The Army: A Profession of Arms

[Chuck Grenchus, CAPE]

In his recent Army Greenbook article titled “The Second Decade,” the Army Chief of Staff addresses the topic of the Army Profession of Arms, and the merits of examining the impact of a decade of persistent conflict on the profession. (See http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2010/10/Documents/Casey_1010.pdf ). The same topic was discussed in one of the Institute of Land Warfare (ILW) panels during the annual AUSA Meeting and Exposition. And earlier this year, the Commanding General of TRADOC dedicated an entire blog discussion to the Army profession. (See http://tradoclive.dodlive.mil/ ). Why an increasing emphasis on this topic and related discussion?

In short, periodic self-reflections and efforts to improve are what healthy professions or organizations do from time to time. In light of the influences , challenges, and even stresses that our Army has operated amidst for nearly a decade, coupled with the fact that ours is indeed an Army in transition, a valid need exists to “review, reemphasize and recommit to our profession” as the Commanding General of TRADOC recently stated. The persistent conflict has impacted both positively and negatively on the state of the Army Profession of Arms. This conflict has exposed strengths that have sustained us, while at the same time it has uncovered tensions and points of friction in our Army culture and DOTMLPF-P.

On 27 Oct 2010, the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army signed a Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Review of the Army Profession in an Era of Persistent Conflict. This TOR sets the stage for a future comprehensive review to examine the state of our profession after nearly a decade of war. The review will be comprehensive, and will include a survey of the entire force, analysis of relevant trends and indicators of individual and unit behavior, sustainment of an Army-wide dialog and discussion . . . all of which lead to a review of existing policies and programs that apply to the Army as an institution. A detailed concept plan for this is currently being developed.

The Army Chief of Staff acknowledges the importance of this to our profession’s future: “ . . . it is essential that we take a hard look at ourselves and ensure the we fully understand what we have been through, how we have changed and how we must adapt to succeed in an era of persistent conflict. I encourage all leaders to think about how to accomplish this. It is essential to the continued effectiveness of our profession and to ensure that our young leaders are prepared for success in the decade.”

[Chris Barnes]

This Profession of Arms campaign will focus largely on 4 domains: military-technical, human development, moral-ethical, and political-cultural. It is important that the Army ensure strength in each domain.

I'm curious as to what domain people think needs to be studied the most.

[Pete]

The Airborne guys I knew used to say it was the Profession of Legs that brought the Army low. ;)

[Bill Jakola]

After 23 years of Army service, I find this question of what it means to be a profession of arms particularly interesting, since it seems to define the cultural fabric of my passion to serve my country while also subordinating that professional culture to our national ideals and civilian leadership. To defend our Nation with the ethical application of force of arms, our profession must maintain a clear sense of who and what we are by honestly studying our history to gain a more complete and nuanced understanding of our successes and our failures. War is such dangerous activity that people have developed the profession of arms, a dedicated group of certified, trained, equipped, organized, and led professional Soldiers, to execute warfare, but in the United States, as in many other countries, the profession remains subordinate to the political leadership who ultimately determine the scope of war.

This subordination of the profession to the political is key to understanding who is a member of the profession of arms and who is not. For example, Soldiers are clearly members, but are retired Soldiers members or newly hired Soldiers who have not completed basic training? Are DoD civilians part of the profession; they are certainly professionals doing military work, but are they working in the profession of arms. Are civilian contractors part of the profession? What about the civilian leadership, the President, or the Secretary of Defense or the Army?

Anchoring it's members in in a unified view of itself is a requirement of any profession and especially important to the profession of arms.

[KNLeavitt]

This subordination of the profession to the political is key to understanding who is a member of the profession of arms and who is not. For example, Soldiers are clearly members, but are retired Soldiers members or newly hired Soldiers who have not completed basic training? Are DoD civilians part of the profession; they are certainly professionals doing military work, but are they working in the profession of arms. Are civilian contractors part of the profession? What about the civilian leadership, the President, or the Secretary of Defense or the Army?

Anchoring it's members in in a unified view of itself is a requirement of any profession and especially important to the profession of arms.

Execellent points, Bill. I envision that what we discover and describe will be something of an apprenticeship model--people are initially admitted to the profession through the declaration (oath) of values and loyalty, but new members must view themselves as operating in a limited capacity with much to learn.

One important issue to consider is the roll of experience versus expertise/training. While we have young soldiers with a lot of specific warfighting experience, "credentialling" them without a greater understanding of the profession would be unwise.

Ultimately, professionals are those who have a proper framework for making sense of their experiences, and turn those experiences into useful tacit knowledge. Without that framework, lessons learned in Afghanistan or Iraq won't meaningfully inform these soldiers if they're deployed to a refugee situation, natural disaster, or different combat scenario in the future.

Professionals not only capitalize on experience, but do so in a meaningful way.

[Bob's World]

Perhaps part of our current problem are our efforts to overly expand the "profession" of arms to all who bear arms in the defense of their country. Certainly this is not the historic approach in the U.S.

European "professionals" rightfully looked down upon American armies made up of armature citizen soldiers as lacking the doctrinal uniformity of training, dress, mannerisms and tactics found in their professional forces. We wore the fact of our military being made up of such armatures as a badge of honor, and similarly mocked them for their stilted, predictable, "professional" ways.

Too much of a good thing, however is a bad thing, so we created the military academies so as to always have a core of professionals to build our citizen armies around whenever the need for such a force drove its formation.

The current professional force, like the strategies of containment it was formed to implement, is as obsolete as the smooth bore musket. The challenge is to get senior leaders to embrace such thinking after the current model being "what right looks like" for three generations.

Americans like their army being a little rough around the edges, and they like it being something that good citizens form in times of need, and that melts back down to its professional core once that need is over. The irony is, that the "profession of arms" that prevents the formation of such a citizenry, is perhaps the group that grieves their fading from the American fabric the most.

[Bill Jakola]

Americans like their army being a little rough around the edges, and they like it being something that good citizens form in times of need, and that melts back down to its professional core once that need is over. The irony is, that the "profession of arms" that prevents the formation of such a citizenry, is perhaps the group that grieves their fading from the American fabric the most.

Bob,

I don't mean to take anything from your excellent points but I would like to refocus them a bit. You maintain "Americans like their army being a little rough around the edges", however, I suggest Americans like their army to successfully defend the country no matter how rough or refined.

I agree with your view of the historical evolution of the American military is important and we need to keep the public interest in mind. But since we do not know what challenges we may face in the future and how much time we will have to respond, we cannot afford to build an army just in time of need "something that good citizens form in times of need".

If we have a quality professional force prepared to respond to the next challenge rapidly and at the earliest sign of trouble, by actively seeking out the weak signals, we are more likely to address the problem when it is small and less costly in resources of blood and treasure, to nip the problem in the bud so to speak. If we follow your advice, our forces would not be ready to react quickly and we would have to wait while we train the "good citizens" before we could act thus making us far less proactive and more likely to ignore small problems until they become overwhelming consuming far more blood and treasure.

Just saying.

Bill Jakola

[Global Scout]

This Profession of Arms campaign will focus largely on 4 domains: military-technical, human development, moral-ethical, and political-cultural. It is important that the Army ensure strength in each domain.

Chris as you know, technology constantly evolves and how we decide to adapt or employ it enhances (or detracts) from our ability to do our job, but it doesn't define our purpose and we're clearly not about technology. The same can be said about human development.

Our moral-ethical and political-cultural (not sure how you separate these two) IMO are clearly what defines are profession.

On a side note I agree with Bob's W that we risk losing something (and already have, again IMO) by over professionalizing the Army (which is frequently practiced as standardization, you will enter the borg and become incapable of independent thinking). Even SF has a lost a lot of the individualism (controlled by a common purpose) when it went to the Regt system.

Definitely important topics for our Army and our nation.

[Bob's World]

There are two things we tend to do that I find worrisome:

1. Intel-driven operations that look for a threat to defeat as the root of every problem.

2. "Means"-driven operations that look for "Ways" to employ the Means we posses to defeat the threat derived by the Intel guys.

Question: Was Iraq the best "Ways" to defend America, or was it merely the best Ways to employ the heavy conventional Means that we possessed to engage the threat identified by the Intel guys???

There was no feasible way to employ those means in Afghanistan at that time, so they sat idle as senior leaders fretted over the threats painted by the Intel community. Where else could we possibly employ them, Iran?? (Probably lends some insight into why that bogeyman keeps getting tossed onto the table as well).

Imagine if when VP Cheney said "Sir, we need to go finish the job your father started with Saddam, besides the intel guys were just telling me that they've long suspected he possesses weapons of mass destruction" (ok, truth in lending, I have no idea what the VP recommended to the President); the Chairman would have spoken up that such an operation would take 90% of the current active force, or require at least 18 months to mobilize, train, and deploy an enhanced force made up of National Guard units; coupled with a "small draft" to ensure we had adequate troops in the pipeline.

