Looking for a SME on implementation of Sons of Iraq..

[jcustis]

...or, as it was also known, Concerned Local Citizens.

I would conduct a deeper scan of the SWJ library, but bandwith is especially tight right now, and all I am looking for is to get in touch with anyone who was involved in implementing a CLC group in Iraq during the Awakening. Relevant .pdf files that speak to the lessons learned, issues for consideration, and second and third order of effects from standing up those types of groups, are also welcome.

[Tracker275]

...or, as it was also known, Concerned Local Citizens.

I would conduct a deeper scan of the SWJ library, but bandwith is especially tight right now, and all I am looking for is to get in touch with anyone who was involved in implementing a CLC group in Iraq during the Awakening. Relevant .pdf files that speak to the lessons learned, issues for consideration, and second and third order of effects from standing up those types of groups, are also welcome.

Well, I can't tell you much about all of that. However, I can tell you how they are being disbanded in areas, and are going back to their Al-Qaeda roots in places like Saba Al Bour, Hor Al-Bosh, and Mushada. Additionally, those in Tarmiyah are getting whacked left and right.

I can't tell anything about the success of the Son's of Iraq, because the only success I've seen first hand this year is they are successfully getting killed by Al-Qaeda in groups of up to (5) or more. Particularly, if they are at checkpoints on the main highways. I've picked up more than my share of parts of blown up SOI members, and those flex-cuffed and shot in the head...sometimes throats cut too...than I care to count this year.

Here is an article for you regarding the extent of what is happening to members, former members, and family of Son's of Iraq.

Balad hospital workers cope with the pain of wounded children (http://www.stripes.com/news/balad-hospital-workers-cope-with-the-pain-of-wounded-children-1.99043)

Lessons learned are that you don't want to become the friend of your foe if you know your former foe won't be around in the end to protect you. Personally, I feel it worked for a bit, but it was like putting a bandaid on a sucking chest wound. In the end, it all ends the same. Unless we stay in Iraq, they are easy prey for insurgents that are moving in faster than we can pull out.

The article describes the child that made it through this incident that I was at. It is any wonder he survived, because his grandfather only had part of his upper torso left. His grandfather was a former Son's of Iraq member. Al-Qaeda are currently seeking out and killing active and even former members of the SOI. It is definitely not a successful program, because they do not have any support anymore, and are becoming an easy target.

Here is what the news article did not show when describing Hani Shaker Mahmod's sons story in Tarmiyah earlier this year...

Took these pictures while at the scene. Definitely reflects the many incidents that we went to where SOI were targeted this year. When the grandfather pulled up, and went inside the building in front of the vehicle, the child was in the car. Al-Qaeda went and through a bomb under the car knowing the child was in it, and when the granfather came back and got into the vehicle...well, the pictures below tell the story...

[OfTheTroops]

Tribal Engagement Teams, Abu Risha, and Marines and Promises

[jcustis]

Tribal Engagement Teams, Abu Risha, and Marines and Promises


I'm sorry, but is this a book?

BREAK--

In the pursuit of developing courses of action with regard to lovally-grown forces, the cookie-cutter policy positions continue to present themselves: that security forces, once trained, should be forward deployed to minimize corruption.

I'm sorry, but after working on Iraqi Security Forces and now Afghan National Security Forces issues, I continue to scratch my head over where this argument comes from? Can anyone point me to policy paper, study, or FID operating principles text that support this policy position?

Right now, there is nothing that convinces me that forward deployed forces are better than locally-grown and locally-deployed forces, especially in the context of tribal power and influence, but I don't fully understand the source of the other side of the coin.

[ganulv]

It is nothing in depth, but there was a related act of This American Life (http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/416/iraq-after-us?act=1)first broadcast last October. Don’t know how the facts as presented or the spin square with reality, but the piece is a nice piece of storytelling. The protagonist has been mentioned on SWC (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=32022&postcount=2).