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Bob's World
08-24-2010, 03:06 PM
In my own work on Insurgency I have come over time to the postion that Insurgency is much more accurately a condition rooted in the perceptions of a populace towards its governance than it is any specific family of actions or organizations. How those conditions manifest is a choice made by the rebelling segments of the populace; but the causation itself is rooted in the governance. This is why one may well have several pockets of subversion and insurgency with unique views on ideology, tactics, goals, etc all orbiting about one hub of "poor governance"

The goal of this thread is to look at the relative merits of Violent vs. Non-Violent approaches on the part of the insurgent.

There is a body of work that makes a strong case for the smart insurgent (who I hope are reading this thread) to abandon violent approaches and to embrace non-violent apporaches instead. Not just because we seek greater stability and security for the populaces that are affected by the condition of insurgency, but because the U.S. stands very much for the principle of "good governance."

Governments rarely change of their own accord, and often it is necessary for the populace to force change upon their government. While current "war-based" COIN is rooted in preserving the current government and convincing the populace to stand down; suggested here is that it may well be far more effective to instead focus on encouraging those same popualces to take non-violent approaches, while at the same time encouraging those poor governances to listen to their people and evolve.

I will post a variety of products to support this premise. This is a debate that needs to take place. We have been trapped by our doctrine and definitions into narrow lanes that tend to cast violence as warfare, and all populace violence as insurgency. I hope to explore new, and more effective ways to characterize these activities as a part of this thread as well.

Bob's World
08-24-2010, 03:29 PM
What is Civil Resistance?

"The waging of determined conflict by strong forms of nonviolent action, especially against determined and resourceful opponents who may respond with repression."
---G. Sharp

Has this approach been applied over the past century, if so, where?

Indians, ‘20s-40s
Salvadorans, ‘44
African-Americans, ’60s
Poles, ‘70s-’80s
Czechs/Slovaks, ‘80s
Chileans, ‘85-’88
Filipinos, ‘86
East Germans, ‘89
Mongolians, ‘90
Malians, 91
Russians, ‘91
South Africans, 92
Serbs, ‘00
Georgians, ‘03
Ukrainians, ’04
Lebanese, ‘05


What are some examples of non-violent approaches to Poor Governance?

I. Nonviolent protest and persuasion
Petitions, wearing symbols, vigils, marches, humorous skits, walk-outs, renouncing honors, mock awards

II. Non-cooperation
Boycotts, strikes, social ostracism, stay-at-homes, refusal to pay taxes, civil disobedience

III. Nonviolent Intervention
Hunger strikes, sit-ins, alternative institutions, blockades


What is the track record of taking such approaches?

Study comparing 323 violent and NV campaigns, 1900-2006, found that NV campaigns succeeded 53% of the time, compared to 26% success rate for armed struggles (Stephan/Chenoweth)

Why: Participation, Pressure, Legitimacy

50/67 transitions from authoritarianism from 1970-2005 driven by bottom-up nonviolent resistance (Freedom House, How Freedom is Won)

Joske
08-24-2010, 05:15 PM
Here are some thoughts i have have about this subjects and your theories about them.

-To start of one of the points of critique i have towards your insurgency model is that you view insurgency as a product of bad governance which causes people to rise up against the government.
My view on the issue is that you can distinguish a two-part struggle within an insurgency (or rebellion or whatever you want to call it).
You got the actual war or conflict part which is fought between two or more parties, whose goals or views are total opposites of each other and thus require military force so that one side can impose his will on the other party.
And then you got the part of people rising up against the government (or some other actor), and this part is formed thanks to bad governance and not thanks to opposing political views.
So essentially i view insurgency as divided between the need of a political group to impose its political views on another group who has political views who are entirely different from those of the first group.
And in this process the first group enlist the help of the populance or atleast a part of the populance by attacking the bad governance of the opposing group and promising them good governance.

-Now about the point of the Non-violent completion of political goals, what about information campaigns that can sway the opinions of the population or the international community.
here's a potential example of this kind of aproach (the palestine-israel issue is full of examples of this sort of aproach)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exodus_(ship)
another example could be the gaza flotilla or the Al-Durrah incident, wikileaks maybe?

-a possible counterpoint is of course that you would need more popular support to conduct mass-movement prostests then you would need to conduct a guerilla/terror campaign (albeit it might not be too succesfull) and thus it might not be too popular with certain groups.

So i hope you suceeded in comprehending what i was trying to say, and i hope i made a usefull contribution to the debate.

Bob's World
08-24-2010, 05:47 PM
Joske,

Excellent points, and welcome to the SWJ!

All successful insurgencies require popular support; infact I see this as one of the key distinguishing points between what I would consider true conditions of insurgency and some other "less noble" form of populace-based turmoil. A criminal movement is profit motivated, and may morph into an insurgency, but is not one in of itself. Mexico is not, I believe, yet faced with insurgency from this element. Neither is a power-based grab, a Colonel who leads his BN to the capital building and grabs power, or some group seekin to grab control of some valuable resource for the money and power it provides.

As to information, effective use of information is essential for both preventing and promoting insurgency. The actions of the party will always be their loudest "voice"; all the more reason for the insurgent to employ non-violent tactics that lend greater legitimay to their complaints and are more likely to garner support from external (official and unofficial) parties to their cause.

jmm99
08-24-2010, 07:02 PM
Here are some links:

Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3301_pp007-044_Stephan_Chenoweth.pdf) (2008).

David Ackers, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Does terrorism work? (http://www.opendemocracy.net/terrorism/articles/stephan110407) (23 May 2007)

Véronique Dudouet, Nonviolent Resistance and Conflict Transformation in Power Asymmetries (http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/dudouet_handbook.pdf) (2008)

International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) - Resource Library (http://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/index.php/learning-and-resources/resources-on-nonviolent-conflict). This is a huge collection of books (some online), monographs and other articles, etc.

Berghof Conflict Research (BCR) - Online Handbook (http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/):


Preface & Introduction
Section I: Concepts and Cross-Cutting Challenges
Section II: Analysing Conflict and Assessing Conflict Transformation
Section III: Third-Party Tools and Capacity Building
Section IV: Structural Reforms, Institution Building and Violence Control
Section V: Recovering from War – Post-Conflict Regeneration and Reconciliation
Glossary

BCR Dialogue Series (http://www.berghof-handbook.net/dialogue-series/):


No 9 - Human Rights and Conflict Transformation
No 8 - Building Peace in the Absence of States
No 7 - Peacebuilding at a Crossroads?
No 6 - A Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation
No 5 - Social Change and Conflict Transformation
No 4 - New Trends in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)
No 3 - Transforming War Economies
No 2 - Security Sector Reform
No 1 - Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment

Bob, this may be a worthy effort; but I'd suggest you link your resources so that we can read the originals.

Regards

Mike

Joske
08-24-2010, 07:08 PM
what if a non-violent aproach does not generate attention in general, why would for example the UN care about a few thousand protesters somewhere in say india, why would even the governement themselves care if it happens somewhere far away from their seat of power in an area that is inhabited by an ethnic group that is too small to hold actual political power in a democracy, people who do suffer from bad governance but who might not be able to mount a massive strike or protest march big enough to actually get enough attention to their cause. This might result in those dissafected people to see a possibility in military measures.
So what if strictly non-violent measures alone fail?
also a while ago i watched a video about a social-movement in India composed almost entirely of women and besides building schools and generaly trying to build a bit of better governance, they where also known for beating up corrupt officials.
here's the link. as it might be something interesting
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EXwH-kjSUSs

also one element that seems in common in several media actions that suceeded in completing political goals, is the ability of the "winning" side to portray themselves as victims.
in this way a protest against a certain issue is more likely to achieve its goal if they are for example shot upon by the governement, because it will generate more international and internal outrage.

Global Scout
08-24-2010, 10:40 PM
I think once serious study is undertaken on this important topic, we'll discover that non-violent revolution or insurgency is more dependent upon international reaction, duration (if it gets crushed quickly it won't linger in the media long enough to make a difference), the degree of popular support, and the righteousness of the cause (as viewed by the global community and the affected nation).

Tiananmen Square failed because it was quickly quashed, even after receiving considerable media attention. China didn't care about world opinion on how it managed its internal affairs, and a year later it was as though it never happened. The example in Poland is an excellent example, because the Solidarity Movement had a degree of popular support (whether or not it a majority or not can be argued, but they did mobilize politically). The Soviets did care about world opinion, so they had limited options, and the movement lasted for several months and was tied into a global network (the Catholic Church).

It works in some conditions, in others it won't stand a snow ball's chance in hell. Definitely worth the discussion, but it won't completely replace armed conflict anytime in the near future.

slapout9
08-24-2010, 11:32 PM
In the movie "The 7TH Dawn" there is nice sean where they use a "bicycle strike" during the Malaya Campaign often sited by COIN (Sir Robert Thompson) experts as classic COIN doctrine. In this case the insurgents win and the UK government yields.

Link to movie synopsis
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_7th_Dawn

Bob's World
08-24-2010, 11:34 PM
Often it is a mix of both approaches that ultimately gets governance to evolve. Currently AQ is encouraging violent approaches; it may be time to suggest that non-violent approaches are more likely to produce the moderate adjustments of governance that the majority of the populace actually, and reasonably, desires.

Dayuhan
08-25-2010, 02:01 AM
I think once serious study is undertaken on this important topic, we'll discover that non-violent revolution or insurgency is more dependent upon international reaction, duration (if it gets crushed quickly it won't linger in the media long enough to make a difference), the degree of popular support, and the righteousness of the cause (as viewed by the global community and the affected nation).

Another variable that has to be considered is the condition of the government being opposed. In a number of these cases you could argue that non-violent resistance succeeded against colonial regimes that no longer had sufficient political will or profit motive to make holding onto the colony worth the trouble. Some dictatorial regimes (eg Philippines 86) collapse before non violent resistance because they have already decayed to the point where they no longer command the loyalty of their own armed forces. Collapse from within is often as much a factor as pressure from the outside.


Often it is a mix of both approaches that ultimately gets governance to evolve. Currently AQ is encouraging violent approaches; it may be time to suggest that non-violent approaches are more likely to produce the moderate adjustments of governance that the majority of the populace actually, and reasonably, desires.

To whom would we make such a suggestion? AQ is not a populace based movement, and certainly has no interest in moderate change.

