View Full Version : Army Cancels GCV Competition
Military.com has a link to an article about the U.S. Army canceling the competition for the GCV. What I am not getting is why there's such a push for a new IFV when the Brad has proved itself in combat? I know the Brad is old and the Iraq War has worn out equipment, but would it not be cheaper, more efficient to upgrade the Brads with new engines, transmissions, band tracks, etc - then going out and spending billions on a new vehicle that we all know will run way over budget? Heck, remove the turret and put on a remote gun with javelins - free up space to move a 9-man squad.
Also, it the Stryker really that bad? I read the U.S. Army report from 2002 or so, I read the M113 to Stryker comparison, I read the Washington Post or Times articles about the vehicle in Iraq and I read the the more recent article where soldiers referred to it as the Kevlar Coffin. I have also read books such as Killing Time and Kaboom and the Stryker received favorable reviews - especially in regards to it's stealth (noise signature) and speed. Is there anyone posting on this site with combat experience in the Stryker? Anyone know of a no b.s. combat analysis of the Stryker combat vehicle?
Fuchs
08-27-2010, 07:22 PM
There's such a push because the Army takes decades to complete a development program. Look at the similar AAAV/EFV saga.
And yes, the Stryker is bad (as a combat vehicle). It's a transportation vehicle, not a combat vehicle.
SJPONeill
08-27-2010, 08:37 PM
A few years back, a working group I was on had as one of the members an O-5 who had recently returned after a tour in Iraq with the first SBCT to be deployed there. Although the focus of the brief he delivered was on the C2 systems within the SBCT, he spoken quite highly of Stryker and the capabilities it brought to the brigade. As he didn't pull his punches in other parts of his presentation, I always saw that as some validation of the vehicle for THAT operating environment. Toss it into the Fulda Gap and it is clearly not going to be as suitable as a 'proper' IFV that weighs twice as much...
Before they were bitching about the "kevlar coffin" (and Stryker isn't made from kevlar, just for the record), they were bitching about the M113 as the "aluminium coffin" and before that probably about the M2/M3/M5 half-track series...
At the moment, while we dither between MCO or COIN or both or a blend of both being the war of the future, maybe it is a better move to zero hour and upgrade the Bradley series...it has worked with the 113 - look how many armies persist in keeping this 50 year old design in service - although like the AH-1 Cobra there might not be too many similarities between the original and what trundles around now - so it must offer greater utility than just the cheapest option...
Cavguy
08-27-2010, 11:38 PM
Also, it the Stryker really that bad? I read the U.S. Army report from 2002 or so, I read the M113 to Stryker comparison, I read the Washington Post or Times articles about the vehicle in Iraq and I read the the more recent article where soldiers referred to it as the Kevlar Coffin. I have also read books such as Killing Time and Kaboom and the Stryker received favorable reviews - especially in regards to it's stealth (noise signature) and speed. Is there anyone posting on this site with combat experience in the Stryker? Anyone know of a no b.s. combat analysis of the Stryker combat vehicle?
I just took over (2 months ago) as XO of a Stryker Reconnaissance unit. The Stryker is what it is - an eight wheeled personnel carrier. It's fast, carries a lot of troops, has good sights and sensors, and is reliable. It is also lightly armored by design, and does not possess stabilized gun systems. It is under-gunned in general, with only a .50 cal remote turret or a Mk19 mounted for firepower. We have 3x MGS Strykers per infantry company (9 PLTs in all) which mount a 105mm cannon. It's more of an infantry support gun than a tank killer, but that is what it is meant to be, although it can be effective in the anti-tank role. We have a Stryker TOW missile company as well. We have towed M777 howitzers in the Brigade and Stryker mounted 120mm mortars (with digital fire control) in our Squadron.
BLUF, it can transport lots of infantry to the battlefield and then provide overwatching fires against light/medium threats. It suffers all the mobility advantages (speed, efficiency) and disadvantages (off road performance) of wheeled APCs. It is also fully networked with FBCB2 and other systems, and the command variants are well equipped to conduct on the move C4I. Pound for pound, a Stryker unit has more dismounted infantry than any other formation in the Army. But it's not a mechanized force that can effectively oppose a heavy mechanized enemy without significant augmentation.
As far as soldier reviews, there are many vets in this unit with x2 tours in Iraq on Strykers. All praise the vehicle (with qualifications). They performed well in Iraq, but took significant hits in Afghanistan (as the CDN LAV3s did) due to increased canalization of terrain limiting mobility routes and options, and unfavorable cross-country terrain for wheeled vehicles. It wasn't designed like the MRAP for C-IED purposes, and suffers when large subsurface munitions detonate underneath it.
The Army is considering production of an upgraded double hulled version for Afghanistan.
I just took over (2 months ago) as XO of a Stryker Reconnaissance unit. The Stryker is what it is - an eight wheeled personnel carrier. It's fast, carries a lot of troops, has good sights and sensors, and is reliable. It is also lightly armored by design, and does not possess stabilized gun systems. It is under-gunned in general, with only a .50 cal remote turret or a Mk19 mounted for firepower. We have 3x MGS Strykers per infantry company (9 PLTs in all) which mount a 105mm cannon. It's more of an infantry support gun than a tank killer, but that is what it is meant to be, although it can be effective in the anti-tank role. We have a Stryker TOW missile company as well. We have towed M777 howitzers in the Brigade and Stryker mounted 120mm mortars (with digital fire control) in our Squadron.
BLUF, it can transport lots of infantry to the battlefield and then provide overwatching fires against light/medium threats. It suffers all the mobility advantages (speed, efficiency) and disadvantages (off road performance) of wheeled APCs. It is also fully networked with FBCB2 and other systems, and the command variants are well equipped to conduct on the move C4I. Pound for pound, a Stryker unit has more dismounted infantry than any other formation in the Army. But it's not a mechanized force that can effectively oppose a heavy mechanized enemy without significant augmentation.
As far as soldier reviews, there are many vets in this unit with x2 tours in Iraq on Strykers. All praise the vehicle (with qualifications). They performed well in Iraq, but took significant hits in Afghanistan (as the CDN LAV3s did) due to increased canalization of terrain limiting mobility routes and options, and unfavorable cross-country terrain for wheeled vehicles. It wasn't designed like the MRAP for C-IED purposes, and suffers when large subsurface munitions detonate underneath it.
The Army is considering production of an upgraded double hulled version for Afghanistan.
Do you think this is something that should remain in the active force or be moved to the National Guard? What I mean is quite this, the Guard has two roles natural disasters, etc and war. We are a country with a well developed road system. Seems to be a vehicle that would be quite useful for something like Katrina, Tornados, etc. As far as war, the Guard played a huge part in Iraq, but a stablization role seems better suited and it seems that's when the Stryker is at it's best. Plus, the Stryker would come in handy for civil disturbance - I'm just saying:)
CavGuy thinks for the post that was the kind of stuff I am looking for.
Does the 1BCT 1st Armor still change to a SBCT as well as the 3rdACR?
Infanteer
08-28-2010, 12:21 AM
And yes, the Stryker is bad (as a combat vehicle). It's a transportation vehicle, not a combat vehicle.
Having campaigned in one for 7 months, I'd disagree.
As CavGuy said, the endorsment comes with qualifications, but that's the truth with anything. It is light (hence the L in LAV) and it isn't intended for heavy combat, but it is a superb vehicle with excellent fighting capabilities. As well, our Canadian version has a stabalized 25mm chain-gun.
Fuchs
08-28-2010, 12:26 AM
It's a target in mechanised combat.
No matter against whom you've campaigned in Strykers, their most modern weapon was likely a 1980's technology man-portable RPG-29.
Some 1930's armoured cars were superior to most Stryker versions in vehicle/vehicle combat.
It's a transportation/utility vehicle, and an expensive one.
Infanteer
08-28-2010, 12:36 AM
It's a target in mechanised combat.
Anything is a target if employed poorly.
No matter against whom you've campaigned in Strykers, their most modern weapon was likely a 1980's technology man-portable RPG-29.
Well, since that's what 90 percent of the world is armed with, I guess I'm cool with that.
