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Tracker275
08-26-2010, 05:10 AM
Back to Basics…The Lost Art of Basic Combat Fundamentals

Four days after I turned 17-years old, I found myself at MEPS enlisting in the Army in January of 1993. A lot has changed since then, and a lot of redirection of focus has taken place over the last two decades of the service I still maintain.

When I went to 2nd Ranger Battalion in 1994, I was instantly given the realism of what I had entered, as I did not really get a chance to sleep for the first few days of my arrival. I inprocessed through CIF, received the (3) duffel bags of gear, rucksack, etc., only to get to the Ranger Battalion and instantly have an E4/Specialist yelling at me that night to get my gear ready to head to the field. He threw his web gear at me, and said, “Make yours look like mine.” So, without any hesitation, I took the SOP that was given to me, and started to take 550-cord and start to tie down my equipment, cut off excess nylon off of straps, 100mph tape up loose tails, and place items in the little pouches tied down to my gear that I would later use in the field. Just for my canteen cover and canteen, I had to even tie down the little plastic flap for utilizing the tube on a gas mask, then secure it with 100mph tape…Place iodine tablets in the little pouch on the outside of the canteen cover, place engineer tape in the cover, with a canteen cup that had a stove stand that slid over the outside of the cup, and finally tied down my canteen to my gear in case it fell out, I wouldn’t drop it and lose it in the night or on a jump.

The detail to which I had to just get my canteen and canteen cover ready to the way my rucksack was setup. Even something as simple as taking illumination tape, writing my personal information on it, covering it with acetate, and then securing it with 100mph tape to the frame of my rucksack was an intricate detail. To some, they may wonder why you would do that, but to someone with basic knowledge of field craft, they know that at night, you will be able to see your name in the dark, and know which rucksack is yours in an ORP when you have to grab it and run to move out from a raid or ambush.

In today’s world, it is all about what “guchi gear” you can get, or what elaborate setup you can have your weapon put into…From Surefire lights, Picatiny Rails, custom buttsocks, etc., it is all about what may work, but looks “cool” at the same time. The pictures of Rangers floating down the river on a Zodiac with painted faces are gone. We have become the age of the “Techy Warrior”, and less on the basics, and field craft. I personally have seen infantry that are barely able to utilize a compass, read a map, perform a true road march, and be able to setup their gear to be able to stay out on a patrol for more than 24hrs. The US soldier of the modern age is completely attached to their vehicles, “guchi gear”, technology, and the roads of the country we are in. The philosophy of decentralized operations is a lost art, and even the ability to perform extended patrols with knowledge of “The Basics” is becoming even more of an issue. No longer do soldiers place camouflage paint to their faces, but rely on digital camouflage that has proven to be ineffective in all environments to aid in their physical feature break up.

This is something that I have been watching for a long time since we changed to the ACU, Velcro, MOLLE, body armor (IBA, IOTV, etc.) and other equipment.

Yes, it all works fine in Iraq and Afghanistan, but there is absolutely no way on earth that you can take the soldier equipped for Iraq or Afghanistan and place them in a jungle and expect them to be able to perform the same mission. In the heat and humidity of the jungle and other temperate environments, the foam padded helmet that does not breath creates a heat trap, and absorbs moisture that will not ever dry…the body armor expected to be worn will fry a soldier due to their body core temperature going through the roof…the lack of knowledge of field craft while on a patrol when they expect to be back at the FOB that night…etc…….These are all examples and failures of our military to understand we cannot become “Pigeon-Holed” into one form of combat, but have to realize we must be able to fight in any environment.

Honestly, based on how we equip our soldiers for Iraq/Afghanistan, if we had to send them to a tropical environment with exactly what they have there….Can anyone honestly say that a Stryker, or that soldier with the IOTV, and tons of gear will be able to survive there?

….I say not

Tracker275
08-26-2010, 05:19 AM
Take the "Techy Warrior" of today and place him here with everything he his reliant on and see how he does...

Panama - 1997 (2nd Ranger Battalion)

William F. Owen
08-26-2010, 06:45 AM
Do not confuse one thing, with the other.

YES - modern infantry are overloaded with much they could do without/discard, and would not work if the need arose to conduct extended dismounted operations.
YES - core navigation and field craft skills need to be emphasised and retained.

BUT - a lot of modern equipment is remarkably useful. I was soldiering in the 1980's. I am deeply envious of some of the equipment I see today.
Also a lot of what infantry does/did is just dumb. Rubber boats? Armies who have actually fought in jungles use wooden or metal boats. They also used outboard motors. You can plug a 7.62mm whole in aluminium boat with a rag, pushed home with a round. Can't do that in rubber death-trap. Rubber boats do have a role, but it is very, very limited.

A large amount of "Infantry skills" are actually just "Hiawatha BS" not fixed in an operational reality.
In modern warfare no one can operate without vehicle support or some sort. Even SF are deeply reliant on helicopters.

All for core skills, but beware the "Hiawathas".

Tracker275
08-26-2010, 02:21 PM
Do not confuse one thing, with the other.

YES - modern infantry are overloaded with much they could do without/discard, and would not work if the need arose to conduct extended dismounted operations.
YES - core navigation and field craft skills need to be emphasised and retained.

BUT - a lot of modern equipment is remarkably useful. I was soldiering in the 1980's. I am deeply envious of some of the equipment I see today.
Also a lot of what infantry does/did is just dumb. Rubber boats? Armies who have actually fought in jungles use wooden or metal boats. They also used outboard motors. You can plug a 7.62mm whole in aluminium boat with a rag, pushed home with a round. Can't do that in rubber death-trap. Rubber boats do have a role, but it is very, very limited.

A large amount of "Infantry skills" are actually just "Hiawatha BS" not fixed in an operational reality.
In modern warfare no one can operate without vehicle support or some sort. Even SF are deeply reliant on helicopters.

All for core skills, but beware the "Hiawathas".

You missed the point I was trying to make. It is not about the boats...It is about the reliance on technology. Technology is great, however they can't do anything without it anymore.

I may need to repost to get the point I'm trying to make so folks don't think it is about boats.

Pete
08-26-2010, 04:14 PM
When we changed from olive drab fatigues to the Battledress Uniform in 1982 we were told not to starch and press the BDUs because it would ruin some sort of protection in the fabric against detection by infrared night-vision technology. I'm glad nobody could see me while I was standing next to a 105mm howitzer or a 5-ton truck ... :rolleyes:

Tom Odom
08-26-2010, 05:30 PM
When we changed from olive drab fatigues to the Battledress Uniform in 1982 we were told not to starch and press the BDUs because it would ruin some sort of protection in the fabric against detection by infrared night-vision technology. I'm glad nobody could see me while I was standing next to a 105mm howitzer or a 5-ton truck ... :rolleyes:

But don't forget, Pete, that after the BDUs were reissued in a hot-weather version (post-Grenada after the heat injuries), we started starching them....:D

I keep watching for the first pair of shined roughside out boots.

Sooner or later, it will happen :cool:

Tom

Pete
08-26-2010, 05:40 PM
I was told that with the old WWII buckle-top boot you used a dog-tag chain to make the rough leather smooth so it would accept a polish.

Ken White
08-26-2010, 07:44 PM
I was told that with the old WWII buckle-top boot you used a dog-tag chain to make the rough leather smooth so it would accept a polish.and let it burn long enough to burn off most of the little bits of protruding hide then hit 'em with an old bore brush. Five times as fast as the chain...

Not that I know, I read that somewhere...:D

Tracker 275
"I may need to repost to get the point I'm trying to make so folks don't think it is about boats.Nah, you made the point. Wilf's merely pointing out a basic "stay alive" fact lest someone get the wrong ides from the visuals and Ranger usage, rubber boats do have merit (turning over in heavy surf...) but patrolling jungle rivers sure isn't advisable.

For that, you use the old M2 Assault Boat shown below. Engineer Assault Boat Teams have 80 of 'em by TOE, probably few to none operational right now but there are likely dozens of the boats in the bunkers at Pueblo Army Depot. Six guys can carry them and get 'em in the water then ride in them (10 overload :wry: ).

Your points, that we do not teach the basics at all well and that we are sometimes over reliant on techo-goodies is well made and is certainly valid. Your further point that things that work in the 'Stan or I-rak may not work elsewhere is even more important. I've long been waiting to see he who tries personal armor in the Jungle...:eek:

However, in line with the 'picture is worth a thousand words' bit, putting pitchers of a large batch of boats with outboards and a couple of shots of a SOF 60 bird did sort of turn the end result toward the techno aspects rather than your valid and important points... ;)

Pete
08-26-2010, 10:06 PM
Now that Ken's let the cat out of the bag it won't be long before the Army is shining its rough-leather-out boots. It'll start at Fort Bragg, migrate to Fort Campbell, and then to Fort Riley.

GI Zhou
08-26-2010, 11:52 PM
When we changed from olive drab fatigues to the Battledress Uniform in 1982 we were told not to starch and press the BDUs because it would ruin some sort of protection in the fabric against detection by infrared night-vision technology. I'm glad nobody could see me while I was standing next to a 105mm howitzer or a 5-ton truck ... :rolleyes:

I was told that same thing when in the Royal Australian Air Farce when we got our AUSCAM uniforms. Army blokes told me to boil and use heavy detergent for three washes before wearing them as they were a heat magnet. 40% nylon in the tropics sucks.

Ken White
08-27-2010, 12:25 AM
if it can be avoided...:wry:

Infanteer
08-27-2010, 03:37 AM
This is something that I have been watching for a long time since we changed to the ACU, Velcro, MOLLE, body armor (IBA, IOTV, etc.) and other equipment.

Yes, it all works fine in Iraq and Afghanistan, but there is absolutely no way on earth that you can take the soldier equipped for Iraq or Afghanistan and place them in a jungle and expect them to be able to perform the same mission. In the heat and humidity of the jungle and other temperate environments, the foam padded helmet that does not breath creates a heat trap, and absorbs moisture that will not ever dry…the body armor expected to be worn will fry a soldier due to their body core temperature going through the roof…the lack of knowledge of field craft while on a patrol when they expect to be back at the FOB that night…etc…….These are all examples and failures of our military to understand we cannot become “Pigeon-Holed” into one form of combat, but have to realize we must be able to fight in any environment.
Honestly, based on how we equip our soldiers for Iraq/Afghanistan, if we had to send them to a tropical environment with exactly what they have there….Can anyone honestly say that a Stryker, or that soldier with the IOTV, and tons of gear will be able to survive there?

….I say not

Did you walk 40 miles to school each day with no shoes as well? Thanks for reminding me about how inferior my generation is. As I was humping around in the 40 degree celcius heat in a grapefield I should have said "Well, it could be worse, I could be soldiering in the '80s when men were men!"

Funny thing is, the generation before yours probably said the same thing about you guys.

I don't doubt that your relevant points have merit, but they get lost in your polemic about "the good ole days". For some reason, people tend to remember the "good" of the past while only focusing on the "not-so-bad" of the present.

Pete
08-27-2010, 04:44 AM
*Nothing* migrates to Fort Riley if it can be avoided...:wry:
The Big Red One would be the last outfit in the world that would want to be left behind in a race to be starched and shiny-boots STRAC.

Question for Ken -- what was STRAC, anyway? Strategic Command? The figure of speech lived on way after the existence of the organization. In my time it had the connotation of being squared-away and ready for inspection.

Tracker275
08-27-2010, 04:57 AM
Did you walk 40 miles to school each day with no shoes as well? Thanks for reminding me about how inferior my generation is. As I was humping around in the 40 degree celcius heat in a grapefield I should have said "Well, it could be worse, I could be soldiering in the '80s when men were men!"

Funny thing is, the generation before yours probably said the same thing about you guys.

I don't doubt that your relevant points have merit, but they get lost in your polemic about "the good ole days". For some reason, people tend to remember the "good" of the past while only focusing on the "not-so-bad" of the present.

I find it funny you say that, because I am still in. Having just returned from a tour only weeks ago, I think my points are valid as they encompass not only several years ago, but today. So, to act as if I am out of the service and dwelling on the "good-ole-days" is definitely a deficiency on your part, as I still live it and do it in combat theaters as you do.

So, do not belittle me with your dribble about today vs. yesterday, as I am still humping the same ruck as you today in the same places that you end up. See you in theater on my next tour.

Tracker275
08-27-2010, 05:09 AM
However, in line with the 'picture is worth a thousand words' bit, putting pitchers of a large batch of boats with outboards and a couple of shots of a SOF 60 bird did sort of turn the end result toward the techno aspects rather than your valid and important points... ;)

I do not see how this particular portion of your points actually makes sense. Considering that the Waffen SS utilized inflatable boats in WWII, and the innovation of the helecopter is as old as the Korean War.

A soldier can still make their ruck float, and helecopters transporting troops is definitely not a new concept. However, the fact that those same individuals that were transported either by boat or helo, could at least use a compass.

Most are missing the point that after you are tranported to where you need to go, they maintain the reliance on everything from mine resistant vehicles, satellites, roads, etc. The Chinese proved that a satellite is just as vulnerable as anything on earth, when they shot one out of space in January 2007. Considering that all vehicles are reliant on their Blue Force Tracker, DAGGER GPS, etc., and the fact that the lensatic compass is not considered as part of your kit, or a map is anywhere to be found....

...Well, that is only one piece of the big picture. Look at who we are fighting in Afghanistan. The fact that we are still there after almost 10-years, the supposedly most "advanced" military in the world can not defeat those that wear regular cultural garb, and only carry the most basic of weapons.

Please note, that the enemy we fight today, is holding off the self-proclaimed "military superpower" of the world. All the Taliban is doing is what we did against the British in our own history.

Now, for a recap on the boats and helecopters you speak of, here is some history when apparently "techy" was started.

...The first picture is a squad in the Waffen SS on the Eastern Front in an inflatable boat, and the second is a MEDEVAC in Korea during the Korean War.

Tracker275
08-27-2010, 05:11 AM
....Geesh...to think we moved beyond frick'n boats...

carl
08-27-2010, 06:00 AM
Tracker:

Your point about over reliance on technology and disregard for the basics is well taken (please note that I am a forever civilian when you consider my opinion) I think. And it extends beyond the ground and into the air. I illustrate with the following story.

We took off one very fine day from our base next to the Tigris. About 2:00pm it was with visibility clear to the horizon. 15 miles from the field we had a total electrical failure and lost all our radios, nav and comm. I was the non-flying pilot so while I was sorting things out I told the flying pilot to head back to the field. He then asked me which way he should go. 15 miles out and he didn't know where he was or how to get back to base because the GPS was out! I was shocked. After that I made sure to tell new pilots to make a point of learning the landmarks so they could find their way in good wx if the nav went out. When I started my flying career 36 years ago I never dreamed that I would someday have to brief a professional pilot to look at the countryside so he could find his way.

The guy I flew with that day wasn't deficient or especially unusual. That is how many guys are today. Not just civilian either. If the GPS constellation was knocked out, it would be complete chaos.

I would like your opinion on something I've thought about over the years and asked other people. Do you think it would be useful to sort of wargame old battles and campaigns using present equipment and technology? For example, run the Merrill's Marauders mission with modern uniforms, equipment and weapons; but without the helos. Could it be done? Or chasing the Apaches into Mexico, again without the helos. Just curious.

carl
08-27-2010, 06:06 AM
That was just one story about aircrew learning to forget about landmarks, maps and roads. I have lots of others.

Tracker275
08-27-2010, 06:30 AM
I would like your opinion on something I've thought about over the years and asked other people. Do you think it would be useful to sort of wargame old battles and campaigns using present equipment and technology? For example, run the Merrill's Marauders mission with modern uniforms, equipment and weapons; but without the helos. Could it be done? Or chasing the Apaches into Mexico, again without the helos. Just curious.

I would like to say that you provided a perfect case in point...

No, the wargaming of old battles and campaigns using present equipment and technology is not the key to either training or current operations in a wartime environment.

One thing I learned early on in my military career is always have a contingency plan. That plan was focused on utilizing another avenue for completing the mission without any relationship to the initial plan.

When I go to theater, yes, I utilize my GPS, and all of the technology that is available to our forces in a combat theater.

However, I always have another means that does not rely on the same technology that doesn't work at that time so I can continue on with my mission.

A few months ago, I will never forget the look on a Platoon Leaders face when he was fiddling around with his GPS, and couldn't get it to do what he wanted. In the time it took him to just fiddle around with the various screens of his GPS, I pulled out a lensatic compass out of my kit, and in literally seconds...I was like, "Sir, we need to go this way, and we should be at the point we need to get to just up ahead...Follow me..."

What he was trying to pull up was the compass capability on his GPS, instead of just pulling out a compass, which he did not have. Granted, this is a simple scenario that is only one facet of what I am bringing up. It does not have to be a GPS vs. a compass. It can be anything that has a technological tie, but is backed up by a backup that does not require the same technology.

I do not ever want anyone to say that I said technology is bad. What I want folks to realize is you never "put all your eggs in one basket", so to speak.

Always have a contingency that does not rely on one thing, and always be able to rely on what is not the latest and greatest in technology.

Right now, we are finding ourselves in theater only a few dead batteries away from disaster. However, the main point I've been trying to make is that when technology fails, we do not have a backup.

William F. Owen
08-27-2010, 06:55 AM
Tracker 275Nah, you made the point. Wilf's merely pointing out a basic "stay alive" fact lest someone get the wrong ides from the visuals and Ranger usage, rubber boats do have merit (turning over in heavy surf...) but patrolling jungle rivers sure isn't advisable.


As ever... thank you Ken.

Technology: - I watched every sniper doing a British Army stalking exercise get detected by an old Hand held thermal imager in 1985. Today, TIWS, NVG and PRR have made soldiers greatly more effective that they were in the 1980s provided they are used in context. GPS has meant that things previously very difficult, can now be done quicker and by more people.

The down side of technology is stupid people, and stupid leaders, unable to correctly understand its limitations or advantages. OK some folks can't work without it. They are merely badly trained and badly lead.

Ken White
08-27-2010, 04:04 PM
I do not see how this particular portion of your points actually makes sense.and trying to help. My point was simply that you diluted your important message about the basics by including not totally germane pictures. Nothing more than that.
Considering that the Waffen SS utilized inflatable boats in WWII, and the innovation of the helecopter is as old as the Korean War.How did that end up for the Waffen SS in Russia? The point Wilf made was that rubber boats can be sunk easily with small arms fire and that on jungle rivers, patrolling or moving to contact, where concealment of your opponent is not difficult, that is a likely occurrence. My added point was that we have craft better suited but they aren't readily available. That mostly to remind Ol' Wilf and various readers that we've been one of those Armies with Jungle experience as well, however in training as in war, you use what's available... :D

Yeah, I remember we had hoptiflopters in Korea, I saw 'em. Also got to ride in a bunch of different types flown by Army, Navy, Marines and the Air Force as well as Korean and Viet Namese birds and do insertions and CAs in the southeast Asia War Games.
A soldier can still make their ruck float, and helecopters transporting troops is definitely not a new concept. However, the fact that those same individuals that were transported either by boat or helo, could at least use a compass.I take your point and agree. That says it all, the rest of your here quoted comment is unnecessary. Been there, done that -- lot of folks who post here have been other places and done more... :wry:

However, you also said this in another post above:
Right now, we are finding ourselves in theater only a few dead batteries away from disaster. However, the main point I've been trying to make is that when technology fails, we do not have a backup.Also true. Also not the first time it's been noted here: LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10422&highlight=reliance+technology). You can use the 'Search' function on this site and find other posts and threads related to over reliance on technology and allied thoughts. Here's an example (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/search.php?searchid=2767068) using 'infantry load weight.' Try searching posts for 'GPS' then scroll through the resulting Titles. That's merely a suggestion for your consideration, there are a lot of experienced folks posting here and many ideas have been broached in an existing thread that one can add to; the newest post will rise to the top and make the front page even on a Thread started in 2006 and with no posts since 2008.

Please recall that 'discussion' isn't a synonym for attack. Lighten up...:cool:

Ken White
08-27-2010, 04:09 PM
...what was STRAC, anyway? Strategic Command? The figure of speech lived on way after the existence of the organization. In my time it had the connotation of being squared-away and ready for inspection.That was XVII Airborne Corps in the early to mid-60s. The STRAC appellation for squared away came from the propensity of the 82d and then 101st to spit shine anything not nailed down...

The Strategic Army Corps reported to US Strike Command, then commanded by one Paul D. Adams, noteworthy for relieving and firing more senior people than even did DePuy (and thus arousing the ire of the Personnel folks who actually had to work and scurry to find replacements...). He demanded and got results. Different world today...

Tom Odom
08-27-2010, 05:41 PM
That was XVII Airborne Corps in the early to mid-60s. The STRAC appellation for squared away came from the propensity of the 82d and then 101st to spit shine anything not nailed down...

The Strategic Army Corps reported to US Strike Command, then commanded by one Paul D. Adams, noteworthy for relieving and firing more senior people than even did DePuy (and thus arousing the ire of the Personnel folks who actually had to work and scurry to find replacements...). He demanded and got results. Different world today...


Not only was Adams (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_D._Adams) CINC US Strike Command (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Strike_Command), he was USCINCMEAFSA (Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia). Adams' personality conflicted with the equally large personality of Ambassador Godley (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._McMurtrie_Godley) in the Congo in 1964. Godley actually refused him country clearance.

