Force Ratios (the old 3-to-1 rule)

[Chris jM]

Falling further into the realms of doctrine-geekiness, I've become interested and obsessed with the golden rule in that we fight the enemy on a 3-to-1 ratio. From what I've seen it appears to reside in the area of corporate knowledge only, without it being doctrine in any ABCA nation.

The closest I've come to finding out info on the ration is in the British Army's Doctrinal Note 00/5 (Annex B - Calculating Force Equivalence/ Ratios) - a restricted doc, so unfortunately I can't post or fd it to anyone - which lays out various other ratios, such as a guide that we can undertake a delay mission with a 1:6 ratio. The doc is meant to assist as a guide for wargaming and has no links to other doctrine or history for further research.

Does anyone know where the 'ratio' system came from? WW2? Does it have any links to doctrine, logic, history or tactical practices that anyone knows of?

I don't doubt the validity of the concept when used as a very general rule for quick appreciations that are qualified by situational factors, however I do like to know as much about the tools I employ as is possible.

[Tukhachevskii]

Actually, I think mapping doctrinal development is like an exercise in the history of ideas. Anyway, I'm sure I was taught at Uni that the 3:1 rule had something (for the life of me I can't recall what) to do with Lanchester's Square rule (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lanchester's_laws) (or perhaps they are related).


Which see Chimpanzes and the mathematics of battle (http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/269/1496/1107.full.pdf)

Actually, scratch that, see this...

Aggregation, Disaggregation and the 3:1 Rule in Ground Combat (http://192.5.14.110/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR638.pdf)...just stumbled onto it whilst look for schtuff on Lanchester! (by which I meant the chimp article above):eek:

[Fuchs]

The Soviets researched their experience form 43-45 and quantified a lot. Their conclusions pointed rather at a 6:1 ratio, and I don't remember older literature with focus on force ratios than 50's stuff right now.

The necessary ratio (usually a ceteris paribus thing) depends a lot depending on the mission and level anyway. A 1:1 ratio can suffice on the offence as demonstrated in 1940, whereas a 3:1 ratio can be insufficient.


I personally think that the culminating point distance is a more useful metric - and a badly neglected one.

[Ken White]

The necessary ratio (usually a ceteris paribus thing) depends a lot depending on the mission and level anyway...I personally think that the culminating point distance is a more useful metric - and a badly neglected one.Distance is critical -- relative position, time, terrain and training, along with mission and distance are far more determinant than numbers. Ratios as low as .1:3 have been successful, as high as 6:1 not successful...

[Tom Odom]

Some citations for further research:


Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule
T. N. Dupuy
International Security
Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer, 1989), pp. 195-201
(article consists of 7 pages)
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538771


Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics
John J. Mearsheimer
International Security
Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring, 1989), pp. 54-89
(article consists of 36 pages)
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538780

[SJPONeill]

Back in the Good Old Days (for me) of Knight Rider, Miami Vice, big hair and pastel clothing i.e. the early-mid 80s, as a young soldier we were taught the 3-1 ratio as applicable against a like opponent i.e. the classic Commonwealth section with 1 MG, and 7-9 riflemen (with semi-automatic rifles) ...so a rifle platoon should be able to successfully engage a rifle section, a company a platoon, etc etc...the reference material for this would have been one or some of the pubs in fine Aussie series The Manual of Land Warfare (MLW)...however...if the adversary was armed along the Soviet model where every soldier had an automatic weapon like an AK, the ratio was 10-1 especially if the adversary was in a defended position...

Going up to 10-1 may have been a simplification for young soldiers by simply increasing the level of engagement from platoon to company as I do recall that some instructors referred to this increase as a Soviet lesson so the 6-1 above may be quite correct...

Our network is down at the moment but I have most of these pubs in the library and will do some research once it is back up...

[JMA]

Falling further into the realms of doctrine-geekiness, I've become interested and obsessed with the golden rule in that we fight the enemy on a 3-to-1 ratio. From what I've seen it appears to reside in the area of corporate knowledge only, without it being doctrine in any ABCA nation.

[snip]

I don't doubt the validity of the concept when used as a very general rule for quick appreciations that are qualified by situational factors, however I do like to know as much about the tools I employ as is possible.

I suggest that it is the standard rule of thumb. I would look in the Infantry Platoon in Battle and the Infantry Battalion in Battle both circa 1960 as I recall something about when your advanced patrols came into contact with a small unit of enemy with a machine gun (deemed then to be a section) the platoon commander would probably put in a platoon attack. The same or similar for a platoon or for a company.

Another indication of why you will need this sort of ratio can be found in your SORHB (Staff Officers Reference Handbook) which lists the scale of casualties you can expect attacking positions in day/at night, with different type of field defences etc etc. Remembering also that as defences are organised in depth so must attacks be planned in depth.

In training (in my experience) 3:1 in the attack was used as standard while accepting that operational circumstances may alter that. Wartime operational discretion would be up to the commander.

A good example of this I remember from Slim's Defeat into Victory (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Defeat-into-Victory-Battling-1942-1945/dp/0815410220) and I dug out my copy and paste as follows relating to ratios in the context of the war in Burma:


Chapter IX
The Foundations

From page 187 – (paperback)

Thus many of those who had scrambled out of Burma without waiting to get to grips with the invader or who had been in the rear areas in 1943 had the most hair-raising stories of Japanese super-efficiency. Those of us who had really fought him believed that man for man our soldiers could beat him at his own jungle game and that in intelligence and skill we could excel and outwit him. …

… In August and September of 1942 Australian troops had at Milne Bay in New Guinea inflicted on the Japanese their first undoubted defeat on land. If the Australias in conditions very like ours had done it so could we. Some of us may forget that of all the allies it was Australian soldiers who first broke the spell of invincibility of the Japanese Army those of us who were in Burma have cause to remember.

But all this could not be convincingly put over by talking and education alone. It had to be demonstrated practically. This is what my predecessors had tried in Arakan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arakan_Campaign_1942%E2%80%931943), but they had been, are amongst other things, too ambitious. A victory in a large-scale battle was, in our present state of training, organization, and confidence not to be attempted. We had first to get the feel through the army that it was a we who were hunting the Jap, not he us.

All commanders therefore directed their attention to patrolling. In jungle warfare this is the basis of success. It’s not only gives eyes to the side that excels at it, and blinds its opponent, but through it the soldier learns to move confidently in the element in which he works. Every forward unit, not only infantry, chose its best men, formed patrols, trained and practised them, and then sent them out on business. As it was to be expected, that the superior intelligence of our officers and men told. The trials came back to their regiments with stories of success, of how the Japanese had walked into the ambushes, and how they had watched the enemy place their observation posts a day off today in the same place, and then had pounced on them, how they had followed their patrols and caught them asleep. …

The stories lost nothing in the telling, and there was a are lack of competition for the next patrol. It went up with new men but under an experienced leader, and came back with more tails of success. Even if it returned with little to report, it had stalked its quarry without finding him, and that is one way to whet a hunter’s appetite. By the end of November our forward troops had gone a long way towards getting that individual feeling of superiority and that first essential in the fighting man - the desire to close with his enemy. …

… Having developed the confidence of the individual man in his superiority over the enemy, we have now to extend that to the corporate confidence of the units and formations in themselves. This was done in a series of carefully planned minor offensive operations, carried out as the weather improved, against enemy advanced detachments. These were carefully staged, ably led, and as I was always careful to ensure in greatly preponderating strength. We attacked Japanese company positions with brigades fully supported by artillery and aircraft, platoon posts by battalions. Once when I was studying the plan for an operation of this kind submitted by the local commander, a visiting the staff officer of high rank said, “Isn’t that using a steam hammer to crack a walnut?” “Well,” I answered, “if you happen to have a steam hammer handy and you don’t mind if there’s nothing left of the walnut, it’s not a bad way to crack it.” Besides, we could not at this stage risk even small failures. We had very few, and the individual superiority built up by successful patrolling grew into a feeling of superiority within units and formations. We were then ready to undertake larger operations. We had laid the first of our intellectual foundations of morale; everyone knew we could defeat the Japanese, our object was attainable.

