Returning to a Division Centric Army

[gute]

General Chiarelli said the modular force is “not as efficient as a division” and that he is looking at “adjustments” to it.

My question: What will be adjusted?

Much more in this article.

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/09/23/army-program-whacks-coming/

[Van]

The question to start with is "efficient by what metric?"

This is part of the standard self-flagellation by flagellation between centralized, financially efficient and decentralized, combat efficent organizations.

For example; efficent combat units have organic maintenance capabilities, but financially efficient units have the maintenance centralized at a higher echelon (and company commanders can just get in line to get their vehicles fixed). Same argument applies to any support function I can think of (intel, signal, trans assets, etc).

The discussion of precision guided munitions (PGM) vs conventional munitions was more interesting. I'd like to see a rigorous study of the advantages of PGM vs. iron rounds, integrating the consequences of increased gunnery to make up for less technically sophisticated munitions. That is, does increasing gunnery with the money saved on PGM increase the guns' accuracy and precision to a greater extent than the PGM allows?

This sounds suspiciously like GEN Chiarelli was directed to come to a specific solution and is attempting to rationalize the answer that has been imposed upon him.

[SJPONeill]

I like the theme he's taking with PGM: one of the ongoing legacies of DESERT STORM is this myth of clean precise war that was fostered through the 90s in Serbia and Kosovo, and into OIF. PGMs are all very nice when you have the luxury of relatively undefended precise targets but less so perhaps against an adversary that is dispersed, concealed and able to retaliate and/or defend itself.

The articles pretty vague on how the modular force is “not as efficient as a division” and more so on the nature of the “adjustments” to it that he may be considering. My first thought is that the modular brigade structure seems to have been working fairly well to support the long campaigns of the last decade...

[Tukhachevskii]

This sounds a lot less like anything to do with the structure of the army. It sounds a lot more like the Army, or at least certain members of it, want to get a handle on the enormous war profittering (for instance, of contractors & industry- hence the JRAP, MTLV, Hummer issue) in evidence since OIF I (anyone remember Halliburton? Civil contractors? etc.). The issue of PGms sounds a lot like an argument over "value for money" than it does "measures of performance/effectiveness". But that's just IMO from this side of the "pond". Perhaps there are domestic issues, tacitly presupposed by the article, which I am unaware of.

For my money the brigade based army is a sound idea in principle (in fact the Soviet army before it disolved had already come to that conclusion too). The only problem I have with the BCTs is the lack of true manouvre capability. They need at least three manouvre battalions and a cav/recon bn and one (as a minimum) proper arty bn (with 24 not 16 tubes:confused:). By the way, while I'm on my hobby horse get rid of the combined arms bn in the HBCT and return to flexible, task organsied (I know, this is still practiced) pure bns (two of each). A HBCT has four armour companies (two per Bn) that's one battalion's worth of armour for what kind of an overhead?:confused: Dammit, I need a fag (that's a cigarette to you:rolleyes:), I'm really grumpy this morning.:D

[gute]

By using the word efficient and not effective one must assume costs. The following link is from an article by Lt. Colonel Melton which has been before, but is now about five years old, but I think it still applies and might very well be the adjustments the general is talking about:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/melton.pdf

Here is another article I came across:

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA446784&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

For those who don't have time to read and are unfamilar with Lt. Colonel Melton, he argued in his article that the small BCTs had caused the Army to have to create additional types of BCTs, which increased overhead. He recommened combining BCTs, attaching FA battalions to BCTs even if the FA battalion is not firing in support of the BCT, establishing an engineer hqs in the BCT, combining sustainment and maneuver brigades (which may have already been done - combat support brigades), BGs command BCTs.

[Hacksaw]

You know...
I used to be a tad cynical towards the DA Civilian/Contractor (present complany excluded of course) who would tell me oh that concept (pick your topic from organization design to personnel policy to operational approach) is in vogue again... and then they would dig deep in their historical files to show you the other three times the pendulum had swung back and forth...

I need a Bud

[Pete]

... oh that concept (pick your topic from organization design to personnel policy to operational approach) is in vogue again...
If we were to revert back to muzzle-loading rifle-muskets it would support the kinder, gentler, population-centric COIN approach, as opposed to the firepower-intensive Fulda Gap model. We could save on ammo costs as well. ;)

[SJPONeill]

If we were to revert back to muzzle-loading rifle-muskets it would support the kinder, gentler, population-centric COIN approach, as opposed to the firepower-intensive Fulda Gap model. We could save on ammo costs as well. ;)

Would never fly...the lead ammo is too environmentally-unacceptable...:D

[Van]

If we were to revert back to muzzle-loading rifle-muskets it would support the kinder, gentler, population-centric COIN approach, as opposed to the firepower-intensive Fulda Gap model. We could save on ammo costs as well. ;)

Muzzle loaders? That's too effete.
Sabers. 1850 Staff and Field Officer Sabers.
Eliminates ammunition costs, allows for exception precision in targeting, virtually eliminates the possibility of collateral damage, useful in offence or defence, quiet, promotes morale and esprit de corps.

@Hacksaw - if you're in Honolulu, first round is on me.

Re: the PGM/conventional munitions debate - This is one where the pendulum has only gone one way so far. GEN Chiarelli is the first senior leader I've heard questioning the value or efficiency of PGM. I am curious to see if there is serious, quantifiable research done on this or some instantaneous and unreasoning ad hom attack on whoever questions the superiority of gadgets.

[Ron Humphrey]

Something along the lines of determining exactly how and if PGM and associated delivery mechanisms may or may not change the calculus when one talks about field artillery?

Just a guess, very interesting article though

[SethB]

I had the chance to attend a Fires conference in which General Ridge posed the PGM question as "How much precision can we afford."

In that vein, GMLRS makes a lot of sense because one guided rocket has the same planning value as six standard rockets, as well as twice the (UNCLAS) range. When accuracy for the standard round is 10 mils a 1M CEP is a tremendous improvement.

There was the implication that we could save money on PGMs and apply that towards more gunnery instruction. When you are using AFATDS the degree of accuracy possible is significantly higher than with standard techniques. When you are using a system like the M777A2 that can receive Fire Commands to the nearest tenth mil your accuracy increases as well.

You still have to account for the five Requirements for Accurate and Predicted Fire, four of which fall squarely on the artillery unit. An Artillerist on another forum that I frequent mentioned that when he was shooting in OIF he shot "cold stick" which means he made no attempt to quantify some non-standard conditions. Specifically, he stated that he shot without accounting for the differences in propellant lot. When you have dozens of different lots of propellant on hand it may be difficult to use the proper one (on the sun section) and quantify the effect on MVV (on the FDC).

With a system like PGK, the round would automatically compensate for that error and impact where the guidance system directed.

Excalibur is a different deal. It offers the ability to hit and kill a single building, or even a room in a building, with an increase in range over standard 155MM rounds, a near vertical angle of fall, and a small warhead that limits collateral damage. It also requires certain charges and the Fire Commands must be digital. Thus it has some limitations. It is also the most expensive FA PGM.

As for what we can afford, we have JDAMs in service or in development that can do all these things, but once you factor in flight time they may not be any cheaper.

I would like to ask those more senior to me if it would ultimately be cheaper to use aircraft to generate targeting information and then fire the mission from a SPLL or HIMARS.

But then, I do have a professional bias.

[Ken White]

Chiarelli was in a Division in Desert Storm. He saw what Divisions did in Iraq in 2003. He commanded a Division there. Divisions work great in the Desert -- we found that out in North Africa in WW II. He saw that...

He's never fought anywhere else and is Armor, the Combat Arm of Derision; they believe in MASSS. ;) However, What we found in virtually all other types of terrain WWI and in the Pacific, in Italy, in Northwestern Europe during WW II, in Korea, In Viet Nam, in Afghanistan -- and even in Mexico and the Civil War -- was the Divs aren't much good anywhere else, they're too big and unwieldy (I'd say totally unnecessary and even an impediment in the form of underemployed and overindustrious Div Cdr and Staff except for the fact we haven't adjusted that admin / log effort to cope with the absence of the Div); so you break up into Regimental Combat Teams, Brigades or Combat Commands which do work and work well. The Div supports them and the Div Cdr gets to visit and ask odd questions.

Their (RCTs, Bdes, etc) biggest downside is they do not call for enough General Officers... :rolleyes:

Msg
Fm: Old DAC
to: Hacksaw

Pendulums swing. Fourteenth iteration :D

P.S.

Design an organization that EVERYONE says is one maneuver Bn light of a full load, that decimates the Field Artillery branch much to their chagrin and has acknowledged inadequate sustainment capability built in; then determine that it doesn't work as well as is we would like. Masterful... :rolleyes:

[Kiwigrunt]

Would never fly...the lead ammo is too environmentally-unacceptable...:D

But if we increase the calibre somewhat we could use Kiwifruit. Howz dat for a clean-green-machine.

[Pete]

Sabers. 1850 Staff and Field Officer Sabers.
I own a Model 1840 Light Artillery Saber that shows signs of field use and also has the original leather straps still attached to the rings on the scabbard. It's marked 1860. I also have a Model 1840 NCO's Sword and leather scabbard that's in almost new condition. It was made by Ames and is dated 1864.

[Fuchs]

Propellant lots etc:
It's not necessary to have PGMs to compensate for such variances. It's been standard procedures with several MRL systems to shoot one rocket, observe with radar, then self-destruct the rocket (timer) in the air in order to prevent that the following rocket salvo with corrected aim loses the surprise effect.
It adds a few seconds and is not very efficient with large rocket calibres, but it works.

There's also a trajectory correction system with which the launcher simply aims too high and the trajectory correction module in the rockets gets radio command to deploy air brakes at the perfect time to negate the distance error/dispersion.


Divisions/brigades:
It's been accepted in Europe since the Division 59 (a brigade-based design) that brigades are the way to go. The Americans learned the same in WW2 and re-learned it after the Pentomic excursion (maybe after ROAD, don't remember ROAD details now).

I'm still struggling to learn whyTF the division has come back to favour with so many people. It's obvious to me that we should delete the division level, not the corps level.
Brigades might actually be too large already. A very small brigade (two reinforced battalions worth) might be the way to go (=full circle to early 50's). We need very agile formations, and we've got much to do till we have them.

[Pete]

The Pentomic force structure with Battle Groups didn't work out.

[SethB]

Propellant lots etc:
It's not necessary to have PGMs to compensate for such variances. It's been standard procedures with several MRL systems to shoot one rocket, observe with radar, then self-destruct the rocket (timer) in the air in order to prevent that the following rocket salvo with corrected aim loses the surprise effect.
It adds a few seconds and is not very efficient with large rocket calibres, but it works.

That system increases accuracy, but it will not give the the 1M CEP that you can get through the GPS/INS systems that GMLRS uses.

Rockets don't use propellant lots. They are standard. Artillery rounds do use the propellant lot code to determine MVV.