Adams was also notable as a former member of the 1st Special Service Force (Devils Brigade) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Special_Service_Force)

Ken White
08-27-2010, 08:24 PM
His acquisition of the MEAFSA title was a notable bit of bureaucratic guile. Nearly as I could tell, Adam's personality conflicted with most everyone. He never seemed terribly concerned. He was the ADC of the 25th in Korea and fought with everyone. He earned the ire of the entire 1st MarDiv when he was CofS Eighth Army -- except for one Platoon Sergeant whom Adams had given a bottle of Bourbon in Italy when he was the 1 SSF XO...

Never met Godley but I do know he and COL Laurent, the Belgique Para Cdo commandant in the fall of '64 were, um, not friendly... :D

Infanteer
08-28-2010, 12:29 AM
I find it funny you say that, because I am still in. Having just returned from a tour only weeks ago, I think my points are valid as they encompass not only several years ago, but today. So, to act as if I am out of the service and dwelling on the "good-ole-days" is definitely a deficiency on your part, as I still live it and do it in combat theaters as you do.

So, do not belittle me with your dribble about today vs. yesterday, as I am still humping the same ruck as you today in the same places that you end up. See you in theater on my next tour.

Well then you should know as well as I the capabilities of today's soldier. Mine were fit, enthusastic and pretty savvy young men. Sure, they have had some things imposed on them from above (protective equipment), poor operational concepts (KFC in the FOB) and some training deficiencies (GPS/Compass seems to be a favourite) but the soldiers of today are as adaptable and hungry to shoot their enemy in the face as before. I really don't get where the assertion that we'd fall apart in the jungle is coming from. We'd probably adapt, improvise and overcome in that environment just as we did when we got fired off to the desert or the Hindu-Kush.

My 2 Cents,

Infanteer

Ken White
08-28-2010, 01:14 AM
Well then you should know as well as I the capabilities of today's soldier...but that's the fault of the system, not the kids. Aside from a small percentage recruited who should not have been for obvious reasons, most of these kids will do what's needed -- if they don't do it right, it is the fault of the system that failed to decently train and prepare them.

The same son who came from Afghanistan on the MTT to Edmonton four or five years ago was a few years before that a Ranger Instructor (RI) at Dahlonega. While he was there, they brought in a bunch of old, retired 1960 version RIs for a couple of days to assess and get their thoughts on current training.

After they'd followed the working RIs around a bit, they assembled them and asked their opinion. The general response was "It's a wonder you get anything done; you have a bunch of wusses..." (I think they used another word). The Bn Cdr replied, "Yes, student preparation and attitudes are a problem." The Old guys response was "Yeah, they're kinda weak, too..."

The story that the second US Marine recruited in 1775 came aboard the Frigate Alfred, griping and moaning and was met by the first one recruited with "You should've been in the old Corps..." may well be true...

Some things don't change all that much. :wry:

Tracker275
08-28-2010, 03:55 AM
As ever... thank you Ken.

Technology: - I watched every sniper doing a British Army stalking exercise get detected by an old Hand held thermal imager in 1985. Today, TIWS, NVG and PRR have made soldiers greatly more effective that they were in the 1980s provided they are used in context. GPS has meant that things previously very difficult, can now be done quicker and by more people.

The down side of technology is stupid people, and stupid leaders, unable to correctly understand its limitations or advantages. OK some folks can't work without it. They are merely badly trained and badly lead.

Yup, well put. I'd say everything you wrote regarding the use of technology is right on the money, in my honest opinion.

I have to say, I am most definitely not against it at all. Shoot, I am also a computer junky in more ways than one. I would just say I like to always incorporate a backup that does not rely on the same technology, or have a contingency plan that I can fall back on if everything goes to pieces.

Tracker275
08-28-2010, 04:07 AM
However, you also said this in another post above:Also true. Also not the first time it's been noted here: LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10422&highlight=reliance+technology). You can use the 'Search' function on this site and find other posts and threads related to over reliance on technology and allied thoughts. Here's an example (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/search.php?searchid=2767068) using 'infantry load weight.' Try searching posts for 'GPS' then scroll through the resulting Titles. That's merely a suggestion for your consideration, there are a lot of experienced folks posting here and many ideas have been broached in an existing thread that one can add to; the newest post will rise to the top and make the front page even on a Thread started in 2006 and with no posts since 2008.

Please recall that 'discussion' isn't a synonym for attack. Lighten up...:cool:

Ken, I'm fully aware of the use of the "Search" function on a website, and fully capable of utilizing it. However, if it is taboo to note from my own thoughts what I wish to post, because it has already been posted...then maybe we should only post thoughts that have not been published after a full comprehensive query of this entire site.

As far as a "discussion" vs. an "attack"...I totally agree. But, please note that a majority of my posts have been to support my initial post, which I have had to provide a multitude of couter-arguments. Which have only in recent posts brought out thoughts and debate of the concept of what I bring up, instead of the "sharpshooting" of my content.

So, if it is viewed as an attack, then I would like to transition your comment back in yours, or anyone elses direction. It does go both ways, which I can say that I have yet to view anyone in this thread as having attacked my position. Well, the only one would be Infanteer, whose comments were most definitely sarcastic to say the least. So, yes, I will attack back in light of comments of that nature.

Now, what I have been noticing is that there has been a fixation in this thread on "boats", "jungle", etc. That was not the point. The point was to point out an opposite environment, and a different time period with a different viewpoint. Unfortunately, the point I've made has maybe been identified by some, and still not by others. Instead, the defensive seems to be what I am viewing after my initial posting. I read how "Yes, your point is valid, but..." which appears to be the comments. That is fine though.

So, I'm going to sit back and see what comes about, and leave it up to the audience to determine if they wish to continue with this thread. Maybe it should not be, since as you noted, this topic has already been discussed.

Please let me know the rules of this board, and if I am supposed to search the site entirely for any topic I wish to post on. If this thread does not have validity in any form, because of previous posted topics, then please remove it.

Just my opinion, for what it is worth.

Pete
08-28-2010, 04:31 AM
Lighten up Tracker, don't take yourself so seriously. You made some good points that people in this thread have made a special point of agreeing with and acknowledging. However, your Ranger experience doesn't make you the only person here who has been through some tough things while in uniform. It seems to me that one of the main occupational hazards of long service in the military is turning into an opinionated know-it-all.

Tracker275
08-28-2010, 04:54 AM
Lighten up Tracker, don't take yourself so seriously. You made some good points that people in this thread have made a special point of agreeing with and acknowledging. However, your Ranger experience doesn't make you the only person here who has been through some tough things while in uniform. It seems to me that one of the main occupational hazards of long service in the military is turning into an opinionated know-it-all.

Hey Pete, you need to lighten up. I could say the same about Ken, yourself, or anyone else. However, I definitely do not throw the kind of directed attack that you just did.

You need to chill out Pete, you are getting worked up over a simple website. However, if this is your only life, then I guess you can. That is your call.


It seems to me that one of the main occupational hazards of long service in the military is turning into an opinionated know-it-all.

Funny you say that. Everything I have posted, and everyone else has posted is their "opinion". So, I would say based on your argument, we are all "opinionated know-it-all's". If we weren't, we wouldn't be reaching out to post our opinion on an open forum. If you do not have an opinion, what is there to talk about on forums such as this??? Now, if mine annoy you, you also have the freedom to not read it or respond to it.

Note, what you just posted is most definitely an example of another...yes..."opinion".

....So, lets move on with more of them in this forum, as that is what forums are based on to keep them going.

Ken White
08-28-2010, 05:09 AM
However, if it is taboo to note from my own thoughts what I wish to post, because it has already been posted...then maybe we should only post thoughts that have not been published after a full comprehensive query of this entire site.No one said that -- I sure didn't. However IF one turns up a relevant thread, there's nothing wrong IMO in one adding ones opinions to those of others. Sometimes it makes sense, sometimes not. Certainly post in a way that suits you.
As far as a "discussion" vs. an "attack"...I totally agree. But, please note that a majority of my posts have been to support my initial post... instead of the "sharpshooting" of my content.My point was and is that most are not sharpshooting. Wilf made a valid point on the rubber boats, I agree with him, you may not -- but we do not have to totally agree on everything. The point on the boats was made because it seemed relevant and could conceivably keep someone some day from making a bad mistake. It was not made to attack you or your point -- didn't even really pertain to your point, in fact. It was an aside comment and those will happen in threads, all you gotta do is avoid getting upset and try to steer everyone back on track. Sometimes a Moderator will step in to do that, sometimes they'll just let it go.

My comment on the boats and the bird was aimed at pointing out that including those pictures in a written comment about getting back to basics drew attention away from your point -- I was trying to help for the future, not sharpshoot anything.
Well, the only one would be Infanteer, whose comments were most definitely sarcastic to say the least. So, yes, I will attack back in light of comments of that nature.That's fine, to respond in kind. He misread your intent, I think, and took it to be "We used to do it better..." thing. I didn't see your comment that way but I can see how he or others could do so. Since you didn't mean that, you could have simply pointed out that he misread your intent. Thus my comment, perhaps poorly worded on my part, about attacks was merely to point out that -- as you note -- no one was really attacking you or your points, just writing about them to discuss things written. This is an imperfect medium and without smiles and body language, the ability to say "Uh, wait, I really meant..." it's easy to misconstrue people and to be misunderstood. :(
So, I'm going to sit back and see what comes about, and leave it up to the audience to determine if they wish to continue with this thread. Maybe it should not be, since as you noted, this topic has already been discussed.No reason for it not to continue and while it could be added to a couple of old threads, there's nothing wrong with revisiting the topic with a new thread. The suggestion was made simply because the fewer the number of threads, the easier it is for someone visiting the site to find topics of interest and comment on them. As I said, it doesn't hurt to look and if it makes sense tack on to an existing thread, if not just start a new one. No hard and fast rule on it. Sometimes the Moderators will gather up a thread or part of one and consolidate somewhere that makes sense to them. All that solely in the interest of trying to keep it simple...

To get back on the topic, you asked:
Can anyone honestly say that a Stryker, or that soldier with the IOTV, and tons of gear will be able to survive there?Good point. Current practice mostly works for the war and METT-TC factors of today. The loads and the vehicles will be totally inappropriate in a Jungle or heavily wooded environment and much of the so-called 'urban' tactical practice will get people killed in a defensed urban area. We're picking up some bad habits that will not do us well in event of mid or high intensity combat. The excessive number of senior people, the oversized staffs, the over use of 15-6 investigation, ramp ceremonies and memorial services -- none of those are possible in more intense combat. As you wrote, our training today is marginal and breeds failure to trust subordinates because they're not well trained...

The list is long.:mad:

Ken White
08-28-2010, 05:13 AM
Pete made a comment based on his perception. Not taking any of this too seriously is good advice. Tracker 275 came back with the same advice -- so perhaps we can all chill out and not get personal. I'd hate to lock the thread for a cool-off period... ;)

Tracker275
08-28-2010, 05:21 AM
Hey, you bet Ken. Got all you said, and what you were saying is exactly where my thoughts are as well. Honestly, I see where you are coming from on many points in many threads. However, you definitely pose a good fun challenge in debates. :D

In regards to opinions I post on here, I know that nothing much will become of it, regardless of how many read it here. I view forums like this as a way to vent about things sometimes, particularly when many of us at work feel like we are bashing our heads against the wall due to policies that are in place...many which take devine intervention to change.

You are definitely fun to debate with on here though, I can say that for sure. :)

Tracker275
08-28-2010, 05:26 AM
Pete made a comment based on his perception. Not taking any of this too seriously is good advice. Tracker 275 came back with the same advice -- so perhaps we can all chill out and not get personal. I'd hate to lock the thread for a cool-off period... ;)

This may sound silly, but in some ways...I think that there is a good thing that comes to mind with all of this. Due a potential elevated blood pressure level in this thread for a moment...:D

I think it reflects a concern by many of us from different points of view.

What I am curious about is what is the best way to go about trying to present this one particular issue in the right venue?

Ultimately, I think that is probably one of the first questions that should be answered, particularly since there are other threads covering the same subject.

Ken White
08-28-2010, 05:31 AM
send you a Private Message tomorrow with a thought or two.

Tracker275
08-28-2010, 05:35 AM
send you a Private Message tomorrow with a thought or two.

Cool, looking forward to it Ken.

Pete
08-28-2010, 05:55 AM
Oh well, my little kitty-cat Skindles still loves me. Or at least she did the last time I checked--females have this irritating way of changing their minds all the time.

Kiwigrunt
08-28-2010, 06:51 AM
...females have this irritating way of changing their minds all the time.

That's why their minds are cleaner than ours.:D:p

Infanteer
08-28-2010, 07:26 AM
To get back on the topic, you asked:Good point. Current practice mostly works for the war and METT-TC factors of today. The loads and the vehicles will be totally inappropriate in a Jungle or heavily wooded environment and much of the so-called 'urban' tactical practice will get people killed in a defensed urban area. We're picking up some bad habits that will not do us well in event of mid or high intensity combat. The excessive number of senior people, the oversized staffs, the over use of 15-6 investigation, ramp ceremonies and memorial services -- none of those are possible in more intense combat. As you wrote, our training today is marginal and breeds failure to trust subordinates because they're not well trained...

The list is long.:mad:

Yup. Behind this there seems to be a mix of lessons forgot, luxary of facing mediocre opponents and no real urgency in winning (ie: we're more keen to see a conflict rolled into the institutional Army than see the Institutional Army bent to win a war).

Ken White
08-28-2010, 04:10 PM
Yup. Behind this there seems to be a mix of lessons forgot, luxary of facing mediocre opponents and no real urgency in winning (ie: we're more keen to see a conflict rolled into the institutional Army than see the Institutional Army bent to win a war).We have met the bureaucracy and it is us. :rolleyes:

Thank goodness most said opponents are even more fouled up than we generally happen to be...

Not to worry, Pete. We still luvs ya. ;)

I think Kiwi Grunt must associate with higher order females than I seem to have encountered. I agree their speech is generally cleaner but the minds seem to be somewhat darker in all respects... :eek:

Pete
08-28-2010, 11:34 PM
One of the guys in the photo Ken posted of the WWII G.I.s with the metal boat is wearing the First Army patch. I suspect that he was in an Echelons Above Corps engineer battalion that was specially equipped and tailored for the Rhine River crossing. Metal boats are probably not in any current TOEs, but it would be nice if there were a few of them stored somewhere in active theaters of operations.

In 1975 my Dad was a member of a group that toured Europe studying urban transportation systems -- subways, rail, and busses. When they arrived in Germany they were welcomed with a luncheon near Bonn at a restaurant overlooking the Rhine. When the official German government greeter asked Dad whether he had ever been in Germany before, Dad pointed to the right and said he'd crossed the river at Remagen in 1945.

COMMAR
08-29-2010, 12:52 AM
The point Wilf made was that rubber boats can be sunk easily with small arms fire and that on jungle rivers, patrolling or moving to contact, where concealment of your opponent is not difficult, that is a likely occurrence. My added point was that we have craft better suited but they aren't readily available.

Wilf & Ken are spot on w/the boat reference. I was in a unit called Small Craft Co. We were a Marine Infantry Rifle Company that specialized in Riverine Assault & various forms of Amphibious Raid.

We used our Inflatable Zodiacs almost exclusively in open water. And for anything brown water we used our Hard Bottoms; the 12' Rigid Raider & the 38' Riverine Assault Craft for the reasons stated above.

The Rigid Raider:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/picture.php?albumid=31&pictureid=158

The RAC: Our Gunboat Platform
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/picture.php?albumid=31&pictureid=159

Together for a Combined Large Scale Assault in Paraguay:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/picture.php?albumid=31&pictureid=161

We eventually combined them & added the Surf Zone(Blue Water) capability of the Zodiac & made the SURC (Small Unit Riverine Craft). It can basically do all missions.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/picture.php?albumid=31&pictureid=164

Tracker275
08-29-2010, 10:25 PM
Yup. Behind this there seems to be a mix of lessons forgot, luxary of facing mediocre opponents and no real urgency in winning (ie: we're more keen to see a conflict rolled into the institutional Army than see the Institutional Army bent to win a war).

Infanteer,

I have to say that you have two points that you stated that are absolutely correct to a “T”, as far as I’m concerned.

#1

“Behind this there seems to be a mix of lessons forgot, luxary of facing mediocre opponents and no real urgency in winning”

It is ironic you say “mix of lessons forgot”, because the US Army has the Center for Lessons Learned (CALL), however I see at times that what is posted as a learning point is not sent down to the lowest level and implemented too often.

Also, you are so correct in the fact that there seems to be no real urgency in winning. Instead of getting in, getting what we went there for, and getting the hell out…we end up staying and changing the end state goals that do not match the initial ones at all. While we change that, we build up bases, start moving in contractors, and even make sure Starbucks has a shop next to the Burger King. To me, that is occupying, and indicates we intend to stay their far longer than who we are supporting ultimately intended. This also only increases the outward appearance as an “occupier” vs. “liberator”.

Frankly, I really don’t see how we as a Coalition Force that went into both Iraq and Afghanistan to root out terrorism that is responsible for attacking all of us in our own homelands….to the sudden shift to promoting a democratic form of government. Besides the fact that a democratic form of law goes completely against their religious belief, which the Sharia Law and the Koran are what they believe is a form of government. There is no democracy in Islam, there is only Sharia Law and their guide book, the Koran. Maybe this was an effort to promote us staying longer, I don’t know.

What I do know is that the British tried to do the same thing in Iraq in 1920, and within a few years, they realized that the establishment of a Parliament, and a King, were a failure in the region.

#2

We're more keen to see a conflict rolled into the institutional Army than see the Institutional Army bent to win a war.

If you do not mind, I would like to use this quote from you, because It is again so true with what is going on right now. There is nothing I can elaborate on this anymore, because what you have stated says it all.

Great points, and I’d like permission to use them in some of what I write.

Pete
08-29-2010, 11:04 PM
... absolutely correct to a “T”, as far as I’m concerned. Keep your messages coming, Tracker, you have good input. The expressions "To a T" and "Screwed Up to a T" go back to the old technician grades during World War II. Back then it was a stripes-for-skills kind of thing, which offended the old-school NCOs. My Dad was an E3 technician, two stripes with a T, and later a E4 tech, three stripes and a T. As a courtesy they were called corporal and sergeant, and those ranks were the origin of the later Specialist grades.

Rex Brynen
08-30-2010, 12:20 AM
Frankly, I really don’t see how we as a Coalition Force that went into both Iraq and Afghanistan to root out terrorism that is responsible for attacking all of us in our own homelands….to the sudden shift to promoting a democratic form of government. Besides the fact that a democratic form of law goes completely against their religious belief, which the Sharia Law and the Koran are what they believe is a form of government. There is no democracy in Islam, there is only Sharia Law and their guide book, the Koran. Maybe this was an effort to promote us staying longer, I don’t know.

I agree that trying to achieve rapid, substantial democratization in Afghanistan or Iraq was always an unrealistic goal. That being said, relatively few Muslims believe that Islam and democracy are fundamentally incompatible. As Mark Tessler has argued (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/upload/5_tessislamdem_2.pdf) on the basis of extensive public opinion polling in the region:


Taken together, the findings presented in Tables 3-6 suggest that Islamic orientations and attachments have at most a very limited impact on views about democracy. With respect to personal religiosity, at least as measured by involvement in religious activities, there is not a single instance when this variable is related to attitudes toward democracy to a statistically significant degree. Further, there is only one instance when this variable is related to views about whether there are problems associated with democracy. This is the case in Egypt, where individuals with higher levels of involvement in religious activities are more likely than others to agree that democracy has drawbacks. The relationship is significant at the .05 level.

As noted earlier, there is very little variance associated with personal piety, belief in God, and self-reported religiosity, and so these questions from the survey instrument have almost no explanatory power. All that can be said is that most people claim to be pious and most also have a favorable opinion of democracy, thus suggesting, in the aggregate, that there is no incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Support for democracy, in other words, is widespread in Arab societies where most citizens have strong Islamic attachments.

Similarly, a survey of Egyptian opinion (http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/archives/mideast/tessler/) found no linkage between Muslim religiousity and support for democracy:

http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/archives/mideast/tessler2.jpg

Now, back to combat fundamentals...

Infanteer
08-30-2010, 02:27 AM
It is ironic you say “mix of lessons forgot”, because the US Army has the Center for Lessons Learned (CALL), however I see at times that what is posted as a learning point is not sent down to the lowest level and implemented too often.

I see lessons learned coming out of theater line "don't use the same trail twice" and "combined arms will beat the enemy"; stuff that our fathers and grandfathers would say "well, yeah - you didn't know that?"

Unfortunately, I think generations of soldiers are like generations of adolecences. No matter what lessons your parents learn, you make the same stupid mistakes and learn them yourselves. Is there any way around this?



If you do not mind, I would like to use this quote from you, because It is again so true with what is going on right now. There is nothing I can elaborate on this anymore, because what you have stated says it all.

Great points, and I’d like permission to use them in some of what I write.