Slim's book is a must read for certainly all officers and has lessons for Afghanistan.

“Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it”

[JMA]

A good example of this I remember from Slim's Defeat into Victory (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Defeat-into-Victory-Battling-1942-1945/dp/0815410220) and I dug out my copy and paste as follows relating to ratios in the context of the war in Burma:

Apologies, that the voice recognition software I use is not as accurate as I would like. This quote gives the idea but best to revert to the book itself.

[William F. Owen]

I have never really considered the 3:1 "Idea" as having any validity in fact or theory. Never made sense to me. I would really like to know if the idea existed prior to WW1.

[Chris jM]

Thanks for the responses. Much appreciated, especially Tom and Tukhachevskii for the links. It'll take me a few days to get through them as I've got a 'healthy' work-load on, but it all looks like interesting stuff.

Likewise JMA and SJP, cheers for the snippets.

SJPONeill - firstly, I hope your new job is going well. Secondly, with regards to the 1-6 against a conventional enemy, I'd be interested if you dig anything out on that as all the info I have to hand indicates it is 3-1 against a conventional enemy when the ratio is normally applied (excluding Fuchs mentioning of it applying to Soviet theory - from 'our' side I haven't seen any mention of it, at least).

Wilf - at the very least, I think the 3-1 "idea" is a good sanity checking device for a conventional commander in a conventional battle to determine if he is walking to his imminent doom, or if he has weighted success in his favour. It provided a good conceptual basis when I started to be assessed tactically - if you find a section, put a platoon up against it. If I find more than a section, get on the means and hit up the Company Comd for some more resources. I wasn't the smartest tactically so any and every idea available to me to simplify my job did help.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf - at the very least, I think the 3-1 "idea" is a good sanity checking device for a conventional commander in a conventional battle to determine if he is walking to his imminent doom, or if he has weighted success in his favour. It provided a good conceptual basis when I started to be assessed tactically - if you find a section, put a platoon up against it. If I find more than a section, get on the means and hit up the Company Comd for some more resources. I wasn't the smartest tactically so any and every idea available to me to simplify my job did help.

Checks on sanity may be very necessary. 3:1 may not serve that purpose, and I believe we can do better. Essentially it MAY be an aid to planning, but after that it really fails the "So what" test of effectiveness, because it is at best simplistic and at worse very misleading.

[JMA]

Checks on sanity may be very necessary. 3:1 may not serve that purpose, and I believe we can do better. Essentially it MAY be an aid to planning, but after that it really fails the "So what" test of effectiveness, because it is at best simplistic and at worse very misleading.

My opinion FWIW is that for a peacetime army 3:1 in training is probably essential. It certainly provides commanders (at junior levels) in battle for the first time with the ability to roll off a plan which will probably work just fine in most cases.

Yes also to the fact that as one gains combat experience against a specific enemy in a particular environment one no longer needs this 3:1 crutch... but that takes some time and a number of contacts at varying ranges, durations and intensities.

In our little war we did not have the resources in terms of helicopter lift and CAS to get anywhere near this sort of ratio on the bigger attacks into Mozambique and Zambia and subsequently had to rely heavily on the initial air strikes by aging Canberras and Hawker Hunters to get the comrades to adopt the swastika position and run into the stop lines. For example on Op Dingo - Zulu 1 - Chimoio of the 1,200 ZANLA fighters killed about half were killed by the airstrikes and the rest by the 184 men (96 SAS paras, 48 RLI paras, 40 RLI heliborne). Cost to us 2 KIA, 7 WIA. So it was a .04:1 ratio - made possible by accurate and decisive air strikes. In many cases the time of the daily muster parade when the whole camp was formed up on the parade square was a sitting duck for the Canberras and their cluster bombs.

Two days later Op Dingo - Zulu 2 - Tembue was also a turkey shoot except that their morning parade had been delayed so they missed their appointment with the flechettes which were dropped that day from a Hawker Hunter.

Op Barras - Sierra Leone - year 2000 the Brits applied a similar force level (180) against 600 West Side Boys to release hostages and suffered 1 KIA and 11 WIA. It is assumed that the aim was to free the hostages and not to get maximum kills. So 25 confirmed kills must be accepted. The ratio here was .3:1 ratio

Now contrast all this with the final Dien Bien Phu attack of 25,000 Viet Minh against fewer than 3,000 garrison troops. An 8.33:1 ratio.

In the end you do what you need to do to win... and to win you need to know your enemy!

[Tukhachevskii]

Checks on sanity may be very necessary. 3:1 may not serve that purpose, and I believe we can do better. Essentially it MAY be an aid to planning, but after that it really fails the "So what" test of effectiveness, because it is at best simplistic and at worse very misleading.

How? In what way? What would your prefered method of a "sanity/reality" check look like?

[Fuchs]

My opinion FWIW is that for a peacetime army 3:1 in training is probably essential. It certainly provides commanders (at junior levels) in battle for the first time with the ability to roll off a plan which will probably work just fine in most cases.

Yes also to the fact that as one gains combat experience against a specific enemy in a particular environment one no longer needs this 3:1 crutch...

This reminds me of what I read about the German army in (surprise!) WW2:

'Green' units were assigned especially simply tasks at first (if the situation allowed for it). A Battalion was tasked with what would be a veteran company's task, a green company would do what a veteran platoon would and so on.



I do also remember having read that a study of historical battles showed no significant correlation between numerical superiority (of an army) and victory (in battle).


It seems to be of much greater importance to fight when the opponent isn't really ready for a fight (that's another way to look at the topic of tactical surprise).

[Ken White]

I do also remember having read that a study of historical battles showed no significant correlation between numerical superiority (of an army) and victory (in battle).

It seems to be of much greater importance to fight when the opponent isn't really ready for a fight (that's another way to look at the topic of tactical surprise).The teaching of so-called rules of thumb like the 3:1 rule are bad practice and lead to tactical group think. They do not aid tactical thinking at all, they actually hinder it.

[Global Scout]

The teaching of so-called rules of thumb like the 3:1 rule are bad practice and lead to tactical group think. They do not aid tactical thinking at all, they actually hinder it.

Ken, you're so right on this one, the 3:1 madness that has polluted our thinking is destroying a lot of good options. The 3:1 metric was designed for a frontal assault against a peer enemy, so if our officers are still no better than they were in WWII Italy where they simply throw mass against mass, then hell we may need 10:1; however, if you're better trained, equipped and no how to maneuver forces you probably won't need a 3:1 advantage. This is group think at its worse. So typical of our force to look for simple rules to do their thinking for them, instead of actually thinking on their own.