I'm not convinced that we should make a policy of meddling in relations between other governments and their populaces; the potential for unintended adverse consequences is to high and I see no reason to believe that either populaces or governments want us messing in their domestic affairs.

OfTheTroops
08-25-2010, 03:08 AM
Each of the elements are the same. The primary difference is that coercives/terrorists usually isolate themselves from the population. Non-violence can be snuffed out sooner but their leaders and narrative are more enduring.

William F. Owen
08-25-2010, 06:08 AM
What are some examples of non-violent approaches to Poor Governance?

I. Nonviolent protest and persuasion
Petitions, wearing symbols, vigils, marches, humorous skits, walk-outs, renouncing honors, mock awards

II. Non-cooperation
Boycotts, strikes, social ostracism, stay-at-homes, refusal to pay taxes, civil disobedience

III. Nonviolent Intervention
Hunger strikes, sit-ins, alternative institutions, blockades




So Small Wars Journal has turned into Small Politics Journal. No Violence? Then it is simply not a military problem. It's Campus, Town-hall politics.

Moreover, a lot of the examples used were actually under-pinned by the option to use violence, and were used in direct co-ordination with armed violence.

davidbfpo
08-25-2010, 06:47 AM
Wilf,

Rarely in my knowledge has the use of violence not been preceded by a non-violent phase, notably a public statement of the campaigns aims and so this thread addresses Small Wars in its widest application. I have recently read a book on the Baader-Meinhof gang / Red Army Faction and cite that as an example.

IIRC Frank Kitson's books also covered the pre-violent phase and that the military should stay away then.

So, SPJ it maybe Wilf and no harm is being done here:D. We are here to discuss and learn - within limits we know well.

Another time for a response to Bob's World.

Global Scout
08-25-2010, 07:22 AM
Posted by Dayuhan,


Some dictatorial regimes (eg Philippines 86) collapse before non violent resistance because they have already decayed to the point where they no longer command the loyalty of their own armed forces.

I think you hit the nail on the head, another peaceful protest would have simply been crushed by Marcus if he believed he could control the military, but he knew his military was divided and the U.S. Government gave him and Imelda a comfortable exit. He didn't have to worry facing a violent end like like Mussolini did; otherwise he made have made a different decision.

Many of the examples given as noted by Wilf are not accurrate. King's Civil Rights Movement was NOT an insurgency, it was simply a political movement working largely within the established legal framework. There was no intent to overthrow the government.

Gandhi was NOT responsible for India's independence. Serious Indian and British historians will tell you that Gandhi's civil movement had minimal impact on Britian's decision to give up India. As a matter of fact, Gandhi's movement died 10 years before the British decided to leave. Several factors influenced their decision, but the main one according to knowledgeable historians was the revolts of Indian National Army led by Bose. Although the military revolts failed, the subsequent trial of the militants exposed that Britian lost control of Sepoy's and could not count on them to maintain order in India. Furthermore, not only didn't Gandhi's movement contribute in any significant way to India's liberation, it didn't stop Britian's decision to divide India and create a separate country for the Muslims (East and West Pakistan), which led to consider slaughter on both sides (Hindu and Muslim). Since the Hindu nationalist movement wouldn't support Britian during WWII, the Brits relied on willing Indian Muslims to do so, and in return for their support they were rewarded with Pakistan (a gift that just keeps on giving).

Violence or the threat of violence has always played a key role in these movements. In the case of the Philippines the critical role of the threat of violence was mitigated because Marcus's behavior alienated much of his military. The movement started by Aquino and supported by Cardinal Sin definitely set the conditions for this to happen, but if the military remained loyal to Marcus the movement would have failed.

Bob's World
08-25-2010, 08:14 AM
Violence or the threat of violence has always played a key role in these movements.

Is this not also the case with Diplomacy? With Deterrence? Is not "the threat of violence" typically the forcing function behind much of the influence that governments wield?

Do not be distracted by that fact, the point is that insurgent movements may well set conditions for success through violence; but that they ultimately achieve their aims more effectively once they switch to non-violent tactics.

I was under the impression that this site was focused primarily on not how to go out and about the globe starting and winning small wars so much as it is about effectively preventing, or when that is not possible, prevailing when confronted with the same.

Currently there is tremendous unrest in many populaces around the world. They will act out. They have a choice, to do nothing and endure the unendurable; to act out violently; or, to act out non-violently. Insurgency is the condition among the populace that makes them feel this way. Violence is merely a tactic they employ to address that condition.

The point of this thread in not just to get those out there faced with this condition of insurgency to see that they have other options than to act out illegally to address such conditions when legal options are either denied or ineffective than to go straight to violent warfare against the state. The point of this thread is also to those in the Counterinsurgency business to see that COIN is not warfare per se, but rather that it is a condition that must be addressed, not an enemy defeated or war won. At times it will become just that, a bloody affair that must be dealt with. That won't resolve the conditions of insurgency, but if the populace goes down that route they need to understand that it will not end well for them.

For those who prescribe to "protecting the populace" as the primary tenet of COIN, why not make part of your campaign being to encourage the populace to switch to non-violent tactics to address their concerns? That is going to be far more acceptable to them than accusing them of having mass mental illness through "radicalization," or simply telling them through information campaigns that they are wrong about how they feel about there government. At times it might be better to simply say "you make a good point, but you are going about it all wrong." As has been pointed out, even the hardest, most warlike insurgents have found the success they seek in making such transitions from violence to non-violence.

For parties who are outside the "family" of the populace from which both the insurgent and government rise and compete for influence over, what does it matter who prevails so long as they represent the majority of the populace and are willing to join the global community and operate reasonably within the same? Every successful insurgent becomes immediately a struggling counterinsurgent unless they evolve to providing good governance to the populace they represent. If those foreign parties are focused on stability and securing their interests in a particular region first, and who actually governs second, they will be more successful.

This is one of the largest disconnects in US COIN doctrine. It makes the presumption that success requires sustaining the current government in power. Unless that government evolves in the process, all that does is reset the conditions of failure when an insurgent organization was merely defeated militarily. Once we retire the presumptions that COIN is war, and that sustaining a poor governance in power is success, we move to the next level in dealing more effectively with such situations.

Bob's World
08-25-2010, 09:06 AM
"War is war. There are varying types of warfare, but defeating an irregular enemy is rooted in some fairly well understood methods of applying military force. What we see with "counterinsurgency theory" is a collection of fallacies that seeks to suggest that somehow defeating an irregular force in rebellion or revolt is not best enabled by applying lethal force against the right people for the right political reason.
If you inflict military defeat on the enemy, you remove his ability to use violence as a political instrument.
You do not out-govern the enemy. You kill him." (Posted by Wilf on a different thread).

Ok, I think this quote represents fairly Wilf's point. It is a reasonable position, and one that is widely held. You don't have to knock on too many doors at the Pentagon to find someone who thinks the best response to illegal violence is a well applied dose of legal violence in kind.

But how does that resolve the underlying condition that gave rise to that violence? Suppression of insurgency works, granted. Tito's Yugoslavia, Stalin's Russia, Saudi Arabia, to name but a few. The examples are many. But in all of these the conditions of insurgency continue to smolder and fester, and once that suppressive force is removed, tend to explode in uncontrolled violence that no one wants (Balkans, Rwanda, and on and on...)

So, if insurgency is seen not as the violent response to these conditions, but rather as the condition itself, it opens up options to both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent as how to go about best resolving the problem. The military may well be given the task of violently suppressing some insurgent group; but that will not resolve the conditions of insurgency. It never has, and it never will. Just as the state must judiciously apply violence when necessary, but most often hold it back in the form of the threat of violence to impose it's will, so must a savvy populace when faced with conditions of insurgency.

Besides, sometimes the government yields its position when faced with non-violence because they recognize it is the right thing to do for everyone involved, and the actions of the insurgent have served primarily to accelerate the timeline. They are not faced with the potential loss of face associated with yielding to violent pressure, and they also have many sane and legal voices from respected organizations around the globe that often come on line supporting the position of the non-violent insurgent as well. Bottom line is that while they could win "the final argument of kings", they realize that doing the right thing is more important than proving one is more powerful. The U.S. Civil rights movement, the collapse of Soviet control of Eastern Europe, the independence of India, etc.

I suspect there are some timelines in the Middle East that could use a bit of acceleration as well. Better that is done non-violently than through the terrorist tactics espoused by Bin Laden and his AQ organization. The sooner the populaces of the Middle East come to recognize this, the sooner they can correct the conditions that they find oppressive. Bin Laden is not an insurgent, he is waging UW to leverage the conditions of insurgency that exist in these populaces. Once those populaces believe they have better options, Bin Laden becomes moot and his movement collapses. To simply destroy Bin Laden and AQ will open the door for the next generation to step forward, and they may well achieve levels of violence that Bin Laden only dreams about. That would be a major strategic error on our part to enable that to happen.

MikeF
08-25-2010, 11:07 AM
My curiousity of late has centered around the decision making process an actor uses to determine:

1. Rebel/Revolt/Secede violently
2. Rebel/Revolt/Secede non-violently
3. A dual prong strategy of violent and non-violent movements

Here's a couple of good references,

Constructing the Revolution:
The Social Psychological Development of Radical Spiritual Leaders (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/08/constructing-the-revolution/)
by John Ty Grubbs

Deep Inside the Insurgent’s Mind:
Past the Motorcycle Diaries towards understanding Che Guevera
by Hugues Esquerre (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/08/deep-into-the-insurgents-mind/)

Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement (http://www.amazon.com/Walking-Wind-Movement-John-Lewis/dp/0156007088/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1282734293&sr=8-1)
by John Lewis

Mike

Bob's World
08-25-2010, 12:23 PM
A note and link from Dr. Stephan:

"...As for the empirics behind Dr. Erica's Chenoweth's and my contention that nonviolent campaigns have been nearly twice as effective at achieving their strategic goals as their violent counterparts, please check out Erica's web-site (she directs the Program on Terrorism and Insurgency Research at Wesleyan), which contains the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Dataset (NAVCO). Here it is:"
http://echenoweth.faculty.wesleyan.edu/ptir/.

jmm99
08-25-2010, 04:18 PM
to expanded versions of her publications and primary sources, Research and Data (http://echenoweth.faculty.wesleyan.edu/research-and-data/).

Cheers

Mike

William F. Owen
08-26-2010, 08:49 AM
IIRC Frank Kitson's books also covered the pre-violent phase and that the military should stay away then.