Give 'er. I lay no claim to the idea. If we were serious about winning, we would have put the right people, resources and organizations into it. Instead, its now a place for various parts of the institution to busy themselves with.

Tracker275
08-30-2010, 08:18 AM
I agree that trying to achieve rapid, substantial democratization in Afghanistan or Iraq was always an unrealistic goal. That being said, relatively few Muslims believe that Islam and democracy are fundamentally incompatible. As Mark Tessler has argued (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/upload/5_tessislamdem_2.pdf) on the basis of extensive public opinion polling in the region...

Similarly, a survey of Egyptian opinion found no linkage between Muslim religiousity and support for democracy...

Rex,

I couldn't agree with you more. Unfortunately, what comes about is the fact that even though the general populace has no problems with incorporating a democratic form of government into their daily life...The folks that call the shots, and plant the bombs are dedicated to that not happening.

When you start looking at groups like Al-Qaeda, Ansar Al-Sunna, Naqshbandi Army, 1920's Revolutionary Group, Lebanese Hezbollah, Mujahadin, Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), Taliban, etc., etc....

None of those groups will allow for democracy to take a foothold, because they are the ones with the power to influence the populace. Hence, why they are so able to fight the "super-powers" of the world, and become a formidible adversary. When you look at the fact that they are able to fight what the world considers a "super-power" and deadlock them in years of combat, it is definitely understandable why the push for democracy in those lands is a futile attempt. The local populace is caught in the middle, and in the end, we will leave like all of the foreign forces back to Alexander the Great before us. They will stick with what they know will keep them alive in the long run, regardless of what the potential good outcome may be if they decide to use what is presented to them.

....Well...just as you said, back to the the topic at hand...:D

Tracker275
08-30-2010, 08:22 AM
Keep your messages coming, Tracker, you have good input. The expressions "To a T" and "Screwed Up to a T" go back to the old technician grades during World War II. Back then it was a stripes-for-skills kind of thing, which offended the old-school NCOs. My Dad was an E3 technician, two stripes with a T, and later a E4 tech, three stripes and a T. As a courtesy they were called corporal and sergeant, and those ranks were the origin of the later Specialist grades.

Not to stray off topic, but sometimes looking around...I think the old TSGT, and SPC4-9 are sometimes not a bad thing to bring back. Some folks are definitely more the specialist in their field, and some are the leaders. That would be something of interest to debate in another post...which area I don't know...,but definitely something to ponder in another post/thread outside of this one. :D

JMA
08-30-2010, 01:42 PM
I see lessons learned coming out of theater line "don't use the same trail twice" and "combined arms will beat the enemy"; stuff that our fathers and grandfathers would say "well, yeah - you didn't know that?"

Unfortunately, I think generations of soldiers are like generations of adolecences. No matter what lessons your parents learn, you make the same stupid mistakes and learn them yourselves. Is there any way around this?

This is perhaps the greatest potential weakness in any military. Those of us on and around the 60 year mark will have the ability to look onto the arrogance of youth (that we probably exhibited as well) and consider how to avoid the cycle of destructive repetition.

I would say it is always about selection. The truly intelligent young officer/NCO will be open to learn from others (his peers) and from the past. I believe you need to watch the youngsters carefully with an eye on who during discussions/debates demonstrates that he knows why he got two ears and one mouth . Does he know how to listen? Or does he always have an answer or an opinion before the last speaker has finished? Arrogant people get soldiers killed. Get rid of them I say they are not worth the effort to try to salvage.

That said, it is important that the lessons learned from the past are institutionalised (we have discussed this elsewhere an know that it does not happen, why?). That the past gets revisited regularly and the lessons debated, refined to current conditions, circumstances and TTPs. The non adherence to which should lead to disciplinary action. It is the creation of a culture of professionalism that is necessary IMHO and this peer pressure can't be left to what goes down in the barrack room but must be managed, certainly by senior NCOs and in certain instances by officers. In this regard it is essential that instructors have their lessons "sat in on" by senior NCOs and officers to make sure that TTPs are being complied with and the correct "experience" is being passed on and "know it all" instructors are kept on their toes.

I guess we have all had instructors of various types across the spectrum. Those who are useless, those who diligently train according to the relevant pamphlet or manual, and those "smart alecs" who let it be known that the manual is BS and out of date and they and only they know the score. This is why supervision of instruction is so critical IMHO.

It all starts with leadership and training. You select the wrong type of candidate as leader or an instructor and all you do is compound your problems. War and the deaths that war brings makes for too serious an situation to let idiots command and train troops.

Try this: ask an infantry instructor what the training is on the positioning left-handed shots in a patrol formation. Watch the eyes and mouth. They will tell you whether you are talking to: a) and idiot, b) someone sincere, or c) a BS'er.

Ken White
09-03-2010, 01:12 PM
Check the LINK (http://www.strategypage.com/military_photos/20100902214645.aspx). Sad...:(

In fact that's beyond sad. :mad:

Fuchs
09-03-2010, 04:41 PM
This looks indeed very, very bad. He might have a laser pointer on the side of the M4, though?

jmm99
09-03-2010, 05:01 PM
this photo (which ought not to have been released because of classification):

1246

illustrates the latest in combat fundamentals, via ESP and telekinesis fron the Men Who Stare At Goats Project. It establishes a Vulcan Mindlock betwixt brain and target via a true line of sight right down the bore.

What of parabolic ballistics, you say. Not material - telekinesis controls the bullet's flight along the path. The next step in the project is to integrate fire missions into the ESP-telekinesis system.

One would think that Fuchs would have had all the info on this one. :D

Cheers

Mike

Pete
09-03-2010, 05:19 PM
They have a lot of snow in upper Michigan, which gives people living there lots of time to ponder things. It'll start falling in about three weeks. :eek:

jmm99
09-03-2010, 05:25 PM
today, it looks like a rain-snow mix - goose-hunting weather. Very true: lots of snow, lots of time to ponder.

Give my regards to your cat Skindles.

Mike

82redleg
09-03-2010, 05:40 PM
This looks indeed very, very bad. He might have a laser pointer on the side of the M4, though?

I can only hope he is pointing out a target to AHs with a laser pointer/GCP/IZLID/something of that sort. However, since his finger is on the trigger, and his NVG is up, I doubt he is doing anything except spraying bullets, possibly aided by tracers.

Pete
09-04-2010, 02:43 AM
About 30 percent of dudes always fire blind over the berm, since War II, so this ain't nuthin' new. But it don't make it right, no way.

Any NCO sayin' this is new is a lyin' mutha, and if he says I'm wrong I'll whup him and his daddy too ...

... and I be short fo' a MF, a double-digit midget, so you can't do nuthin' to me. Whatcha gonna do, throw me out of the Army?

Ken White
09-04-2010, 04:22 AM
About 30 percent of dudes always fire blind over the berm, since War II, so this ain't nuthin' new. But it don't make it right, no way.
I disagree with your statement. That's a a very questionable statement with no basis in fact. Neither of us has seen every unit in combat siince WW II but in the ones I have seen I strongly doubt if as many if 2% of the folks did that or anything remotely like it. How about you?

If you know any NCOs that would do that or tolerate anyone who did, you have my sympathy. Though I note the guy in the picture IS an NCO -- and is an FO, probably an Infantry mortar FO...

The rest of your comment contributes little to anything. I also doubt you can whip my Daddy -- he died before you came in the Army.

Pete
09-04-2010, 05:11 AM
Ain't no use in lookin' down
Ain't no Discharge on the ground
Ain't no use in feelin' blue
Jody's got your girlfriend too

82redleg
09-04-2010, 11:06 AM
If you know any NCOs that would do that or tolerate anyone who did, you have my sympathy. Though I note the guy in the picture IS an NCO -- and is an FO, probably an Infantry mortar FO...


If he's a forward observer, he is MOS 13F. The Army combined all their forward observers (the FA FOs, the IN BN Mortar FOs and the IN CO Mortar FOs) into MOS 13F in the mid-70s. Each maneuver company/troops had a Fire Support Team (FIST), with a LT, SSG and a couple of RTOs for the CO HQ, and, depending on unit type, an FO party of a SGT and an RTO for each platoon. Until 2004-2006 (the modular MTOEs), they were generally assigned to the HHB of the DS FA BN, and attached to the Infantry/Armor/Cavalry unit for deployments (there were some exceptions to this: they were organic, to the companies I believe, in the 75th RGR RGT; they belonged to either the HOWBATs or to the SQDN HHT in the ACRs; the 82nd generally, and some other places at certain times, put a BNs worth in each firing battery instead of consolidated in HHB; in Germany/Korea, where BNs lived on their own kasernes, they were often attached from the FA all the time; but overall, at least on the MTOE of most units, the FISTs belonged to the FA). Under the first iteration of the idea, from the Close Support Studies Group, they were supposed to belong to the manuever unit, but that changed somewhere before implementation. In the initial Stryker MTOEs, they were broken down, all the way to PLT level, in the maneuver unit. Beginning in 2004, with the modular unit MTOEs, the FISTs were put into a platoon in the HHC/HHT of the maneuver unit. In my experience, the maneuver units often made the attachment of the FISTs to their companies a full time thing. This significantly degraded their training in their MOS- the CO is supposed to have a LT and a SSG- in my last assignment, I was putting SPCs in charge of the CO FIST as soon as they made SGT, and since they often operated without the LT, they were only training on whatever the IN CO was doing, not in their MOS. However, even given lack of MOS skills, I would have thought that they would have been trained in basic small arms skills while assigned to the IN CO.

Ken White
09-04-2010, 02:54 PM
If he's a forward observer, he is MOS 13F...I think I knew that but had certainly forgotten. I'm old, sometimes I don't know what I forgot...:D

"There are known knowns, unknown knowns..." :o

Pete: I see your tacit admission at 0511 that you didn't know what you were talking about at 0243 and were trying to foist just another off kilter joke. Good man ;)

Not to worry, we're used to it and old or not, I do remember that chant -- as well as the one that starts with "If I die on the old Drop Zone..." and a bunch of others that also add nothing to discussion here.

Pete
09-04-2010, 08:41 PM
A guy I went to OCS with was in an Air Defense Artillery unit in Vietnam. He said the only time he was under fire was when the VC hit his base one night, and that he fired his M16 blind from the top of the berm. An actual percentage of the number of guys who might do that is hard to say, just like S.L.A. Marshall's assertions about the number of men who didn't fire their rifles. When non-Infantry types suddenly find themselves unexpectedly in combat odd things happen, like Jessica Lynch's Ordnance unit in 2003.

Ken White
09-04-2010, 09:43 PM
...When non-Infantry types suddenly find themselves unexpectedly in combat odd things happen, like Jessica Lynch's Ordnance unit in 2003.One of our many training flaws -- thankfully, that one's been fixed at least a bit for the kids today.

Marshall was full of more BS than Ferdinand. Met him once, nice enough guy but none of his books stand close scrutiny. :wry:

Pete
09-05-2010, 01:14 AM
S.L.A. Marshall was definately a mixed blessing -- the firepower ratios he put in his book Men Against Fire were based upon his interviews with troops in the Normandy beachead who were relatively green at the time, but his statistic was probably a case of him exaggerating the problem to make a point that he believed was true.

I've never been in a firefight, but it seems to me that after the initial burst of suppressive fire one needs to orient onself as to what is going on and assert some sort of fire control. If the world were a perfect place the officers would be the ones doing that, but probably in all the noise and confusion it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on before they do. In spite of school solutions and doctrine the reality is probably pretty messy.

My last battalion commander in Germany in '81 said S.L.A. Marshall in Vietnam was a politician. Hackworth wrote something to the same effect. Marshall's books about WW II had turned him into a minor celebrity at Fort Benning and he milked it for all it was worth in his later life.

Ken White
09-05-2010, 05:03 AM
...after the initial burst of suppressive fire one needs to orient onself as to what is going on and assert some sort of fire control. If the world were a perfect place the officers would be the ones doing that, but probably in all the noise and confusion it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on before they do. In spite of school solutions and doctrine the reality is probably pretty messy.First, not an Officer's job -- they're supposed to be doing more important things like figuring out what to do next. Plus there are not enough of them around to provide 'instructions' to the Troops who should be too dispersed for even their Squad Leaders to really control their fire. Officers who try to interject themselves into the brouhaha often do as much harm as good and are not doing what they get paid for. So do some poorly trained NCOS do a bit of damage in that effort... :eek:

METT-TC of course applies.:cool:

The theory is -- and the doctrine says -- that the NCOs will control the fire. That is sometimes possible and it even happens occasionally. More often, there is an initial free for all and Joe has to KNOW what to do and nobody controls anything very well. The flaw is that only after he gets to a decent unit will someone possibly teach him what to do. Or he can partake of two or three firefights and figure out most of it. If he goes to a poor unit, no one will teach him and as the institution did not do it, he'll have a rough couple of fights initially. My estimate is that about half or more of the Troops did not really know how to react until they'd been in fights. Used to be that most didn't understand all they know about what they were doing. May be better now but I wouldn't bet on it...:wry:

Good units train on it and work at it and get a good system of individual fire discipline and control operating; the poor ones never do. There are a lot of poor units out there, thus the reputation of the US Army and Marines for being trigger happy. I enjoyed watching units from both organizations fire at each other a lot of places in the world. Fortunately, the fire was usually so poorly aimed that only rarely did anyone get hurt...:D

We simply do not train as well as we should. Our training and much of our doctrine is residual from WW I with a WW II overlay. The lessons of Korea and Viet Nam -- and Afghanistan and Iraq thus far -- are not allowed to move the Ark of the Covenant that is "mobilization of a big Army oriented training." Even though we don't have that large an Army...

jmm99
09-05-2010, 06:21 AM
on this:


from Pete
If the world were a perfect place the officers would be the ones doing that, but probably in all the noise and confusion it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on before they do. In spite of school solutions and doctrine the reality is probably pretty messy.

but I do have a little vignette from Bill Lyman's history of the 1/117-30ID which illustrates Pete's point (.. "it is the NCOs or even privates are the ones who catch on..."). The "take charge PFC" is probably something that Ken and other combat vets here have seen more than once.

The tactical situation is from 2 Oct 1944 (breach of the Siegfried Line, where C-1/117 was the tip of the spear), which I described in this post, Mathematical models & reality (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=71741&postcount=48), in another thread. While Charlie (and an attached HMG platoon of Dog) were the spear's tip, that tip was blunted by accurate German arty and mortar fires. The net result was that Charlie (coy +) sustained about 50% TOE casualties and its attack stalled out at the little river and railroad just West of the pillboxes.

The two platoon leaders (1 Johnson & 3 Stanley) at the river and railroad tracks managed to reorganize what was left of their units (27 soldiers) - 2 & 4 (weapons) platoons were knocked out of immediate action. Meanwhile, Baker was swinging South to attack the north flank of C's pillboxes and Able was advancing to join Charlie in a direct assault. The options for Charlie 1 & 3 were to sit and wait for the other two companies, or do something.

At this point, we join Bill Lyman's rendition; but first we need to meet a PFC (later SGT), Frank C. Brakefield, Crab Orchard, W. Va. - jd 7 Aug 1944 (Mortain, No. France), WIA 24 Dec 1944 (Ardennes); Ind. - CIB, PH, SS (2 Oct 1944). His conduct testifies that, in "Arms and Man" (Arma virumque cano), Man is the more important component by far.


Heavy shell fire continued pouring on the depleted Company C platoons on the railroad track. The units were also receiving crossfire from two machine gun nests, one situated in the 119th sector at the right flank and the other close to the nearest pillbox at the left front.

In this situation, a First Platoon man performed in an exceptionally heroic manner. Private First Class Frank C. Brakefield asked Lieutenant Johnson, "Why don't we go up and take that pillbox where the machine gun fire's coming from?" The lieutenant explained that the platoon did not have enough men and equipment and also there was no way of knocking out the MG in the 119th's area.

"Somebody's got to get that pillbox," Brakefield persisted. Lieutenant Johnson continued to explain the folly of attempting it and pointed out that the outfit already had more than enough casualties for the day.

Despite the continued discouragement, Brakefield borrowed an extra grenade, wished everyone luck, and proceeded forward alone. Initially, he ran across the railroad track and paused for a moment in a trench there. Then he dashed out in the open and raced a couple of hundred yards to the pillbox. He threw a grenade in the embrasure, rushed to the rear door and found the structure empty !

He went back outside and, from a covered position, wiped out the MG nest that had been giving trouble. Inspired by Brakefield's action, the rest of the platoon moved up to the pillbox. Soon someone noticed fire coming from what appeared to be a barn nearby. Spearheaded by the indomitable Brakefield, a group moved forward to eliminate the fire and found the barn to be a camoflaged pillbox. It was captured with a combination of grenade and rifle fire and a number of prisoners were taken.

Now, all of this was only a small part of the 1/117th's attack on 2 Oct 1944; and it is quite possible that Able and Baker would have still breached the pillbox line, even if the remnants of Charlie 1 & 3 had huddled at the RR track. What we know is not the possible speculation, but the actual reality.

The net result (via Bill Lyman):


The First Battalion's assault on the Siegfried was exceedingly significant. Curlew was the only lead battalion in the division to accomplish its mission the first day. The outfit cracked the Westwall for the entire XIX Corps.

Cheers

Mike

JMA
09-05-2010, 07:00 AM
on this:

[snip]

At this point, we join Bill Lyman's rendition; but first we need to meet a PFC (later SGT), Frank C. Brakefield, Crab Orchard, W. Va. - jd 7 Aug 1944 (Mortain, No. France), WIA 24 Dec 1944 (Ardennes); Ind. - CIB, PH, SS (2 Oct 1944). His conduct testifies that, in "Arms and Man" (Arma virumque cano), Man is the more important component by far.

[snip]

Cheers
Mike

In my experience there are those more predisposed to bravery/gallantry/valour in battle.

He may have be offered the opportunity to display this as a 18 year old private soldier or as a 20 something young officer or maybe even as a hairy ass'ed sergeant in his 30's.

Seldom are these exceptional guys predictable and often it is that moment of action they carry out that is critical to the success of the battle.

Another thing is the emotional calmness of such actions (as I have noticed them)... just calmly rises up and does the business then settles back calmly into his normal position as if nothing has happened.

JMA
09-05-2010, 01:11 PM
One of our many training flaws -- thankfully, that one's been fixed at least a bit for the kids today.

Marshall was full of more BS than Ferdinand. Met him once, nice enough guy but none of his books stand close scrutiny. :wry:

In the 70's there were some of us out here in the colonies who read SLA Marshall and others. His Men against fire: the problem of battle command (http://books.google.com/books?id=rzLxoITDhQQC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Men+Against+Fire&source=bl&ots=Vvub-t_7tP&sig=LHBl1REBfm2eJ8phOzz7mMUBays&hl=en&ei=4HCCTMS0CIWclgftyqzDDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false) has some text preview on google books. Importantly in terms of this thread. The Inroduction by Russel W Glenn does deal with some of the "issues" relating to Marshall's sample size and methodology but the fact remains that his book has some merit.

I read it and found that there were (other) areas in the book where my military experience led me to agree with what he wrote. There were others which did not resonate. I found the book useful.

Now may I suggest that for a person without any war or combat experience the book may lead to some confusion or at worst the (unwitting) adoption of positions which in fact be wrong. I would therefore caution people with no personal frame of reference to dig too deeply into that book.

All that said I accept that whatever the accuracy of what Marshall published about soldiers not firing their weapons in contact or as he said:


... I mean that 75% will not fire or will not persist in firing against the enemy and his works...

So we see that no matter how poor Marshall's methodology was he has been unfairly criticised by people who have seized upon only half of what he said (that being that soldiers don't fire their weapons).

The issue of the US soldier not firing seems to have been put to bed by Marshall himself (which his critics seem to have missed) as reported (http://www.historynet.com/men-against-fire-how-many-soldiers-actually-fired-their-weapons-at-the-enemy-during-the-vietnam-war.htm)in this piece:


Marshall himself visited Vietnam to conduct studies similar to those done during World War II and later emulated in Korea. He concluded that much had changed since those earlier conflicts and that it was not unusual for close to 100 percent of American infantrymen to engage the adversary during firefights in Vietnam.

Can we move on from Marshall now please?

Now I submit the question is what % of infantry soldiers fire aimed shots that the enemy or the likely positions the enemy are likely to be?

There is the type of firing into likely cover where the enemy may be or in response to a fire control order being given. In the case of the former we refined the skill through the Drake shoot - firing aimed shots into likely cover at an unseen enemy. (For the record on the Drake/Cover shoot see at the end below)

Now exactly how many of the soldiers actually fired aimed shots then and in combat situations I can't tell. What I do know is that where such prophylactic fire was used by a sweep line as it advanced we were seldom surprised by a gook popping up out of nowhere.

This I submit is the easy part. Shooting at likely positions where unseen enemy may be. Perhaps there is a lot of blind firing in the general direction of the enemy as firing the weapon is expected and makes one feel good.

Another factor is that this "feel good" firing of weapons could be the reason why it appears that so much more ammo is expended per kill these days.

The next one is where the soldier actually sees the enemy. I accept that it is natural for a human to hesitate before firing on another human. How does one train for this?

It is said that this comes with combat experience. So why then do modern armies continue to send raw troops into battle when there are other options?

