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patmc
08-24-2010, 02:45 PM
In light of the first US Soldier KIA after the withdrawal of US Army Brigade "Combat" Teams and the reflagging of the "Advise and Assist" Brigades, I thought about something on my ride in to work today. With Operation Iraqi Freedom over/ending, will our troops still be reckognized for their service in a combat environment?

The names have changed, but US forces will still be targetted by the enemy and will engage in kinetic operations, whether offensive or defensive. Will US forces deployed to Operation New Dawn be eligible for combat awards? Will infantrymen be eligibile for CIBs, everyone else CABs? Is a wound eligible for the Purple Heart? I don't know the rules for training/advising operations, so if anyone knows please let me know. If US trainers or advisors are wounded in a foreign nation where combat is not declared, are they considered combat actions? If combat is over, is combat over?

I am glad and proud that the US has been able to draw down, but I worry that changing names and saying "combat is over" has a dangerous tendency to bite back down the road. I served in OIF IV, 2005-2006, when we prematurely tried to hand the country back to the Iraqis. This time the transition seems to be much smoother and the Iraqis more ready and willing to step up. I just hope we didn't take the training wheels off too soon and the bike falls over.

sullygoarmy
09-28-2010, 07:23 PM
I'm currently in the brigade responsible for Baghdad and was here during the "end of combat operations". The funny thing is we ended up in more direct fire engagements post 1 September than are previous 9 months in theater. Soldiers are still getting wounded and receiving Purple Hearts. IEDs continue to be the biggest threat and, for those who earn them, Soldiers receive CIBs/CABs. We still draw hostile fire pay and the enemy is doing everything they can to inflict harm, regardless of the date. Apparently they never received the memo to stop their combat operations on 1 September.

I would argue that combat operations have not ended. Instead, the focus has shifted from combat operations to the primary mission being Advise and Assist. We are a little different, however, since we trained as, were resourced for, and arrived in theater as an AAB almost a year ago. Our mission has always been advise and assist since day 1. For us, 1 September looked like every other day we've been in theater, working with our ISF partners.

What I think we did by declaring the end of combat operations, however, was to open an information operations seam for the enemy to exploit. Every firefight, every wounded U.S. Soldier, contradicts the misleading statement that combat operations are at an end.

Tom Odom
09-29-2010, 12:45 PM
I'm currently in the brigade responsible for Baghdad and was here during the "end of combat operations". The funny thing is we ended up in more direct fire engagements post 1 September than are previous 9 months in theater. Soldiers are still getting wounded and receiving Purple Hearts. IEDs continue to be the biggest threat and, for those who earn them, Soldiers receive CIBs/CABs. We still draw hostile fire pay and the enemy is doing everything they can to inflict harm, regardless of the date. Apparently they never received the memo to stop their combat operations on 1 September.

I would argue that combat operations have not ended. Instead, the focus has shifted from combat operations to the primary mission being Advise and Assist. We are a little different, however, since we trained as, were resourced for, and arrived in theater as an AAB almost a year ago. Our mission has always been advise and assist since day 1. For us, 1 September looked like every other day we've been in theater, working with our ISF partners.

What I think we did by declaring the end of combat operations, however, was to open an information operations seam for the enemy to exploit. Every firefight, every wounded U.S. Soldier, contradicts the misleading statement that combat operations are at an end.

Sully

Great to hear from you!

I would agree with your point on the IO aspects. Much has been driven by the artificialty of the SA and its timetable, one that the Iraqis pay lip service to even as they use it.

Best regards
Tom

Bob's World
09-29-2010, 01:44 PM
Far better to have declared that the "war" is over, but that the mission continues, and that that mission will indeed include combat operations.

We do not want to define our endstate as total peace with no combat going on, or we could be there another 10 years. Rather at that point where we have raised Iraqi capacity and reduced the threat to the point where they meet. Where our capacity is no longer required and we can step aside.

Granted, even then there may be some areas or certain periods where threats surge beyond Iraqi capacity, but that by an large they have it and there mission continues as well.

I think we cling to terms like "war" and "combat" in the military because our guys are out there doing hard, dangerous work and we want to get full credit. At some point you just have to be a quiet professional and realize not everyone is going to understand what you do, why you do it, or how dangerous it actually is. You just do it because its your mission and you understand that strategically its better not to oversell these things. It's only an IO seam if you make it one.

I hate to think about how many soldiers were killed in WWII doing "mop-up" operations after MacArthur had declared a place "secured."

sullygoarmy
10-01-2010, 09:54 AM
Tom,
Great to hear from you too. Our Brigade HQs is now co-located in the same building as the division HQs...some interesting dynamics there that's for sure! Not much as changed inside VBC from when you were here last although outside the wire lots has happened.