[Ken White]

the Colonels didn't like it. That and the fact that the intended equipment got stalled in the bureaucracy and only started appearing in units AFTER the decision was made to revert to the tired and true -- and easier to control if you're into centralizing things -- Brigade of ROAD. The Pentomic concept had a great many good things, but it was designed for those who are willing to delegate and trust subordinates. Not the Army way...:wry:

[Pete]

Oh well, I might be one of the only people here who knows what Pentomic force structure and Battle Groups were. I read that it had something to do with dispersing units on a nuclear battlefield in Germany.

[82redleg]

the Colonels didn't like it. That and the fact that the intended equipment got stalled in the bureaucracy and only started appearing in units AFTER the decision was made to revert to the tired and true -- and easier to control if you're into centralizing things -- Brigade of ROAD. The Pentomic concept had a great many good things, but it was designed for those who are willing to delegate and trust subordinates. Not the Army way...:wry:


Oh well, I might be one of the only people here who knows what Pentomic force structure and Battle Groups were. I read that it had something to do with dispersing units on a nuclear battlefield in Germany.

Pete, I think Ken actually served in the Pentomic Army. I know what it was, but only through reading about it.

[gute]

Pentomic infantry divisvion consisted of five subunits commanded by colonels. The initial intent of the modularity mafia was to create five BCTs from division assets only. Hmmm - coincidence?

From what I read, Pentomic divisions did not include armor divisions which remained combat commands.

[Tukhachevskii]

I'm still struggling to learn whyTF the division has come back to favour with so many people. It's obvious to me that we should delete the division level, not the corps level.


Sorry, I disagree. Although I like the idea of having brigade groups you'll still need an intermediary HQ between Corps and Bde if not because of span of control then information overload (I think the two might be connected;). A purely divisional HQ outfit, no supporting arms (etc), purely devoted to C&C (anyone remember that game? brings back memories...) will be needed (as per UK practice). In fact, if 'm not mistaken the whole Uv/Ux/Uy/Uz (or whatever the acronymns are, Yanks really do love 'dem acronyms) is based on the concept that a "divisional" type HQ will be set up (on an ad hoc basis) to manage the bdes. Can't see a corps commander having to deal with up to 5 manouvre bdes, a couple o' support bdes, maybe an artillery bde or two (if the US still has those of course) and maybe an aviation bde (for starters). Of course if fewer bdes are attached you've just got an old school Div anyway. Come to think of it, IIRC I read somewhere that US doctrine calls for US commanders to plan two levels below them (hardly aufragstaktik, but if it works for them, who am I to judge). IFF (if and only if) that's the case then a Corps cdr is going to have to plan not only for the 5 bdes (my maths isn't as good as TAH's, or anyones for that matter, so 'll forgoe mentioning the other bdes:o) but also for their constituent bns (lets say four) for a total of 20 and five Bde HQ. That's my take on it anyway.

[Fuchs]

I can describe a leadership & command method that easily allows for such a corps, the span of command is no insurmountable challenge. It's basically about horizontal cooperation instead of synchronization planning, Auftragstaktik and about a different training of leaders.

Military history has seen many highly successful operations with a very small amount of directions from corps or division down to brigades.
The challenge at the operational level doesn't seem to be the span of command, but the understanding of the situation and issuing missions in a timely fashion.
An emphasis on reconnaissance / skirmishing forces helps with the former, minimal staff sizes and careful selection & training of leaders and staff personnel helps with the latter.

[SJPONeill]

I can devise a leadership & command pattern that easily allows for such corps, the span of command is no insurmountable challenge. It's basically about horizontal cooperation instead of synchronization planning, Auftragstaktik and about a different training of leaders.

Straight up, I'm sceptical about that but would love to stand corrected and see this occur. I think it might run all very well so long as every thing was IAW THE PLAN but at the point of departure from THE PLAN, I think the corps staff, no matter how augmented by staff and technology, would be unable to keep up with events. The complexity would not come so much from the conduct of combat/kinetic operations but from the need to sustain those forces one their initial loadout was consumed and equipment began to require maintenance, recovery, etc...

A centralised headquarters would also be just that, centralised, keeping the next higher level of command and coord away from where operations are being conducted i.e. unless the missionspace is so small or the tempo so slow, the corps command can only be close to some not all of the actions that may need influence/guidance from the next level up...

[Fuchs]

Well, this may be the right time to mention that I'm not exactly convinced of planning or even a fan of planning. I'm more into creating opportunities and exploiting the same with cat-like reactions.

The force densities and the mobility of a well-organized and well-trained battalion exceed the horizon of a divisional headquarters anyway. To restrict brigades to Div Cmd and to lead a corps operation by issuing orders to two or three divisions isn't going to work well any more any way.

Such a mode adds too many restrictions, too many delays, too much friction ... let's just mention that it's a bad idea. The time of the division has passed away. it has actually passed away back in the 50's when NATO planned to defend a 1,000 km front-line in Central Europe with basically only 26 divisions instead of having 100-400 divisions on a 1,000 km front-line as Europe experienced it a few years earlier. The wide frontages required a mobility and agility which simply didn't fit into the division corset.

West Germany would have introduced a brigade-centric army without divisions based on late war experiences in the 50's, but didn't for entirely political reasons: The government had promised 12 "divisions" to Western Allies.

That's how outdated the division actually is.

[Hacksaw]

I don't even know where to start... but I will do my best to be brief...

Mandatory caveat upfront... I too am a fan of reducing unnecessary levels of bureacracy where and when appropriate...

"I'm not exactly convinced of planning or even a fan of planning. I'm more into creating opportunities and exploiting the same with cat-like reactions."

Hmmmm.... Not sure which of the two to begin with... is it that you don't enjoy planning or is it that you don't find the activity of identifying likely future challenges and possible solution approaches very productive? Trust me, I hate planning too... it sucks... never ending series of what if's that the CDR wants examined... that said, perhaps not everyone has cat-like reactions or that they should have cat-like reactions... sometimes you have to go slow to go fast... maybe this approach is good up to a certain point... but to be honest I'm not a fan :rolleyes:

"Such a mode adds too many restrictions, too many delays, too much friction ... let's just mention that it's a bad idea. The time of the division has passed away. it has actually passed away back in the 50's when NATO planned to defend a 1,000 km front-line in Central Europe with basically only 26 divisions instead of having 100-400 divisions on a 1,000 km front-line as Europe experienced it a few years earlier. The wide frontages required a mobility and agility which simply didn't fit into the division corset."

Which operations are you referencing? Division centric operations in DS/DS weren't overly pedantric... leash was logistical not an inability to operate without detailed orders... OIF 1 wasn't exactly plodding either on the combat side... again logistics was the leash (that and a biblical-esque mud shower)...

How exactly have Division staffs impeded BCT operations in OIF/OEF beyond initial combat operations???

"The West German Army would have moved to BCT centric forces if not for NATO..."

and the obvious reason that keeps popping up... Resourcing, Managing and synchronizing non-maneuver combat enablers/forces

Redundancy in these capabilities is not sustainable (pun intended)... or at least that seems to be the case in this instance

Live well and row

[Fuchs]

Which restrictions?
Well, a corps might order one division to give a Bde to another Div, but then you're again at a higher span of command for the latter division (and the div/bde staffs don't know each other). Keeping brigades under command of a specific division ties them together. You get bundles of brigades which you couldn't move as freely in a corps sector as you could without the division layer. That's one restriction.

A corps HQ has a picture of the corps area, issues missions to division HQs which in turn update their own intent and issue orders to brigades.
The lag in here should be obvious. Such a lag is a restriction on agility of command.


I'm not particularly interested in DS or OIF experiences. That's like boxing experiences based on punching ball training. The fact that there were problems at all is embarrassing. A competent army would have created very different challenges and a modern army structure should not be modelled with the least problematic and long since gone opfor in mind.
Yet, if OIF was of interest; the British 1 Armoured Division wasn't an effective HQ in that operation. It issued few orders, and those came often very late. The brigades pulled their weight.


By the way; the quotation marks (" ") are not for paraphrasing. Your third quote was paraphrasing and I would appreciate not to see false quotes.

I can assure you that nobody in the 50's thought of "synchronizing", for that is a much newer fashion - and mostly an anglophone fashion. There's an official military history book on the early years of the Heer (up to 1970) and it clearly tells us that the reason for the division in the second army structure was a political one. The German experts were advocating a brigade-centric army. The result was the Division 59, an often-copied structure which focused on the brigades and left only a small role for the division.

[82redleg]

The math earlier in this thread regarding span of control is incorrect. A Corps C2s (commands and controls) 3-5 divisions, plus appropriate support brigades (usually, a maneuver enhancement BDE, combat aviation BDE, battlefield surveillance BDE and fires BDE). A Division C2s 3-5 BCTs, plus appropriate support BDEs (usually, a CAB and a fires BDE, at least). So, eliminating the division HQ would increase span of control from 7-11 to 19-34.

Are there any examples of a military HQs handling that kind of span of control during operations? I can't think of any.

In LTC Melton's article on small vs large BCTs http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/melton.pdf discusses the span of control hypthetical for OIF 2003, in light of his proposed organization.

Using the proposals here to eliminate the division, span of control for V Corps in OIF 1 would have increased from 23 to 77. I reached this by using the task organization listed in On Point, beginning on pg 510 of the pdf file, or p 454 of the document. http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/OnPointI.pdf In reaching the second count, I counted BN and BDE size elements that were directly subordinate to the divisions, the COSCOM and CORPS ARTY (division level elements). I assumed that the CO and smaller elements would have been split out to the BDEs if the divisions were eliminated. I can't see how a HQ manages 23 subordinates, even though some of them are fairly limited in scope, much less 77.

[gute]

The math earlier in this thread regarding span of control is incorrect. A Corps C2s (commands and controls) 3-5 divisions, plus appropriate support brigades (usually, a maneuver enhancement BDE, combat aviation BDE, battlefield surveillance BDE and fires BDE). A Division C2s 3-5 BCTs, plus appropriate support BDEs (usually, a CAB and a fires BDE, at least). So, eliminating the division HQ would increase span of control from 7-11 to 19-34.

Are there any examples of a military HQs handling that kind of span of control during operations? I can't think of any.

In LTC Melton's article on small vs large BCTs http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/melton.pdf discusses the span of control hypthetical for OIF 2003, in light of his proposed organization.

Using the proposals here to eliminate the division, span of control for V Corps in OIF 1 would have increased from 23 to 77. I reached this by using the task organization listed in On Point, beginning on pg 510 of the pdf file, or p 454 of the document. http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/OnPointI.pdf In reaching the second count, I counted BN and BDE size elements that were directly subordinate to the divisions, the COSCOM and CORPS ARTY (division level elements). I assumed that the CO and smaller elements would have been split out to the BDEs if the divisions were eliminated. I can't see how a HQ manages 23 subordinates, even though some of them are fairly limited in scope, much less 77.

This will be a learing lesson for me. In OIF1 the brigade commanders reported to BGs right? The BGs reported to the division commander. What if the BGs were removed - does that limit the layers or is that too much for the division commander and his deputy to manage? The BGs removed fill corps staff positions probably like they do now. So that would be 3-5 BCTs, a FA brigade, sustainment brigade and CAB reporting to the division commander. Again, is that too much?

What if corps and division were combined - the division commanders are part of the corps command staff during operations? That might be putting many eggs in one basket.