[Tukhachevskii]

Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics
John J. Mearsheimer
International Security
Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring, 1989), pp. 54-89
(article consists of 36 pages)
Published by: The MIT Press

The above paper is avaliable at a more friendly location (i.e., for free:D) here (http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0013.pdf)


Other works by Mearsheimer avaliable here (http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/all-pubs.html)

[Fuchs]

It's probably noteworthy that a different strain of thought about necessary ratios does not look at friendly / allied forces, but at friendly forces / frontage in kilometres.

This was often done in regard to breakthrough battles (guns/km, tanks/km, AT weapons/km) and there were also rules of thumb about acceptable frontages for battalions or brigades (of specific type, such as mechanized infantry) in various forms of combat (attack, defence, delay).

The latter seems to have been favoured for scenarios with unusual force densities (such as the Cold War when 26 NATO divisions were supposed to defend a 1,000 km front line - this took rather 50+ divisions in WW2).

[JMA]

This reminds me of what I read about the German army in (surprise!) WW2:

'Green' units were assigned especially simply tasks at first (if the situation allowed for it). A Battalion was tasked with what would be a veteran company's task, a green company would do what a veteran platoon would and so on.

I do also remember having read that a study of historical battles showed no significant correlation between numerical superiority (of an army) and victory (in battle).

It seems to be of much greater importance to fight when the opponent isn't really ready for a fight (that's another way to look at the topic of tactical surprise).

It all makes sense to use these rules of thumb or assumptions during basic and routine training.

It is folly to assume that we can present a blank tactical canvas during training and let commanders at every level exercise their initiative. Further when in times of total war when officers are being produced via a conveyor belt (90 day wonders) and experienced NCOs are produced in weeks rather than years they will need every crutch they can lean on.

If we look at the abject failure of Brit and US troops to adapt to the type of warfare required in Afghanistan we should not look at the use of rules of thumb (like 3:1) in their training but rather go look elsewhere...

And yes Fuchs you are correct, adapt to the enemy and the theatre. Let the decision like in your example be enforced just like Slim did in Burma. It gets a little more tricky in insurgency scenarios where more skilled leadership is required in depth... this may be lacking in most armies.

[JMA]

The above paper is avaliable at a more friendly location (i.e., for free:D) here (http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0013.pdf)

Other works by Mearsheimer avaliable here (http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/all-pubs.html)

OK, having read the free copy I see where the problem lies. The 3:1 ratio should apply at platoon and company levels and less so further up the line. By the time you get to division it would not apply as the greater battlefield intelligence picture would dictate actions. If you have no battlefield intelligence then you would not know what you are up against to apply the ratio of three against, would you?

[Bob's World]

A planning factor. Paint by numbers. Something for the observer controllers to use to abuse you with at the AAR "Well, certainly your unit was successful, but we're concerned that you did not have a 3:1 ratio over all (though your may well have been 8:1 where you through your strength against a point of weakness while the bulk of your opponent's force sat idle eslewhere...)

[JMA]

A planning factor. Paint by numbers. Something for the observer controllers to use to abuse you with at the AAR "Well, certainly your unit was successful, but we're concerned that you did not have a 3:1 ratio over all (though your may well have been 8:1 where you through your strength against a point of weakness while the bulk of your opponent's force sat idle eslewhere...)

Yes in a peacetime army it could become a pain if misused in such a manner... but then who wants to be a soldier in peacetime?

[William F. Owen]

How? In what way? What would your prefered method of a "sanity/reality" check look like?

Start with education, so that training makes more sense. It requires skill and skills can be taught. Beyond anything else it is the ability of an attacking force the generate SHOCK, SURPRISE, SUPPRESSION and ISOLATION, that will see them succeed. It is the resources/training/skill etc to do those things that causes the other side to give up, NOT "throw a BN against a Company."

The great fallacy of 3:1 is it assumes you know all about "1" so you can plan for "3." Time and space are relevant. If you can concentrate more of your force against a small part of the enemy and then exploit that success, you may roll him up with a very low loss exchange ratio - LER. LER is almost always the defining criteria of tactical success, in that a low/very low LER enables the winning side to exploit more effectively.

Contrast and compare the Falklands War Battle of Mount Harriet, with Mount Longdon.

[Tukhachevskii]

If you can concentrate more of your force against a small part of the enemy and then exploit that success, you may roll him up with a very low loss exchange ratio - LER.

Sir, thanks for the reply (I may have sounded overly "agressive" in the previous post). What kind of metric/rule-o-thumb would one deploy to ascertain the correct amount of "concentration"? (Isn't that what the 3:1 ration is meant to provde, a shorthand battlefield expedient/reflexive aid). Is that concentration of "fire", "forces" or both? IMO Mearsheimer gives a pretty good defence of the 3:1 rule as a "rule of thumb" but he is careful to qualify that based upon terrain and troops avaliable and limits it's application to a purely frontal offensive situation (i.e., a break through battle).

My interest has been well and truely piqued. Mearsheimer and Dupuy...and the Chimp article is about all I read at Uni on the 3:1 rule so I'd like to be pointed in the direction of further readng material along the lines you suggested (this time...pretty please:D)

[William F. Owen]

I'd like to be pointed in the direction of further readng material along the lines you suggested (this time...pretty please:D)

Work by Jim Storr (http://www.continuumbooks.com/authors/details.aspx?AuthorId=151574&BookId=132565).

[Infanteer]

Storr's book is a good first start and it is a good first start for a lot of things. Of importance is what he writes on victory and what it is. Surprise, suppression and shock are the key and none of these are really dependant upon numbers. If I inflict enough shock on you, it doesn't matter what the ratio is.

Force Ratio, like the "Troop/Civilian" ratio often put forward in Counterinsurgency/Irregular Warfare theory, is likely a number pulled from outer space that has no factual basis.

[Tukhachevskii]

Work by Jim Storr (http://www.continuumbooks.com/authors/details.aspx?AuthorId=151574&BookId=132565).

Would that be the same Jim Storr who helped draft ADP Land Operations?

[JMA]

Force Ratio, like the "Troop/Civilian" ratio often put forward in Counterinsurgency/Irregular Warfare theory, is likely a number pulled from outer space that has no factual basis.

No.

The 3:1 was a product of experience gained over many years and many hard lessons.

I say again, IMHO, that in a training scenario where sections. platoons and companies are being exercised the 3:1 works well in that it exercises the drills that 99% of your force (the doers at that level) need in battle. The weakness (of developing straight jacket thinking) affects only the platoon commanders and the company commanders (four of the hundred odd - and then only one at any given time). This weakness can and should be rectified on platoon commander/company commander/combat team commander/battle group commander courses. One can't hold up one hundred odd soldiers training while the company commander (being exercised) and the DS argue the toss about some smart ass tactical innovation. That's what TEWTs are for.

Anyone want to guess what percentage of platoon and company commanders in any army have the smarts to be tactically innovative to never have to rely on rules of thumb and assumptions?

[William F. Owen]

Would that be the same Jim Storr who helped draft ADP Land Operations?
The very same! - and that edition of ADP Land Ops that made some sense, and not the ones that clearly don't!