Do we still go to Iraq? I doubt it. It was never essential, it was just the convenient Ways that fit our Means. The requirement to build a war fighting force in order to wage war provides the time to gain a broader perspective of the situation than the one provided in a morning intel brief in the Oval Office with a handful of senior leaders. In the Cold War we did not have that luxury, we had to have a larger than normal standing army to help deter that first push. We have different deterrence requirements today, and should shape our force to meet them.

No, in today's environment the US can be defended quite well by a much smaller force that the one we fund today. Trimming off the NATO mission and allowing the Europeans to resource their own national security would be a good step toward right-sizing, as would trimming off a half-dozen equally obsolete Cold War positions in Asia and the delusions of nation building as an answer to insurgency.

It is time for a return to strategy-driven operations; perhaps then we'll stop searching for round holes (Intel-driven) to pound our square peg (Means-driven) through.

Just a thought.

[Chris Case]

If we have a quality professional force prepared to respond to the next challenge rapidly and at the earliest sign of trouble, by actively seeking out the weak signals, we are more likely to address the problem when it is small and less costly in resources of blood and treasure, to nip the problem in the bud so to speak.

According to international law, this is illegal. It also violates the moral reasoning that underpins international law (Just War Theory). That being said, it does not follow that we won't do it anyway. My guess is that it isn't because anyone in the military necessarily wants to intentionally violate these laws and norms, it is that they have no idea what they are or how to apply them. The profession's interest in its moral-ethical knowledge usually ends with a notion of "leadership=ethics" (internal jurisdiction) and "following orders=ethics" (external).

[Bill Jakola]

There

Do we still go to Iraq? I doubt it. It was never essential, it was just the convenient Ways that fit our Means.

Bob's W,

Great point and I completely agree that whatever force we build will tend to be used in ways that are more convenient to the strengths of that particular Army. So the question is what type of profession of arms should build. That in essence is the reason for this discussion the CSA asked us to have.

I value your end, ways, means, perspective as it really highlights the connection between the decision of what type of Army we make to what type of national strategy and policy we can follow. "Build it and they will come" may work for a field of dreams but in the real world we should think deeply about such decisions.

Do we need a large forward deployed force to keep us safe at home; maybe not, perhaps a smaller more expeditionary force would serves us better. But either way our political leadership may ask us to do things we did not anticipate, so a core aspect of any force should be the ability to adapt while engaged in the fight. The more adaptable the force the more easily it can transition along the full spectrum of conflict. Some may point out that such an adaptable force is also easier to use and thus more likely to be used. Providing political leaders with a profession of arms means they may be less inclined to solve problems with other means, but not providing such a force would leave the nation less prepared.

As a profession, we should strive to provide the most effective force possible within our means and trust the political leadership to use it appropriately. As a profession we should not attempt to limit our political leaders by designing a less than optimal force.


Bill Jakola

[Bill Jakola]

According to international law, this is illegal. It also violates the moral reasoning that underpins international law (Just War Theory). That being said, it does not follow that we won't do it anyway. My guess is that it isn't because anyone in the military necessarily wants to intentionally violate these laws and norms, it is that they have no idea what they are or how to apply them. The profession's interest in its moral-ethical knowledge usually ends with a notion of "leadership=ethics" (internal jurisdiction) and "following orders=ethics" (external).


Okay, Chris, you are going to have to educate me. I do not see how preparing our force to be more responsive to a rapidly changing enviroment is illegal.

Bill Jakola

[Chris Case]

Okay, Chris, you are going to have to educate me. I do not see how preparing our force to be more responsive to a rapidly changing enviroment is illegal.

Bill Jakola

Here you are asserting a slightly different claim, but I assume the intent is the same. Preparing to be responsive to a "rapidly changing environment" is not illegal. I did not make that claim. Your claim went beyond preparation to an ability "to respond to the next challenge rapidly and at the earliest sign of trouble, by actively seeking out the weak signals, we are more likely to address the problem when it is small and less costly in resources of blood and treasure, to nip the problem in the bud so to speak." This is called preventive war in Just War Theory and preventive war is illegal in international law [see UN Charter, Art. 39-51]. This is rather uncontroversial. President Bush's NSS in 2002 makes an expanded claim for preemption "where the threats are large enough [p. 15, note 1]," but it did not claim a right to go around the world finding "weak signals" and eliminating possible future threats. Some claim that his NSS advocated preventive war and that this is the "Bush Doctrine," but neither the President nor his legal advisors made that claim. If you are interested, check out Jus ad Bellum criteria for more information on when it is considered justified for states to resort to the use of force.

[jmm99]

by Chris Case that this, simply as stated:


from Bill Jakola
If we have a quality professional force prepared to respond to the next challenge rapidly and at the earliest sign of trouble, by actively seeking out the weak signals, we are more likely to address the problem when it is small and less costly in resources of blood and treasure, to nip the problem in the bud so to speak.

constitutes a prescription for either preventive or preemptive war.

Bill's prescription does not necessarily call for a resort to armed force ab initio - nor, does Bob's World in his numerous posts on "nipping things in the bud".

Regards

Mike

[Bill Jakola]

by Chris Case that this, simply as stated:



constitutes a prescription for either preventive or preemptive war.

Bill's prescription does not necessarily call for a resort to armed force ab initio - nor, does Bob's World in his numerous posts on "nipping things in the bud".

Regards

Mike

Look, I am not advocating preemptive war but keeping an eye on potential future problems seems only prudent.

[Chris Case]

by Chris Case that this, simply as stated:



constitutes a prescription for either preventive or preemptive war.

Bill's prescription does not necessarily call for a resort to armed force ab initio - nor, does Bob's World in his numerous posts on "nipping things in the bud".

Regards

Mike

Mike,

Your claim is true--but my pointing out the possibility is hardly "ludicrous" as the title of your reply claims. I also did not claim there was any "necessity" in what Bill said either. In fact I even stated that I doubted "anyone in the military necessarily wants to intentionally violate these laws and norms." So I don't know where your claim that I somehow bestowed "necessity" of any sort on Bill's claim gets it support? But, I am the one who draws "a ludicrous conclusion" according to you. Thanks for your careful attention to what I wrote.

In addition, you claim that I somehow think that Bill's remark "constitutes a prescription for either preventive or preemptive war." I am not sure how my pointing out that descriptively his claim was (particularly without further qualifications), by definition, a description of a form of preventive war. I am not sure what you understand "prescribe" to mean, but my reply to Bill's claim was in an effort to clarify what he was describing. His response continues this effort towards a clear description. He has asserted that this is not what he meant to describe. Great. I never assumed he had bad intent or motives, but I do think we should make an effort to be clear when thinking about these things.

Now, if we want to get into a discussion of what sort of means that the military can use "to nip things in the bud" ab intitio that doesn't constitute force, war, etc., that could be interesting.

Best regards,
Chris

[Bob's World]

"nipping things in the bud" is what the Special Forces community is doing in dozens of countries around the world every day. It is the largest aspect of Foreign Internal Defense. It is done best by small footprint operations executed with a regularity and in a manner that builds enduring relationships at the personal level. It works well.

Security Force Assistance is a steroid infused version of the same that could potentially see the Army attempting to send BCTs into a mission typically addressed by an ODA. Bigger footprints, different manner, less personal, less frequent. Another example of "Means-driven" operations. How to justify all these BCTs as operations draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan, employ them against an enduring mission that someone else is already doing just fine.

The Army did the same thing prior to the Balkans kicking off when it got involved with NORTHCOM and the National Guard's mission domestically. Increased OPTEMPO overseas soon made them wish they hadn't attempted that hostile takeover.

Yes, we need a professional core to the army, but we also need an army that does more than just change missions, it must change size as well.

[Chris Case]

"nipping things in the bud" is what the Special Forces community is doing in dozens of countries around the world every day. It is the largest aspect of Foreign Internal Defense. It is done best by small footprint operations executed with a regularity and in a manner that builds enduring relationships at the personal level. It works well.

This is interesting. How do we classify these types of actions? Are they acts of war, politics, justified self-defense, etc.? Also, regarding the claim that "It works well," I personally think we need to be more specific. Works well for what?

[Ken White]

...my pointing out the possibility is hardly "ludicrous" as the title of your reply claims..."Make standing broad jumps at wrong conclusions often?" ;)

That does not equate to ludicrous, a judgment call, however it does seem to imply that your comment was perhaps a bit hasty.
...my reply to Bill's claim was in an effort to clarify what he was describing...Perfectly understandable and I agree with you that he wasn't clear. Still, it helps to phrase questions with a "Did you mean..." as opposed to "That is flipping criminal..." :wry:

FWIW, you can use the search function on the site and discover that many discussions on the topic have been held and the post above by Robert C. Jones stating his opinion on what should happen have been echoed by me and others -- still others have posed alternatives.

Here are some Threads on or near the topic: LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10437&highlight=preventive+war), LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7960&highlight=foreign+internal+development), LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7949&highlight=foreign+internal+development).