It seems what LTC Melton recommends is combining BCTs, with a BG as the commander. This removes the BG as the "middle man" in drug enforcement talk - buy directly from the source. I'm I 2way off here and I need to stick to drug law enforcement or should I be promoted to general?:)

[Infanteer]

The time of the division has passed away. it has actually passed away back in the 50's when NATO planned to defend a 1,000 km front-line in Central Europe with basically only 26 divisions instead of having 100-400 divisions on a 1,000 km front-line as Europe experienced it a few years earlier. The wide frontages required a mobility and agility which simply didn't fit into the division corset.

For all your bold pronouncments on the invalidity of the Division, the relative incompetence of the US Army, etc, etc there is nothing I can see that backs up your theories of an all singing, all dancing Corps that can handle such a large span of command.

The fact that all armies use a Division (a grouping of small formations), have used the division since Napoleon, and continue to use the Division as a organizational construct either means every professional military out there is crazy or perhaps you have to present a better case. I'm not being argumentative here - I am honestly asking you to present a comprehensive case as you've merely hinted at things with your posts.

LCol (ret) Jim Storr puts for a convincing argument of Divisional command in his book. He cites some operational analysis (on your favorite war, not the "punching bag" wars) of over 200 battles that concludes that the practical span of command for commanders is actually quite low - 1.7 subordinates committed on average to combat. This suggests that, historically, Division commanders have put forth at most 8 companies during a majority of their actions. Employment in DS and OIF seems to validate this observation.

The "so what" out of this is that bigger formations are unwieldy, despite the notions of "combat power" we like to ascribe to them. Combat power is nice, but only if the organization is one that can be properly utilized by a human commander.

Having a Corps Commander with 20-40 subordinates seems to fly in the face of this and unless you are going to take humans out of the equation, I don't know how you are going to get around it. What we probably need is smaller Bdes, Divs, and Corps served by smaller staffs.


Yet, if OIF was of interest; the British 1 Armoured Division wasn't an effective HQ in that operation. It issued few orders, and those came often very late. The brigades pulled their weight.

The article Command of British Forces in Iraq (attached somewhere in these threads) indicates otherwise. Brigades in general suffer from the same problems that Divisions do in that the C2 is clunky and focused on output rather than outcome. The most famous example was the British Bde that issued orders to its battalions to take Basrah - 24 hours after those battalions had already entered the city.

I'd also challenge that command is a human thing, not a technical one, and that observing divisions in Iraq in 2003 is just as valid as France in 1940 as the essential human dynamic is unchanged.

[SJPONeill]

LCol (ret) Jim Storr puts for a convincing argument of Divisional command in his book. He cites some operational analysis (on your favorite war, not the "punching bag" wars) of over 200 battles that concludes that the practical span of command for commanders is actually quite low - 1.7 subordinates committed on average to combat. This suggests that, historically, Division commanders have put forth at most 8 companies during a majority of their actions.

So that study finds that, instead of the span of 5-7 commonly held to be manageable, actual practice is much less than that i.e. 1.7? Might that be commanders focusing on their main effort operation and leaving supporting operations to their staff to manage? Does he distinguish in the study between the span of a commander i.e. the individual, and the span of command i.e. a command headquarters and staff? Please don't misread the question as critical of the statement - I think it's a fascinating insight and am just seeking clarification for myself.

Once again, just for myself, how does that reduced span link into the 8 companies in the next sentence? Is that a reduction of the number of companies by the same reduction as for the span of command?

[Rifleman]

What we probably need is smaller Bdes, Divs, and Corps served by smaller staffs.


That's different than what I usually hear. Many on this board (and other boards I've lurked on) seem to advocate a return to big brigades of three or four battalions.

The idea of a smaller division with a smaller staff is interesting. Am I correct that commanders of most Roman legions actually commanded about 10,000 men in the field because the famed legions of 5000 - 6000 men were supported by an almost equal number of auxiliaries? And, of course, the Mongol tumen was 10,000.

I don't know if those examples are applicable to modern warfare but I find it interesting that their strength is what we would think of as a small division.

[SJPONeill]

I'd say, though, that their support overhead would be a lot smaller though...no troublesome '6' to bitch about comms problems, a '4' whose main problem was skill in foraging...

[Rifleman]

I'd say, though, that their support overhead would be a lot smaller though...no troublesome '6' to bitch about comms problems, a '4' whose main problem was skill in foraging...

You so funny. :p

[Fuchs]

The emphasis was on "committed" in regard to "8 companies". Storr links it also to organization and appears to dismiss whatever the other units are doing (reserve, security..) as uninteresting.
---------------------------------------------------------

I wrote a lengthy response with an example of a typically complex action, but this is not the right place for such details. This has to suffice:


The current system is not very indicative or the actual potential for another reason; a different system would need a different doctrine and different training. It's doable.
Guderian is known as champion of armoured divisions and as influence on tank development and production. His most important contribution was another one, though: He transformed his armour commanders into commanders which were useful in his new system. He had to exorcise the fear of open flanks and slowness, for example. He had to select daring officers with the inner urge to move forward. The officer corps of 1935 wasn't suitable for the armoured division actions of 1940. Those actions would have appeared foolish and impossible in 1935 to most officers (and actually kept looking foolish & impossible up to their success in May 1940). They WERE impossible with 1935's officers.

The corps concept which I'm thinking of would require a different officer training, even if applied in Germany.

[Fuchs]

That's different than what I usually hear. Many on this board (and other boards I've lurked on) seem to advocate a return to big brigades of three or four battalions.

The idea of a smaller division with a smaller staff is interesting. Am I correct that commanders of most Roman legions actually commanded about 10,000 men in the field because the famed legions of 5000 - 6000 men were supported by an almost equal number of auxiliaries? And, of course, the Mongol tumen was 10,000.

I don't know if those examples are applicable to modern warfare but I find it interesting that their strength is what we would think of as a small division.

The span of command at that time depended on marching speed, courier rider speed and visual battlefield range. 25,000-30,000 was the practical corps/army size until the 19th century.
This doesn't tell us much about today. It's merely interesting up to the early 20th century divisions, which were almost that large.

[Hacksaw]

Which restrictions?
Well, a corps might order one division to give a Bde to another Div, but then you're again at a higher span of command for the latter division (and the div/bde staffs don't know each other). Keeping brigades under command of a specific division ties them together. You get bundles of brigades which you couldn't move as freely in a corps sector as you could without the division layer. That's one restriction.

A corps HQ has a picture of the corps area, issues missions to division HQs which in turn update their own intent and issue orders to brigades.
The lag in here should be obvious. Such a lag is a restriction on agility of command.


I'm not particularly interested in DS or OIF experiences. That's like boxing experiences based on punching ball training. The fact that there were problems at all is embarrassing. A competent army would have created very different challenges and a modern army structure should not be modelled with the least problematic and long since gone opfor in mind.
Yet, if OIF was of interest; the British 1 Armoured Division wasn't an effective HQ in that operation. It issued few orders, and those came often very late. The brigades pulled their weight.


By the way; the quotation marks (" ") are not for paraphrasing. Your third quote was paraphrasing and I would appreciate not to see false quotes.

I can assure you that nobody in the 50's thought of "synchronizing", for that is a much newer fashion - and mostly an anglophone fashion. There's an official military history book on the early years of the Heer (up to 1970) and it clearly tells us that the reason for the division in the second army structure was a political one. The German experts were advocating a brigade-centric army. The result was the Division 59, an often-copied structure which focused on the brigades and left only a small role for the division.

Example 1: Task Organization... you find your example a restriction... that Armies in general and the US in particular find the attachment of another maneuver force troublesome? Which decade and situation do you refer to??? 101st received a balanced TF during OIF and we couldn't be happier... and I KNOW if you asked the LTC or CPTs in that unit that they would overwhelmingly tell you we employed them properly... and in the end they wanted to wear our combat patch... they were fairly emphatic... we certainly didn't find them a burden... nor did they feel as if they were malused or somehow otherwise neglected... anecdotal evidence - certainly... any less rigorous than your hypethetical... nope

Example 2: Orders process... exactly how deliberate/regimented do you perceive the orders process to be in execution??? Corps finishes their order, then the Division starts, etc? Beyond the initial orders self-flagulation that might be CLOSER to reality, but not really representative of the parallel nature of the process... in combat the orders are actually without much delay at all because we've already done the staff work prior to receipt of the order... The fact that a British Division issued the order after the fact is not necessarily a condemnation... I don't KNOW, but I SUSPECT the order was meant to "clean up" the battlefield and formally capture the VOCO issued as commanders executed with CAT-like reflexes... an order as opposed to a FRAGO actually has a shelf life... since I don't presume that our British allies are a bunch of bungaling baboons... I think it likely to be closer to the truth

Example 3: DS and OIF are not valid... they are what we have in the last 20 years... so we should delve back to the 1940s or 1950s or 1960s as more representative of our likely future challenges??? Why is that? For which future challenges should we organize???..

False quotes... my deepest apologies... did I misrepresent the West German's allies by calling them collectively NATO? If so, mea culpa... For the record, I don't find the 1970's German Army particularly interesting so I guess we are even... However, for the sake of argument... that force would be used to do what??? defend the IGB... didn't have to deploy (actually was against the constitution right?) fought on intimately familiar terrain... known and well rehearsed OPLANS... hardened facilities and incredibly nice road and rail infrastructure... this is exemplar and more intellectually interesting than the fights of the past 20 years in terms of informing the future???

To be perfectly honest, I'm usually far more swayed by your logic

[82redleg]

This will be a learing lesson for me. In OIF1 the brigade commanders reported to BGs right? The BGs reported to the division commander. What if the BGs were removed - does that limit the layers or is that too much for the division commander and his deputy to manage? The BGs removed fill corps staff positions probably like they do now. So that would be 3-5 BCTs, a FA brigade, sustainment brigade and CAB reporting to the division commander. Again, is that too much?

What if corps and division were combined - the division commanders are part of the corps command staff during operations? That might be putting many eggs in one basket.

It seems what LTC Melton recommends is combining BCTs, with a BG as the commander. This removes the BG as the "middle man" in drug enforcement talk - buy directly from the source. I'm I 2way off here and I need to stick to drug law enforcement or should I be promoted to general?:)

No, the DCG is not a link in the chain of command between BDE/BCT and DIV- he is just what the name says, a deputy. The chain of command goes DIV CG to BCT CDR. The DCG assists the DIV CG as he (the DIV CG) directs/requires.

As understand things, the traditional division is for the DCG-Operations/Maneuver to run the DIV TAC, the COS to run the DIV MAIN, and the DCG-Support to run the DIV REAR. This leaves the CG to place himself where he feels best, based on the fight. Obviously, this construct is better suited to a linear MCO, and to the traditional organization that had these 3 organizations (TAC, MAIN, REAR). I'm not sure exactly how DCGs are employed today- I'm sure there are members that can detail it better than I can- I've never worked above BCT.

As I understand LTC Melton, he is about maximizing span of control (4 BNs, RECON, FA, EN, BSB, a couple separates) is alot for a BCT to manage, but doable (in my opinion). In conjunction with the original concepts of modularity, I think we can eliminate one headquarters for most operations (MCO excepted), but at the cost of the huge increase in the BCT staff that we experienced in the 2004-2006 changes. Tradition kept us from implementing it, just like (AIUI) traditionalists killed the pentomic organization.

