of Prof. David Kennedy's "pulling levers" approach is in this law review article at Harvard (http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/publications/pulling_levers.pdf). The rolling stone article makes mention of Kennedy's ideas being the lastest, greatest thing in the war on drugs strategy, and I have seen the way law enforcement embraces it, although in my opinion, an i2 approach would be better than the GIS approach in pulling levers. However, what's probably most interesting is the poor way criminologists conceive of outcomes. Prof. Kennedy actually thinks that in a properly-advertised abstinence regime, offenders will not only get arrested less often, but will start turning themselves in.

selil
12-10-2007, 11:33 PM
Interesting intersection. Valparaiso University is next door.

jonSlack
12-28-2007, 08:25 AM
GIOIA TAURO, ITALY -- Europe is fast overtaking the U.S. as the leading destination for the world's cocaine, and a single Italian mafia is largely responsible.

The 'Ndrangheta crime syndicate, a ruthless and mysterious network of 155 families born in the rough hills here in southern Italy's Calabria region, now dominates the European drug trade. By establishing direct ties with Colombian producers and building a multibillion-dollar empire that spans five continents, the syndicate has metamorphosed into one of the craftiest criminal gangs in the world, authorities say.

" 'Ndrangheta is king," said Sabas Pretelt de la Vega, a former Colombian interior minister who is his country's ambassador to Rome.

The 'Ndrangheta (pronounced en-DRAHN-geh-tah) peculiarly combines the modern skills of multinational-corporation high finance with a stubborn grip on archaic rural traditions. Some members live in garishly opulent villas outside Madrid and invest in bustling restaurants and hotels in Germany, whereas others, including key bosses, remain in the dreary, closed Calabrian mountain villages of their birth. It is a mafia of businessmen in Dolce & Gabbana, of sheepherders in scruffy woolens.

http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-fg-mafia27dec27,1,6414821,full.story?coll=la-headlines-frontpage&ctrack=1&cset=true

Jedburgh
01-03-2008, 03:41 PM
From the Jan-Feb 08 Military Review:

Threat Analysis: Organized Crime and Narco-Terrorism in Northern Mexico (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb08/KnowlesEngJanFeb08.pdf)

Organized crime syndicates are modern enemies of democracy that relentlessly engage in kidnapping and assassination of political figures, and traffic not only in addictive and lethal substances, but also increasingly in human beings. To create an environment conducive to success in their criminal interests, they engage in heinous acts intended to instill fear, promote corruption, and undermine democratic governance by undercutting confidence in government. They assassinate or intimidate political figures and pollute democratic processes through bribes and graft in cities along both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border. In the long term, such actions erode individual civil liberties in America and Mexico by undermining both governments’ abilities to maintain societies in which the full exercise of civil liberties is possible. This danger is ominously evident on the Mexican side of the border, where 86 percent of those responding to a poll in Mexico City in 2004 said they would support government restrictions of their civil rights in order to dismantle organized crime, and another 67 percent said militarizing the police force would be the only way to accomplish this. These views suggest that an extremely unhealthy sociopolitical environment is evolving at America’s very doorstep. We should see this not as a collateral issue associated with the War on Terrorism, but as a national security issue deserving of the same level of interest, concern, and resourcing as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This article provides an ethnographic analysis of narco-terrorism, narcocorruption, and human trafficking in the northern states of Mexico, and an overview of Mexican organized crime and its destabilizing effect on Mexico’s attempts to create a functioning, uncorrupt democracy.....

Jedburgh
01-22-2008, 03:20 PM
NYT, 22 Jan 08: Mexico Hits Drug Gangs With Full Fury of War (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/world/americas/22mexico.html?_r=2&ref=americas&oref=slogin&oref=slogin)

These days, it is easy to form the impression that a war is going on in Mexico. Thousands of elite troops in battle gear stream toward border towns and snake through the streets in jeeps with .50-caliber machine guns mounted on top while fighter jets from the Mexican Navy fly reconnaissance missions overhead.

Gun battles between federal forces and drug-cartel (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf) members carrying rocket-propelled-grenade launchers have taken place over the past two weeks in border towns like Río Bravo and Tijuana, with deadly results.

Yet what is happening is less a war than a sustained federal intervention in states where for decades corrupt municipal police officers and drug gangs have worked together in relative peace, officials say. The federal forces are not only hunting cartel leaders, but also going after their crews of gunslingers, like Gulf Cartel guards known as the Zetas, who terrorize the towns they control.....

Jedburgh
01-23-2008, 09:02 PM
BBC, 23 Jan 08: Colombia's Campaign to Win Rebel Minds (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7194377.stm)

As the hostage crisis continues in Colombia, the government is stepping up its efforts to bring another group of people back from the country's jungles: the guerrillas themselves.

New figures (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7194377.stm#table) show that a record number of illegal fighters - nearly 3,200 - demobilised last year under a government scheme which offers immunity and benefits.

In the words of Colombia's deputy defence minister, Sergio Jaramillo, "Some countries have had amnesties for a few months, but Colombia is perhaps the only one with a permanently open hand."....

Jedburgh
01-29-2008, 07:29 PM
ISN Security Watch, 29 Jan 08: Violence on the US-Mexico Border (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18581)

Dozens of murders have resulted from battles between the Mexican security forces and armed criminals along the US-Mexico border since the beginning of this year. It is a spike in violence that has many in the US worried that gun fights may spill across the border, carrying all the reprisals that left a string of Mexican border towns without journalists, mayors, police chiefs and musicians in 2007.

In another bloody encounter for what has already been a violent year, on 7 January, a van full of gunmen ran a roadblock outside the border town of Reynosa, Mexico. Mexican soldiers and federal police chased the van to a small house across the street from the Reynosa police station. The gun battle began soon after. In the aftermath, 10 suspects were arrested and five policemen were dead. Along with the suspects, Mexican police seized three automatic rifles, an Uzi submachine gun, grenades and hundreds of rounds of ammunition.

The US Border Patrol has not taken any extra precautions, but is keeping its agents in the field "abreast of the situation," according to Border Patrol spokesman Oscar Saldana.....

Jedburgh
03-01-2008, 01:19 PM
2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 29 Feb 08

The 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is an annual report by the Department of State to Congress prepared in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act. It describes the efforts of key countries to attack all aspects of the international drug trade in Calendar Year 2007.

Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control (http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol1/pdf/index.htm)

Volume 2: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes (http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol2/pdf/index.htm)

slapout9
03-18-2008, 06:29 PM
Interesting show on Showtime this month. Called American Drug War. Check local listings for local times. I watched it last night,it's 2 hours long....Tom Odom you should watch this....I think the producer must be related to you...he was very pro legalization. link to website http://www.americandrugwar.com/

Tom Odom
03-18-2008, 06:58 PM
I tried watching part of that and it was too much Michael Moore to stomach.

The "DEA Agent" with the camouflage wall hanging complete with an M16 reminded me of the MALL Ninja. Maybe he was real but he came across to me as a real A$$.


best

Tom

slapout9
03-18-2008, 07:15 PM
The DEA dude looks a lot like Cheech of Cheech and Chong fame to.

Tom Odom
03-19-2008, 05:16 PM
The DEA dude looks a lot like Cheech of Cheech and Chong fame to.

Slap

I watched it from beginning to end last night. That let me distinguish between the conspiracy theories and the actual thinking. I will say that when they got to thinking and analyzing what it means, the documentary actually made sense. You know what I think about all of this: a collosal waste of money, manpower, and time. The analysis linking it to the prison industry was quite relevant. I would say the points made concerning alchohol, tobacco, and pharmaceutical industries lobbying against marijuana were also telling. I also accept the parallels between the emergence of large scale moonshine under Prohibition and crystal meth today. The US now has more folks in prison than any other country. The PRC is 2nd. the greatest point in the documentary was about the "addiction" of Washington DC power brokers to the money involved in all of this.

Best

Tom

slapout9
03-19-2008, 06:23 PM
Tom, l am getting soft in my old age. As you said it was kinda like Micheal Moore however once you get past that it does make some points. I have always said that there are 2 DEA's the one inside and the one outside of the USA which has such potential to be used as a convert agency that it needs some serious oversight. Also the part about legalizing the medical use of the products should have been done years ago. A pain killer is a pain killer whether you smoke it or take it as a pill. The people that make the millions off other people's personal misery are the people that should be in jail. Arresting people for using itaccomplishes nothing.

As has been brought up before buying the entire crop of poppies would have a lot of benefits, but the biggest opponent would be drug companies because such a large legal supply would put pressure on the price of legal pain medications which are unbelievable expensive. Never new how bad it was until I started being around hospitals. Helathcare is rationed largely on price despite what people may think.

Sergeant T
03-20-2008, 08:10 AM
The thing that originally annoyed me about the Rolling Stone piece was the lazy use of political commentary and stubby metaphors in place of actual analysis. Then I came across this piece in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/stories/2008/03/08/Atlantavice_0309.html):

If law enforcement someday succeeds in breaking up established drug territories — the real sign of success from a metropolitan perspective — it could mean a similar spike in murders, as drug organizations vie for a larger market share.

"If the market here gets unstable down to the street, then the streets will get bloody," said Killorin, director of Atlanta High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Force (HIDTA). "I don't think we're there yet."

Actually, we are. One of the points of the piece was the Head Fed in Atlanta clucking about how his "success" at drug interdiction is driving up crime. And whom, exactly, benefits from the fed's "success"? This is an analysis worth undertaking and the point that was completely missed by the Rolling Stone piece.

slapout9
03-20-2008, 10:17 AM
I have believed for a long time now that the main transportation proces is by land, so I think the article makes a lot of sense from that stand point. Was a little shocked to see Forest Park mentioned, my father used to live about 4 miles from there. Like I said used to:wry:

Tom Odom
03-21-2008, 03:29 PM
Someone heard you, Slap!


Coast Guard hunts drug-running semi-subs (http://edition.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/03/20/drug.subs/index.html)

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Sophisticated submarine-like boats are the latest tool drug runners are using to bring cocaine north from Colombia, U.S. officials say.


Semi-submersible boats used to smuggle drugs are gaining in quality, the Coast Guard says.

1 of 2 Although the vessels were once viewed as a quirky sideshow in the drug war, they are becoming faster, more seaworthy, and capable of carrying bigger loads of drugs than earlier models, according to those charged with catching them.

"They tend to be one of a kind," U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen said. "They cost up to a million dollars to produce. Sometimes they are put together in pieces and then reassembled in other locations. They're very difficult to locate."

The boats are built in the Colombian jungle. They sail largely beneath the surface of the water but cannot submerge completely like a true submarine.

But they are the latest escalation of a tactical race between smugglers and the U.S. Coast Guard.

In the past three months the Coast Guard has learned of more semi-submersible vessels smuggling drugs than it did in the previous six years, when there were 23 cases, officials said.

slapout9
03-21-2008, 03:39 PM
Yep and you will see more of it. As border patrol intensifies they will move to unguarded coastlines that is why you have to secure the Border and the Coast and the Airspace at the same time or they will just adapt.

tulanealum
03-29-2008, 04:02 PM
Guys, any recommendations on FARC reading...would like to get a little smarter on it.

thanks in advance!

carl
03-31-2008, 02:44 AM
I've always found the reports by the International Crisis Group to be very useful.

John T. Fishel
03-31-2008, 11:34 AM
Linda Robinson of US News has written a number of articles about the FARC in cluding one where she had an interview with Raul Reyes (deceased).:D

Dr. Tom Marks has also done some stuff on the FARC insurgency with outstanding access to the govt side.

Hope this helps.

JohnT

bourbon
03-31-2008, 09:51 PM
Drug cartels operate training camps near Texas border just inside Mexico, By ALFREDO CORCHADO (http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/texassouthwest/stories/033008dninttrainingcamps.1836949.html). The Dallas Morning News, March 30, 2008.


Mexican drug cartels have conducted military-style training camps in at least six such locations in northern Tamaulipas and Nuevo León states, some within a few miles of the Texas border, according to U.S. and Mexican authorities and the printed testimony of five protected witnesses who were trained in the camps.

The camps near the Texas border and at other locations in Mexico are used to train cartel recruits – ranging from Mexican army deserters to American teenagers – who then carry out killings and other cartel assignments on both sides of the border, authorities say.

bourbon
03-31-2008, 10:01 PM
Paying Through the Nose: Why cocaine traffickers praise the Euro (http://www.motherjones.com/cgi-bin/print_article.pl?url=http://www.motherjones.com/news/outfront/2008/03/paying-through-the-nose.html), by Ryan Grim. Mother Jones, March 19, 2008.


And it says it has spied one: The cost of pure coke rose 44 percent in the United States between January and September 2007. The dea credits its own efforts, of course, along with increased Mexican and Colombian cooperation, for the downturn in supply it says caused the price hike.

But the agency omits an important factor: the plummeting value of the dollar, especially as compared to the soaring euro. Even as the dea has made it more bothersome to bring coke into the United States, the sliding dollar has made importing it less profitable. Both the UN and dea note that a kilo of coke brings in two times as much in Europe as it does in America.

As with any commodity, producers look to maximize earnings by selling in markets with the strongest currencies. But unlike oil, for instance, the value of which is measured in dollars, the cocaine market is more fluid. "The euro has become the preferred currency for drug traffickers," declared then-dea administrator Karen Tandy at an anti-drug conference last May. "We're seeing a glut of euro notes throughout South America," she said, adding that "9 of 10 travelers who carried the $1.7 billion euros that came into the United States during 2005 did not come from Europe...They came from Latin America."

The 500 Euro banknote must also make the Euro pretty attractive.

tulanealum
04-01-2008, 03:22 AM
The following link will take you to a WashPost story about how Colombian troops are killing civilians and dressing them up as insurgents. The purported reason is that insurgent kills can get you benefits...if true, this is a bad way to conduct COIN...obviously.

Colombian Troops Kill Farmers, Pass Off Bodies as Rebels' (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/29/AR2008032901118.html)
By Juan Forero
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, March 30, 2008; A12

....under intense pressure from Colombian military commanders to register combat kills, the army has in recent years also increasingly been killing poor farmers and passing them off as rebels slain in combat, government officials and human rights groups say. The tactic has touched off a fierce debate in the Defense Ministry between tradition-bound generals who favor an aggressive campaign that centers on body counts and reformers who say the army needs to develop other yardsticks to measure battlefield success.

The killings, carried out by combat units under the orders of regional commanders, have always been a problem in the shadowy, 44-year-old conflict here -- one that pits the army against a peasant-based rebel movement.

But with the recent demobilization of thousands of paramilitary fighters, many of whom operated death squads to wipe out rebels, army killings of civilians have grown markedly since 2004, according to rights groups, U.N. investigators and the government's internal affairs agency. The spike has come during a military buildup that has seen the armed forces nearly double to 270,000 members in the last six years, becoming the second-largest military in Latin America......

Ken White
04-01-2008, 04:17 AM
Suggestion, rather than cut and paste the entire article, what we normally do is post the link and just a paragraph or two as an excerpt, saves bandwidth. You can edit to do that.

Steve Blair
04-01-2008, 01:54 PM
Suggestion, rather than cut and paste the entire article, what we normally do is post the link and just a paragraph or two as an excerpt, saves bandwidth. You can edit to do that.

It also avoids nasty copyright issues....

Umar Al-Mokhtār
04-02-2008, 07:41 PM
the Columbians haven't heard of My Lai.

Poor form that!

Surferbeetle
04-20-2008, 02:37 AM
From the April 19, 2008 edition of the LA Times (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-bribes19apr19,1,7646147.story)


MEXICO CITY -- Mexicans are spending more on bribes than they were just a few years ago.

They paid the equivalent of about $2.6 billion in bribes last year, according to the nonprofit group Transparency Mexico. That's 42% more than two years earlier and an average of more than $24 for each of the country's 105 million people. Much of the money went to have garbage collected, parking tickets fixed or to get parking spots from the legions of informal attendants who block spaces, then charge for them.

bourbon
04-20-2008, 03:07 PM
Cost of Graft in Mexico
Hmm...The peso has strengthened against the dollar (http://finance.yahoo.com/currency/convert?from=USD&to=MXN&amt=1&t=2y) in the past 2 years. What effect would that have on the cost of graft? The Freakonomics guys should look into it.

Meanwhile the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas appear to be on a membership drive:
Official says cartel hit men posted 'help wanted' sign on border (http://www.kten.com/Global/story.asp?S=8164398), Associated Press - April 14, 2008.

A giant banner hung across a thoroughfare appeared over the weekend in Nuevo Laredo and read: "Operative group 'The Zetas' wants you, soldier or ex-soldier. We offer a good salary, food and benefits for your family. Don't suffer anymore mistreatment and don't go hungry."
I imagine they will be posting in Craigslist's Help Wanted section next.

bourbon
05-27-2008, 06:21 PM
McMafia: Crime without frontiers, By Misha Glenny
Gangsters, profiteers, poisoners and pimps are ripping through global society. A grim new study concludes that peace brings crime to nations (http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/mcmafia-crime-without-frontiers-by-misha-glenny-804285.html), Reviewed by Cal McCrystal. The Independent, 6 April 2008.


Their power and occasional resemblance to (or even consanguinity with) some western capitalists have left old international institutions "bewildered", Glenny says of Eastern European crime syndicates. "These men (and occasionally women) understood instinctively that rising living standards in the West, increased trade and migration flows, and the greatly reduced ability of many governments to police their countries combined to form a gold mine." A new Silk Route – "a multi-lane criminal highway" – now links the "thick belt of instability" in the Balkans with Central Asia, China and Pakistan, permitting the swift and easy transfer of people, narcotics, cash for laundering, and other contraband to Western Europe and the United States.

...
"Virtually overnight," Glenny argues, a UN Security Council vote for sanctions against Belgrade in 1992 "created a pan-Balkan mafia of immense power, reach, creativity and venality." Greece, which believed the embargo to be unjust, helped the gangs break it.