[William F. Owen]

The 3:1 was a product of experience gained over many years and many hard lessons.
I would be very careful of that assumption. I see little evidence, that it is anything more than senior officers opinion. Based on Core Functions, we should seek a minimum of 4:1. The Russians have taught very high ratios from about 1922 onwards.

I say again, IMHO, that in a training scenario where sections. platoons and companies are being exercised the 3:1 works well in that it exercises the drills that 99% of your force (the doers at that level) need in battle.
Good point and very true, BUT it needs to explicitly explained as a training vehicle alone, with no operational merit.

One can't hold up one hundred odd soldiers training while the company commander (being exercised) and the DS argue the toss about some smart ass tactical innovation. That's what TEWTs are for.
Again, good point, but if this is the case then the Exercise is very badly planned. The DS shouldn't be in a position to hold up the exercise. Sadly and traditionally, not the case.

Anyone want to guess what percentage of platoon and company commanders in any army have the smarts to be tactically innovative to never have to rely on rules of thumb and assumptions?
Soldiering is learnt skill. Commanders should be those identified as skilled in the relevant areas.

[Infanteer]

No.

The 3:1 was a product of experience gained over many years and many hard lessons.

Prove it.

It's enough to say "experience...many years...hard lessons" but that doesn't mean it's true or based on any factual evidence - there are a few military maxims I see that fall into this catagory.

For every example of 3:1 you find, there are examples that disprove the theory with either 3:1 (or more) failing or 1:1/2:1 succeeding. Combat is a clash of human will within a chaotic system. There are too many variables at play if you pitted company X attacking platoon Y.

[JMA]

I would be very careful of that assumption. I see little evidence, that it is anything more than senior officers opinion. Based on Core Functions, we should seek a minimum of 4:1. The Russians have taught very high ratios from about 1922 onwards.

It evolved (the 3:1 ration in the attack) just as the principles of the 4 Phases of War did... as did the Principles of War and the principles relating to just about every action in the military (and were not pucked out the air). All are guidelines (and a point of departure) but one would IMHO be required to justify discarding any one principle. I agree that a straight jacketed mind is to be avoided among the officer corps (as T.E. Lawrence complained about the British officer being "too much body and not enough mind"). The problem as I see it is that the limited ability to find officers who have the ability to read a battle (at any level) and make intelligent judgement calls as where, how and with what force level to attack makes the use of such rules of thumb and assumptions vital. Then we see armies (where they line up the cannon fodder in waves) where I would suggest they screen out the characteristic of imagination among officers.

Fuchs mentioned the German approach at a given time and I mentioned Slim from Burma. There are times (we need to accept) when such tactical matters need to be imposed.


Good point and very true, BUT it needs to explicitly explained as a training vehicle alone, with no operational merit.

Yes, but does rifleman no 1 in the left forward section of the left forward platoon of the left forward company need to know that a battalion infiltration attack may have been the better option under those battlefield circumstances? If the officers and the senior NCOs know and understand that it is merely an exercise then that is all that matters.


Again, good point, but if this is the case then the Exercise is very badly planned. The DS shouldn't be in a position to hold up the exercise. Sadly and traditionally, not the case.

It really depends on who is being exercised doesn't it? If the whole company (for example) is being exercised then then the flow must be unimpeded and tactical disputes or disagreements can be dealt with after the fact.

Its all about the maintenance of the selected aim.


Soldiering is learnt skill. Commanders should be those identified as skilled in the relevant areas.

Yes, in the main. However, do not discount the natural attributes some bring to the table. As a young Troop (platoon) commander I noticed that certain of the troopies exhibited a knack and a level of understanding of combat soldiering way ahead of the pack (these were not necessarily leaders but could be a machine gunner or the like). When I moved on to officer training again one could detect the recognition and understanding in some of the eyes which simply said "OK I get it ... so when do we start." Then the crunch came when for the first time the crack-and-thump was real. Some faltered, some did OK and others (sometimes the most unlikely troopie) rose magnificently to the occasion. Not foreseeable.

So yes much can be taught and indeed should... probably better than we are doing at the moment. And (seriously) if I were the Brits I would roll every Sandhurst cadet through Afghanistan on an op attachment to test them under fire as that would take the guesswork out of that matter.

Finally (and somewhat off topic), a while back in another thread I recommended to Red Rat that the best use for Kenya was not for trained soldiers (other than tracking courses) but certainly for all officer cadets and maybe certain levels of recruits to do a month out there as part of their training. This would take the form of a cross between Outward Bound (http://theoutwardboundtrust.org.uk/individuals/courses.html/), a military bushcraft course and an an environment training in some basic military skills. Here I emphasize it not being a selection course where you try to knock 90% off the course but rather where you aim to lift 100% of the courses up appreciably in terms of self worth, self confidence and character development. We would need a couple of rules of thumb for this training ... only kidding.

[JMA]

Prove it.

It's enough to say "experience...many years...hard lessons" but that doesn't mean it's true or based on any factual evidence - there are a few military maxims I see that fall into this catagory.

For every example of 3:1 you find, there are examples that disprove the theory with either 3:1 (or more) failing or 1:1/2:1 succeeding. Combat is a clash of human will within a chaotic system. There are too many variables at play if you pitted company X attacking platoon Y.

I am not going to get into a knock down drag out with you over this. Not that I would not in a heartbeat (being a now old but still aggressive infantryman) but because the moderators do not have a sense of humour in such circumstances.

The best I can offer is to refer to my reply to Wilf (above). I trust that is in order.

[William F. Owen]

It evolved (the 3:1 ration in the attack) just as the principles of the 4 Phases of War did... as did the Principles of War and the principles relating to just about every action in the military (and were not pucked out the air)
Sorry, but a great deal is plucked out of the air. For example, the Principles of War - as first written by Fuller - have no basis in fact or even as useable principles as Col. Leonhard so ably pointed out. - there is a good thread on that here on SWJ.

Yes, in the main. However, do not discount the natural attributes some bring to the table. ...... Not foreseeable.
I am talking about selecting officers based on what can be tested and assessed. The IDF system seems optimal, though would need modification to be used elsewhere. If what I hear about the Omani system is correct, then this also has merit. I agree combat reaction cannot be foreseen, but there is good evidence that you can weed-out even the expert poodle-fakers given a rigourous enough system.

And (seriously) if I were the Brits I would roll every Sandhurst cadet through Afghanistan on an op attachment to test them under fire as that would take the guesswork out of that matter.
before or after you have spent the money on making them officers?

[Infanteer]

I am talking about selecting officers based on what can be tested and assessed. The IDF system seems optimal, though would need modification to be used elsewhere. If what I hear about the Omani system is correct, then this also has merit. I agree combat reaction cannot be foreseen, but there is good evidence that you can weed-out even the expert poodle-fakers given a rigourous enough system.

I've read some good material (usually in the form of Staff College papers) about the Israeli system. What do you hear about the Omani system?

[William F. Owen]

What do you hear about the Omani system?
You can only apply for officer training if you have completed basic training and 6 months in a unit. - and be recommended by the CO.

[JMA]

Sorry, but a great deal is plucked out of the air. For example, the Principles of War - as first written by Fuller - have no basis in fact or even as useable principles as Col. Leonhard so ably pointed out. - there is a good thread on that here on SWJ.