[120mm]

It would also help if we actually conducted diplomacy, and had a robust diplomatic corps, and used the DoS instead of the DoD to elminate the need to constantly "nip things in the bud" militarily.

[Chris Case]

That does not equate to ludicrous, a judgment call, however it does seem to imply that your comment was perhaps a bit hasty.Perfectly understandable and I agree with you that he wasn't clear. Still, it helps to phrase questions with a "Did you mean..." as opposed to "That is flipping criminal..." :wry:
.

Thanks for your comments. Please do not take this the wrong way, but since it already appears that I am off on the wrong foot in the "Small Wars" community, I will push ahead hoping that trying harder with the same strategy will eventually lead to success. Perhaps you could clarify a few things for me to make me a better discussion forum participant?

A bit hasty? How is this implied? I don't follow. Is their an implied rule to wait for people to respond to their own posts to clarify comments they have already made? If so, what is the point of a "discussion forum?"

I am not certain why it supposed to be nicer, more charitable, etc. to assume that someone has not stated what they mean when they assert something. Is it proper etiquette on discussion forums to assume people don't mean what they say? Is the assumption that they don't understand their own words or how others may interpret them? This clearly happens and is the point of discussions, but I think assuming that people mean what they say is actually more charitable and less condescending than starting with "Did you mean...."

Also, endorsing clarity while putting words ["flippin"] and implicature into my reply that were not there, all the while accusing me of somehow running afoul of being nice, is a nice touch. The implicature could be the result of me not understanding how my words would be taken given the way people on the forum seem to think--fair enough. It appears to be the case that I have run afoul of the norms of this discourse community. In the future I will avoid being hasty and responding to posts, I will assume people to not mean what they say in their posts and if I have a question that I hope will further the discussion in a thread, I will do a search through previous discussions so that I can find the answer (or something close) in a different thread so that I can keep the my proposed discussion to myself.

Feel free to vote me off your island. I don't seem to fit in very well. But, thanks for the brief opportunity to pop in to discuss the "profession of arms."
To answer Chris Barnes' question from earlier in the thread, I think the moral-ethical and political-cultural domains will require the most amount of study and will be the most difficult given the Army's culture.

[Ken White]

A bit hasty? How is this implied? I don't follow. Is their an implied rule to wait for people to respond to their own posts to clarify comments they have already made? If so, what is the point of a "discussion forum?"You assumed he could mean 'preventive war,' used that as an interrogative subject line and then went into a discussion of that topic. I merely suggested that instead of imputing something not said, a question of intent might have been more appropriate.
I am not certain why it supposed to be nicer, more charitable, etc. to assume that someone has not stated what they mean when they assert something. Is it proper etiquette on discussion forums to assume people don't mean what they say? Is the assumption that they don't understand their own words or how others may interpret them? This clearly happens and is the point of discussions, but I think assuming that people mean what they say is actually more charitable and less condescending than starting with "Did you mean...."It's a question civility, no more. This is an imperfect medium, the little nuances of gesture and tone that we all use in face to face communication are lacking here, so one should IMO attempt to replace those missing body language hints with simply a little caution in reading into things.
Also, endorsing clarity while putting words ["flippin"] and implicature into my reply that were not there, all the while accusing me of somehow running afoul of being nice, is a nice touch.My apologies. My wife has long contended my attempts at humor don't hack it... :(
The implicature could be the result of me not understanding how my words would be taken given the way people on the forum seem to think--fair enough. It appears to be the case that I have run afoul of the norms of this discourse community.Not really, you assumed something and we all do that. jmm's post and mine were merely suggestions that it is usually better to try to avoid doing that -- you're free to ignore them. :wry:
In the future I will avoid being hasty and responding to posts, I will assume people to not mean what they say in their posts and if I have a question that I hope will further the discussion in a thread, I will do a search through previous discussions so that I can find the answer (or something close) in a different thread so that I can keep the my proposed discussion to myself.I don't think you need to go that far. Searching threads is not necessary prior to commenting -- civility is. Thinking a second before posting helps. You were not un civil, initially, however, your first post did seem to me and others to be bit hasty is assuming implications not seen by others who have seen the discussion before. That you had not is understandable and non problematic. That you received what you apparently think are less than civil responses seems to have led to this:
Feel free to vote me off your island. I don't seem to fit in very well. But, thanks for the brief opportunity to pop in to discuss the "profession of arms."I don't think anyone wants to vote you off the island, rather your participation is welcome. However, no one's going to put up with what could seem to be unnecessary chips on shoulders. Undue sensitivity can be a detriment.
To answer Chris Barnes' question from earlier in the thread, I think the moral-ethical and political-cultural domains will require the most amount of study and will be the most difficult given the Army's culture.I think you're correct on both counts.

[jmm99]

as to this:


from 120mm
It would also help if we actually conducted diplomacy, and had a robust diplomatic corps, and used the DoS instead of the DoD to elminate the need to constantly "nip things in the bud" militarily.

but, given DOD Directive 3000.05 (Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations) and its progeny, the military has been (and into the foreseeable future, will be) tasked not only with the "M" component, but with the "DIE" components as a practical matter.

Tomorrow's armed forces will have to deal not only with the military "struggle" (the continuation of Politik by other means - mainly military, the "M" component), but also with the political "struggle" (a different continuation of Politik by still other means - mainly political, the "DIE" components). The injection of the political struggle into the mix will certainly impact the "moral-ethical and political-cultural domains" of our (US) armed forces.

We (US) have (doctrinally) apolitical armed forces. Moving aspects of the political struggle into their tasked missions will most probably give rise to moral-ethical and political-cultural issues which in the past have been consigned to the non-military side of the ledger - and which generally have been considered "political questions" constitutionally.

The general question, in a "DoD 3000.05 world", is how deeply do our armed forces become involved in "Politik" - that is, in formulating the policies that are the driving engines behind both the military struggle and the political struggle ?

More specifically, how deeply should individual members of the military, because of ""moral-ethical and political-cultural" concerns, become involved and respond to policy decisions made by the National Command Authorities ?

E.g., a decision to go to war ("Jus ad Bellum" for those who prefer Latin), where arguments are made for and against characterizing the decision as an aggressive war, a preventive war, a preemptive war (different, BTW, from a preventive war), a just war, etc., etc.

What should happen to "PVT-GEN Jakola", if (after he has considered all of the "jus ad bellum" arguments) he says "Hell no, I won't go" ?

Regards

Mike

[Chris Case]

Ken,

Again, thanks for the comments. I have not taken the least bit of umbrage at having a discussion. Do not infer from me trying to be clear about what I am saying and what other people are saying in response as some sort of offense or annoyance. I argue all the time and don't see it as a bad thing. It is certainly not something that annoys me. If it did I would need to find another job. I don't see how engaging in argument to get clear about what we are talking about equates to a chip on shoulder, but if that is how you take it, okay. A few last chips to flick and I will stop trying.


You assumed he could mean 'preventive war,' used that as an interrogative subject line and then went into a discussion of that topic.

I did not assume anything in the part of my claim that has apparently been so offensive and I did assume something in the part that no one has yet pointed to as showing a lack of civility. I quoted a description and made a claim that, on its face, it was a definition of preventive war. That is all. No assumption needed about what he meant for this part of my claim. I then did assume that he did not mean to endorse anything illegal, to wit, preventive war. He came back and clarified that my assumption about what he meant was correct. Fine. We are now clear and can move on to a further discussion. However, other people felt a need to jump to his defense and muddy the water with what I take to be poor reasoning. Fine as well, but if the idea is that, in order to be civil, I really should make no effort to be clear about what I said or didn't say, then I see no point in my continuing any further discussion in such a civil place.

[Chris Case]

as to this:



but, given DOD Directive 3000.05 (Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations) and its progeny, the military has been (and into the foreseeable future, will be) tasked not only with the "M" component, but with the "DIE" components as a practical matter.

Tomorrow's armed forces will have to deal not only with the military "struggle" (the continuation of Politik by other means - mainly military, the "M" component), but also with the political "struggle" (a different continuation of Politik by still other means - mainly political, the "DIE" components). The injection of the political struggle into the mix will certainly impact the "moral-ethical and political-cultural domains" of our (US) armed forces.

We (US) have (doctrinally) apolitical armed forces. Moving aspects of the political struggle into their tasked missions will most probably give rise to moral-ethical and political-cultural issues which in the past have been consigned to the non-military side of the ledger - and which generally have been considered "political questions" constitutionally.

The general question, in a "DoD 3000.05 world", is how deeply do our armed forces become involved in "Politik" - that is, in formulating the policies that are the driving engines behind both the military struggle and the political struggle ?

More specifically, how deeply should individual members of the military, because of ""moral-ethical and political-cultural" concerns, become involved and respond to policy decisions made by the National Command Authorities ?

E.g., a decision to go to war ("Jus ad Bellum" for those who prefer Latin), where arguments are made for and against characterizing the decision as an aggressive war, a preventive war, a preemptive war (different, BTW, from a preventive war), a just war, etc., etc.