Needless to say, we can conceptualize what we want, but the vehicle has saved lives, killed lots of bad guys and has given me and my soldiers the 90% solution so far, so I'm happy with it.
Believe we have an opportunity here. It depends on the veracity of several assumptions that are arguable, but not unrealistic. Assumptions:
1) The current plan to buy 573 EFVs may not be affordable. An EFV costs $20 million and a ship-to-shore connector LCAC replacement is just $50 million and can carry two Infantry vehicles plus all the other Marine and Army non-amphibious equipment and supplies....and aid for disaster victims, etc. We already have 90 LCAC and plans for 80 newer replacements. Smarter positioning of both faster-than-EFV air-cushioned vehicles combined with amphibious ship stowage launching farther from shore would be a complete solution when added to about 150 EFVs and 500+ cheaper, non-amphibious squad carriers.
2) The Army can't afford large numbers of new super-heavy GCVs either. It would require more engineer equipment, HETs, air and sealift, heavy recovery vehicles, and far more fuel trucks, plus greater operational/training costs. If GCV was intended as a common vehicle for other applications, every tracked vehicle on the battlefield would be the size and weight of a tank!
3) The Marines still must get to shore if they don't buy all 573 EFVs. They also want a LAV replacement. Army forces also need to get to shore and cannot always rely on deep water ports. If the weight of their respective vehicles is in the 75 ton weight range without troops, an LCAC or future ship-to-shore connector can carry two infantry vehicles, and more will fit aboard JHSV. Conceivably, a few could even fit aboard LCS.
4) If their respective vehicles weigh around 80,000 lbs with troops, two can fit aboard a C-17 and three aboard a C-5M.
5) Marines need a vehicle that can carry a 13-man infantry squad. The Army needs to carry its 9-man squad. The crew number and location in the vehicle as well as the need for a full or remote turret is debatable.
6) IED/mine protection, the largest killer on today's battlefield that is not going away, is non-negotiable. Full all-around 30mm protection is required. RPG and ATGM protection is a given but how much and how to provide it? Ability to withstand a main tank Sabot round is NOT a given. That capability did not exist against the far more formidable USSR, M113s led M1A1 during one thunder run, Bradleys did not suffer disproportionate casualties in either Iraq war, nor did LAV/AAV on the road to Baghdad. Despite hybrid threat claims, the Israelis lost only 121 dead...hardly an earth-shattering lesson compared to lessons learned by our ground forces facing IEDs/EFPs.
Possible solution? A Joint Ground Combat Vehicle (JGCV). If it makes sense for F-35, M1A1, M777, etc,, it could be a solution for IFVs despite the parochial concerns it would raise.
Possible course of action?
1) Marine IFV version: 13-man squad carry achieved by three rows of 4 troops and the squad leader sitting next to the vehicle commander adjacent to the turret housing only a gunner.
2) Army heavy IFV version: 9-man squad carry achieved by three rows of 3 troops and a tenth spot available next to the vehicle commander as with the forward-part-of-vehicle on Marine version
3) Army heavy CFV version: 4-man scout carry (even if only two usually used) with two outer rows of 2-men and telescoping sensor in the middle between scouts as well as other unmanned systems carried.
4) Air-deployable Marine and Army IFV version: 13-man or 9-man squad carry versions with remote turret on both to reduce weight Only one combined arms battalion would have these vehicles per HBCT and it would include just 3 JGCVs and 3 M-ATVs per infantry platoon and just a single larger armor company with 19 tanks (4 platoons +3 in HHC). The CAB with sea-deployed full-turreted JGCV would have a full 2 companies of infantry with 4 JGCVs and 4 M-ATVs per platoon (vs. 3 of each in air-deployed) and 2 armor companies with 14 tanks each.
5) Mortar, anti-armor, FIST, C2V, engineer, and ambulance version with higher roof to allow standing and opening roof. The opening roof would allow mortar firing, line-charge launch, and an elevating Joint Air-Ground Missile launcher for those vehicles.
The front part of all vehicles would be identical. The rear of each would be slightly longer dependent on whether the three rows of 4, 3, or 2 dismounts were being carried. The track length of all vehicles could be identical offering an opportunity for a rear platform for unmanned ground vehicles on the shortest scout version.
The JGCV would need to be 12' wide with a 10' wide interior (2' row+2' aisle+2' row+2' aisle+2' row) and troops sitting partially over tracks. If you assume the bottom of the vehicle starts 18" off the ground, then has another foot of clearance to the cabin floor above the middle ridge to allow V-armor, then another 18" above that to suspended shock-resistant seats, the troop seats are four feet above the ground over 3' tall tracks. That still allows another foot on either side of the cabin for additional armor and active protection systems.
The Marines would use a combination of EFV and JGCV aboard LCAC to get to shore. Marines probably should reconsider sending 20 Marines inside an EFV to get to shore given the difficulty in getting out of the vehicle...MV-22 could carry them to shore where they would link up with respective vehicles.
Just food for thought/debate.
Fuchs
08-28-2010, 02:30 AM
Anything is a target if employed poorly.
Well, since that's what 90 percent of the world is armed with, I guess I'm cool with that.
My problem is of course that while 95% of unimportant annoyances might not have better weaponry, 100% of those who would really dare to attack my country seriously (at least in scenarios) are playing five leagues higher.
Believe we have an opportunity here. It depends on the veracity of several assumptions that are arguable, but not unrealistic. Assumptions:
1) The current plan to buy 573 EFVs may not be affordable. An EFV costs $20 million and a ship-to-shore connector LCAC replacement is just $50 million and can carry two Infantry vehicles plus all the other Marine and Army non-amphibious equipment and supplies....and aid for disaster victims, etc. We already have 90 LCAC and plans for 80 newer replacements. Smarter positioning of both faster-than-EFV air-cushioned vehicles combined with amphibious ship stowage launching farther from shore would be a complete solution when added to about 150 EFVs and 500+ cheaper, non-amphibious squad carriers.
2) The Army can't afford large numbers of new super-heavy GCVs either. It would require more engineer equipment, HETs, air and sealift, heavy recovery vehicles, and far more fuel trucks, plus greater operational/training costs. If GCV was intended as a common vehicle for other applications, every tracked vehicle on the battlefield would be the size and weight of a tank!
3) The Marines still must get to shore if they don't buy all 573 EFVs. They also want a LAV replacement. Army forces also need to get to shore and cannot always rely on deep water ports. If the weight of their respective vehicles is in the 75 ton weight range without troops, an LCAC or future ship-to-shore connector can carry two infantry vehicles, and more will fit aboard JHSV. Conceivably, a few could even fit aboard LCS.
4) If their respective vehicles weigh around 80,000 lbs with troops, two can fit aboard a C-17 and three aboard a C-5M.
5) Marines need a vehicle that can carry a 13-man infantry squad. The Army needs to carry its 9-man squad. The crew number and location in the vehicle as well as the need for a full or remote turret is debatable.
6) IED/mine protection, the largest killer on today's battlefield that is not going away, is non-negotiable. Full all-around 30mm protection is required. RPG and ATGM protection is a given but how much and how to provide it? Ability to withstand a main tank Sabot round is NOT a given. That capability did not exist against the far more formidable USSR, M113s led M1A1 during one thunder run, Bradleys did not suffer disproportionate casualties in either Iraq war, nor did LAV/AAV on the road to Baghdad. Despite hybrid threat claims, the Israelis lost only 121 dead...hardly an earth-shattering lesson compared to lessons learned by our ground forces facing IEDs/EFPs.
Possible solution? A Joint Ground Combat Vehicle (JGCV). If it makes sense for F-35, M1A1, M777, etc,, it could be a solution for IFVs despite the parochial concerns it would raise.
Possible course of action?
1) Marine IFV version: 13-man squad carry achieved by three rows of 4 troops and the squad leader sitting next to the vehicle commander adjacent to the turret housing only a gunner.
2) Army heavy IFV version: 9-man squad carry achieved by three rows of 3 troops and a tenth spot available next to the vehicle commander as with the forward-part-of-vehicle on Marine version
3) Army heavy CFV version: 4-man scout carry (even if only two usually used) with two outer rows of 2-men and telescoping sensor in the middle between scouts as well as other unmanned systems carried.
