Purpose of the MBT?

[Chris jM]

A question for the more knowledgeable folk out there:

In 'The Human Face Of War' Jim Storr notes that (page 126):


...'the best defence against a tank is a tank' is simply not true. Specialist anti-tank weapons are about 2.5 times better at destroying tanks. Guderin freely admitted it.

Storr goes on further with some more statistics, but the main thrust of his argument is above. this confuses me as I have always being taught that the tank's reason for being is primarily to kill other tanks. I can agree with Storr, but remain confused as to why MBTs are so predominant in many forces.

My early, uneducated thoughts (caveated with the fact that I have no experience with armour):

- MBTs are the most flexible form of armour (as opposed to specialist infantry-support tanks and dedicated missile vehicles), representing the best possible outcome in a trinity of protection, mobility and firepower

- MBTs are the most suitable capability to accompany infantry into the assault and are able to exploit through contested territory better than any other form of AFV.

As such, although they are neither the most suited capability for a dedicated infantry-support task or for vehicle-vehicle combat, they remain the most flexible platform around and because of their flexibility are the most suitable capability for the assault and exploitation functions in any army (which, using Storr's paradigm of combat for those who are aware of it, means that the tank is the most suitable capability we have to create widespread shock amongst an enemy force).

I know some discussion occurred in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10546) on the IFV/ AFV concept, however my confusion remains. What is/ where is the utility and value of the MBT?

[120mm]

Forgive me for not reading through the article, but MBTs exist to exploit penetrations and to provide a mobile "fist" to fight blitzkrieg. The also provide a type of defensive mobility that other platforms lack.

Specialist anti-tank weapons tend to be inflexible and not very survivable in a conventional battlefield. BTW, in the time it takes a TOW or SAGGER missile to fly to its' target at 3000 m, a well-trained tank crew can hit and kill 2 and possibly 3 targets at the same range.

Tanks suck at accompanying infantry. It doesn't mean they cannot do it, it's just not a very optimal use of their capabilities and exposes their greatest vulnerabilities. The converse is not true, of course, as infantry accompanying tanks is like peanut butter and jelly.

BTW, does Storr not even know how to spell Guderian?

IMO, anyone who concentrates on one system to make a battlefield argument is a naif, an amateur, and should not be taken seriously.

[Chris jM]

To clarify, that would be me... the misspelling of Guderian was my mistake when I typed up the paragraph. :o

Also, in defence of Storr, his argument was not that armour or MBTs are not valid or useful. You are completely right that fixation on one system does not make a valid argument simply by extrapolation. I had simply taken one of his statements as I'm curious as to the subject and placed in on the board in isolation. A few paragraphs earlier Storr had written that "Anti-tank defence illustrates the need to take a systemic view of combat and armed forces." He makes the same point you do - just because scissors trumps paper in a certain situation doesn't mean you decide one is better than the other.

Thanks for the points, though.

[Fuchs]

... however my confusion remains. What is/ where is the utility and value of the MBT?

The Main Battle Tank is a vehicle that was developed for intentional use in line-of-sight combat. its crew is capable of justifying the investment into the tank team and the hardware by exploiting the degree of protection offered by the tank for the critical mass of survivability on the battlefield.

This critical mass does not include invulnerability, but rather vastly reduced or entirely negated effectiveness of most threat weapons. The tank is still vulnerable to few threat weapons - crew training and tank tactics are required to counter these threats for additional survivability on the mission.

The high survivability in comparison to ""light" forces (especially on open ground) in combination with the internal combustion engine's power offer a high mobility (with a heavyweight weaponry and ammunition) on the battlefield.

This high practical mobility in face of many threats can be exploited by large unit and formation tactics to great effect.
Tanks can also be used with assault gun tactics; in this case they serve on the offence as fire support platforms with weapons and ammunitions heavier than practical for dismounted troops.

The best targets for a tank are those which justify the expenditure of scarce ammunition and the risk involved. Hostile main battle tanks are sometimes in this category, sometimes not. It depends on the other forces' ability to deal with them (does your army have enough effective threats against hostile tanks?).