What should happen to "PVT-GEN Jakola", if (after he has considered all of the "jus ad bellum" arguments) he says "Hell no, I won't go" ?

Regards

Mike

These are questions that the military needs to address.

I would argue that the Army is already involved in formulating policies that drive political struggle. In fact, I think it has been involved in it for a long time. Even setting aside the Generals from World War II and prior, consider the role of people like Generals Taylor, Abrams, Powell and Petraeus. They all made decisions that influenced political struggle both internally and externally.

Now it seems that what has been happening has just been made more explicit. Many of the futures concepts that the Army has published seem to entail the collapse of the distinction between the ad bellum and in bello.

A few more questions:

Does this mean that the Army needs to consider something like selective conscientious objection for a professionalized force? Or does being a "professional" remove the ability to choose not to fight?

Is the military professional the sort of professional who does not have the autonomy to exercise their own expert judgment in refraining from doing harm?

[jmm99]

you want to pick up your ruck and move to greener pastures, then do so. It's not my role to push you out or pull you back.

Gentlemen, let's try to get back to the point of the thread.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

some of the many questions you propound (e.g.):


from Chris Case

A few more questions:

Does this mean that the Army needs to consider something like selective conscientious objection for a professionalized force? Or does being a "professional" remove the ability to choose not to fight?

Is the military professional the sort of professional who does not have the autonomy to exercise their own expert judgment in refraining from doing harm?

Unless, of course, you have no opinion re: the answers to them. Somehow, I doubt that is the case.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

I can take a shot at both.

Re: question 1. Once someone volunteers for that professional force and signs the contract without coercion, they lose all right to object to being told to do what they voluntarily took on. I think that means if you sign on, you're stuck. Don't want to be stuck -- seek other employment. Because it's a job, it's a trade, not a profession. Did I mention that entrance is not mandatory? Since it's not, the old saw 'be careful what you want, you may get it' applies.

Yes, draft or conscription changes that rule and conscientious objection is permissable -- probably should be encouraged... :cool:

On question 2, those engaged in the trade of soldiering have taken someone's Shilling, as it were, therefor they have an obligation to do what they're told. It as they say, goes with the territory. They do have the autonomy -- and IMO an obligation -- to exercise their own expert judgment in refraining from doing harm to an extent in executing the missions given as they see fit. They do not have the right to decline missions but have a responsibility to attempt to structure missions to best accomplish them at the lowest possible cost to own nation and force. If given a mission they do not believe is lawful or that is consistent with their values they may resign if possible or take the punishment prescribed for failure to follow orders or violation of their contract. Hopefully without whining about it in either case.

One always has choices.

[Old Eagle]

Have we blitzed by the classical approaches to this question on purpose?

Why not begin with Janowitz, Huntington, or similar, then propose modifications based on substantive changes that make their arguments invalid or at least not as strong as they were back in the day?

[Ken White]

Have we blitzed by the classical approaches to this question on purpose?Others may not...

[jmm99]

and a good evening to everyone else.

I'm not a great fan of DoDD 3000.05 et seq. - believing that the political struggle should largely be handled by civilian agencies (which would require a substantial shift in resources) in co-ordination with the military effort. As such, I've a bias and shouldn't be answering my own questions about who makes policy.

I'd like to see a more conservative presentation, updating Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (1957), and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (1960). Since Janowitz at least floated the concept of "constabulary forces", he might not be that far off re: some of the present doctrine.

I can think of no better person to educate us than you. :)

Kiitos ennakollisesti ;)

Mike

[Bill Jakola]

and I agree with you that he wasn't clear.


I was not clear, and Chris is right to insist on precise language when discussing war, since so much depends on getting it right. So let me try again to present this idea of increasing the adaptability of our forces to provide the political leadership as useful a military as possible.

We now have a better understanding of a limitation on this concept, as Chris made clear, we want to remain within the legal constrains of preventive war. However, as Bob's W pointed out we routinely do prevention with our SF and other units in the FID mission. So perhaps we need to sharpen this distinction between what exact actions are legal and what are not.

The changing character but enduring nature of war that Clausewitz described is helpful here, since we now face a more transparent, faster paced, more competitive, more decentralized operational environment. These factors are changing the character of war in ways we have not fully anticipated or prepared our forces to address. I hesitate to narrow our focus to the operational environment because we actually must prevail in all environments. And there in lies the problem.

Preventive war legalities do not adequately arm us for the changing character of war. For example, we live in a time when there is a deep blurring of lines of responsibilities, missions, and roles that goes beyond purely defined war as a continuation of politics with other means. This blurring now has Soldiers making political decisions like a company commander organizing local a government, or a commanding general influencing a the leadership of foreign country. Moreover, humanitarian missions like the recent earthquake response to Haiti or the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico are not strictly war but rather roles where force is potentially necessary but not exactly the point of the mission. We now depend on our military to work with other federal state and local agencies, as well, as a cornucopia of international organizations, foreign governments and their military and civilian leaders.

So in this environment of multiple roles for our forces, defined as the full spectrum of operations, where Soldiers must be able to conduct, offense, defense, and the stability operations/civil support missions where does war and the use of force begin; when Soldiers are building water treatment plants, providing food and shelter or the requisite security to protect a population.

When does a Soldier have to stop preventing war; when even by the mere existence of an army can and does prevent war.

I'll give Chris his preventive war point a try as well here. Why is this a law? I imagine we would want to keep nations from using force when a less that lethal solution exists. For in it's extreme, preventive war would dictate all powers would attack all other powers to prevent being attacked.

I see the value in not using force if something better will work, but better than what. Avoiding war at all cost results in weakness and slavery. So where do we draw the line of demarcation between preventive war and preventing a war.

Exactly what is allowed under the law as it exists? Why would we not install metaphorical smoke detectors in our environment and train and equip our fire department to respond rapidly to the weak signals of the smoke alarm beeping? Should we wait for a raging fire before we react?

As a profession of arms we are tasked with the defense of the nation. Our duty is to make that profession as capable and useful as possible for ensuring that defense. In our environment of transparency, rapid change, more competition, and blurring of roles we need a profession with high resiliency, one that maximizes it's ability to see and react to weak signals so we can solve problem with the least cost in terms of blood and treasure of all parties.

Okay, I was not much clearer here, but the more I think about the tension between avoiding preventive war and how we need to build our profession, I find a clear line established by our founding fathers to provide an answer. The founders subordinated the military to the civilian political leadership. We can use structure to solve our dilemma. As Soldiers we simply build the best army we can with our signal detectors and all and allow the civilian political leaders decide when and how to use that army. In other words, military focus is on providing the capability to conduct preventive war, and political responsibility is the use of that capability.

[jmm99]

a good professional military force make.

The thread title says the profession of arms. Perhaps, DoDD 3000.05, etc., has added the profession of politics as well. Even if that is so, the military is not and will not become the profession of law; nor would you want it to be.

That is particularly so where the legalisms deal with the issue of going to war (in modern jargon, engaging in an armed conflict), which in our (US) system is placed constitutionally in the hands of the executive and legislative branches.

These Wikis (read as neutrally as possible - read their caveats) illustrate the slippery nature of that international law topic: War of aggression (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_aggression) (Crime against peace (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime_against_peacehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime_against_peace)); Preventive war (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preventive_war); and Preemptive war (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preemptive_war). I skipped "Just War Theories", which is really moral theology varying by religion.

Of course, if you want every trooper to delve into those topics, I suppose you could do that.

I expect more important things have to be done. Substantial civil-military operations have been added to the mix. That means that the military will have to make decisions on whether operations are to be governed by the Laws of Wars (LOAC; IHL) or by the Rule of Law (civil laws). That is a difficult enough area - tying in to ROEs, RUFs, EOF, etc.

All this being said, military law is certainly with us and is no longer the province of "Spaight's Ambitious Subaltern" (bold added):


..... for an ambitious subaltern who wishes to be known vaguely as an author and, at the same time, not to be troubled with undue inquiry into the claim upon which his title rests, there can be no better subject than the International Law of War. For it is a quasi-military subject in which no one in the army or out of it, is very deeply interested, which everyone very contentedly takes on trust, and which may be written about without one person in ten thousand being able to tell whether the writing is adequate or not. James Molony Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911), p.18

Ah, the good old days. :)

A decent article from the ICRC on the "antiquity" of the Latin terms, Robert Kolb, Origin of the twin terms jus ad bellum / jus in bello (http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList163/D9DAD4EE8533DAEFC1256B66005AFFEF). No, they don't go back to the Romans.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

I would suggest worrying less about the legality of preventive war, and more about the inevitability of it in the face of certain forms of failed deterrence.

When two parties are at peace, but in high distrust of each other (Think Iran-Israel or Pakistan-India for current examples) deterrence becomes a very careful balancing act. Being balanced are an array of provocative capabilities and postures to maintain a zone where each side's assessment of the cost-benefit of war vs peace leads them to believe that the best result comes from peace. When something disrupts that balance in a way that significantly shifts the cost-benefit calculus, the side that feels that a potentially overwhelming attack is inevitable is "provoked." This is likely to result in an act of preventive war in an attempt to re-balance the scales of deterrence.