4) Air-deployable Marine and Army IFV version: 13-man or 9-man squad carry versions with remote turret on both to reduce weight Only one combined arms battalion would have these vehicles per HBCT and it would include just 3 JGCVs and 3 M-ATVs per infantry platoon and just a single larger armor company with 19 tanks (4 platoons +3 in HHC). The CAB with sea-deployed full-turreted JGCV would have a full 2 companies of infantry with 4 JGCVs and 4 M-ATVs per platoon (vs. 3 of each in air-deployed) and 2 armor companies with 14 tanks each.
5) Mortar, anti-armor, FIST, C2V, engineer, and ambulance version with higher roof to allow standing and opening roof. The opening roof would allow mortar firing, line-charge launch, and an elevating Joint Air-Ground Missile launcher for those vehicles.
The front part of all vehicles would be identical. The rear of each would be slightly longer dependent on whether the three rows of 4, 3, or 2 dismounts were being carried. The track length of all vehicles could be identical offering an opportunity for a rear platform for unmanned ground vehicles on the shortest scout version.
The JGCV would need to be 12' wide with a 10' wide interior (2' row+2' aisle+2' row+2' aisle+2' row) and troops sitting partially over tracks. If you assume the bottom of the vehicle starts 18" off the ground, then has another foot of clearance to the cabin floor above the middle ridge to allow V-armor, then another 18" above that to suspended shock-resistant seats, the troop seats are four feet above the ground over 3' tall tracks. That still allows another foot on either side of the cabin for additional armor and active protection systems.
The Marines would use a combination of EFV and JGCV aboard LCAC to get to shore. Marines probably should reconsider sending 20 Marines inside an EFV to get to shore given the difficulty in getting out of the vehicle...MV-22 could carry them to shore where they would link up with respective vehicles.
Just food for thought/debate.
I think you are reading my mind. I like the idea of a joint GCV and I think both services have much more to gain from this then lose. Based on our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq (as well as our allies) we should be able to get this design right. But, again, cost is a concern - I mean 20 million for an EFV - that's nuts. That's why upgrading the Brads might be the best way to go, but I do not have experience with the Brad to defend that opinion. Maybe the Brad has hit its ceiling and going with a new vehicle is the best way to go - that will be up to people smarter then me.
Infanteer
08-28-2010, 07:20 AM
My problem is of course that while 95% of unimportant annoyances might not have better weaponry, 100% of those who would really dare to attack my country seriously (at least in scenarios) are playing five leagues higher.
Your point on employment is valid. If my country was attacked, we'd likely be mounting SAR missions to find all the frozen invaders....
Your point on employment is valid. If my country was attacked, we'd likely be mounting SAR missions to find all the frozen invaders....
Nobody ia gonna invade Canada except South Park.
Everybody likes the Canadians.
GI Zhou
08-28-2010, 09:15 PM
Sounds like some of the exercises we had in Northern Australia. The SAR chopper was always busy picking up the enemy who had come down with heat stress.
More importantly, and meant as no criticism, Cole your idea sounds very similar to what Richard Simpkin was advocating in the late 1970s/early 1980s with his modular AFV concepts. From my translation of a recent article, the Chinese are impressed with the German Puma IFV, especially with its armament and protection levels.
Tukhachevskii
08-28-2010, 09:20 PM
From my translation of a recent article, the Chinese are impressed with the German Puma IFV, especially with its armament and protection levels.
What exactly impresses them?
Nobody ia gonna invade Canada except South Park.
Everybody likes the Canadians.
We (US) tried twice, but it ended badly both times.
Ingrates.
;)
GI Zhou
08-28-2010, 10:36 PM
What exactly impresses them?
They are particularly impressed with the turret as a whole; the vehicle ergonimics of the vehicle and modular arnmour upgrading. The fire control system, especially the commander's independent sight along with the sensor system itself; the smoke grenade dischargers at the rear of the turret enabling modular uparmouring; and the location of the Mk-30-2 automatic cannon and co-axial 5.56mm MG4 machine gun come in for special mention.
... 100% of those who would really dare to attack my country seriously (at least in scenarios) are playing five leagues higher.
I'll never forget when as a lieutenant I went on a training exercise with 21 Battaillon Feld Artillerie at Munster Lager in January 1979. That's when a storm dumped about two feet of snow on Hamburg and Hannover. I couldn't decide whether I was in the Ardennes or on the Russian Front. The maps we had were cross-hatched in red to show where persistent chemical agents remained in the ground from experiments during the First World War.
Fuchs
08-29-2010, 11:05 AM
They are particularly impressed with the turret as a whole; the vehicle ergonimics of the vehicle and modular arnmour upgrading. The fire control system, especially the commander's independent sight along with the sensor system itself; the smoke grenade dischargers at the rear of the turret enabling modular uparmouring; and the location of the Mk-30-2 automatic cannon and co-axial 5.56mm MG4 machine gun come in for special mention.
The armament is nothing special, rather weak indeed. A CV9035 has clearly superior firepower.
The MK30-2 uses only two cartridges;
* ABM, air burst munition - AHEAD type. Minimal bursting charge.
* APFSDS
There we have two munitions, both with serious issues. ABM has no explosive power to eat its way through a wall, for example. It can only defeat exposed soft targets.
APFSDS has the old problem of discarding sabot ammunition for IFVs; the discarded SABOTs create a dangerous zone, so it's tricky to have infantry ahead.
Modular armour: Looks fine.
Electronics and sensors; up-to-date, but I would argue that an IFV does not need a CITV at all. That's gold-plating.
Mobility: As far as I know the engine has its issues with lack of torque at low rpm.
Dismount element: Too small.
The only really, really good thing about the Puma (except probably the modular armour) is that vibrations and noise inside have been reduced by 10 dB thanks to a decoupled suspension (the suspension is mounted on a longitudinal element that's itself mounted on the hull with dampeners).
I think you are reading my mind. I like the idea of a joint GCV and I think both services have much more to gain from this then lose. Based on our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq (as well as our allies) we should be able to get this design right. But, again, cost is a concern - I mean 20 million for an EFV - that's nuts. That's why upgrading the Brads might be the best way to go, but I do not have experience with the Brad to defend that opinion. Maybe the Brad has hit its ceiling and going with a new vehicle is the best way to go - that will be up to people smarter then me.
If it is joint, there is probably less probability of calls for upgraded Bradleys and AAVs. Don't know anything about European, BMP-3, or even Bradley designs other than cursory research...except they all are much, much lighter than 53 tons. The FCS manned ground vehicle also would have been even in overweight form. In Europe's case, AFVs also seem tied to A400M lift capabilities so the U.S. has an advantage there given larger C-17 payloads and numbers...yet we don't seem ready to exploit that capability. Allied A-400M could augment that early airlift of their lighter vehicles.
The BMP-3 design shows you can even add a main gun +30mm and keep the weight down. Interesting how they created a rear engine under the floor and put two dismounts next to the driver to still have 7 dismounts.
The BMP3 has a pretty big turret, too. With no engineering background, just playing around using 100 lbs per square foot of armor, it is amazing how quickly the weights add up for a large turret or even 33 cubic feet of fuel pods on the rear if you tried to put them there. A wider, shorter vehicle seems to give you more penalty on lighter bottom and top armor but less penalty on heavier side armor...and it allows fuel and other assets under main vehicle armor and troops to sit next to the turret.
Bottom line, seems like smart design can manage weight without excessive tech that may not be ready. Could you fill the V-bottom with water once in country to get by with less armor?
Fuchs
08-29-2010, 02:37 PM
If it is joint, there is probably less probability of calls for upgraded Bradleys and AAVs. Don't know anything about European, BMP-3, or even Bradley designs other than cursory research...except they all are much, much lighter than 53 tons.
The German Puma and the 90's Marder 2 prototypes went beyond 40 (metric!) tons already. Eastern Europeans developed some MBT/APC crossbreeds and the Near East seems to like the heavier HAPC (APC on MBT chassis, no turret) idea.