(This ability was in doubt since 1940. Anti-tank guns were largely immobile, dedicated tank destroyers/Jagdpanzers were a kind of tank themselves, infantry and engineer anti-tank munitions were very rarely able to withstand concentrated breakthrough attempts.
The problem continued during the Cold War when shaped charge-based weapons were able to penetrate tanks mostly with unpredictable effect. Their employment either required vicinity (and weighed down the dismounted troops) or depended on missile guidances and long flight times - both offering countermeasure opportunities to the enemy.
In short; there was little trust in the non-tank-based anti-tank capabilities.)


edit:
Lengthened version here:
About tanks, and why they're a necessity in modern ground forces (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/09/about-tanks-and-why-theyre-necessity-in.html)

[Tukhachevskii]

The Role of Armour in Urban Combat (http://defense-update.com/features/du-1-06/feature-urban-armor.htm)

...an opposing view...

HEAVY ARMOUR IN SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v7/serbu-swjvol7.pdf)

...and an interesting Israeli monography about the benefits of M1 Ambrams production/acquisition over the Merkava...

Tank Tops and Heavy Metal: Armour’s Enduring Appeal on the Modern Middle Eastern Battlefield (http://www.acpr.org.il/pp/pp156-Fishbein-E.pdf)


Personally I think the combination of Protection, Mobility and Firepower that the MBT brings to the combined arms mix is essential in any kind of operating enviroment be it FIBUA, PSO or World War X.

In fact, come to think of it, I remember a discussion in Luttwak's, Strategy (http://www.amazon.com/Strategy-Logic-Peace-Revised-Enlarged/dp/0674007034), (earlier edition, 1987) where he debunked the Cold war myth that the profusion of ATGMs would make MBTs obsolete given the frontages in question, rate of fire and other factors (such as artillery suppression, the fog of war and fog proper, etc.) as well as the MBTs mobility, rate of advance, etc.

ok, I think I'm done editing now, really must work on my memory.

[Infanteer]

Jim Storr's book as an excellent look at a whole gamut of military issues and he attacks a lot of things that military folks/observers take for granted. I'd have to check the reference (I don't have the book available to me now) but the context of Storr's statement is a look at organizing forces for optimal battlefield use. Storr is big on "operational analysis", using data garnished from conflict to inform military debate. Again, I'd have to check the source but I believe he is referencing some form of data (especially from the Mid-East) referencing tank kills to come to his conclusion. IIRC, Storr makes the argument to support his idea of formation level anti-armour organization.

Gudmunddsson's idea of the "sniper tank" MBT, the current incarnation of the MBT, in On Armor is also interesting. He posits that there is a bit of a dichotomy between "operational mobility" and "tactical capability" (for lack of a better term) and that modern Western MBTs have emphasized the latter at the expense of the former in the last generation of tanks. Almost all development of MBTs has been on targetting systems and, to a lesser extent armour, at the expense of operational mobility. Modern tanks are now "Sniper Tanks", meant to win battles in the first shot (unlike WWII where, usually, tanks would have to smack multiple rounds into eachother to win) but with horrible operational mobility (fuel milage, durability, etc).

That being said, the average speed of the F echelon of an Armoured Division was the same in 2003 as it was in 1944, so perhaps operational mobility is moot?

As for an answer to your original question, I've seen two "purposes" for MBTs. In irregular warfare, we use MBTs because insurgents are often unable to really do much to them; we used Leo2s there for a variety of missions when we felt like making a statement. They're essentially moving pillboxes.

In a more regular setting, there may be validity to the statement that "tanks aren't the best at killing tanks", or at least that they aren't the most efficent method of doing so. In a doctrinal area (static) defence, tanks aren't usually parcelled out in one's defensive area to kill enemy AFVs, but are rather tasked as countermoves/counterattack.

[Uboat509]

Clearly the Sagger and the TOW and other 1st and 2nd generation ATGMs are not going to render the MBT obsolete but what effect do some of the newer AT technologies have on this question. 1st and 2nd generation ATGMs had a variety of issues from portability to accuracy and reliability but some of the new technologies seem to be negating many of those issues.

The fire and forget weapons like the Javelin are one way that these issues are being overcome. With Javelin, the operator no longer needs to remain exposed and immobile while tracking the weapon onto the target and its top-attack mode targets one of the historically weakest areas on the tank.

The CKEM (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compact_Kinetic_Energy_Missile) is another promising technology that seeks to put tank/bunker killing power into a smaller, lighter and (presumably) cheaper package.