So, if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, how does this affect Israel's C/B analysis of deterrence? It may well provoke them in that it causes them to believe that their best chance for peace, or perhaps even survival, is to conduct preventive war.

Similarly between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both sides being already nuclear, it is then other factors that could suddenly change and affect the balance of their deterrence. This is the all too downplayed reality of US meddling in Afghanistan and Pakistan in pursuit of Al Qaeda. What affect do our actions have on Pakistan-India deterrence? How much do we even consider such issues when we are totally consumed by our own interests and our own fears being serviced there currently? If something happened, I suspect the U.S. would be like the bumbling, but well-intended Steve Urkel of the old "Family Matters" TV series and ask "Did I do that???"

We dwell on the Iranian nuclear issue a great deal (too much IMO), when it fact, it may actually lend greater balance to that particular deterrence equation. Yet we completely ignore the delicate balance between Pakistan and India that we have already tipped in India's favor by our very actions in Afghanistan and the FATA. Pile on top of that the President's recent trip and broad assurances to India and that scale tips even more. Not saying anyone needs to be alarmed, but it is certainly something we should be extremely aware of and take fully into account when weighing various COAs.

Legal vs illegal is a nicety of civilized society. It is quickly trumped by perceptions of national survival.

[120mm]

I'm sure you meant "Pakistan-India" when you were speaking of both sides being nuclear. Not a lot of Afghan nukes, as far as I know...

[William F. Owen]

This Profession of Arms campaign will focus largely on 4 domains: military-technical, human development, moral-ethical, and political-cultural. It is important that the Army ensure strength in each domain.
OK......


I'm curious as to what domain people think needs to be studied the most.
The profession of arms? Arms are for violence. Killing and breaking stuff or maintaining authority by threat of harm. How about studying the application of violence in the service of policy? - the ONLY job armed forces have.

Military-technical, human development, moral-ethical, and political-cultural are all little or nothing to do with that. For example, your policy is ALWAYS ethical. Morals are entirely personal.

What exactly is it that the persons wanting to study all this are so confused about? What is it they feel they are lacking?

[Fuchs]

I'm sure you meant "Pakistan-India" when you were speaking of both sides being nuclear. Not a lot of Afghan nukes, as far as I know...

Wait!

No oil.
No nukes.
No commies.
Reputedly only about 50 AQ terrorists.

Why again are U.S. troops there? ;)

[Bob Underwood]

If it's with Chris Barnes' question, then I would have to say the moral-ethical, and political-cultural domains (as much as I loath the domain-speak) are most important. For, if we exist as profession to do this (BTW I think we do):


the application of violence in the service of policy? - the ONLY job armed forces have.

Then it is curious why we should, as a profession, ignore the context in which we apply force. What if a given application of force will actually undermine the current policy goal? How would we know?

Is this the solution? To assume that


your policy is ALWAYS ethical.

seems to me to be self-defeating. At the very least, we should agree that policies that would lead to defeat, less security etc aren't ethical. Also, if I take your "ALWAYS" to mean in all possible cases, then we might have another problem. Certainly there is at least one case, or even a small set of cases in which the policy in question will not be ethical.

What I think is lacking in our Army is precisely the understanding we need to turn tactical action into effective strategic responses to the hybrid threats we face. For my money, this is because the Army has, for too long, assumed that all policy is, ipso facto (had to use my own latin), ethical and worth killing and dying in service to it.

Regards,
Bob

[Bob's World]

I'm sure you meant "Pakistan-India" when you were speaking of both sides being nuclear. Not a lot of Afghan nukes, as far as I know...

Indeed, I meant India and Pakistan. Afghanistan's role in that little dance is what we tend to subjugate to our own issues in the region.

[Bob's World]

Wait!

No oil.
No nukes.
No commies.
Reputedly only about 50 AQ terrorists.

Why again are U.S. troops there? ;)

Insert emoticon of right index finger tapping the tip of the nose...

[Bob Underwood]

For moving this discussion quickly beyond a theological exposition of Huntington et al. I don't want to suggest that there's nothing useful there, but we need to get a sense of what our problem is before we go looking for answers.

But, your answers seem curious to me for a couple reasons:
First, you say that:


Once someone volunteers for that professional force and signs the contract without coercion, they lose all right to object to being told to do what they voluntarily took on. I think that means if you sign on, you're stuck. Don't want to be stuck -- seek other employment. Because it's a job, it's a trade, not a profession. Did I mention that entrance is not mandatory? Since it's not, the old saw 'be careful what you want, you may get it' applies.
There might be a few problems here. For one, no one has a right to volunteer for or be obligated to do something that is morally wrong in the first place. On the other side of this, no one has a right to contract another person to do something morally wrong as well. Basically, this means that a contract for murder, rape, robbing, beating kids etc. has no obligatory force on either party. If we are going to take on the problem of selective contentious objection(SCO) as a profession, we need something better than this. The SCO's objection will be a moral claim so we need to be able to tell them why the action is moral - otherwise, we should not be surprised that the contract fails to motivate them.

Your second observation seems better to me.


If given a mission they do not believe is lawful or that is consistent with their values they may resign if possible or take the punishment prescribed for failure to follow orders or violation of their contract. Hopefully without whining about it in either case.

One always has choices.

However, I don't see the choices as quite so freeing. What do we think should be the prescribed punishments for someone doing what they think is, ex hypothesi, moral? According to the case at hand, they are choosing the harder right over the easier wrong. Also, the problem above still looms. How can I be in violation of a contract that has no moral or legal grounds?

Regards,
Bob

[jmm99]

We might want to define what each of us means by "selective conscientious objection". I'll start by reference to Conscientious objector (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscientious_objector) - Wiki and its sub-topic, Selective conscientious objection (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscientious_objector#Selective_conscientious_obj ection) - Wiki.

To keep things simpler, I'll posit an all-volunteer force and that the service person was not hussled (a great legal term) into the contract and had no firm conscientious objections when he or she entered into the contract.

I'd present three examples (all post-entry "conversions" to eliminate issues of fraud by the service member):

1. Conversion to complete pacifism - joins the American Friends Service Committee (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Friends_Service_Committee) and wouldn't raise a finger in violence to defend himself or others from great bodily harm.

2. Conversion to pacifism re: a particular war - this is the situation presented in the Wiki subtopic re: "Selective conscientious objection (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscientious_objector#Selective_conscientious_obj ection)" (basically, "hell no, I won't go [there].")

3. Conversion to pacifism re: a particular form of warfare - e.g., service member willingly participates in air operations involving conventional ordinances; but refuses an order to perform the preliminary arming sequence on a nuclear device.

Leaving aside the strict legalisms for the moment, should all of these cases be treated the same ?

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

For one, no one has a right to volunteer for or be obligated to do something that is morally wrong in the first place.That's a rather sweeping statement and it raises several questions. Says who? Who enforces that? Who determines what is 'right?' My version of morals say that they are very much an individual construct and I have no right to impose mine on you nor do you have a right to impose yours on me.

Thus if the governmental system says the issue is legal and moral and one disagrees, that is ones right. However, that disagreement does not automatically contravene the legality (or the morality in the eyes of that government) of the law that established the contract.
On the other side of this, no one has a right to contract another person to do something morally wrong as well.The same questions apply.
Basically, this means that a contract for murder, rape, robbing, beating kids etc. has no obligatory force on either party.It may have no legally binding obligatory force but it could have a morally (or immorally, dependent upon how one views such concepts as honor) binding force.

That not withstanding, the issue is not generally acknowledged criminal actions, it is the legal right granted by the People to the State to use force. That has been adjudged over the years by the majority of people in most nations and certainly including this one to be moral and, with some contraints, legal. Assuming those constraints are properly addressed and / or negated, then the contract in service of that usage is legal, period. Whether or not it is moral is an individual determination. The preponderance of evidence in this country today is is that most people assess it and the recruiting or selection of people willing -- not forced -- to accept those terms as morally acceptable (I'll insert a reminder here that a draft or conscription totally changes the rules...).
If we are going to take on the problem of selective contentious objection(SCO) as a profession, we need something better than this. The SCO's objection will be a moral claim so we need to be able to tell them why the action is moral - otherwise, we should not be surprised that the contract fails to motivate them.Again, morality is an individual construct. Nations do not, cannot, have morals -- if they are to act 'morally' then it is in the terms of the various beholders and thus, obviously, some may not agree with the presumed correct "morality" of an issue. If one accepts a "moral" norm (some people do, some do not...) then one would presume that nations laws were crafted in "moral" terms and should account for such contingencies.