For the lack of military studies to hand look at this FBI study (http://www.theppsc.org/Archives/DF_Articles/Officers-Killed/Fed-Stats/1992_FBI_Study.htm) In it of the 54 agents killed they found:

Only 8% of partner officers returned fire
85% failed to fire their weapon

I appreciate we need more info and context from each example of the FBI study but the point is made that the military needs to find a way to ensure that soldiers will instinctively use their weapons against both seen and unseen enemy without hesitation.

Drake/Cover Shoot. A Major David Drake joined the Rhodesian Army in the late 60's from the Brit Army (he had served in Korea). It was he who dug the Cover Shoot out of the fieldcraft manual (I think) and refined it into what became known as the Drake Shoot in Rhodesia. The shoot went something like this. A section of recruits were each issued 10 rounds of ammo. They were arranged on a firing point looking at a treed and bushy rise. They were then instructed that there were enemy hiding out there and that they should fire at where they thought the enemy might be. Once all the ammo had been fired off instructors took off into the range area and exposed a number of figure 12 targets and counted the hits. It was normal that there would be few if any hits and if there were then they would be high up on the target. The instructor would then explain the need to 1) fire low and 2) carefully and methodically fire aimed shots into likely cover. The recruits were then turned around while the instructors repositioned the targets. The shoot was then repeated. The targets then typically have more and lower hits. This would be repeated regularly with trained soldiers in differing areas (quite often off the end of the airfield where we (the RLI) would be based. I would appreciate it if there was someone out there who has a copy of the pre-1960 Brit fieldcraft manual (I'm sure it was) which contained the detail of the cover shoot which can be reproduced here or sent to me.

Pete
09-05-2010, 11:08 PM
Some of the recent messages tie in with an earlier thread that touched upon the change from Known-Distance Marksmanship training to Trainfire in 1958. The following is from an article in Infantry Journal in July-August 2006 by David Linawag:


WWII observations made by Colonel (later Brigadier General) S.L.A. Marshall, as he documented U.S. infantry fighting experience in Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, led the Army to change its training methods to get more infantrymen to fire their weapons during engagements. His analysis led him to several conclusions:

* "What we need is more and better fire."

* "What we need to seek in training are any and all means by which we can increase the ratio of effective fire when we go to war."

* "... weapons when correctly handled in battle seldom fail to gain victory."

* "... a highly proper doctrine which seeks to ingrain in the infantry soldier a confidence that superior use of superior weapons is his surest protection."

* "The rarest thing in battle is fire in good volume, accurately delivered and steadily maintained."

* The secret of mobility: "They moved faster because they could place their trust in the superior hitting power of relatively small forces."

* "The soldier who learns and applies correct principles of fire will always move."

* "The man who has the fire habit is looking always for forward ground from which to give his fire increased effectiveness."

The Infantry School at Fort Benning converted these observations into the Trainfire marksmanship program. The Known Distance (KD) marksmanship training system to teach recruits was abandoned for Trainfire instruction on reactive popup/knock-down targets to 300 meters.

General Willard G. Wyman, Commanding General of the Continental Army Command (predecessor of FORSCOM and TRADOC), wrote an eight-page article in the July-September 1958 Infantry Magazine titled "Army Marksmanship Today," to answer questions and assuage institutional doubts about the new system.

The entire article can be read by clicking here (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_4_95/ai_n16884008/).

Perhaps we've sorted out the issue of volume of fire, and now the challenge is to have unit SOPs so it will be aimed at the right places. This is mainly a unit training issue, not one to be to be taught at TRADOC schools, although the schoolhouse could help by developing and distributing generic Programs of Instruction for units in the field.

Pete
09-06-2010, 12:34 AM
Speaking of fire contol, in 1945 men in my Dad's 105mm battery peppered a treeline in Germany with their M1 Carbines when they thought it was the source of German small-arms fire. They heard distinct reports of Mausers being fired, until someone noticed that two of the guys in the battery were firing K98 Mausers that they had picked up.

Ken White
09-06-2010, 02:03 AM
JMA:
So we see that no matter how poor Marshall's methodology was he has been unfairly criticised by people who have seized upon only half of what he said (that being that soldiers don't fire their weapons).Nope. There are those who do not fire, no question -- the issue is in fact only the percentage who do not. Marshall may or may not have been correct for the units he interviewed, we have no way of knowing. He did upgrade his number considerably for Korea and even more for Viet Nam (It happens that my then Battalion was one he visited in writing 'Battles in the Monsoon.') . There are a slew on military studies -- citing the FBI is a pointless Apple to Baobab comparison. Google 'US army volume of fire studies.' There are several studies in those hits; if that's too much work, here's a good little synopsis of some collected results, not directly related but some bearing on the issue. LINK (http://benandbawbsblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/suppressive-firedoesnt.html).

Marshall did some good, no question but he also did a lot of harm. In addition to "Men against fire," he also wrote a number of columns in the late 40s and early 50s for the Detroit Free Press newspaper for whom he was military correspondent and for other US publications. The result was that US Army leaders bought his flawed tale and developed 'Trainfire' (discussed in Pete's link above). Trainfire accomplished its mission of getting more people to shoot more -- unfortunately, it taught them to pour a large volume of fire at short range easily seen targets. It did not teach them to shoot accurately. Worse, it did not teach them to locate obscured or difficult targets, to estimate range, to have their fire controlled and several other important things. There was supposed to be a Field Firing function and Range Estimation exercise that accompanied the range firing but it got ignored more often than not.:mad:

Fortunately, the new Outcome Based Training methods in range firing fix many of the problems. (LINK) (http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/12/04/31365-new-training-method-produces-better-marksmen/index.html), (LINK) (http://www.defencetalk.com/standardized-rifle-marksmanship-training-program-23843/) That last says firing is limited to 300m, that's temporary due to a combination of ammo available and range limit, both are to be fixed and the intent is to go to 600m. Better late than never, I guess...

You asked this:
It is said that this comes with combat experience. So why then do modern armies continue to send raw troops into battle when there are other options?Because modern Armies have their training designed and approved by people who've seen little or no combat.

Pete:

Just four quotes from your link:
Army assumptions that combined arms, crew-served weapons, and the infantry battalion's six organic snipers would dominate the infantryman's half kilometer have not proven true in recent mobile expeditionary warfare.

Close-quarters combat rifle courses of fire can be conducted on existing 25-meter zero rifle ranges that are universal on Army posts.

The Soldier's perceived limited effectiveness with his rifle has spawned the requirement for the Objective Individual Combat Weapon to compensate.

The historic U.S. eight-man infantry squad was issued 384 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition for their M1 rifles (six 8-round clips per soldier. The traditional round count remains at 384 for today's MI6 or M4 match)...In order:

The so-called Army assumptions are just that -- assumptions made by random Generals who thought they knew more than 200 years of experience or dozens of fairly good studies that produced sensible data. Anyone who thought along the lines of that first item had little to no front line infantry combat experience and predicated his or her assumption on idle hunches. Not one of those items is in any sense a substitute for fire in infantry combat.

Anyone advocating 'close combat courses of fire on a 25m range is foolish. The KD stuff he advocates will work -- it is not the only way but it does work -- and then a field firing course is needed. We used to what JMA above called the "Drake/Cover Shoot" with semi to fully concealed silhouettes out to 600m and beyond -- but Willard Wyman and his minions sold 'Trainfire' -- which destroyed Army marksmanship. Trainfire dumped the old Field Fire Course (three days of it annually...). The location of concealed targets and determination of their range is a critical infantry skill. It is not taught in institutional training at all well mostly because it is difficult to teach and, far more to the point, has a low "Go" rate -- that makes Trainers and units look bad, so they avoid it. Benning is not the Army Infantrymans friend...

He touts the OICW "to compensate" -- that's the American way :rolleyes: : "...we have a significant training shortfall; lets spend a little money and time so we fix it" "NO! We can't do that, we need to improve the technology, Congress will buy stuff, they won't fund more training..." Not if you don't ask them and make a valid case they won't. :mad:

The killer is the last item. The eight man squad existed right after WW I up until WW II only, been nine or more since -- and we're still issuing ammo predicated on something that's been gone since 1942 :eek:. One more example of my oft repeated comment that our training is based on WW I models and we've 'upgraded' it only incrementally if at all.

So the author was out in left field. Not to knock AMU that hard, they have some good people and their mission is NOT to improve Army training...

You said:
This is mainly a unit training issue, not one to be to be taught at TRADOC schools, although the schoolhouse could help by developing and distributing generic Programs of Instruction for units in the field.Wrong. It is indeed a unit training issue but it also must be taught in the schoolhouse. It is a basic soldiering and survival skill and the TRADOC institutions have the resources and responsibility to teach it, not least because if they don't, it will get only lip service in poor units -- and, by definition, 50% of the units in the Army are less good than the top 50%. TRADOC has a responsibility to train the trainer. They could do a much better job of that.

The POI you suggest out there right now for the required training, so TRADOC did their development thing -- then washed their hands of it. It is not getting done and a large part of that is the NCOs and LTs who should be teaching it don't know how because no one -- guess who failed to do their job -- trained them...

It is yet one more item in the long list of shortcomings in our Officer and Enlisted initial entry training -- and PME...

Schmedlap
09-06-2010, 02:33 AM
I'm hesitant to take my perceptions of my narrow experiences and assume that they are 1) correct and 2) apply equally to all or most of the force.

Pete
09-06-2010, 02:54 AM
Well, that disclaimer having been said, tell us your perceptions. It need not be a general theory.

Schmedlap
09-06-2010, 02:57 AM
My perception:
- Most of the skills that are lamented as having been forgotten/lost in the original post haven't actually been forgotten/lost.
- Much of the use of current technology is more indicative of the greater availability of that technology than of a need to rely on it.

Pete
09-06-2010, 06:14 AM
For the foreseeable future sorting out these basic kinds of Infantry things would have a more favorable impact on our military success than all of the high-tech and high-dollar wish lists of all three of the services put together. It might not take place because there's no big money behind it to make sure it happens. "Pick Up Your Weapon and Follow Me."

Pete
09-07-2010, 12:19 AM
Times have changed a bit, so we're not completely locked into the past:


276. Deploy Squads as Skirmishers. The platoon being in squad columns, the platoon leader may deploy squads as skirmishers by commanding: AS SKIRMISHERS. At this signal or command the squads deploy, retaining their relative positions within the platoon.

Source: Infantry Drill Regulations, 1941 ("These regulations supersede those contained in Field Manual 22-5, July 1, 1939.")

Ken White
09-07-2010, 02:19 PM
Times have changed a bit, so we're not completely locked into the past:That's an excellent example of a timeless and valuable technique and the training and drills required for units to do it almost automatically being eliminated due to obsolete terminology. Thus we cater to to perceived rather than actual obsolescence.

Happens when your doctrine writers -- and leaders -- don't understand all they know about what they're doing.

It's like the terribly flawed conversion to Trainfire; instead of using available increased knowledge and simply improving the wheel, we insist on reinventing it. Those square ones don't work too well...

All so some General can get credit for being innovative.

Pete
09-07-2010, 09:39 PM
If I'm not mistaken it was the 1941 revision of FM 22-5 that streamlined the drill and ceremonies taught to troops by eliminating much of it from doctrine. By then it was probably considered to be a non-essential use of training time, and it had been a long time since drill and ceremonies were used to deploy troops in tactical situations. (That being said, traveling formation is still column and fighting formation is still line.) I've read of Civil War versions of "Cannoniers' Hop," with its calling out of numbers and so forth.

Pete
09-08-2010, 11:37 PM
This post is hypothetical, in the area of what might have been decades ago. When the Infantry Drill Regulations and FM 22-5 became relegated to tradition and the putting on of spectacles for the public rather than how units deploy to fight in the field, perhaps a manual with similar drills for companies and battalions in tactical situations should have been published to fill the void. Men wouldn't have to have been in step or have done things by the numbers, but after a command they would assume formations in a certain spatial relationship to each other, not as exact as dress and cover but something like it. I imagine there could be about 20 or 30 drills for different situations.

No doubt things like this have been tried in the past, called "combat drills" or "unit SOPs." I was a Gunner myself, so during my day I was mainly concerned with quadrants and deflections.

Ken White
09-09-2010, 12:20 AM
It's still doctrine. Problem is few units teach and use it. We get in a real war, they will...

LINK (http://www.usmc.mil/news/publications/Documents/FM%203-21.8%20%20The%20Infantry%20Rifle%20Platoon%20and%2 0Squad_3.pdf).

Michael C
09-09-2010, 12:38 AM
Ken we aren't in a real war now? Soldiers and civilians are fighting and dying in Iraq and Afghanistan in real combat everyday.

Pete
09-09-2010, 12:43 AM
Things like this need command emphasis. Dad used to say everyone supports the Infantry, which he probably heard during a motivational speech in 1944. I picked up a bit of this at Fort Benning OCS, but not much. By the way, I can't get the link to open.

Ken White
09-09-2010, 03:42 AM
Ken we aren't in a real war now? Soldiers and civilians are fighting and dying in Iraq and Afghanistan in real combat everyday.So do you and the rest of the Herd...

However, I would qualify the combat in Afghanistan, as I did the earlier combat in Iraq, as just that. Combat. So was Viet Nam, mostly. Korea was a war before it runed into something less. Afghanistan combat is certainly, as you highlighted, real -- and it can kill individuals just as dead as WW II did. Just not as many or on the same scale...

Semantic quibble, perhaps but I base that combat versus war bit on the overall casualty rate. If infantry units in contact are receiving less than 2% or so casualties per day of actual contact, then I personally have difficulty calling that a war. YMMV and many will not agree; that's fine.

My Son who is on his third Afghan tour (plus one in Iraq to add a star to his first CIB from Desert Storm) said it well on the phone least weekend. After decrying the fact that a Valley his company had cleared three years ago had been reinfested and had seen no NATO or Afghan troops in over two years he started describing the changes to Kanadahar from his last trip (the garbage trucks and the new brick buildings fascinated him...) and ended with "I don't know what this is, Pop, but it's not war..."

So there's at least two who don't think it's a war -- certainly not a big one against a near peer. May all be my fault, I may have corrupted him... :wry:

Then again, I sometimes get lazy an call it a war; easier than this explanation...

Ken White
09-09-2010, 04:01 AM
I can't get the link to open.I checked before I sent it and just went back and checked it again and it works for me. I use Firefox but I also tried it with Internet Explorer 8 and it worked with that as well. It is a very slow loading site, took about 15 seconds to load in Firefox and twice that in IE8. I usually load distant sites at about 2 to 3MB per seconds on Cable...

It's FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. You may be able to Google it but that was the only link I found that was free or not behind a .mil firewall.

Here are four typical diagrams in case you can't get to it:

Infanteer
09-09-2010, 05:17 AM
the earlier combat in Iraq, as just that. Combat. So was Viet Nam, mostly. Korea was a war before it runed into something less. Afghanistan combat is certainly, as you highlighted, real -- and it can kill individuals just as dead as WW II did. Just not as many or on the same scale...

Semantic quibble, perhaps but I base that combat versus war bit on the overall casualty rate. If infantry units in contact are receiving less than 2% or so casualties per day of actual contact, then I personally have difficulty calling that a war. YMMV and many will not agree; that's fine.

Add me to your tally. Your distinction between War and Combat is apt. When I can sit in one of the single most dangerous districts in Afghanistan for weeks without any hostile act against me and plan a big luncheon with locals and work on a plan to get the ANA to the market so we can get some good goat, "it's something, but it ain't war".

My 2 cents.

JMA
09-09-2010, 06:12 AM
Add me to your tally. Your distinction between War and Combat is apt. When I can sit in one of the single most dangerous districts in Afghanistan for weeks without any hostile act against me and plan a big luncheon with locals and work on a plan to get the ANA to the market so we can get some good goat, "it's something, but it ain't war".

My 2 cents.

Have you thought that maybe its not "one of the single most dangerous districts" after all?

82redleg
09-09-2010, 11:13 AM
Have you thought that maybe its not "one of the single most dangerous districts" after all?

Could be, but the numbers of attacks there probably say it is, and that's why he called it that.

And you can track stuff like "# of attacks per district"- I'm not sure that's a good thing, but its certainly available information.

Fuchs
09-09-2010, 11:37 AM
Here are four typical diagrams in case you can't get to it:

I'll never understand the idea behind such formations.

A platoon should march separately in order to retain the freedom of movement for at least a part of itself in the event of a contact. Even a whole infantry platoon can easily get pinned down - fixed - if it marches as a whole in one body.

Military history knows incidents of whole companies being temporarily fixed by a single sniper.

It's absolutely crucial to move in separate groups of minimum capability each if that's possible at all (communication, coordination).

JMA
09-09-2010, 11:50 AM
Could be, but the numbers of attacks there probably say it is, and that's why he called it that.

And you can track stuff like "# of attacks per district"- I'm not sure that's a good thing, but its certainly available information.

A term comes back to me after all these years... "low intensity war". I see Ken's point in that we don't see armoured divisions crashing into each other but rather small unit contacts and minor incidents.

Maybe we are not seeing battles like Ia Drang and Chosin Reservoir or indeed worse (Stalingrad) but I'll bet those caught up in a sharp skirmish or an IED in Afghanistan will nevertheless certainly have a mind focusing experience.

Infanteer
09-09-2010, 01:50 PM
Have you thought that maybe its not "one of the single most dangerous districts" after all?

Google "Zharei/Panjwayi"


Maybe we are not seeing battles like Ia Drang and Chosin Reservoir or indeed worse (Stalingrad) but I'll bet those caught up in a sharp skirmish or an IED in Afghanistan will nevertheless certainly have a mind focusing experience.

Re-read Ken White's post.

Tom Odom
09-09-2010, 02:15 PM
So do you and the rest of the Herd...

However, I would qualify the combat in Afghanistan, as I did the earlier combat in Iraq, as just that. Combat. So was Viet Nam, mostly. Korea was a war before it runed into something less. Afghanistan combat is certainly, as you highlighted, real -- and it can kill individuals just as dead as WW II did. Just not as many or on the same scale...

Semantic quibble, perhaps but I base that combat versus war bit on the overall casualty rate. If infantry units in contact are receiving less than 2% or so casualties per day of actual contact, then I personally have difficulty calling that a war. YMMV and many will not agree; that's fine.

My Son who is on his third Afghan tour (plus one in Iraq to add a star to his first CIB from Desert Storm) said it well on the phone least weekend. After decrying the fact that a Valley his company had cleared three years ago had been reinfested and had seen no NATO or Afghan troops in over two years he started describing the changes to Kanadahar from his last trip (the garbage trucks and the new brick buildings fascinated him...) and ended with "I don't know what this is, Pop, but it's not war..."

So there's at least two who don't think it's a war -- certainly not a big one against a near peer. May all be my fault, I may have corrupted him... :wry:

Then again, I sometimes get lazy an call it a war; easier than this explanation...

All good but consider how many times you and others have used the phrase "war is war" when discussing distinctions between regular and irregular warfare, COIN, or other variations on the same theme.

Mexico is at war along our borders. The Congo is approaching 20 years of continuous war. Neither have involved massed formations, artillery, or aerial fires. The first has resulted in thousands of casualties, the second millions.

I will go with Michael C. People are dying and rounds are being fired. Combat is part of war. We can disagree.

Best

Tom

Fuchs
09-09-2010, 02:34 PM
Semantic quibble, perhaps but I base that combat versus war bit on the overall casualty rate. If infantry units in contact are receiving less than 2% or so casualties per day of actual contact, then I personally have difficulty calling that a war.

Define contact. The definition of contact I am aware of would call sitting 200m in front of each other in trenches "contact with the enemy", and by that standard even WWI would fail to meet your criterion (and the Yugoslav Civil wars as well).

Ken White
09-09-2010, 02:43 PM
I'll never understand the idea behind such formations...
It's absolutely crucial to move in separate groups of minimum capability each if that's possible at all (communication, coordination).I agree and the key is to have formations for some basic semblance of control (not to mention the training aspect...) while maintaining adequate separation to avoid the pitfalls you cite.

Rough rule of thumb - 5 to 15m between individuals in Urban areas, 10 to 30m in open terrain, 20to 50m in desert. Close up a bit at night or in the woods or jungle -- but just a bit. About 100m between Squads in a Platoon on average, twice that, minimum, between Companies...

Always go for the maximum the terrain and vegetation will allow for control and situational awareness.

Ken White
09-09-2010, 02:48 PM
A term comes back to me after all these years... "low intensity war". I see Ken's point in that we don't see armoured divisions crashing into each other but rather small unit contacts and minor incidents.Both Korea, post 1951 and Viet Nam generally with only rare exceptions were low intensity wars IMO. I went to the Dominican Republic in 1965. There was a bit of combat, people got killed -- but it wasn't a war. Not even low intensity conflict, really...
Maybe we are not seeing battles like Ia Drang and Chosin Reservoir or indeed worse (Stalingrad) but I'll bet those caught up in a sharp skirmish or an IED in Afghanistan will nevertheless certainly have a mind focusing experience.No question about it...