Well Fuller may well have written about the Principles of War but he was certainly not the first to do so. (Just like Livingston may have been the first Brit to see the Victoria Falls but was certainly not the first person to do so.)

Fuller's The Foundations of the Science of War (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/fuller2/fuller2.asp#208) is worth a browse from time to time as he has much to offer.

Here is a quote from chapter XI to prove/indicate/suggest that he did not just pluck the principles out of the air as some may suggest.


THE SEARCH AFTER PRINCIPLES

The value of principles in war has been a subject of much discussion. Some authorities have definitely stated that war has no principles ; others, when propounding the art of war, have made free use of the word without even understanding its meaning ; and still others, those who may be classed as educated soldiers, have made various attempts to establish principles on general inferences, and, as far as I am aware, without much scientific proof.

The necessity and utility of principles is hinted at by Clausewitz when he explains how difficult it is for men excited in battle" to preserve equilibrium of the mind."* Yet he does not directly state that the value of principles lies in their power to eliminate self when judgments have to be formed, and so assist us to maintain that mental equilibrium which is only possible when the mind is attuned to the law of economy of force.It is of some interest, I think, to trace this search after principles in modern times.

Lloyd, virtually, lays down three-namely, strength, agility, and universality which I have already examined. Jackson lays down four. He writes : "The principal points which relate to the management of a military action appear to be comprehended under the following heads.(I) A precise knowledge of what is to be done. . . . (2) A rapid and skilful occupation of such points, or positions, as give the best chance of commanding the objects. . . . (3) The employment of mechanical powers . . with just direction, united force, and persevering effect. (4) A retreat from the contest, when the end is unattainable, in a deliberate and correct manner."1 Broadly speaking, these may be called the principles of the object, of mobility, of concentration, of offensive power, and of security. Jomini lays down two. He says : " . . . employment of the forces should be regulated by two fundamental principles : the first being to obtain by free and rapid movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against fractions of the enemy ; the second, to strike in the most decisive direction." Napoleon lays down no definite principles, yet he apparently worked by well-defined ones, for he once said in the hearing of Saint-Cyr : "If one day I can find the time, I will write a book in which I will describe the principles of war in so precise a manner that they will be at the disposal of all soldiers, so that war can be learnt as easily as science." 2 Clausewitz lays down four: (1) " To employ all the forces which we can make available with the utmost energy. .. (2) To concentrate our forces as much as it is possible at the point where the decisive blows are to be struck. . . ." (3) To lose no time, and to surprise the enemy ; and (4) " To follow up the success we gain with the utmost energy." 3 Finally, Foch lays down four: " The principles of economy of forces; the principle of freedom of action ; the principle of free disposal of forces; the principle of security, etc."4

I do not intend to examine these various principles. Some, as it will be seen later on, I consider to be correct, and others incorrect. To examine them would be to digress, since my object in this chapter is to attempt to show systematically how principles are, or may be, derived from the law of economy of force.

If man were so fashioned that he could know all things, he would be omniscient, and if to do all things, then, omnipotent ; and, possessing these two powers, he would see that every change which takes place in Nature is righteous, that is to say that it could not in the circumstances take place in any other manner -better or worse.

Man is, however, ignorant, fearful, and weak; consequently, if his aim is to progress, he must seek knowledge, courage, and strength, and the nearer he attains to the fullness of these conditions the more readily will he be able to economize the forces they include. When he has learnt to economize his knowledge, or rather its expenditure, he has discovered wisdom ; and when he has learnt how to economize the power of courage he has attained to self-command ; and when he has learnt how best to use his strength he has become skilful. The government of these three states is the province of the principles of war.


His book, his opinion.


I am talking about selecting officers based on what can be tested and assessed. The IDF system seems optimal, though would need modification to be used elsewhere. If what I hear about the Omani system is correct, then this also has merit. I agree combat reaction cannot be foreseen, but there is good evidence that you can weed-out even the expert poodle-fakers given a rigourous enough system.

Most countries believe their system is superior. Do you ever expect the Brits to accept that their Sandhurst selection is inferior? Or the yanks for that matter? Never.

The aim needs to be constantly reviewed. "What characteristics are we looking for?" There is the certainty that the aim will become fuzzy unless you are vigilant.

We were talking about this in another thread which ran out of steam.


before or after you have spent the money on making them officers?

As early as possible in their training.

This (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=99370&postcount=62) was as we discussed such training. And when these little pink poms get back burned brown by the African sun and having lost their puppy fat and had the pimples burned out I promise you they will be so different the family dog will bite them.

I'm still free in November ;)

[Fuchs]

Most countries believe their system is superior. Do you ever expect the Brits to accept that their Sandhurst selection is inferior? Or the yanks for that matter? Never.


You might want to walk back on this considering what many (especially retired) U.S. soldiers think of their army personnel system. You sound like you missed the whole Vandergriff thing, for example.


It's not really important whether a system is inferior anyway. It takes some tactics in politics, but reformers can simply point out the potential for improvements without pointing at superior examples. There's usually an old experiment or study to point at - in worst case you can let someone produce it for your use.

[JMA]

You might want to walk back on this considering what many (especially retired) U.S. soldiers think of their army personnel system. You sound like you missed the whole Vandergriff thing, for example.

Always happy to be proved wrong. I would, however, ask you to look at my comment in the narrow confines of the officer selection process before acceptance on the actual officers course (which the context of my discussion with Wilf.)

Further I have noted that an increasing number of retired Brit officers are also starting to have a lot to say once their pensions are secure. Interesting reading and perhaps they make some money on lecture tours but do they change anything? This is what you are alluding to with the especially retired comment?


It's not really important whether a system is inferior anyway. It takes some tactics in politics, but reformers can simply point out the potential for improvements without pointing at superior examples. There's usually an old experiment or study to point at - in worst case you can let someone produce it for your use.

Again perhaps you are using too broad a brush here again. Improved officer selection systems will only come from within. For a military, any military, to accept a selection process from another (outsider) is tantamount to accepting that it was inferior in this regard. Will not happen.

[William F. Owen]

Well Fuller may well have written about the Principles of War but he was certainly not the first to do so. (Just like Livingston may have been the first Brit to see the Victoria Falls but was certainly not the first person to do so.)

Well aware. Foch's "Principles of War" dates from 1903 lectures. The Fuller version however were the ones passed into UK training and doctrine.


Fuller's The Foundations of the Science of War (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/fuller2/fuller2.asp#208) is worth a browse from time to time as he has much to offer.
A book I know, along with the disastorous "Reformation of War" and "Lectures on the FSR". I could write a book on Fullers fallacies - indeed my current Thesis deals with his abysmal ideas on armour. I have little time for the man.


Most countries believe their system is superior. Do you ever expect the Brits to accept that their Sandhurst selection is inferior? Or the yanks for that matter? Never.
Based on many conversations over many years with a lot of serving officers, almost all seem to accept we could do officer training better. It is thus utterly bizarre that grass roots opinion does not translate into action.


And when these little pink poms get back burned brown by the African sun and having lost their puppy fat and had the pimples burned out I promise you they will be so different the family dog will bite them.
Objective as ever.