The purpose of a contract is to obligate two parties to do certain things. Generally a quid pro quo situation exists. No contract of which I am aware is intended to "motivate" anyone -- motivation, like morality is an individual thing -- so whether a given contract motivates anyone should not be a question. Whether it is legal is a valid question. Whether, in a democratic society, it is morally acceptable to the majority of the people, is also valid. Whether it is moral to an individual or small group of them is immaterial.
However, I don't see the choices as quite so freeing. What do we think should be the prescribed punishments for someone doing what they think is, ex hypothesi, moral? According to the case at hand, they are choosing the harder right over the easier wrong. Also, the problem above still looms. How can I be in violation of a contract that has no moral or legal grounds?What case at hand? To my knowledge, no exemplary case exists in this thread. If you're using the blanket SCO postion as an example, whether the "harder right" is in fact right or even exists is not a given.

IMO, if a "moral" objection to an assignment (combat or not) is raised and is proven valid on the merits and corroborative testimony, I'd just discharge the individual (with an obligation to collect any funds not recouped). If, OTOH, it was not proven then they'd have the option of complying or receiving punishment as the modified UCMJ and a Court Martial direct.

One can be in violation of a contract that one deems to have no moral or legal grounds to ones hearts content. However, if that contract is deemed moral and legal by the people, legislature and courts of a democratic society, I'm doubtful ones opinion will count for much.

If one signed that contract on own volition, regardless of one's perception of its contents, one has accepted an obligation to comply with its terms. If one decides later that those terms are onerous or that one does not wish to comply with any or all of those terms, one has options. One can do it anyway, protesting mightily; If allowed, one can resign forfeiting all future benefits and paying any contractual debt incurred and not met; One can refuse to comply and take the contractually stipulated penalty for so doing. Either way as I said, hopefully without whining.

It is not the job of the Armed Forces in this nation to tell anyone why a given action is "moral." That is the job of the elected civilian leadership (not that they won't try to sluff it :rolleyes: ). That is dipping into the realm of strong personal opinions and that is no place for a large unwieldy bureaucracy to try to go. Particularly not one whose very existence is itself broadly immoral in the minds of a number of the citizens it serves...

I also suggest that we as a profession do NOT need to take on the issue of Conscientious Objection other than to determine and prescribe procedures for dealing with those who elect to so object. What constitutes that objection, and all the various ramifications surrounding it are matters of national political policy. They are not and should not be military policy. The comment in the paragraph just above applies; the 'military' solution will always be suspect in the eyes of many. Our penchant for messing around in the political milieu invariably brings big problems. We ought to quit doing that... :mad:

[Pete]

Speaking of the Profession of Arms, the Army-speak that has creeped into our doctrinal writings over the last 20 years drives me up the wall. Soldiers should be plain-speaking guys who say what they mean and mean what they say, without words like "optimizing, " "integrating," "leveraging," and so on. Strunk and White's Elements of Style should be our guide for effective writing. The cerebral bl*w job graphics that accompany Army-speak publications and PowerPoint presentations don't help at all, they only make things worse. Even before this Army-speak came along 20 years ago the overuse of acronyms had gotten way out of hand. We should communicate in a way thal allows the maximum number of people to understand what it is we're saying.

[Bob Underwood]

Pete, I agree. Jargon inhibits our discourse both internally and externally. Hopefully what follows is plain spoken and clear.

Mike, I have in mind the second and third cases that seem related. Such people would have no principled objection to violence as such (that would be the pacifist in Case 1). They would only object to using it on certain people (case 2) and in certain ways (case 3).

The problem is that professionals traditionally enjoy autonomy in practice. Namely, they generally get to decide when, where, how and on whom to practice their expertise. Most would fear this level of freedom granted to our profession. So the question is: how much should we have? Can we afford this sort of autonomy?

The problem with our profession is that rights are at stake. If we fail to do our job, those we protect will lose rights (life, liberty, political community etc.). However, if we do our job incorrectly, act on the wrong people or in the wrong way, rights are lost as well. This is what makes morality appropriate to the conversation.

This brings me to Ken, and I’m unsure what to make of the discussion so here’s what I offer in reply:

First:


That's a rather sweeping statement and it raises several questions. Says who? Who enforces that? Who determines what is 'right?' My version of morals say that they are very much an individual construct and I have no right to impose mine on you nor do you have a right to impose yours on me.
Two things here: My point doesn’t necessarily depend on what is right and wrong. Whatever you suppose is right, you generally agree that you can’t be obligated to do wrong. Also, this statement seems inconsistent with your earlier claims. I take you to think it wrong to make a contract and then renege. So what would you say if I told you my version of morality tells me “don’t keep contracts”? If you think its wrong to break contracts, that’s fine, but such claims impose morality across individual constructs.

Second:


That not withstanding, the issue is not generally acknowledged criminal actions, it is the legal right granted by the People to the State to use force. That has been adjudged over the years by the majority of people in most nations and certainly including this one to be moral and, with some contraints, legal. Assuming those constraints are properly addressed and / or negated, then the contract in service of that usage is legal, period. …. Again, morality is an individual construct. Nations do not, cannot, have morals -- if they are to act 'morally' then it is in the terms of the various beholders and thus, obviously, some may not agree with the presumed correct "morality" of an issue. If one accepts a "moral" norm (some people do, some do not...) then one would presume that nations laws were crafted in "moral" terms and should account for such contingencies.
Here I cut parts of the quote together and don’t mean to do so unfairly. But, the issue is generally acknowledged criminal actions. Illegal wars are criminal, and widely thought to be so. The point holds if we extend this to moral terms as well. There is a long and well-established acknowledgement that unjust international attacks are moral wrongs in the strongest sense. What is widely accepted is the right to use defensive force. It might be true that nations do not have morals in the way individuals do. However, this does not mean that morality should not or cannot apply to state/national action. People take such actions, these actions affect people, and are meant to benefit still other people. These are moral issues.

Some common ground:



IMO, if a "moral" objection to an assignment (combat or not) is raised and is proven valid on the merits and corroborative testimony, I'd just discharge the individual (with an obligation to collect any funds not recouped). If, OTOH, it was not proven then they'd have the option of complying or receiving punishment as the modified UCMJ and a Court Martial direct.

I think there is something here worth talking about. However, this would be a significant departure from current policy. Does this mean the Army, National Command authority, or other agency have an obligation to tell its professionals on the merits and with corroborative testimony that the combat assignment is legal and moral? I think it might.

Parting shot:


It is not the job of the Armed Forces in this nation to tell anyone why a given action is "moral." That is the job of the elected civilian leadership (not that they won't try to sluff it :rolleyes: ). That is dipping into the realm of strong personal opinions and that is no place for a large unwieldy bureaucracy to try to go. Particularly not one whose very existence is itself broadly immoral in the minds of a number of the citizens it serves...

This is interesting because it is clearly in tension with what you say above. Also, I think we have a duty to explain the morality of our actions when those actions involve killing people, ordering others to kill people, and ordering others to die. None of that makes any sense to me unless it is in a moral context. If you fear a large bureaucracy getting involved in moral issues, then first among those must be those that involve the deaths of thousands of people. Maybe that is exactly why it should be a personal and not governmental choice.

Regards,
Bob

[jmm99]

might want to slog through this (http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=philosophy_theses).

Cheers

Mike

[Ken White]

The problem is that professionals traditionally enjoy autonomy in practice. Namely, they generally get to decide when, where, how and on whom to practice their expertise...So the question is: how much should we have? Can we afford this sort of autonomy?I'm disposed to think it a trade and not a profession -- I think aspirations to be a profession create several problems -- however, that's a digression. What is certain is that the Armed forces of the US have a very mixed bag in the autonomy arena. Those forces deploy to missions only on orders of the national government and the civilian masters of the force. That is far from autonomous in the largest sense.
The problem with our profession is that rights are at stake. If we fail to do our job, those we protect will lose rights...However, if we do our job incorrectly, act on the wrong people or in the wrong way, rights are lost as well. This is what makes morality appropriate to the conversation.I agree with most of that but will point out that the decision to deploy to do the job is made by the politicians. Thus they have the onus to decide the vagaries of conscientious objection. If we deploy and then err, thus turning some willing US participants into unwilling participants (as happens in all wars), then the onus is on the service(s) involved for errors of commission, i.e. they didn't do their job competently (as unfortunately happens in all wars). Regardless, the responsibility for the determination of what qualifies as Objector status and what should be done about claimants lies with the civilian law makers, not the Armed Forces.
Two things here: My point doesn’t necessarily depend on what is right and wrong. Whatever you suppose is right, you generally agree that you can’t be obligated to do wrong.Essentially correct IMO. Unless of course that generic you wants to do wrong...

It is important to note that the "generic you's" determination of wrong may or may not be supported by legal and public more considerations. Just because you or I think 'X' is wrong doesn't mean that it is legally wrong or morally deficient in the determination of the broader public.
Also, this statement seems inconsistent with your earlier claims.Obviously, I see no inconsistency so you'll have to point that out to me, please.
I take you to think it wrong to make a contract and then renege. So what would you say if I told you my version of morality tells me “don’t keep contracts”? If you think its wrong to break contracts, that’s fine, but such claims impose morality across individual constructs.Yes, I do think its wrong to make contracts then renege because because something one failed to foresee occurs. That is admittedly my opinion and many do not share that view. I have no problem with that.