And so, grimly, to Dubai, Mumbai, the "gaudy opulence" of Nigeria's kleptocracy, South Africa's billion-dollar car thefts, Canada's marijuana trade, the paramilitary gangsters of Colombia, the bent nouveaux riches of China, the notorious yakuza of Japan – all seemingly, in our small, increasingly tightly bound world, tentacles of a single monster.

This is a well-sustained narrative dealing seamlessly, if dismayingly, with the tricks, motives and rewards of the new global underworld and the (for the most part) impotence of governments in tackling it successfully. Indeed, Glenny tells us how President Bill Clinton ordered the Italian authorities to back away from prosecuting Montenegro's young president, Milo Djukanovic, for organising a $20 million-a-year cigarette smuggling racket, because Washington needed him in its battle against Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic.

No wonder, then, that the world's "shadow economy" now accounts for between 15 and 20 per cent of global turnover, or that most countries have their own silnice hanby, the "Road of Shame" linking Dresden and Prague on which prostitutes and pimps openly ply their trade for tourists, truckers and toerag-toffs.
emphasis mine

Jedburgh
06-19-2008, 12:07 PM
USIP, 17 Jun 08: Colombia's Crossroads: The FARC and the Future of the Hostages (http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0617_colombia_farc.html)

In the wake of the death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez, co-founder of the FARC, and his succession by Antonio Cano, longtime FARC political wing leader, Colombia stands at a crossroads. FARC spokespersons have renewed their vows to carry on their deceased leader’s fight and Cano may seek short-term military victories to bolster his internal support. However, a window of opportunity for peace with the world’s oldest guerrilla fighting force may simultaneously be opening.....
The Economist, 12 Jun 08: The End of Illusion and the Last Guerrilla (http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11535679)

....The tough line Colombia has taken with the right-wing warlords makes a peace deal with their left-wing counterparts harder. The FARC's leaders, too, have committed crimes against humanity, and some of them traffic drugs. So they now have little incentive to demobilise. Some Colombians say the best place for the FARC's leaders is jail. That is true, but the best can be the enemy of the good. Though the FARC can no longer destroy Colombia's democracy, fighting to the last guerrilla is in nobody's interest. Ending this conflict will require compromise as well as continued military firmness.....

jonSlack
07-02-2008, 07:41 PM
AP - Colombia: Betancourt, US hostages freed (http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jJaYKcOF6IpYZDLaJur12Nw69PxQD91LTCOOI)


BOGOTA, Colombia (AP) — Colombia's military says it has rescued 15 hostages, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three U.S. military contractors, from leftist rebels.

Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos made the announcement at a news conference on Wednesday.

Just saw this on CNN as Breaking News. Cannot find much on the Internet as of yet. MTF.

Currently, it is being reported that the hostages were rescued in a military operation as opposed to being released.

Wildcat
07-02-2008, 07:52 PM
Noticed that, too. Great news. Makes me wish I had a bottle of Club Colombia so I could celebrate properly.

bourbon
07-02-2008, 09:05 PM
UNDERSEA TRAFFICKING:Colombia's Cocaine Cartels Learn a New Trick (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,562603,00.html), By Cordula Meyer. Spiegal Online, 06/27/2008.

Columbian authorities have found seven of the secret shipyards since 2007. In each shipyard, 15 workers spent up to a year building a single boat. They built the hulls and then installed the engines and propellers. A boat agents managed to seize last summer before it was sunk measured 17 meters (56 feet) long and weighed 46 tons. There were 10 tons of cocaine in the vessel's hold.


SPIEGEL ONLINE speaks to Coast Guard Rear Admiral Joseph L. Nimmich (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,562606,00.html) about the increasingly sophisticated methods employed by the drug cartels.

Nimmich: In 2006 we became more effective against the fishing vessel threat, one of their primary conveyances of large quantities of cocaine. As we got better against that, they refined the semi-submersibles. We talk in terms of three generations of semi-submersibles. The new ones have steel construction, two engines, larger capability, more fuel, and greater distance capability. They can go longer distances by themselves. Between 3,000 and 3,500 miles (4,800 and 5,000 kilometers).

The first generation subs found in 1999 were around 78ft, and Russian nationals were involved in the construction. See:
The Submarine Next Door (http://partners.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20001203mag-semple.html), by Kirk Semple. The New York Times Magazine, December 3, 2000.

Before that, in the mid-nineties some Russian mob guys out of Miami were taken down by the Feds, at the time they were in negotiations with a cartel to provide an old Soviet diesel sub fully crewed. They had already sold some heavy lift helicopters to the cartels to run chemicals out to labs in the jungle, so the deal was reportedly taken pretty seriously by the Feds at the time.

jonSlack
07-02-2008, 11:16 PM
Washington Post - Colombia Rescues Hostages Held by Guerrilla Group for Years (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/02/AR2008070202502.html)


Santos said the rescue, dubbed Operation Jaque and carried out by Colombian military intelligence, began with the infiltration of a FARC squad commanded by guerrilla known as Cesar. The squad has controlled a group of hostages in recent years, he said. Jaque is a Spanish chess term meaning "check."

In a ruse in which Cesar was told the hostages were to be flown to a meeting with the FARC commander known as Alfonso Cano, the hostages were brought together and put on board a helicopter supposedly operated by a humanitarian organization, Santos said. In fact, the organization was fictitious, and the helicopter belonged to the Colombian army, he said.

While the hostages were flown to freedom, Cesar and another member of his squad who were to accompany them to the meeting were "neutralized in the helicopter" and will be brought to justice, the defense minister said.

Wow. How disrupted must command and control and overall communications within FARC be to allow an operation like that to succeed? Or is it more likely that "Cesar" is now going to disappear into a Witness Protection Program with full amnesty?


As for about 15 other members of Cesar's squad, as well as other FARC guerrillas a few kilometers away, "we decided not to attack them" in hopes that the rebel group will reciprocate by releasing the rest of its hostages, Santos said.

I wonder what those 15 are doing, and thinking, right now...

MattC86
07-04-2008, 09:39 PM
. . . I know we are a very (and probably rightly) ME-focused community, but I think the Betancourt rescue has some serious implications for the future of the Colombian Civil War:

- Is this a fair assessment of the current state of the FARC? FARC was long considered nearly impervious to the type of infiltration that pulled off this operation. They have rapidly wavering support among the villagers in the ever-shrinking areas it controls, it has taken big hits in 2008 (Raul Reyes KIA; the discovery of its Chavez ties; Sureshot dead) already, and it is widely considered a vestige of political movements gone by (even though it always was a Marxist-lite operation). Usually infiltrations of guerrilla groups lead to major counterintelligence purges and witch-hunts in the group itself; FARC is slipping so much it may not be able to afford an overzealous purge.

- Uribe's popularity - no longer just in Bogota but nationwide is extraordinarily high (70% + in many areas), and likely to continue to rise in the coming months. The support for his continued prosecution of the war is at an all-time high, and concerns over continued corruption in Bogota, the struggles against the coca crops, and his increased centralization of power in the presidency (plus coming Constitutional issues as he contemplates messing with the election cycle) will likely fade for a time, particularly among the international community.

- The Colombian military would not have been capable of this operation 10 years ago. Maybe not even 5. The OPSEC required for this kind of operation simply didn't exist in a military riddled with both leftist and paramilitary informants. It also shows a good deal of daring, planning abilities, and - perhaps most importantly - patience on the part of Colombian command. Probably makes Chavez glad he didn't pick a fight earlier this year.

So, what is the future outlook? Particularly, 3 questions:

- Latin American geopolitics. Colombia has faced a lost of ostracizing within the Latin American community, particularly as it has grown closer to the US while the rest of LA moves away since 9/11. It's appearance as the US local lapdog may not change, but it becomes harder to ignore the fact that it is a capable and powerful "lapdog" that is winning its civil war. Do the pro/anti Washington dynamics at work change as Colombia becomes recognized more and more as it's own, viable state?

- What impact will this have on the drug trade? FARC's shrinking support base is a great opportunity to take control - not just spray and fly away - of many coca-producing areas. But if the Colombians aren't prepared to administer the alternative-development assistance that these small farmers will require, they never will gain their true allegiance to Bogota.

- Will the US follow up its massive and apparently effective military aid with a new developmental assistance program? "Plan Colombia" was proposed by the Pastrana administration as largely an economic aid program, a "Marshall Plan" for Colombia, as it were. It became, thanks to the Republican congress (and later the Bush administration) a largely military aid program. Washington, I believe, needs to be prepared to (1) provide a large amount of economic development aid if the war continues to go Bogota's way, and (2) renew pressure on Uribe's administration to respect human rights, fight the corruption in Bogota, and not take advantage of the political moment to fiddle with the Constitution.

Looking at that, it looks kind of like a call that the war is over - it most definitely is not, so my apologies if it sounds so. But I think we need to start thinking about the next stage; after all, our involvement in Colombia has always been predicated upon counternarcotics - and defeating the FARC may not put much of a dent, at least immediately, on the drug trade.

Regards,

Matt

Jedburgh
07-07-2008, 01:06 PM
ISN Security Watch 7 Jul 08: FARC's Revolution is Over (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=19164)

.....FARC has lost international political support from Chavez and Castro, its two most outspoken supporters. Chavez will likely not make any public overture to support the FARC again.

Its support base inside Colombia has long been lost. The guerrilla army clearly struggles with attrition, facilitating the infiltration of Colombian commandos with enough swagger to wear Che Guevara t-shirts during their rescue operation. But they earned it. Not one shot was reportedly fired.

The FARC of old, of even two years ago, is forever lost. What was once a formidable, organized and confident rebel army has ebbed to nearly half its size and operational strength.

Its high-water mark will never again be reached, a reality that possibly has FARC leader Alfonso Cano (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91355748) considering options for downsizing into a smaller group, one specifically focused on the drug trade and avoiding any confrontation with the Colombian military or government installations.

What was once a glorious rebel army with a clear socialist conscious came relatively close to its ultimate goal, overthrowing the Colombian government. Now it must embrace its reality as simply another Colombian drug smuggling organization....

Wildcat
07-07-2008, 04:06 PM
ISN Security Watch 7 Jul 08: FARC's Revolution is Over (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=19164)

What was once a glorious rebel army with a clear socialist conscious came relatively close to its ultimate goal, overthrowing the Colombian government. Now it must embrace its reality as simply another Colombian drug smuggling organization....

I think I just threw up a little bit in my mouth... :wry:

Wildcat
07-07-2008, 07:26 PM
I want to attempt to address some of the things MattC86 brought up:

Is this a fair assessment of the current state of the FARC? ... Yes. They're on their last leg, even before the hostages were rescued, even before they put Marulanda on ice, FARC was reeling from Plan Colombia and Democratic Security (Uribe's domestic policy). I was pretty critical of some parts of Plan Colombia, mainly the use of chemical defoliants which seemed to exacerbate the plight of IDPs (internally displaced persons), but it allowed the CAF to finally come into their own, to the point where they were able to pinpoint FARC leaders for strikes, and to pull off the Betancourt rescue. In my mind, Plan Colombia has been vindicated, and I hope this generates some interest in Congress for broadening our avenues for trade and investment with Colombia. I also hope it may serve to convince some people of the need for patience and political will when it comes to defeating insurgencies. There's still a ways to go, though. Demobilizing the rest of the guerrillas, reintegrating them into society if possible, as well as not forgetting the presence of the paras and the ever-present drug trade.

I would say the real winner here was Democratic Security, and, as a result, Uribe. He's been maligned by a few neighboring heads of state, but he has shown Latin America the true meaning of "staying the course." He got tough with the guerrillas and paras, but he also go smart. Offering them chances to demobilize and reintegrate were critical in taking the wind from their sails. If I were him, I would go out gracefully once his term is up. I know a lot of Colombianos are pushing for him to take another term, but he needs to quit while he's ahead. Continue to root out corruption (which some of his own family have been involved in) and do as much damage to the guerrillas as he can before his successor takes over.

The Colombian military has matured quite well. Not really much else to say. I wish I knew more about Operation Jaque, but on the surface it looks like a pretty sophisticated plan, and they pulled it off without a hitch, and without a shot fired in anger. They are disciplined veterans at this point. Chavez and Correa would do well to avoid tangling with them, I think.

As to the Washington dynamics, like I said, I hope it changes. Congress has been blocking some initiatives based on concerns over Uribe's human rights record, and probably out of a sense that Plan Colombia was going nowhere. Hopefully recent events will turn some heads. Several Latin American countries are modernizing and enlarging their militaries. I saw a recent Economist article that cited huge defense spending boosts in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Brazil. It's probably in our best interests to see Colombia stay on top of the heap.

I don't think Washington's involvement in Colombia has always been predicated on drug interdiction. We've had our hands in Colombian affairs since the Panama Canal was being built. We were assisting the CAF in counter-guerrilla operations as early as the 1960s, before the drug trade really blossomed, because that's when communist revolutions were in vogue. The drug trade merely became a nice pretext for escalating our involvement since it just happened to coincide with the rise of the FARC in the late 60s and early 70s. I think it's always been about keeping a stable democratic ally in a region that is prone to violent political upheavals. Realpolitik, my friends, realpolitik...

That being said, it will be tough to uproot the drug trade. One need only take a glance at Afghanistan to see the obstacles. The good news is that Colombia already has the infrastructure needed to pull it off. It's just a matter of locking down security for those areas by pushing out the FARC, and then letting NGOs fill the vacuum to start alternative development projects.

I think the war is winding down. Chavez and Correa can't afford to be implicated any further in supporting the guerrillas, and the FARC themselves have ceased to be a threat. It's time for them to either melt into the jungle, or melt back into civil society.

MattC86
07-15-2008, 08:13 PM
Is this a fair assessment of the current state of the FARC? ... Yes. They're on their last leg, even before the hostages were rescued, even before they put Marulanda on ice, FARC was reeling from Plan Colombia and Democratic Security (Uribe's domestic policy). I was pretty critical of some parts of Plan Colombia, mainly the use of chemical defoliants which seemed to exacerbate the plight of IDPs (internally displaced persons), but it allowed the CAF to finally come into their own, to the point where they were able to pinpoint FARC leaders for strikes, and to pull off the Betancourt rescue.


Agreed. It does serve to reinforce the value of high-visibility, propaganda victories like the Betancourt rescue - most of the world was not particularly aware of the state of the Colombian Civil War. Coverage has gone from the "intractable" struggle between rebel groups and the government to a widespread perception that FARC is dying. Like I suggested, I think this will give Uribe a lot more breathing room in the international community - far less pressure for a settlement or anything of the sort.


In my mind, Plan Colombia has been vindicated, and I hope this generates some interest in Congress for broadening our avenues for trade and investment with Colombia. I also hope it may serve to convince some people of the need for patience and political will when it comes to defeating insurgencies. There's still a ways to go, though. Demobilizing the rest of the guerrillas, reintegrating them into society if possible, as well as not forgetting the presence of the paras and the ever-present drug trade.


Here's where it gets dicey. Once again, suppressing the symptoms (i.e., the armed rebellion) will prove easier than curing the disease. The landless and peasant classes, in many parts of the country, have been hostile to the governments in Bogota since Gaitan's assassination in 1948. Just because they no longer support an ideologically obsolete (and never particularly pure) rebellion any longer does not mean their complete support for the state, nor ensure against further rebellion or illicit behavior if allegiance to Bogota does not improve their economic state. A development package along the original lines of Plan Colombia, at least, is going to be needed. Perhaps finally all the disciples of "alternative development" who've been crying their programs don't work because of security conerns will get their chance to make good. But the cash needs to be there, from Bogota and internationally.

And as far as trade, the neo-protectionism in the Democratic party right now (which I believe will win both the White House and maintain considerable majorities in both houses) along with knee-jerk anti-Bush reactions means not only is the Colombia FTA DOA right now, but I doubt you will see it passed in the next four years. That's a big hit for the Colombians.

And Lord knows what will happen with the paramilitaries. One would hope that the demise of FARC leads to their buddies in the CAF abandoning this marriage of convenience, but I fear it will not be so. And the paras have their fingers as deep into the coca trade as FARC ever did. . .



I would say the real winner here was Democratic Security, and, as a result, Uribe. He's been maligned by a few neighboring heads of state, but he has shown Latin America the true meaning of "staying the course." He got tough with the guerrillas and paras, but he also go smart. Offering them chances to demobilize and reintegrate were critical in taking the wind from their sails. If I were him, I would go out gracefully once his term is up. I know a lot of Colombianos are pushing for him to take another term, but he needs to quit while he's ahead. Continue to root out corruption (which some of his own family have been involved in) and do as much damage to the guerrillas as he can before his successor takes over.


Concur, particularly on the corruption issue.



The Colombian military has matured quite well. Not really much else to say. I wish I knew more about Operation Jaque, but on the surface it looks like a pretty sophisticated plan, and they pulled it off without a hitch, and without a shot fired in anger. They are disciplined veterans at this point. Chavez and Correa would do well to avoid tangling with them, I think.

The US should take some serious lessons from its aid to the Colombian military - the turnaround has been dramatic, and relatively rapid. I've spent a few cursory moments looking for more complete information on US military aid, but haven't found exactly what I'm looking for.




As to the Washington dynamics, like I said, I hope it changes. Congress has been blocking some initiatives based on concerns over Uribe's human rights record, and probably out of a sense that Plan Colombia was going nowhere. Hopefully recent events will turn some heads. Several Latin American countries are modernizing and enlarging their militaries. I saw a recent Economist article that cited huge defense spending boosts in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Brazil. It's probably in our best interests to see Colombia stay on top of the heap.


I think this is potentially dangerous. Latin America has a huge way to go economically, and seeing everybody shoot their military spending through the roof is not beneficial to any of that. Brazil is going to be the regional power in the long-run; they are already an economic "dwarf-giant," if you will, and their political power will rise in tandem. We should continue to support Colombia, but I just don't see the utility, for us, the Colombians, or anybody in Latin America from a new round of arms races caused by descent into competing "camps." In the long run, Brazil (especially), Argentina, Chile, and Colombia are the powers in LA, not Venezuela or Ecuador or Bolivia, no matter what Chavez and Morales would say.