[Tukhachevskii]

Well, this may be the right time to mention that I'm not exactly convinced of planning or even a fan of planning. I'm more into creating opportunities and exploiting the same with cat-like reactions.



Based on my reading of German military history (Moltke the Elder and his political mirror image excepted-Bismarck) I'd say that's been a problem for a while. Yes, sure you can create opportunities on the battlefield, exploit gaps and infiltrate entire armour coprs into the Ardennes (for instance)...but then what? Dunkirk? Orsha?(i.e. the command conference duruing Op Barbarossa, eastern front). How the hell do you "plan" (sorry, dirty word:rolleyes:) for contingencies (in a world of finite resources and a limited force size at your disposal)? How do you know which manourvre groups need to be augmented with extra armour/artillery/infantry/engineers? Where do you take an operational or even (if you're feeliong lucky) and operational pause to allow your log tail (or log pack if you're feeling corporate) catch up with you?

Oh look, we've penetrated 50 miles into Clairmont(Kelly Heroes reference there for all you fans!:cool:) shame we didn't have any bridging equipment or have sufficient logistics stored to maintain it given that our feline reflexes meant that all our unused CSS elements were commited to another bright spark suffering from over-activity! OTOH, ooooops, I really wich we'd thought this through (aka "planned") and had an extra few inf bns to secure our flanks (etc., etc., etc.). Or something along those lines.

[Fuchs]

Well, thanks. I'll work on another way to communicate my idea and reasoning, for this crude & short approach obviously didn't work.

A proper explanation would take a dozen pages and reveal more than I'm read to publish today.

[Steve Blair]

Not only that, but the proliferation of communications works against the development of anything remotely resembling cat-like reflexes in most military organizations. It seems that without the proper application of a ball-gag, senior leaders (no matter how far removed from the action) simply cannot resist the urge to "help." Stripping out a division command and replacing it with a corps isn't going to change that a jot.

[Tom Odom]

Not only that, but the proliferation of communications works against the development of anything remotely resembling cat-like reflexes in most military organizations. It seems that without the proper application of a ball-gag, senior leaders (no matter how far removed from the action) simply cannot resist the urge to "help." Stripping out a division command and replacing it with a corps isn't going to change that a jot.

Tru dat...it just gives the senior officer at corps more freedom to intervene directly.....

[Tukhachevskii]

.....(note to self: put them in some kind of order you dote!:mad:) here are some interesting takes on the place of the division and the divisional HQ:

OPTIMIZING THE UNIT OF ACTION BASED MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION FOR HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA424048&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

The U.S. Army Heavy Division: An Appropriate Platform for Force Projection Operations? (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA324267&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

The Brigade based Division: Saddling the Right Horse (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA324340&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

...and the monograph that really got me thinking about the role of the divisional HQ...
Does the U.S. Army Need Divisions? (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA416029&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

[Infanteer]

So that study finds that, instead of the span of 5-7 commonly held to be manageable, actual practice is much less than that i.e. 1.7? Might that be commanders focusing on their main effort operation and leaving supporting operations to their staff to manage? Does he distinguish in the study between the span of a commander i.e. the individual, and the span of command i.e. a command headquarters and staff? Please don't misread the question as critical of the statement - I think it's a fascinating insight and am just seeking clarification for myself.

I should be careful here. One of the key assessments that Storr makes is that combat is not fractal. Brigades are not big companies and corps are not big brigades - commanders at each level have different things that they must take into consideration during the fight. A Division Commander doesn't care about the range of a GPMG, but to a platoon commander, it's one of his primary concerns. Dead ground is everything to a company but irrelevant to a Brigade.

With this principle in mind, I must make it clear that Storr only argued about the Division. The Brigade and the Corps will have different factors and thus different requirements. I made my guess of "smaller" based on some fundamental aspects of Div command which I extrapolated to the Bde and Corps level.

The figure of 1.7 is from a Dupuy study. Also citied is an unpublished DERA study which, in looking at Division activity in WWII, showed that at no time were all nine battalions of the measured division employed at the same time. Of the 81 days the measured divisions spent in combat, 43 featured only 3 battalions employed. Thus half the time divisions employed only 1/3 of their strength to defeat the enemy. Looking further at this data, divisions only employed a majority of their forces 1/3 of the time. Additional data from Suez and the Gulf further support this view. Fuchs mentioned reserves and rear duties - do these duties routinely use up over half a division's strength, especially when it is committed to frontline activity? These studies seem - at least to me - to give some concrete evidence of what the span of command actually is.

The so what - if 6-10 maneuver companies (and 2-4 battalions and 1-2 brigades) are all that a division commander can realistically employ at once, than the division should be designed around sustaining 6-10 maneuver companies in combat while, at the same time, making the organization as nimble and agile in combat. 6-10 maneuver companies do not likely require an additional 14-17 companies in reserve.

What does this mean for the Brigade and the Corps? I dunno - but the methods behind identifying the above structure (span of command, movement times, relation of space and time, etc, etc) can probably give us a good idea.

[Kiwigrunt]

Infanteer, I’ll tread carefully because I may be reading you completely wrong. Like my fellow Kiwi, I’m really just trying to get my head around this.

What does “practical span of command” actually mean? Is that the max a commander should/can be dealing with or the average he happens to deal with based on subunits in contact? If the latter is the case I should think it is perhaps a meaningless statistic.

In post 30 you say:


… the practical span of command for commanders is actually quite low - 1.7 subordinates committed on average to combat. This suggests that, historically, Division commanders have put forth at most 8 companies during a majority of their actions. Employment in DS and OIF seems to validate this observation.

Does ‘committed to combat’ suggest that the remaining units are held in reserve to the point that they are shelved till required, or just that they are not in contact?

Based on a ‘typical?’ WWII triangular infantry division, 1.7 Brigadiers may suggest about half the division. 1.7 CO’s may suggest half of those brigades. 1.7 OC’s may suggest half of those battalions. By this reasoning your estimate of 8 companies would be about right.

But this seems a bit simplistic. Firstly, 9 companies in contact could be one from each battalion, in which case the division commander has all his brigades and battalions in contact. (this is working up from your number 8 instead of down from 1.7)
Also, even if the commander holds subunits in reserve and has only one in contact most of the time that contact is made, that does not mean that he is not pulling the strings on the other units. He may be manoeuvring them and/or leapfrogging units in contact or moving one through the other etc.

This may be in line with what Fuchs said in post 35:


The emphasis was on "committed" in regard to "8 companies". Storr links it also to organization and appears to dismiss whatever the other units are doing (reserve, security..) as uninteresting.

From your previous post:


The figure of 1.7 is from a Dupuy study. Also citied is an unpublished DERA study which, in looking at Division activity in WWII, showed that at no time were all nine battalions of the measured division employed at the same time.

OK, that would counter my earlier mentioned alternative. I have not read the studies.


Looking further at this data, divisions only employed a majority of their forces 1/3 of the time.

Are these not the times that matter?


The so what - if 6-10 maneuver companies (and 2-4 battalions and 1-2 brigades) are all that a division commander can realistically employ at once, than the division should be designed around sustaining 6-10 maneuver companies in combat while, at the same time, making the organization as nimble and agile in combat. 6-10 maneuver companies do not likely require an additional 14-17 companies in reserve.

Is one third all a division can employ, or the most that a division commander likes to employ at any one time for the purpose of holding a reserve? So a question here could be: is ‘one up’ at division level realistic/sensible or just not required? Is ‘one up’ at division level really one up in the same sense that it is within companies and battalions? This in terms of the size of brigades and the relative distances involved.

So iff (wink to Tukhachevskii) 6 – 10 companies are realistically the most a division can employ at once, then should the division be reduced in size or (to support I think Ken and Fuchs) should the division be cut out of the hierarchy. If you cut down the 14 -17 companies in reserve to only a few, then what’s left is perhaps a descent size brigade.

I can think of a few extreme cases where divisions were fully employed (not including the desert). UK First Airborne in Arnhem. US 101st in Bastogne (I think).

I confuse me, I’ll stop here.

[SJPONeill]

I'm not sure that this cncept of looking at the % of a formation in combat at any one time is not a bit of a red herring...a large proportion of the force will (should) be committed to reserves at each level - I think 1/9 at each level from distant memory e.g. a section/squad at company level, a platoon at bn level, a coy at Bde level etc - that's a lot of troops when you roll them all up but I don't think it's correct to say that they are necessarily 'out of combat/contact' and thus not necessarily out of the span of comamnd equation.

I'd argue that the NZ Div on Crete and at Minqar Qaim was pretty heavily committed, as was pretty much every airborne div immediately following a combat drop in WW2...

[Fuchs]

There's usually no reserve up to company level in many armies; instead, the combat troops are meant to be capable of counter-attacks without a dedicated reserve. That's more responsive.

A battalion reserve is often not much more than a platoon, if there's any at all (a Verfügungsplatoon - a platoon directly under command of the Bn Cmdr - is an enticing idea from the Cold War; it could serve as recce Plt, as couriers, as HQ guard, as traffic organizers, as CO escort and as Bn reserve).


The share of reserves grows on formation levels, unless these formations are overstretched (on the other hand some experts think that reserves are even more important the more you're overstretched).

[Fuchs]

Kiwigrunt, I'm no fan of Storr's considerations about how few companies of a force are typically involved in combat at once. He exaggerates the point. That's especially ironic as he focuses much on the human side of war in that book.

Let's say a division has never more than ten companies at once in combat. Could it b replaced by a 10 company brigade? No!
There would be no rotation, the companies would quickly be exhausted if not depleted.
There would be no reserve, and thus no good tactics.
There would be no security elements, and thus great opportunities for OPFOR.
Perfect anticipation would be required to have these ten companies at the points of action.
OPFOR could deploy in a way which would require more than ten companies to counter.


It's one of the weaker parts of his book. My reasoning in favour of brigades rests on completely different foundations.

[TAH]

I would contend that we never stopped being division centric.

We still retain Division HQs. We still deploy Division HQs for C2.

What changed was how divisions are structured/organized.

We went from "Type" divisions (Light, Armored/Heavy, Airborne, Air Assault etc) to Modular.

So what's different? The Division "Base", the types of units organic to the division not including its maneuver battalions.

These were: ADA Bn, MI Bn, Signal Bn, Engineer Bn(s), Cavalry Sqdrn, number and types of tube/rocket Artillery Bns and their controling HQs (DIVARTY), the number and type of CSS/Support Bns and their controling HQs (DISCOM), number and type of aviation Bns and their controling HQs (Division AVN Bde) as well as MP and NBC/Chemical Companies.

In many ways, the modular BCT are acknowledgement of how we task organized maneuver brigades for operations with supporting artillery, engineers and CSS units.

The issue to be solved/re-solved is how do modular divisions operate. Who plans fires for the modular division? A section on the division staff or folks over in a assigned/attached Fires Bde? Same question/issue for division level Aviation operations.