The weight by itself isn't the problem in my opinion; the concept as a whole made no sense.
IFV development is a bit on autopilot; armies forget to think about the basic idea of an IFV. The original, WW2-derived idea of an IFV is long since obsolete (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-1.html), as is the Russian idea of a ICV that rides through nuke-devastated terrain.
We're left with moderately armed vehicles with a mixed vehicle combat and infantry transport role that close in with MBTs (100% fighting machines) in regard to sensors and other gadgetry.
In the end, both Western and Eastern heavy brigades and divisions have only IFVs as infantry transports. These infantry transport vehicles have few seats, so our divisions and brigades lack the infantry for more than providing security to MBTs.
We can improve (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-2.html) the firepower element of the IFV (=rapid fire + ATGMs) very much and improve the dismount strength very much by separating them into a combat vehicle like BMP-T (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/04/medium-calibre-allround-option.html) and a HAPC. Add some classic APCs for additional infantry and you might end up with a much better heavy formation both in versatile firepower and infantry strength.
The IFV compromise has become way too elaborate and is no good choice any more. The GCV all-eggs-in-one-gold-plated-basket approach was in(s)ane.
Sounds like some of the exercises we had in Northern Australia. The SAR chopper was always busy picking up the enemy who had come down with heat stress.
More importantly, and meant as no criticism, Cole your idea sounds very similar to what Richard Simpkin was advocating in the late 1970s/early 1980s with his modular AFV concepts. From my translation of a recent article, the Chinese are impressed with the German Puma IFV, especially with its armament and protection levels.
GI Zhou, it would be cruel of Aussies to shoot down bad guys over the desert or ocean so the great whites or box jelly fish got them.
Not familiar with Simpkin, but sounds like a smart guy.;) As you may know FCS was a family of vehicles as is Stryker. Find it interesting that an original full family of replacements and promises of full funding of an alternative, has evolved to just a much larger infantry GCV replacement, an M109 upgrade, and now even talks of upgraded Bradleys. Yet if a stateside heavy force is solely sea-deployable, it rapidly loses relevance to lighter options like Marines and double-hulled and possibly up-gunned Stryker. So if upgraded Bradleys remain under 80,000 lbs, maybe they are a viable alternative with some other organizational and equipment changes.
Thought I read something about moving to as many as 13 Stryker BCTs. From that, you quickly envision a near equal number of Stryker BCTs, Infantry BCTs, and Heavy BCTs. With ARFORGEN rotations, that leaves about 3-4 of each BCT type available to deploy dependent on how much you continue to deploy Army Soldiers...and some of those are advise and assist brigades. Is air deployment of 2-3 heavy combined arms battalions unrealistic? It certainly would be a deterrent with parked C-17s sitting loaded with heavy gear on Guam and elsewhere during periods of tension.
With M-ATVs, and smaller number of GCVs and tanks in the air-deployed HBCT MTOE, you are well on your way to a wide area security force with an organic stability ops and self-sustainment capability to carry extra fuel, food/water, and ammo, or relief supplies. You also can carry augmenting light infantry fire teams and unmanned systems for distributed noncontiguous ops with heavy-light task forces. And M-ATV can deploy via 747-400s.
The German Puma and the 90's Marder 2 prototypes went beyond 40 (metric!) tons already. Eastern Europeans developed some MBT/APC crossbreeds and the Near East seems to like the heavier HAPC (APC on MBT chassis, no turret) idea.
The weight by itself isn't the problem in my opinion; the concept as a whole made no sense.
IFV development is a bit on autopilot; armies forget to think about the basic idea of an IFV. The original, WW2-derived idea of an IFV is long since obsolete (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-1.html), as is the Russian idea of a ICV that rides through nuke-devastated terrain.
We're left with moderately armed vehicles with a mixed vehicle combat and infantry transport role that close in with MBTs (100% fighting machines) in regard to sensors and other gadgetry.
In the end, both Western and Eastern heavy brigades and divisions have only IFVs as infantry transports. These infantry transport vehicles have few seats, so our divisions and brigades lack the infantry for more than providing security to MBTs.
We can improve (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-2.html) the firepower element of the IFV (=rapid fire + ATGMs) very much and improve the dismount strength very much by separating them into a combat vehicle like BMP-T (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/04/medium-calibre-allround-option.html) and a HAPC. Add some classic APCs for additional infantry and you might end up with a much better heavy formation both in versatile firepower and infantry strength.
The IFV compromise has become way too elaborate and is no good choice any more. The GCV all-eggs-in-one-gold-plated-basket approach was in(s)ane.
I've read that blitzkrieg was largely a product of getting the war over with before logistics ran short. The WWII Germans were hindered by lots of horse-drawn logistics and had special brigades designed to seize enemy supplies. Well both strategies and huge tanks didn't work too well on the eastern front or eventually in the Ardennes. Even our smaller tanks had logistics problems straining the Red Ball Express. And we want even more behemoths?
Whatever happened to the old saying about amateurs and logistics...and trust me I'm an amateur, but still am mindful of the loggies who are going to need to be more plentiful and vulnerable to protect combat arms guys with excessive armor.
Pete mentioned earlier, and you touch on it here that heavy forces are ideal for nuclear and chemical warfare. MAD fortunately precluded that in the Cold War. But today's risk of small scale nuclear employment and terrorism is very real from rogue states and stateless entities with unstable or misguided leadership. HBCTs become the sole means of cleaning up afterwards because heavy armor and elevation off the ground to protect against IEDs also protects against radiation.
BTW, in the eighties, I volunteered for an unclassified chemical warfare research project (to get necessary flight time) that had researchers injecting 12 of us with atropine and sending us out flying instruments and navigating NOE. Raises body core temps, makes you blind close up and in need of your shaded visor, and two injections make you nauseous-feeling yet you can't throw up. One injection did not seem bad but I'm perpetually around 245 lbs. Two injections ruins your day. It was a blind study that included a placebo but it was obvious which was which.
Fuchs
08-29-2010, 03:43 PM
The heavy tanks actually worked out greatly. The kill ratios were beyond impressive, even the supposedly failure behemoths such as Elefant/Ferdinand were huge successes and many copies survived very long in the war.
The insanity began only beyond 70 tons (British, French and Americans also had too heavy tanks under development).
Blitzkrieg is an operational concept that works out very well if you have a qualitative edge. The ultimate failure was rooted on the strategic level and the gradual loss of this qualitative edge (the latter in part because truck production never caught up with at least the peacetime attrition rate!).
I am personally no fan of very heavy tanks, but modern technology pretty much requires 40, maybe 50 metric tons weight for a combat vehicle that move intentionally against the enemy. Another (support) vehicle family that is not meant to move voluntarily into duel situations can be built at much lower weight - comparable to Strykers.
Both depends on the expectations. You can go up to 70 tons if you decide not to tolerate this or that threat and cannot resist the urge to protect your combat vehicle against a few more threats. Alternativel you could aim at the lower 4x metric ton rnage as did Germany with the Puma and Japan with tis newest MBT.
Even non-combat vehicles can go beyond 30 metric tons if you don't tolerate certain vulnerabilities (as happened with the GTK/Boxer project, which has to satisfy protection requirements in excess of many IFV protections). The lower end for this is well below 10 metric tons, CVR(T), for example.
Armoured vehicles are after all never invulnerable - it's all about a compromise. You look at the different threats and choose the ones the vehicle has to be protected against. You need to make this list rather long to make it viable as a combat vehicle, for commanders will otherwise either lose their combat AFVs real quick or not dare to use them in brazen actions.
edit: German heavies had a suspension design with overlapping/interleaving road wheels that distributed the pressure better on the ground than the fewer road wheels of modern MBTs. The consequence of this and the great track width was a very low peak ground pressure (mean maximum pressure index) and as a result to real problem with ground pressure.
The durability of some components was a dynamic system problem, though.
Infanteer
08-29-2010, 03:46 PM
[QUOTE=Fuchs;105765]The armament is nothing special, rather weak indeed. A CV9035 has clearly superior firepower.