I don't think Washington's involvement in Colombia has always been predicated on drug interdiction. We've had our hands in Colombian affairs since the Panama Canal was being built. We were assisting the CAF in counter-guerrilla operations as early as the 1960s, before the drug trade really blossomed, because that's when communist revolutions were in vogue. The drug trade merely became a nice pretext for escalating our involvement since it just happened to coincide with the rise of the FARC in the late 60s and early 70s. I think it's always been about keeping a stable democratic ally in a region that is prone to violent political upheavals. Realpolitik, my friends, realpolitik...


Indeed, but since the 1980s, the drug trade has been the watchword and political cover. And to a degree, even if FARC is defeated, our real goals will still coincide with counternarcotics. Economic development and eradication of the drug trade are going to require huge amounts of aid and effort.



It's just a matter of locking down security for those areas by pushing out the FARC, and then letting NGOs fill the vacuum to start alternative development projects.

I think the war is winding down. Chavez and Correa can't afford to be implicated any further in supporting the guerrillas, and the FARC themselves have ceased to be a threat. It's time for them to either melt into the jungle, or melt back into civil society.

Indeed.

But like I said, the fear is thinking the hard part is over. I think Africa shows that a bunch of NGOs running around the countryside doing their own alternative development is not going to be effective. The money is going to have to come from a lot of places, and the development strategy needs to be cohesive, which is not a traditional strongsuit of NGO-designed development projects. The US has poured billions into assistance for the Colombian military - it is vital that we continue to give generously for economic or "alternative" development.

Regards,

Matt

mmx1
07-16-2008, 04:53 AM
Unfortunately, looks like there's a downside to the rescue:
Colombian military used Red Cross emblem in rescue (http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/07/15/colombia.red.cross/index.html)

Ron Humphrey
07-16-2008, 12:32 PM
Unfortunately, looks like there's a downside to the rescue:
Colombian military used Red Cross emblem in rescue (http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/07/15/colombia.red.cross/index.html)

And it is a valid one, it brings to mind some questions .

1- Have the FARC been respectful of Red Cross immunity in the past?
(do they respect them and treat them as nuetral)

2- How do we know this is that symbol, its is during the rescue vs recovery, it is an actual use for deception,etc?

3- This isn't just spin trying to give a now probably very paranoid organization an excuse to trust noone / possibly take some softer targets hostage?

Rex Brynen
07-16-2008, 01:32 PM
2- How do we know this is that symbol, its is during the rescue vs recovery, it is an actual use for deception,etc?

At this point, it would appear from the footage that someone from the Columbian military was wearing an ICRC bib during the actual deception/rescue.

If so, this is a very large no-no (and a violation of international humanitarian law), regardless of whether the FARC respects the red cross itself.

wm
07-16-2008, 02:24 PM
I think it is a pretty excessive leap of faith that some guy was wearing ICRC markings during the rescue attempt from the minimal evidence I saw displayed at the link. (F6 source and content eval from where I sit.) BTW, I thought the rescue operation was based on a deception--the rescuers were passing themselves off as FARC insurgents, come to move the captives to another location. So, if an ICRC marking was worn, perhaps that is a tactic used by FARC and was used by the rescuers to improve their credability as bad guys rather than to pass themselves off as ICRC personnel.

Rex Brynen
07-17-2008, 01:57 AM
I think it is a pretty excessive leap of faith that some guy was wearing ICRC markings during the rescue attempt from the minimal evidence I saw displayed at the link.

The Columbians have now acknowledged (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7510423.stm) that one of the rescue team wore ICRC insignia, apparently without/against orders (although I suspect this mistake was more of the "none of us really care" variety). According to published reports, the deception involved a fictitious humanitarian NGO facilitating the hostage transfer.

Uribe has apologized to ICRC for the incident.

Creon01
07-17-2008, 06:43 PM
This may seem like a good idea to some but I can't begin to explain why in the long term this is going to hurt the cause. Although I'm happy that these hostages are free, the use of well known humanitarian symbols as an integral part of the mission will feed into the belief that humanitarian NGOs, the UN and the Red Cross are all just tools of the US and full of spies. Does the end justify the means on this occasion? Hard to justify to me, but like I said I’m happy to see these guys back home.

Fuchs
07-17-2008, 07:10 PM
This may seem like a good idea to some but I can't begin to explain why in the long term this is going to hurt the cause. Although I'm happy that these hostages are free, the use of well known humanitarian symbols as an integral part of the mission will feed into the belief that humanitarian NGOs, the UN and the Red Cross are all just tools of the US and full of spies. Does the end justify the means on this occasion? Hard to justify to me, but like I said I’m happy to see these guys back home.

That was a covert mission. They were obviously not wearing visible military uniforms as well. The kidnappers thought that the helicopter was a charter helicopter.
I believe that's not covered by conventions.

And everybody knows that NGO personnel, UN organization personnel, embassy personnel and journalists have a high probability of co-operation with interested nations. The IAEA inspectors that searched in Iraq during Saddam's time were full of MI6/CIA spies, for example.

Rex Brynen
07-17-2008, 07:16 PM
That was a covert mission. They were obviously not wearing visible military uniforms as well. The kidnappers thought that the helicopter was a charter helicopter.
I believe that's not covered by conventions.

And everybody knows that NGO personnel, UN organization personnel, embassy personnel and journalists have a high probability of co-operation with interested nations. The IAEA inspectors that searched in Iraq during Saddam's time were full of MI6/CIA spies, for example.

The ICRC is a different kettle of fish--the red cross insignia is protected under Chapter VI of the 1906 Geneva Convention (and subsequent IHL), and its misuse is a war crime.

Tom Odom
07-17-2008, 07:17 PM
And everybody knows that NGO personnel, UN organization personnel, embassy personnel and journalists have a high probability of co-operation with interested nations. The IAEA inspectors that searched in Iraq during Saddam's time were full of MI6/CIA spies, for example.

Sorry you are wrong in that assertion. Everyone does not know that and to assert that embassy and NGO personnel are all part of the same group is ill-informed. The IAEA was an international group and its composition was openly discussed in the media. That is a completely different case from an ICRC worker in Columbia or elsewhere. In cases like the camps in Zaire, NGO workers rightly distanced themselves as a means of self-preservation.

Tom

slapout9
07-17-2008, 07:45 PM
The Columbian government should have a "no comment" policy on everything about this operation. That is why it worked in the first place. Celebrate the release of the hostages, other than that be like Sgt. Shultz from Hoagans Heroes.... "I know nothing"

Rex Brynen
07-17-2008, 10:53 PM
The Columbian government should have a "no comment" policy on everything about this operation. That is why it worked in the first place. Celebrate the release of the hostages, other than that be like Sgt. Shultz from Hoagans Heroes.... "I know nothing"

Actually, I think they did the right thing in apologizing (especially since evidence of misuse of the ICRC was already in the public domain). The ICRC has been quite heavily involved in Columbia (http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/colombia-update-090608), both in humanitarian assistance and in facilitating previous hostage releases--it really is not the kind of assistance that Columbia wants to compromise.

slapout9
07-18-2008, 03:42 AM
Actually, I think they did the right thing in apologizing (especially since evidence of misuse of the ICRC was already in the public domain). The ICRC has been quite heavily involved in Columbia (http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/colombia-update-090608), both in humanitarian assistance and in facilitating previous hostage releases--it really is not the kind of assistance that Columbia wants to compromise.

I understand what you are saying Rex but I disagree. Evidence is not proof and I think the Columbian government had plenty of room for plausible deny- ability by simply stating they will not discuss in detail any capability to rescue hostages and then leave it at that.

Tom Odom
07-18-2008, 12:49 PM
I understand what you are saying Rex but I disagree. Evidence is not proof and I think the Columbian government had plenty of room for plausible deny- ability by simply stating they will not discuss in detail any capability to rescue hostages and then leave it at that.

Slap

I am with Rex on this one. The government of Columbia needs ICRC more that ICRC needs the government of Columbia. What counts most is the perception of the folks on the ground toward the ICRC; without the mea culpa from the government, assumptions would tend toward suspicion.

best

Tom

slapout9
07-18-2008, 01:03 PM
Slap

I am with Rex on this one. The government of Columbia needs ICRC more that ICRC needs the government of Columbia. What counts most is the perception of the folks on the ground toward the ICRC; without the mea culpa from the government, assumptions would tend toward suspicion.

best

Tom

Hi Tom, again I understand what you are saying, but I think the most important perception is the people see the Government of Columbia as in charge, to show the people they are the government and can protect them from FARC. Placing ICRC interests above that is not a good idea.

Tom Odom
07-18-2008, 01:14 PM
Hi Tom, again I understand what you are saying, but I think the most important perception is the people see the Government of Columbia as in charge, to show the people they are the government and can protect them from FARC. Placing ICRC interests above that is not a good idea.

And by pretending to be the ICRC, they undercut their ability to show they are in charge. I am glad the hostages were saved, Slap but the use of the ICRC logo as a ploy was a mistake.

slapout9
07-18-2008, 01:27 PM
And by pretending to be the ICRC, they undercut their ability to show they are in charge. I am glad the hostages were saved, Slap but the use of the ICRC logo as a ploy was a mistake.

I think is was good use of urban camoflouge(cain't speell:wry:). By doing this they pulled off the operation without a shot being fired or an injury or death to anybody. That's getting all Sun Zu and stuff on the enemy. All warfare is based on deception.

Tom Odom
07-18-2008, 02:23 PM
I think is was good use of urban camoflouge(cain't speell:wry:). By doing this they pulled off the operation without a shot being fired or an injury or death to anybody. That's getting all Sun Zu and stuff on the enemy. All warfare is based on deception.

Committing a war crime is not good for long term interests.

It remains to be seen what the after effects will be regarding ICRC and other IO/NGOs.

We will have to agree to disagree on this one.

Tom

Rex Brynen
07-18-2008, 02:57 PM
Just on a side note, I'll mention how important that Red Cross bib is to ICRC personnel. They frequently go into combat zones, into insurgent areas, and negotiate checkpoints, with just that as protection--no body armour, no PSD, no side arms... just a white piece of cloth.

In many war zones--coupled with good field-level intelligence and good local staff--it is enough, in large part because how ICRC has protected the symbol and its own reputation.

In some areas (Iraq and Afghanistan among them), obviously, it is not.

slapout9
07-18-2008, 05:10 PM
If the use of the red cross emblem was a mistake or not is open to debate, but it is not a war crime. The Legal concept of Exigent Circumstances was created just for cases like this.(sometimes lawyers do good stuff) Exigent Circumstances will allow Law Enforcement to violate other laws,rules,and procedures in situations where there is an extreme risk of loss of life. Freeing hostages would qualify.

Further if it was a mistake,that does not require the Columbian Government to discuss it in public. (Having a no comment policy is the same as pleading the 5th in this country) They could have seen the Red Cross in private.

Rex Brynen
07-18-2008, 05:20 PM
If the use of the red cross emblem was a mistake or not is open to debate, but it is not a war crime. The Legal concept of Exigent Circumstances was created just for cases like this.(sometimes lawyers do good stuff) Exigent Circumstances will allow Law Enforcement to violate other laws,rules,and procedures in situations where there is an extreme risk of loss of life. Freeing hostages would qualify.

It doesn't apply in this case--while international humanitarian law often allows a degree or exigency (or military necessity) to be balanced against harm to civilians, there is no such exemption for use of the red cross symbol (for the obvious reasons that people would constantly be using ambulances to gain tactical surprise). Misuse of the ICRC is an absolute war crime, against which IHL would allow no such defence.

Hence the Columbians 'fessing up and apologizing so fast--and blaming it on a nervous soldier.

slapout9
07-18-2008, 05:40 PM
Since nobody was hurt or killed I don't see how use of the Red Cross is a war crime. So we go with copyright violation and a $50.00 fine.

Ken White
07-18-2008, 07:17 PM
It doesn't apply in this case--while international humanitarian law often allows a degree or exigency (or military necessity) to be balanced against harm to civilians, there is no such exemption for use of the red cross symbol (for the obvious reasons that people would constantly be using ambulances to gain tactical surprise). Misuse of the ICRC is an absolute war crime, against which IHL would allow no such defence.Without getting into the semantic and legal argument about whether there is such a thing as International Humanitarian Law (as opposed to the existence of international norms, which I fully acknowledge and further acknowledge cover the use of such symbols), use of the Red Cross -- or it's allied symbols including the Red Crescent and Red Star of David (or red Crystal :rolleyes: ) -- in an operation may be acknowledged by treaty to be misuse but I don't see how it rises to 'war crime' status. No such misuse is generally likely to produce massive or repulsive damage equating to a war crime.

As to its use of symbols on ambulances to achieve tactical advantage; I've been the recipient of three attempts to do that on two continents -- all were unsuccessful. My favorite was the US Peace Corps Nurse in the Dominican Republic in mid-1965 who attempted to smuggle two 'wounded' Rebels and about 500 pounds of miscellaneous ammo and weapons past us to the Rebels. When we insisted on searching her ambulance, driver and patients (though not initially her) she proved she was not a lady...

Nor did the Indian Major general who was the UN Military rep there at the time prove he was a neutral observer with his attempt to defend her and accuse us of a 'war crime.' I'm no lawyer but some of them came to our defense and it was pretty well acknowledged that no crime had been committed by us or her. :cool:

Rex Brynen
07-18-2008, 08:10 PM
Yes, I think we're getting a bit hung up on the "war crimes" issue (and we haven't even started into the "breach" versus "grave breach" of the Geneva Conventions aspect)... the bottom line is that misuse of the red cross is explicitly prohibited under Article 44 of the First Geneva Convention (1949).

And yes, misuse does occur.. the Israelis have been known to commandeer Palestinian ambulances to make arrests, and the Palestinians have been known to use them to transport wanted individuals or weapons. I can't think of a case there, however, where anyone has misused the ICRC symbol though (as opposed to a generic red cross).

Tom Odom
07-18-2008, 08:18 PM
Yes, I think we're getting a bit hung up on the "war crimes" issue (and we haven't even started into the "breach" versus "grave breach" of the Geneva Conventions aspect)... the bottom line is that misuse of the red cross is explicitly prohibited under Article 44 of the First Geneva Convention (1949).

And yes, misuse does occur.. the Israelis have been known to commandeer Palestinian ambulances to make arrests, and the Palestinians have been known to use them to transport wanted individuals or weapons. I can't think of a case there, however, where anyone has misused the ICRC symbol though (as opposed to a generic red cross).

Agreed but with a difference. What is important to consider is the secondary and tertiary effects of misuse in arenas such as Colombia, Congo, or elsewhere the effective rule of law is already in dispute. Again I am tickled pink they got the hostages out; using the ICRC emblem was maladroit at best and may cost others their lives in the future.

Tom

Wildcat
07-21-2008, 11:38 PM
I think this is potentially dangerous. Latin America has a huge way to go economically, and seeing everybody shoot their military spending through the roof is not beneficial to any of that. Brazil is going to be the regional power in the long-run; they are already an economic "dwarf-giant," if you will, and their political power will rise in tandem. We should continue to support Colombia, but I just don't see the utility, for us, the Colombians, or anybody in Latin America from a new round of arms races caused by descent into competing "camps." In the long run, Brazil (especially), Argentina, Chile, and Colombia are the powers in LA, not Venezuela or Ecuador or Bolivia, no matter what Chavez and Morales would say.

Whether or not it's beneficial to them, the Latin American states have already started the arms race (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=52773&postcount=3). Chavez recently acquired some new Sukhoi fighters, and apparently he's looking for more from the Russians. Regardless of the fact that his people are still struggling to make ends meet, he's going to buy weapons and boost his domestic surveillance programs. He's got a country flush with oil revenues and he's got a whole lot of ambition. He wants to stick it to The Man, that being the United States and its "puppet," Colombia. Just because it's the proper and prudent course of action doesn't mean that a man like Chavez is going to follow that path.

Remember, this is IR we're talking about. Regional hegemons wax and wane, and states always compete to enhance their power and influence. An arms race was easy to predict in this case. It was inevitable, IMO.



Indeed, but since the 1980s, the drug trade has been the watchword and political cover. And to a degree, even if FARC is defeated, our real goals will still coincide with counternarcotics. Economic development and eradication of the drug trade are going to require huge amounts of aid and effort.

Oh, don't get me wrong. If the FARC evaporates tomorrow I don't expect us to pick up and leave. Drug interdiction is still a huge reason why we're there. But I will counter by saying that if the FARC and the drugs disappear overnight, we will still have a considerable presence in Colombia and we will still shower money on them, because the overarching reason for our involvement in Colombia is based on its importance as a strategic and democratic ally in that region.

Stan
08-06-2008, 08:54 PM
Misuse of the symbol undermines Red Cross neutrality (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7545519.stm)



The Geneva-based ICRC says the footage shown on Colombian TV on Monday indicates that the emblem was being used before the operation to free the hostages from Farc guerrillas had even begun, indicating intentional misuse.

"If authenticated, these images would clearly establish an improper use of the Red Cross emblem, which we deplore," said ICRC deputy director of operations Dominik Stillhart.

Mr Uribe said he had apologised to the Red Cross for the error, which he said had been made by a nervous soldier acting against orders.

Bill Moore
10-12-2008, 06:20 PM
I thought about posting this in the Latin American section, but decided there are relevant points in this article about international support (both State and non-state) for insurgents and terrorists are relevant on the global level. The take away is that the McCormick Counterinsurgent Diamond model argues you must isolate the insurgents not only from the populace and but also international support. Of course theory is always easier than practice.

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefafarcirnetworkdeception0908.pdf


This paper examines:
• The FARC's long-standing ties to Latin American countries such as El Salvador
and Nicaragua,
• The information-sharing with other terrorist groups, particularly the Provisional
IRA of Ireland and the ETA Basque separatists of Spain, and the role this
collaboration played in allowing the FARC to develop weapons that primarily
targeted the civilian population,
• The FARC's role in founding and directing the Coordinadora Continental
Bolivariana (CCB), an umbrella group active in much of Latin America.
• The FARC's European network,
• The FARC's attempts to acquire weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, from a
variety of countries and intermediaries of different nationalities.