So, SPJ it maybe Wilf and no harm is being done here:D. We are here to discuss and learn - within limits we know well.

I concur. Politics is the only cause of war. Most politics is non-violent.
So what? We know that. Thucydides and CvC observed that a very long time ago. Soldiers set forth policy using violence. They do not create policy, and they do not seek to apply non-violent means. Ethics is politics, and distinct from personal morality.

Harm is being done IF soldiers are confusing War with Warfare, and the fact that military force is merely instrumental. If people cannot understand that then they are set on a path to their own destruction and confusion, in woolly worded pseudo science. - Something I have witnessed all too often here on SWJ. I point this out in a commitment to the spirit of learning and discussion.

As an analogy, IMO, senior UK police officers are uniquely ill-equipped and unqualified to comment on what drugs should be legal and illegal. If they comment, while in uniform, they are bluffing above their pay grade, and are possibly doing massive harm to the moral of the officers under his command. They're job is to seek to convict those selling drugs, regardless of what drugs are legal or not. Are there some silly laws? Very much.

William F. Owen
08-26-2010, 09:05 AM
If you inflict military defeat on the enemy, you remove his ability to use violence as a political instrument.
You do not out-govern the enemy. You kill him." (Posted by Wilf on a different thread).
Correct. This is an immutable verity.

But how does that resolve the underlying condition that gave rise to that violence? Suppression of insurgency works, granted.
None of your business. The underlying causes of an insurgency are utterly irrelevant to you. As a US Army officer, it is absolutely above your pay grade and not your job to address these problems.- quite the opposite! You are an instrument of US Government Policy. You are not there to make the world a better place. Your job is to make the US President the most powerful man in the world, if that's what he wants.
You are their to lay the hard hand of war on who he tells you. He has other people to do the non-violent parts of diplomacy.

With some sense of irony, US Special Forces once had a de-facto mission to create violent insurgencies amongst populations who were not dissatisfied with their Government. - and they still should if that serves US policy.

Bob's World
08-26-2010, 09:21 AM
Harm is done as well when soldiers confuse a civil emergency with war; simply because an overwhelmed civil government called for their assistance, there is an identifiable opponent conducting acts of violence, and because their doctrine says "COIN is war."

military mission + violent enemy + doctrine = war. Simple.

The problem being that a study of the history of insurgency suggests that it is not.

It is not really a military mission, it is a civil mission that the military supports, like sending soldiers to a flood or hurricane disaster site.

There it no violent "enemy," it is a small segment of a nation's own populace, supported by a much broader base of the populace than what actually takes up arms, and related by blood and friendship to an even broader base of the populace. This is like dealing with a violent spouse as opposed to dealing with a violent neighbor; the acts may look similar but the consequences are far different.

Sometimes, just sometimes, doctrine is wrong.

But all of that aside, this thread is to assess the relative merits of populaces who take up non-violent approaches to address the condition of insurgency, and how that might be more effective than those who take up violent approaches. Both are in situations where they are forced to act out illegally, violent or non-violent; or it is not insurgency, it would be as Wilf says, just politics if they can simply act legally and peacefully to affect some change of government, large or small.

But to Wilf's credit he has pointed out one excellent reason for choosing non-violent approaches to act out illegally against one's own government to affect political changes based upon perceived conditions of insurgency by the populace:

The state won't be able to so easily call it "war," to brand the organized segment of the populace as "the enemy" or "terrorists" and in turn will not be able to sick the military on them without immediately losing the battle for which side is perceived as "right" or "wrong" in the court of world opinion.

Bob's World
08-26-2010, 09:40 AM
Actually those of us who actually are in Special Forces, and work continually with varying aspects of Insurgency, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare and Counterterrorism understand that this statement is both incorrect and infeasible:

"With some sense of irony, US Special Forces once had a de-facto mission to create violent insurgencies among populations who were not dissatisfied with their Government. - and they still should if that serves US policy. "

We understand that an outsider cannot create conditions of insurgency, only the government of that populace can. You can go in a put a spin on the facts, but a populace in conditions of "good governance" is largely immune to UW efforts to organize and incite insurgency. The populace may be the fuel of insurgency, and SF guys conducting UW may be able to organize the fuel for fire and provide a spark; but if the fuel is well dampened by a healthy government-populace relationship, it will never ignite into insurgency.

No the SF mission was, and still is, to understand this dynamic, and to conduct FID in countries where the US has a relationship with the government, but where we assess the government does not have a healthy relationship with its populace. To help prevent conditions from sliding into violent insurgency if they are still at peace, or to help restore conditions of peace if violent insurgency has already erupted. Similarly to conduct UW in countries where the US does not have a relationship with a government and knows they will never be granted one, but has interests that demand such a relationship. When, and only when, conditions of insurgency exist, and usually only if organized resistance organizations already exist, it is an option to employ SF to conduct UW. That is the mission. The focus is typically on violent insurgency, but SF guys being unconventional thinkers in general, may well pick up on the fact that they can employ the same skills and tactics to incite non-violent insurgency as well. To do so creates far less risk of negative blow-back in the court of world opinion and, as history shows, is far more likely to produce the desired result.

(Wilf, I am all about waging war when war is the mission, and when one does so to do so to the nth degree; but to confuse a mission for war that is not and to wage it regardless, is a tragedy of the highest order.)

Bob's World
08-26-2010, 09:58 AM
http://wesfiles.wesleyan.edu/home/echenoweth/web/data.zip

This is the raw data compiled for their research, and while one can argue with their conclusions based on one's general understanding of history and insurgency; once one works through the excel spreadsheet one can see the detail of analysis behind this work.

One also sees that success or failure, violent or non-violent; invariably where insurgency erupts the governing authority being challenged lacks any true standing of legitimacy in the eyes of a large segment of the populace being governed.

Well worth taking 5-10 minutes and scrolling through.

William F. Owen
08-26-2010, 10:54 AM
Harm is done as well when soldiers confuse a civil emergency with war; simply because an overwhelmed civil government called for their assistance, there is an identifiable opponent conducting acts of violence, and because their doctrine says "COIN is war."
War is War. COIN (as talked about today) is a pseudo-science constructed by people embarrassed by their connection with instrumental political violence.

Bob's World
Are you saying,

a.) US Military Officers should study non-violent protest?
b.) Non-violent protest should be re-sourced as an instrument of US Military Power?

William F. Owen
08-26-2010, 11:01 AM
One also sees that success or failure, violent or non-violent; invariably where insurgency erupts the governing authority being challenged lacks any true standing of legitimacy in the eyes of a large segment of the populace being governed.

Well when the President tells you who is legitimate and who isn't you'll have the personal opinion that matters.

If the USG says they are legitimate, - as in the Saudi Arabian Royal Family, or the Hashemite throne, then that is the policy, and your job is to kill those trying to get rid of their King, appointed to rule over them by God!

Joske
08-26-2010, 01:47 PM
so how about turning this discussion around, now we are saying why a movement should choose a non-violent path over a violent one.
So what about saying how a governement could make a violent movement turn into a non-violent one.

Off course a first possibility is to force them to become non-violent by using enough force to compell them abandon violence, but violence alone might not be the most effective way to do this in some cases.

A second option might be to make use of less force, and make use of other options than the military one.
So a first step by the government side is determine which of the enemies political goals can be negotiated about and which cant, and also determining what grievances excist that cause the movement to be popular in the first place.
(in afghanistan something that cant be negotiated about might be the implementation of sharia law, but certain other demands, demands that are more important to the rank and file taliban can be adressed, im thinking about things like poverty or corruption here)

A second step might be then to encourage/create non-violent protest and adopting a policy to negotiate only with the non-violent movements and not with the violent ones, and important thing here might be to grant the non-violent movement some consessions to show that a non-violent aproach actually works. What can also be considered is actually creating protests instead of waiting for them to actually happen, a bit like agent provocateurs but then in reverse.

Another important issue is the use of force in this strategy, force might be used to isolate and demoralize a violent movement and combined with an amnesty program, maybe using converted militants to denounce violence and dicredit the violent movement and praise the non-violent one.

Off course during the creation of the actual non-violent movement the government should be carefull about separating the more moderate and acceptable ideas (which should be encouraged) and the more radical and unacceptable ideas (which should be discouraged and marginalized as much as possible).

Important to note is that the now non-violent militants are not working for the government in an attempt to gain better governance but they are still working more or less against the government and thus could potentially count on more support and they could avoid getting the label of "traitor".
Off course it is still important to prevent the non-violent movement from leaning too much towards the violent one so a bit of covert guiding by the government might be usefull.

Also important is the fact that such an aproach should be adapted to the culture, political structure, social and economical situation..etc off a certain country/area.

Bob's World
08-26-2010, 02:03 PM
My president can tell me who is "official" in the eyes of our government, but the "legitimacy" I speak of, the one that is essential in assessing insurgent situations only comes from one source: the governed populace in question.

Outsiders forget, ignore, or simply do not grasp this fact to their peril. (In a parallel, but separate track, the same situation is IMO a large part of Israel's challenge. Western powers facilitated their return to Palestine and granted them "legitimacy" as a state; when in fact all we could really do is recognize their officialness. It is the strong sense that they have no legitimate right to be there that far more than religious differences, fuels the persistence of that conflict. Once they accept that Israel stands on its own two feet and they can't make them budge, I believe the violence will begin to subside. Perceptions are so deadly. I am amazed at how many believe that the US is an agent of Israel. We don't appreciate how important perceptions are, and how to best target negative perceptions and promote positive ones through action and word)

As to a soldier's duty, it is to accomplish the missions he is assigned. "How" belongs to the executor, and if the mission is UW, then certainly non-violent tactics as well as traditional violent tactics, should be on the table.

Rex Brynen
08-26-2010, 02:09 PM
Once they accept that Israel stands on its own two feet and they can't make them budge, I believe the violence will begin to subside.

This is force majeure (or realism, or deterrence, or pragmatism), however--it isn't legitimacy.

To draw a parallel, my very first teaching job was on a First Nations reservation. All of my students would have regarded the Canadian government as an unshakeable reality. Very few (if any) of them would have regarded it as "legitimate." (None of them would have regarded Canada as having a "right to exist," to draw another parallel and use the formula often cited in the Israel-Palestine context.)

Bob's World
08-26-2010, 02:52 PM
This is force majeure (or realism, or deterrence, or pragmatism), however--it isn't legitimacy.