The MK30-2 uses only two cartridges;
* ABM, air burst munition - AHEAD type. Minimal bursting charge.
* APFSDS
There we have two munitions, both with serious issues. ABM has no explosive power to eat its way through a wall, for example. It can only defeat exposed soft targets.
APFSDS has the old problem of discarding sabot ammunition for IFVs; the discarded SABOTs create a dangerous zone, so it's tricky to have infantry ahead.[QUOTE]
We use a third type, FAPDS, as a middle ground. It still has the discarding sabot but it can eat through things.
A double v-shaped hull Stryker with tracks instead of wheels might be something to consider for a future GCV.
A heavy-light mix, air deployable HBCT consisting of the CV90 family of vehicles, namely CV90120, CV9030, and CV90 APC Armadillo.
Sea deployable HBCT with M1, M2 and the Namer. A mech infantry platoon would have two brads and three Namers.
It seems to me we are trying re-invent the wheel and/or a one size fits all - the capabilities are out there and can be had now. Unless the future GCV has a cloaking device, we should look at Brad upgrades, CV90, and the Namer.
Question: Can older M1 tank chasis be utilized to build something like the Namer or is this prevented by the location of engine?
I really like the idea of a tracked Stryker - a design that is battle tested.
Fuchs
08-29-2010, 04:38 PM
A real HE-frag with electronic time fuze and with point detonation (enough delay for 5cm of wall), similar to the OCSW ammunition would have been more versatile.
That Ahead design seems to be optimised against exposed soft targets, including probably small UAVs. The ammunition load isn't great either - it restricts to a kind of 30mm sniping if it needs to last for a whole day of fighting.
Question: Can older M1 tank chasis be utilized to build something like the Namer or is this prevented by the location of engine?
The Jordanians converted rear engine vehicles to HAPCs, but the amount of effort you need to put into rebuilding would likely not be affordable in the U.S..
Some 1930's armoured cars were superior to most Stryker versions in vehicle/vehicle combat.
That reminds me of the old days:
Vor der Kaserne
Vor dem großen Tor
Stand eine Laterne
Und steht sie noch davor
Let's open the GCV to a nationwide design competition - make it the GCV Idol. I bet that will produce a GCV with a cloaking device, transporter, kitchen sink, and starboard and port attachments.
A real HE-frag with electronic time fuze and with point detonation (enough delay for 5cm of wall), similar to the OCSW ammunition would have been more versatile
That Ahead design seems to be optimised against exposed soft targets, including probably small UAVs. The ammunition load isn't great either - it restricts to a kind of 30mm sniping if it needs to last for a whole day of fighting.
The Jordanians converted rear engine vehicles to HAPCs, but the amount of effort you need to put into rebuilding would likely not be affordable in the U.S..
We could outsource it to China and India like everything else. Or, we can build Mexican laborer armament factories. I know that was not pc.
Fuchs
08-29-2010, 04:55 PM
You could do a lot. You could also simply employ some unemployed directly or even send unnecessary staff members to an army depot for a course in welding and for rebuilding those vehicles.
That's not how things work, though. Profit-driven companies would attempt to suck as much money out of the system for some welding works as possible, and they would succeed. It's the American (Western) way of military procurement.
Sometimes industry comes up with revolutionary innovations, such as this (http://www.hackman-adams.com/guns/spencer.htm). The Spencer rifle and carbine were the first magazine-fed small arms in the U.S. military inventory. The inventor Christopher Spencer also invented the pump-action shotgun after the war.
Fuchs
08-29-2010, 05:23 PM
I wouldn't call that "industry".
You could do a lot. You could also simply employ some unemployed directly or even send unnecessary staff members to an army depot for a course in welding and for rebuilding those vehicles.
That's not how things work, though. Profit-driven companies would attempt to suck as much money out of the system for some welding works as possible, and they would succeed. It's the American (Western) way of military procurement.
You do realize I was kidding.
Nothing on my idea of a tracked Stryker - a no go?
Tukhachevskii
08-29-2010, 05:43 PM
Question: Can older M1 tank chasis be utilized to build something like the Namer or is this prevented by the location of engine?
I wouldn't worry about the position of the engine as much as the engine itself. The Temsah's (http://www.military-today.com/apc/temsah.htm) engine was so complex (due less to sophistication and more extant the level of technology) that they simply decided to turn the rear into the front. The Temsah essentialy drives backwards:cool:. What concerns me more (yes I have thought about the idea myself) is the type of engine installed. The choice of a turbine was, IMO only, plain dumb but understandible. US doctrine saw tanks making rapid tactical advanced from potion to position rather than operational movement (strategic movement was essentially a question about sealift). A gasoline guzzling engine was thus een a s a favourable tradeoff for the tactical manouevrability it afforded the M1. You don't need that now (didn't even need it then IMO). You can talk about armour and armament all you want (I have and do, more so when slightly inebriated:rolleyes:) but it's the powerpack and drivetrain that are as, if not more, important. Remember the trinity , no not Clausewitz' although one could spin it that way philosophically speaking, for armoured (indeed most warfare); Protection, Mobility, Firepower. The Leo 1 traded (physical) protection for mobility on the (correct) assumption that moving about the battlefield was a better idea than sitting around presenting a large target (it was a dual purpose decision and highlights the relationship between the "armour trinity" and doctrine/employment). Nowadyas there is really only one calibre (120mm) for tanks (140mm being a still immature round in all but conventional for which there are 120mm rounds than can match it).
For a HAPC I can't see why the conversion of an M1 into a HAPC with a RCWS could be done but with the U.S. Congress penetrated by vested industrial interests and congressmen on the payroll I don't see that happening anytime soon. Sorry, if this post rambles, just had chocolate bar and got all tingly at the thought of armour (are tankers the armour encased equivalent of leather-clad fetishsists?:eek:)
I wouldn't call that "industry".
I don't know what else to call it. They were made by the Spencer Repeating Rifle Company of Boston, Massachusetts. Some were made under a subcontract to the Burnside Rifle Company of Providence, Rhode Island, owned by the Union general for whom "sideburns" are named after.
Blitzkrieg is an operational concept that works out very well if you have a qualitative edge. The ultimate failure was rooted on the strategic level and the gradual loss of this qualitative edge (the latter in part because truck production never caught up with at least the peacetime attrition rate!).
I am personally no fan of very heavy tanks, but modern technology pretty much requires 40, maybe 50 metric tons weight for a combat vehicle that move intentionally against the enemy. Another (support) vehicle family that is not meant to move voluntarily into duel situations can be built at much lower weight - comparable to Strykers.
I'll take your word for the ground pressure and wear on vehicles. I'm thinking more about the fuel consumption, HETs, vehicle recovery, wear on roads, and difficulty finding strong enough bridges. We all know who ends up paying for road/bridge repairs after the war.
When you think 500 gallons a fill-up for a 2 gallon per mile Abrams, a 2 mpg/175 gallon tank Bradley starts looking pretty darn good to the fuel truck driver...and a 5 mpg/60 gallon tank Stryker looks even better. Gotta figure a 53 ton GCV would be no bettter than 1 mpg, requiring a 300 gallon fuel tank. Multiply those figure by 58+ tanks/GCVs in a combined arms battalion and the brigade support company is in a world of hurt every few hours.
Blitzkrieg also had an air component that Germany had and did not face at first, but did face later in Russia and with the P-51 etc. Today's opponent attempting blitzkrieg would be constrained by F-35s and F-22s, AH-64D/Cobras, eventually A-10s, MLRS, blown bridges, and Volcano mines before encountering the first tank/GCV.
It puzzles me that with the lessons learned from threat use of IEDs, that we don't consider using cheap timed mines and MARKED, registered minefields in places like Afghanistan to canalize the Taliban. Smart mines had been planned for FCS and still should have a place on our future battlefield, IMHO.