[JMA]

Well aware. Foch's "Principles of War" dates from 1903 lectures. The Fuller version however were the ones passed into UK training and doctrine.

OK, lets move on from this now shall we? We have established that Fuller did not merely pluck his 9 Principles of War out of the air then.


A book I know, along with the disastorous "Reformation of War" and "Lectures on the FSR". I could write a book on Fullers fallacies - indeed my current Thesis deals with his abysmal ideas on armour. I have little time for the man.

For better or worse nations need their own military thinkers to shake things up a bit... and this is what Fuller and Liddell-Hart certainly did... (and perhaps the status you aspire to?)

Abysmal ideas on armour? Yea I guess with 80 odd years of hindsight one could pick holes in any theory from those times.


Based on many conversations over many years with a lot of serving officers, almost all seem to accept we could do officer training better. It is thus utterly bizarre that grass roots opinion does not translate into action.

Not so difficult to understand. First rule in securing a pension is "do not make waves or rock the boat." The second aspect is that sometimes we need a period of reflection away from a situation so close to the action where we can't see the wood for the trees.


Objective as ever.

Of course. Its called reverse psychology. Let an outsider suggest something to the Brits and one can rest assured that they would rather die than accept advice.

On the training mentioned, yes, certainly even a local Outward Bound course built early into the the training will do wonders... but a similar strongly military approach in an exotic location away from mommy and daddy with no cell phone reception or Internet will be a life changing experience for 18/9 year olds.

[William F. Owen]

For better or worse nations need their own military thinkers to shake things up a bit... and this is what Fuller and Liddell-Hart certainly did... (and perhaps the status you aspire to?)
Shake things up? They had a substantially malign influence. That people still hold thier ideas to be useful and insightful essentially shows the mess military thought is in.

Abysmal ideas on armour? Yea I guess with 80 odd years of hindsight one could pick holes in any theory from those times.
You may want to actually read what Fuller in particular wrote. The result of his rather wooly thinking, was no good tanks for the UK until 1944! Not a mistake the Germans or Russians made ONCE THEY REJECTED Fullers ideas. If you want to start a separate thread on Fuller, go ahead.

I certainly do not aspire to the Fuller/Liddell-hart status. I actually aim at the opposite, based on observing them.
a.) Speak only to an informed community.
b.) Avoid taking credit.
c.) Accept responsibility.
d.) Subject ideas to rigour and avoid coming up with new ideas, where none are needed had someone actually read some books and done some work.


Not so difficult to understand. First rule in securing a pension is "do not make waves or rock the boat." The second aspect is that sometimes we need a period of reflection away from a situation so close to the action where we can't see the wood for the trees.
Concur. Understandable yes, forgivable no.


On the training mentioned, yes, certainly even a local Outward Bound course built early into the the training will do wonders... but a similar strongly military approach in an exotic location away from mommy and daddy with no cell phone reception or Internet will be a life changing experience for 18/9 year olds.
That maybe true, but "being tough" has never been a British Army problem. The problem is ideas and practice, not mental or physical robustness. The British Army got the "getting tough" bit as right as anyone, long ago. No evidence that this is the problem.

[Fuchs]

The poor tank designs of the British till the Centurion were afaik rather the result of an under-appreciation of good guns (too small turret diameter) and shoddy engineering. No other army had the same emphasis on leadership as the German one, so there's no particular British fault in regard to radio equipment and lack of three-an turrets.

Tukachevsky envisaged a division of tank tasks similar to the British and French recipes and it didn't turn out that badly simply because Russian engineers began to appreciate the value of a long 76mm gun in 1939 and were able to fit it into both new major designs.

relevant book (http://www.amazon.co.uk/British-American-Tanks-WWII-Commonwealth/dp/0304355291/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1287224837&sr=8-1)

[William F. Owen]

The poor tank designs of the British till the Centurion were afaik rather the result of an under-appreciation of good guns (too small turret diameter) and shoddy engineering. No other army had the same emphasis on leadership as the German one, so there's no particular British fault in regard to radio equipment and lack of three-an turrets.
That is not what the research done in support of MRES Thesis suggests, though you would be right about the German emphasis on Command.

Tukachevsky envisaged a division of tank tasks similar to the British and French recipes and it didn't turn out that badly simply because Russian engineers began to appreciate the value of a long 76mm gun in 1939 and were able to fit it into both new major designs.

He may have done, but Stalin had him killed and the Soviets reverted to some better proven ideas. A lot of folks have put words in Tukachevsky's mouth. The 76mm gun was one of several things that enabled largely successful tanks designs.

[Fuchs]

Wilf,
it was hardly Liddell-Hart's fault that the British Army was too dumb to issue 40mm HE shells for the 2pounder, even for infantry support tanks as the Mathilda II. Meanwhile French and Germans issued even 37mm HE shells.
The few "close support" CS versions of British tanks which carried a 76mm low velocity gun didn't compensate for this usually overlooked and disastrous hit on British tank firepower in 1939-1941.

Liddell-Hart did neither dictate that a tank needs to have a length:width ratio that made pivoting difficult and allowed only for small turret rings which didn't enable the use of recoiling long 76mm guns.

He wasn't responsible for the timetable which turned the Crusader into a tank which - despite hasty design and subsequent teething problems - didn't absorb lessons from France in time for the Desert War.

L-H didn't request the Covenanter to have a freakishly high ground pressure either, did he?

It wasn't his fault that the 2pdr AT gun was too complex and not superseded in time by a better gun, or for the fact that the British equivalent of the 8-8 was too heavy for tactical deployment in land battles for AT purposes.

L-H wasn't at fault for metallurgical problems in AP shell production which led to many AP shells breaking up on German face-hardened armour, either.

The division into infantry and cruiser tanks wasn't a major mistake either, as proved by the StuG III later on. Guderian was actually wrong on this one early on.


So how exactly did L-H mess up British tank development?

The British tank development mess of 1930s till 1943 looks to me rather like an engineering and procurement bureaucracy failure.

[JMA]

He may have done, but Stalin had him killed and the Soviets reverted to some better proven ideas. A lot of folks have put words in Tukachevsky's mouth.

Better proven ideas? At that time, what ideas were proven?

[JMA]

The British tank development mess of 1930s till 1943 looks to me rather like an engineering and procurement bureaucracy failure.

Yes it does rather, but the British being the British need a scapegoat... in this case two.

Guderian seemed to be happy with what Fuller and Liddell-Hart propoosed as can be seen from his book General Der Panzertruppen Heinz W Guderian Memories (http://www.scribd.com/doc/21460394/General-Der-Panzertruppen-Heinz-W-Guderian-Memories)... so maybe it was more a case that the British were half asleep?


It was principally the books and articles of the Englishmen, Fuller, Liddell-Hart and Martel, that excited my interest and gave food for thought. These farsighted soldiers were even then trying to make the tank something more than just an infantry support weapon. The envisaged it in relationship to the growing motorisation of our age, and thus they became the pioneers of a new type of warfare on the largest scale.

I learned from them the concentration of armour, as employed in the Battle of Cambrai. Further, it was Liddell-Hart who emphasised the use of armoured forces for long-range strokes, operations against the opposing army’s communications, and also proposed a type of armoured division combining panzer and panzer-infantry units. Deeply impressed by these ideas I tried to develop them in a sense practicable for our own army. So I owe many suggestions of our further development to Captain Liddell-Hart.