If we follow existing CSS doctrine, Sustainment Bdes are NOT just replacements for DISCOM/COSCOMs. They are supposed to be assigned/attached to a theater-level Sustainment HQs (A TSC or ESC) and provide "area support" to all units within their designated AOR. Currently none of the deployed division HQs/CDRs are allowing that to happen. They have TACON (a command versus support relationship) of their supporting Sustainment Bde.

No adequate replacement has been found/resourced for the Division Cavalry Sqdrn. For lots of reason, its NOT a Battlefield Surveillance Bde (BFSB).

We have also not solved the issue of, I need more X but not a whole modular Bde of X, where to I go to get it?

[Ken White]

two star + 2 one star spaces plus the Staffs. In peacetime -- and the US Army has been at peace since 1945 -- flags and spaces mean more than capability and competence.That's why when we ostensibly went 'modular' we deliberately did not restructure the EAD echelons to cope with that 'modularity.'

The Div Cdrs insist on TACON of CSS elms in their AO because they want control of all forces in an AO if they're going to be held responsible for that AO. That is simply perfectly logical self protection in an Army that, at this time, hates decentralized execution and where few trust people they do not know -- a factor stems partly from mediocre training and partly from institutional bias....

Span of control depends little on the technology or communications ability available; those factors are a crutch to allow marginally competent commands / commanders to function with an enhanced degree of success. The tech stuff can be a force multiplier but there are absolutely no guarantees that it will be.

The effective span of control really rests on state of training or experience at all levels AND ability plus willingness of the Commander(s) to delegate and trust their subordinates. Really good units / people can do a span of 9 or 10, really poor units / people have trouble with 2. An average of 3 to 5, mission dependent, is a rule of thumb, -- and thus a design parameter -- and little more. It very much depends on people and that level of training or experience...

If you recruit, train, promote and retain your entire force for great competence you can design small elements with a large (~10) span of control. If you do the same things to achieve mass and thus aim for acceptable competence, you can got to a span of ~5. If you're in need of greater mass, you'll have to accept less competence and may be constrained to a span of two or three.

Since people change with time and the Peter Principle exists, there is little chance of ensuring an acceptable design size of the span for other than a year or two at a time. Any attempt to design for specific people and mission s will probably have to change when the parameters change; thus the need for a simple, generic organizational template / TOE that allows then current Commanders to tailor their forces for specific missions with little effort. If that is done reasonably well, then the span of control issue sorts itself out with no problems and you may well have a Bn commanding a 300 plus man Co Team; seven independent Platoon Task Forces and have two Co Cdrs assigned to CP guard along with their Hq elms.:D

[TAH]

two star + 2 one star spaces plus the Staffs. In peacetime -- and the US Army has been at peace since 1945 -- flags and spaces mean more than capability and competence.That's why when we ostensibly went 'modular' we deliberately did not restructure the EAD echelons to cope with that 'modularity.'

The Div Cdrs insist on TACON of CSS elms in their AO because they want control of all forces in an AO if they're going to be held responsible for that AO. That is simply perfectly logical self protection in an Army that, at this time, hates decentralized execution and where few trust people they do not know -- a factor stems partly from mediocre training and partly from institutional bias....

Since people change with time and the Peter Principle exists, \

1. But we did restructure EAD, no more COSCOMs, no more CSGs/ASGs, no more ACRs, no more Corps Artillery/FA HQs or Corps Eng Bde or dedicated, organized Corps anything.

2. Agree with your comments regarding controlling everything in your sandbox. Thought/think the Area Support part of CSS doctrine is flawed from the start.

3. Amazing how many times in the past few years I have mentioned the "Peter Principle" and had to explain it in detail. The Army is THE case study of it.

4. Read somwhere that two of the characteristics of organizations that easily and readily accept and introduce bold change are small and young. The US Army is neither small (500K+AC, 1M+ total) nor young (200+years)

TAH

[Tukhachevskii]

...what's the "Peter Principle" that both TAH and KW are refering to?

[Tom Odom]

...what's the "Peter Principle" that both TAH and KW are refering to?

promote people one grade above their level of competence

[Fuchs]

...what's the "Peter Principle" that both TAH and KW are refering to?

The Peter Principle is the principle that "in a hierarchy every employee tends to rise to their level of incompetence".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_principle


It's one of the important rules of thumb about how people and organizations function. Others are Pareto Principle, a principle about bureaucracies (maximize until there's no further justification for growth) etc.

[Ken White]

1. But we did restructure EAD, no more COSCOMs, no more CSGs/ASGs, no more ACRs, no more Corps Artillery/FA HQs or Corps Eng Bde or dedicated, organized Corps anything.Yep, did that -- but 'forgot' to remove the Div to force those organizations you cite to operate on an area basis and to do so without interfacing with a Div, thus forcing the structure to work a bit harder. Was that omission just an oversight? I suspect not...

The US Army is masterful at complying with the wishes of Congress -- without at all actually complying. Then some wonder why many subordinate Cdrs do only what they want to do. :rolleyes:
2. Agree with your comments regarding controlling everything in your sandbox. Thought/think the Area Support part of CSS doctrine is flawed from the start.It was / is flawed based on what is; not sure it's all that bad based on what should be.

Given the risk averse culture of today, the Div Cdr has little choice; I also suspect many CS/CSS Cdrs don't mind all that much -- that way they blame screwups on the Div; many people like a little cover, many also like to be told what to do and how to do it (it's easier that way) -- they have no place in a decent Army but they exist everywhere...

3...The Army is THE case study of it...Yup, I'm a living example... :D
4. Read somwhere that two of the characteristics of organizations that easily and readily accept and introduce bold change are small and young. The US Army is neither small (500K+AC, 1M+ total) nor young (200+years)However, the Army could easily develop small and young Corps, Bdes, what have you and support forces for 1.5 year activate and trainup; 1.5 year deployment cycle (2x6mo deployments / mission asgmts) and a year of stand down, schools prior to the next activation, etc. That could be done relatively easily within the Cbt Arms Regimental System and need not necessarily be done for a lot of CSS elements. Of course, that would require trusting Commanders and not micro managing. It would also mean the massive HRC infrastructure would probably be unnecessary. Those two things may be beyond us. :rolleyes:

However, there are other ways to skin that. Lots of ways to foster innovation and imaginative operating techniques. Unfortunately, they would require admitting that what we've been doing since 1917 with little change was and is probably wrong... :mad:

[Infanteer]

Infanteer, I’ll tread carefully because I may be reading you completely wrong. Like my fellow Kiwi, I’m really just trying to get my head around this.


I'm not sure that this cncept of looking at the % of a formation in combat at any one time is not a bit of a red herring...


Kiwigrunt, I'm no fan of Storr's considerations about how few companies of a force are typically involved in combat at once. He exaggerates the point.

I put forward the argument to address the discussion on Span of Control(Command) that arose with Fuch's proposal of the "Division-less" Force. Storr speaks to reserves and their importance while pointing out that formation reserves can get inefficent due to span of command issues. He also points to a natural adjustment to this in WWII with US and German Divisions moving to smaller formations based on more potent Brigading in the form of "Kampfgruppes" or "Combat Commands". In a sense, a more effective division focuses on looking down and improving the Brigade (if that makes sense).

He has given his take on the span of command as a human issue based off of data he presents. Other takes on the span of command(control) are presented and many seem to be based on that common "military wisdom" that puts forward an idea as fact with no objective data or information to back it up. I will give Storr's argument that smaller formations are more flexible, efficient and effective (he looks at the Div level; Corps and Bde may have different considerations and thus different factors) credit for at least trying to draw validity from the historical record.

Before we get too far in the weeds and I end up taking Storr's argument as my own, I'll say this. We all have ideas of the perfect fighting force. Whether it be by some radical change which is too extensive to discuss here or through better training and delegation, I think it is safe to say that the "perfect" concept is just that, a concept. When making decisions, I'd ere to the side of the 80% solution based off data from our imperfect past as opposed to the current theory of the day.

[Rifleman]

The debate so far has been about eliminating the division and having seperate brigades work directly for the corps commander. Some are for it and some think it will cause span of control problems. No one has mentioned the possibility of flattening the structure by keeping the division but eliminating the corps.

Better idea, worse idea, or just the same span of control problems at a different level?

It doesn't seem to me like a regional commander could handle any more divisions without a three star HQ in between than a corps commander could handle brigades without a two star HQ in between.....but I don't know.

As Kiwigrunt said, "I confuse me, I'll stop here." :o

[Fuchs]

The corps is the largest army structure that's affordable for most European countries unless the horizon darkens. It's going to stay in one form or another.

This means that with all those compatibility efforts at NATO level it would make little sense to delete U.S. corps because this would mean one unnecessary level of command in multinational campaigning.

We might experience in our lifetime that corps HQ morph into theatre HQs, though.

[Tukhachevskii]

The debate so far has been about eliminating the division and having seperate brigades work directly for the corps commander. Some are for it and some think it will cause span of control problems. No one has mentioned the possibility of flattening the structure by keeping the division but eliminating the corps.

Better idea, worse idea, or just the same span of control problems at a different level?

It doesn't seem to me like a regional commander could handle any more divisions without a three star HQ in between than a corps commander could handle brigades without a two star HQ in between.....but I don't know.

As Kiwigrunt said, "I confuse me, I'll stop here." :o

..what I was thinking. Wasn't the enitre evoluton of the divisional HQ (as apposed to manouvre formation0 because CORPs began to become unweldy after that dminiutive Corsican wih the perpetual chp-on-the-shoulder invented them? Corps staffs couldn't hndle the number o formatin being assigned so div HQ were formed as intermediary lnks in the command and control chain. Or I am wrong? t just sees we're going backwards only to relearn the same lesson.

@TAH I think you're right, US dctrine nevr envsaged disolvng the Div level HQ just tas organsied permamnently to BDE groups.

(this keyboard is 8888ed! Srry if nne of the above makes sense...of curse it migt not mak any snse anyway;))

[Fuchs]

The old limit for practical corps size was 25,000 to 30,000 and was defined by march duration and pass time. Think of men marching in column. Width is 5 men on one road, average spacing is 1.5m. Total column length for 30,000 men:
6000 * 1,5m = 9 km. Pass time at 4 km/h: 2.25 hours.

Now keep in mind all those frictions and it becomes visible why larger formations were unwieldy.

Another reason for corps size limitation was overview over a battlefield (few km width can be controlled by a single commander with telescope, flag signals and courier horsemen).

None of this is relevant today.


(Btw, a pre-radio army or corps commander had much more direct subordinates than three!).

[Rifleman]

The corps is the largest army structure that's affordable for most European countries unless the horizon darkens. It's going to stay in one form or another.

That sounds sensible from a European standpoint.


This means that with all those compatibility efforts at NATO level it would make little sense to delete U.S. corps because this would mean one unnecessary level of command in multinational campaigning.


I asked if eliminating the corps would be practical because the U.S. does business through it's regional Unified Commands. If the four-star commander (are they still called CinCs or "sinks"?) already has a couple of three-stars working for him does he still need corps commanders between him and the divisions? Don't know, maybe he does.

But the discussion is usually about flattening the command structure by eliminating the division. I never see any talk of eliminating the corps and keeping the division so I thought I'd ask.