Jedburgh
10-13-2008, 03:15 AM
I thought about posting this in the Latin American section, but decided there are relevant points in this article about international support (both State and non-state) for insurgents and terrorists are relevant on the global level. The take away is that the McCormick Counterinsurgent Diamond model argues you must isolate the insurgents not only from the populace and but also international support. Of course theory is always easier than practice.

The FARC’s International Relations: A Network of Deception (http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefafarcirnetworkdeception0908.pdf)
The necessity of isolating the insurgent from international support has long been a recognized keystone of successful COIN, but - as you state - it is a goal that is very difficult to reach. Reduction of such support (to varying degrees), rather than isolation from, tends to be what is achievable in practical terms. And in today's operational environment, there is a broad spectrum of factors that make such reduction much more difficult than it was in the Cold War era.

Back in 2001, RAND published a decent, if simplistic, study on Trends in Outside Support for Insurgencies (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf). The brief NEFA paper talks to several of the issues in the context of the FARC that the authors identified as post-Cold War support trends.

As an aside, given events since '01, the topic could use an in-depth relook.

bourbon
12-15-2008, 05:17 PM
Jules Verne eat your heart out:

In Colombia, they call him Captain Nemo: Authorities say Enrique Portocarrero was the innovative creator of stealthy submarines called semi-submersibles, used by cocaine traffickers to evade detection (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-captainnemo14-2008dec14,0,1166020.story), By Chris Kraul. Los Angeles Times, December 14, 2008.



But law enforcement officers here have dubbed him "Captain Nemo," after the dark genius of "20,000 Leagues Under the Sea." They say the 45-year-old has designed and built as many as 20 fiberglass submarines, strange vessels with the look of sea creatures, for drug traffickers to haul cocaine from this area of southern Colombia to Central America and Mexico.

Capping a three-year investigation that involved U.S. and British counter-narcotics agents, Colombia's FBI equivalent, the Department of Administrative Security, arrested Portocarrero last month in the violent port city of Buenaventura, where he allegedly led a double life as a shrimp fisherman.

A day later, they descended on Portocarrero's hidden "shipyard" in a mangrove swamp 20 miles south of here and destroyed two of the vessels, which police say were each capable of carrying 8 tons of cargo.

Jedburgh
12-16-2008, 04:38 PM
National Drug Threat Assessment 2009 (http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf) (18.7 MB pdf)

DTOs rapidly adapt to law enforcement and policy initiatives that disrupt their drug trafficking operations. Law enforcement and intelligence reporting revealed several strategic shifts by DTOs in drug production and trafficking in 2007 and early 2008, attributed in part to the success of counterdrug agencies in disrupting the operations of DTOs. Many of these shifts represent immediate new challenges for policymakers and resource planners. The National Drug Threat Assessment 2009 outlines the progress and emerging counterdrug challenges in detailed strategic findings, including the following:

• Mexican DTOs represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States.
• Violent urban gangs control most retail-level drug distribution nationally, and some have relocated from inner cities to suburban and rural areas.
• Cocaine is the leading drug threat to society. Methamphetamine is the second leading drug threat, followed by marijuana, heroin, pharmaceutical drugs, and MDMA respectively.
• Cocaine availability levels in the United States are lower than 2005 and 2006 levels.
• Domestic methamphetamine production is projected to surpass 2007 levels.
• To increase domestic methamphetamine production, individuals and criminal groups are increasingly circumventing state and federal pseudoephedrine and ephedrine sales restrictions.
• The level of domestic outdoor cannabis cultivation is very high and possibly increasing.
• Marijuana potency has increased to the highest level ever recorded.
• Lucrative northeastern white heroin markets are attracting Mexican DTOs that distribute Mexican black tar or brown powder heroin.
• Southwest and Southeast Asian heroin availability and distribution are limited.
• The level of prescription drug abuse is very high, and individuals are able to acquire these drugs from numerous sources.
• Asian DTOs are producing MDMA in large clandestine laboratories in Canada.
Complete 94-page document available at the link.

Bill Moore
01-23-2009, 08:24 AM
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf


DTOs rapidly adapt to law enforcement and policy initiatives that disrupt their drug trafficking operations. Law enforcement and intelligence reporting revealed several strategic shifts by DTOs in drug production and trafficking in 2007 and early 2008, attributed in part to the success of counterdrug agencies in disrupting the operations of DTOs. Many of these shifts represent immediate new challenges for policymakers and resource planners. The National Drug Threat Assessment 2009 outlines the progress and emerging counterdrug challenges
in detailed strategic findings, including the following:

• Mexican DTOs represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States. The influence
of Mexican DTOs over domestic drug trafficking is unrivaled. In fact, intelligence estimates indicate a vast majority of the cocaine available in U.S. drug markets is smuggled by Mexican DTOs across the U.S.–Mexico border. Mexican DTOs control drug distribution in most U.S. cities, and they are gaining strength in markets that they do not yet control.
• Violent urban gangs control most retail-level drug distribution nationally, and some have relocated from inner cities to suburban and rural areas. Moreover, gangs are increasing their involvement in wholesale-level drug distribution, aided by their connections with Mexican and Asian DTOs.

Unfortunately no good news in this report, but it is excellent study on international criminal networks (with many parallels to international terrorist organizations). One reader criticized the report due to its sole focus on illegal drugs, while failing to show the ties between the illegal drug trade and terrorists.

davidbfpo
02-15-2009, 09:28 PM
A report by an Inter-American body and a commentary on a US news website: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/02/reality_intrudes_on_the_drug_w.html

davidbfpo

Ken White
02-15-2009, 11:10 PM
Nixon declared the War on Drugs in 1971. By 1975, most of us dumb Anglos here in El norte figured out that it was not going to work.

Been downhill ever since...

bourbon
02-16-2009, 07:10 PM
UN crime chief says drug money flowed into banks (http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSLP65079620090125), Reuters, Jan 25, 2009.

"In many instances, drug money is currently the only liquid investment capital," Costa was quoted as saying by Profil. "In the second half of 2008, liquidity was the banking system's main problem and hence liquid capital became an important factor."
I am glad someone is speaking about this unpleasant reality, even if she is just scratching the tip of the iceberg.

slapout9
02-17-2009, 12:37 AM
UN crime chief says drug money flowed into banks (http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSLP65079620090125), Reuters, Jan 25, 2009.

I am glad someone is speaking about this unpleasant reality, even if she is just scratching the tip of the iceberg.

Agree, nice post bourbon.

bourbon
03-09-2009, 09:49 PM
How to stop the drug wars: Prohibition has failed; legalisation is the least bad solution (http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=13237193). The Economist, Mar 5th 2009.

Legalisation would not only drive away the gangsters; it would transform drugs from a law-and-order problem into a public-health problem, which is how they ought to be treated. Governments would tax and regulate the drug trade, and use the funds raised (and the billions saved on law-enforcement) to educate the public about the risks of drug-taking and to treat addiction. The sale of drugs to minors should remain banned. Different drugs would command different levels of taxation and regulation. This system would be fiddly and imperfect, requiring constant monitoring and hard-to-measure trade-offs. Post-tax prices should be set at a level that would strike a balance between damping down use on the one hand, and discouraging a black market and the desperate acts of theft and prostitution to which addicts now resort to feed their habits.


Selling even this flawed system to people in producer countries, where organised crime is the central political issue, is fairly easy.
I'm not sure about that. I'd bet the power structures in producer and transport countries, speaking candidly and off the record would acknowledge they don't want legalization in consumer countries. Even if they are clean and not related to the trade itself, they know the huge amount of money involved, and how a significant part of their economy will be removed if drugs are legalized in consumer countries. The criminal and terrorist problems that accompany the drug trade are but a cost in a cynical trade-off. Imagine if cocaine were legalized; its production cost would be cheaper than coffee, which the Colombian's subsidize already.

In the consumer countries, the US at least, the amount of money made off the war on drugs is considerable, and allot of influence and money would be thrown up against legalization legislation. Not to mention powerful financial and economic interests who would not want to see the huge international cash flows disappear.

bourbon
03-10-2009, 04:58 AM
Blowing the Whistle -- and Paying the Price: For one compliance officer, blowing the whistle opened a can of worms (http://online.barrons.com/article/SB123639102998259161.html), By Bill Alpert. Barron's, March 9, 2009.

WHEN WACHOVIA BANK COMPLIANCE OFFICER Martin Woods started seeing traveler's checks arrive at his London branch from Mexican currency exchanges in 2006 -- sequentially numbered, improperly endorsed, large denomination -- he became suspicious.
They always shoot the messenger.

Jedburgh
03-10-2009, 03:58 PM
How to stop the drug wars: Prohibition has failed; legalisation is the least bad solution (http://www.economist.com/printedition/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=13237193). The Economist, Mar 5th 2009....
The linked article above is just the Leader in that issue, more of an intro piece on the subject. The substantive bit is a Briefing consisting of four articles:

Dealing with drugs: On the trail of the traffickers (http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13234157)

The cocaine business: Sniffy customers (http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13234124)

Levels of prohibition: A toker's guide (http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13234134)

Drug education: In America, lessons learned (http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13234144)

Sergeant T
03-10-2009, 04:43 PM
In the consumer countries, the US at least, the amount of money made off the war on drugs is considerable, and allot of influence and money would be thrown up against legalization legislation. Not to mention powerful financial and economic interests who would not want to see the huge international cash flows disappear.

Haven't gotten to The Economist piece yet, maybe they cover this. One potential upside to legalization would be moving billions of dollars from the shadow economy into the mainstream financial system. Agreed that the folks currently holding that money wouldn't go without a fight, but the end result would probably be an uptick in cash flow and GDP. And a lot fewer CTRs and SARs to investigate.

bourbon
03-10-2009, 06:31 PM
Haven't gotten to The Economist piece yet, maybe they cover this. One potential upside to legalization would be moving billions of dollars from the shadow economy into the mainstream financial system. Agreed that the folks currently holding that money wouldn't go without a fight, but the end result would probably be an uptick in cash flow and GDP. And a lot fewer CTRs and SARs to investigate.
I think the shadow economy is interconnected to the global financial system. It's already in the mainstream financial system in a significant ways, the system loves the liquidity that illicit trade brings.

I don't think legalization would bring an increase in cash flow and GDP. The production costs of narcotics is very low, if they were legal in producer and consumer countries the price paid for them would be low. Naturally the government(s) would want to tax them; say even if the taxes make for a 100% of the price tax, drugs would still be significantly cheaper then they are today.

I'm no fan of the drug war and would support legalization. But I think public opinion is moving more in that direction, and will be less of a challenge then the financial and economic interests who do not want legalization.

slapout9
03-11-2009, 01:33 AM
I think the shadow economy is interconnected to the global financial system. It's already in the mainstream financial system in a significant ways, the system loves the liquidity that illicit trade brings.


Boy is that ever true...money has no concious...but it does leave a trail:wry:

Jedburgh
03-26-2009, 01:58 PM
ICG, 26 Mar 09: Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/30_ending_colombias_farc_conflict___dealing_the_ri ght_card.pdf)

.....Despite the FARC’s historic resilience and proven capacity to overcome military and political setbacks, President Uribe’s strategy aimed at military victory and ending the conflict without political negotiations began to yield visible results in 2007. The government is confident that further attacks on the insurgents’ command-and-control structure, sustained operations in its strongholds and the increasing rate of defections will slowly break the FARC’s backbone. In time, units will crumble or splinter into factions that may become interested in negotiating their disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion (DDR). The remaining FARC Secretariat members and hardline factions would then be more isolated, militarily and politically, and thus easier to defeat.

Uribe’s broad popularity is based largely on the tough stance he has taken against the FARC. His political priorities in advance of the 2010 presidential elections and his conviction that the insurgents would again use any political pause to regain strength rather than negotiate seriously give him little motive to assign the same weight to a vigorous political strategy as to his security policy.

But the FARC has been adapting to more difficult circumstances with some success, and several of its fronts are capable of resisting offensives in key areas, especially in high mountain ranges and tropical jungles along the Pacific coast and the borders with Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama. In these locations the government’s security consolidation strategy is incipient at best, and drug trafficking revenue continues to fuel the conflict. Even if some units eventually split away, partly as a result of the new, more decentralised system that gives them greater autonomy, the leadership under Alfonso Cano appears unlikely to give up as a result of the ongoing military pressure. And should the government’s strategy of fracturing the FARC into easier-to-demobilise pieces succeed, it entails the serious risk of driving the resulting splinter groups not into a DDR program but into closer forms of cooperationwith powerful organised criminal groups or NIAGs.....
Complete 38-page paper at the link.

bourbon
04-25-2009, 01:13 PM
Drug-Sub Culture (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/magazine/26drugs-t.html), By DAVID KUSHNER. The New York Times Magazine, April 23, 2009.

This kind of vessel — a self-propelled, semisubmersible made by hand in the jungles of Colombia — is no longer quite so mythic: four were intercepted in January alone. But because of their ability to elude radar systems, these subs are almost impossible to detect; only an estimated 14 percent of them are stopped. And perhaps as many as 70 of them will be made this year, up from 45 or so in 2007, according to a task-force spokesman. Made for as little as $500,000 each and assembled in fewer than 90 days, they are now thought to carry nearly 30 percent of Colombia’s total cocaine exports.
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2009/04/26/magazine/26drugs-600.jpg

AmericanPride
04-25-2009, 02:21 PM
Legalizing drugs (of any kind) won't stop crime, if stopping crime is the intent. If taxed, people will find ways around those taxes. Even cigarette smuggling brings in billions of dollars a year. And even those smuggling operations have suspected ties to terrorist organizations. See 2004 GAO Report on cigarette smuggling (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04641.pdf) And if expensive (because of taxation), people who cannot afford them will still resort to illicit behaviors to purchase them for their addictions (and those addiction rates are much higher than alcohol). Legalization will not push traffickers into the open -- some will change clothes (like the corportization of Las Vegas) and others will find business in smuggling. Meanwhile, the public will still be exposed to the genuine public health risks caused by drugs. Anyone consider the effects of drug legalization on the extortion scheme we call health insurance and the healthcare system? How many addicts will there be, and how many will find private insurance policies? Will taxation make up for the (extremely) high expenses in healthcare that will result? If the war on drugs is a 'failure' now, how can we expect to have effective enforcement measures (rehab, counter-smuggling, prevention of sale to minors, etc) when drugs are legalized and the public (particularly the consuming portion of the population) perceives drug use to be legitimized?

jmm99
04-25-2009, 05:32 PM
as we can see from the attached, Bourbon's Boat had its grandpappy in the booze-running subs of Lake Superior, which plied the Thunder Bay to Keweenaw route during Prohibition - as commorated by this WPA project on US 41 near Kearsarge, MI.

And if you believe this story, you will also believe that there is a "solution" to the drug problem(s) which does not involve some minuses.

AmericanPride asks some good questions - similar questions were involved in Prohibition and Repeal. I don't have the answers.

Ken White
04-25-2009, 06:00 PM
Have the answers. If the three of us do not have them, there may not be any... :D

Ron Humphrey
04-25-2009, 06:28 PM
They tend to result and be amplified by so many of the so called "socially neutral" habits and requirements we have become inundated with in efforts to ensure complete and total "equality" without any regard to common understanding that in life there are such things as good and bad.

And more importantly the fact that if the adults don't define them the kids will cease to even recognize them. :(

The only thing that would truly effect the drug business is a recognition that if your young are raised with the awareness of how good life can be when you live it right they will be a lot less inclined to partake in those things which take that ability away. It's not a supply and demand issue, it's a culture and environment one.

This biggest hurdle to that is the likelihood that as in the past there will be efforts to have the state deal with it instead of finding ways to empower families to. (Catch 22)

Ken White
04-25-2009, 07:16 PM
It's not a supply and demand issue, it's a culture and environment one.That specifically but agree with the whole post. Good comment.

goesh
04-26-2009, 04:06 AM
I've wondered about legalizing small time marijuana use simply to free up more time for LE - the Gov. at all levels is so screwed up they probably couldn't even sell pot without costing the tax payers billions of dollars - the thought was limited sales, X number of joints per mo. per adult, with real control and tracking measure in place, would generate some additional revenue. However, if pirates sporting AKs can tie up portions of the US Navy, the Gov. can do little to impact the drug trade in any respect.

I like the cultural comments too and I remember LBJs war on poverty and certainly the war on drugs - both are still in full force.

Presley Cannady
04-26-2009, 10:35 PM
The people that make the millions off other people's personal misery are the people that should be in jail. Arresting people for using itaccomplishes nothing.

Setting aside the moral question, criminalizing usage does have the effect of driving prices up--evidence of declining demand in absence of declining supply. The baseline fluctuating between 50 and 300 percent, if I remember, but it does clearly set the price higher here than it does in say Amsterdam.


As has been brought up before buying the entire crop of poppies would have a lot of benefits, but the biggest opponent would be drug companies because such a large legal supply would put pressure on the price of legal pain medications which are unbelievable expensive. Never new how bad it was until I started being around hospitals. Helathcare is rationed largely on price despite what people may think.

Buying up the crop wouldn't necessarily drive down prices, in fact it shouldn't unless the government--as either a result of playing the futures game poorly or as a matter of deliberate policy--consistently undercuts its own position on the eventual harvest price or imposes a price that promotes illegal crop selling. The model here is farm subsidies.

slapout9
04-26-2009, 10:54 PM
Setting aside the moral question, criminalizing usage does have the effect of driving prices up--evidence of declining demand in absence of declining supply. The baseline fluctuating between 50 and 300 percent, if I remember, but it does clearly set the price higher here than it does in say Amsterdam.



Buying up the crop wouldn't necessarily drive down prices, in fact it shouldn't unless the government--as either a result of playing the futures game poorly or as a matter of deliberate policy--consistently undercuts its own position on the eventual harvest price or imposes a price that promotes illegal crop selling. The model here is farm subsidies.


I agree with point one. Criminalizing something usually starts a high price black market.

As for point two, the main idea was to remove the crop from the market entirely. If we (the US) decided to do something with the product beside destroy it then the economics of drug companies would or would not come into play.