I wouldn't worry about the position of the engine as much as the engine itself. The Temsah's (http://www.military-today.com/apc/temsah.htm) engine was so complex (due less to sophistication and more extant the level of technology) that they simply decided to turn the rear into the front. The Temsah essentialy drives backwards:cool:. What concerns me more (yes I have thought about the idea myself) is the type of engine installed. The choice of a turbine was, IMO only, plain dumb but understandible. US doctrine saw tanks making rapid tactical advanced from potion to position rather than operational movement (strategic movement was essentially a question about sealift). A gasoline guzzling engine was thus een a s a favourable tradeoff for the tactical manouevrability it afforded the M1. You don't need that now (didn't even need it then IMO). You can talk about armour and armament all you want (I have and do, more so when slightly inebriated:rolleyes:) but it's the powerpack and drivetrain that are as, if not more, important. Remember the trinity , no not Clausewitz' although one could spin it that way philosophically speaking, for armoured (indeed most warfare); Protection, Mobility, Firepower. The Leo 1 traded (physical) protection for mobility on the (correct) assumption that moving about the battlefield was a better idea than sitting around presenting a large target (it was a dual purpose decision and highlights the relationship between the "armour trinity" and doctrine/employment). Nowadyas there is really only one calibre (120mm) for tanks (140mm being a still immature round in all but conventional for which there are 120mm rounds than can match it).
For a HAPC I can't see why the conversion of an M1 into a HAPC with a RCWS could be done but with the U.S. Congress penetrated by vested industrial interests and congressmen on the payroll I don't see that happening anytime soon. Sorry, if this post rambles, just had chocolate bar and got all tingly at the thought of armour (are tankers the armour encased equivalent of leather-clad fetishsists?:eek:)
How realistic is this? I envision a transverse-mounted 4'x 8' diesel engine compartment in front. Behind it would be batteries, electric engine, fuel tank, and driver sitting in the next 3' x 8' behind the diesel engine. So with 7' of vehicle length accounted for, you now decide how big a turret you want. Obviously a 4' turret with just a gunner is adding less length to the vehicle than a 6' or bigger turret...and much less turret armor weight.
So engine(s), driver, and turret in my assumed GCV are just 11' in length with a four foot turret. Because the interior is 8' wide, you have space to put a vehicle commander and dismount squad leader next to the offset 4' circumference turret to share common displays/radios and plan where to dismount. Now add 6' to 8' of length for dismounted troops dependent on the 3-row Marine or Army version and you have a 17' to 19' long vehicle.
Where did I err? Why does this vehicle need to be even the 21+ foot length of a Bradley let alone the 30' foot of an EFV?
The other reason a Abrams made sense was multiple forward-positioned divisions and infrastructure in Germany and equipment/supplies for many more in POMCUS and in bunkers. Same thing in Iraq the second time around with equipment in Kuwait. Where is that equipment going to be in the future? My bet is it will be both in the U.S., Diego Garcia, and other places pretty far from the battlefield. Facing unreal numbers of Soviet tanks, nobody decided the Bradley needed to be tank-sized.
SethB
08-29-2010, 06:34 PM
Regardless of the decision to design the M1 with a turbine, the more recent failure is that of not replacing it. We have turbines (LV 100-5) and diesels (MTU 890) that are more than capable of doing the job. In fact, they can do the same job for less money, and they are about half the size and weight. Buying any of these engines and phasing them in at Anniston when the M1 undergoes its periodical refurbishment makes a lot of sense.
At the same time, we never bothered to purchase a light tank, instead buying the MGS...
Fuchs
08-29-2010, 07:25 PM
I don't know what else to call it. They were made by the Spencer Repeating Rifle Company of Boston, Massachusetts. Some were made under a subcontract to the Burnside Rifle Company of Providence, Rhode Island, owned by the Union general for whom "sideburns" are named after.
These early capitalist manufacturies were not comparable to General Dynamics or Boeing which would likely get a complex tank reworking contract.
That's why I'd call them manufacturies to avoid misleading about their nature.
The fuel consumption of a MBT (and there are much more fuel-efficient ones than Abrams) is operationally of lesser importance than the its practical range, which in turn depends on consumption+tank size. The practical road range can actually increase with weight if you change a design to accommodate greater fuel capacity.
Most WW2 bridges in Europe were limited to 26 tons - even a T-34 faced bridge troubles. Most rivers weren't as tamed as they are today and had offered the alternative of fording in some places.
Recovery of heavy tanks was a problem, but this was obviously overcompensated with battle performance, from the total loss ratios (tanks lost vs. tanks killed) were still great, even superior to 25 ton tanks while taking into account per unit costs.
Heavy tanks always had their issues, but both the positive and negative myth-spinning around the German ones of WW2 was very distorting.
Not the historical record, but today's technology, threats, mission profiles and operational doctrine decide on the optimum weight range of combat vehicles. I say everything from 40 to 70 metric tons is debatable, and I personally prefer 40-50 metric tons for many reasons.
----
The use of mines to secure roads would immediately kill the war effort politically, it's therefore a self-defeating idea.
These early capitalist manufacturies were not comparable to General Dynamics or Boeing ...
When they placed the contract for the Signal Corps Radio 300 "Walkie Talkie" that came into service in 1943 who would have thought all that spending on communications and electronics technology would have led to the computers and internet we're talking on now ...
The fuel consumption of a MBT (and there are much more fuel-efficient ones than Abrams) is operationally of lesser importance than the its practical range, which in turn depends on consumption+tank size. The practical road range can actually increase with weight if you change a design to accommodate greater fuel capacity.
Now wait a minute. You seem to assume a single fill up and its resulting range is all that is important. Isn't that synonymous with President Bush's "Mission Accomplished" when we reached Baghdad? What about the other 7+ years and required stability ops? What about initial heavy fuel consumption every few hours over hundreds of miles whether moving or not to power the electronics and sensors?
As for fuel under armor to achieve range, divide 500 gals x 7.4805 to calculate how many cubic feet of fuel tank under thick armor is required. It's about 67 cubic feet requiring armor.
Deployment sorties and fuel consumption of two alternative combat equipment partial packages for early air-deployment:
First option (current CAB maneuver cross-section with 53-ton GCV):
2 Armor companies with 14 tanks each + 1 for CAB Cdr = 29 tanks
2 Infantry companies with 14 each 53-ton GCV = 28 GCV
2 M-ATV in each Infantry company = 4 M-ATV
11 HEMTT fuel tankers
29 M1A2 x 500 gals = 14,500 gals
28 53-ton GCVs x 300 gals = 8,400 gals
4 M-ATV x 40 gals = 160 gals
Total = 23,060 gals every 8 hours?
11 HEMTT fuel tankers carrying 2250 gals = 24,750 gals carried
63 C-17 sorties required
2nd Option (air-deployable smaller CAB with 40-ton GCV)
One Armor company with 4 platoons (16 tanks) + 3 in Co HQ (1 for CAB Cdr) = 19 tanks
Two Infantry companies with 11 each 40-ton GCV + 11 each M-ATV = 28 GCV + 22 M-ATV
7 HEMTT fuel tankers
19 M1A2 x 500 gals = 9,500 gals
22 40-ton GCV x 240 gals = 5,280 gals
22 M-ATV x 40 gals = 880 gals
Total = 15,660 gals every 8 hours
7 HEMTT fuel tankers carrying 2250 gals = 15,750 gals carried
39 C-17 sorties required
Note the substantial difference between 39 and 63 C-17 sorties meaning ample supporting equipment/supplies could augment the 2nd alternative before reaching a 63 sortie total approximating that at Bashur over 5 nights in northern Iraq during the 173rd ABCT airdrop and airland.
Note the addition of far more M-ATV in the Infantry companies of the smaller air-deployed task force to assist in securing perimeters, moving light troops of the heavy-light task force, conducting patrols and stability ops, and providing for sustainment using inbound C-17s as the supply source.
Most WW2 bridges in Europe were limited to 26 tons - even a T-34 faced bridge troubles. Most rivers weren't as tamed as they are today and had offered the alternative of fording in some places.
Recovery of heavy tanks was a problem, but this was obviously overcompensated with battle performance, from the total loss ratios (tanks lost vs. tanks killed) were still great, even superior to 25 ton tanks while taking into account per unit costs.