[Tukhachevskii]

The old limit for practical corps size was 25,000 to 30,000 and was defined by march duration and pass time. Think of men marching in column. Width is 5 men on one road, average spacing is 1.5m. Total column length for 30,000 men:
6000 * 1,5m = 9 km. Pass time at 4 km/h: 2.25 hours.

Now keep in mind all those frictions and it becomes visible why larger formations were unwieldy.

Another reason for corps size limitation was overview over a battlefield (few km width can be controlled by a single commander with telescope, flag signals and courier horsemen).

None of this is relevant today.


(Btw, a pre-radio army or corps commander had much more direct subordinates than three!).

OK. Thanks for the lecture. But what does it have to do with my original post?

[Fuchs]

Or I am wrong? t just sees we're going backwards only to relearn the same lesson.

It is not the same lesson. The resemblance of outcome is coincidental.

[TAH]

TAH I think you're right, US dctrine nevr envsaged disolvng the Div level HQ just tas organsied permamnently to BDE groups.


Agree.

The Transformation/modularization of the US Army is a relatively recent effort that appears to be driven, at least to some extent, by the period of extended combat/conflict.

"Flattening" of the C2 structure pre-dates transformation by about 5-10 years (late 90s, early 200xs).

Had a thought the other day of why not making the Division HQs/Base its' own brigade type. C2/staff/HQs Bn + Signal Bn + Troops Bn (MPs, NBC, local security force units, other odds & sods), + CAV Sqdrn/Recon Bn.

[Tukhachevskii]

Agree.

The Transformation/modularization of the US Army is a relatively recent effort that appears to be driven, at least to some extent, by the period of extended combat/conflict.

"Flattening" of the C2 structure pre-dates transformation by about 5-10 years (late 90s, early 200xs).

Had a thought the other day of why not making the Division HQs/Base its' own brigade type. C2/staff/HQs Bn + Signal Bn + Troops Bn (MPs, NBC, local security force units, other odds & sods), + CAV Sqdrn/Recon Bn.

Now that's an idea pregnant with possibilites. I can certainly see the advantages of "herding" together all the beaurocratic types to let the fighters get on with it:D However, I'd be concerned that decision-making in that kind of organisation will be slowed right down what with all the specialists bickering over CoA development not to mention the amount of information that will be sucked/gathering/hoovered in to it for no real appreciable benefit or use. It would be an anally-retentive CO's dream; just think of all that micro-management that would become possible (perhaps that's the real RMA) never mind that the Div HQ BDE has just been overun. Personnally I think a specialist Divisional HQ or the kind you propose would be more efficient if kept to a Bn size, anything bigger and you'll need another layer of command just to sort out the resultant com/intel/planning/MPDP-jam.

[TAH]

Now that's an idea pregnant with possibilites. I can certainly see the advantages of "herding" together all the beaurocratic types to let the fighters get on with it:D However, I'd be concerned that decision-making in that kind of organisation will be slowed right down what with all the specialists bickering over CoA development not to mention the amount of information that will be sucked/gathering/hoovered in to it for no real appreciable benefit or use. It would be an anally-retentive CO's dream; just think of all that micro-management that would become possible (perhaps that's the real RMA) never mind that the Div HQ BDE has just been overun. Personnally I think a specialist Divisional HQ or the kind you propose would be more efficient if kept to a Bn size, anything bigger and you'll need another layer of command just to sort out the resultant com/intel/planning/MPDP-jam.

under this concept/proposal the actual Division HQs is really only a Bn. Supported by the Signal Bn, protected by a security force and fed information by its own Recon Bn / CAV Sdrn.

[82redleg]

under this concept/proposal the actual Division HQs is really only a Bn. Supported by the Signal Bn, protected by a security force and fed information by its own Recon Bn / CAV Sdrn.

The DIV only needs a SIG CO.

How about a drastically enlarged Headquarters and Headquarters BN. With a combat arms commander and staff, so it becomes more than a force provider/admin HQs. It still has admin responsibilities (for its subordinates AND for the DIV HQs staff), but now tactically employs a security force company (infantry or MP, maybe a mixture of both), a mounted recon troop (4 PLTs x 6 trucks per), a LRS-C (no change necessary). By combining the BFSB HQ, the BFSB Recon SQDN HQ and the DIV HHB, we've gotten all the employed elements (except the BFSB MI stuff). In order to plan for all this, the current combined S2/3 section probably needs to be enlarged, with a focus on security and recon planning (depending on how directly the LRS-C and recon troop interfact with the G3 & G2)- it can't be LESS efficient going DIV-BN-CO than the current DIV-BFSB-SQDN-CO for these elements.

The admin/log aspects of this BN are large and diverse, and it might make sense to split its HHC into a CSS company and a HQ/admin company. Its staff sections would have large and diverse responsibilities, but not, I think, any more difficult than a maneuver battalions. The LRS-C and recon troop could still plan their missions directly with the G2/G3. It would probably require a support operations/CSS plug of some sort, and maybe some additional clerks in the S1 shop (the BN already has a CW4 HR tech, compared to the CW2 authorized in a BCT).

Anyone see any other issues with this enhanced HHB?

[TAH]

The DIV only needs a SIG CO.

How about a drastically enlarged Headquarters and Headquarters BN. With a combat arms commander and staff, so it becomes more than a force provider/admin HQs. It still has admin responsibilities (for its subordinates AND for the DIV HQs staff), but now tactically employs a security force company (infantry or MP, maybe a mixture of both), a mounted recon troop (4 PLTs x 6 trucks per), a LRS-C (no change necessary). By combining the BFSB HQ, the BFSB Recon SQDN HQ and the DIV HHB, we've gotten all the employed elements (except the BFSB MI stuff). In order to plan for all this, the current combined S2/3 section probably needs to be enlarged, with a focus on security and recon planning (depending on how directly the LRS-C and recon troop interfact with the G3 & G2)- it can't be LESS efficient going DIV-BN-CO than the current DIV-BFSB-SQDN-CO for these elements.

The admin/log aspects of this BN are large and diverse, and it might make sense to split its HHC into a CSS company and a HQ/admin company. Its staff sections would have large and diverse responsibilities, but not, I think, any more difficult than a maneuver battalions. The LRS-C and recon troop could still plan their missions directly with the G2/G3. It would probably require a support operations/CSS plug of some sort, and maybe some additional clerks in the S1 shop (the BN already has a CW4 HR tech, compared to the CW2 authorized in a BCT).

Anyone see any other issues with this enhanced HHB?

1. Really, really hate the current BFSB. It's an MI Bn with stuff added and not very much of that. It does NOT possess the capabilities a Division or Corps of JTF commander will require from it.

2. With the elimination of the final heavy ACR, neither the corps of division commanders/echelons have a unit specifically organized, manned, equipped and trained to gather/fight for information for them. They do already have access to lots of various types of sensors that can monitor the situation and conduct passive/stand-off surveillance. All good stuff. All vulneable to spoofing/deception. The current choice/option is for the corps/division to task this mission/function to a BCT or a group of BCTs or an Ad Hoc Task Force.

3. Long-range recon units have a place. They also have significant limitations on timely employment. INTs (SIGINT, COMINT, ELINT, etc) have a place. And they are all capable of being spoofed and assume some action on the part of the enemy. HUMINT is good, once you have someone to talk to.

4. An Bn versus a Bde is probably a viable option but lascks the "horsepower" of an COL/O6 commander trying to get "his" staff folks to do what he needs them to do.

5. A problem of combining the Division Hqs with the BFSBs is that there are not the same number. 18 division Hqs only 10 or 11 BFSBs.

6. A "big" HQs Bn (800-1000 PAX) plus a "big" CAV Sqdrn/Recon Bn (800-1000 PAX) probably only add up to a "small" Bde (1700-2000 PAX).

[gute]

Had a thought the other day of why not making the Division HQs/Base its' own brigade type. C2/staff/HQs Bn + Signal Bn + Troops Bn (MPs, NBC, local security force units, other odds & sods), + CAV Sqdrn/Recon Bn.[/QUOTE]

This is different then the sustainment brigade?

According to Wikipedia, the sustainment brigade for the 1st Infantry Division consists of a STB, a CSSB, 1DHHB, and 84th ORD BN.

[TAH]

Had a thought the other day of why not making the Division HQs/Base its' own brigade type. C2/staff/HQs Bn + Signal Bn + Troops Bn (MPs, NBC, local security force units, other odds & sods), + CAV Sqdrn/Recon Bn.

This is different then the sustainment brigade?

According to Wikipedia:
the sustainment brigade for the 1st Infantry Division consists of a STB, a CSSB, 1DHHB, and 84th ORD BN.

A sustainment Bde will normally consist of a Hqs a supporting signal unit and a number of single function (trans, QM, maintenance etc) and multi-function CSS battalion. There role/mission is to sustain the force.

My proposed DIV HQs Bde would focus on C2 and include those units (staffs, admin signal, force protection, intel and recon&security) a division would normally need to operate.

TAH

[gute]

This is different then the sustainment brigade?

According to Wikipedia, the sustainment brigade for the 1st Infantry Division consists of a STB, a CSSB, 1DHHB, and 84th ORD BN.

A sustainment Bde will normally consist of a Hqs a supporting signal unit and a number of single function (trans, QM, mainteance etc) and multi-function CSS battalion. There role/mission is to sustain the force.

My proposed DIV HQs Bde would focus on C2 and include those units (staffs, admin signal, force protection, intel and recon&security) a division would normally need to operate.

Could you combine the two into a Combat Control and Support Brigade or is there no need to do such a thing?

The cav squadron you propose is not the old division cav squadron, but the corps BfSB?

Brigades directly subordinate to the Corps seems to be a no-go because of span of control. So, how does one flatten C2 between the BCTs and Corps?

Others have written that corps and division are combined - is this an UEx? Basically, a smaller corps?

In theory how is this suppose to look?

[Fuchs]

A meaningful command level of ground forces should offer more than staff work and radio traffic.

Most combat units are most of the time not really busy - but usually some combat unit somewhere is very busy, if not in a crisis or overburdened by responsibility.
Does it make sense to allocate support equally among the combat units (or formations - it doesn't matter this time) in light of this? Certainly not. At least some support and some reserves are being pooled and under direct control of the superior commander.

A commander with only staff and radio guys would have no direct control over anything but the combat unit missions. He could not create a quick Schwerpunkt with the direction of his support assets (electronic warfare, engineers, artillery, area AD, nbc troops, and much else).
Meanwhile, his combat units would need to be designed for almost worst case scenarios because they couldn't expect non-organic support from a higher level.

A level of command without substantial direct assets (other than combat units/formations) for use in their whole area of operations is therefore systematically inferior to the same level of command in a force which balances its support between decentralized and centralized control.
A very lean divisional or corps level with staffs and signals units only is a suboptimal decentralization extremism version of force structure.

[TAH]

A sustainment Bde will normally consist of a Hqs a supporting signal unit and a number of single function (trans, QM, mainteance etc) and multi-function CSS battalion. There role/mission is to sustain the force.

My proposed DIV HQs Bde would focus on C2 and include those units (staffs, admin signal, force protection, intel and recon&security) a division would normally need to operate.