The two technologies (AT and MBTs) seeming to be going in opposite directions. AT technologies seem to be getting smaller, lighter and cheaper while MBTs, in response to these new technologies are getting larger, heavier and more expensive. It reminds me of the problems we were having when I was in Iraq. The IEDs kept getting better and in response we kept adding armor to our HMMWVs, almost to the point of absurdity. It seems to demonstrate that lethality progresses much faster than survivability. At some point I suspect that we will reach a point where simply cannot add anymore armor to the MBT and expect it to move or expect to be able to transport it on any platform other than a ship. AT weapons, on the other hand, will continue to get better. At what point will the lethality of AT outweigh survivability of MBTs to the point of obsolescence?

[Fuchs]

CKEM is promising, as has been something called HATM, HVM or similar back around 1980. That technology is apparently a bit like fusion power and battlefield lasers - always a fixed amount of time away.

Javelin has many issues, as does the conceptionally similar Spike. There are many opportunities for effective countermeasures that could be fitted to legacy tanks. Both systems might end up being obsolete by the time they see a major modern conflict.


Even vulnerability to these weapons/munitions doesn't change much. A well-used tank force spends little time fighting against battle-ready opponents and much time exploiting.

edit: HVM. Proof-of-concept missile flew in 1983.
http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/hvm.html

The proof-of-concept development phase of HVM culminated in a fully successful guided test flight in March 1983. In October 1984, the USAF, U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps agreed to jointly develop the HVM into an operational weapon, which would include a surface-launched variant.

[Tukhachevskii]

The CKEM (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compact_Kinetic_Energy_Missile) is another promising technology that seeks to put tank/bunker killing power into a smaller, lighter and (presumably) cheaper package.

The two technologies (AT and MBTs) seeming to be going in opposite directions. AT technologies seem to be getting smaller, lighter and cheaper while MBTs, in response to these new technologies are getting larger, heavier and more expensive. It reminds me of the problems we were having when I was in Iraq. The IEDs kept getting better and in response we kept adding armor to our HMMWVs, almost to the point of absurdity. It seems to demonstrate that lethality progresses much faster than survivability. At some point I suspect that we will reach a point where simply cannot add anymore armor to the MBT and expect it to move or expect to be able to transport it on any platform other than a ship. AT weapons, on the other hand, will continue to get better. At what point will the lethality of AT outweigh survivability of MBTs to the point of obsolescence?

Yes, but what is it they say about the defence/offense relationship...defence is always cheaper (i.e., counter-measures). ATGMs were countered by first generation active armour (or re-eactive armour) like the Israeli Blazer system. MBT protection will be vastly improved with the addition of active protection systems like LEDS (http://www.saabgroup.com/Global/Documents%20and%20Images/Land/Force%20Protection/LEDS/LEDS%20product%20sheet.pdf) as well as electric armour (which detonates/prevents detonation/initiates premature detonation[:eek:] of the missile warhead section by frying its electrics). Future systems will be capable of engaging hard core penetrators like the HVM or APFSDS penetrators (by knocking them of course rather than destroying them). The real problem are TTPs for the activation of active armour in environments of heavy force density such as FIBUA where infantry will be in intimate support. Will probably necessitate greater dispersion of vehicles in open terrain and the deployment of single vehicles well clear of infantry in urban terrain (sort of like mobile pillboxes). Consequently, I don't see future MBTs weighing as much as the monsters around nowadays (65 tonnes in some cases).

[Fuchs]

(...) electric armour (which detonates/prevents detonation/initiates premature detonation[:eek:] of the missile warhead section by frying its electrics).(...)


Electric armour appears to be impractical except probably for niche applications. It's only capable against shaped charges.

It works very differently as well. The armour plates are effectively two insulated capacitors with a huge voltage. The shaped charge forms outside, its projected metal pierces through the first plate and comes into contact with the second one. Now this copper (or tantalum) from the shaped charge closes the circuit and a huge current flows through it. Some electromagnetic effects disperse the fragile shaped charge metal jet and it is rendered harmless to the main armour behind the second plate.

[Tukhachevskii]

Electric armour appears to be impractical except probably for niche applications. It's only capable against shaped charges.