You seem well versed in this area...what are your suggestions on how to handle it?

Presley Cannady
04-27-2009, 12:01 AM
I agree with point one. Criminalizing something usually starts a high price black market.

Errata: I mentioned "evidence of declining demand in absence of declining supply." I meant "despite." Criminalizing usage (with no additional change to penalties for suppliers, should force a drop in prices eventually. Decriminalizing should do the opposite. On the other hands, the Netherlands has this weird system where they've decriminalized only possession for personal use and the coffee shop boutique. Supply remains unaffected by the law, demand increases, but prices drop. Go figure.


As for point two, the main idea was to remove the crop from the market entirely. If we (the US) decided to do something with the product beside destroy it then the economics of drug companies would or would not come into play.

My sentiments exactly. It's almost disturbing how little public literature there is at least humoring the idea.


You seem well versed in this area...what are your suggestions on how to handle it?

I'm interested in epidemiology in general, and drug policy addresses such a problem. I don't have any particular expertise in it, though. Still, I'm an American and a New Yorker so I'll offer my opinions anyway:

1) On the demand side, OECD nations have done a reasonable job containing the threat of hard drugs to civil society, though it remains to be seen if prohibition's gone overboard and is more costly than other alternatives--decriminalization is now going on in enough countries to do a real longitudinal study with good regional variance. I really don't have any recommendations that don't boil down to "those Romanian Newports are looking like a bargain right now."

2) The supply side effort has been inadequate, largely because of how tunnel-vision in drug policy in OECD nations has shaped our relations with key cocaine and heroine supply termini. You've outlined a serious operation that could be used to achieve much broader objectives in say, Colombia, where we can identify farmers, politicians seeking broader farmer constituencies, military and law enforcement officers and even narcotraffickers who'd rather deal legally with a government agency's billion dollar budget than their more bloodthirsty confederates. I think this is what folks at SWJ call a "population-centric" approach.

davidbfpo
04-27-2009, 09:57 AM
The 'War on Drugs' is a snappy, old title and of little relevance now IMHO.

In the UK and I suspect elsewhere the price of both hard and soft drugs has gone down. Here SOCA (similar to the FBI & DEA) acknowldeges that supply remains robust and is reflected in the ready availability on the street.

In the UK and hard drugs aside, as those users remain a small consumer minority. The problem is first a significant consumer minority exists (around 40% of under 25's IIRC) and this affects the legitimacy of anti-drug policy. I would expect a large minority would support decriminalisation of cannabis. Eventually this will be reflected in institutions.

Secondly most national effort is concentrated on supply and not demand. I wonder if HIV & AIDS has had an impact on the use of needles, for the non-addict.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
05-07-2009, 09:58 PM
Today the UK Home Office have released some figures on seizures plus other data sources: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/5291099/Cocaine-seizures-hit-record-levels.html

Some 'spin" has been applied, thankfully supports my previous posting.

davidbfpo

bourbon
06-06-2009, 05:09 PM
Plying the Pacific, Subs Surface as Key Tool of Drug Cartels (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/05/AR2009060503718.html), by William Booth and Juan Forero. The Washington Post, June 6, 2009.

MEXICO CITY -- When anti-narcotics agents first heard that drug cartels were building an armada of submarines to transport cocaine, they thought it was a joke.

Now U.S. law enforcement officials say that more than a third of the cocaine smuggled into the United States from Colombia travels in submersibles.

An experimental oddity just two years ago, these strange semi-submarines are the cutting edge of drug trafficking today. They ferry hundreds of tons of cocaine for powerful Mexican cartels that are taking over the Pacific Ocean route for most northbound shipments, according to the Colombian navy.

The sub-builders are even trying to develop a remote-controlled model, officials say.

"That means no crew. That means just cocaine, or whatever, inside the boat," said Michael Braun, a former chief of operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.
Had the impression the narco-subs were kind of a novelty for the traffickers. Guess it isn’t anymore; one-third of all cocaine going from Colombia to the Mexican cartels in semi-subs is serious weight.

tequila
07-06-2009, 09:27 PM
Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for Creating Fair and Successful Drug Policies (http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10080). Cato Institute.


On July 1, 2001, a nationwide law in Portugal took effect that decriminalized all drugs, including cocaine and heroin. Under the new legal framework, all drugs were "decriminalized," not "legalized." Thus, drug possession for personal use and drug usage itself are still legally prohibited, but violations of those prohibitions are deemed to be exclusively administrative violations and are removed completely from the criminal realm. Drug trafficking continues to be prosecuted as a criminal offense.

...

The political consensus in favor of decriminalization is unsurprising in light of the relevant empirical data. Those data indicate that decriminalization has had no adverse effect on drug usage rates in Portugal, which, in numerous categories, are now among the lowest in the EU, particularly when compared with states with stringent criminalization regimes. Although postdecriminalization usage rates have remained roughly the same or even decreased slightly when compared with other EU states, drug-related pathologies — such as sexually transmitted diseases and deaths due to drug usage — have decreased dramatically. Drug policy experts attribute those positive trends to the enhanced ability of the Portuguese government to offer treatment programs to its citizens — enhancements made possible, for numerous reasons, by decriminalization.


Full white paper at the link.

bourbon
08-18-2009, 05:38 PM
90% of U.S. currency tainted with cocaine. Which city's is the worst? (http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/08/cocaine-money-washington-d-c.html). Top of the Ticket - L.A. Times, August 18, 2009.

A new -- and strange -- study by the American Chemical Society has just revealed that nine out of 10 pieces -- as in 90% -- of the paper currency sampled around the United States recently contained traces of cocaine -- as in the illegal substance, which binds to the green ink.

Schmedlap
08-18-2009, 06:53 PM
I read of a similar report a while back, but that one only referred to 100 dollar bills and the highest rate of incidence was in LA and Las Vegas, if I recall correctly. I am surprised to see DC at the top. I knew that there was a drug problem in DC, but I always figured that they were smoking crack, judging by the legislation.

Ken White
08-18-2009, 07:39 PM
...I am surprised to see DC at the top. I knew that there was a drug problem in DC, but I always figured that they were smoking crack, judging by the legislation.that refined...:mad:

IntelTrooper
08-18-2009, 10:29 PM
I read of a similar report a while back, but that one only referred to 100 dollar bills and the highest rate of incidence was in LA and Las Vegas, if I recall correctly. I am surprised to see DC at the top. I knew that there was a drug problem in DC, but I always figured that they were smoking crack, judging by the legislation.

Dude, can you filter your comments so that they're not making me laugh out loud while I'm supposed to be working?

bourbon
09-14-2009, 01:24 PM
Colombia Confronts Drug Lord’s Legacy: Hippos (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/11/world/americas/11hippo.html), by Simon Romero. The New York Times, September 10, 2009.

DORADAL, Colombia — Even in Colombia, a country known for its paramilitary death squads, this hunting party stood out: more than a dozen soldiers from a Colombian Army battalion, two Porsche salesmen armed with long-range rifles, their assistant, and a taxidermist.

They stalked Pepe through the backlands of Colombia for three days in June before executing him in a clearing about 60 miles from here with shots to his head and heart. But after a snapshot emerged of soldiers posing over his carcass, the group suddenly found itself on the defensive.

As it turned out, Pepe — a hippopotamus who escaped from his birthplace near the pleasure palace built here by the slain drug lord Pablo Escobar — had a following of his own.
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2009/09/10/world/10hippo2_650.jpg

Pepe bears a resemblance to his owner (http://18.media.tumblr.com/tNzpvQVUdm0kds3bQruq9wXBo1_500.jpg).

Tom Odom
09-14-2009, 03:37 PM
Hippo makes a fine meal...:)

Mike Burgoyne
09-20-2009, 01:25 AM
I recently returned from an interesting visit to Colombia. The government is working to consolidate its gains against the FARC and establish government services in formerly lawless areas. Colombia has developed the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/descargas/Documentos_Descargables/ingles/Policy_for_the_Consolidation_of_Democratic_Securit y.pdf) which is supported by the United States’ Colombian Strategic Development Initiative.

Both plans focus on delivering enduring economic opportunity and government services to formerly ungoverned or FARC controlled regions. Both plans shift resources from the primarily security heavy efforts of the last decade while maintaining extremely successful and unrelenting intelligence based targeting of the FARC leadership. With continued US support and Colombian political will, Colombia could prove to be an example of successful government consolidation following an internal conflict.

General Freddy Padilla de Leon’s analysis “Beyond Victory: The Future of the Armed Forces of Colombia” also provides some interesting insights into the way forward in Colombia. http://www.world-military.net/IMG/pdf_BEYOND_VICTORY_padilla.pdf

davidbfpo
09-20-2009, 11:29 AM
Mike,

Good catch and although rather laudatory in places I liked the following:


Our vision is to develop men and women in our armed services with this exceptional character:

* We need the future members of the military class to be thinkers. This is the only alternative, not only so that they will have the necessary criteria for making good operational decisions, but also so that they can deal with a strategic scenario that is characterized by a growing uncertainty.
* We also want officers and soldiers to share a solid military ethic as the only response for guaranteeing legitimacy in the context of the dramatic dilemmas inherent to war.
* We require Colombian officers to behave as doubly excellent citizens who are capable of setting an example for their countrymen while being aware of their duty to their service.
* Moreover, we expect armed service officers to develop an informed vision of the world and discernment to be able to assume the role of defense intellectuals capable of understanding society’s security needs beyond the current conjuncture.
* We demand that armed forces members be imbued with the character of leaders who can conduct the institution in battle, and also lead it and make it grow in times of peace.
* As is natural, the officer corps must incarnate military ethics such as discipline, determination, and the values that make them the nation’s greatest resource at the times of greatest difficulty.

I wonder if TRADOC have read the speech?

davidbfpo

John T. Fishel
09-20-2009, 12:22 PM
Max Manwaring of SSI has made a number of trips to Colombia in the past few years and is deeply pessimistic. I'll get into his reasons in a moment. In 2006, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies hosted a Colombian conference of their Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action (CCAI in Spanish) which is the institutional interagency implementer of the Strategic Plan. The problem was that CCAI had never been institutionalized by legislation and the last time I discussed it with Max it still had not been. This is an indicator in his mind, supported by other observations, that President Uribe's positive impact can only be transitory. He really doesn't build, hasn't built institutions, so little of what he has done will survive his tenure in office. The root of the problem is that Uribe, like Chavez, in Venezuela, is a caudillo - the tradition of strong man leadership that is enshrined in most Latin American constitutions in a Presidency that is the 800 pound gorrilla to all the other institutions of governement.
As our good friend Ambassador Ed Corr puts it, the best thing Uribe could do for Colombia is not run again. Then he would go down in history as a great President. To which I would add that before he leaves office he should institutionalize his innovations like CCAI in legislation. But, of course, this is all wishful thinking on my part.:rolleyes:

Cheers

JohnT

Mike Burgoyne
09-20-2009, 03:55 PM
John:

I came away feeling cautiously optimistic.

It seemed to me that the political future of Colombia was the critical issue. I would think that having someone like former defense minister Santos continue the Uribe government policies would be the best. However, if Uribe does achieve a third term will this derail the gains of the last ten years?

The PCSD and my observations of their forces leads me to believe that they have identified and are now dealing with the challenges of this phase of the war. I am heartened to hear that, after defeating the large FARC columns, they haven't declared victory and ignored the root causes.

"Irreversibility" was the buzz word around Bogotá. In your opinion what are the signs/steps that must be seen for Colombia to achieve a lasting victory over the FARC?

V/R

Mike

John T. Fishel
09-20-2009, 06:27 PM
:)Mike, in a word.;) I must say I'm not as pessimistic as Max but he said that Dave Spencer (at CHDS) is pessimistic too. That said, I would go on and use the old 1950s-60s slogan of Peru's CAEM, No hay defensa sin desarrollo (there is no defense w/o development). The critical development IMO is a real civil service in all areas. For example, although the MOD is a civilian, his position in the chain of command is shaky at best and the position is totally political. Well, you say, ours is too. Yes, but, look at the politicals, especially our USDP, Michelle Flournoy a total defense professional and one in the shadow Democratic Administration for the duration of the G W Bush years. There is nothing like this in Colombia. My old colleague from CHDS, Andres Suarez, attached himself to the Deputy MOD; when that gentleman moved on to the intel service he took Andres with him. Nor are there professional civilian bureaucrats in the MOD or other ministries who continue beyond a single Presidency. Thus there is no institutional civil service in Colombia or most of Latin America. There are exceptions like Chile and Argentina or the Brazilian foreign service (and some others) but mostly they aren't. Another area of major weakness is in the realm of legislative staff. they really don't exist either. (As a FAO you will be beleaguered by CODELS consisting solely of Staff but remember as you are griping that thos staffers [kids barely out of diapers] are the ones who provide the Congressmen and senators the info they need.) Anyway, good, professional legislative staff is essential to intelligent institutionalization and development.

Boy, did you hit a button! :)

Cheers

JohnT

jmm99
09-20-2009, 07:01 PM
From my armchair, the various points you make (no disagreement here) are symptomatic of the larger Cental and South American problem of a limited middle class, whether in the civil service, in business or in the military. While the text quoted by David is edifying, it mentions "officers" (mostly) and "soldiers" (sometimes). The non-mention of NCOs stood out to me; but then I may have been guilty of reading too much MM and JTF, as well as some studies on the FID efforts in ES.

The "caudillo" problem - both in large and small sizes.

In justice to GEN Padilla de Léon, he does mention NCOs once, officers 17 times and soldiers thrice.

John T. Fishel
09-20-2009, 08:52 PM
The is heresy for all my SF friends. Latin America doesn't have an NCO problem. It also doesn't lack a middle class, so that isn't the source of the civil service problem.
Back to NCOs. What the LATAM militaries lack is a first level supervisor. We use NCOs for that purpose. The Soviets and the LATAM militaries used/use junior officers. In LATAM the problem was too few LTs and a culture that said/says that officers don't get their hands dirty. El Salvador never solved the problem during the war and few, if any, LATAM militaries have.
John Waghelstein tried to solve the problem with an OCS course that produced a lot of LTs but ran into the problem of the regular officers not seeing the OCS products as real officers and seeing them as a threat. So, that approach died. Nobody ever tried my proposed solution which was to create a class of Warrant Officers - the requirement would have been a high school diploma and reserve, not regular status. This would have taken advantage of El Salvador's middle class...

Cheers

JohnT

jmm99
09-21-2009, 12:20 AM
with your SF friends - cuz I'd lose; but a Google search - "el salvador" "middle class" - brings up 187,000 hits, with the first 3 being....

middle class - 8% (http://www.dirla.com/elsalvador2.html):


Unfortunately, this small country's most serious problems didn't end with the war. An estimated 90 percent of the nation's population is considered poor and clamoring for land. Only 2 percent of the country's population can be considered wealthy, while an additional 8 percent from a struggling middle class.

A nice anecdote from 1950 (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,805472,00.html):


EL SALVADOR: Discovery of a Middle Class
Monday, Jul. 10, 1950
....
Placed on sale early last week in Salvadorean banks, the bonds sold briskly to shop girls, taxi drivers and other small citizens. Less than $400,000 worth were bought by members of the Twenty Families. At week's end the $5,000,000 issue was entirely subscribed.

middle class-- about 8 percent in the early 1980s (http://countrystudies.us/el-salvador/27.htm):


The small proportion of society constituting a middle class-- about 8 percent in the early 1980s--included skilled workers, government employees, professionals, school teachers, smallholders, small businessmen, and commercial employees. These people were caught between the polar extremes of wealth and poverty. Not being members of the traditional oligarchy--although the great success of nineteenth- century coffee production had stimulated the development of the middle sector as well as of the elite--the middle sector traditionally had little direct influence in government affairs.

That being said, the 2009 Brookings Report, "Central America in 2009: Off the U.S. Radar" (Google cache (http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache:69NPaGa-i3gJ:www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0106_central_america_lowenthal.aspx+%22el+salvador %22+%22middle+class%22+2009&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)) has this marked improvement over the approx. 90% poverty rate of the 1980s:


These countries remain sharply divided, however, between highly privileged elites and very large sectors of the population mired in poverty or extreme poverty. These two latter categories together total about half the population in Guatemala and Nicaragua, more than 30% in El Salvador, and more than 28% even in wealthier Panama. Politics and communications have democratized, but access to major economic assets and to high quality education is still extremely restricted. Significant economic growth has occurred since 1990 in Panama, El Salvador and Guatemala and since 2000 even in Nicaragua, but the benefits of growth are still very unequally distributed in all four countries. Guatemala’s elite has more helicopters per capita than any other country (admittedly in a mountainous terrain) but infant malnutrition rates in Guatemala, although improving, are still among the worst in the world. The contrast between the homes and lifestyles of the wealthy and of the poor, both urban and rural, remains stunning.

Apparently, economic changes since 1990 require some amendment to pre-conceptions from more ancient times. :)

Cheers

Mike

John T. Fishel
09-21-2009, 12:51 AM
Mike good info on all counts. Still, we need to remember that the definition of 'middle class' is going to vary significantly depending on what we choose to measure. Clearly, the middle class in CENTAM was very small in 1980 and a good bit larger in 2009 by any measure. But even taking the 8% figure that was about 640,000 folk in the pool - cut it in half for the women = 320,000 and you stiil have a rather good sized pool of potential Warrant Officers. Since my criteria for the Warants was a high school diploma and I believe that there were more of those than the 8% MC, then the pool was probably bigger still. Incidentally, a HS diploma is probably a pretty good indicator of MC status in CENTAM.

Cheers

JohnT

jmm99
09-21-2009, 01:48 AM
Methinks, you are wanting a response from me on your warrant officer proposal.

OK, an armchair civilian view, heavily influenced by the SNCOs who post here. A military needs folks who are long term, experienced, smart; and with status to supervise, educate and train those folks below them in rank - without looking down on them as "enlisted swine". Junior officers flunk that test at least in the "long term, experienced" part.