To draw a parallel, my very first teaching job was on a First Nations reservation. All of my students would have regarded the Canadian government as an unshakeable reality. Very few (if any) of them would have regarded it as "legitimate." (None of them would have regarded Canada as having a "right to exist," to draw another parallel and use the formula often cited in the Israel-Palestine context.)

If those same students believed that they could prevail over the Canadian government and its security forces, but for the support of the U.S. acting as a stooge of Canada and committed to protecting them; you would have a very different situation on your hands. Probably an insurgency (and they would then make a choice as to employ violent or non-violent means to illegally challenge that government).

But in fact, I suspect they believe that while they do not like the fact that they were defeated and now a new power reigns the land of their ancestors, they know they lost and that the new victor has a legitimacy borne of his power to win to begin with and to suppress any challenger of his own capabilities.

Israel may very well be able to ward off all challengers on her own as well; but it is the perception in the minds of many Arabs that she could not that fuels the conflict. I know from my own experience with the Egyptian Army in the first Gulf War that none of the officers I spoke to had ever been defeated by the IDF. I found this to be an interesting perception then, but I am only coming to appreciate the importance of that perception now.

jmm99
08-26-2010, 04:17 PM
National Command Authority policy re: "stability operations" begins with Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (http://www.usaid.gov/policy/cdie/sss06/sss_1_080106_dod.pdf), November 28, 2005 (in summary of 11 pages pertinent to this discussion):


3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. Stability Operations. Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.

3.2. Military support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR). Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.

4. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

4.2. Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

4.3. Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and
foreign forces.

(emphasis added)

2005 DoDD 3000.05 was, if anything, enhanced towards emphasis on the "non-military" aspects by Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf), September 16, 2009 (a 15-page policy statement):


1. PURPOSE. This Instruction:

a. Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 (Reference (a)) as a DoD Instruction (DoDI) in accordance with the authority in DoDD 5111.1 (Reference (b)) and Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (c)).
....
3. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this Instruction, stability operations is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. ....

(emphasis added).

Both the 3000.05 Directive and Instruction have to be read in conjunction with Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf), December 1, 2008, re: Irregular Warfare (IW):


4. POLICY. It is DoD policy to:

a. Recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater than in traditional warfare.

b. Improve DoD proficiency for IW, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct across the full range of military operations in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.05 (Reference (b)).

(emphasis added).

I will stop beating this horse, unless someone wants to seriously argue that the US military has not been tasked with missions that, in a Wilfian world (which I think I understand), would be tasked to "politicians in suits" - i.e., "non-military" missions.

That 3000.05 tasking (and the 3000.07 IW tasking) become rather apparent factually when we consider (as of Jun 2010) approx. 100K US military in Astan, as opposed to approx. 1K of US civilian personnel engaged in CMO.

So, COL Jones' selected topic is well within the parameters of US National Command Authority policy, which frankly for a long time has rejected the much more restrictive policies of Wilf and Brig. "Trotsky" Davies (God bless him for "I'm a soldier, not a politician") as to what the military "should do".

Regards

Mike

William F. Owen
08-27-2010, 07:54 AM
So, COL Jones' selected topic is well within the parameters of US National Command Authority policy, which frankly for a long time has rejected the much more restrictive policies of Wilf and Brig. "Trotsky" Davies (God bless him for "I'm a soldier, not a politician") as to what the military "should do".


Sorry, but this fundamentally misrepresents the issue. War is Politics. Col Jones should be very aware of the Politics, and use force in line with a Political objectives. He is told what the policy is, he does not get to decide.

...Col Jones does not hold elected office, and cannot know what is legitimate or ethical beyond his personal morality. He can have opinions, but his opinions are always irrelevant, in this context.

Ethics and legitimacy are subjective and emotional views based on a political view point. No entity on the planet has a political view they know or feel to be unethical or illegitimate.! - which is why we need war!

The US Army is told what is ethical and legitimate by the US Government. An Army is a political instrument, (as Mao pointed out) not a maker of policy. It is utterly irrelevant as to whether the policy comes from a King, a dictator or an "elected President."

Good soldiers can take any policy and set it forth, within the limits of strategy and tactics. - which is why the words are usually connected in this form!

Non-violence? Wake me up when they start being violent. You don't call the Fire service because your someone might be smoking in bed, or playing with matches.

Bob's World
08-27-2010, 10:22 AM
I'm just wondering who is talking about setting policy?

All this thread is about is the (very sound) concept that "insurgency" is really a condition within a populace that can manifest itself in a couple of equally illegal ways when legal means of addressing such governmental changes are either not available or not effective (As is the case, by the way, in most of the Muslim countries where AQ conducts UW and where foreign fighters hail from)

1. It can be in the classic violent way, that is really waging war against the state. Typically states respond in kind by waging war back. Got it. I would recommend to my boss, as a member of the portion of the military that he has tasked to focus on such events, that waging war back is not the best way to manage our interests and present him options. That seeing COIN more as military support to civil authorities dealing with an overwhelming civil emergency is smarter than seeing it as war and putting the military in charge. I would also advise him not to see intervention operations as "COIN" as that creates a presumption of preserving the current government, which may make the results he seeks unfeasible in any reasonable period of time. That is not mucking around in policy, that is doing due diligence as a professional. As is saluting, and moving out smartly once the boss makes a decision.

2. The other way the populace can act out illegally when legal means ("politics") are either denied or ineffective is through non-violent tactics. This is what Dr.s Stephan and Chenoweth's work focuses on. Their research matches up with my far less sophisticated perception, that these tactics are historically more effective for a wide range of reasons that they explore.

A branch line of discussion off of this is for those who work the UW mission. UW typically focuses on fomenting and supporting violent insurgency. This is what AQ has been doing. If AQ were smarter they would pursue non-violent tactics. If we were smarter we would be a whole lot less focused on countering AQ and a whole lot more focused on addressing the underlying condition of insurgency that they are targeting, and then out-competing them for influence with those same populaces but with the promotion of non-violent tactics.

If history is any measure, then AQ ultimately will either evolve (though they have way too much blood on their hands to ever be accepted into the official political society, so they have really rendered themselves immaterial in the long run) or be replaced by a smarter, more sophisticated, more politically savvy organization that also conducts UW, but with the promotion of non-violent tactics as their approach, coupled with broader diplomatic efforts. Then our allies will be in real trouble.

Dayuhan
08-27-2010, 12:09 PM
A number of thoughts on the topic…

First, I completely agree that insurgency is almost always rooted in popular disaffection stemming from perceptions of bad governance. I do not agree that popular disaffection stemming from perceptions of bad governance is necessarily insurgency, unless we expand the definition of insurgency to a point beyond any utility. I think it would be more accurate to say that insurgency is one of a number of actions that disaffected populaces use to address perceptions of bad governance. For example: before the last US election there was certainly a widespread disaffection among the American populace and a widespread perception of bad governance. Into the merits of this perception it is not here necessary to inquire, it suffices it to say that it existed. The response to this perception was to vote the other party into power. I do not see that this can usefully be called insurgency. I suspect that it’s more useful to say that popular disaffection may be expressed in legal political action, illegal but non-violent political action, and illegal armed action. I would only refer to the last of these as “insurgency”. I also suspect that the course adopted by any given political opposition is less a conscious choice than a reaction to the specific circumstances involved.

The apparent effectiveness of non-violent vs violent resistance assumes that a direct comparison is relevant. I’m not sure that it always is. I suspect that one reason for the high success rate of non-violent resistance is that these movements tend to rise as a government reaches a state of terminal decline. They often do not come about when a resistance movement makes a conscious decision to follow a non-violent path. The beginnings of a “color revolution” may be quite tentative, small rallies and small actions undertaken by fringe groups. If a broader populace sees that government is unable to effectively respond, and that security forces are not able to muster an effectively repressive response, the movement snowballs and the masses hit the streets. Really broad scale mass resistance is so effective because it doesn’t happen until the populace perceives that the Government is no longer able to effectively suppress it.

This is something we need to remember before we go about encouraging people to embrace non-violent resistance. If we do this at a time when government has full control of its security apparatus and has the ability to effectively suppress the movement, we may very well be encouraging people to undertake actions that are essentially suicidal. One might well ask what business we have encouraging people to rise against their governments (or for that matter to support their governments) in any event… in any but the rarest cases, it’s not our business, nor is it something we should be messing with.

I think it’s a wild oversimplification to assume that resistance movements simply sit down and make a decision about what sort of tactics they will adopt. These situations emerge as responses to conditions, and the tactics any given movement adopts are largely dictated by its circumstances, the location, commitment, and capacity of its support base, and the type of government it faces. Location is key. Nonviolent “color revolutions” may involve a very small percentage of the populace, but they can succeed with that if that portion is located in the capital, where they have the capacity to directly challenge government on its own turf under the eye of the media. A disaffected rural population spread over a wide area will have a much more difficult time making these tactics work: they simply can’t muster enough people in any one place and at any one time to get noticed fast enough, and it’s much easier for government to crack down on them before anyone takes notice. The same conditions that make a rural support base conducive to violent insurgency make it not conducive to non violent resistance.

While I think it’s accurate to say that insurgency requires a disaffected and angry populace, I don’t think it’s accurate to say that an insurgent movement necessarily represents or speaks for the disaffected populace. We often see the leadership of insurgent movements being co-opted by third party movements seeking to leverage that discontent for their own purposes, which may be quite disconnected from the interests or desires of the populace. While it is important to challenge these insurgencies by addressing the issues causing disaffection, it is not necessarily accurate to conclude that the agenda of the formal insurgent group is necessarily the agenda of the populace, or that the groups in question speak for the populace in any negotiation.


Bin Laden is not an insurgent, he is waging UW to leverage the conditions of insurgency that exist in these populaces. Once those populaces believe they have better options, Bin Laden becomes moot and his movement collapses.

It’s worth noting that the only “insurgencies” from which bin Laden has gained meaningful leverage were those that involved foreign occupation of Muslim countries: the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Attempts to inspire insurgencies against Muslim governments have so far been abject failures: populaces in many of these countries may not be enchanted by their own governments, but they show no evident desire to be ruled by bin Laden or anyone like him. Certainly he can rally support, financing, and followers, as long as he’s fighting foreign occupiers, but only then. This of course is why he needed so badly to goad the US into attacking and occupying Muslim territory: without an invader, there was simply no demand for the sort of jihad Osama offers.