It works very differently as well. The armour plates are effectively two insulated capacitors with a huge voltage. The shaped charge forms outside, its projected metal pierces through the first plate and comes into contact with the second one. Now this copper (or tantalum) from the shaped charge closes the circuit and a huge current flows through it. Some electromagnetic effects disperse the fragile shaped charge metal jet and it is rendered harmless to the main armour behind the second plate.

Thanks for the clarification, from what I have read the folks designing the stuff aren't too sure about its utility either.

[Granite_State]

Javelin has many issues


Can you elaborate on this?

[Fuchs]

Can you elaborate on this?

- robust lock-on against tanks with good camouflage
- susceptible to modern countermeasures (specially the active ones)
- difficulties against targets with same IR profile as their surroundings (the earth bunker problem)
- sensor in missile drives up the price, thus making the missile less suitable for low chance shots.

[Tukhachevskii]

- robust lock-on against tanks with good camouflage
- susceptible to modern countermeasures (specially the active ones)
- difficulties against targets with same IR profile as their surroundings (the earth bunker problem)
- sensor in missile drives up the price, thus making the missile less suitable for low chance shots.

That's not just an issue with the Javelin seeker.

[Fuchs]

Javelin has many issues, as does the conceptionally similar Spike.

;)

[TAH]

Some of the things an MBT can do for you even in small numbers.

1. Provide stabilized platform with advanced fire control for machine guns.

2. Provide a range or main gun ammo types to be able to address a wide range of targets and circumstances.

3. A heavily protected platform from which to rally friendly troops and conduct C2.

4. A heavy vehicle to use brute force to smash through walls, buildings and obstacles.

5. A weapon system capable of rapidly firing accurately at point targets at long and very long range.

[William F. Owen]

Some of the things an MBT can do for you even in small numbers.

1. Provide stabilized platform with advanced fire control for machine guns.

2. Provide a range or main gun ammo types to be able to address a wide range of targets and circumstances.

3. A heavily protected platform from which to rally friendly troops and conduct C2.

4. A heavy vehicle to use brute force to smash through walls, buildings and obstacles.

5. A weapon system capable of rapidly firing accurately at point targets at long and very long range.

Yep. All things it did in 1917 or 18. It's an infantry support weapon, and it has never progressed from being "a covered field gun," which is what it does best.

[Steve Blair]

Yep. All things it did in 1917 or 18. It's an infantry support weapon, and it has never progressed from being "a covered field gun," which is what it does best.

Uh...not really, at least in terms of "being able to do those things" in 1917 or 1918. I would say that the tank was (at best) in its infancy during WW 1 and didn't attain the majority of the capabilities mentioned by TAH until World War 2.

[William F. Owen]

Uh...not really, at least in terms of "being able to do those things" in 1917 or 1918. I would say that the tank was (at best) in its infancy during WW 1 and didn't attain the majority of the capabilities mentioned by TAH until World War 2.
The tanks in WW2 were more capable, but there were few "new capabilities," bar the specialist engineer vehicles.

[Rifleman]

...on armored warfare in WWII: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/gabel/gabel.asp

I thought it was an interesting article. I don't know how it applies to small wars.

[Fuchs]

The tanks in WW2 were more capable, but there were few "new capabilities," bar the specialist engineer vehicles.

You may be right on a very, very abstract level, but you're completely wrong on a technical level.

[William F. Owen]

You may be right on a very, very abstract level, but you're completely wrong on a technical level.
Sure, tanks of WW2 were technically very different, but when used correctly, they did things known to work in WW1. The Conceptual use stayed very coherent.

[Fuchs]

Sure, tanks of WW2 were technically very different, but when used correctly, they did things known to work in WW1. The Conceptual use stayed very coherent.

...except that they as similar to each other as were medieval knights to Celtic nobles.

The WW2 tanks were - with exception of assault guns, tank destroyers and infantry tanks - an operational enabler while it was merely a moving pillbox for tactical support in WW1. All WW1 tanks - even the Whippet - were either infantry tanks or carrier vehicles.

I fail to see that 'conceptual use' in a Tiger2, Chaffee, Pzkpfw III or T-34.

[TAH]

Sure, tanks of WW2 were technically very different, but when used correctly, they did things known to work in WW1. The Conceptual use stayed very coherent.