In Iraq, then LTC Marconi, the lead armor TF commander for the 3rd ID advance on Baghdad had problems at bridge locations at two separate locations. Marines had problems at An Nasiriyah with tracked AAVs getting stuck in mud on the far side of a bridge when trying to avoid taking big vehicles through a narrow city road. They eventually had to assault through the city street and were fortunate to make it through fierce fighting...and those were lighter but still quite long and wide AAV.
Heavy tanks always had their issues, but both the positive and negative myth-spinning around the German ones of WW2 was very distorting.Unless fuel trucks have the same mobility and speed over terrain as the combat vehicles they are supporting, there is a potential problem during the first and subsequent refuelings, i.e. horses and lesser armored trucks trying to support tanks and IFVs moving cross-country at speed. Few U.S. advances involve just a single refueling and short capitulation which is why the lessons of other countries involving shorter lines of communications and no intertheater deployment do not apply to U.S. GCV requirements, IMHO.
Not the historical record, but today's technology, threats, mission profiles and operational doctrine decide on the optimum weight range of combat vehicles. I say everything from 40 to 70 metric tons is debatable, and I personally prefer 40-50 metric tons for many reasons.
Threats tend to get exaggerated relative to U.S. and allied capabilities. Hezbollah is not a typical threat having years to prepare covert defenses and infiltration of weapons. The U.S. generally gets involved defending other nations that have been invaded. That gives the enemy less chance to prepare his defenses in a newly secured location if we can air-deploy credible forces within 100 miles of the enemy within days rather than months. With sufficient warning, we can airland forces prior to any threat border or amphibious crossing thus precluding any need for forcible entry. In other scenarios, ABC/CBS/CNN/FoxNews/NBC could be showing C-17s on the ground at Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska carrying both Strykers and heavy-light task forces ready to roll down the runway within minutes. That could be new doctrine...a joint Army and Air Force contribution to AirSea Battle perhaps, IMHO.
The use of mines to secure roads would immediately kill the war effort politically, it's therefore a self-defeating idea. Good point about allied and Karzai resistance, but was not talking about roads. Maybe the mountainous portions of the border. Maybe adjacent to a concrete wall built around Kandahar with concertina and signs warning civilians.
I've noted far fewer civilian suicide attacks and problems of Palestinians infiltrating into Israeli areas since the wall was constructed in the West Bank and around Gaza. Similar lessons were learned in Baghdad...until the walls started coming down.
Fuchs
08-30-2010, 12:14 AM
Now wait a minute. You seem to assume a single fill up and its resulting range is all that is important.
Yes, and I can elaborate on why this is the case.
The sad historical truth is that combat service support rarely if ever catches up with armoured spearheads to supply them unless they rest for a day or two. This means that the tactical if not operational culminating point of attack of a heavy brigade is defined by its vehicles' practical driving range (ammunition consumption is typically rather low on very mobile ops).
The fiscal aspect is unimportant in comparison. Capabilities have their price.
1,000 km road range MBTs are actually feasible (refitting Western MBTs with EuroPowerpack and using the freed two cubic metre space for fuel tanks already does the trick!) and this could (in my opinion) revolutionise armoured warfare more than Chobham armour and 120mm smoothbore combined.
1,000 km road range is even more easily feasible with soft vehicles (excluding motorcycles of course), only light and medium AFVs would have trouble to meet that road range.
Maybe the mountainous portions of the border. Maybe adjacent to a concrete wall built around Kandahar with concertina and signs warns civilians.
Nice. Now you add all smugglers on the list of your enemies. And many traders. And you strangle the economy, making mercenary jobs and drug economy even more attractive. Concertina wire and minefields are obstacles. Obstacles that are not at least observed by troops are useless. So you need to add incredible quantities of troops to make your questionable obstacles work in that huge country.
Fuchs
08-30-2010, 12:35 AM
Your calculations are misleading because they only look at the weight of the tip of the spear, not at the whole spear's weight:
Article: Breaking the Tether of Fuel
http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume5/april_2007/4_07_3.html
Excerpt:
The most telling characterization of fuel usage came from the Marine
Corps 2003 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Study. This study showed
that almost 90 percent of the fuel used by MEF ground vehicles would accrue
to tactical wheeled vehicles (TWVs), including HMMWVs, 7-ton trucks,
and the logistics vehicle system. Moreover, the study showed conclusively
that combat vehicles (e.g., M1A1 tanks, light armored vehicles, and assault
amphibious vehicles), although fuel guzzlers individually, as a fleet consume
a relatively minor fraction of the fuel.
SethB
08-30-2010, 12:35 AM
End use efficiency is the best way to save money. The fuel isn't that expensive. The infrastructure and personnel are.
In 2001, the United States had 60,000 personnel dedicated to POL activities. That doesn't include the "snowball" of people that train and support them.
ETA: That logic is terrible. Much of that is fuel. The Army calculated that 50% of what it moved in 2001 was fuel. By extension, a 50% reduction in consumption would result in a 25% reduction in the need for transport as a whole.
By that metric, a new engine for the Abrams starts looking like a pretty good deal.
Yes, and I can elaborate on why this is the case.
The sad historical truth is that combat service support rarely if ever catches up with armoured spearheads to supply them unless they rest for a day or two. This means that the tactical if not operational culminating point of attack of a heavy brigade is defined by its vehicles' practical driving range (ammunition consumption is typically rather low on very mobile ops).
The fiscal aspect is unimportant in comparison. Capabilities have their price.
1,000 km road range MBTs are actually feasible (refitting Western MBTs with EuroPowerpack and using the freed two cubic metre space for fuel tanks already does the trick!) and this could (in my opinion) revolutionise armoured warfare more than Chobham armour and 120mm smoothbore combined.
1,000 km road range is even more easily feasible with soft vehicles (excluding motorcycles of course), only light and medium AFVs would have trouble to meet that road range.
Good point, but Army's require fuel trucks anyway because eventually you hit 1,000 kms and you still have years left to fight. Even if you got down to 1 mpg that would be 620 gallons to move 1,000 kms (or so many hours of idle) which is lots of weight of fuel and armor protecting fuel tanks on a GCV or tank. More fuel trucks at risk please, so that heavy forces never want to dismount?
Plus don't recall that the OIF tactical refueling pauses were unreasonable or resulted in a different outcome. But that was with lighter Bradleys.
Nice. Now you add all smugglers on the list of your enemies. And many traders. And you strangle the economy, making mercenary jobs and drug economy even more attractive. Concertina wire and minefields are obstacles. Obstacles that are not at least observed by troops are useless. So you need to add incredible quantities of troops to make your questionable obstacles work in that huge country. Wasn't talking about the valleys. Just the peaks that air Volcano could lay with built-in timers that could be adjusted for longer durations...say at the start of the fighting season along North Waziristan? Shouldn't the Pakistani Army be overwatching? Oh wait, they aren't in North Waziristan.
In Gaza, the Israelis have robotic .50 cal towers overwatching their barriers. Stateside Soldiers could handle that duty the same way the USAF Predator/Reaper drivers do.
Fuchs
08-30-2010, 12:48 AM
Do you have current data on M1A2 practical fuel consumption?
The old data from competition trials in Europe (twice as thirsty as Leopard2) became obsolete with the introduction of the APU.
End use efficiency is the best way to save money. The fuel isn't that expensive. The infrastructure and personnel are.
In 2001, the United States had 60,000 personnel dedicated to POL activities. That doesn't include the "snowball" of people that train and support them.
ETA: That logic is terrible. Much of that is fuel. The Army calculated that 50% of what it moved in 2001 was fuel. By extension, a 50% reduction in consumption would result in a 25% reduction in the need for transport as a whole.
By that metric, a new engine for the Abrams starts looking like a pretty good deal.
Agree with your points SethB but fuel has been estimated to cost as much as $48 per gallon if conveyed via aerial tanker, or flown by helicopter to COPs/FOBs. It's some lesser but still outrageous amount when trucked in via Pakistan/Kunduz.
Herr Oberst Fuchs has no patience for small talk. :mad:
SethB
08-30-2010, 01:14 AM
The FBCF factors in structural costs associated with transportation and storage. The DLA price is the actual price. So while we can forecast with the FBCF it isn't the appropriate tool to determine an actual cost.