I am not at all sure why so many Americans seem to feel that we have a growing problem with insurgency, or that we need to develop all sorts of new and better ways of countering insurgency. As far as I can see the only reason we're dealing with insurgency today is that we've adopted policies that are almost guaranteed to provoke insurgency. If we had refrained from trying to install governments in other countries, we wouldn't have to be fighting insurgencies. Maybe we need to think less about how to fight insurgencies and more about how to stay out of situations that require us to fight insurgencies.

Granite_State
08-27-2010, 04:02 PM
Many on here have probably read T.X. Hammes' book, I thought the comparison between the success of the (largely non-violent) First Intifada with the failure of the bloody Al-Aqsa Intifada was the best section.

jmm99
08-27-2010, 04:26 PM
from Wilf
The US Army is told what is ethical and legitimate by the US Government. An Army is a political instrument, (as Mao pointed out) not a maker of policy. It is utterly irrelevant as to whether the policy comes from a King, a dictator or an "elected President."

Good soldiers can take any policy and set it forth, within the limits of strategy and tactics. - which is why the words are usually connected in this form!

DoDD 3000.05 and 3000.07 are USG policy.

What do you do (as a USA COL) when ordered to execute that policy in a project that is outside the limits of military strategy and tactics ?

Perhaps, "Wake me up when they start being violent" would be accepted by your superiors, but I doubt it.

Regards

Mike

Dayuhan
08-27-2010, 09:39 PM
Sorry, but this fundamentally misrepresents the issue. War is Politics. Col Jones should be very aware of the Politics, and use force in line with a Political objectives. He is told what the policy is, he does not get to decide.

What issue is being misrepresented? This forum isn't a military unit executing policy, it's a place for open discussion of all aspects of small wars, including policy and how it might be adjusted to make our current sort of military engagement, which might reasonably be thought ill advised on many levels, might be avoided in the future.

I've no doubt that when Col Jones and the other serving members of the military that post here put on uniforms and go to work, they execute policy to the best of their ability. If they come here in their spare time, why shouldn't they also discuss policy? A lifetime of executing policies, often less than intelligent ones, surely provides a sufficient background for relevant comment on policy, on a personal if not a professional basis.

As for speaking above the pay grade, there aren't any pay grades here. To the best of my knowledge, nobody's getting paid to post here (if anyone is, please let me know how to get in on that racket). In this place we're not executing or making or influencing policy, we're just a bunch of people talking about matters of mutual interest. I often don't agree with Col Jones, but I see no reason why he should refrain from discussing any subject within the rules of the forum.

Global Scout
08-28-2010, 03:45 AM
Dayuhan,

Fully concur with your last post, and even agree with many of COL Jone's ideas, but I do have a rub. There are discussions on policy that should be identified as such to avoid confusion (and unintended insult). Too often the posts sound like the poster is accusing the military for policy decisions, and imply if the military would only implement this policy everybody could live in perfect harmony.

Recommendations for policy makers and recommendations for Soldiers asked to achieve the policy objectives are two separate discussions, and while I agree both should be discussed here by all who desire, even those of us in uniform, we need to better clarify when are discussing TTPs for achieving the given policy, and when we're discussing policy itself. Many of COL Jone's inputs are directed at the policy, not the military units involved in achieving the policy objectives, yet they read like the military developed the policy and the military needs to change it. He obviously knows that isn't the case, he is an experienced strategic planner, but his posts often read like the Bde or Bn Commander needs to change their political policies.

Just a simple change in writing style would alleviate much of the confusion.

Dayuhan
08-28-2010, 08:59 AM
We should share the case with Wilf and the Col, the problems of the world might get solved. Or possibly not, but the effort would amuse.



Recommendations for policy makers and recommendations for Soldiers asked to achieve the policy objectives are two separate discussions, and while I agree both should be discussed here by all who desire, even those of us in uniform, we need to better clarify when are discussing TTPs for achieving the given policy, and when we're discussing policy itself. Many of COL Jone's inputs are directed at the policy, not the military units involved in achieving the policy objectives, yet they read like the military developed the policy and the military needs to change it. He obviously knows that isn't the case, he is an experienced strategic planner, but his posts often read like the Bde or Bn Commander needs to change their political policies.

I might be guilty of that myself at times; I tend to speak about policy more than about military matters. That's partly because i have no military background and have studied and observed policy a bit; it's also because I suspect that much of the difficulty now faced by our strategists and tacticians emanates from problems on the policy level. There are limits to what strategy and tactics can achieve in pursuit of policy goals that are vacuous, impractical, or uncertain.

UrsaMaior
08-28-2010, 09:40 AM
What is Civil Resistance?

Poles, ‘70s-’80s
Czechs/Slovaks, ‘80s
East Germans, ‘89
Serbs, ‘00
Georgians, ‘03
Ukrainians, ’04



Could you be more specific? While in Poland there was a non-violent resistance organisation called Solidarnosc, the same cannot be said of Czechoslovakia, or East Germany. If you say there was NV resistance against communist rule it is generally true for all eastern european countries like Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania too.

OTOH serb, georgian and ukrainian movements in th 21st century were much rather political than classical resistance to oppressive systems. Same can said of the african american movement in the USA. In that sense you can add the Tea Party or Greenpeace to the above NV movemenent list.

The selected and oversimplifying knowledge and usage of history is seriously limiting the NATO's capability.

Bob's World
08-28-2010, 11:09 AM
So, if a military commander is given a mission, consisting of task, purpose and commander's intent to go to a foreign land to lead a coalition effort to help resolve an insurgency, he is limited to only violent approaches to addressing the insurgent organizations; or he is somehow muddling in "policy" if, as the only expert in COIN sitting around the Cabinet table he says:

"Mr. President, our initial assessment is that the current government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of their own populace, and our intervention will not only exacerbate that condition; but because of it we will likely end up in a campaign that could take years rather than months. Also, we need to consider that we are presumably looking at this intervention as a way of reducing the risk to the United States of Terrorist attacks, but because of the same legitimacy concerns that make COIN success unlikely, this intervention is likely to cause the insurgency to direct a portion of their effort to attacks designed to break our support to the government. We should not expect those efforts to be limited to being against our combat forces in country, but could well be against civilian targets anywhere in the world.

Finally, while I fully appreciate that your predecessor handed you a "war against terrorism" as you came into office, and I have been dutifully waging that war to the best of my ability; my Special Forces strategists have pointed out that what AQ is really doing is waging a very sophisticated campaign of unconventional warfare to leverage active and latent insurgent movements in populaces across the Middle East. Getting mired too deeply in any one of those insurgencies lends a lot of credence to AQ's sales pitch, and will distract thinking, resources and effort from where they really need to be applied. Our professional military opinion is that the best application of the military is to conduct CT directly against the core of AQ leadership and toward the disruption of critical nodes of the network they employ as a non-state entity to wage this UW campaign. Coupled with this we need to conduct a holistic analysis of each of the states where the majority of foreign fighters come from, where terrorists hail from, and where we see these AQ nodes operating to conduct UW. We then need to develop a comprehensive campaign plan that addresses everything from policy, to governance, military capacity that is focused not on the presumption of maintaining any particular government in power, and not on the defeat of any particular nationalist insurgent movement, no matter how in bed with AQ they are. It must be focused on bringing the parties together and enabling a more effective dialog between the parties, while at the same time disempowering AQ in their efforts to leverage these distinct movements to their larger purpose."

"Thank you general, that makes a tremendous amount of intuitive sense, and aligns very well with the published positions of my administration for how I wish to engage the world in general, and this challenging problem in particular. Why is it just now that the Pentagon is bringing me this course of action?"

"Well, sir to be fair, this is new for all of us, and DoD focus is on deterrence and defeat of military foes. We've had to make a lot of changes to adjust to this new mission and are proud of the flexibility that we have demonstrated as an organization and the efforts we have made to attempt to address this problem over the past 9 years. But our natural tendency to be careful to avoid what might be considered as policy by some has blinded us from fully considering every aspects of a problem that extends well beyond the simple military defeat of those who take up arms against us and our allies. We're working through that though and felt that it was important that we tried to lay out the big picture for you. As always, we stand ready to execute to the best of our ability any mission you hand us, and I can have the first significant push of SOF forces on the ground in 48 hours, with the elements of three BCTs beginning to flow in 24 hours after that. Air, Space, and Naval forces are repositioning as we speak."

Dayuhan
08-28-2010, 12:18 PM
In the scenario suggested, the advice proposed above would probably be quite good. It's worth noting, though, that our current insurgency issues do not derive from similar scenarios, nor does the US face any situation where we are likely to have to send combat troops to defend an allied government against insurgency.

If we want to learn the lessons we need to learn from our current engagements, we need to see them for what they are. Our COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan did not derive from efforts to support an allied government against insurgency, they emerged from our belief that we could remove hostile governments and replace them with governments of our design.

I certainly don't think it's a good idea, in any but the rarest case, to send forces to defend an ally against insurgency... but that's not something we're doing, or that we look likely to do in the near future: what vital US ally now faces an existential threat from insurgency? What we need to be examining is not only how we support allies threatened by insurgency, but our misguided belief that we are capable of installing governments in places where we've seen fit to remove governments that we don't like. That's a somewhat different scenario, and one that we need to confront directly.

Bob's World
08-28-2010, 12:48 PM
Dayuhan,

Granted that our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are unique. But you really need to step back from some of the labels that have been placed on the problems of other allies and take a fresh perspective. Consider the following article in Foreign Policy magazine:

http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/11/there_is_nothing_soft_about_saudi_counterterrorism

Now, the article talks about the relative merits of Saudi approaches to "counterterrorism" versus the more aggressive approaches used by Egypt and Algeria.

Now, all three of these countries are allies of the US; all three are major sources of foreign fighters to places like Iraq and Afghanistan to support AQ's operations; and all three have elements of AQ operating within their borders conducting UW to incite and support insurgent efforts against those governments as well as recruit members to operate as foreign fighters or to conduct special missions employing terrorist attacks directed at Western targets.

The Intel community slaps a label on these organizations of "terrorist." Then they look at the AQ affiliation and slap an additional label on them of "AQ." Then, when those national governments take actions against those organizations we slap a label on those operations of "counterterrorism."