Ken White
09-09-2010, 03:12 PM
Combat is a part of most but not all wars, all combat does not take place in war. Those are also truths.
All good but consider how many times you and others have used the phrase "war is war" when discussing distinctions between regular and irregular warfare, COIN, or other variations on the same theme.Oh, I do, thus my my above mentioned resort to being lazy on occasion. :D

That mostly to avoid discussions like this. :wry:
Mexico is at war along our borders. The Congo is approaching 20 years of continuous war. Neither have involved massed formations, artillery, or aerial fires. The first has resulted in thousands of casualties, the second millions.Totally true and you'll get no disagreement from me on either of those. However, we were not discussing US involvement in either of those nations. Neither did I cite massed formations, artillery or aerial fires -- I cited casualties, specifically Infantry but by implication all including Civilians and both wars you cite meet that criteria. Iraq and Afghanistan also do at times but generally do not IMO. Note that IMO; it is mine and it is an opinion; As I noted Michael C. and others -- obviously including thee, Tomas -- and I'd guess most others disagree. :cool:

As I told JMA above, IMO (again) most but not all of the Korean and Viet Nam conflicts were not war as I saw it. War as a term can be misused; the 'War on Terror' and the 'War on Drugs' are but two examples. That said, I certainly do not object to anyone else using "war" for Afghansitan or Iraq and the kids that go are in a war as far as they're concerned -- and I certainly respect that. And them.

My point in much I post here including this is simply to remind people not to confuse what's happening from 2001 to date with what will occur in mid intensity to high intensity conflict. That could be quite dangerous...
I will go with Michael C. People are dying and rounds are being fired. Combat is part of war. We can disagree.Okay, we can do that. Hopefully without being disagreeable. ;)

Steve Blair
09-09-2010, 03:39 PM
If we're getting into the whole war thing again (and like Tom I tend to find the "war is war" position something of a dodge), I think you have to go at it from at least two standpoints: the combat/conflict one and the legalistic one. I've seen much historical evidence of this in one of my favorite research periods, as Congress refused to award brevets or other considerations during the Indian Wars. The reasoning (as put forward by Logan among others, and I'm paraphrasing here) was that 'it wasn't really a war.' Perhaps it wasn't when compared to the Civil War campaigns Logan and many of his fellow congressmen had waged, but to the guys on the ground there wasn't much difference between being blown up by Rebel canister or being cut up by Sioux women if he fell wounded on the field.

The above is one reason I tend to subscribe to the idea that often the definition of war is based on perspectives. What is LIC (and I like that term as well) to us may well be a full-blown battle for national survival in the eyes of the people we're helping. War may be war to the guy at the end of the pointy stick, but the further away you get from that (and the more you're concerned with resource allocation, troop levels, and reelections) the grayer it all becomes and a full-blown war in the Haitian jungle becomes a minor stabilization operation using a handful of Marines, cheap local troops, and State department governing officials.

There's also the question of techniques and skillsets (and the appropriateness of them in some situations). And to go back to Ken's somewhat rhetorical question, I certainly hope that people don't forget that what has happened between 2001 and now will certainly be valuable in the future. Relegating it to training manuals and once-every-four-years exercises will do no one any good. We need to get over this "either-or" hangup and actually tackle the hard questions. I really doubt that will happen, though.

Ken White
09-09-2010, 03:45 PM
Define contact.LINK (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contact). As in 'Movement to contact' (LINK) .pdf) (http://www.usna.edu/USMCInfo/Documents/Pubs/b0376.pdf). Or this Video (LINK) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xu1cTil6xNI). Or the US DoD Dictionary (LINK) (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/) under 'M' for Movement to contact...

Any contact involving an exchange of fire or direct combat, ranging from hand to hand all the way indirect as in an Artillery duel. It can be at close or long range, with or without visual acquisition. That can and does include meeting engagements, static defense, tank on tank fights, ambushed patrols, aerial combat between fighters, bombers dropping bombs...

Virtually unlimited methods of action designed to achieve a military effect and where opposing forces meet or engage each other.

A well known German Officer knew it -- this from the Clausewitz Wiki entry: "Moltke's notable statement that "No campaign plan survives first contact with the enemy" is a classic reflection of Clausewitz's insistence on the roles of chance, friction, "fog," and uncertainty in war."
The definition of contact I am aware of would call sitting 200m in front of each other in trenches "contact with the enemy", and by that standard even WWI would fail to meet your criterion (and the Yugoslav Civil wars as well).That seems an awfully narrow definition. We can differ...;)

Ken White
09-09-2010, 03:49 PM
(and like Tom I tend to find the "war is war" position something of a dodge)In using "dodge" you mean intellectually lazy, I agree and am guilty. Cheerfully so. It is done to make a point...;)

Coldstreamer
09-09-2010, 03:58 PM
Combat? War? A lot of parallel, inter-related, relative stuff here.

If you are on a small scale focussed intervention - say a NEO or a Hostage Rescue effort - you may still find yourself in a punchy - event brutal and protracted - firefight, with lots of combined arms integrated activity. But are you in a war? No.

Yet in an enduring, protracted, 9 year+ multinational effort along all lines of Dip, Info, Mil, Economic effort - but against a non-state insurgency, with a much lower casualty 'density' than say Korea, or WW2 - or even the Falklands, where ships and planes were lost and battlegroups fought pitched battles - is it a war? I think so - because of the enduring nature of the Clausewitzian clash of wills.

Its been a while since I've posted. Busy bloke. But no-one's mentioneD style.

WW2 saw Glenn Miller on the Allied side (George Formby...lets not go there). The Germans had the Horst Wessel song (still catchy, for the Airborne).
In the 50s, the first Cold-War Hot-War saw the emergence of Rock and Roll. And success in Vietnam, had it been measured by music, would have been assured.

So where's the music for Generation Y at War? Hereinlies the strategic stall. Obama and Cameron (probably) listen to Coldplay. No wonder they're gloomy.

I made my Company listen to the Red Hot Chilli Peppers. Every man came back. When things were dark, I'd educate the young with Credence Clearwater Revival. 'What's that?' their innocent faces would ask. 'That's wisdom', I'd answer.

I think thats enough for now.

Tom Odom
09-09-2010, 04:23 PM
When things were dark, I'd educate the young with Credence Clearwater Revival. 'What's that?' their innocent faces would ask. 'That's wisdom', I'd answer.

Lieutenant Dan would say. "GET DOWN! Shut Up!"

And we did...:wry:

Tom

Steve Blair
09-09-2010, 06:27 PM
So where's the music for Generation Y at War? Hereinlies the strategic stall. Obama and Cameron (probably) listen to Coldplay. No wonder they're gloomy.

I made my Company listen to the Red Hot Chilli Peppers. Every man came back. When things were dark, I'd educate the young with Credence Clearwater Revival. 'What's that?' their innocent faces would ask. 'That's wisdom', I'd answer.

I think thats enough for now.

Depends on who you ask. You've got some Gen X hangers-on with RATM, and Disturbed and Saliva often make it into the mix. The music's out there, but unlike the '60s and such it doesn't get major airplay.

Rifleman
09-09-2010, 07:05 PM
The Red Hot Chilli Peppers? Nah! :rolleyes:

CCR when things get gloomy? That's a step in the right direction. ;)

Want 'em to march forever? This is what it sounds like done right.

Link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EsIqEq9OFxE

Slapout will appreciate that. It's right from his era and area. It's also the best rendition I've found.

By the way, that's a '76 concert in the UK. Skynyrd opened for the Rolling Stones. Those people waving the Stars and Bars are a bunch a fish and chippers! Skynyrd was such a hit that the Stones delayed coming on stage because they didn't want to follow them to closely! The Stones never had Skynyrd open for them again after that! I guess Jumping Jack Flash couldn't compare. :p

Pete
09-10-2010, 12:44 AM
I'll never understand the idea behind such formations.
I think the main reason for having standardized formations and combat drills is so units can swiftly change course during rapidly changing circumstances without the need for lengthy conversations between leaders, either face-to-face or on the radio. I don't know how the Bundeswehr does it, but German soldiers were no slouches at it in years gone by.

I was in Field Artillery, so putting perimeters around the battery and having a reaction force was about as "Infantry" as we got. We'd change position about two or three times a day, so our perimeters weren't very elaborate, just hasty positions that were enough to satisfy ARTEP evaluators. We rarely put the Traversing and Elevation Mechanisms on our MGs during static defense, but they would have been handy had we been hit at night by a real enemy.

JMA
09-10-2010, 12:49 PM
It's still doctrine. Problem is few units teach and use it. We get in a real war, they will...

Which was the last "real war" Ken?

Ken White
09-10-2010, 02:47 PM
The Congo is ongoing.

The far more important question is 'When and where will be the next and who will be involved...'

Michael C
09-10-2010, 04:08 PM
The Congo is ongoing.

The far more important question is 'When and where will be the next and who will be involved...'

My prediction is that the next war could be messy. Saying where or when is nigh impossible (who really would have said Afghanistan and Iraq before 9/11?), but describing what it could look like is.

To borrow a poorly understood doctrinal term, the next war will likely be full-spectrum, from high intensity division fights to low intensity cleaning. There isn't a war we could fight that won't require us to win the peace afterwards. Failure to win the peace, as in Iraq twice and Afghanistan once, will cost us dearly.

So this brings me to the original point of this post: we need to train an army prepared for high intensity conflict and low intensity conflict--and everything in between. We need leaders who are adaptable, but still knowledgeable in the core competencies of moving, shooting and communicating; then acting like diplomats, police and trainers.

Are these skills limited by our current wars? I don't think so. My platoon in Afghanistan had a hundred time more live fire training exercises than a Ranger Battalion had in the entire 90s. We called for fire, maneuvered, linked in with air support and then, when the fire fights were done, sat down and drank chai with the locals. Units in Afghanistan and Iraq aren't just a little better at fighting than units were in the 90s, they are ten times better. We have honed are skills in live fire training exercises called combat, and we are so much better for it.

Fuchs
09-10-2010, 05:08 PM
You make an assumption that may be self-evident in some countries, but history disagrees.

A war doesn't need to end with an occupation - not even "successful" wars.


In fact, it's most often better to negotiate an acceptable peace instead of going the whole distance to the enemy's surrender.


No matter how much the world war and this "we've let Saddam escape once" thinking distorted many people's views; war does not need to be waged for maximal objectives.

Romans fought their wars till their opponent was destroyed as a threat forever (and inevitably replaced by another one). Cato was the typical Roman in this regard.

Americans have clung to this maximum objectives approach as well, but it's rarely advisable.



So no, although you're probably right that the "next" war (for a major Western power) may include some classic manoeuvring and clashing of brigades - there's no inevitable occupation phase.

In fact, this next war could very well be lost. Allies might find themselves in a INS situation instead of a COIN situation.

Ken White
09-10-2010, 07:35 PM
Occupation is not only often unnecessary, it can be counterproductive. No question one needs to be prepared to do it but one should be prepared to do many things one hopes one will never have to do and one should actively seek to not do some of those things. I can recover some aircraft from a spin and do a fishhook turn in my car but I work at not having to do those things..

Cases in point:
...who really would have said Afghanistan and Iraq before 9/11?), but describing what it could look like is...Failure to win the peace, as in Iraq twice and Afghanistan once, will cost us dearly.I believe that to be a double misstatement of what actually occurred. First, both Afghanistan and Iraq were totally predictable and what in fact occurred (before, during and after...) had been predicted by many. Both nations as problems and the aftermath possibilities were well up on the radar screen. The difficulty was that no one involved in policy making at the national, DoD, HqDA and TRADOC levels (remember those last three for the future...) was remotely interested in hearing any of that. Domestic concerns took -- always take (remember that also for the future...) -- precedence. :mad:

It's well known fact that Armed Forces do pretty much what they're trained to do. Conversely, they are unlikely to do what they are not trained to do. The force that went into Afghanistan did its job beautifully -- then we inserted forces we did not need there to do things that did not need to be done there and said Forces were not trained to do what was asked of them. That is at one time a policy, a military advisory and a training shortfall that created the situation that led to your unit being better trained and more capable than its predecessor was 12 years ago.

That same cluster held true in Iraq; the initial entry and action was great; good people doing what they'd trained to do and doing it very well indeed. Then, the lack of training showed in the tolerance of looting, excessive reliance on force and the abject failure of the intelligence system -- and those forces and their commanders -- to predict Saddam's publicly announced initiation of an insurgency. The fact that all that was also eminently predictable is shown by the Franks deal with Rumsfeld -- "I'll take Baghdad for you but then I want to immediately retire..."

Secondly, the initial failure in Iraq was one of political will and not of capability (more with Viet Nam experience about; plus I cannot see Norman Schwarzkopf ever tolerating looting...:D), the second failure was engendered by a good case of merited and desirable political will but a badly flawed assessment of capability; it also happens to not necessarily be a 'failure' -- too early to tell. Same thing is true of Afghanistan. However, failures or there is no doubt that both were and are extremely costly endeavors that did not have to occur. That fact remains true with or without our being better trained at the time than was the case.

So even though it does reflect much current thought, your assessment of how we got where we are is, I believe, incorrect. The good news is that this comment by you, your bottom line, is totally correct and bears emphasis:
So this brings me to the original point of this post: we need to train an army prepared for high intensity conflict and low intensity conflict--and everything in between. We need leaders who are adaptable, but still knowledgeable in the core competencies of moving, shooting and communicating; then acting like diplomats, police and trainers. (emphasis add / kw)I totally agree and have been banging on that drum for almost 45 years of service and work and the fifteen years since I've been fully retired. You are correct. That is an achievable goal.

IF...

We scrap our flawed personnel and training processes and do not delude ourselves that everything in Afghanistan and Iraq would have been alright had we simply been more proficient in actions after the attack, COIN efforts and FID skills -- that is a very dangerous over simplification of the problem. Hubris can be its own worst enemy.

For example:
Units in Afghanistan and Iraq aren't just a little better at fighting than units were in the 90s, they are ten times better. We have honed are skills in live fire training exercises called combat, and we are so much better for it.I agree that you and we are better for it but I also submit that by pegging it against the Army of the 90s you are setting a pretty low standard. Nor is a Ranger Bn anything special -- if you had their selectivity and their money, you might well be able to do a better job than can they. :wry:

More apt comparison might be the less 'well trained' but slightly more all round capable Army of the early and mid 60s before the late 1967 Viet Nam malaise set in and led to the Army of the 70s through the 90s, the Army that created Ranger Bns to fill an obvious shortfall in Infantry capability induced by a deeply flawed training strategy and a culture of risk aversion that was developing. The capability of the Infantry has been regained in part, the risk aversion is a societal thing and will be more difficult to dispel.

Never forget that same 70 to 90s Army made Tommy Franks a four button... :rolleyes:

JMA
09-11-2010, 04:30 PM
I'll never understand the idea behind such formations.

A platoon should march separately in order to retain the freedom of movement for at least a part of itself in the event of a contact. Even a whole infantry platoon can easily get pinned down - fixed - if it marches as a whole in one body.

Military history knows incidents of whole companies being temporarily fixed by a single sniper.

It's absolutely crucial to move in separate groups of minimum capability each if that's possible at all (communication, coordination).

Essentially I am in agreement with you.

I taught this basic stuff once to a series of officer cadets/trainees.

I made a point of stating that such text book diagrams were illustrative. That platoon commanders allow individual section commanders to call their formations according to the terrain and likely enemy tactics and only to intervene when there is really a problem (which would be best solved by sending the platoon sgt across to sort it out).

Secondly the distance between the sections and platoon HQ would be what we termed "a tactical bound". (This would be learned during practical training on the ground.)

It would take a pretty elaborate ambush with heavy machine guns to pin a platoon down when on patrol. Can't think of how a company can be pinned down.

JMA
09-11-2010, 04:35 PM
Are these skills limited by our current wars? I don't think so. My platoon in Afghanistan had a hundred time more live fire training exercises than a Ranger Battalion had in the entire 90s. We called for fire, maneuvered, linked in with air support and then, when the fire fights were done, sat down and drank chai with the locals. Units in Afghanistan and Iraq aren't just a little better at fighting than units were in the 90s, they are ten times better. We have honed are skills in live fire training exercises called combat, and we are so much better for it.

Why does this "over simplification" not ring true?

How much combat does it take for a raw platoon to reach the level of arrogance that they believe they have become the single greatest soldiers since the Spartans?

Fuchs
09-11-2010, 04:41 PM
It would take a pretty elaborate ambush with heavy machine guns to pin a platoon down when on patrol. Can't think of how a company can be pinned down.

There was a time and a front where both smoke grenades and armour as well as trees, ditches and settlements were so much in short supply that infantry had to attack on open plains with nothing but some mortar HE fire support...

JMA
09-11-2010, 04:55 PM
LINK (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contact). As in 'Movement to contact' (LINK) .pdf) (http://www.usna.edu/USMCInfo/Documents/Pubs/b0376.pdf). Or this Video (LINK) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xu1cTil6xNI). Or the US DoD Dictionary (LINK) (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/) under 'M' for Movement to contact...

Any contact involving an exchange of fire or direct combat, ranging from hand to hand all the way indirect as in an Artillery duel. It can be at close or long range, with or without visual acquisition. That can and does include meeting engagements, static defense, tank on tank fights, ambushed patrols, aerial combat between fighters, bombers dropping bombs...


I would qualify that with the term "effective fire". If you come under effective fire, or you exchange effective fire or you deliver effective fire in the enemy.

There is all this talk about long range "contacts" (500-900m) in Helmand. This can not be effective fire for most platoon weapons. Does one even bother to take cover?

...ah but as per my many previous comments about strolling around over open ground I guess the soldiers led into harms way by and idiot officer will probably feel a little vulnerable.

JMA
09-11-2010, 05:13 PM
There was a time and a front where both smoke grenades and armour as well as trees, ditches and settlements were so much in short supply that infantry had to attack on open plains with nothing but some mortar HE fire support...

I qualified my comment with "when on patrol." But yes a Normandy beach scenario could be problematic for a brigade let along a company.

Ken White
09-11-2010, 07:27 PM
I would qualify that with the term "effective fire". If you come under effective fire, or you exchange effective fire or you deliver effective fire in the enemy.However, if one has seen a few people killed by random, even unintended, fire one will probably look at a definition of 'effective' in a different light than others.
There is all this talk about long range "contacts" (500-900m) in Helmand. This can not be effective fire for most platoon weapons. Does one even bother to take cover?Depends on the weapons. If the opponents have SVD(s), any of the PK series or even old Nagants or Enfields -- even an RPK -- much less a Dshk, they can bring very effective (by any reasonable definition) fire on you at those ranges. Conversely, the M-14 series, the M240/MAG 58s and the various other long range weapons can initiate or return effective fire at those ranges. So whether one even bothers to take cover is -- as always -- situation, state of training and / or experience and all that METT-TC stuff dependent. The only rule in combat is that there are no rules... ;)
...ah but as per my many previous comments about strolling around over open ground I guess the soldiers led into harms way by and idiot officer will probably feel a little vulnerable.Or the Soldier led into harm's way by a quite competent officer or NCO not by strolling -- as you so repetitiously, drolly and ignorantly put it -- but by crossing open areas that are forced upon them by the situation in as tactically sound a manner as is possible.

The good news is that you don't have to worry about any of that, you can just fulminate at length over the internet while a lot of others ranging from more competent than you or I ever were to those incompetents you seem to see everywhere get on with business... :wry:

Fuchs
09-11-2010, 07:59 PM
I qualified my comment with "when on patrol." But yes a Normandy beach scenario could be problematic for a brigade let along a company.

...always these Western Allies countrymen!

I thought of the Eastern Front which had incredibly featureless plains, and most of the forward movement had to be done dozens if not hundreds of km away from the next armour battlegroup.

Pete
09-12-2010, 01:39 AM
In these discussions about getting back to basics we have to remember what the missions are of the different branches of the combined arms team. In his article "The Secret of Future Victories," available at this link (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/gorman/gorman.asp), General Paul F. Gorman states the following:


IIn 1971, Lieutenant General W.E. DePuy, in a lecture at Fort Benning, took issue with the standard formulation of the mission of infantry pointing out that in World War II, per his recollection, what an infantry company really accomplished on any given day was not to 'close with and destroy the enemy,' but rather to move its artillery forward observer to the next hill. His views were not well received by his audience, but he was accurately reflecting the fact that the most important success of the U.S. Army in World War II must be attributed to its artillery ordnance and technique.

On another note, I wish the forum had a "Devil Grin" emoticon, but in lieu of that this one will have to do. :p

JMA
09-12-2010, 05:49 AM
...always these Western Allies countrymen!

I thought of the Eastern Front which had incredibly featureless plains, and most of the forward movement had to be done dozens if not hundreds of km away from the next armour battlegroup.

I can only use a example I have some knowledge about (through reading).

You don't find too many insurgents on open rolling plains. Closest you get to that around here is northern Namibia where Koevoet used to ride SWAPO down in their vehicles. (If Koevoet had been soldiers rather than policemen they probably would have got a lot more for less - if you know what I mean.)

Fuchs
09-12-2010, 10:31 AM
@Pete:

The U.S. infantry was a bit extreme in this regard, likely due to the personnel system and the abundance of fire support.
The infantry of other nations behaved mostly different.

It'll be interesting (and sad) to see how infantry behaves in the next modern vs. modern major conflict. It might very well follow the FO model - not the least because infantry quantity will be very insufficient at the beginning of such a conflict and the average competence would drop quickly.