More to the point, it is a number that helps illustrate the costs of delivering fuel on the battlefield. We use several gallons for every gallon that we deliver. Thus a 50% reduction in end use would result in a much more significant reduction overall.
Is such a reduction possible? The LV 100-5 reduces consumption by 33%, the MTU 890 would probably reduce consumption by about 50%, and an APU by about the same amount, although I don't know what the two would do, in combination.
So it is conceivable that a lighter Abrams (with a rewire, an M360 cannon, etc) with a new engine and APU could be 75% more efficient. That would mean an immediate reduction in the number of fuel trucks needed for resupply and by extension the number of trucks needed to supply mechanics, security and life support for those personnel.
Fuchs
08-30-2010, 11:15 AM
Good point, but Army's require fuel trucks anyway because eventually you hit 1,000 kms and you still have years left to fight.
I doubt that modern warfare against real threats might last for years, but if it did, a farther culminating point might save a year. The Soviets didn't arrive in Berlin in 1944 because the culminating point of their offensives wasn't very far forward. They lacked trucks, reliability, survivability and on-board supplies (especially on their IS series heavy tanks). They demonstrated the importance of a far culminating point of attack very much on the Eastern Front, and Rommel did the same. He might have captured Suez if he hadn't run out of power after a few hundred km each.
One of the most important challenges in operational art is to push the culminating point farther. Operational art should inform tactics and training, and all three should inform equipment designers.
To clarify this topic I started, the FCS was cancelled and the GCV competition was put on hold for another six months. According to the Army there is not enough agreement on GCV capabilities. I think General Casey had a lot to do with this because he has questioned why the GCV will weigh close to 70 tons and not be much lighter. The Brits have signed on for the ASCOD which seems to be a capable vehicle.
One of the requirements for the GCV is the ability to carry nine troops. I am only speculating, but is it possible that the U.S. Army would go with three vehicle mech platoons because the vehicle carries more troops? PL in one vehicle, PltSgt in another with the master gunner in the third. That would give the platoon 29 dismounts which is about the same number now.
tankersteve
09-09-2010, 08:49 AM
Interesting discussion and I have been lurking in the back listening in. Two minor points I would like to add.
Stryker fuel consumption gets much, much higher when the vehicle actually moves cross-country, rather than on semi-improved surfaces. Its actual range is significantly less if you are not moving along road systems.
M1-series tanks get fueled twice a day not just because they desparately need fuel - most are well over 1/2 full on each top off - but because the crews don't trust the fuel transfer pumps to get the fuel from the front cells to the back. Thus, half the fuel is sitting there, not used and the average operational range is significantly diminished while the fuelers are making double the daily runs actually needed.
Tankersteve
Tukhachevskii
09-09-2010, 10:49 AM
Stryker fuel consumption gets much, much higher when the vehicle actually moves cross-country, rather than on semi-improved surfaces. Its actual range is significantly less if you are not moving along road systems.
Isn't that the case for all vehicles, armoured or not?
To clarify this topic I started, the FCS was cancelled and the GCV competition was put on hold for another six months. According to the Army there is not enough agreement on GCV capabilities. I think General Casey had a lot to do with this because he has questioned why the GCV will weigh close to 70 tons and not be much lighter. The Brits have signed on for the ASCOD which seems to be a capable vehicle.ASCOD seems kind of light at 31 tons if Wikipedia is correct. And it is 3 crew + 8 dismounts. Think I read something since the announcement that weight was not the reason...hope that was wrong.
One of the requirements for the GCV is the ability to carry nine troops. I am only speculating, but is it possible that the U.S. Army would go with three vehicle mech platoons because the vehicle carries more troops? PL in one vehicle, PltSgt in another with the master gunner in the third. That would give the platoon 29 dismounts which is about the same number now.
Nine troops + crew of three. Don't believe the three-man crew would dismount. So doesn't that mean the Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant would be vehicle commanders and normally not dismounting if there were just 3 vehicles per platoon? That's another reasons to add M-ATVs.
The other reason to have M-ATVs or a 4th GCV per platoon is to carry future unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, unattended sensors, the RTO, machine guns, Javelins, and their operators....plus any extra supplies in the truck bed. Alternately, you could have a common Army and Marine GCV carrying 13 to fit the extra guys and gear.
Interesting discussion and I have been lurking in the back listening in. Two minor points I would like to add.
Stryker fuel consumption gets much, much higher when the vehicle actually moves cross-country, rather than on semi-improved surfaces. Its actual range is significantly less if you are not moving along road systems.
M1-series tanks get fueled twice a day not just because they desparately need fuel - most are well over 1/2 full on each top off - but because the crews don't trust the fuel transfer pumps to get the fuel from the front cells to the back. Thus, half the fuel is sitting there, not used and the average operational range is significantly diminished while the fuelers are making double the daily runs actually needed.
Tankersteve
That still implies greater quantities of less-armored fuel trucks and crews are driving around twice a day waiting to get blown up by North Korean or fill-in-the-blank stay behind forces....just so combat arms guys can remain in an over-armored and soon stationary cocoon when the fuel trucks are blown up.:confused:
Might point out that the now defunct FCS BCT design had just 10 tanks in its armor companies. That is another alternative for an air-deployed combined arms battalion with 14 tanks still in the sea-deployed companies. But adding the armored reconnaissance squadron, you still have the same number of HBCT company commands for armor officers if you have just one large tank company...thus saving and diverting one armor Co's HQ personnel.
Plus with four platoons of four tanks in a single armor company, you could task organize one platoon to each infantry company and still have two platoons for an armor-heavy reserve.
tankersteve
09-10-2010, 05:08 AM
Isn't that the case for all vehicles, armoured or not?
Yes, to an extent, but the Stryker actually needs refueling at levels similar to heavy armored vehicles when moving cross-country. Tanks and Bradleys combat radii are based on X-country moves.
Tankersteve
Cavguy
09-10-2010, 07:27 AM
Yes, to an extent, but the Stryker actually needs refueling at levels similar to heavy armored vehicles when moving cross-country. Tanks and Bradleys combat radii are based on X-country moves.
Tankersteve
Not quite Steve. It needs at about the same interval but nowhere near the same quantity .... because of the much smaller fuel tank.
Tukhachevskii
09-10-2010, 07:34 AM
The Brits have signed on for the ASCOD which seems to be a capable vehicle.
Ascod has not been selected for the MICV (IFV) role as a replacement for the Warrior (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrior_tracked_armoured_vehicle). It's been chosen as the basis for the recce/scout vehicle under the FRES (http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/535/) (Future Rapid Effects System:eek:, excuse me while I vomit) programme. There are no plans to replace Warrior as yet, instead the UK gov is focusing on the WLIP (http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/04/cta-40mm-canon-information/) programme to replace the 30mm rarden with a 40mm case telescoped cannon. Carrier priorities are focused on the Piranha Mk V (again for the FRES requirement) but with the recession this may be cut. Like a lot of other better informed than myself, I don't buy into the whole Light/Medium/Heavy divison of forces or the Medium Weight Capability mythos. Far better to train heavy and light forces to be interoperable and become "medium" weight after ditching a few kilos (leaving un-necessary equipment at home that is) rather than consign the heavy weight programmes to the dustbin of history.
I can only second what Agatha de la Boulaye's character Adele Rousseau says in that god aweful monstrosity of a film, Aliens V Predator (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alien_vs._Predator_(film));
"Alexa 'Lex' Woods: [Rousseau is loading a pistol] Seven seasons on the ice, and I've never seen a gun save someone's life.
Adele Rousseau: I don't plan on using it.
Alexa 'Lex' Woods: Then why bring it?
Adele Rousseau: Same principle as a condom. I'd rather have one and not need it, then need it and not have one".!!!
Anyway, FRES has thankfully been cut down to size (http://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=articles_defence&ref=A4A37A634D499A).
Oh, and as for the ACOD being a capable vehicle (which makes a mockery of the "medium weight" and "wheeled" requirement) see, FRES Scout- Spot the Diference (http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/03/fres-scout-%e2%80%93-spot-the-difference/)
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