In large law firms, it's necessary to have lawyer or paralegal office managers - and, in litigation, that most important functionary, the litigation manager (a lawyer). They fit between the lawyers and the clerical staff (as to which, at least in the 60s, there was a definite gap - call it institutional culture or whatever). Those folks were not partners in the firm - and didn't expect to be. So, if effect, they were warrant officers, who had seen many young associates come and go - and not a few partners.

A smart young lawyer makes sure that he gets along with those folks - and that the "get along" is genuine on his part because they are experts at spotting phonies. They can, of course, screw you in a minute if they want to; but more important, they are a source of institutional memory and tips on the practical side of law.

I suppose analogous reasoning caused SF to go to WOs as more permanent team members and above, since Os and Team Sergeants tend to be rotated out and about.

So, yeah, your proposal has merit based on what little I know.

John T. Fishel
09-21-2009, 11:23 AM
Thanks - I personally think it was brilliant!!!!!!!:rolleyes: But it also had little or no chance of being adopted because it ran afoul of the US military perception/culture at the time and of the ESAF military culture. What made it doable with the ESAF, IMO, is that it could have been bent to meet their cultural perceptions. Unfortunately, I was never in a position to find a champion I could convince to take it up. My bosses in the ESAF Assessment team would have felt (my belief or perhaps excuse) that it was too radical and/or they were not willling to expend the political capital to make it happen after Wag's try at using junior officers and an OCS.

Cheers

JohnT

PS I like your lawfirm analogy. Works for a large element of the university as well.

slapout9
09-21-2009, 01:40 PM
Or you could do it like a police department and just abolish the difference. Everybody starts as an officer. Everybody should start as a soldier and as you gain experience your training and education is based upon what you are going to do for the organization. Not some idea that you are an officer and a gentleman and everybody else is some how a lesser being;) Thats bad for the system, it causes Bifurcation right from the start.....you want Unification right from the start.:eek: Of course John T. is right... this ain't gonna happen.

sgmgrumpy
12-22-2009, 10:33 PM
This documentary is airring again Wed Dec 23rd at 3PM EST again. A very well put together documentary. Period covered from early 1980s up through the 2008 cartel wars. A few narratives by current AFO Task Force members.


In the late 1980s the Arellano-Felix brothers take over the Tijuana Cartel. Using a network of tunnels, modified cars, boats and planes they flood the US with billions of dollars worth of drugs; quickly establishing themselves as the worlds largest smugglers of cocaine. To protect this business the brothers recruit and train an army of American gang bangers. When rival cartels attempt to muscle in on their business the result is a war that claims thousands of lives. Mexican and US law enforcement join forces to take the Brothers down but they're powerless to stop a wave of violence engulfing Tijuana.



http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/series/inside/4551/Overview#tab-Overview

jmm99
01-11-2010, 06:34 PM
on successes in Colombia, What Afghanistan Can Learn from Colombia (http://www.american.com/archive/2010/january/what-afghanistan-can-learn-from-colombia) (linked from SWJBlog (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=90866#post90866)).

He cites as a resource on Colombia the CSIS report, Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State: Lessons from Colombia (http://csis.org/files/publication/090918_DeShazo_CounteringThreats_Web.pdf) (Sep 2009).

What I glean from this:

1. A bi-lateral financial effort (vs the multi-lateral effort in Astan), with the HN supplying a much greater part of the effort (e.g., US funding over 2000-2008 was $4.8B, Colombia spent that much in 2003 alone - CSIS p.45 pdf).

2. A small-footprint FID effort (measured in the 100s of US advisors, who did just that) by the AN.

3. The HN took the lead in developing the political effort and providing for local governance and security (e.g., formation of some 600 platoons of home guard units - folks who would have been drafted into the army, but who were allowed to serve in their home towns).

As to application of Colombia to Astan (particularly with respect to the political side of the ledger) - ???

Regards

Mike

davidbfpo
01-17-2010, 10:25 AM
Not caught any report like this before; with this sub-title: After 40 years, Washington is quietly giving up on a futile battle that has spread corruption and destroyed thousands of lives.

Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-waves-white-flag-in-disastrous-war-on-drugs-1870218.html

Starts with:
After 40 years of defeat and failure, America's "war on drugs" is being buried in the same fashion as it was born – amid bloodshed, confusion, corruption and scandal.Ends with:
This year should be the year that common sense vanquishes the mailed fist in an unwinnable war against an invisible enemy.

Is this reporting echoed in the USA?

Bill Moore
01-17-2010, 04:48 PM
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/index.htm

Found the article to be excessively bias and inaccurate. Whether we continue to call our efforts against the cartels a war or not is up for debate, but we will and are continuing to disrupt their activities. All this reporter had to do is investigate numerous official open source sites to see where the U.S. was providing assistance. A set back in one one or two countries (assuming this reporting was accurate) hardly represents a retreat.

Within the U.S. there is a growing movement to transform our criminalization approach for users to managing it as a health problem. In turn that should lessen the pressure on our over crowded prisons and court systems, and who knows it may actually work better. However, overseas I don't see any sign of substantial policy change. Nor do I see how we could with the now clear linkages between terrorism and the drug trade. Seems we have an intractable problem where we're darned if we do and darned if we don't attack it.

jmm99
01-17-2010, 07:16 PM
No tears at dumping the word "war" and calling it something else. The two aspects of it are obvious, Supply and Demand. Even if the US governments (Federal and States) took over the Demand side (as they have in the area of booze), efforts to interdict illegal Supply side activities would still have to exist.

Regards

Mike

bourbon
01-20-2010, 04:33 PM
Is this reporting echoed in the USA?
The closest that I have seen recently is this:

Saving Mexico (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704254604574614230731506644.html), by David Luhnow. The Wall Street Journal, December 26, 2009.

To weaken the cartels, some argue the U.S. should legalize marijuana, let cocaine pass through the Caribbean and take the profit motive out of the drug trade

bourbon
01-20-2010, 05:48 PM
Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-waves-white-flag-in-disastrous-war-on-drugs-1870218.html
From the article:

"Prepare to shed a tear over the loss of revenue that eventual decriminalisation of narcotics could bring to the traffickers, large and small, and to the contractors who have been making good money building and running the new prisons.."
...and the loss of liquidity drug trafficking brings to the global economy; or the significant contribution to GDP narcotics production and trafficking brings to developing countries which far eclipses foreign aid received.

All of which is in part, and I hope I am wrong here, why we are not likely to see legalization anytime soon.

The following anecdote is a passage from the epilogue to retired Customs and DEA agent Robert Mazur’s book The Infiltrator: My Secret Life Inside the Dirty Banks Behind Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2009). The book tells of Mazur’s undercover role as a money launderer in what would become Operation C-Chase, an incredibly successful undercover law enforcement operation in the late 1980’s.
The conversation is with an officer of the Latin American division to the infamous Bank of Credit and Commerce International which Mazur had successfully penetrated:

Regine’s nightclub, Miami
2:00 A.M., September 3, 1988

As our night on the town was coming to a close and Scotch had loosened Bilgrami’s tongue, he said, “Bob, do you know who the biggest money launderer is in the U.S.?”

“Who?” I shrugged, smiling.

“The Federal Reserve Bank. They are such hypocrites! They know that the Bank of the Republic in Bogota has a teller window known as the ‘the sinister window.’ Under Colombian rule, any citizen who has huge piles of cash can come to that window and anonymously exchange their U.S. dollars for Colombian pesos – no questions asked. This causes the central bank to accumulate palletloads of U.S. dollars that are shipped to the Federal Reserve and credited to the account of the Bank of the Republic—again, no questions asked. The people at the Federal Reserve aren’t idiots. They see this river of hundreds of millions in U.S. dollars being shipped to them from Colombia. They know what generates that cash. That’s drug money that has been smuggled from the U.S. and Europe to Colombia. The Federal Reserve takes that because its good economics for this country’s banking system. The Americans’ so-called War on Drugs is a sham.”

I was floored. If this was true, why were risking our lives?

Later research confirmed Bilgrami’s claim, and I had never felt more betrayed. For the first time, I questioned whether we’d been naïve to think we could make a difference.

- Mazur, pp. 339-340

Now, I must say that this is the only part in this book where Mazur offers an opinion on the war on drugs; and it cannot speak for his overall assessment of it. Rather, I believe this passage illustrates the economic complexity, if not underlying hypocrisy of the war on drugs (at least in the 1980’s). I do not know if this loophole with the Federal Reserve still exists today.

Mike Burgoyne
02-27-2010, 10:50 PM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/27/AR2010022700523.html

So can Santos keep Colombia on track? Has Colombia achieved irreversibility and institutionalization?

Chao

Mike

John T. Fishel
02-28-2010, 07:06 PM
Mike, this is indeed good news. consider the contrast between Uribe's reaction and Zelaya's or Chavez' and Morales. The point is that when faced with a Supreme Court decision Uribe agreed to step aside. Now, the test is whether his initiatives like CCAI have been/will be institutionalized by law. Colombia has plenty of talented and relatively honest politicians as well as the longest tradition of democratic transition in Latin America.

Cheers

JohnT

davidbfpo
04-01-2010, 10:47 PM
Our new columnist (Maria Carolina Latorre) charts the run-up to the Colmbian presidential election this year and where this may take the sometimes turbulent south American country.

Maybe of interest and glanced through - the comments made by readers are a serious "demolition job" on the author.

Link:http://www.progressonline.org.uk/columns/column.asp?c=381

John T. Fishel
04-02-2010, 01:04 PM
she, at least, did some serious research on the topic. Of the comments, only Juan Cabrera gives any indication that he actually knows what is going on in Colombia. His comes from personal experience. That said, recent academic research by Dr. Jennifer Holmes of the U of Texas at Dallas, indicates that with the increase of government presence there is a reduction of violence, Her research is focused on quantitative indicators disaggregated to the departmental level (tempered by in-country interviews).

Cheers

JohnT

bourbon
07-01-2010, 06:59 PM
Banks Financing Mexico Drug Gangs Admitted in Wells Fargo Deal (http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2010/06/28/bloomberg1376-L4QPS90UQVI901-6UNA840IM91QJGPBLBFL79TRP1.DTL#ixzz0sFUcyT00), Bloomberg News, 28 June 2010.

Wachovia admitted it didn't do enough to spot illicit funds in handling $378.4 billion for Mexican-currency-exchange houses from 2004 to 2007. That's the largest violation of the Bank Secrecy Act, an anti-money-laundering law, in U.S. history -- a sum equal to one-third of Mexico's current gross domestic product.

"Wachovia's blatant disregard for our banking laws gave international cocaine cartels a virtual carte blanche to finance their operations," says Jeffrey Sloman, the federal prosecutor who handled the case.

Large banks are protected from indictments by a variant of the too-big-to-fail theory.

Indicting a big bank could trigger a mad dash by investors to dump shares and cause panic in financial markets, says Jack Blum, a U.S. Senate investigator for 14 years and a consultant to international banks and brokerage firms on money laundering.

The theory is like a get-out-of-jail-free card for big banks, Blum says.

"There's no capacity to regulate or punish them because they're too big to be threatened with failure," Blum says. "They seem to be willing to do anything that improves their bottom line, until they're caught."

tequila
07-01-2010, 11:39 PM
Not sure why the institutions themselves should be indicted. My local BoA teller didn't sign off on a drug lord's transactions.

Criminal indictments against select account executives, OTOH, would do absolute wonders.

bourbon
07-07-2010, 02:03 PM
Ecuador police seize 100-foot narco-submarine being built secretly (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-ecuador-narco-sub-20100706,0,162212.story), by Chris Kraul. Los Angeles Times, July 6, 2010.

Police in Ecuador seized a 100-foot submarine being built by suspected drug traffickers capable of carrying a crew of six and 10 tons of cocaine on underwater voyages lasting up to 10 days — a "game changer" for U.S. anti-drug and border security efforts, officials said Monday.
.......
The craft was outfitted with a conning tower, a periscope, air conditioning and "scrubbers" to purify the air, and bunks for a maximum crew of six. But what set the craft apart from semi-submersible craft that drug traffickers have used for years was a complex ballast system that would have enabled it to dive as deep as 65 feet before surfacing.

An excellent 27min documentary on narcosubs (http://www.vbs.tv/narcosubs) was made by vbs.tv last summer; includes extensive interview with a Colombian Coast Guard officer and a former trafficker, and tours the Colombian Coast Guard's collection of captured semisubmersible's illustrating the evolution of these craft. In Spanish with English subtitles.

gute
08-15-2010, 03:14 AM
I did not see the show so I am unable to comment specifically on the show, but I can say that in my 18 years with DEA I have spent my time on the sources of supply and not the street junkies. But, that's our mission. Well, the mission sometimes changes from administrator - administrator. MET teams, RET teams, gangs, follow the money, priority targets, OCDETF, assets, SWBI, interdiction - WTF! So, you do it all.

I would assume that when one supports leglization they are talking personal use amounts and not care givers or distribution centers for any and everything. Meth especially is so distructive at whatever amounts, but I'm sure I'm preaching to the choir on that one.

I did a foreign stint from 2000 -2002 in Pakistan - ran a Pakistani vetted unit of 50+ military officers and police officials - like herding cats. I'm sure someone in there was ISI. IMO big waste of money. What the U.S. is experiencing with akistan right now and the GWOT is no big suprise to me.

Things have changed over the years, no doubt about it. I use to take things personally - aphathetic public, knob supervisors, lazy prosecutors, but learned that I all I can do is continue to be a good public servant, earn my paycheck, make it a job and not a crusade, and control only what I can control. Maybe that's referred to as growing up.

War on Drugs? Maybe when I first came on. I'm looking forward to the day when I don't do this anymore - that gives ya a pretty good idea what I think about the War on Drugs.

I'm done whining.

gute
08-15-2010, 04:49 AM
In my earlier post I did not address how we lost the war on drugs, well in my opinion it was changing stategies, political correctness, too many different federal agencies working dope, in fighting between federal agencies, and the fact we have a free society (freedom is good). There are many countries who deal with drug crimes much more harshly then we do and they do not have the problem we have.

Another thing I never quite understood is why the Drug Czar was not the DEA Administrator. Then again, I'm biased.

Not that I have all the answers, but if I ran the show and could get people on the same sheet of music (good luck) I would combine drug enforcement efforts at the federal level under the DEA. That would mean the ICE, ATF, FBI, etc working dope would work with the DEA everywhere. Again, I'm biased. Never happen. We tried in the 1990's with the Southwest Border Initiative - Customs, DEA, FBI, and USBP. DEA and Customs constantly argued over Title 21 authority and Bureau does not like to have their people answer to others.

At the local/state level I would deputize more officers so they can work across state borders and have the protections that I have as a federal agent. I have found over the years that state laws tend to be more restrictive when it comes to drug investigations i.e. use if search warrants, consenual recordings, use of tracking devices. One area the states seem to get it right is with wire taps - the title III law or maybe it's DOJ's policies need to change. Exhausting all avenues before getting a wire tap is time consuming and costly. Obviously so much can be gleaned from taps and the tap is quite effective at dismantling an organization. But, with the frequent use of the cell phone to C2 drug organizations it should be something that we do sooner then later. Of course the use of taps depends on federal district -federal district. It seems to be much easier to get one in New York then one in Oregon.

Going back to deputizing more locals - you have to have C2 or everyone is running around doin their own thing - kind of like now. Drug cops and their egos! Not that DEA is any better at then anyone else, but DEA should have oversight or C2. Remember I'm biased.

I've learned a lot over the years. I started off in Honolulu assigned to a plain clothes patrol unit patroling the China District because my DEA boss said I needed to learn from cops because they know how to talk to people. Well, I learned and had a blast. That's the perfect fit for a 23 year-old with a blue flame shooting out of his ass. I've seen it all until I go to work Monday.

If I'm coming off as an expert that was not my intention - I am far from it because if I were I would have solved this a long time ago. This is all my humble opinion.

Night gents.

bourbon
09-17-2010, 05:29 AM
Op-Ed: Follow the Dirty Money (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/13/opinion/13mazur.html), by Robert Mazur. The New York Times, 12 September 2010.

LAST month, a federal district judge approved a deal to allow Barclays, the British bank, to pay a $298 million fine for conducting transactions with Cuba, Iran, Libya, Myanmar and Sudan in violation of United States trade sanctions. Barclays was discovered to have systematically disguised the movement of hundreds of millions of dollars through wire transfers that were stripped of the critical information required by law that would have enabled the world to know that for more than 10 years the bank was moving huge sums of money for enemy governments. Yet all federal prosecutors wanted to settle the problem was a small piece of the action.

When Judge Emmet Sullivan of federal district court in Washington, who ultimately approved the deal with Barclays, asked the obvious question, “Why isn’t the government getting rough with these banks?” the remarkable response was that the government had investigated but couldn’t find anyone responsible.

How preposterous. Banks can commit crimes only through the acts of their employees. Federal law enforcement agencies are simply failing to systematically gather the intelligence they need to effectively monitor the crime.
The author served 27 years with IRS, Customs, and DEA; and spent several years undercover in the largest money laundering case in US history.

Bob's World
09-17-2010, 09:26 AM
Anyone else notice how similar our approach to Insurgency and/or terrorism is to our approach to drugs?

Step one: Declare a war on the problem.

Step two: The problem must be the supply, not the demand, so set out aggressively to defeat the supply.

Step three: Recognize that Demand is important, but still only put minor energy against that to avoid having to make any hard choices that affect yourself. Enforce 'rule of law' at home to criminalize and punish those who participate, but ignore why they participate and how changes in governance approaches could mitigate demand or change the destructive nature of the market that has been forced into illegal and often violent approaches through the denial of legal venues to operate.

Step four: Take the war against the Supply overseas and pick a couple of key states to focus your efforts in.

Step five: As problem continues to grow put more and more money, people and effort against eradicating supply in those key states.

Step six: Having "squeezed the balloon" adequately in key states, but not done anything to address demand, watch suppliers simply move to a different state and continue operations.

Step seven: Shift focus to new supply state and begin squeezing the balloon again.

Step eight: Repeat steps 1-7 as necessary, often returning to states where the problem was previously "defeated" until your national influence and economy begin to wane under the burden of direct and higher order effects.