In WWI, you find some tanks armed only with MGs (the "females"), a mobile pillbox/machine gun next.

This idea/concept carried forward into early (39/40/41) with a number of countries fielding a number of models of tanks armed only with MGs.

The idea/concept of an MBT is an outgrowth from WWII. No more, infantry & cruiser tanks, no more light, medium & heavy tanks.

Today, recon vehicles and IFVs serve in the WWII light tank role, recon, screening etc. medium & heavy are merged into the MBT. The function of infantry support or cruiser now comes from organization not some much from the individual tank itself.

[120mm]

Yep. All things it did in 1917 or 18. It's an infantry support weapon, and it has never progressed from being "a covered field gun," which is what it does best.

Actually, what it does best is to exploit, which relegates infantry to a "tank support weapon".

Which is as it should be. Inferiors SHOULD support their superiors.;)

[William F. Owen]

I fail to see that 'conceptual use' in a Tiger2, Chaffee, Pzkpfw III or T-34.
Are you confusing concept with design? Everything those tanks were designed to do, was being done in WW1. I would further suggest that the Tiger2 was a failed concept, and poorly designed as a result.


The idea/concept of an MBT is an outgrowth from WWII. No more, infantry & cruiser tanks, no more light, medium & heavy tanks.
Light, Medium and Heavy, all exist today, and never went away. They have merely morphed, from what they were in WW1.

Actually, what it does best is to exploit, which relegates infantry to a "tank support weapon".
So show me 8-10 + times where unsupported armour successfully exploited to gain ground and hold it? The historical records shows this as very rare and often leading to sever tank losses.

Guys, I am not writing my Thesis here on a bulletin board. OK, my bad for letting the cat out of the bag, but I am merely trying to get away from the "I love tanks" school of history.

[120mm]

So show me 8-10 + times where unsupported armour successfully exploited to gain ground and hold it? The historical records shows this as very rare and often leading to sever tank losses.

My point, exactly!!!

Tanks need infantry for support. Otherwise, infantry is just a form of protoplasmic track lubricant.

Wilf, I'm yanking your chain, man.

I couldn't care less what tools one uses to win wars. It's about the mission, not the means....

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, I'm yanking your chain, man.

Ahhhh....... :D
It would appear that I am as emotionally bound to the antithesis as some may be to the hypothesis!!

[Fuchs]

Are you confusing concept with design? Everything those tanks were designed to do, was being done in WW1. I would further suggest that the Tiger2 was a failed concept, and poorly designed as a result.

As I said - on a very, very abstract level that may be true. It's highly unlikely that you'll find much agreement by focusing on this level, though.


One example: No tank in WW1 ever bounced a cannon shell. Tiger2 was definitively built to do exactly this. The first tank built to stop shells -not only bullets and fragments- was the Char B-1bis, with a few days advantage over the Mathilda II.

Show me a tank type of WWI which served as command tank or was in radio contact with all other tanks.

Show me a WWI tank which was meant for reconnaissance.

Show me a WWI flamethrower tank.

Show me a WWI tank with a useful operational range and speed - enough for the encirclement of an army or corps.

Show me a swimming WWI tank.


Besides; Tiger and Tiger 2, even Ferdinand/Elefant were highly successful vehicles in the context of open terrain (Eastern front), well worth their price. These designs have been bashed a lot for their difficulties, but the kill ratio is outstanding and they were able to harass front lines or support a local counterattack at little risk.

[Tukhachevskii]

As I said - on a very, very abstract level that may be true. It's highly unlikely that you'll find much agreement by focusing on this level, though.


One example: No tank in WW1 ever bounced a cannon shell. Tiger2 was definitively built to do exactly this. The first tank built to stop shells -not only bullets and fragments- was the Char B-1bis, with a few days advantage over the Mathilda II.[Was the technology extant to do that? The Germans had a programme to copy British tanks in an enlarged format which would have weighed in at around 100 tonnes (the AZU? IIRC)to protect them against British artillery firing in the DF mode. The engine, suspension and ergonomic technology avaliable at the time made that a fantasy]

Show me a tank type of WWI which served as command tank or was in radio contact with all other tanks.[Conceptual flaw not a design "flaw"]

Show me a WWI tank which was meant for reconnaissance. [Doctrinal/Conceptual issue not a design issue]