My take on infantry is difficult, though:
Infantry should dominate closed terrain, repel attackers inside it.
It should attack into closed terrain preferably by infiltration.
Infantry on mountains will most likely follow the FO model, no matter what else is being attempted (this will be valid till we get some rapid individual movement capability in mountaineous terrain.)


New slogan for infantry:
Infantry - the invisible sovereigns of closed terrain.

Pete
09-12-2010, 10:16 PM
Fuchs, what's your definition of closed terrain and how does it differ from the open kind? Do you mean urban, wooded, or otherwise compartmented?

Fuchs
09-12-2010, 10:50 PM
I used an often-read term to make communication non-ambiguous and this is the result...I wasn't understood. :(


I usually call this kind of terrain "infanteriefreundliches Gelände" (infantry-friendly terrain) or "infanteriegünstiges Gelände" (infantry-favouring terrain) in German because the Bundeswehr doesn't seem to have such a summary term. The German field manuals are full of more detailed terrain categories (mountainous, forests, settlements, movement-impairing terrain) instead.

A simple definition would be the relationship between tanks and infantry; terrains that allow tanks to exploit their strengths (range of guns and sensors, firepower, speed) and best tactics (tanks supporting each other) is tank-friendly, open terrain.

This is about relative combat strength, not so much about mobility (tanks can drive through settlements and many forests just fine).

An exact definition would depend on the forces involved; especially on the man-portable anti-tank weapons and tanks involved.

--------

I do sometimes call an intermediate form "mixed terrain":
Enough opportunities for concealment of static infantry (not necessarily enough concealed routes for infantry movements), and few route options for vehicles that avoid the fields of fire of such hidden infantry forces. It could also be understood as a patchwork of closed and open terrain.

Belarus has much terrain of this kind (if you assume weapons such as Javelin for the infantry) and the Central European landscapes with the many dispersed settlements fit as well.
Mixed terrain and its associated challenges is probably the most important and most interesting terrain category for Europeans.


edit: A quick search yielded "closed terrain" being mentioned in FMs 17-18, 17-98 and 1-112. I remember it mostly from books, though.

Kiwigrunt
09-12-2010, 11:12 PM
Maybe the Bundeswehr approach makes more sense. Differentiating between close/open terrain may be a bit too stark, i.e. black/white to be truly useful in all of those intermediate situations. Basing doctrine upon it may leave too little (perceived?) flexibility, also considering all other factors. So I’m wondering if it may be one of those areas where an attempt at strict classification and categorising can sometimes be more limiting/confusing than helpful.

Pete
09-13-2010, 12:20 AM
Est tut mir leit, Herr Doktor Fuchs. My German never got much past the, "Wo ist der Schwerpunkt, bitte?" level. :o

JMA
09-13-2010, 08:17 AM
However, if one has seen a few people killed by random, even unintended, fire one will probably look at a definition of 'effective' in a different light than others.

In Section Battle Drill 2 - Reaction to Effective Enemy Fire (the Brit version) it is as follows: "Effective enemy fire is fire which is causing casualties, or likely to do so if the advance is continued." Does not matter what source.


Depends on the weapons. If the opponents have SVD(s), any of the PK series or even old Nagants or Enfields -- even an RPK -- much less a Dshk, they can bring very effective (by any reasonable definition) fire on you at those ranges. Conversely, the M-14 series, the M240/MAG 58s and the various other long range weapons can initiate or return effective fire at those ranges. So whether one even bothers to take cover is -- as always -- situation, state of training and / or experience and all that METT-TC stuff dependent. The only rule in combat is that there are no rules... ;)

Its all about whether its effective fire. Some bangs in the distance with the odd high crack overhead is hardly worth responding to. The question needs to be asked again what are the troops doing out in the open and exposed to someone with any weapon 900m away?


Or the Soldier led into harm's way by a quite competent officer or NCO not by strolling -- as you so repetitiously, drolly and ignorantly put it -- but by crossing open areas that are forced upon them by the situation in as tactically sound a manner as is possible.

I appreciate it touches a nerve with you Ken but your responses don't address the issue. I ask again what do these patrols wish to find out there on the open ground they walk over? If they were there to draw fire that a few Gunships would respond to then I can understand it. But then we know this is not the case.

I asked this question before and now I ask it again:
... what kind of tactical movement is being used by these patrols where they are out in the open and able to be seen from 500-700m? Not to mention fieldcraft and "selecting lines of advance" issues.

I know the Brit teaching on this and they are deviating from the doctrine (they will probably say they have no choice because of the large tracts of open ground - but will forget that under such circumstances the requirement is to picket the high ground).

Then we got into the supposed need to get from point A to point B. And it turns out they wanted to have a chat with the civvies in the villages.


The good news is that you don't have to worry about any of that, you can just fulminate at length over the internet while a lot of others ranging from more competent than you or I ever were to those incompetents you seem to see everywhere get on with business... :wry:

Its called the pursuit of excellence Ken. Keep questioning and keep trying to improve. The competent will continue to learn and improve and the incompetents will continue to go like lambs to the slaughter.

Ken White
09-13-2010, 02:39 PM
In Section Battle Drill 2 - Reaction to Effective Enemy Fire (the Brit version) it is as follows: "Effective enemy fire is fire which is causing casualties, or likely to do so if the advance is continued.[/
B]" Does not matter what source.(emphasis added / kw)Thank you for confirming my comment with British doctrine. It must be terribly conflicting to have been trained under it, quote it often and yet have to denigrate the nation that produced it.

That's an inane and inept add-on of yours. The source does matter. The difference in the effective range of 7.62x39 and 7.62x54 rounds can and does matter...
...The question needs to be asked again what are the troops doing out in the open and exposed to someone with any weapon 900m away?The answer is again provided -- Moving from one point to another. Sometimes that's necessary, sometimes not. We usually cannot tell from our distance which is which. I have no problem saying it's possibly not smart or required on occasion -- you seem to have a problem acknowledging that mission dictates and METT-TC can occasionally force one to do things that are undesirable. You also discount the terrain of Afghanistan and try to equate with that in your locale. It's rather different.
I appreciate it touches a nerve with you Ken but your responses don't address the issue. I ask again what do these patrols wish to find out there on the open ground they walk over?I can't answer your question -- nor can you. We aren't there and cannot know whether there is a reason (whether sensible or not); you just wish to be negative -- you do that well if snidely...

The snide factor does indeed touch a nerve; mostly because it's counterproductive and cloaks your value as a commenter. It does you no favors. The rest of the rather ill informed comment, not at all ;)
... If they were there to draw fire that a few Gunships would respond to then I can understand it. But then we know this is not the case.There you go again. "we" do NOT know -- you assume. You also apparently assume there are more gunships available and that they can respond to every Platoon sized patrol from over probably around 3,000 or so platoons involved, perhaps about a quarter of which may see some activity daily. Figure 20% of them may make a minor contact -- that's a minimum 150 or so actions a day in a nation twice as large as was Rhodesia. Plus maintenance and other stuff going on like escorting MedEvac and resupply birds. Not that many gunships.
I asked this question before and now I ask it again: ... but will forget that under such circumstances the requirement is to [B]picket the high ground).You do that a lot; mostly because you apparently deliberately choose to ask generic questions that cannot be answered for various reasons, most frequently a lack of situational context and / or knowledge. Old and tired debating technique, that. I will point out that the Western Forces and the Afghan government forces in the fight do not have sufficient personnel strength to adequately "picket the high ground" on a constant basis (as many have repeatedly told you). More pointedly, I'll also note that you've been provided a few pictures -- and Google has many more --of the terrain there and if you're foolish enough to think that 'picketing' the high ground on a ridge that is two miles away from a valley or Village one has been directed to patrol to and conduct a search is going to do much good, you have my sympathy.
Then we got into the supposed need to get from point A to point B. And it turns out they wanted to have a chat with the civvies in the villages.That's the theory...:cool:
Its called the pursuit of excellence Ken. Keep questioning and keep trying to improve. The competent will continue to learn and improve and the incompetents will continue to go like lambs to the slaughter.I agree with the last portion, you're correct on that. On the first part, as on the rest of your comment to which this responds, you aren't "pursuing excellence," you're merely carping -- and doing that about a war you seem to choose to deliberately misunderstand and misrepresent. Sensible and knowledgeable suggestions can aid in the pursuit of excellence, obviously ill informed or deliberately elided and notably biased sneering comments will not. Your choice...

Tukhachevskii
09-13-2010, 03:11 PM
Belarus has much terrain of this kind (if you assume weapons such as Javelin for the infantry) and the Central European landscapes with the many dispersed settlements fit as well.


Fuchs, that's the second time I've read you using Belarus as an example. Anything going on I or the Bylorussians should be aware of?:D

Fuchs
09-13-2010, 04:27 PM
The constitutional mission of the German Armed Forces is the protection of Germany, extended into alliance defence. A dictatorship at a relatively new alliance frontier is naturally attracting interest, although I don't think primarily about their forces...

We're in good enough times that even tiny irritations can get attention. There's no big threat.

JMA
09-13-2010, 10:53 PM
Thank you for confirming my comment with British doctrine. It must be terribly conflicting to have been trained under it, quote it often and yet have to denigrate the nation that produced it.

Not the nation. Certainly the politicians (no surprise there) mainly for the conduct of the war in Basra and Helmand. Sadly this disease has spread to the senior officers of the British army. If you read widely you will see that the issues I have raised re the conduct of the Brit forces in Helmand are hardly if at all being contested now days. Outstanding soldiers are being misused and incorrectly employed by some very average (or worse) senior officers. This is very sad. But my criticism is hardly of the nation as a whole.

Am I too expect a defence of British tactics in Helmand from 2006 to the present from you to prove me (and a host of others - mainly Brits themselves) wrong?


That's an inane and inept add-on of yours. The source does matter. The difference in the effective range of 7.62x39 and 7.62x54 rounds can and does matter...

Read the definition of effective fire again. Effective fire is effective fire.


The answer is again provided -- Moving from one point to another. Sometimes that's necessary, sometimes not. We usually cannot tell from our distance which is which. I have no problem saying it's possibly not smart or required on occasion -- you seem to have a problem acknowledging that mission dictates and METT-TC can occasionally force one to do things that are undesirable.

My information is that movement over open ground is treated like the words of the song of that song about Old Man River in that they just keep rolling along. There is no longer any pretense of dealing with such open ground as an obstacle and treated as such.

Now think about it. This patrolling pattern gifted the Taliban with an opportunity to maintain the initiative by choosing the time and place for initiating contact with ISAF forces at ranges they know can't be accurately responded to.

Now we hear that 52% of contacts are at ranges out beyond 500m. Then we have had threads of what poor shots the Taliban in general are other than for a small group of snipers. Then I was told the use of "crack and thump" was not applicable because of the short ranges that the contacts take place. Well there is obviously confusion here as "crack and thump" only blurs at ranges around 50m. But the problem is not that "crack and thump" doesn't work it is that the soldier with one ear covered can't use his hearing to the maximum.

The tactical problems are self inflicted and the enemy is taking advantage of the "Keystone Cops" situation presented to them.


You also discount the terrain of Afghanistan and try to equate with that in your locale. It's rather different.I can't answer your question -- nor can you. We aren't there and cannot know whether there is a reason (whether sensible or not); you just wish to be negative -- you do that well if snidely...

I never discount terrain (in fact careful use of terrain will compensate in large part for a lack of knowledge of the enemy). I look on in horror how some of the best soldiers in the world are failing to use ground correctly. What ever happened to conducting an appreciation of the ground prior to movement? The sad point has been reached where an MO has been developed and Brits when asked as to why they do things that way the answer is "that's the way we do it over here." Unquestioning acceptance of a failed tactical approach... which is heartbreaking.


The snide factor does indeed touch a nerve; mostly because it's counterproductive and cloaks your value as a commenter. It does you no favors. The rest of the rather ill informed comment, not at all ;)

I am not hear to earn any favours (with a U). I will continue to plug on with basic aspects which so many people merely pay lip service to.

I await with interest for the next posting by some 30 something kid who will announce that he has solved some hitherto intractable tactical problem which should never have been a problem if only he/they had either read the manual carefully or sought out the answer from those with the experience.


There you go again. "we" do NOT know -- you assume. You also apparently assume there are more gunships available and that they can respond to every Platoon sized patrol from over probably around 3,000 or so platoons involved, perhaps about a quarter of which may see some activity daily. Figure 20% of them may make a minor contact -- that's a minimum 150 or so actions a day in a nation twice as large as was Rhodesia. Plus maintenance and other stuff going on like escorting MedEvac and resupply birds. Not that many gunships.

I was merely suggesting the "bait and trap" approach as being the only really sane reason to force infantry to walk over open barren ground.

Hmmm... 150 contacts per day. I wonder when we will get some analysis from the Wikileaks documents to show what results and kill rates are being achieved in Afghanistan.

In Rhodesia it took some time before the right concentration and use of air assets was worked out. Once it was the results were devastatingly effective.

Interesting tactic used by South African forces in southern Angola where they had little or no idea where the enemy was. Called Butterfly Ops two Alouette III gunships would would fly a tactical bound ahead of a handful of Puma helos loaded with troops and when they saw likely camp areas would drop to tree top level and overfly the areas to try and draw fire. If successful they would call up the Pumas and the game would be on.

Last time the aggressive tactical use of helos was suggested we had half a dozen people around here collapse in a heap shouting RPG... RPG!!!


You do that a lot; mostly because you apparently deliberately choose to ask generic questions that cannot be answered for various reasons, most frequently a lack of situational context and / or knowledge. Old and tired debating technique, that. I will point out that the Western Forces and the Afghan government forces in the fight do not have sufficient personnel strength to adequately "picket the high ground" on a constant basis (as many have repeatedly told you). More pointedly, I'll also note that you've been provided a few pictures -- and Google has many more --of the terrain there and if you're foolish enough to think that 'picketing' the high ground on a ridge that is two miles away from a valley or Village one has been directed to patrol to and conduct a search is going to do much good, you have my sympathy.

We are taking about 52 % of contacts being initiated at ranges from 500-900m... so where does the two miles come from?

OK so ISAF have been at it in earnest for 5 years now and a tactic for dealing with "shoot and scoot" contacts has not evolved yet? Maybe its because the troops rotate at too short an interval to learn this stuff? (Oh yes... its all about PTSD isn't it?)


That's the theory...:cool:I agree with the last portion, you're correct on that. On the first part, as on the rest of your comment to which this responds, you aren't "pursuing excellence," you're merely carping -- and doing that about a war you seem to choose to deliberately misunderstand and misrepresent. Sensible and knowledgeable suggestions can aid in the pursuit of excellence, obviously ill informed or deliberately elided and notably biased sneering comments will not. Your choice...

Good so you agree with:
The competent will continue to learn and improve and the incompetents will continue to go like lambs to the slaughter. Good.

There are obviously so home truths which are unpalatable to swallow. It is only through the efforts (as unpopular they may be among the guilty) of people like Stephan Grey, Anthony King, Theo Farrell and others that the Brit politicians and senior officers will be shamed into taking the long overdue corrective action.

Pete
09-13-2010, 11:35 PM
JMA, your discussion of tactical and operational issues nearly always turn into a kind of moral condemnation of the leaders involved. I have no doubt that you learned some important things during your wartime service that give you insights into how current operations could be better conducted. The point I'm making is that it isn't your tactical commentary that arouses ire on this forum, it's your habit of claiming the moral high ground in each and every message. Why not try discussing tactics without the elements of indignation and contempt?

Ken White
09-14-2010, 02:39 AM
If you read widely you will see that the issues I have raised re the conduct of the Brit forces in Helmand are hardly if at all being contested now days...Am I too expect a defence of British tactics in Helmand from 2006 to the present from you to prove me (and a host of others - mainly Brits themselves) wrong?Nor have I questioned them here, I do not disagree with you; the quote "Lions led by Donkeys" is older than you or I and I probably was aware of it before you were born. ;)

What I have questioned is your tone on the topic and your frequent assertions of your opinions as incontroverible facts. Both those things are mildly bothersome and IMO, do not do you or your message any favors.
Read the definition of effective fire again. Effective fire is effective fire.I knew what that was before you were born also, possibly experienced it long after your last bit. :wry: The point was that the right weapon or caliber enhances the possibility of effective fire at extended ranges. Surprised you missed that simple and basic fact.
My information is that movement over open ground is treated like the words of the song of that song about Old Man River in that they just keep rolling along. There is no longer any pretense of dealing with such open ground as an obstacle and treated as such.I hear the same thing -- unlike you, I know it's due to the vast extent of open terrain -- there are few options. It's not a matter of choice, it's a matter of getting where you need to be and few alternatives.
Now think about it. This patrolling pattern gifted the Taliban with an opportunity to maintain the initiative by choosing the time and place for initiating contact with ISAF forces at ranges they know can't be accurately responded to.Incorrect; cannot be adequately responded to with the 5.56mm round we're saddled with; the 7.62mm weapons in the unit can and do respond; thus the Talibs are smart enough to stay where many weapons in the Platoon cannot tap them -- but not all. They also have range limitation in that most are armed with AKs.
Now we hear that 52% of contacts are at ranges out beyond 500m. ... the soldier with one ear covered can't use his hearing to the maximum.Yep, confusing isn't it. Conflicting figures abound. What's an armchair warrior to do... :D
The tactical problems are self inflicted and the enemy is taking advantage of the "Keystone Cops" situation presented to them.Of course they are, wouldn't you? Though I suggest your Keystone Cops comment is specious, made from a position of incomplete information and thus amounts to speculation and is unduly pejorative to no good purpose.
I never discount terrain (in fact careful use of terrain will compensate in large part for a lack of knowledge of the enemy). I look on in horror how some of the best soldiers in the world are failing to use ground correctly. What ever happened to conducting an appreciation of the ground prior to movement? The sad point has been reached where an MO has been developed and Brits when asked as to why they do things that way the answer is "that's the way we do it over here." Unquestioning acceptance of a failed tactical approach... which is heartbreaking.Heartbreaking? Are you perchance a dramatist? In any event, I suggest that yet again you're projecting for some obscure reason. I doubt your stated points are accurate.
I am not hear to earn any favours (with a U). I will continue to plug on with basic aspects which so many people merely pay lip service to.Good, do that. Does that mean you'll try to post in a civil manner and avoid speculative and judgmental pronouncements? That would probably help your stated cause. Plugging on is good. Does help if one has one's act together while plugging.
Hmmm... 150 contacts per day. I wonder when we will get some analysis from the Wikileaks documents to show what results and kill rates are being achieved in Afghanistan.Sigh. There you go again -- you do know that "150" is only my broad 'estimate,' a hypothetical figure and could be terribly incorrect. Surely you won't go elsewhere and announce, authoritatively, that "The NATO force in Afghanistan has 150 c0ntacts a day..."
...they saw likely camp areas would drop to tree top level and overfly the areas to try and draw fire...Yet another US Air Cavalry tactic from Viet Nam you folks successfully later employed. Good for you. ;)
Last time the aggressive tactical use of helos was suggested we had half a dozen people around here collapse in a heap shouting RPG... RPG!!!Surely you jest. Better go back and review the comments, I was in on that and as the Bard said, "Thou doeth protest too much..."
We are taking about 52 % of contacts being initiated at ranges from 500-900m... so where does the two miles come from?I thought you said you never discounted terrain. It came from the pictures you've seen and obviously forgotten at this (LINK) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=101777&postcount=46). If one wanted to operate on any of those flats, the nearest ridge top is some hundreds of meters -- a couple of miles in two cases -- away. I thought surely the good soldier would remember those...
OK so ISAF have been at it in earnest for 5 years now and a tactic for dealing with "shoot and scoot" contacts has not evolved yet? Maybe its because the troops rotate at too short an interval to learn this stuff? (Oh yes... its all about PTSD isn't it?)Yes, it is indeed due to the tours -- but that's democracy for you. That's five years (or nine, depending on how you're counting who. Or more...) separate and not always equal one year or less tours. Not a thing you or I can do about that so you might as well accept it. The Troops who go and do it are; you're the one doing the sniveling -- and doing it in a pejorative manner that isn't in your professed interest.

As for the PTSD, don't think any one here said that. They did point out that it was a societal / political concern. Not much any of us here can do about that, either. So why get snide and stroppy with people who are inclined to agree with you and generally have on more points than not -- until you get unduly and egregiously bitchy and effectively imply that some who served there are lying or shading the truth at best. You're too cagey to accuse them but you drop a lot of innuendo -- unnecessary innuendo.[quote]There are obviously so home truths which are unpalatable to swallow. It is only through the efforts (as unpopular they may be among the guilty) of people like Stephan Grey, Anthony King, Theo Farrell and others that the Brit politicians and senior officers will be shamed into taking the long overdue corrective action.That is as may be and I wouldn't take bets on the corrective part. If those people achieve that, good on 'em. OTOH, your making yourself a minor pain here by pursuing fetishes to excess and offering gratuitous slaps to fellow posters here is hardly likely to help anyone.

JMA
09-14-2010, 02:18 PM
What I have questioned is your tone on the topic and your frequent assertions of your opinions as incontroverible facts. Both those things are mildly bothersome and IMO, do not do you or your message any favors.