One word: "Responsibility." Until governments are willing to take responsibility for the effects of poor governance, bad laws, and bad choices and instead are allowed to focus massive time, energy, blood and treasure attacking the naturally occurring effects of their causation, we are doomed to a downward spiraling do-loop on these issues.

Drug Dealers don't create the illegal drug problem, they exploit it for their economic gain.

Insurgents don't create insurgency, they exploit the condition of insurgency for their own purposes as well when and where governments fail to provide the type good governance that immunizes populaces against such movements.

Target Demand first (not to be confused with those who actually participate in the "market," but rather why the market exists); and mitigate the damaging effects of Supply while continuing to focus on Demand.

Entropy
09-17-2010, 06:09 PM
BW,

Yes, so true. The GWoD's is mostly a failure considering the billions spent.

slapout9
09-17-2010, 10:56 PM
One word: "Responsibility." Until governments are willing to take responsibility for the effects of poor governance, bad laws, and bad choices and instead are allowed to focus massive time, energy, blood and treasure attacking the naturally occurring effects of their causation, we are doomed to a downward spiraling do-loop on these issues.



You forgot step Zero, which is to make up some Bovine Excrement excuse to, go to step: one declare war, in the first place.

Classic John Boyd where you sew "menace,mistrust,and uncertainty" where there is none.

Bob's World
09-18-2010, 11:20 AM
You forgot step Zero, which is to make up some Bovine Excrement excuse to, go to step: one declare war, in the first place.

Classic John Boyd where you sew "menace,mistrust,and uncertainty" where there is none.

Theory A: Slap is John Boyd

Theory B: John Boyd has photos of Slap in a very compromising position...:D

But you are totally right that we do get into some crazy stuff, and once everyone buys in, then its not crazy anymore. Then when someone comes along with a rational postion it is what ends up sounding crazy in comparison.

carl
09-18-2010, 02:52 PM
Anyone else notice how similar our approach to Insurgency and/or terrorism is to our approach to drugs?

I think your eight step program (plus Slap's step zero) very well describes our 100 year war on drugs. It is a strain though to apply it to our small wars abroad.

Those small wars involve motivations like political ideology, religious zealotry, megalomania and interference by mischief making, malicious nation states. Drugs are a matter of people wanting to get high or get rich. That makes a very great difference.

Commander Reyes in the SWJ blog Plan Mexico post makes some recommendations, such as lightnening up on marijuana in Mexico, that will not be popular with American drug warriors. Does anyone know how widespread that opinion is in Mexico especially amongst the police and military? If Mexico were to reduce or eliminate the criminal penalties associated with marijuana, boy would that stimulate the bidding at imperial headquarters.

slapout9
09-18-2010, 04:32 PM
But you are totally right that we do get into some crazy stuff, and once everyone buys in, then its not crazy anymore. Then when someone comes along with a rational postion it is what ends up sounding crazy in comparison.

Yep, and that is what is happening to our country now, we are being destroyed morally.

Examples:

Would God have bailed out Wall Street?

Would God kill people and put them in jail for smoking some weeds?

Would God say 20 million unemployed people is OK with me?

Would God foreclose on the largest number of houses in history so that they could sit empty.... and people are left without proper shelter?

Would God bomb Iran?

Our National leadership of all parties and all positions are Moral cowards:mad:

Time for a song.
"What If God were One Of Us?"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B5P5vxf6IuQ&feature=related

bourbon
09-18-2010, 05:26 PM
Those small wars involve motivations like political ideology, religious zealotry, megalomania and interference by mischief making, malicious nation states. Drugs are a matter of people wanting to get high or get rich. That makes a very great difference.
As it applies to BW’s comparison, I believe the demand for drugs is analogous to the population’s willingness to support or tolerate the insurgency/ terrorist group.

Greed and desire to do drugs are motives just like political ideology, religious zealotry, or megalomania.

So if this were the SAT’s: the supply of drugs (to include dealers) is to the demand for drugs as the insurgency/terrorist group is to the population’s willingness to support or tolerate the insurgency/ terrorist group.

Bob's World
09-18-2010, 06:16 PM
My point is that insurgents don't cause insurgency, governments do.

The government creates the "demand", or what I call "conditions of insurgency" among the populace they govern when they fall short in a few critical, fundamental ways that Dr. Maslow identified long ago. When they cut the populace out of the loop in terms of granting them the right and authority to govern (become illegitimate in the eyes of the governed); when they apply the rule of law in a manner the populace perceives as unjust; when they formalize inequalities that treat certain segments of the populace worse than others as a matter of some status (race, religion, neighborhood, etc); and when they deny the populace trusted, legal, and certain means to make changes in government when necessary. This is DEMAND. it is Poor Governance. It is the Conditions of Insurgency.

Where there is Demand, there will be supply. Some leader will come along, and he will employ some ideology that speaks to the target audience, and he will create an insurgent organization to challenge the government. That is SUPPLY.

What does the Government do? It holds itself shameless and blameless, ignores the tremendous demand they are creating and the reasonably easy changes they could make that would quickly diminish demand; and instead they blame Supply, and they Attack Supply.

Now, supply must be dealt with, but only as a supporting effort to taking on Demand. Supply side economics do not work!

The U.S. Civil rights movement response (our nation's second greatest COIN effort) targeted Demand and passed and enforced the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

(For those wondering what number one is, no, not Iraq. Number one was coming together in the summer of 1787 to scrap the articles of confederation and produce the Constitution. That is one genius bit of COIN there.)

The recent success in Sri Lanka? Pure Supply-side. Demand is probably greater than ever, and a new supplier WILL step up. It is as inevitable as the turning of the tide.

We will never be good at COIN until we slap ourselves on the forehead and realize that Insurgents don't cause Insurgency, Governments do.

Similarly, Mr. Bin Laden is also in the Supply business. If one wants to find Demand they must go to U.S. Foreign Policy. If we want to defeat terrorism against the U.S. we must definitely manage the supply, but we must make that secondary to targeting Demand. Our current Supply side approach is quite arguably making Demand greater than ever, and that should scare people. What happens when AQ is defeated, but Demand is still there? The next group to come along may likely be way smarter and way more dangerous to our way of life than the current suppliers.

No, our war on Terror is way more like our war on Drugs than most realize.

slapout9
09-19-2010, 04:44 AM
We will never be good at COIN until we slap ourselves on the forehead and realize that Insurgents don't cause Insurgency, Governments do.



Exactly,and Governments do that by acting Immorally, by operating against the greater interest of the people that creates a gap for the insurgent to enter through.

JMA
09-20-2010, 08:02 AM
Yep, and that is what is happening to our country now, we are being destroyed morally.

Examples:

Would God have bailed out Wall Street?

Would God kill people and put them in jail for smoking some weeds?

Would God say 20 million unemployed people is OK with me?

Would God foreclose on the largest number of houses in history so that they could sit empty.... and people are left without proper shelter?

Would God bomb Iran?

Our National leadership of all parties and all positions are Moral cowards:mad:

Time for a song.
"What If God were One Of Us?"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B5P5vxf6IuQ&feature=related

The other side of the coin is whether God would tolerate madmen having nuclear weapons, genocide being planned and/or committed, whole nations being oppressed by ruthless dictators, people killing in his name, people growing/processing/distributing/selling drugs which destroy the lives of many thousands etc etc.

The most difficult question you can ask of the "everything is negotiable" generations is "what do you stand for". Long on criticism of the actions of others you at least stand for something they are merely empty skeletons.

I like this quote from Theodore Roosevelt - American 26th US President (1901-09), 1858-1919


It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; because there is not effort without error and shortcomings; but who does actually strive to do the deed; who knows the great enthusiasm, the great devotion, who spends himself in a worthy cause, who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement and who at the worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly. So that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.

Bob's World
09-20-2010, 10:41 AM
The nature of the deed matters; as does how one goes about it.

In the construct of "Ends-Ways-Means" Ways is by far the most important. Ends are broad and incredibly generic. In fact the US stated ends are so incredibly broad that we (with equally incredible hubris) declare them to be "Universal." Means are pretty fixed. We have DIME. Ways are the most interesting, here is where there is room for artistry of thought, for the fine-tuning of approach that can determine the success or failure of some operation or engagement. We argue too much about Means, and have determined that Ends (universal, so no need to adjust) and Ways (Nation building) are resolved questions, so now it is just a matter of who does it; with the easiest answer being "have the military do it" so thus the need to convert the military to a nation building force. Simple, right? Or maybe just scary in what is lost in the simplicity.

slapout9
09-20-2010, 01:05 PM
The other side of the coin is whether God would tolerate madmen having nuclear weapons, genocide being planned and/or committed, whole nations being oppressed by ruthless dictators, people killing in his name, people growing/processing/distributing/selling drugs which destroy the lives of many thousands etc etc.


I agree completely which is why answering the moral question is the most important.

As for quotes I like this quote from the Bible. "Fools go where Angels fear to tread."

Valin
09-26-2010, 05:39 PM
WSJ (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703384204575509732682999678.html)
JOSé DE CóRDOBA And DARCY CROWE
9/24/10


BOGOTA—Colombia's army killed the military leader of the country's communist guerrillas in a two-day battle that involved airstrikes against his jungle bunker, dealing a major blow to the four-decade insurgency, officials said Thursday.

Related:
How They Found Him (http://gizmodo.com/5647480/how-they-found-and-killed-one-of-bloodiest-narcoterrorist-in-the-world)

davidbfpo
09-26-2010, 06:41 PM
A very nice story, however well sourced I am sure others will be sceptical. Personally I think it is "smoke".

AdamG
12-20-2010, 04:08 PM
Special forces used helicopters to reach the remote Macarena mountain range, where they decorated a 82 foot (25 metre) tree with 2,000 lights.

The tree's lights are fitted with motion sensors, so that the festive offering is illuminated when rebels pass.

Banners reading: "Demobilise, at Christmas everything is possible" and "If Christmas can come to the jungle, you can come home" decorate the branches.

Rest of story and Youtube video here
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/colombia/8211354/Colombian-army-gives-militants-giant-jungle-Christmas-tree.html

AdamG
12-27-2010, 04:07 PM
WASHINGTON — The Drug Enforcement Administration has been transformed into a global intelligence organization with a reach that extends far beyond narcotics, and an eavesdropping operation so expansive it has to fend off foreign politicians who want to use it against their political enemies, according to secret diplomatic cables.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/world/26wikidrugs.html?_r=1

Sergeant T
12-28-2010, 03:14 PM
Interesting take on the problem. (http://www.ajc.com/health/portugals-drug-policy-pays-787954.html)


Now, the United States, which has waged a 40-year, $1 trillion war on drugs, is looking for answers in tiny Portugal, which is reaping the benefits of what once looked like a dangerous gamble. White House drug czar Gil Kerlikowske visited Portugal in September to learn about its drug reforms, and other countries — including Norway, Denmark, Australia and Peru — have taken interest, too.

"The disasters that were predicted by critics didn't happen," said University of Kent professor Alex Stevens, who has studied Portugal's program. "The answer was simple: Provide treatment."

AdamG
02-15-2011, 04:53 PM
The Colombian military has nabbed a sophisticated, 100-foot long submarine capable of transporting eight tons of cocaine to the coast of Mexico, authorities said Monday.

The fiberglass sub, which was seized in a jungle in Timbiqui, near the Colombia's southwestern Pacific coast, could carry a crew of four to six people, had two diesel engines and navigational equipment allowing it to remain fully submerged up to 30 feet below the surface of the Pacific Ocean, navy officials said.

It also had a 16 ½ foot periscope and an air-conditioner to keep the crew cool during the trip. Authorities estimated it cost about $2 million to build.



Read more: http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/2011/02/15/2011-02-15_colombian_military_seizes_fullysubmersible_100f oot_drug_sub_capable_of_holding_8.html#ixzz1E2zlvD q7

SWJ Blog
03-06-2011, 10:12 AM
Colombia Assuming Instructor Role for Other Militaries (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/colombia-assuming-instructor-r/)

Entry Excerpt:

Colombia Assuming Instructor Role for Other Militaries (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-colombia-mexico-pilots-20110306,0,5393523.story) by Chris Kraul, Los Angeles Times. BLUF: "We have a lot to learn from Colombia. We're now going through what they have experienced for the last 20 years," the 27-year-old Garcia said later of the drug-fueled violence plaguing Mexico. "What Colombian pilots know about night missions, flying over difficult terrain, and participating in joint task forces is invaluable to us."



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/03/colombia-assuming-instructor-r/) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
04-18-2011, 10:44 PM
Full title: 'The Farc Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of  'Raúl Reyes' is coming out next month and some here maybe interested.

The IISS advert:
This Strategic Dossier provides unique insights into the thinking and evolution of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). It is based on a study of the computer disks belonging to Luis Edgar Devía Silva (aka Raúl Reyes), head of FARC’s International Committee (COMINTER), that were seized by Colombian armed forces in a raid in March 2008 on Devía’s camp inside Ecuador.

It shows how FARC evolved from a small, autarkic and strategically irrelevant group into an insurgent movement which, fuelled by revenues from narcotics production, came close to jeopardising the survival of the Colombian state. A key part of FARC’s evolution was the development of an international strategy aimed at acquiring financial support, arms and political legitimacy. The dossier looks in detail at FARC’s relations with Venezuela and Ecuador.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/the-farc-files-venezuela-ecuador-and-the-secret-archive-of-ral-reyes/

In an email some more details:
In the early hours of 1 March 2008 Colombian forces launched Operation Phoenix, an assault on a jungle camp of the country's largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The operation killed one of the group's leading members - Luis Edgar Devía Silva, better known as 'Raúl Reyes' - and over 20 other FARC operatives and camp visitors.

Operation Phoenix plunged Colombia's diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Ecuador into crisis - and not only because the camp had been located almost 2km inside the latter's territory. Along with Reyes' body, Colombia retrieved a metal briefcase with eight data-storage devices holding an archive of sensitive FARC correspondence and documents. The government wasted no time in releasing selected FARC emails to the media, claiming they provided evidence of official Venezuelan and Ecuadorian complicity with the group.

The Colombian government subsequently obtained confirmation from the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) that the archive had not been manipulated following its capture and exploited the operational leads that it provided over the following months. However, the vast majority of the information that it contained remained classified. Until now.

Several months after Operation Phoenix, senior officials from the Colombian Ministry of Defence invited the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) to conduct an independent analysis of the material. IISS researchers were granted unrestricted access to the archive and, since then, have exercised sole control over the research and publication process and the nature of the conclusions reached.

(Mod's Note:It was this that prompted merging the threads).

AdamG
04-27-2011, 04:03 PM
Mr Bergman pointed out that so far, no drug submarines have been detected under the sea, but seizures of semi-submersibles have dropped dramatically in the past two years.

That could mean that traffickers have already made the switch to submarines - and that they are evading detection.

"For the analyst looking at emerging threats," Mr Bergman said, "when they see this precipitous drop in semi-submersibles and then the advent of these two submarines, there's a concern that's raised. What are we missing?"

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13141498

davidbfpo
05-15-2011, 09:04 PM
Full title: 'The Farc Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of  'Raúl Reyes' is now out, for details how to purchase:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/buy-strategic-dossiers-now/?entryid9=53640&q=0~FarC~

There is a detailed commentary by IISS's Nigel Inkster (ex-SIS) which is worth a read:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/the-farc-files-venezuela-ecuador-and-the-secret-archive-of-ral-reyes/executive-summary/

The launch was on May 10th and just noted (I am an IISS member).

Sergeant T
07-18-2011, 02:04 PM
In what is fundamentally a good sign, Scott's is expressing interest in entering the marijuana production business (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304665904576383832249741032.html).

Dayuhan
07-19-2011, 12:46 AM
The other side of the coin is whether God would tolerate madmen having nuclear weapons, genocide being planned and/or committed, whole nations being oppressed by ruthless dictators, people killing in his name, people growing/processing/distributing/selling drugs which destroy the lives of many thousands etc etc.

The most difficult question you can ask of the "everything is negotiable" generations is "what do you stand for". Long on criticism of the actions of others you at least stand for something they are merely empty skeletons.

I wouldn't know what God would or would not tolerate. If s/he is around at all (I wouldn't know that either), s/he seems to tolerate a great deal.

Fortunately we are not God, and the affairs of others are not ours to tolerate or negotiate. If we set out to reform the world we will accomplish nothing but our own exhaustion, bankruptcy, and collapse.

I agree with Mr Jones, a fairly unusual event. The War on Drugs is being fought against the wrong people, in the wrong places. The problem doesn't come from supply - from the "people growing/processing/distributing/selling drugs which destroy the lives of many thousands" - the problem starts with demand, with the people who seek the stuff out and pay money to get it. If the demand is there somebody will supply it. Users aren't "pushed" into drug use by suppliers, suppliers are "pulled" into the trade by an overwhelming financial incentive, produced by a demand we haven't the courage to address and by efforts to curtail supply that are only enough to impose an enormous risk premium on the trade, rendering it obscenely profitable. Dry up demand, supply is no longer a problem. Leave demand in place, and trying to control supply is like bailing with a sieve.

The problem isn't them, the problem is us. If we want to win the "War on Drugs", we have to bring it home, where the problem starts.

AdamG
07-30-2011, 03:02 AM
(Reuters) - Combined Honduran and U.S. naval forces recovered 2.5 metric tons of cocaine from a submarine intercepted on its way from Colombia to the United States, authorities said Thursday.

The drugs were on the vessel sunk off the Caribbean coast of Honduras around two weeks ago by its four-man crew after the coast guard caught up with the suspected traffickers.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/29/us-honduras-drugs-submarine-idUSTRE76S0HL20110729

SWJ Blog
09-27-2011, 01:02 AM
WTF: Is Colombia Losing Now? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/wtf-is-colombia-losing-now)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/wtf-is-colombia-losing-now) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

AdamG
10-01-2011, 06:04 PM
An interesting little small war going on right now...