Show me a WWI flamethrower tank. [Design issue, not a conceptual one]

Show me a WWI tank with a useful operational range and speed - enough for the encirclement of an army or corps. [Conceptual/doctrinal issue not a design "flaw"}

Show me a swimming WWI tank.[If you mean "amphibious, show me where on the Western Front a Tank would have been required to "swim"...also a design "flaw" not a conceptual/doctrinal issue]


Besides; Tiger and Tiger 2, even Ferdinand/Elefant were highly successful vehicles in the context of open terrain (Eastern front), well worth their price. These designs have been bashed a lot for their difficulties, but the kill ratio is outstanding and they were able to harass front lines or support a local counterattack at little risk.

Fuchs,

I don't know if its a confucsion based upon sematics but as I see it you're confusing conceptual/doctrinall issues (what are tanks for and how should they do it) with technical design (i.e., how they are designed to fulfill their conceptual potentionl in accordance with military doctrine.

You criticise that there were no command tnaks in the Great War. Tanks were infantry support vehicles, not an autonomous arm. Sure, after 1918 and Fuller's embryonic operational concept/scheme of manouvre for 1919 (Plan 1919) tnaks begun to be thought of as an autonomous arm rather than an adjunct branch of the Army. Sort of like air warfare doctrine, fighter tactis only developed as a by product of the original purpose of the plane...reconnaisance.

Secondly, (actually I think I might not be addressing the issues in order:rolleyes:) the idea of reconnaisance beyond the FEBA was alter development. I see a lot of people applying hidsight in the discussion...you've got to rememebr that unlike Athena who sprouted from Zeus' head fully armed an armoured tank warfare doctrine develoepd in penny packets. WILF, your comments against Fuller are, on the whole, accurate but you have to remember that Fuller was one of the first, if not the first, to serously sit downa nd consider the implications, applications and ramifications of the tank (and the internal combustion engine) for warfare. It wa sonly the interwar years that the Soviets and Germans really tried to figure things out practically (as opposed to theoretically as was the case in the cash strapped UK).

p.s. A defence of Tukhachevskii...like many of the inter-war innovators he experimented with various designs for the army but his primary goal was the mechanisation of the soviet army. His advocation of meachnisation was as much a political ploy- aimed at the cavalry and infantry gurus like Budenny and Voroshilov (also Stalin cronies) who despised the former Tsarist era voin-spetsy (military-technical specialist) as rivals and saw mechanisation as a threat to the proletariant workers and peasants army- as it was a "purely" military exercise. Tukhachevskii and many of his supports advocated mechanisation to get the industrialisation of the USSR going (i.e., to get production targets and manufacturing on line)...they were NOT settled on the tactcal composition of mech units. In fact, IIRC Tukhachevskii advocated Bde based formations organised aropund loose Corps HQ (Divisioanl size acording to Soviet nomenclature) based on the mission, terrain and enemy.

If you want to aim your fire at tank design try this on for size....Tsar Tank (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czar_tank)

[William F. Owen]

Show me a tank type of WWI which served as command tank or was in radio contact with all other tanks.
Command tanks fitted with radio existed as early as 1917.

....and that's not the point. My point is that the major roles, applications and limitations of the tank/AFV were all known or in place by November 1918.
It's not abstract. It's all there in the operational record. Point being there were ample grounds to challenge the Tank Avant Garde, based on what was known at the time.


Besides; Tiger and Tiger 2, even Ferdinand/Elefant were highly successful vehicles in the context of open terrain (Eastern front), well worth their price. These designs have been bashed a lot for their difficulties, but the kill ratio is outstanding and they were able to harass front lines or support a local counterattack at little risk.
Says who? What is the basis for a comparison with other causes of action? A few more Hetzers and a few less Tiger 2s?
Yes, some achieved a very high LER, but never high enough to win. Not much good having a tank fleet that could suffer 30-75% loss if it had to march any distance.
Note: the most mechanically reliable German AFVs power-trains of WW2 all dated from 1937-39 designs.

[Fuchs]

Tukhachevskii, read my reply again with these quotes in mind:


Yep. All things it did in 1917 or 18. It's an infantry support weapon, and it has never progressed from being "a covered field gun," which is what it does best.


The tanks in WW2 were more capable, but there were few "new capabilities," bar the specialist engineer vehicles.