Great, we've labeled the problem. None of that, however, changes the reality of the situation that the primary objectives of all of those organizations are nationalist and political in nature. All are latent or active insurgencies. Merely because we have labeled them otherwise does not change what they are. Merely because governments that are essentially dictatorships can employ aggressive tactics that democracies cannot to keep such movements from picking up much steam, does not change the nature of the movements themselves.

We are blinded by our labels and the inertia of our operations and policy; we are also blinded by the narrow lanes that institutions and experts define problems within.

Ask a religious scholar about what is going on and he/she will cast it in terms of religion.

Ask a military expert about what is going on and he/she will cast it in terms of threat.

Ask a terrorism expert about what is going on and he/she will cast it in terms of terrorism.

Ask a governance expert and he/she will cast it in terms of form of government.

Ask a human rights expert and he/she will cast it in terms of the relative merits of western values over those of the country in question.

Ask a development expert and he/she will cast it in terms of infrastructure and services.

Ask a justice expert and he/she will cast it in terms of rule of law.

I would simply offer that they are all right in part and wrong in part; and that it is in looking at all of these factors collectively in the context of historical insurgencies and counterinsurgencies (both violent and non-violent) that one begins to sort out a clearer picture.

In my professional opinion, the three countries listed are/were conducting "COIN." Now, they take a very CT approach to COIN to be sure; and that is something that has implications that we really need to think about and appreciate more fully as we determine how to best help these allies move forward toward stability in a manner that does not increase the likelihood of acts of terrorism being directed against us in turn.

Global Scout
08-28-2010, 07:41 PM
Posted by Bob's World,


"Mr. President, our initial assessment is that the current government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of their own populace, and our intervention will not only exacerbate that condition; but because of it we will likely end up in a campaign that could take years rather than months.

Great advice that I hope the Secretary of State shares with the President, and I hope the CJCS concurs with her.

CJCS with SECDEF's concurance says to the President, "Sir, based on the Secretary's assessment I think the military role should be----------------------------, in order to achieve your political objectives. There are several risks that we'll face with this approach, and if the State Department fails to achieve its objectives of course the military will be left holding the bag, and then America will be looking for a military solution for a non military problem. I recommend we go back to the drawing board sir, and design a plan that minimizes our risk of getting stuck in a quagmire that will drain our miliary resources and increase our risk elsewhere in the world."

Bob's World
08-28-2010, 09:00 PM
Yes, "it takes a village..."

jmm99
08-28-2010, 09:11 PM
I've mentioned the Davies-Hoxha conversation more than once, but haven't quoted it in full. That classic quote seems appropriate here because it summarizes both sides of the debate re: in what activities a soldier should engage - and in what activities a soldier should not.

The time and place were WWII Albania. The characters were Brig. Edmund "Trotsky" Davies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian_Resistance_of_World_War_II#Sources) (SOE mission chief) and Enver Hoxha (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enver_Hoxha) (then a leader of a communist resistence group). The conversation as reported by Davies (via Robert Asprey, War In The Shadows: The Guerrilla In History (http://www.amazon.com/War-Shadows-Guerrilla-Robert-Asprey/dp/0595225942), p.545):


At his first conference with the Communist leader [Hoxha], he [Davies] refused Hoxha's request to review the present world political situation:


....Enver said, very pointedly, "The military situation depends entirely on the poltical situation, so why will you not first give us your impression of world politics.

I replied, "Because I am a soldier and not a politician" [35]

35. Brigadier Davies, Illyrian Venture - The Story of the British Military Mission to Enemy-Occupied Albania 1943-1944 (London: Bodley Head, 1952)

Of course, Hoxha went on to become Albania's Supremo; and Davies went on to be captured by the Germans.

Everyone here probably has different ideas about how much (if any) soldiers should become involved in the political side (non-violent) efforts in an armed conflict, on-going or threatened on the horizon. We could (and probably will) argue until the cows come home about the "correct" warmth of the porridge.

My very limited, but I think important, point is that the US (via DoDDs 3000.05 and 3000.07; and many other doctrinal publications) has moved away from the Davies position and toward the Hoxha position. One can also argue whether that movement is or is not wise.

However, if one accepts that it has occured (as the current policy pronouncements require, IMO), then the question becomes what to do with it. COL Jones has his own approaches; others (including me) have somewhat different approaches (but still using the military as an integral part of the political struggle).

Regards

Mike

PS: I've toyed with writing my own brief for POTUS, but they all end with my being fired.

Dayuhan
08-29-2010, 01:34 AM
In my professional opinion, the three countries listed are/were conducting "COIN." Now, they take a very CT approach to COIN to be sure; and that is something that has implications that we really need to think about and appreciate more fully as we determine how to best help these allies move forward toward stability in a manner that does not increase the likelihood of acts of terrorism being directed against us in turn.

Certainly these countries have their own internal problems. Whether or not those problems constitute "insurgency" depends largely on how we define "insurgency". Whatever we call them, though, how are their problems our business? Why should we be meddling in their internal issues? What benefit would we get from telling them what we think they should do, and what would the likely consequences be... even in the unlikely event that the governments in question followed or even considered our advice?

Mucking about in other people's problems has not worked out terribly well for us in the past, not have I any reason to suspect that it will in the future. Certainly if these governments were asking us to send troops to defend them from insurgents it would become our business... but they aren't, nor are they likely to.

To get back to the example you gave above... I think there's something missing. The advice your hypothetical general gives to the hypothetical President is reasonable enough. What's not dealt with, though, is the absolute certainty that if a US President is considering sending troops to fight an insurgency somewhere, there must be some US interest at stake, and that interest must be perceived as vital. We are not going to send troops anywhere, or consider doing so, simply because an ally is threatened by insurgents. So when the hypothetical President weighs your advice, he will have to weigh it as part of an equation that also includes some American interest that is specific and immediate enough to warrant the expense and risk of deploying troops. How it would weigh out would of course depend on what that interest is, but we can't usefully imagine the situation without including elements that would necessarily be a powerful influence on whatever decision is being made.

William F. Owen
08-31-2010, 05:32 AM
What issue is being misrepresented? This forum isn't a military unit executing policy, it's a place for open discussion of all aspects of small wars, including policy and how it might be adjusted to make our current sort of military engagement, which might reasonably be thought ill advised on many levels, might be avoided in the future.
Agree. But we have to differentiate between Policy and Strategy. That was my point. Discussion here often fails to differentiate the two, in a useful way.
Policy is not a plan. It's an objective. Strategy has to conform to policy, until it has cycled through tactics, which bear on the policy.


As for speaking above the pay grade, there aren't any pay grades here. To the best of my knowledge, nobody's getting paid to post here (if anyone is, please let me know how to get in on that racket).
Poor use of metaphor on my part.

Bob's World
02-18-2011, 11:13 PM
I may have started this thread before most people were ready to look at such events with an open mind.

Infanteer
02-19-2011, 04:35 AM
I've been coming back to your theories and the various critiques from time to time. I'll have to go through this thread again. I take it the bump was in response to situations in the Middle East?

Although I think you're apt to not allow walls to be built between politics, governance, violence and war, sometimes I find that the definition of insurgency gets stretched to the point of uselessness. We shouldn't let the similarities between political opposition in Egypt and say Afghanistan override the key differences. The Egyptians did not resort to violent, organized resistence to seize some form of political power - if they did, we could lump it into an insurgency.

When we keep the definition focused on armed resistance against the state (which we know is only part of spectrum of political opposition to governance) we keep it rooted on a portion most of us of a professional stake in.

When we let "insurgency" expand to the point where it takes up non-violent opposition to governance and beyond - and likewise consider counterinsurgency to be simply "good governance" - it ceases being useful. "Counterinsurgency" and "good governance" should not be confused; counterinsurgency doesn't always require good governance and good goverance doesn't always require counterinsurgency.

I think it is better to keep insurgency relagated to the specific context I mentioned above. I don't see value in expanding the realm of counterinsurgency and insurgency into situations like the alderman addressing the fact that I'm pissed off because my property taxes got raised and they won't extend garbage removal to my house.

Infanteer
02-19-2011, 04:40 AM
When I look back through the thread, I say stuff that has already been said - apologies for the necro-parrot. However, this is a fundamental stumbling block I hit when trying to work through your ideas.

Bill Moore
02-19-2011, 05:13 AM
Posted by Infanteer,


When we keep the definition focused on armed resistance against the state (which we know is only part of spectrum of political opposition to governance) we keep it rooted on a portion most of us of a professional stake in.

When we let "insurgency" expand to the point where it takes up non-violent opposition to governance and beyond - and likewise consider counterinsurgency to be simply "good governance" - it ceases being useful. "Counterinsurgency" and "good governance" should not be confused; counterinsurgency doesn't always require good governance and good goverance doesn't always require counterinsurgency.

I agree with you for the most part, but non-violent movements have been part of many insurgencies (although I hate the term you can call it another line of operation). Sometimes they didn't know they were tools of the insurgents, but it was basically active PSYOP to create the perception that the government was illegimate to create doubt and hopefully reduce external support to the government. Especially effective if the government overreacts to these movements.

Bob is taking considerable liberty with definitions, but I think it is helpful. Are we going to develop strategy and doctrine for a particular set of tactics (insurgency), or are we going to develop a strategy that clearly identifies the desired strategic end state regardless of the tactics being employed, and then employ the talent of the Whole of Government as appropriate to achieve our objectives?

I'm not sold on Bob's expansion of the term insurgency and counterinsurgency, but on the other hand I'm beginning to see less utility for those terms to begin with.

Dayuhan
02-19-2011, 07:19 AM
I may have started this thread before most people were ready to look at such events with an open mind.

Disagreement doesn't necessarily indicate closed minds. Quite the opposite, I'd think.

Looking back over the thread I can't think of anything I'd say differently.

Really important to recognize that this sort of mass-based non-violent action does not just take place because popular discontent has risen to critical mass. It also happens because the capacity of the Government to suppress popular action has been reduced, often because the coercive apparatus of the State refuses orders to act against the populace. Non violent action is so successful precisely because it doesn't gather impetus until the populace recognizes that the State no longer has the capacity to suppress it. In many ways this is how a Government dies of natural causes.

I'm all for non-violent change. The thought of the US - or anyone - trying to promote or encourage non-violent change, though, is a good deal more doubtful. If you start pushing mass action while a Government still has the capacity to crack down you're likely to send people out to die.

As is so often the case, just because a certain type of development is often positive doesn't mean that outside parties should be going out and trying to promote it.