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/09/30/MNKU1LC28O.DTL

Misifus
10-31-2011, 02:12 AM
This was just on the SWJ Blog feed from Foreign Affairs Journal. What a friggin' joke! Plan Colombia is nothing but a money pit failure. And now the same geniuses who put it in place want to couple it with the same geniuses who brought you "Hearts & Minds" and sissified Romeos in OIF and OEF? Is there no end to our stupidity?

More drugs are flowing into the US now than ever. While we would like to claim that it's a Mexico problem, the fact is that the Mexicans are just the transporting middle-men for the Colombians and their junkies in the US.

Link to cited article:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/27/plan_afghanistan_colombia

Bill Moore
10-31-2011, 03:38 AM
Is there no end to our stupidity?

If there is, I see no sign of it. Too many crack pots out there want to lobby through think tanks and various journals for failed models, whether it be Plan Columbia or the Operation in the Southern Philippines. Which I could find it on (I think it was removed from U-tube), but it was a General Officer from Columbia stating that they starting making progress against the FARC (not the narco trade) when they quit listening to the U.S. and started treated it like a war. Um? You mean waging a war like a war might actually work?

Of course with our very loose definition of success, I guess that means we can never lose. :D

davidbfpo
10-31-2011, 09:32 AM
I read the linked FP article and was staggered at the suggestion. Re-reading it today I found this, which confirms it is wishful thinking:
However, the United States should solicit a significant sharing of the burden from other countries, particularly from some of the wealthy Gulf countries, which have so much at stake in the region and have so far done so little to help.

These are the countries that to date, with one tiny exception, UAE SF, have not contributed to ISAF, like others "walked away" after the Soviet withdrawal and are still suspected to have insufficient control over donations to the 'cause'.

Barely credible IMHO.

Misifus
10-31-2011, 02:45 PM
I read the linked FP article... Thanks for posting the link and the correction. I meant FP and not FAJ in my post. I use them interchangeably sometimes. FAJ used to be balanced IMO, but now it appears to be just as Left as FP.

Misifus
10-31-2011, 03:02 PM
If there is, I see no sign of it. Too many crack pots out there want to lobby through think tanks and various journals for failed models, whether it be Plan Col[o]mbia or the Operation in the Southern Philippines. Which I could find it on (I think it was removed from U-tube), but it was a General Officer from Columbia stating that they starting making progress against the FARC (not the narco trade) when they quit listening to the U.S. and started treated it like a war...

Yes, there are many who think the El Salvador insurgency would have been defeated quicker had the US not gone in there to dictate nice guy tactics. As an example next door, Guatemala quashed its insurgency rather quickly once Gen. Rios Montt decided to kick the army out of the barracks and make them go do their job correctly.

You are correct that with the focus against FARC, and not the narco trade, that Colombia has made "progress." Leave the narcos alone and it is apparent how the violence reduces quickly. Indeed if President Calderon in Mexico brought the troops back into the barracks the violence in Mexico would decrease as well, with the exception of the Zetas that is until the other cartels wipe them out.

These are strategies of capitulation against the narcos. The capitulation to the narcos in Colombia is being sold as a "victory" of Plan Colombia when it is in fact a failure. Drugs flow freely from Colombia into Mexico now more than ever. So much for Plan Colombia.

davidbfpo
11-06-2011, 12:21 PM
Just in case missed:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15608811

davidbfpo
11-25-2011, 04:32 PM
An IISS Strategic Comment


The death of FARC rebel leader Alfonso Cano during a Colombian special forces raid on 4 November 2011 was the latest in a series of government successes against the country's largest left-wing insurgent group. A fascinating article republished here from local magazine Semana shows in rare detail how his death resulted from a well-planned and adventurous intelligence operation – involving officers infiltrating communities deep inside FARC territory, masquerading as shopkeepers, drivers and more.


The Semana article, which is based largely on interviews with some of the intelligence operatives involved in Operation Odyssey against Cano, may not tell the whole story. However, it shows in detail how intelligence, mostly human intelligence, built up over time and combined with well-planned military operations can transform counter-insurgency operations.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-17-2011/november/the-downfall-of-farc-leader-alfonso-cano/

Bill Moore
12-03-2011, 06:51 PM
Interesting article in SWJ round up today.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/us/officers-punished-for-supporting-eased-drug-laws.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ref=us

Police Officers Find That Dissent on Drug Laws May Come With a Price


If marijuana were legalized, Mr. Gonzalez acknowledges saying, the drug-related violence across the border in Mexico would cease. He then brought up an organization called Law Enforcement Against Prohibition that favors ending the war on drugs.

Those remarks, along with others expressing sympathy for illegal immigrants from Mexico, were passed along to the Border Patrol headquarters in Washington. After an investigation, a termination letter arrived that said Mr. Gonzalez held “personal views that were contrary to core characteristics of Border Patrol Agents, which are patriotism, dedication and esprit de corps.”

More than a little concerning that a view that doesn't support the failed war on drugs is viewed as non-patriotic. This is a way to guaruntee group think by prohibiting those on the front line to provide their insights on a policy that is not producing the desired results. I suspect the idiot who wrote this letter wasn't really interested in whether the drug war was working, but very interested in protecting their budget, and used patriotism as a Red Herring.

Strickland
01-29-2012, 04:09 PM
If Plan Colombia is not an operational model of successfully COIN that can be replicated, then it is a strategic policy model of success that should be replicated. If one reviews the process that was followed by the Clinton administration between Pastrana's initial call for a Marshall Plan for Colombia, and Clinton's appeal for Congressional support during the 2000 State of the Union Address, then one will discover a process that should be emulated by all future administrations working within divided government. The genius of Plan Colombia is not to be found in its operational successes or failures, but rather in the simple fact that it satisfied everyone in some manner - human rights advocates, tough on drugs folks, interventionists, non-interventionists, environmentalists (yes - they were pissed about spraying), SOUTHCOM, Congress, and most importantly - the Colombians. It was the policy that become something to everyone. It is the essence of good policy via compromise.

SWJ Blog
05-09-2012, 05:00 AM
Should U.S. Troops Fight the War on Drugs? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/should-us-troops-fight-the-war-on-drugs)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/should-us-troops-fight-the-war-on-drugs) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

bourbon
06-04-2012, 01:03 AM
Western banks 'reaping billions from Colombian cocaine trade' (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/02/western-banks-colombian-cocaine-trade?newsfeed=true), by Ed Vulliamy. The Guardian, 2 June 2012.

While cocaine production ravages countries in Central America, consumers in the US and Europe are helping developed economies grow rich from the profits, a study claims
The most far-reaching and detailed analysis to date of the drug economy in any country – in this case, Colombia – shows that 2.6% of the total street value of cocaine produced remains within the country, while a staggering 97.4% of profits are reaped by criminal syndicates, and laundered by banks, in first-world consuming countries.

"The story of who makes the money from Colombian cocaine is a metaphor for the disproportionate burden placed in every way on 'producing' nations like Colombia as a result of the prohibition of drugs," said one of the authors of the study, Alejandro Gaviria, launching its English edition last week.

Bill Moore
06-10-2012, 03:26 AM
An interesting series of articles enclosed to demonstrate growing trends and links between networks.

http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/09/justice/puerto-rico-drug-trafficking/index.html

Puerto Rico: A forgotten front in America's drug war?


But some analysts say a new trend may be pushing even more cargo containers, fishing boats and yachts with hidden compartments toward Puerto Rico's shores from South America (often by way of the Dominican Republic).

Faced with increased security at the Mexico-U.S. border, cartels may be searching for other trafficking routes, some analysts and officials speculate.

"If you attack one front, if you put your resources there, they search for other avenues, and the Caribbean is one of those avenues," says Pedro A. Velez Baerga, an attorney and former deputy U.S. Marshal in Puerto Rico.

http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/09/us/mexican-cartels-small-town-usa/index.html

In small-town USA, business as usual for Mexican cartels


News of cartel machinations are common in cities near the border, such as Phoenix, and the far-flung drug hubs of New York, Chicago or Atlanta, but smaller towns bring business, too. In unsuspecting suburbs and rural areas, police are increasingly finding drugs, guns and money they can trace back to Mexican drug organizations.


In 2009 and 2010, the center reported, cartels operated in 1,286 U.S. cities, more than five times the number reported in 2008. The center named only 50 cities in 2006.


It's a microcosm of what's happening in the country, as cartels quietly begin operating anywhere that lends them a competitive advantage in a market that contains about 4 percent of the world's population yet consumes roughly two-thirds of its illegal drugs.

The core of the problem is market demand. Drilling down another level there is a serious problem with our culture that somehow promotes addictive behavior whether it is video games, smoking, junk food, and of course drugs. More and more people are in search of a quick pleasure hit, and are void of values to guide their life. And we want to promote our culture globally?

http://www.capradio.org/news/npr/story?storyid=154576485#.T9O1rRERqYI.twitter

Mexicans Want New Approach To Bloody Drug War


Pena Nieto's strategy — targeting criminal violence over pursuing and arresting capos — would be more popular than the current approach.

"People don't care about the drugs; people don't care about the narcos. It's the violence associated with the drugs," says Carlos Seoane, vice president for the security firm Pinkerton Consulting and Investigations in Mexico. There's a name for this strategy, he says — crime management.

"So what has to be the message?" Seoane continues. "If you go over this line we will fight you until we eliminate you. We can do business as long as there are no killings, no shootings, everything quiet like it was in the past."

An interesting discussion, and if the political situation actually drives this course of action after the election it will have major implications for our current strategy.

http://www.krgv.com/news/increase-expected-in-chinese-illegal-immigrants-crossing-into-rgv/

Increase Expected in Chinese Illegal Immigrants Crossing into RGV


He says the Zetas and Chinese mafia have a drug trafficking network that runs through Latin America. U.S. drug agents and customs officers intercepted 40-foot containers filled with a highly dangerous and addictive drug used to make methamphetamine. The containers were headed to the Zetas in Belize. The seizure is reportedly worth $10 billion.

"If the intelligence continues to show the Chinese are partnering with the Zetas, you're going to see an obvious increase in the number of Chinese coming across," says Jordan.

The U.S. State Department's 2010 human trafficking report states the Zetas have the biggest human trafficking network in the world transporting Asians. They charge up to $70,000 or more per person. According to Jordan, human trafficking is the cartels' second biggest moneymaker.

AdamG
06-15-2012, 06:05 PM
American travelers to Mexico should beware of possible violent retaliation for this week's arrest of alleged Zetas drug cartel associates and family members inside the U.S., the U.S. State Department has warned.

http://news.yahoo.com/travel-warning-mexico-possible-violent-retaliation-against-americans-143445504--abc-news-topstories.html;_ylt=AsXTiqfUpFCq.BueiN_OWfemWot4; _ylu=X3oDMTUwYTloazZuBGNjb2RlA2N0LmMEbWl0A0FydGljb GUgTW9zdCBQb3B1bGFyBHBrZwNhNTk2OGQ0Zi1lZjczLTNiZDM tOWNlYi04ZWI0ZjM2YzM3M2EEcG9zAzQEc2VjA01lZGlhQkxpc 3RNaXhlZE1vc3RQb3B1bGFyQ0FUZW1wBHZlcgM4MTViMjEyMS1 iNTgwLTExZTEtYjVlZi01MGQ3MGJmZGQwZjg-;_ylg=X3oDMTNiZnJxMG03BGludGwDdXMEbGFuZwNlbi11cwRw c3RhaWQDMzZiODdjNWQtODVmOC0zOGUyLTgyZjEtZmRhNzViYz BiMTBjBHBzdGNhdANwb2xpdGljc3xkZXN0aW5hdGlvbjIwMTIE cHQDc3RvcnlwYWdl;_ylv=3

davidbfpo
07-03-2012, 07:47 PM
Not strictly on topic, but fits here.


The World Drugs report for 2012 is out and it shows that 230 million people around the world - 1 in 20 of us - took illicit drugs in the last year. The report also says that problem drug users, mainly heroin - and cocaine-dependent people number about 27 million, roughly 0.6% of the world adult population. That's 1 in every 200 people. The report is published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and is full of fascinating stats - we've extracted some of the key ones for you in this visualisation, created by Andy Cotgreave of Tableau. Click on the map to see how drug use changes around the world.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/interactive/2012/jul/02/drug-use-map-world

Not sure whether the UNODC has the best data.

davidbfpo
08-18-2012, 09:01 PM
Hat tip to AbuM for raising this issue and citing Colombia as an example:
The argument essentially goes that, as weapon power has increased exponentially in past millennia, so too has the density of combatants in the field appeared to decrease substantially. The relationship here is obvious, but also obviously not one-sided. The increased lethality of weapons raises the risk of concentrated formations, but additionally, technological advances in logistics, battlefield mobility and communications enable more dispersed formations as well.

Link:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2012/08/firepower-and-dispersal.html

AbuM cites a Colombian paper, which is in Spanish and defeats Google Translator.

AdamG
09-10-2012, 08:44 PM
Narco u-boat update


After years of detecting these craft in the less trafficked Pacific Ocean, officials have seen a spike in their use in the Caribbean over the last year. American authorities have discovered at least three models of a new and sophisticated drug-trafficking submarine capable of traveling completely underwater from South America to the coast of the United States.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/world/americas/drug-smugglers-pose-underwater-challenge-in-caribbean.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all

Bill Moore
12-16-2012, 06:17 PM
http://www.alternet.org/take-drug-warriors-9-amazing-signs-were-heading-towards-sane-drug-policy?page=0%2C0

Take That, Drug Warriors! 9 Amazing Signs We're Heading Towards Sane Drug Policy


We are at a paradoxical moment in our country. We are clearly moving in the right direction, toward a more rational drug policy based on science, compassion, health and human rights. But we need to step up our efforts, grow our numbers, and continue to win hearts and minds because the casualties from the war continue to mount every day. If the people lead, the leaders will follow.

An opinion. I agree the trend where both citizens and officials are challenging the rationale behind the way we're waging this war is increasing and that is a good thing. On SWJ there have been several articles and posts faulting our national leadership for not holding our generals accountable for failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, but those failures pale in comparison to our failures in the "war on drugs", and again no one is held accountable. The strategy for the so called war has never been seriously questioned. We just keep marching on.

Bill Moore
03-31-2013, 12:47 AM
http://news.yahoo.com/kansas-couple-indoor-gardening-prompted-pot-raid-182449463.html


Two former CIA employees whose Kansas home was fruitlessly searched for marijuana during a two-state drug sweep claim they were illegally targeted, possibly because they had bought indoor growing supplies to raise vegetables.


"If this can happen to us and we are educated and have reasonable resources, how does somebody who maybe hasn't led a perfect life supposed to be free in this country?" Adlynn Harte said in an interview Friday.


When law enforcement arrived, the family had just six plants — three tomato plants, one melon plant and two butternut squash plants — growing in the basement, Harte said.

The suit also said deputies "made rude comments" and implied their son was using marijuana. A drug-sniffing dog was brought in to help, but deputies ultimately left after providing a receipt stating, "No items taken."

The war on marijuana drugs within our borders is largely stupid waste of resources, especially when it is directed aganist Ma and Pa shops growing their own marijuana (not organized crime promoting violence). However, when the police raid a family home based on unfounded suspicions of growing marijuana it is border line criminal. If raids like this are permited it is a much greater threat to our freedoms than someone growing marijuana in their house, much less growing tomatoes. If the cops had them under surveillance for months and knew a family lived there, why did they did need to conduct a SWAT like raid on the house instead of knocking on the door and serving a warrant? Our police in many respects have gotten out of control with these tactics. These tactics were designed for and are appropriate for hard targets, but not for to responding to suspected minor violations of the law.

If my family was terrorified by the police in this way without cause I would be seeking justice also. A law suit is one method of doing so, but heads would have to roll in this case to get satisfaction. The detective who submitted the warrant for approval to the judge who approved it need to be fired.

http://www.city-data.com/crime/crime-Leawood-Kansas.html

After reviewing the crime rate in Leawood I'm beginning to think the poor SWAT team is bored and looking for an excuse to kick in a door.

bourbon
03-31-2013, 01:14 PM
I fear that civil asset forfeiture is driving a lot of this. I think forfeiture funds have become a significant source of budgetary funding for police departments in many states, creating incentives to seize property from the criminal low-hanging fruit (Ma and Pa Stoner).

The proliferation of SWAT teams across our country is also troublesome. At the least – on a practical level – can these smaller departments devote adequate resources to train and equip these units?

Is there a connection between the boom in civil asset forfeiture since the 80's/90's and the proliferation of SWAT units?

davidbfpo
03-31-2013, 02:55 PM
This level of LE activity has been a topic here before, IIRC over the use of SWAT teams, but the relevant thread eludes me.

Perhaps Erich Simmers will be able to comment? He has an interest in SWAT teams, albeit in a different context - on campus.

As this raid was part of two-state LE operation one wonders whether this was Leawood PD's only contribution?

The unstated implication is that Leawood PD relied on information from a gardening supplier's records; I would suggest another source is a call to Crimestoppers, quite possibly by a neighbour, someone with a grudge and of a classic "2+2+100".

Incidentally Leawood PD have an online public survey:http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/JSN6D85

J Wolfsberger
04-07-2013, 02:44 PM
I fear that civil asset forfeiture is driving a lot of this. I think forfeiture funds have become a significant source of budgetary funding for police departments in many states, creating incentives to seize property from the criminal low-hanging fruit (Ma and Pa Stoner).

The proliferation of SWAT teams across our country is also troublesome. At the least – on a practical level – can these smaller departments devote adequate resources to train and equip these units?

Is there a connection between the boom in civil asset forfeiture since the 80's/90's and the proliferation of SWAT units?

After several decades, most people have wised up to the DUI scam. That's left a large hole in the operating budget for a lot of municipalities. Civil Asset Forfeiture does a nice job of closing that. Add in the need to justify all that expense for training a SWAT team, and the temptation to over react in order to over use in order to generate funds would be unbearable to an average person.

Fortunately, all our politicians are above average, and thus have the integrity and self discipline not to engage in such ... activities.

slapout9
04-09-2013, 04:38 AM
Link to "Insanity: Four Decades Of US Counter Drug Strategy"

http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1143