Surely an example of the proverb; A prophet is not recognized in his own land.

[Fuchs]

Interestingly, General Willmann who attempted a kind of operational revival of the German Heer in about 1996/97 was apparently a huge fan of Liddell-Hart and the "indirect approach". That idea is mentioned many times in the (published) key document of that short reform movement.

I attempted to dig into what exactly happened at that time in the German army last year, but a Lt.Gen. hinted to me that appearance and behind the scenes facts didn't match. I made no further progress with this mini investigation.

There's a nice summary about "Freie Operationen" here:
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll3&CISOPTR=649&filename=650.pdf

The most important effect of this top-down one-man reform movement was probably that it served as an umbrella for many smallish and unspectacular fixes for ill-advised Cold War habits.

----------------------

Some officers/reformers who deserved recognition succeeded much less than Liddell-Hart in exercising influence;

Percy Hobart (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percy_Hobart), an excellent armor formation trainer and father of armoured combat engineers


Sir Archibald Wavell dismissed Hobart into retirement in 1940, based on hostile War Office information due to his "unconventional" ideas about armoured warfare. Hobart joined the Local Defence Volunteers (precursor to the Home Guard) as a lance-corporal and was charged with the defence of his home village, Chipping Campden. "At once, Chipping Campden became a hedgehog of bristling defiance", and Hobart was promoted to become Deputy Area Organiser.[3] Liddell Hart criticised the decision to retire Hobart and wrote an article in the newspaper Sunday Pictorial. Winston Churchill was notified and he had Hobart re-enlisted into the army in 1941.


De Gaulle, to some extent...

[Infanteer]

Guderian seemed to be happy with what Fuller and Liddell-Hart propoosed as can be seen from his book General Der Panzertruppen Heinz W Guderian Memories (http://www.scribd.com/doc/21460394/General-Der-Panzertruppen-Heinz-W-Guderian-Memories)... so maybe it was more a case that the British were half asleep?

From what I can tell, interwar German facination with Liddell-Hart's writings have pretty much been debunked as a post-war sleight of hand by Sir Basil while working with the German generals on their memoirs.

[JMA]

[snip]
That maybe true, but "being tough" has never been a British Army problem. The problem is ideas and practice, not mental or physical robustness. The British Army got the "getting tough" bit as right as anyone, long ago. No evidence that this is the problem.

This was the reply in response to my:


On the training mentioned, yes, certainly even a local Outward Bound course built early into the the training will do wonders... but a similar strongly military approach in an exotic location away from mommy and daddy with no cell phone reception or Internet will be a life changing experience for 18/9 year olds.

I assume you are the same William F. Owen who wrote Patrol-based infantry doctrine (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_1_95/ai_n16346580/?tag=content;col1)?

If that is so then we are closer to agreement than it appears (unless you just like a good argument ;)

I maintain that the infantryman can no longer just be a bayonet... no matter how tough.

As William F. Owen said:


The PB Soldier must be a robust and determined individual, with a useable level of common sense, and arguably some modern armies do contain a significant percentage of such men, and even women...

...A PB Soldier is taught to navigate and live in the field as an individual. He is required to accomplish tests of navigation in both urban and rural terrain, possibly utilizing not just conventional maps but also aerial photographs and sketches. He must prove himself reliant when isolated and he must achieve a useable basic level of first aid and NBC skills. He is taught individual field craft and stalking in much the same way snipers are traditionally trained, and ultimately, he is taught to shoot under field rather than range conditions.


And yes I agree with that too.

That is why I advocate the kind of individual training I outlined above. See it like a rising tide needing to lift all the ships rather than just cherry-picking the best of the rest and probably underutilising them.

Take your average citizen and mold him to the best of his potential into the kind of individually skilled soldier needed on the modern battlefield. Get them young. Go to your traditional recruiting areas and fund/subsidize their attendance on a normal commercial Outward Bound course while still at school. Threat them like Premiership football clubs academies do their young and promising. Invite them to your Regimental days. Train them up in various proficiencies (like the Boy Scouts) etc etc

Now why Kenya is a good option is that what I would propose for the training at the various levels is because it would probably be problematic in the UK given the lunatic Health and Safety gestapo that exist.

(BTW have you updated that 2006 piece? If so where.)

[JMA]

From what I can tell, interwar German facination with Liddell-Hart's writings have pretty much been debunked as a post-war sleight of hand by Sir Basil while working with the German generals on their memoirs.

Difficult to accept the obvious?

Stick with what Guderian wrote. That is enough. Fuller and Liddell-Hart provided the spark... no more... no less.

[Granite_State]

From what I can tell, interwar German facination with Liddell-Hart's writings have pretty much been debunked as a post-war sleight of hand by Sir Basil while working with the German generals on their memoirs.

Yes, John Mearsheimer wrote the book on that, I think it was called Liddell Hart and the Weight of History.

Liddell Hart wrote and said some interesting things, but he was also all over the map. He, along with many others, drew the wrong lessons from the Spanish Civil War, and was opposed to a continental commitment until pretty late in the game.

[Granite_State]

Some officers/reformers who deserved recognition succeeded much less than Liddell-Hart in exercising influence;

Percy Hobart (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percy_Hobart), an excellent armor formation trainer and father of armoured combat engineers



On the contrary. Hobart exercised entirely too much influence in the Thirties, and was a major factor in faulty British armor tactics (the lack of combined arms) that got them kicked around the desert for two years. Auchinleck and others had to rebuild an army that he had set up for failure.

[JMA]

On the contrary. Hobart exercised entirely too much influence in the Thirties, and was a major factor in faulty British armor tactics (the lack of combined arms) that got them kicked around the desert for two years. Auchinleck and others had to rebuild an army that he had set up for failure.

Can you provide some sources to substantiate this please?

[JMA]

Yes, John Mearsheimer wrote the book on that, I think it was called Liddell Hart and the Weight of History.

Liddell Hart wrote and said some interesting things, but he was also all over the map. He, along with many others, drew the wrong lessons from the Spanish Civil War, and was opposed to a continental commitment until pretty late in the game.

There were no positives in Liddell-Hart's contribution?

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,
it was hardly Liddell-Hart's fault that the British Army was too dumb to issue 40mm HE shells for the 2pounder, .....
Liddell-Hart never really said much about AFV per se. The guilty party is Fuller. Liddell-Hart was more imprecise about his ideas, and really majored on his supposed "Indirect Approach."

Dumb was not the problem. It wasn't ignorance. It was well-sold ideas put forth by supposedly smart men.


The division into infantry and cruiser tanks wasn't a major mistake either, as proved by the StuG III later on. Guderian was actually wrong on this one early on.
I beg to differ. If you mean the StuG III/IV were excellent at infantry support, I would agree. The creation of "Cruiser/Cavalry" tanks was a disaster. Correct me if I am wrong, but were not StuGs manned by the artillery and attached to the infantry?



The British tank development mess of 1930s till 1943 looks to me rather like an engineering and procurement bureaucracy failure.
Their were engineering and bureaucracy problems, and all was made far worse by the "Tank Avant Garde" who really screwed it up. Had they know what they had wanted, - and been right, they rest would have followed.