However, the issue is not one of disparate moral views, it is one of legal requirements. Whatever one's moral approach to the issue, if the contract is legal and binding, then the legal aspects will overrule everyone's moral concerns. Whether they should or not is irrelevant, they will.:cool:
Second:Here I cut parts of the quote together and don’t mean to do so unfairly. But, the issue is generally acknowledged criminal actions. Illegal wars are criminal, and widely thought to be so.Possibly correct though "widely" could be problematic. Still, I'll accept that. What I do question is who determines the legality of a given war. Everyone does not accept the ICJ and the invasion of Iraq for one example was adjudged illegal by many. Now what? We're still there and in a role blessed to a degree by the UN. :wry:
The point holds if we extend this to moral terms as well. There is a long and well-established acknowledgement that unjust international attacks are moral wrongs in the strongest sense.My goodness. Again, WHO determines these things? Unjust? Moral wrongs? If you mean public opinion, well and good -- but I'll mention that it generally is divided and getting true consensus on 'unjust' and 'morally wrong' is difficult. Certainly that was not obtained for the Iraqi adventure. Even if that consensus existed and was overwhelmingly opposed, it is still only public opinion. That the public believes a thing does not make it so. Five years ago they believed we were all going to die of heat stroke before 2010 due to global warming... :rolleyes:
What is widely accepted is the right to use defensive force.We can agree on that. What we might not agree on is when and how that force can be applied and what should happen to those in a volunteer force who are to be part of such application but decide they do not want to participate. :D
It might be true that nations do not have morals in the way individuals do.I do not not believe "it might be true," it is a fact.
However, this does not mean that morality should not or cannot apply to state/national action. People take such actions, these actions affect people, and are meant to benefit still other people. These are moral issues.Ah, yes. Different thing and we can agree on that. The issue then becomes a moral consensus on which a or the decision maker(s) operate. In a democratic society, can we accept that will generally be the sensing of what the majority -- not all -- of the population is believed to think appropriate or moral?
I think there is something here worth talking about. However, this would be a significant departure from current policy.Really? Not in my experience. I've been retired for a while but we used to do both those things pretty much as I laid them out.
Does this mean the Army, National Command authority, or other agency have an obligation to tell its professionals on the merits and with corroborative testimony that the combat assignment is legal and moral? I think it might.My suspicion is that social mores are trending in that direction. I personally think that is not good for the Armed forces or the National Command Authority but they seldom seek my opinion.

My answer to that would be no, the constraints I mentioned earlier, the checks and balances in this governmental, the ease and rapidity of communication today and other factors really mean that any mission commitment is going to meet or exceed and reasonable criteria for legality (as most of the Legion of Lawyers determines) and morality (as viewed by most of the populace or politicians). Thus, any quibbles along that line are generally going to be outliers and no one should cater to them. Regardless, the politicians have the responsibility to explain to the voters (including those serving) their rationale -- though they are past masters at sluffing this off to the services -- who should IMO stoutly resist playing that game.
Parting shot: This is interesting because it is clearly in tension with what you say above.Sorry, once again I do not see any tension or disagreement. Please enlighten me. Obviously, I was unclear somewhere but a couple of revisits leave me unsure just where...
Also, I think we have a duty to explain the morality of our actions when those actions involve killing people, ordering others to kill people, and ordering others to die.First and foremost, Armies kill people, by definition (and by law in this country) that's what they do. So no one should be confused on that Score. To include those who sign or intend to sign enlistment or accession contracts...

I don't disagree with the duty to explain unless by 'we' you mean the Armed Forces, then I disagree. If the national government commits a force, then that government has the responsibility to justify its action legally and morally.
None of that makes any sense to me unless it is in a moral context. If you fear a large bureaucracy getting involved in moral issues, then first among those must be those that involve the deaths of thousands of people.I'm unsure of your meaning. Yes, I do fear a large bureaucracy getting involved in moral issues, particularly if it is an organization that is viewed as only marginally moral by a good many citizens. I believe that to be an invitation to problems. Politicians are elected by the citizens to make decisions, hopefully legal and moral decisions. It is their responsibility to explain to the public -- and to those serving who will do their bidding -- the rationale and to assure all of the legality and morally acceptable dimensions of the mission.
Maybe that is exactly why it should be a personal and not governmental choice.If you mean it should be a personal choice to enter the Armed forces, I totally agree. If you mean that once one has entered the force that any decision to not comply with orders or participate in an action should be (and currently, as well as in my future view, is) a personal choice, I also agree. I not only agree one can make such a choice, I have no animosity toward those that elect to do so. I do, however, have little sympathy for anyone that inconsistent.

If you mean the government has or should have no entry into those choices, I also agree. If you mean the government should have no recourse if an individual reneges on a contract voluntarily undertaken, I do not agree, many members of the public do not agree nor does the Congress or US Code. The Courts have also been known to disagree.

As I said yesterday, One always has choices.

[Ken White]

might want to slog through this (http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=philosophy_theses).Yet again the concept of the morality of a nation is introduced as 'normative.' :cool:

I could cite the 1/3 rule and its pertinence to the jus (or lack of juice) and such normativity but I'll spare everyone. :D

[William F. Owen]

Then it is curious why we should, as a profession, ignore the context in which we apply force. What if a given application of force will actually undermine the current policy goal? How would we know?
Read Clausewitz! If the application of force is not effectively setting forth the policy then it should not applied. - and you should either change the policy or apply the force in a way that serves it.

...and Policy is way above your pay grade. Keep out of it. The profession of arms serves policy. Understand the limits. Do not probe the boundaries!


At the very least, we should agree that policies that would lead to defeat, less security etc aren't ethical.
Name me a politician or leader who has ever set forth a policy he states to be "un-ethical?" Policy comes from politics. Politics is power over people. Power is always ethical in the eyes of those holding it.


What I think is lacking in our Army is precisely the understanding we need to turn tactical action into effective strategic responses to the hybrid threats we face. For my money, this is because the Army has, for too long, assumed that all policy is, ipso facto (had to use my own latin), ethical and worth killing and dying in service to it.

Well then the problem is a lack of education in basic professional military thinking. The very basics of linking Policy to tactics via strategy are missing. This is not because the world got more complicated. It is because the Army gave up reading books and educating people.

Again, what is it you are confused about?

[120mm]

Read Clausewitz! If the application of force is not effectively setting forth the policy then it should not applied. - and you should either change the policy or apply the force in a way that serves it.

...and Policy is way above your pay grade. Keep out of it. The profession of arms serves policy. Understand the limits. Do not probe the boundaries!


Name me a politician or leader who has ever set forth a policy he states to be "un-ethical?" Policy comes from politics. Politics is power over people. Power is always ethical in the eyes of those holding it.


Well then the problem is a lack of education in basic professional military thinking. The very basics of linking Policy to tactics via strategy are missing. This is not because the world got more complicated. It is because the Army gave up reading books and educating people.

Again, what is it you are confused about?

Unfortunately, policy has historically been not so well insulated from military service. Amazingly junior officers have set policy in the past, because they were "Johnny on the Spot".

I seem to remember reading about a fairly Junior Brit Naval Officer who started and ended a war with Denmark in one fell swoop and a Reserve Captain by the name of Fertig in the Phillipines who also set policy despite not having guidance from higher.

[120mm]

Wait!

No oil.
No nukes.
No commies.
Reputedly only about 50 AQ terrorists.

Why again are U.S. troops there? ;)

I'll tell you that, if you tell me what U.S. troops are doing in the Balkans.

[William F. Owen]

Unfortunately, policy has historically been not so well insulated from military service. Amazingly junior officers have set policy in the past, because they were "Johnny on the Spot".
Correct! Which means you have to understand the policy in place and how your actions serve it. Many on this board confuse, Party Politics with Policy. Considering the US Government cannot tell the difference between Strategy and Policy, this is not surprising.

I seem to remember reading about a fairly Junior Brit Naval Officer who started and ended a war with Denmark in one fell swoop and a Reserve Captain by the name of Fertig in the Phillipines who also set policy despite not having guidance from higher.
Right. Do you think they engaged in needless navel-gazing about the "Profession of Arms." No. They understood the Ends required and made it happen. If you understand (not invent or try to change) the policy in place, then the action you should take becomes a pretty simple choice.

[Bob Underwood]

Read Clausewitz! If the application of force is not effectively setting forth the policy then it should not applied. - and you should either change the policy or apply the force in a way that serves it.



I have read Clausewitz ... one of the reasons I hold my views. So, now what? Also, here you are making a normative or moral claim about policy - "should not". No government has taken up action intending to lead to their own ruin. However, simply because they thought it was smart doesn't make it so. (cf. below).




Name me a politician or leader who has ever set forth a policy he states to be "un-ethical?" Policy comes from politics. Politics is power over people. Power is always ethical in the eyes of those holding it.