Sure, tanks of WW2 were technically very different, but when used correctly, they did things known to work in WW1. The Conceptual use stayed very coherent.

He completely downplays the difference between WWI and WWII tanks, apparently deliberately ignoring the differences in order to fit history to an idea.

[William F. Owen]

He completely downplays the difference between WWI and WWII tanks, apparently deliberately ignoring the differences in order to fit history to an idea.
Ya Allah! I do not down play the difference between WW1 and 2 tanks. There was nothing like the Panther in WW1! - Not the point!

The Major ROLES IN WHICH THE TANK HAD BEEN PROVEN EFFECTIVE, had NOT CHANGED! Did the role or basic employment of artillery magically altered between WW1 and 2? Did Infantry? That's my point. We need to get beyond the TAMIYA history of tanks!

[TAH]

Light, Medium and Heavy, all exist today, and never went away.

Based on what parameter of factor?

How much they weigh?

Caliber of their Armament?

Their Mission?

There are "light" MBTs armed with 105mm+ cannons out their, but they are not normally used in the "Light tank role" scouting, recon, screening ect.

The modern analog to the PZII is a cannon armed IFV or scout/recon vehicle.

There are a lot of very "heavy" MBTs out there M1A1, M1A2, Leo2A4/A5/A6, Challenger 2 are all examples. But the concept of a heavy/breakthrough/infantry support tank (lots of armor and slow) is gone.

So are the last generation MBTs, (M60s, Leo1s, AMX30s) your mediums?

[William F. Owen]

But the concept of a heavy/breakthrough/infantry support tank (lots of armor and slow) is gone.

Yes, I concur. No more T-10's for example. The "Breakthrough Tank" has ceased to exist, - BUT the basic taxonomy (Lt, Med, Hvy) continues, albeit in an evolving form - as it has evolved since 1918.

[Fuchs]

The role of artillery was altered between both world wars, as was the role of most tanks.

Artillery assumed a role in support of mobile warfare in WW2, including quick reaction defensive and offensive fires - its job was much more about pre-planned fires in WW1, which restricted it to a much smaller role in that war.

Likewise, tanks had very different roles in WW2 than in WW1. They were breakthrough tanks with marginal exploitation capability (about the depth of a division sector) in WW1 , but became the spearhead of exploitation efforts in WW2 - the German army even preferred to achieve breakthrough without much if any tank involvement. The Japanese tank actions in Malaya had no resemblance of Cambrai either. The role, purpose and technical abilities were entirely different.
It's simply not appropriate to throw them into a bag and downplay the differences (AS YOU DID). An Frankish knight at Poitiers had certain similarities with a heavy Mongol horseman, but it's inappropriate to throw them into one basket labelled "horse cavalry" unless you want to dumb history down for a 6th grader.
It's the same with tanks. They're all the same if you go very abstract or dumb down very much, but that serves no real purpose. It's much more useful to look at the differences, for that's where the lessons are hidden.

[William F. Owen]

Artillery assumed a role in support of mobile warfare in WW2, including quick reaction defensive and offensive fires - its job was much more about pre-planned fires in WW1, which restricted it to a much smaller role in that war.
Really? I see no evidence that any of that is the case, and nor do any artillery historians. How does an 18 pounder Field Gun of 1918 get employed so differently than a 25 pounder of 1944? Because one was horse drawn the other vehicle drawn?
Why is a Sopwith Camel, so different to a Spitfire?

As I say, I am not going to debate my Thesis here and this has been a very good example of why it was dumb to even try. Salutary lesson on the pitfalls of straying away from the model-makers version of history.

[Fuchs]

Oo, you really don't know the answers to your questions?

[Tukhachevskii]

TAMIYA history of tanks!

Sir, I respect everything you have said thus far but LEAVE Tamya out of it! Perhaps some of the fondest memories I have of childhood revolve around Tamiya kits...one more slur against them and I shall demand satisfaction sir!:D

OTOH you can slate Revel and Airfix all you want;)


p.s Can we/I assume (safely or not) that your thess, once completed, will be post on the SWJ (or another reputable journal, of which, f course, there are many) where we can all get our teeth into it?

[Steve Blair]

Please. They all date back to Da Vinci. All WW 1 did was copy his brilliance.:D