Can't help you with that Ken.


The point was that the right weapon or caliber enhances the possibility of effective fire at extended ranges. Surprised you missed that simple and basic fact.

Didn't miss it. I was talking about effective fire. Pretty obvious different weapons have different effective ranges, yes?


I hear the same thing -- unlike you, I know it's due to the vast extent of open terrain -- there are few options. It's not a matter of choice, it's a matter of getting where you need to be and few alternatives.

The question is where do the troops need to be. And if they really need to be there how is the best way to get there (considering the IED threat and all).


Incorrect; cannot be adequately responded to with the 5.56mm round we're saddled with; the 7.62mm weapons in the unit can and do respond; thus the Talibs are smart enough to stay where many weapons in the Platoon cannot tap them -- but not all. They also have range limitation in that most are armed with AKs.

So how many 7.62mm weapons are their in a platoon on averge? So what do the 5.56mm boys do while the 7.62mm boys are duking it out? Take a smoke break, brew up?


Yep, confusing isn't it. Conflicting figures abound. What's an armchair warrior to do... :D

Confusing? No. Interesting (and sad) to see how slow the forces are adapting.


Of course they are, wouldn't you? Though I suggest your Keystone Cops comment is specious, made from a position of incomplete information and thus amounts to speculation and is unduly pejorative to no good purpose.

Ken the sad fact is that the war is being lost. The Soviets killed them (mujahideen, civilians, whatever) by the million and still left with their tail between their legs. Is the prognosis for ISAF any better?

As too the Keystone Cops. That happens when soldiers come under fire when out in the open. See how they run... looking for non existent cover. Shopuldn't have been there in the first place.


Yet another US Air Cavalry tactic from Viet Nam you folks successfully later employed. Good for you. ;)

Nothing new under the sun Ken, wonder where the US Air Cavalry learned that.

For the rest you seem to have had a memory lapse. I would take no pride in turning the knife.

JMA
09-14-2010, 02:26 PM
JMA, your discussion of tactical and operational issues nearly always turn into a kind of moral condemnation of the leaders involved. I have no doubt that you learned some important things during your wartime service that give you insights into how current operations could be better conducted. The point I'm making is that it isn't your tactical commentary that arouses ire on this forum, it's your habit of claiming the moral high ground in each and every message. Why not try discussing tactics without the elements of indignation and contempt?

Pete, people (commanders) who get soldiers killed should be singled out for special attention. Name them and shame them.

Start with the soldiering basics and get them right. (Marksmanship, fieldcraft and minor tactics).

Study the terrain and accept that your enemy grew up in "them thar hills" and work especially hard at it.

Study the enemy tactics from every possible source and try to get inside his head.

Lastly know yourself. Understand your strengths and weaknesses and don't push your luck.

Sun Tzu said: "If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles."

Ken White
09-14-2010, 03:23 PM
Can't help you with that Ken.but obviously choose not to do so for your own obscure reasons.
So how many 7.62mm weapons are their in a platoon on averge? So what do the 5.56mm boys do while the 7.62mm boys are duking it out? Take a smoke break, brew up?Google can answer your question, though it is interesting that you comment 'knowledgeably' apparently without basic knowledge...
Nothing new under the sun Ken, wonder where the US Air Cavalry learned that.Reconnaissance by fire; among others, the Sumerians and the Mongols excelled at that.
For the rest you seem to have had a memory lapse. I would take no pride in turning the knife.Heh, can't you even exit gracefully? :D

JMA
09-15-2010, 01:07 PM
snip

OK, enough of that.

This is about the basics right?

Now the first problem IMHO is that the one ear of an infantryman is covered/blocked by a radio ear piece which obviously reduces his situational awareness (and also renders it near impossible to locate the enemy through crack-and-thump (or crack-and-bang as I believe it is in the US). We (I was specifically involved) tried this for stick commanders on Fireforce in 1976 and laughed it off for two reasons. One that the technology (available at that time) was not reliable enough, and two, that there was strong resistance blocking out environmental sound from one ear. The idea behind our trial was not to give everyone access to the radio traffic but rather to place the pressel switch (Brit) / push-to-talk switch (US) on the pistol grip of the FN so that both hands could remain on the weapon at all times.

The next is forcing on soldiers the restricted view of the battlefield through universal use of the likes of ACOG. At what range would or should the use of an ACOG begin to benefit the soldier in terms of marksmanship? Secondly to what extent does the improved vision through the optic sight actually benefit the soldier during routine patrol observation and during actual contact with the enemy?

I suggest that supposed improvements may not be as valuable as made out.

reed11b
09-15-2010, 05:24 PM
The next is forcing on soldiers the restricted view of the battlefield through universal use of the likes of ACOG. At what range would or should the use of an ACOG begin to benefit the soldier in terms of marksmanship? Secondly to what extent does the improved vision through the optic sight actually benefit the soldier during routine patrol observation and during actual contact with the enemy?

I suggest that supposed improvements may not be as valuable as made out.

A: ACOGs are not universal, even in A-stan.
B: Yes, they help, not for marksmanship, but for situational awareness. Often wished I had a small magnification ability in Iraq so I could see if the the guy in the field had a hoe or an AK-47. At the ranges in A-stan this is only more true. It's a tool, not a crutch.
Reed

Michael C
09-15-2010, 05:59 PM
An ACOG is like a machine gun, if everyone in the platoon had one it would be way too much of the same thing. As an ISR asset at the platoon level, it rocks. My gunners in trucks had them and binos, I had one as the PL and my expert marksmen had them, in addition to more advanced scopes on M14s.

The magnification definitely helps in positively identifying, then eliminating enemy threats. I, though, have always been a fan of more accurate fires as opposed to more fires, which is what most people tend to overreact with.

82redleg
09-15-2010, 10:21 PM
For rural Afghanistan, I can't see why you'd NOT want everyone to have an ACOG. Beginning at about 150m, it increases ability to accurately IDENTIFY and engage targets. Its not that you can't see the person in the field, but it IS about the ability to hit a hand or other small target behind cover, or engage through a window, etc. There is a tradeoff in speed of close range target acquisition, which can be mitigated to almost nothing with proper training. Given the mission set in rural Afghanistan, you are faced with long ranges alot more than you are with inside stuff, especially now that we are letting the ANSF do the searches.

My 2 cents, for whatever you think its worth.

Tukhachevskii
09-16-2010, 10:43 AM
The constitutional mission of the German Armed Forces is the protection of Germany, extended into alliance defence. A dictatorship at a relatively new alliance frontier is naturally attracting interest, although I don't think primarily about their forces...

We're in good enough times that even tiny irritations can get attention. There's no big threat.

Who said the German's don't have a sense of humour?:rolleyes:

qp4
09-20-2010, 09:07 PM
Nothing new under the sun Ken, wonder where the US Air Cavalry learned that.


Actually I think the large scale use of helicopter insertions really was something new under the sun that was devised by the US Army.

JMA
09-22-2010, 09:32 AM
Actually I think the large scale use of helicopter insertions really was something new under the sun that was devised by the US Army.

Actually the comment related to a much narrower context.

It related to deliberately using one or two choppers to fly at low level over an area trying to draw fire while a sizable force (jets, gunships, troopers) hung back out of earshot waiting for their chance to strike.

The South African's used this in Angola where their intel on locations of insurgents were unknown. They called it "Butterfly Ops".

Pete
11-19-2010, 04:06 AM
Regarding these combat fundamentals -- why does everyone insist on complicating things?


1. I will guard everything within the limits of my post and quit my post only when properly relieved.

2. I will obey my special orders and perform all of my duties in a military manner.

3. I will report violations of my special orders, emergencies, and anything not covered in my instructions to the commander of the relief.

Pete
11-19-2010, 04:40 AM
If I recall correctly Dad said they had to memorize something like ten General Orders. I guess once we kids started eating potato chips while we sat on the couch watching "Gilligan's Island" the Army realized they had to dumb things down. Then they came up with task-condition-standard a few years later, after they invented Doritos and we were watching "All in the Family."

William F. Owen
11-19-2010, 07:15 AM
I suggest that supposed improvements may not be as valuable as made out.

So PRR and Weapons optics? Most of the toys given to the Infantry in the last 10 years are crap, BUT the two that have proven winners again and again are PRR and Weapons optics. A x 4 sight is, IMO, essential, or at least the option to mount a magnifier.
PRR is an absolute winner, used correctly, so leaving it switched off when it's not needed. Yes, headset design is an issue, but everyone I know who have used them, trade hearing in one hear for a greater level of command effectiveness.
PRR makes things like Jungle Snap Ambush an absolute doddle.
Talking to instructors down at the IDF Urban Operations centre, they really want a PRR of some sort.

Red Rat
11-19-2010, 09:39 AM
The problem with the conduct of tactical operations, certainly in Helmand, is that a large number of them take place in what is effectively a medium density minefield. The issue then arises when under contact does one

Close with and kill the enemy?
Manoeuvre hard fast and aggressively into depth?


Or does one try to do either of the above while remaining in the cleared lane? Where does the balance of risk lie? My gut feel is that certainly Brit commanders in Helmand are very aware that if they manoeuvre outside of the cleared lane and take casualties then they will be held accountable in a Coroner's Court.

As for the hearing issue, certainly we recognise that for various reasons troops on the ground are having difficulty identifying firing points and more training emphasis is being directed that way. However I would point out that not only do we have radio input in one ear, but hearing defence (albeit technically sophisticated and personally moulded to fit!) is mandatory. Seems barking, but no hearing defence and we would lose most of our SNCOs and field grade officers as their hearing would be shot to pieces. Another example of the unforseen consequences of the enroachment of civil legislation into military operations.

William F. Owen
11-19-2010, 10:15 AM
My gut feel is that certainly Brit commanders in Helmand are very aware that if they manoeuvre outside of the cleared lane and take casualties then they will be held accountable in a Coroner's Court.
If you consider the Coroners opinion bears on the conduct of Combat Operations you should be relieved of command. No buts, ifs, or maybe, unless to consider that opinion has been handed down as guidance by CGS or similar.

.....but no hearing defence and we would lose most of our SNCOs and field grade officers as their hearing would be shot to pieces. Another example of the unforseen consequences of the enroachment of civil legislation into military operations.
Really? No former SOG 1-0 I ever met was hard of hearing and I doubt JMA, Ken White, Gian Gentile, Reed Dyer or any of the other guys with high time in combat are either. If so, then a pull a percentage disability based on testing. Do we stop parachuting because we may have to pay out?

Rat Mate, I think we have to separate the real issues from the worthless excuses.

Infanteer
11-19-2010, 03:07 PM
We've got numerous NCOs from the 2006 fighting season who are now wearing hearing aids.

Surefire issues an excellent ear plug that fits in the ear and still allows you to hear ambient noise and talking quite well. I didn't wear them all the time (ie night patrols) but I put them in ahead of time on certain occasions where my ears would need some protection.

Fuchs
11-19-2010, 03:24 PM
We've got numerous NCOs from the 2006 fighting season who are now wearing hearing aids.

Surefire issues an excellent ear plug that fits in the ear and still allows you to hear ambient noise and talking quite well. I didn't wear them all the time (ie night patrols) but I put them in ahead of time on certain occasions where my ears would need some protection.

There's actually hearing protection available that includes headset functions and can improve your hearing above its natural limits.

Red Rat
11-19-2010, 03:58 PM
Wilf mate,

Coroners' Court. It is not so much the Coroners' Opinion but the legal liability that is at issue. The fact of the matter is that the army is unsure of the legal consequences and of where culpability lies if (for instance) a commander took risk to exploit a situation, moved outside of the cleared lane and took casualties. That issue will not be cleared up until those circumstances come up to a court. Now it is not having a direct effect, but it is having an indirect effect on how commanders operate. Play safe and be okay, or take risk and get hammered?

Plus pre-deployment training concentrates heavily on getting the TTPs right. There is neither the time nor the resources to extend training into the imponderables of risk taking (and in today's litigious times, risk quantifying and then justifying). With training focusing on getting the TTPs right and not getting in to the 'when not to apply them' that again tends to reinforce inclinations not to step outside the lane as it is 'wrong'.

Having not deployed recently to Afghanistan I am not in a position to see how much an effect this is having. It is not black and white and different commanders will have different attitudes to risk and different AOs will also have different risk levels; but there is a feeling that uncertainty about how much risk commanders can (legally) take is having some effect on how they operate.

The perception of adverse legal consequences for doing one's best in the heat of the moment can have a powerful effect, as witnessed by the cases of Trooper Williams case from Iraq (BBC Trooper Williams (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4420051.stm) and the Private Clegg case from Northern Ireland (Wikipedia Lee Clegg (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lee_Clegg) both of which caused a great deal of alarm, speculation and unwillingness to take risk - especially among junior soldiers. I believe there is a case of manslaughter still due in the courts which relates to an incident in Afghanistan.

Hearing. As for hearing, in 2007 some 40% of the regular army infantry SNCO cohort were judged likely to be unfit to deploy due to hearing issues. This was based on some studies of hearing issues in units and then extrapolated across the wider piece. It is what drove the sudden enhancement in ear defence issued in the UK army. I know that this 40% rate was reflected in my company, almost exclusively among those with 12 years and plus service and who either failed or were 'at risk' in their mandatory pre-deployment hearing tests . I had to sign off, mitigate or body swerve hearing issues among a large number of my SNCOs. I failed my last medical on hearing. I am most certainly not deaf and do not have a discernible hearing problem - but until the docs clarify whether the machine was broken, I was sleeping in the sound booth (it was after lunch on a gorgeous summer's afternoon :D), I had an ear infection or I really am deaf in my left ear then I am strictly limited in where I can go. Personally I think the hearing tests are too rigorous, but they are based on Health and Safety legislation and levels that are common across all employments (our bandsmen now have to wear hearing protection when in band practice...:confused:). And yes, as Fuchs and Infanteer point out there is some excellent active hearing protection out there.

I don't necessarily agree with any of it, but it is out there.

PS: Can you speak up next time? ;)

Infanteer
11-19-2010, 03:59 PM
There's actually hearing protection available that includes headset functions and can improve your hearing above its natural limits.

Yes - Peltor is one of the leader is that. Problem is it is relatively big and bulky at this time.

As a Pl Comd, I had my PRR (Pl Net) on one ear, some hearing protection in the other ear and my MBITR with Coy net attached to a hand-mike. There is a PRR that allows you to plug into the radio and recieve/transmit on both nets through the PRR headset, but I couldn't get it to work and found it wasn't very good when I could get it to work.

The Gold Standard to aim for would be two ear buds that provide hearing protection from blast/loud noises, amplify ambient sound, and each one can receive a network (with a very low-profile mike to transmit). Oh yeah, it's got to be robust enough to take a beating in the field. Scientists - get to work!

Pete
11-19-2010, 04:38 PM
In the old days when I was XO of an eight-inch howitzer battery I kept an earplug in my left ear and put my index finger in my right ear when we fired. I needed to be able to hear the fire commands from the FDC on the speakers, which I couldn't when both earplugs were used. After a while you get an intuition about changes in quadrant and deflection that seem to be in error.

William F. Owen
11-19-2010, 04:40 PM
Wilf mate,

Coroners' Court. It is not so much the Coroners' Opinion but the legal liability that is at issue. The fact of the matter is that the army is unsure of the legal consequences and of where culpability lies if (for instance) a commander took risk to exploit a situation, moved outside of the cleared lane and took casualties. That issue will not be cleared up until those circumstances come up to a court. Now it is not having a direct effect, but it is having an indirect effect on how commanders operate. Play safe and be okay, or take risk and get hammered?

Sorry mate, this is b*llocks. The Coroner has no military training and is not equipped to second guess military action, or advise to it. If any Coroner is having any bearing on operations, the Commanders need sacking. It's a disgrace. Are COs going to be charged with negligence when one of their men gets shot by the enemy?

Red Rat
11-19-2010, 05:11 PM
Sorry mate, this is b*llocks.

Agree.


The Coroner has no military training and is not equipped to second guess military action, or advise to it.

Agree.


If any Coroner is having any bearing on operations, the Commanders need sacking. It's a disgrace. I personally do not think there is yet a direct influence, less the increasing tendency to rely on physical protection measures which I have alluded to in threads elsewhere. But my gut feel is that there may well be a degree of 'box ticking' mentality going on at certain levels. Apocryphally some COs are very very 'safe', (check all boxes and do not pass go unless arse is covered) and others less so. The phrase I have heard used is that we 'have to be wary that we are not breeding a generation of risk averse commanders'.


Are COs going to be charged with negligence when one of their men gets shot by the enemy?

And that is the million dollar question! I very much doubt it, but there may well have to be a test case at some point to settle the matter.

Ken White
11-19-2010, 05:18 PM
Really? No former SOG 1-0 I ever met was hard of hearing and I doubt JMA, Ken White, Gian Gentile, Reed Dyer or any of the other guys with high time in combat are either. If so, then a pull a percentage disability based on testing.Ummm, I can't speak for those others but my third and still more powerful set of Hearing Aids and those of my many contemporaneous former serving friends suggest you may be slightly over optimistic on that score. It's the cumulative effect that gets you, thus his older Officers and NCOs. The explosive and firearms noise are a minor problem but turbines and engines contribute far more nowadays...
Do we stop parachuting because we may have to pay out?No, we pay out to keep people parachuting in spite of a loss every now and then. :D
Rat Mate, I think we have to separate the real issues from the worthless excuses.I agree but what is worthless in your eyes or mine are not in the eyes of politicians and the western variety of that species is perhaps way too attuned to the Mothers of the world...:rolleyes:

Red Rat
11-19-2010, 06:07 PM
but what is worthless in your eyes or mine are not in the eyes of politicians and the western variety of that species is perhaps way too attuned to the Mothers of the world...:rolleyes:

Concur.

An exacerbating factor which came up in some papers last week in the UK was the increasing isolation that the Armed Forces in the UK and the Army in particular are experiencing within the UK. No where is this most acutely felt then in those involved in dismounted close combat (DCC). The reality is that the armed forces are very small compared to society at large and are about to get smaller. The percentage of he armed forces involved in DCC is also small compared to the overall size of the armed forces. This means that in terms of understanding DCC as a process, as a job and just as importantly as an experience, there is simply not that capability within society at large (whereas previously with WW1 and WW2 veterans most households had exposure to armed forces experience and if not directly then indirectly to DCC experience).

What does that mean? It means that increasingly society expects our politicians to look after us in ways that they understand and can relate to, and for us to operate in ways that they can understand and relate to. It is not just a legislative thing, but a cultural thing. That can translate into both top down pressure and sidewards pressure on the armed forces.

I think things would change if we were in a major conflict and the public felt threatened, but we are not and so instead of the 60-80% 'good enough' solution there is a lot of pressure for the 95% 'as safe as possible' solution.

Pete
11-19-2010, 07:20 PM
All I know about the British county coroner investigations into the deaths of military personnel overseas is what I've read in The Times and Daily Telegraph. There seems to have been a lot of hindsight in saying that a soldier should have been issued the new-model body armor instead of an older version, or that years ago MOD should have replaced Snatch Land Rovers with more heavily armored vehicles. I doubt that these inquests have led to explicit restrictions on the operations of units in active theaters, but there may be unspoken nuance type of things that senior officers have inferred or read into the guidance they receive from MOD. There wouldn't have been enough coroners in all of Britain to conduct these kinds of inquests during the two world wars.

JMA
11-20-2010, 01:16 AM
Sorry mate, this is b*llocks. The Coroner has no military training and is not equipped to second guess military action, or advise to it. If any Coroner is having any bearing on operations, the Commanders need sacking. It's a disgrace. Are COs going to be charged with negligence when one of their men gets shot by the enemy?

This is why the Brits should review the advisability of sending "fish and chip" units to Afghanistan. (In fact why have them at all in the current climate of budget cuts)

"Fish and chip" units on short tours are a recipe for disaster.

Pete
11-20-2010, 01:28 AM
Well, JMA, it can truthfully be said you're never at a loss for an opinion. As soon as the first rustle of noise is heard outside your perimeter the Claymores are detonated, the MGs open up, and the artillery is requested to fire battery three rounds. God knows what would happen if B-52s were at your beck and call.

JMA
11-20-2010, 01:41 AM
No former SOG 1-0 I ever met was hard of hearing and I doubt JMA, Ken White, Gian Gentile, Reed Dyer or any of the other guys with high time in combat are either. If so, then a pull a percentage disability based on testing. Do we stop parachuting because we may have to pay out?

At 57 have some issues in a crowd and am told I put the TV on too loud. Other than that I try to point my good ear (the right one) to the sounds I really want to hear.

The question is really at what percentage of hearing loss does one become operationally impaired.

I am surprised about this attitude from the Brit (Health and Safety nazis) because they seem quite happy to allow one ear to be effectively closed off with a radio earpiece.

Also if one is visually impaired the wearing of glasses is permitted so what exactly is the problem?

JMA
11-20-2010, 01:57 AM
Well, JMA, it can truthfully be said you're never at a loss for an opinion. As soon as the first rustle of noise is heard outside your perimeter the Claymores are detonated, the MGs open up, and the artillery is requested to fire battery three rounds. God knows what would happen if B-52s were at your beck and call.