[William F. Owen]

I assume you are the same William F. Owen who wrote Patrol-based infantry doctrine (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_1_95/ai_n16346580/?tag=content;col1)?

If that is so then we are closer to agreement than it appears (unless you just like a good argument ;)
I am.... and all the ideas contained in that article are actually a plea to recover to the basics, and raise the bar. In point of fact, there is little wrong with the actual practice of UK infantry training. The fault lies with the ideas that underpin it. UK infantry tends to be very well built, but just poorly designed, if that makes sense.

See it like a rising tide needing to lift all the ships rather than just cherry-picking the best of the rest and probably underutilising them.
Concur. Good analogy.


Now why Kenya is a good option is that what I would propose for the training at the various levels is because it would probably be problematic in the UK given the lunatic Health and Safety gestapo that exist.
Lunatic Health and Safety exist anywhere that UK troops do. Kenya makes not odds. There is also Cyprus, which is probably one of the best Coy and Platoon training areas anywhere in the world. - BUT, I also believe that some infantry training in the cold and wet is very essential, as that sort of environment really tests determination and personal administration.


(BTW have you updated that 2006 piece? If so where.)
No, but watch this space.

[William F. Owen]

There were no positives in Liddell-Hart's contribution?
Some. His work on Infantry Doctrine in the early 1920's was good. Some was a bit blue sky and stating the obvious, but never really wholly misleading. Having said that he copied and plagiarised Foch's ideas and then sort to destroy Foch's reputation.

After 1945, Liddell-Hart allied himself with the "blitzkrieg" and basically re-invented himself. - BUT, if you read his work, little he says is either insightful, original (not required) or really useful.

There is a far larger issue, that men such as Liddell-Hart, Fuller, and I would also include T.E. Lawrence and Boyd, were masters of gently walking the limelight path, in a way to ensures the actual content of their ideas is never really subject to investigation. MOST Military Theory is rubbish, and that includes the stuff that has come out in the last 10 years.

[Fuchs]

I beg to differ. If you mean the StuG III/IV were excellent at infantry support, I would agree. The creation of "Cruiser/Cavalry" tanks was a disaster. Correct me if I am wrong, but were not StuGs manned by the artillery and attached to the infantry?

That's correct, but the key here is that a division between infantry-supporting tanks for solving tactical problems of infantry-centric forces (infantry divisions) were necessary next to more mobile tanks in motorized forces (armour/mech. infantry divisions or brigades) for solving operational problems.
History showed that the former had the potential of being more cost-efficient tank destroyers as well.


The British infantry tank/cruiser tank and especially the French dispersion of tanks has been bashed in military history and doctrine-related writings a lot, but unfairly. Guderian was wrong in the 30's on this, the British, French, Russians and Manstein were right: At that time the armies needed both infantry and cruiser tanks.
The exact designs (infantry tank with small gun in turret or assault gun with casemate gun with decent HE effect) was only a(n important) detail.

http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/06/assault-guns-past-and-future.html

[William F. Owen]

At that time the armies needed both infantry and cruiser tanks.
I do not agree, but as to why, wait for my thesis.

[slapout9]

I do not agree, but as to why, wait for my thesis.

Can you tell us when that will be?

[JMA]

I am.... and all the ideas contained in that article are actually a plea to recover to the basics, and raise the bar. In point of fact, there is little wrong with the actual practice of UK infantry training. The fault lies with the ideas that underpin it. UK infantry tends to be very well built, but just poorly designed, if that makes sense.

It is the system of the rifle section that is the problem. There you (UK) have an evolving structure. Take this article as the start point for discussion:

The Infantry Section: Lifting its Capability (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Bain,_The_Infantry_Section.pdf) of June 2007.

Now the problem is with all these orgs and structures is for what war were they planned for? Have meaningful adaptations been carried out to cater for Afghanistan?

The weight factor is revisited in the article. Its the body armour that is the problem, not the other stuff.


Lunatic Health and Safety exist anywhere that UK troops do. Kenya makes not odds. There is also Cyprus, which is probably one of the best Coy and Platoon training areas anywhere in the world. - BUT, I also believe that some infantry training in the cold and wet is very essential, as that sort of environment really tests determination and personal administration.

The Health and Safety gestapo is self inflicted... so no one but the Brits can help themselves on this score.

I think you are missing my point.

This one month training phase (I am talking about) should be part of basic training and carried out as early as possible. Once the troopies pass out or the cadets get commissioned, then yes, for an army that my fight anywhere and everywhere over the world training should be carried out in as many environments as needed (or more realistically as can be afforded).

All environments have their challenges. For example I've seen snow a handful of time in my life and been in it twice... so training in that environment would have been a real challenge for me and the other locals.

BTW on my Cadet course in 1974 we did a weeks Outward Bound training. We enjoyed it. I'll email my course officer and see what he felt the army got out of it.

[William F. Owen]

The Infantry Section: Lifting its Capability (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Bain,_The_Infantry_Section.pdf) of June 2007.

Now the problem is with all these orgs and structures is for what war were they planned for? Have meaningful adaptations been carried out to cater for Afghanistan?

The weight factor is revisited in the article. Its the body armour that is the problem, not the other stuff.
I have a number of issues with that article, but the basic message about Body Armour needs to be taken way more seriously than it is currently.

I had an article in the same publication here (http://www.rusi.org/publications/defencesystems/contention/ref:A4672BFF1561B7/). - and I would now modify some of that position.


The Health and Safety gestapo is self inflicted... so no one but the Brits can help themselves on this score. Inflicted via the Government via Europe. - Just like the Land Mine ban.


I think you are missing my point.

This one month training phase (I am talking about) should be part of basic training and carried out as early as possible.
I don't think I am. I have had numerous discussions about a "Knife and Mess tin" type course and/or "Outward Bound/Adventure training." - It has great merit providing it is applied at the right time for the right reasons. Personally I wouldn't restrict it just to officer training, but there again, I wouldn't start training anyone as an officer until he had at the very least completed Basic Training anyway.

[TAH]

Concepts like 3 to 1 ratios are only valid when comparing like or similar capabiity systems, weapons or units.

comparing the average WW2 infantry platoon armed with bolt-action rifles and a limited number of MGs to any of today's cutting edge infantry with magazine fed assault rifles, ICOM intra-squad comms, body armor etc will reveal that a straight comparison of numbers only is invalid. The concept of Relative Combat Power was an attempt by the US during the late 80s early 90s to address this issue. Sometimes it worked, sometimes it did not.:confused:

[JMA]

I don't think I am. I have had numerous discussions about a "Knife and Mess tin" type course and/or "Outward Bound/Adventure training." - It has great merit providing it is applied at the right time for the right reasons. Personally I wouldn't restrict it just to officer training, but there again, I wouldn't start training anyone as an officer until he had at the very least completed Basic Training anyway.

OK so we can agree that this sort of training has merit. I suggest that it be carried out early in the training. And yes as the modern requirement for more individually skilled and reliable soldiers across the board increases all soldiers should receive this training.

We can revisit the desirability of officers having been trained as basic soldiers before being selected for officer training if you wish. I put it to you it is not the (comparative) inferior basic training that is important but rather the experience of soldiering in the ranks for a year (including basic training) which has the value.