Looking around at mass actions of this sort also suggests that this sort of action is often not the result of a conscious strategic choice by established opposition groups. In many cases (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the CPP/NPA in the Philippines) are caught by surprise and left behind when spontaneous mass actions emerge in spite of them.

Bob's World
02-19-2011, 12:58 PM
I admit I take liberties with the current definition of insurgency. I do this for a variety of valid reasons:

1. The current definition demands the presence of violence, and sees insurgency as a form of war and warfare.

2. The current definition of COIN is written from the perspective of an intervening colonial military.

3. The focus on violent internal challenges to the state, regardless of purpose, leads to conflation of true insurgency with similar, but very different conditions, such as piracy, organized crime, civil war, etc. Each has a unique nature that demands a different category of engagement for best enduring effect. All, however, can be temporarily suppressed by brute military force.

4. The current definition of insurgency does not differentiate between one's role in their own country versus one's role intervening in some other country.

This is just off the top of my head, but these points go to the fine nuances that differentiate between success and victory.

I had the pleasure to attend the Rand COIN conference last week, and enjoyed a presentation by Dr. McCormick that was built upon his "Diamond" Insurgency model, but onto which he had applied a couple of new concepts. His proposal was that some situations are "State Heavy," where all of the conditions are in the favor of the state, so no insurgency has much chance. The Insurgent must "play uphill." Some are "Insurgent Heavy," where opposite conditions exist, and the State must "play uphill." Most are somewhere in between, where the insurgent and state compete until either the insurgent or the state reach the other's "break point."

Layered onto this is the perspective that the insurgent "must grow to win"; but that initially there is actually a sense of balance as the State "can hit, but cannot see"; whereas the Insurgent "can see, but cannot hit."

Good discussion, with Dr.'s John Gordon, Ahmed Hashim, Steve Metz and Peter Chalk all on the board.

As I listened, it struck me as to the similarities and difference of how Gordon and I look at insurgency. We both look for the commonalities in the pursuit of simple solutions to complex problems. At that point we then bifurcate, where Gordon's Diamond then lays out a clean model of "What" the dynamic of insurgency is between the State, the Populace, the insurgent, and the International actor; my model is more focused on the "why" of the interactions of these same actors.

This brings me to this point on why I think "violence" is such a poor defining characteristic for insurgency.

As Gordon was describing a "State Heavy" situation, I was thinking "Saudi Arabia and these many other Arab allies where such high conditions of insurgency exist, but any action is suppressed by the state so completely that no one dare act out." The example he gave, however, was Norway. A place where the populace is so content in their governance that no serious movement could possibly take root to begin with. This is the difference between a situation where there are high conditions of insurgency and the state must exert control (verb) and a state where there are low conditions of insurgency and the state enjoys control (noun) of the populace. One state spends its energy controlling the populace and spends little effort on the other essential elements of good governance. The other states are those who are so focused on providing good governance that little energy is required to "control" the populace's behavior.

On my model I have a space for those populaces where there are high conditions of insurgency, but no actual insurgency exists. Either the populace is effectively suppressed from action out by the state, or they have opted to employ non-violent tactics. (In such a situation our doctrine only recognizes the situation as insurgency once the populace decides both to act out AND to do so violently.)

Taking into account the velocity and acceleration from suppressed stability to the achievement of the government breaking point in Tunisia and Egypt, the concept that struck me was that of "Potential Energy." Where high conditions of insurgency exist, based upon the populaces perceptions of the poor governance (IAW my model), but where the state acts aggressive to compress and suppress that populace into submission, it creates a tremendous potential energy for rapid and powerful acceleration and velocity of popular action. Once ignited, these dynamic explode, and on Egypt's case, can achieve the government break point before the populace even has time to organize any true leadership organization to lead the movement (yes, the Muslim Brotherhood was there, but they were caught just as flat-footed as Mubarak, and did not cause or lead events there. They will however exploit to their purposes if allowed to).

Power = Force x Speed. When the potential energy is great enough it generates explosive speed, which can overcome previously overwhelming government force.

Of note, the state of insurgency in both Egypt and Tunisia still plot in the same place on my model. Nothing has been done yet to address the conditions of insurgency, so the plot is still far to the right, in Phase II "Strategic Stalemate". The only difference is that the populace has morphed from being "suppressed" to acting "non-violently". Such a movement can move quickly straight up into violence by the tactical choice of either the state or the populace. Moving the dynamic to the left, and into Phase 0 "peace/pre-insurgency" will take much time and government effort focused on the right aspects of governance. Focus must be on goodness over effectiveness to move the plot to the left.

This shows the plot for Afghanistan. Many of our Sunni Allies plot directly below this in the suppressed/non-violent category.

Infanteer
02-19-2011, 05:52 PM
I agree with you for the most part, but non-violent movements have been part of many insurgencies (although I hate the term you can call it another line of operation). Sometimes they didn't know they were tools of the insurgents, but it was basically active PSYOP to create the perception that the government was illegimate to create doubt and hopefully reduce external support to the government. Especially effective if the government overreacts to these movements.

Maybe we stumble when we view insurgency as independant "thing" - "insurgencies have this" or "insurgencies do that". Perhaps it is more useful to conceptulize insurgency as another "tool" or (I hate the term as well) "line of operation". "Non-violent resistance" and "Insurgency" ("violent resistance"?) are tools that groups of people opposed to the government use to achieve their aims?

As for Bob's post, I read through it twice. I wish to digest it further before comment.

jcustis
02-19-2011, 10:41 PM
We may split hairs over tools and framework, but wow, a lot of the current boing-on would have never registered with me as likely to happen.

Libya with reports of 40-50 shot dead by security forces.
Bahrain with reports of several killed dead in clashes with security forces, and the key terrain of the traffic circle seized again by the protesters.
Egypt at a low, slow simmer that has everyone watching...

What's next, and what the US does to try to steer the situation to an outcome that favors, will be terribly important, but I wonder just how important the five years after 2011 are in the minds of the people trying to forge a plan...and policy. The old ways of looking at things just a year ago seem to be changing at the rate of the microchip.

Bill Moore
02-19-2011, 10:57 PM
Posted by Bob's World,
At that point we then bifurcate, where Gordon's Diamond then lays out a clean model of "What" the dynamic of insurgency is between the State, the Populace, the insurgent, and the International actor; my model is more focused on the "why" of the interactions of these same actors.

I think the Diamond Model definitely addresses why, it is assumed that any practicioner would conduct analysis to determine the why before he or she determines what strategy to implement. This post indicates he is addressing the why to me, the bold and underlined portion (I added) represent the why:


As Gordon was describing a "State Heavy" situation, I was thinking "Saudi Arabia and these many other Arab allies where such high conditions of insurgency exist, but any action is suppressed by the state so completely that no one dare act out." The example he gave, however, was Norway. A place where the populace is so content in their governance that no serious movement could possibly take root to begin with.

The diamond model makes sense to me, and I think it could be a unifying vision from the strategic to the tactical (something we don't have in Afghanistan). I have stared at your model for awhile and it isn't clear to me; however, what you wrote makes perfect sense, but in my opinion it isn't well represented in your graphic.

Posted by Infanteer,


Perhaps it is more useful to conceptulize insurgency as another "tool" or (I hate the term as well) "line of operation". "Non-violent resistance" and "Insurgency" ("violent resistance"?) are tools that groups of people opposed to the government use to achieve their aims?

I think that is very well put, and further defines why I'm opposed to our rigid doctrine (separate discussion on the blog). It frequently prevents us from becoming a learning organization. We're to quick to jump into mission analysis to solve a perceived problem (often defined by doctrine) than conducting the prerequisite analysis to truly define the problem.

I think Bob's World is evolving his thoughts into a coherent argument (after months of BW post bashing) now. There is a significant so what in his arguments that needs to be captured somehow. It doesn't necessarily fit into our curent doctrinal construct, but it needs to.

Bob's World
02-19-2011, 11:36 PM
Bill, the part you highlighted was my assessment of why Gordon picked Norway, not a rationale that he offered. I want to be clear and not imply that any of my ideas are his.

But I agree, that his model is clean and helpful. It is a start point for identifying who the players are, and how they interact. I think the additional concepts he added were helpful as well. I was fortunate to host Gordon in Kandahar last year for a week or so, and had some great conversations.

Worth adding here is that he shared three kinds of wins:

1. A "Weak Win," where one side "breaks" the other side but fails to control the populace space.

2. A "Strong Win," where one breaks the other side and also gains control of the populace space.

3. A "Complete Win" where one breaks the other side, controls the populace space, and also addresses the issues of causation within the populace.

Afghanistan was probably a "Weak Win" in running the Taliban out. Sri Lanka is probably a "strong win", the insurgent is crushed, the government has access to the space, but has done nothing to address the underlying causation. On my model they crushed the problem straight down and now have it suppressed.

Dayuhan
02-20-2011, 01:38 AM
On my model I have a space for those populaces where there are high conditions of insurgency, but no actual insurgency exists. Either the populace is effectively suppressed from action out by the state, or they have opted to employ non-violent tactics. (In such a situation our doctrine only recognizes the situation as insurgency once the populace decides both to act out AND to do so violently.)

One thing to watch out for here is the tendency to define "conditions of insurgency" in Western terms that emphasize democracy and liberty. In much of the world populaces are willing to trade off liberty for security and prosperity, and a government that provides security and prosperity is able to get away with conditions that might easily spark revolt where poverty is higher.

The absence of violent resistance to Government in places like China and Saudi Arabia is not simply a function of suppression: that's a facile explanation that fits the model, but it's not adequate or accurate. The Saudis are no more free than they were during the oil glut and attendant economic crisis, but they are a lot more prosperous, and popular dissent has declined accordingly. China's economic boom has done a great deal to mute dissent. In both cases, despite political conditions that would drive an American to revolt, large-scale populace resistance to government is not likely to happen unless a significant economic upheaval arrives.

Fear is a powerful motivator. When people are financially secure they have something to lose. If they fear that the collapse of the established order is likely to produce conflict and insecurity and to threaten what they have, they may opt to support the established order despite its drawbacks. In much of the Arabian Gulf common citizens support their governments not because they love them, but because they fear chaos more than they fear tyranny.

Not the only factors in play, of course, but factors that have to be considered.