Bob, I agree with you with regards to your comment in World War Two. Excellent example.

sullygoarmy
01-23-2011, 04:06 PM
Mods Note:Copied here from the MRAP thread and is very appropriate.

I'm a day late on this thread but I'll throw my $.02 worth.

We just left as the only maneuver brigade in all of Baghdad. We partnered with 6 Iraqi Divisions (4 IA and 2 FP) and with the district level Iraqi Police. Other than the SF partnerships, we worked with nearly every ISF unit in Baghdad Province. For our Commander to maintain his relationships with the ISF division commanders, we traveled nearly every day. Blackhawk movement was preferred when 1) the weather allowed it, 2) there were secure LZs available at the ISF compound and 3) when birds were available. As the only maneuver Brigade in Baghdad, our Brigade Commander did not have his own dedicated blackhawks so we were never guaranteed a ride.

We therefore spent a good deal to time on the road moving from FOB to JSS to ISF division HQs. Our vehicle composition depended on the route and threat. We had both up-armored HMMWVs and MRAPs available and we used both sets during the deployment.

While I agree with all the tenets through this thread about having boots on the ground, the importance of dismounted patrolling and securing key areas to ensure IEDs are minimized, how do you do that when you do not own the battlespace? The ISF owned the battlespace - we were their supporting partners. The funny thing was the Iraqi division commanders started acting like two-star generals and owning their own areas of operation. We could not conduct unilateral operations - everything was partnered. We could not send a US only dismounted patrol to look for IEDs, and with all the roadways in Baghdad, that would be impossible. Instead we had to coordinate our C-IED efforts with our Iraqi partners and did everything we could to conduct combined patrols, operations, raids and intelligence collection to ensure we were integrated with the land owners: the Iraqi Divisions.

Our battalions/squadron maintained relations with all the Iraqi Divisions and most of the Iraqi Brigade HQs. In order to maintain freedom of movement, the MRAPs were critical assets to maintain our partnership with the ISF. We could not fly everywhere, we could not walk across Baghdad: our Soldiers had to drive.

As I mentioned before, the vehicle type depended on the route. MRAPs were not pratical going through the Mulhallahs or along the canal roads. The damage they caused to the fledgling infrastructure along with their lack of maneuverability in the tight streets limited their uses for those missions. However, moving along better roads or from base to base, MRAPs were the preferred choice. I saw countless Soldiers walk away from IED hits which would have destroyed up-armored HMMWVs and kill those inside.

We worked with our ISF partners to conducted intel-driven raids to mitigate the IED networks. The sad part is, however, the politically established safe havens within Baghdad itself (Sadr City, Shulla, etc) severely limited conventional partnered operations. Even the SF guys had a hard time getting access since the ISF divisions owned the battlespace and started to crack down on Special Operations missions in their OE. If the SF wanted access, they had to work through us to work through our partners. Again, the Iraqis were in the lead, not us. Obviously this is not the case with Afghanistan and the ANA...but that should be the goal.

Of course I've only talked about our maneuver battalions. Everyone from our Transition Teams, Route Clearance Teams, logistic convoys and escorts ran MRAPs a majority of the time as well.

I'd offer to JMA that he's obviously not familiar with U.S. forces. While we would always request helicopter lift assets, the sad fact of the matter is there is never enough resources, even for the U.S. military. Iraq has switched roles with Afghanistan as the "forgotten war" resulting in a shortage of assets. Even in the land of plenty, there will never be enough lift assets to support all the movement requests needed. Air is the best option, but often is the most unpredictable.

Additionally, I'd offer that you can no longer tell the difference (for good or worse) between an infantryman or tanker, especially in the heavy brigades. Our Soldiers and leaders performed the same missions regardless of their occupational specialty. At the battalion level, we no longer have pure armor or mech infantry anymore. 10 years of combat has blurred the lines between combat arms troopers.

Not sure how much time you have deployed but I'd offer Cav Guy has a heck of a lot of time and experience having "been there and done that" and recently.

The MRAP is a valuable tool in our kitbag and should not be discounted. The need for increased MRAPs in the states for drivers training is critical - we suffered from a shortage of properly licensed drivers due to the limited training opportunities and it plagued us through most of the deployment. Everything is METT-T dependent but the need for MRAPs will not go away. It is another tool in the kitbag both leaders and Soldiers need to maintain proficiency with.

Sully Out!