Could you combine the two into a Combat Control and Support Brigade or is there no need to do such a thing?

The cav squadron you propose is not the old division cav squadron, but the corps BfSB?

Brigades directly subordinate to the Corps seems to be a no-go because of span of control. So, how does one flatten C2 between the BCTs and Corps?

Others have written that corps and division are combined - is this an UEx? Basically, a smaller corps?

In theory how is this suppose to look?

Could a C2 Bde and a Sus Bde be combined. Sure, but I would never recommend it. Missions, roles and functions are in no way close enough together.

No, I AM proposing a "new: DIV CAV to replace the missing ones at the division and corps echelons. The BFSB was/is a terrible waste of resources that will never be able to do anything close to what a DIV/Corps CDR needs them to do in terms of fighting for information.

[82redleg]

4. An Bn versus a Bde is probably a viable option but lascks the "horsepower" of an COL/O6 commander trying to get "his" staff folks to do what he needs them to do.

6. A "big" HQs Bn (800-1000 PAX) plus a "big" CAV Sqdrn/Recon Bn (800-1000 PAX) probably only add up to a "small" Bde (1700-2000 PAX).

The 3 GOs and 3 COLs are probably the least of the BN CDRs worries (I assume that's what you meant by "his" staff)- and that issue is already there.

The problem with adding HQs and staffs for "small" BCTs is that we create a lot of FGs and SNCOs that don't provide much to the fight. What is this HQ & C2 BDE doing? All of its elements are TACON of some element of the DIV G staff (with the exception of the sustainment elements and the security company). All he has left is ADCON, and does it really take a BDE to ADCON 2000 +/-? Or to C2 the employment of an IN/MP CO conducting fixed site security?

[82redleg]

Current DIV HHB is 739.

Current BFSB is 1307.

Actually employable elements of the BFSB are:
TUAS PLT x 27 pax (I'm not sure the purpose of this unit? maybe in support of the LRS/CAV)
4 x Scout PLT x 18 pax each (TACON to the DIV G3/G2)
15 x LRS TMs x 6 pax each (TACON to the DIV G3/G2)
18 x HCTs x 4 pax each (TACON/DS to subordinate elements of the DIV- put them there organically. 18 x 5 = 90 HCTs, enough for 2 additional HCTs in each BCT)
3 x CI Tms x 4 pax (TACON/DS to DIV G2- put them there organically)
2 x SIGINT PLTs x 45 pax (probably broken into their component teams) (again, split the assets up into the DIV/subordinates that can employ them)

So, in the BFSB, 363 pax are actually employed in intelligence collection. 25% is not a good ratio. I contend we'd be better off putting the additional assets in the DIV G2 or in subordinates, limiting the coordination necessary to employing these assets, and the overhead that is busy "coordinating" their employment.

[TAH]

The 3 GOs and 3 COLs are probably the least of the BN CDRs worries (I assume that's what you meant by "his" staff)- and that issue is already there.

The problem with adding HQs and staffs for "small" BCTs is that we create a lot of FGs and SNCOs that don't provide much to the fight. What is this HQ & C2 BDE doing? All of its elements are TACON of some element of the DIV G staff (with the exception of the sustainment elements and the security company). All he has left is ADCON, and does it really take a BDE to ADCON 2000 +/-? Or to C2 the employment of an IN/MP CO conducting fixed site security?

My thought was that making the DIV HQs a "Bde Type" makes all of the units in the division a Bde.

The DIV HQs Bde could/would/might have as base:
1. A HQs Bn of the Division Staff
2. A Signal Co to support the HQs Bn
3. A robust DIV CAV Sqdrn
4. A Security/Field Jager Bn for site security and rear area protection & response force/rear area patrolling
5. Bde HHC

To address the UAS question in your other post.

You pretty much got it right, it/they would fly under the direction of the Recon Sqdrn to support the BFSB/DIV requirements. The problem it that teh A/C are Shadows. Only 4 A/C means no to limited 24/7 coverage and only out to 60-75 Kms from launch site. Too few A/C with "legs" that are too short.

[82redleg]

My thought was that making the DIV HQs a "Bde Type" makes all of the units in the division a Bde.

The DIV HQs Bde could/would/might have as base:
1. A HQs Bn of the Division Staff
2. A Signal Co to support the HQs Bn
3. A robust DIV CAV Sqdrn
4. A Security/Field Jager Bn for site security and rear area protection & response force/rear area patrolling
5. Bde HHC


Understand all on the UAVs.

I'm not sure that the operations of a DIV CAV SQDN (which is going to end up TACON to the DIV, as the old DIV CAV generally were) and the Security BN justify a BDE HQ.

The SIG CO is already in the HQs BN.

You end up with (at best) a BDE HQ and BN HQ for a couple of companies, most of whom are doing fixed site security (low overhead) and (when employed as a response force) becoming TACON to someone else (whoever is in contact with whatever they are responding to).

I believe you are better off with a robust BN (put the SECFOR in the HHB), and another robust BN (the DIV CAV) that interfaces directly with the DIV. I think a BN should be able to handle 3 ground troops, a LRSC and an air troop )or two)(preferably with lift, so it can insert the LRS, too).

[TAH]

Understand all on the UAVs.

I'm not sure that the operations of a DIV CAV SQDN (which is going to end up TACON to the DIV, as the old DIV CAV generally were) and the Security BN justify a BDE HQ.

The SIG CO is already in the HQs BN.

You end up with (at best) a BDE HQ and BN HQ for a couple of companies, most of whom are doing fixed site security (low overhead) and (when employed as a response force) becoming TACON to someone else (whoever is in contact with whatever they are responding to).

I believe you are better off with a robust BN (put the SECFOR in the HHB), and another robust BN (the DIV CAV) that interfaces directly with the DIV. I think a BN should be able to handle 3 ground troops, a LRSC and an air troop )or two)(preferably with lift, so it can insert the LRS, too).

Could each of the Bns operate seperate from a Bde, sure. My thought is to standarize thsi new modular brigade type (DIV HQs) to simplify the CSS aspect. Which means I now need to add a DIV HQs CSS Bn capable of supporting: a HQs Bn (with organic Signal Co), a DIV CAV Sqdn, & a SECFOR Bn.

Another way to view this issue is as a transformed/modularized Division Base.

[Infanteer]

Interestingly enough, there is a SAMS monograph on this:

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=2611&filename=2612.pdf

Only had the oppurtunity to gloss through it, but it seems to point at keeping Divisions and eliminating Bdes?

[82redleg]

Interestingly enough, there is a SAMS monograph on this:

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=2611&filename=2612.pdf

Only had the oppurtunity to gloss through it, but it seems to point at keeping Divisions and eliminating Bdes?

Sort of.

At 5 BNs (3 x IN-although he calls them regiments- 1 x CSS and 1 x CS) and 4164 pax, his "small" division ("division-lite") is smaller than the "large" BCT I support. I guess its really just a matter of semantics.

I'd argue that it is also a rump organization, with markedly fewer CS enablers than most other US Army divisions, making it optimized for COIN & LIC, but not for MCO. A "division" with only 1 firing battery of 8 howitzers, 1 recon troop, etc, is hardly a division.

The author acknowledges that his organization is adapted for COIN, but his solution for expansion is that the DIV CG returns to 2*s, BCTs are added back into the structure (building a new staff echelon) and battalions return to fall under regiments (although his regiments are battalion sized). I think that this proposal eliminates a headquarters echelon now, but then proposed building 2 new ones for MTW. I'd prefer to retain the organization, and build more with mobilization. Then, we aren't all trying to work in unfamiliar organizations, we are just working at a higher echelon (of the same organization).

[Kasper]

Perhaps the BCT is not the best solution, but it has certainly been a step in the right direction. To revert back to a Division/Corps centric Army would be a complete devolution of combat effectiveness.

The Army's inability to delegate roles and responsibilities to lower echelons has contradicted and doomed the success of the BCT. I think that many have never wanted the BCT to succeed.


the Colonels didn't like it. That and the fact that the intended equipment got stalled in the bureaucracy and only started appearing in units AFTER the decision was made to revert to the tired and true -- and easier to control if you're into centralizing things -- Brigade of ROAD. The Pentomic concept had a great many good things, but it was designed for those who are willing to delegate and trust subordinates. Not the Army way...:wry:

I think that Ken has hit the nail on the head. Today's Army does not perform well in a decentralized state. This, in my opinion, lends evidence to a larger problem... The Army's quality vs. quantity problem.

Lets be real and frank, the average (pick your rank) fails to embody the level of responsibility, proficiency, and professionalism necessary for the success of the BCT. Furthermore, the truly exemplary junior officers/NCOs have been virtually neutered of their authority/responsibilities. This has a detrimental effect on the entire Brigade.

What we need is the SOF mentality pushed out into the broader Army. Field grades should not be afraid to fire people, junior officers and NCOs must have the opportunity to succeed and/or fail. Eventually these mentalities will rub off onto the lower enlisted who will forgo their Halo tournament (video games) to concern themselves with putting rounds down range.

[Tukhachevskii]

Could each of the Bns operate seperate from a Bde, sure. My thought is to standarize thsi new modular brigade type (DIV HQs) to simplify the CSS aspect. Which means I now need to add a DIV HQs CSS Bn capable of supporting: a HQs Bn (with organic Signal Co), a DIV CAV Sqdn, & a SECFOR Bn.

Another way to view this issue is as a transformed/modularized Division Base.

How different, if at all, would that look compared to current cav Bn's?

[Rifleman]

What is the pivotal command level in a tactical fight? Is it brigade, battalion or something else?

I thought elminating the division sounded like a good idea because it seems like Armies usually do business at the tactical level through brigades. Ken White pointed out that it was that way even in WWII, with the fighting really happening at RCT level.

If it's still that way, should brigades be fixed TOEs or flexible combat commands? If the answer is flexible combat commands, then it seems like the division might be necessary to assign various battalions or squadrons to brigade commanders depending on mission requirements.

If mixing and matching battalions based on METT-TC is necessary, who's doling out the battalions if there's no division?

[TAH]

How different, if at all, would that look compared to current cav Bn's?

It would not look anything like any of the existing BCT Recon/CAV Cdqrns.

Probably something like I have outlined over on the BCT thread:
2 hvy Cavalry Troops that have the capabiity of "fighting for information"
1 light recon troop most likely in scout/armored cars for the smaller/light footprint to be able to manuever thru terrain that the hvy toops are too big/heavy for and for missions that require more stealth/surveillance capability.
1 Mounted Infantry Co for staying power and to augment with more dismounted patrolling capability.
Each Co/troop has it own short-range (5-10 km) UAV, Sqdrn has longer range A/C to look deeper and stay longer.
6-8 heavy mortars for organic fire support.

Another option I have kicked around in my head is a 21st century up-date to the 1944 Panzer Aufklarungs Abtielung.
2 Recon companies (one tracked one wheeled)
2 mounted infantry compnaies (one in IFVs and one in APC)
Support/Heavy Company with mortar, AT, engineer/sapper Plts
Add UAVs as above.

[Tukhachevskii]

It would not look anything like any of the existing BCT Recon/CAV Cdqrns.