Rigidity of doctrine is always a mistake, and any time we fit circumstances into doctrine rather than adjusting doctrine to fit circumstances we are doing ourselves harm. The old rigid doctrine deserves to be challenged, but replacing it with equally rigid and equally absolutist ideas would be a mistake, IMO.


We may split hairs over tools and framework, but wow, a lot of the current boing-on would have never registered with me as likely to happen.

Libya with reports of 40-50 shot dead by security forces.
Bahrain with reports of several killed dead in clashes with security forces, and the key terrain of the traffic circle seized again by the protesters.
Egypt at a low, slow simmer that has everyone watching...

What's next, and what the US does to try to steer the situation to an outcome that favors, will be terribly important, but I wonder just how important the five years after 2011 are in the minds of the people trying to forge a plan...and policy. The old ways of looking at things just a year ago seem to be changing at the rate of the microchip.

I wouldn't have called any of it "unlikely"... all of these (with the possible exception of Bahrain) were clearly unstable situations with high potential for rapid change. The timing of course is never predictable, and the rapid sequence of near-simultaneous outbursts does come across as a surprise. If any one of these countries saw a popular uprising it would not come as any special surprise, I think... they all had it coming.

Steering the situation to an outcome that favors requires a good assessment of interest. I hope we take a long-term view and try to foster real independence, even if it means dealing with people we're uncomfortable with and dealing with governments that perceive their interests as diverging from ours. I think, for example, that it would be a very bad idea for us to push openly or covertly for exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood from governance in Egypt.

I suspect that the next 5 years will be very difficult ones in Tunisia and Egypt. It would be lovely to see a clean transition to democracy and prosperity, but it's not likely to be so easy.

jcustis
02-20-2011, 04:12 AM
Steering the situation to an outcome that favors requires a good assessment of interest. I hope we take a long-term view and try to foster real independence, even if it means dealing with people we're uncomfortable with and dealing with governments that perceive their interests as diverging from ours. I think, for example, that it would be a very bad idea for us to push openly or covertly for exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood from governance in Egypt.

This is precisely what I fear, that we won't have a long-term view that expands past the next sound byte.That's where wide misjudgments will be made...and the rest will be armchair hindsight.

Marc
02-20-2011, 07:44 PM
Steering the situation to an outcome that favors requires a good assessment of interest. I hope we take a long-term view and try to foster real independence, even if it means dealing with people we're uncomfortable with and dealing with governments that perceive their interests as diverging from ours. I think, for example, that it would be a very bad idea for us to push openly or covertly for exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood from governance in Egypt.

I suspect that the next 5 years will be very difficult ones in Tunisia and Egypt. It would be lovely to see a clean transition to democracy and prosperity, but it's not likely to be so easy.

I agree that a favorable outcome requires a thorough analysis of each actor's interest. Westerners often overlook the fact that in non-democratic countries, pursuing one's political ambition is a life-or-death decision. In the USA, the candidate that looses the presidential elections does not have to fear for his life. The contrary is often the case for people who try to take power in non-democratic countries but fail. Under these circumstances, every actor's plans are determined as much by his ambition than by his fear of what will happen to them if he fails.

So what will the Egyptian political landscape look like six months from now? Three main actors will probably determine the outcome: secular groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Army. IMO, it is useful to analyze their plan A, their plan B, as well as their worst case scenario.

Plan A of the secular groups is to unite around a democratic project and lead Egypt towards freedom, security, and prosperity. Their worst case scenario is to be marginalized or oppressed by either a military autocrat or an Islamist regime. Their plan B is a power sharing arrangement between themselves and the Muslim Brotherhood to marginalize the regular army.

Plan A of the Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic republic. However, the Muslim Brothers are pragmatic enough to realize this is not within reach at the moment. Such a project would require a popular Islamic army (like the Pasdaran in Iran) to balance the power of the regular army. At the moment, this is simply beyond their reach. Their worst case scenario is the emergence of a military autocrat like Nasser who removes them from the political scene. Their plan B is a power sharing arrangement between themselves and secular groups to marginalize the army.

Plan A of the Army is to found a military regime. However, the generals are not blind to the fact that this is precisely what the revolution was all about. At the moment, the generals are simply unable to put the genie back in the bottle. Their worst case scenario is the loss of all their priviliges as the prime political and economic power in Egypt. Their plan B is to bide their time and foster disagreements between the Muslim Brotherhood and secular groups and within secular groups themselves. Political instability will put the army in the role of arbitrator, a steppingstone towards a monopoly on political power.

I guess that, at the moment, all actors will opt for their Plan B. This will result in a system that is much more democratic than Moubarak's regime. However, it will be very fragile. Every actor will look for the first opportunity to move to Plan A and every actor will fear that the worst case scenario is just around the corner.

Dayuhan
02-21-2011, 02:19 AM
Plan A of the Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic republic. However, the Muslim Brothers are pragmatic enough to realize this is not within reach at the moment. Such a project would require a popular Islamic army (like the Pasdaran in Iran) to balance the power of the regular army. At the moment, this is simply beyond their reach. Their worst case scenario is the emergence of a military autocrat like Nasser who removes them from the political scene.

I actually suspect that the Muslim Brotherhood would be the primary beneficiary of a repressive military dictatorship. Moderate opposition would be stifled, and the Brothers are used to operating underground. It would take them a while to do it, but they would very likely emerge as the sole organized opposition to an unpopular and unsustainable government. As yu say, the Brotherhood is not in a position to impose an Islamic State right now... but if they are the primary lever in toppling a new dictatorship, they would be.

Marc
02-21-2011, 04:25 PM
Dayuhan,

You may be right. Yesterday, I re-read an account of the Iranian revolution (Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam) by Gilles Kepel. The book emphasizes the importance of organizational power in the aftermath of a revolution. I especially like the quote below on page 110.


As the shah's isolation grew, the support of his principal ally, the United States, was weakened by the election of Jimmy Carter to the White House in November 1976. The brutal tactics of the Savak became a target of the new American president's human rights policy, and Carter himself applied pressure on the shah to liberalize Iranian civil society. Naturally enough, the secular middle class took this criticism as a signal that the United States had withdrawn its unconditional support of the Pahlavis. The year 1977 saw a spate of meetings and demonstrations by the liberal opposition, which for the first time in many years was not repressed by the regime. The clergy took very little part in this short-lived "Tehran spring." Though the secular middle class was the first group to shake off political apathy, it proved incapable of taking the lead in a general resistance to the shah. It lacked the charisma necessary to rally the bazaaris and the urban poor around its cause, and it did not have an organized party base capable of mobilizing these social groups with slogans they could understand. Meanwhile, the student-led Marxist movements were too weak for mobilization, having been decimated by repression or distanced by exile. The way was open for a clerical splinter group led by Khomeini.

This text could have been written yesterday about the situation in Egypt.

Dayuhan
02-21-2011, 11:38 PM
Interesting how little attention Libya is getting here... possibly because it's not a US ally and we can't point to it as an example of US support to a repressive dictatorship?

Despite that, if Qaddafi falls there are a number of possible repercussions, not all of them negative. Both the process and the aftermath could be quite ugly though, it seems to be quickly spinning out of the "non-violent" category.

We'll see.

Bob's World
02-22-2011, 12:04 AM
Interesting how little attention Libya is getting here... possibly because it's not a US ally and we can't point to it as an example of US support to a repressive dictatorship?

Despite that, if Qaddafi falls there are a number of possible repercussions, not all of them negative. Both the process and the aftermath could be quite ugly though, it seems to be quickly spinning out of the "non-violent" category.

We'll see.

Actually Qaddafi jumped on board the GWOT ally bandwagon and has been suppressing his populace in recent years in the name of US blessed counterterrorism.

I am, however, surprised at the ruthless comments coming from his son, as I was under the impression from an article I had read a while back about his son being much more moderate and wanting to implement several reforms that would have granted the populace greater rights and liberties.

Certainly though there is a complex range of issues across all of these diverse populaces of all these many nations, and the US relationship is unique with each. Not everything is about us, and I certainly have never said it was. I have said, and will continue to say though, that the US needs to take greater responsibility for how our Cold War engagement has shaped the politics of this region and the consequences of populaces, joined and empowered by the modern information age, acting out to achieve greater liberties, respect and self. I have also said that over reliance on "facts" is dangerous, as these type of uprisings are based in perception, rather than fact. And as Wilf often says, in this reason everyone has their own perspective on what the "facts" are. I doubt many share our perspective in that regard.

Dayuhan
02-22-2011, 12:59 AM
Actually Qaddafi jumped on board the GWOT ally bandwagon and has been suppressing his populace in recent years in the name of US blessed counterterrorism.

Nominally, yes, though calling him a US ally would be a huge exaggeration, and it's not as if he ever needed or asked our permission to suppress his populace. Certainly the US isn't in any way enabling him, nor do I see any evidence that the US is perceived as a supporter or enabler.


I am, however, surprised at the ruthless comments coming from his son, as I was under the impression from an article I had read a while back about his son being much more moderate and wanting to implement several reforms that would have granted the populace greater rights and liberties.

I'm not that surprised... I had the feeling that the son was being set up in a sort of "good cop" role, but that the "reforms" under discussion were never intended to be more than cosmetic. The son is in the same boat as the father, and knows it; if that boat is threatened he'll defend it as viciously as any of them.


I have also said that over reliance on "facts" is dangerous, as these type of uprisings are based in perception, rather than fact. And as Wilf often says, in this reason everyone has their own perspective on what the "facts" are. I doubt many share our perspective in that regard.

I've also said many times that managing perception is very different from managing fact, and we have to know the difference. If people are responding to actual policies or actual circumstances, we may be able to alter their response by altering policies or circumstances. We can't do that if people are responding to a perception that is not in fact grounded in any reality subject to our influence.

Since we speak of perception, we also have to accept that any US attempt to intervene in or influence domestic policy in other countries, especially in the Muslim world, will be perceived as self-interested meddling, no matter what we say or what we actually intend. Nobody anywhere will ever believe that we are the champion of the populace, least of all the populace. We cannot impose ourselves uninvited in that role with any credibility: what we intend is irrelevant, the perception will be that we are trying to influence or control events for our benefit.

We cannot correct the perceptions left by past meddling with present or future meddling. The answer to bad meddling is not good meddling, it's less meddling. We also can't change these perceptions overnight: they will take as long to change as they took to create, possibly longer: trust is more easily broken than built. We can start the process by thinking twice, and then twice more, before pushing ourselves into other people's domestic affairs.