Well Pete you know what they say about opinions...

As to the rest I learned from the yanks who came out to Rhodesia that the NVA sappers would create a few rustles outside the wire in the hope that you would give away the positions of your MGs and maybe even fire off your claymores. Don't need to fall for that.

Well if I had had B-52s on call Mugabe would still be sitting in exile with the few surviving remnants of his forces.

Pete
11-20-2010, 02:20 AM
Change of subject -- did G.I.s in Korea and Vietnam really make range cards for their MGs, with left and right limits with the terrain sketched in, or was it just point and shoot? I'm trying to sort out the infantry things that are really important versus the things that the manuals say are important that few guys actually do. When I was in the artillery a first sergeant used to say before ARTEPs that he'd do the range cards; it was then a skill that circa 1980 wasn't taught, even though it was in the tech and field manuals.

jmm99
11-20-2010, 02:31 AM
from JMA
Well if I had had B-52s on call Mugabe would still be sitting in exile with the few surviving remnants of his forces.

playing liars' poker with Vo Nguyen Giap and Tran Van Tra. :)

Bad typing hand; bad typing hand. :D

Cheers

Mike

Ken White
11-20-2010, 03:14 AM
Change of subject -- did G.I.s in Korea and Vietnam really make range cards for their MGs...Though I sure didn't see all units in either war even with more than one tour in 'em. Due to the nature of the wars, range cards in Korea only appeared after the lines stabilized. Turnover in Viet Nam and few set piece defenses led to no seeming pressing need.
I'm trying to sort out the infantry things that are really important versus the things that the manuals say are important that few guys actually do.Good luck with that. You can get five Infantrymen sitting around talking and get five different opinions, all based on their varied experiences in varied wars.

Generally speaking, the books from the 50s and 60s are the best for giving a what's important in conventional operations, mid 60s for COIN. Most 70s through 90s stuff is poor though there a few exceptions -- the 1984 edition of FM 21-75 is the best yet and a Troop really conversant with it would be a fairly well trained infantryman. The '93 edition of FM 21-26 was the best ever.
When I was in the artillery a first sergeant used to say before ARTEPs that he'd do the range cards; it was then a skill that circa 1980 wasn't taught, even though it was in the tech and field manuals.What is taught has little bearing on what is important. Check the books and it's all in them, a lot is not taught for three prime reasons. In order (1) If it produces a low 'Go' rate and makes the trainers look incompetent. Makes no difference if it's a task or knowledge proven to have a slow learn rate. (2) If it entails a lot of hard work on the part of the trainers. (3) If it takes an inordinate amount of time, thus limiting details and impacting other training events deemed more important.

MG range cards fail to make the cut for institutional training on points 1 and 3. They get tabbed out for 'Unit Training' -- where they generally don't get taught due to such important things as Rape Prevention training, an occasional review or parade, family day or such like. Not a big problem, we don't defend very well in any event...

Pete
11-20-2010, 05:31 AM
Range Cards might be one of those 1918 kind of things that remained in the manuals even after Machine Gun Battalions were abolished in the Army and Marine Corps before World War II. They seem like a good idea but they'd take several days to teach to privates, not just an hour or two.

A few years ago when I was looking at the unofficial British army Ar*se website I was struck by how detailed British army schools are for guys in troop units who attend them in temporary duty statuses. It seems as though in spite of all the force structure and funding cutbacks the British army doesn't want to part with its institutional training base. Up to a point I don't blame the Brits, but they seem to have more doctrine and techniques than can be taught during a reasonable period of time.

We dumbed down Infantry training in World War II to shorten things-- we taught that one element puts fire on the objective and another goes around and finds a flank -- because we couldn't afford to train people for longer periods of time. The Germans got fancy about tactics -- they had three-element attacks in 1918 but I don't know how long it took to teach them. My impression is that they used mobile training teams to teach combat units that were on rest breaks in rear areas.

Tactical training can reach the point where there simply aren't enough hours in the day, and something has to go.

Ken White
11-20-2010, 03:44 PM
Range Cards...seem like a good idea but they'd take several days to teach to privates, not just an hour or two.Not so. You can teach most kids how to do a range card in a half hour. See below (the graphic is from FM 21-75). The problem is that it is a cognitive skill and you have to initially use it often to embed, retain and improve the capability -- and that means supervision, which is work for trainers and leaders (therefor it gets sluffed...).

No insult or slam intended but your comment is indicative of an attitude that is entirely too prevalent in the US Army; "... take several days to teach to privates..." That attitude colors too much of what we do and it is a holdover from the days of the Draft when we took in a slew of Cat III and IV folks and dumbed down our training to cope with people who should not have been in the Army in the first place (McNamara has a LOT to answer for... :mad:). Those day are long gone -- since the mid 80s -- and we have failed for over 30 years to adapt personnel and training polices to reflect that. :rolleyes:

Most Privates are capable of doing far more than they are allowed to do and there are too many Officers and NCOs who do not wish to accept that fact because they have become annointed and risen above the primoridal slime. Very counterproductive attitude. The civilian educators, multi-degreed folks who believe they are above anointed and who often spout quite flawed theories of human cognition and learning have not helped the Army in this...

I'll also note that in the wider Army, most UNITS are capable of doing far more than they are allowed to do. Excessive control is a bug, not a feature.
A few years ago when I was looking at the unofficial British army Ar*se website I was struck by how detailed British army schools are for guys in troop units who attend them in temporary duty statuses... but they seem to have more doctrine and techniques than can be taught during a reasonable period of time.The British and all the Commonwealth Armies do a far better job of teaching the basics than do we. Far, far better. They have schools for everything and it works. Their secret is low overhead and the NCOs do it; our solution calls for more overhead than Instructors and we underemploy Officers to run things -- they seek to be overemployed and do more things and the whole thing spins out of control so we scrub the School...
We dumbed down Infantry training in World War II to shorten things-- we taught that one element puts fire on the objective and another goes around and finds a flank -- because we couldn't afford to train people for longer periods of time. The Germans got fancy about tactics -- they had three-element attacks in 1918 but I don't know how long it took to teach them. My impression is that they used mobile training teams to teach combat units that were on rest breaks in rear areas.That's an important point and it is glossed over quite often. Good training takes time. At the height of WW II, the Germans were still taking almost six month to train entry tankers and their competence was a significant factor in the length of WW II. We short change training to (a) save money to buy techno solutions to improve poor capability caused by undertraining and (b) save time. Fallacious logic, that time saved translates to less competence after joining a unit and excessive casualties due to under trained troops.

We also 'train' a lot of things that add nothing to military competence and we use troops in training for little details and garrison housekeeping, things that do not exist in combat.

We foster the absolutely stupid mantra that "We cannot afford to train people for more than their next job." Ludicrous. Most new Pvts will become team or even Squad leaders before they go to BNCOC (or whatever inane name we've hung on the course now) and most entering 2LTs will command Co / By / Trp before they go to an Advanced Course / Career (bad name...) Course.
Tactical training can reach the point where there simply aren't enough hours in the day, and something has to go.Strongly disagree. For the combat arms absolutely nothing is more important than that tactical training, there's plenty of time to do it right -- we're just too lazy and impatient to do it right and we're unwilling to demand the repetition and tedium of drill to build muscle memory and conditioned response because the 'trainers' don't like it and the 'senior leaders' think it will inhibit Recruiting. It will to a slight extent but you shouldn't really want most of those so inhibited in any event...

slapout9
11-20-2010, 05:31 PM
In the back of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook there is a whole lecture/class by Col. Wylye that teaches the fundamentals of Tactics in about 25 pages or so including ways to practice the skill by war gaming.

jcustis
11-21-2010, 01:31 PM
The British and all the Commonwealth Armies do a far better job of teaching the basics than do we. Far, far better. They have schools for everything and it works. Their secret is low overhead and the NCOs do it; our solution calls for more overhead than Instructors and we underemploy Officers to run things -- they seek to be overemployed and do more things and the whole thing spins out of control so we scrub the School...

i think there may also be something to be said for the age and skill level of z Commonwealth or Brit NCO, compared to ours. They are more competent, and wayyyyy more confident in many of my observations, due to age and years of service.

82redleg
11-21-2010, 02:02 PM
i think there may also be something to be said for the age and skill level of z Commonwealth or Brit NCO, compared to ours. They are more competent, and wayyyyy more confident in many of my observations, due to age and years of service.

In working with the Brits, Australians and Canadians, I haven't noticed a huge discrepancy in the averages (we have some really young outliers, and they have some rally old outliers) when you consider he duty positions assigned. What I mean is that, yes, their Sergeants are much older than ours, but they aren't really equivalent-- their Sergeant is a platoon sergeant, more like our Sergeant First Class; their Corporal is a section leader, about like our Staff Sergeant; When you look at it that way, they aren't nearly as much older or more skillful than our NCOs.

jcustis
11-21-2010, 02:26 PM
I get where you are coming at it from, but perhaps I was getting hung up on the discrete difference, in USMC terms, between an NCO and a SNCO.

Our SNCOs do the lion's share of entry-level and second echelon advanced training, so they are comparable to a Brit NCO in that case.

Red Rat
11-21-2010, 04:42 PM
This is what the British Army is looking at as the core basics for every soldier and officer in the 21st Century.

Dismounted Close Combat competency for all branches
Combat shooting - proficiency and ethos
Modernised urban combat skills
Unarmed combat
Interdependency with vehicles and operating as a system
Public Order/Crowd Control
Prisoner handling/detention
Combat ID
Soldier as sensor
Soldier and influencer
Critical reasoning
Risk Management
Professional Military Education
IT literacy
Information Management Skills


To elaborate on a couple of them:

Soldier as Sensor:
 Elicitation skills
 Debriefing
 Integrate individual with a range of sensors (sentry duty to include Base ISTAR for example)

Soldier as Influencer:
 Self-awareness (Emotional Intelligence/Myers-Briggs)
 Communication skills
 Rapport building
 Team building
 Mediation
 Negotiation
 Coaching/mentoring
 Basic media skills
 Identify and interpret a range of motivations, perceptions, emotions and desires
 Understand and work towards Unity of Effort

PME:
 Wider and deeper and include soldiers
 How to learn (theory and practice of learning)
 Re-institutionalise After Action Review within battle procedure so that all understand their responsilibility in the lessons process and contribute to adaptability.

There is some good stuff there, there is some buzzword bingo stuff there and there is some stuff that good units have never stopped doing.

My issue is that if we are going to do all these, and do it properly, then that takes a long time to train in the individual proficencies, even before we start using in a unit context. I do not think it can all be done within the current manning construct and operational construct whereby soldiers serve on average two years in any one post and units operate on a 30 month cycle of training and ops. We will need individuals to spend longer in post with all the knock on impacts that will have.

I am also not convinced that this is mastering the core basics, it appears to be jack of all trades and master of none.

Infanteer
11-21-2010, 05:55 PM
i think there may also be something to be said for the age and skill level of z Commonwealth or Brit NCO, compared to ours. They are more competent, and wayyyyy more confident in many of my observations, due to age and years of service.


In working with the Brits, Australians and Canadians, I haven't noticed a huge discrepancy in the averages (we have some really young outliers, and they have some rally old outliers) when you consider he duty positions assigned. What I mean is that, yes, their Sergeants are much older than ours, but they aren't really equivalent-- their Sergeant is a platoon sergeant, more like our Sergeant First Class; their Corporal is a section leader, about like our Staff Sergeant; When you look at it that way, they aren't nearly as much older or more skillful than our NCOs.

Brits, Americans and Canadians all have different names for each rank level (Canada broke with British tradition in the 60's in a wierd period of our history where we tried to burn all things Brit - meaning, to us, everything) - the important thing to consider is the relative experience of the guy doing the same job - ie: Section Commander/Squad Leader.

Any comparison will end up being painted with a broad brush, but some generalities can be made. Two big factors at every level that have to be considered are the training that a person at that level gets and how the career structure informs what a person has done prior to being appointed to that position - these are the two gateways of experience and training.

In Canada, NCOs at the section and platoon level tended to have lots of experience - generally 10-20 years combined with many qualifications within their trade (ie: for infantry, a specialization like mortars, some advanced courses like winter warfare, etc, etc). The general argument is that when compared to their American counterparts, Canadian NCOs were more experienced and had more extensive training. However, with the dynamics of the last 10 years of warfare and changing demographics, we are seeing this "picture" of a Canadian NCO change. We now have lots of younger, less "qualified" (in the formal sense) but more experienced (in the operational sense) NCOs.

A good example is the Canadian Infantry Section Commander's Course (which goes through a name change every couple of years). A pretty intensive course, this is given to potential junior NCOs (Corporals) to qualify them to be 2ICs of a section, let alone a commander. My understanding of the American system is that squad leaders will not recieve comparable training until they've been in the billet for sometime - is this still the case?

As for the British Army, as I understand it there are constraints emplaced by the 22-year career model, which means guys get pushed to the next level much faster then here in Canada. One Senior Officer I know, who has commanded both a Canadian and British Company, commented that he'd take a Canadian Company Sergeant Major over a British one due to the relative levels of experience.

I've also seen a good comment on where skills are truely learned - in the school house or in the unit while on exercise? In Canada, we've had a real "school house" approach; loooong courses to build up skillsets. I thing we'll see a change in things - does a Recce Section Commander develop his skills on an Advanced Recce Course or doing many exercises as a Recce Section Commander in a Battalion?

Again, these are generalities and there are always exceptions but there are some interesting observations to be drawn from them.

Red Rat
11-21-2010, 06:32 PM
My company sergeant major (CSM) had 16 years experience (excluding his pre-18 year old 'Junior Leader' experience (two years)). This means that he is on the 'glide path' for WO1 and has picked up promotion first time every time. Some CSMs will have more experience, very very few will have less (and I cannot recall any in my experience). The enlisted soldier career progression aims to get the soldier to WO1 (Warrant Officer Class One) at the 20 year point and CSMs will have to do at least one further appointment before they are able to be boarded for WO1.

Not sure how that compares with Canadian or US equivalents.

Red Rat
11-21-2010, 06:38 PM
Some of the best infantry SNCOs I have ever served with have been German. Experienced and well trained, they are often found commanding platoons. I got the impression that the Germans educated (professionally) their SNCOs much better then we (the Brits) did.

Infanteer
11-21-2010, 07:09 PM
My company sergeant major (CSM) had 16 years experience (excluding his pre-18 year old 'Junior Leader' experience (two years)). This means that he is on the 'glide path' for WO1 and has picked up promotion first time every time. Some CSMs will have more experience, very very few will have less (and I cannot recall any in my experience). The enlisted soldier career progression aims to get the soldier to WO1 (Warrant Officer Class One) at the 20 year point and CSMs will have to do at least one further appointment before they are able to be boarded for WO1.

Not sure how that compares with Canadian or US equivalents.

To give you an idea, a Canadian CSM would typically have 20+ years of service. Due to our common heritage, I'm willing to bet career paths are almost identical between the two only in Canada guys will spend more time in each rank level (thus longer exposure on the "experience curve"). Canada does not have any overarching circumtances like the Brit career progression models or the US Up-or-Out system.



Some of the best infantry SNCOs I have ever served with have been German. Experienced and well trained, they are often found commanding platoons. I got the impression that the Germans educated (professionally) their SNCOs much better then we (the Brits) did.

Interesting - I have no experience with the German Army. The only thing I've heard is anecdotal from early ISAF experience. It isn't flattering (and they probably think the same thing about us), but it's probably the end result of an oversized multi-national HQ in Kabul with nothing to really do. I don't know if its still the case (Fuchs?) but don't German NCOs command 2 of the 3 Platoons in a Company?

JMA
11-21-2010, 07:29 PM
The British and all the Commonwealth Armies do a far better job of teaching the basics than do we. Far, far better. They have schools for everything and it works. Their secret is low overhead and the NCOs do it; our solution calls for more overhead than Instructors and we underemploy Officers to run things -- they seek to be overemployed and do more things and the whole thing spins out of control so we scrub the School...That's an important point and it is glossed over quite often. Good training takes time.

Sadly I suppose you must be correct. Can't understand this officer involvement in basic training, weapon training, drill and ceremonial and the like. Where do these guys get the experience from to competently fill those positions? I would ask them "So captain you like instructing on medium mortars? Good we can fix that, the position is for a Master Sgt, you want?"

Steady Ken, don't include ALL or even some of the Commonwealth armies. Many are no more than an armed rabble.

Certainly in the RLI we had ex-RSMs who were commissioned who were the Training Officers. The only officers who went near that level of training were those recovering from wounds or parachuting injuries and then only to push the paperwork.

The more I think about it the more I think there are too many officers anyway. Always liked the old German idea of two officers per company.

Red Rat
11-21-2010, 07:59 PM
The more I think about it the more I think there are too many officers anyway. Always liked the old German idea of two officers per company.

I do not think there are too many officers in command. It is the proliferation of officers in headquarters.

Since 2003 I have seen:


Rank inflation (majors now do what captains did, LTCs do what majors did et al)
Hyper-inflation of staff process
A proliferation of HQs


What that means is that not only has everything slowed down, but in order to 'feed the beast' of HQ manning requirements and officer career aspirations we yank officers out of command slots before they are fully competent and effective in their trade and send them onwards and upwards. There with their limited command experience (and in the UK's instance) even more limited PME they are ideally suited to add process and structures. :wry:

Like a turkey volunteering for Christmas I propose a 20% cut in staff officer numbers - focusing on lieutenant colonels and full colonels initially (they always add process!) :D

Fuchs
11-21-2010, 08:39 PM
I do not think there are too many officers in command. It is the proliferation of officers in headquarters.

Since 2003 I have seen:


Rank inflation (majors now do what captains did, LTCs do what majors did et al)
Hyper-inflation of staff process
A proliferation of HQs


The U.S. Army has always had a rather high officer share, similar to the even more extreme Soviets/Russians.

I observed rank inflation sine the mid-90's in Germany, and it was the result of two factors:
* a personnel system too inadequate to offer the right pay without promotion
* a shrinking of the force without laying off many 8- and 12-year volunteers of even professional soldiers (we could have done it, as evidenced by the firing of ten thousands of Eastern German officers and NCOs!).


Any hyper-inflation of staff processes in the U.S.army can probably be blamed on Air-Land Battle doctrine which defined a way of war that provokes such an inflation.


I don't know if its still the case (Fuchs?) but don't German NCOs command 2 of the 3 Platoons in a Company?

The ones I saw had anything from Feldwebel (SSgt) to Oberleutnant (1Lt) as leader. I don't recall a regulation or personnel slot rule for it.
In wartime everybody down to Unteroffizier (lowest NCO rank) could be called upon to lead a platoon to replace casualties. In peacetime practice Unteroffizier is more of an AFV driver job.

Btw, the standard path for officers requires them to run though several NCO ranks (named differently than normal NCOs, but still NCOs).

Pete
11-21-2010, 10:56 PM
Btw, the standard path for officers requires them to run though several NCO ranks (named differently than normal NCOs, but still NCOs).
Here we see yet another example of the pervasive influence of that Karl Marx guy, even in that most reactionary of institutions, the German Army.

slapout9
11-22-2010, 03:38 AM
Here we see yet another example of the pervasive influence of that Karl Marx guy, even in that most reactionary of institutions, the German Army.

Class Warfare is hell:D:D:D

Fuchs
11-22-2010, 11:06 AM
Here we see yet another example of the pervasive influence of that Karl Marx guy, even in that most reactionary of institutions, the German Army.

The IDF uses a similar model afaik.

JMA
11-22-2010, 09:15 PM
I do not think there are too many officers in command. It is the proliferation of officers in headquarters.

Since 2003 I have seen:


Rank inflation (majors now do what captains did, LTCs do what majors did et al)
Hyper-inflation of staff process
A proliferation of HQs


What that means is that not only has everything slowed down, but in order to 'feed the beast' of HQ manning requirements and officer career aspirations we yank officers out of command slots before they are fully competent and effective in their trade and send them onwards and upwards. There with their limited command experience (and in the UK's instance) even more limited PME they are ideally suited to add process and structures. :wry:

Like a turkey volunteering for Christmas I propose a 20% cut in staff officer numbers - focusing on lieutenant colonels and full colonels initially (they always add process!) :D

Yes I agree with that. Important to analyse each job an officer is required to do and assess its continued value.

Pete
11-22-2010, 10:41 PM
1336

Pete
11-23-2010, 12:49 AM
The following is from my Dad's copy of the Army Song Book (http://www.csufresno.edu/folklore/drinkingsongs/html/books-and-manuscripts/1940s/1941-army-song-book/index.htm) compiled by the Adjutant General's Office and published by the War Department in 1941. There is circumstantial evidence that this song was stolen from the British Army during the First World War, just like the the Field Artillery slogan about "Lending dignity to what otherwise be an unseemly brawl" was apparently copied from the British Cavalry during that war.



"The Army's gone to hell," said the generals;
"What's my next command?" said the colonels;
"Where're my boots and spurs?" said the majors;
"We want ten days' leave," said the captains;
"We do all the work," said the shavetails;
"Right by squads, squads right," said the sergeants;
"One two, one two, one," said the corporals;
"Beer, beer, beer," said the privates,
"Merry men are we
There's none so fair as can compare
With the Fighting Infantry."