Probably something like I have outlined over on the BCT thread:
2 hvy Cavalry Troops that have the capabiity of "fighting for information"
1 light recon troop most likely in scout/armored cars for the smaller/light footprint to be able to manuever thru terrain that the hvy toops are too big/heavy for and for missions that require more stealth/surveillance capability.
1 Mounted Infantry Co for staying power and to augment with more dismounted patrolling capability.
Each Co/troop has it own short-range (5-10 km) UAV, Sqdrn has longer range A/C to look deeper and stay longer.
6-8 heavy mortars for organic fire support.

Another option I have kicked around in my head is a 21st century up-date to the 1944 Panzer Aufklarungs Abtielung.
2 Recon companies (one tracked one wheeled)
2 mounted infantry compnaies (one in IFVs and one in APC)
Support/Heavy Company with mortar, AT, engineer/sapper Plts
Add UAVs as above.

So how many dismounts is that? IIRC ther were LRRP detachments assigned to Div HQ in the 1980s

[82redleg]

So how many dismounts is that? IIRC ther were LRRP detachments assigned to Div HQ in the 1980s

Divisions had a LRS detachment from sometime early 80s until modularity (04-06), when they all went to Pathfinder COs in AVN BDEs or to the BFSBs.

A mech CO dismounts 3 x 27 (in rifle squads) + a few more HQ types (CO, 3 x PL, 5 x RTO), so ~90 for the mech CO.

A current mixed (M3/HMMWV) scout section with 10 pax can dismount 4 (3 from the M3, 1 from the HMMWV) while keeping the vehicles fully manned. From this, I deduce that an M3 can carry at least 3 dismounts.

A HMMWV can carry 2, but really should only carry one (keeping the other seat free for a terp/medic/casevac/etc). The old 2 LCR MTOE had no dismounts, simply the 3 vehicle crew per each HMMWV, the same as the current IBCT and BFSB mounted troop platoons.

A current Stryker recon platoon has 6 or 7 pax per Stryker RV, from which I deduce that the RV can carry at least 5 dismounts (leaving the 2 man crew in the Stryker).

Assuming that we go with 3 PLTs of 6 M3 in the Heavy Recon Troops, they should be putting out a 6 man recon team per section, for 18 dismounts per platoon, or 56 per troop. Unless we add additional pax, there is no leadership planned to dismount, at least the CO should have a jump gunner and a couple of RTOs to enable him to dismount, so ~59 per heavy troop.

Assuming (again), 3 PLTs of 6 Stryker RVs in the Light Recon Troops, they can be organized identically, or even put down a full 9-man squad per section. So, minimum of ~59 per troop, maximum of 30 per platoon (3 x 9 + PL/RTO/Medic) + COs crew ~94 per troop.

If we are operating unconstrained, I seem to recall (but can't reference right now) that the initial proposal for the ACR included a mech CO in addition to the tank CO, howitzer battery and 3 x Recon troops. That is a pretty big BN, but maybe doable. It would have 18 operational platoons, but a CAB had 16 (before the EN CO was removed) and the old DIV CAV had 16 (counting the air troops) and was split between ground and air. Since this SQDN will operate independently, organizing it to do so without task organization/augmentation would probably be beneficial.

[TAH]

So how many dismounts is that? IIRC ther were LRRP detachments assigned to Div HQ in the 1980s

For the mounted scout/recon/cav, the larger the number of dismounts, the greater number of dismounted patrols & LP/OPs each unit can support.

A 36-man scout plt (could be CFV or Stryker) can dismount 18 (CFV) or 24 (Stryker) Soldiers. six or eight 3-man teams or three or four 4-man teams per platoon. These folks are recon/scouts with training, manning, and equipping focused on the recon aspects of the mission. Could a Scout platoon defend or clear a building, sure but I don't see that as their primary job.

The infantry company is there to address the recurring issue from recon/cav units that they insufficent dismounts for sustained combat operations. These are infantry Soldiers trained, manned and equipped for their set of combat operations. Could these guys man LP/OPs or conduct dismounted patrols, again sure, but need them focused on missions that will normally require more then 3-8 folks at a time.

The DIV CAV must be capable of BOTH recon (route, area, zone) AND security (screen & guard) operations. Mine will also be a viable canidate for economy-of-force missions, delays etc. None of the existing Recon Sqdron currently have ALL of these capabities without outside augmentation.

[gute]

I found additional information on this topic and seems clear that modularity just costs too much. General Chiarelli has questioned why the Army needs so many vehicles, especially humvee trucks (158,000 by 2012) and puts the blame on the shift to the modular force.

http://www.fortgordonsignal.com/news/2010-10-01/Viewpoint/Army_Vice_Chief_Gen_Chiarelli_Programs_Will_Be_Ter .html

Would eliminating the Brigade Troops Battalion in the BCT and shifting its responsabilities to the Brigade support Battalion help with efficiency?

Would decreasing the number of Forward Support Companies in the BCT do like wise?

Is a FSC necessary for every maneuver battalion or is a 2 to 1 ration sufficient?

[Ken White]

the only type of terrain on earth that is conducive to modern Div operations. We fought Divs in WW II in North Africa only, everywhere else, the Divs formed Regimental Combat Teams to fight. Korea and VN, RCT and Bde fights. Then came Desert Storm, he missed it but his buddies in the 1st Cav told him about the majesty of an Armored Division in full sweep and then he went to Iraq and heard and saw what the attack force had done.

That's point one. It ignores the issue of Divs in Viet Nam being useless and having little to do. If we go back in the Jungle somewhere -- or to Korea, we are not going to fight as Divs.

Point two is the Math. Disregarding Separate Bdes, We had ten Divs @ three Bdes each, total of 9 maneuver Bns each for 90 maneuver LTC cmds. We now have essentially four BCTs per Div Hq with two Bns plus a 'Cav Sqn' each for 80 Bns plus 40 'Cav Sqns' -- that's 120 maneuver LTC cmds.

Take out some 'Cav Sqns' for the reconstituted Divs and that equals 12 Divisions at nine maneuver Bns (12x9=108) plus a Div Cav Sqn (2x1=12. That 12 plus the 108 = 120). That's two more MG slots and four more BG slots at a cost of 8 COL spaces (10 deactivated BCTs less 2 new Div Chiefs of Staff).

Whether that will happen or not remains to be seen, the modular bit works and can be improved to work even better but I suspect that is not the issue. It's a change and we older folks don't like change. Any time budget cuts loom, the power structure seeks to minimize the 'damage' IAW their view on what's important. In my experience that has rarely coincided with what was best for the nation or even the Army. We don't do "It wasn't designed here" nor do we do "it wasn't designed by me." :rolleyes:

Plus modularity leaves the Div Hq (and their GO slots) subject to Congressional questions of "what do they do..." :wry:

[TAH]

Would eliminating the Brigade Troops Battalion in the BCT and shifting its responsabilities to the Brigade support Battalion help with efficiency?

Would decreasing the number of Forward Support Companies in the BCT do like wise?

Is a FSC necessary for every maneuver battalion or is a 2 to 1 ration sufficient?

A second order impact of the BSTB is as a Rear Area Operations C2 Hqs. With most of its units/assets task orged out it has little else to do. But this leaves it a a perfect position to take on this mission and not add work to someone else.

Also provides a Bn Hqs for attached Companies of MPs or Engineers can operate.

Fewer Support Companies is a very bad idea. Not sure there sufficent capability in the force that is there now.

A better choice might be to stand down one of the four BCTs, and use most of the personel to add a third Manuver bn per BCT. Would also need to plus up Arty (add a btry) engineers (small Bn or two big companies) and adjust the Support Bn overhead and add another FSC.

[TAH]

Based on what I read today, the Army is being asked/tasked to cut 27,000 active-duty troops (plus 22,000 already programmed to go) by 2015.

Will be interesting to see where the cuts go.

If out of the TOE force, 47K is somewhere between 2 and four divisions.

In round figures, the combined HQs (BCT HHC+STB HHC+2 CAB HHC+BSB HHC+FA HHB) of an HBCT is 1100 troops, IBCT is 1000.

Only a total of 49 BCTs (18 HBCT, 23 IBCT & 6 SBCT) in the active force.

AVN Bdes have lots of troops but will be surprised if any of those go.

The rest of the Modular Bdes are generally a HQs + a SPT BN + a signal Co.

Lots of room to cut in the CBT SPT area (FA, MPs, ENG ect) but alot of that stuff (50% plus) is in the RC.

Waiting to see.

[Fuchs]

Based on what I read today, the Army is being asked/tasked to cut 27,000 active-duty troops (plus 22,000 already programmed to go) by 2015.

Will be interesting to see where the cuts go.

If out of the TOE force, 47K is somewhere between 2 and four divisions.

In round figures, the combined HQs (BCT HHC+STB HHC+2 CAB HHC+BSB HHC+FA HHB) of an HBCT is 1100 troops, IBCT is 1000.

Only a total of 49 BCTs (18 HBCT, 23 IBCT & 6 SBCT) in the active force.

AVN Bdes have lots of troops but will be surprised if any of those go.

The rest of the Modular Bdes are generally a HQs + a SPT BN + a signal Co.

Lots of room to cut in the CBT SPT area (FA, MPs, ENG ect) but alot of that stuff (50% plus) is in the RC.

Waiting to see.

47k is less than what used to be a divisional slice in the 90's.

[Jrizzuto77]

Gute,
According to the Department of Defense the US will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnership with a growing number of nations. Seeking partnerships with is beneficial because we are adding legitimacy to US operations, shaping public perceptions and learning firsthand through cultural experts. The Army will achieve partnership at the tactical level by regionally aligning Brigades in support of national strategy. Furthermore, regionally aligned partnerships will build expertise in support of a Geographic Commander’s Area of Operation. Ultimately, the Brigade will have regional focus and responsibilities thereby allowing units to develop advisory capabilities, build relationships with allies and host nations. The Army will remain globally engaged and regionally responsive through a Multi-national environment.

r/
John
**The views expressed in this are those of MAJ Rizzuto, Command and General Staff College, and do not reflect the official policy of the Department of the Army, DoD or the US Government. **

[TAH]

A while back, the US Army talked about restructuring its BCTs by adding in a third maneuver battalion. Anyone have any idea when/how that adjustment might be taking place?

My latest has the Army reducing the numbers of Active-duty BCTs down to 28 (as opposed to the Grow-the-Army plan a few years back...), using some of the savings to add the maneuver units in IBCT and HBCT (now called ABCTs) and changing the Special Troops Bn to an organic Engineer Bn with a 2nd company of contruction engineers. They would also bring the SBCTs in lineby adding a STB/Eng Bn to their structure. There would also be additions/adjustmentds to the artillery and support battalions to account for the new battalion.

There had been some discussion of eliminating some or all of the following BCTs sub-units:

Combat Observation and Lasing Teams (COLTs)
BCT security section
BCT MP platoon
BCT NBC recin platoon.

Size of all thre BCT types would be around 4500.

Also, ran across this story about restructuring in the UK that might be of interest.

http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.it/2012/07/army-2020-in-detail.html The UK changes are discussed on a separate thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16516&highlight=2020