I'm not especially worried about the eyes of those holding power. Simply because somebody has the power to do something does not make it right for them to do it. (Read Plato, or Clausewitz, or Fuller, or Fahrenbach et al.)




Well then the problem is a lack of education in basic professional military thinking. The very basics of linking Policy to tactics via strategy are missing. This is not because the world got more complicated. It is because the Army gave up reading books and educating people.


On this we are agreed, however, I think we have widely divergent views on what the products of that education should be. But how can we understand policy and our place in it unless we understand the categories of its making? There is certainly more than simple power protecting power here.

Regards,
Bob

[Bob Underwood]

might want to slog through this (http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=philosophy_theses).

Cheers

Mike


And all I get is an "interesting"?


Ken, as to the tension in your comments: You make arguments that claim we should subordinate our moral judgements to legal requirements. Fine, but this is a moral claim, and one you think should apply to all people (so far as I can tell). But you also say that we have no right to impose such claims on anyone.

Regards,
Bob

[Ken White]

...as to the tension in your comments: You make arguments that claim we should subordinate our moral judgements to legal requirements. Fine, but this is a moral claim, and one you think should apply to all people (so far as I can tell). But you also say that we have no right to impose such claims on anyone.I do not make the claim that we should subordinate our moral judgments to legal requirements. Just the opposite, thus my purposely repeated "One always has choices."

Morals are an individual construct and each person has an absolute right to their own. Legality is a consensual construct that may or may nor accept a particular moral view.

The fact of life I apparently failed to clearly state is that legal requirements today will override individual moral concerns. The politicians set the norms generally IAW majority opinion; individual opinions are trumped. That's my point in this sub thread. One can do what they believe morally correct but if it runs afoul of the statutory factors those factors will prevail and a loss is inevitable.

In event of such loss, I did and do advocate taking responsibility for one's actions without whining... :D

[slapout9]

The fact of life I apparently failed to clearly state is that legal requirements today will override individual moral concerns. The politicians set the norms generally IAW majority opinion; individual opinions are trumped. That's my point in this sub thread. One can do what they believe morally correct but if it runs afoul of the statutory factors those factors will prevail and a loss is inevitable.



Very profound Ken, and that's part of the problem Politicians have no morals but they do have opinions. I was talking to a friend about this the other day relative to Economics and I asked him do you really,really believe God is a capitalist?:D just cut taxes on the rich and everything will be just fine:D bit of a digression but it also applies to war.

[wm]

The problem with our profession is that rights are at stake. If we fail to do our job, those we protect will lose rights (life, liberty, political community etc.). However, if we do our job incorrectly, act on the wrong people or in the wrong way, rights are lost as well. This is what makes morality appropriate to the conversation.

I submit that the problem with this discussion of morality is that it is based on a notion that rights are primary. On such a view, duties (which are the "musts" of moral claims) are artifactual on rights. In other words, because you have a right to life, I have a duty not to kill you.

An alternative point of view is that duties are primary and that rights are artifacts derived from those duties. On this view, your right to life is artifactual on my duty not to harm others.

I suspect that the view of rights as secondary may be somewhat tough to swallow given what the Declaration says about inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But, I submit for reflection the idea that rights derived from duties may be just as inalienable as rights that are primary.

If one wishes to hold that rights are primary, then I think one should be able to explain from where those rights proceed in a way that does not require some appeal to consequences as the source of the rights.
Morality, by its very nature must be universal. That is, the truths of its claims must apply to all people at all times in all places. Otherwise we are simply dealing with useful rules of societal conduct. I submit, along with that eccentric East Prussian Immanuel Kant, that any theory that is based on consequences for evaluating the truth of its moral claims cannot be universal because every one of its prescriptions is conditional--of the form "if..., then...". Should one not desire the antecedent, then the rule of action found in the consequent would not apply.

Universal truths are unconditional. So are duties.

[Pete]

There's morality and then there's morality. When I was in OCS in '77 we had a lecture on the Law of Land Warfare in the auditorium of Infantry Hall at Fort Benning. The instructor described a hypothetical situation -- an NVA machine gunner opens fire on an infantry platoon in Vietnam and blows half of them away. When a G.I. sees his buddies get killed he rushes the MG and when he's 10 feet away the NVA gunner throws up his arms in surrender. The G.I. kills him anyway. The school solution -- a war crime has just been committed. I asked a fellow OCS candidate, an 11B 101st Vietnam veteran, what he thought about that. He said that you should give the guy a medal. Terry's first officer assignment was with the Old Guard at Fort Myer because he was a second lieutenant with a CIB.

[slapout9]

I suspect that the view of rights as secondary may be somewhat tough to swallow given what the Declaration says about inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But, I submit for reflection the idea that rights derived from duties may be just as inalienable as rights that are primary.



I believe the Constitution does say that. Everyone remembers about their rights from their creator but they forget the part about "In order to secure these rights Governments are instituted among men." IOW you have to have laws to enforce responsibilities (duties).

[Bob Underwood]

I submit that the problem with this discussion of morality is that it is based on a notion that rights are primary.

Well, nothing I've said is inconsistent with a Kantian conception of rights. And holding these rights to be primary in this context doesn't necessarily require a consequentialist appeal.



Universal truths are unconditional. So are duties.

Perhaps, but duties are not the only source of moral value. And certainly not the only one relevant to the ethics of war.

[Bob Underwood]

The fact of life I apparently failed to clearly state is that legal requirements today will override individual moral concerns. The politicians set the norms generally IAW majority opinion; individual opinions are trumped. That's my point in this sub thread. One can do what they believe morally correct but if it runs afoul of the statutory factors those factors will prevail and a loss is inevitable.

In event of such loss, I did and do advocate taking responsibility for one's actions without whining... :D

This is interesting to talk about. Do we have no choice as a profession to make this a bit better? Is this the way things ought to be simply because it happens to be true?

I think we could do a bit better with regards to protecting the individual in the face of the majority.

Regards,

Bob

[Ken White]

This is interesting to talk about. Do we have no choice as a profession to make this a bit better?That would require a consensus within the trade or profession in the development of a position. I doubt that could be obtained due to the huge number of conflicting viewpoints. If consensus was obtained, my sensing is that it would gravitate toward the current procedures and policies -- and the overarching rule of laws imperfect though they may be.
Is this the way things ought to be simply because it happens to be true?Difficult to answer IMO. The converse of that is to ask why it is true and the answer seems to be the development of legal codes to control societies more base instincts in the several centuries since Hammurabi. In any event, with respect to this:
I think we could do a bit better with regards to protecting the individual in the face of the majority.Many laws really exist to protect the majority from some of our more crass individuals.

That is particularly true in the Armed Forces and in the US Armed Forces it goes to an extreme. There is no legal code in the world, to my knowledge, that provides the protection to the individual provided by the UCMJ.

I have long advocated a psychological assessment for entry to the Armed Forces and far higher standards for accession and retention (among a lot of other things advocated...). Lacking those -- even with them -- there are always going to be individuals who try to game the system as well as some who truly have a change of mind about what or where they might be engaged. They both deserve fair treatment and my observation over a good many years is that the process is generally fair and works far more often than not.

[wm]

Well, nothing I've said is inconsistent with a Kantian conception of rights. And holding these rights to be primary in this context doesn't necessarily require a consequentialist appeal.



Perhaps, but duties are not the only source of moral value. And certainly not the only one relevant to the ethics of war.

These responses dodge the point I made--that a moral theory whose metaphysical underpinning holds rights claims to be primary in establishing values is not likely to be able adequately to address the issues of morality in war.
And, I submit that the US Army is rooted in a morality that is duty based.
"Duty-Honor-Country. Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, and what you will be. They are your rallying points: to build courage when courage seems to fail; to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith; to create hope when hope becomes forlorn." Speech Upon Receiving the Sylvanus Thayer Medal, United States Military Academy, May 12, 1962


But an officer on duty knows no one -- to be partial is to dishonor both himself and the object of his ill-advised favor. What will be thought of him who exacts of his friends that which disgraces him? Look at him who winks at and overlooks offenses in one, which he causes to be punished in another, and contrast him with the inflexible soldier who does his duty faithfully, notwithstanding it occasionally wars with his private feelings. The conduct of one will be venerated and emulated, the other detested as a satire upon soldiership and honor.


I would really like to see an argument (in the philospher's use of that term) in defense of the primacy of rights that does not appeal to consequences for its proof.

[jmm99]

since I am not going to be doing legal philosophy. My focus is as a legal practitioner, where I have to look at what the "law" is and how it will be applied today, and a certain amount of prophecy about the future (perhaps a decade or so out).

As one with a practitioner's focus, I will definitely not satisfy those who actually believe in Wilf's signature line - without his big grin at the end:


"I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

Therefore, I avoid getting involved in legal philosophical arguments (as a philosopher would voice them).

If wm and bob underwood join in such a discussion, much of it will be over my head. As you can see from Jurisprudence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jurisprudence) - Wiki, there are many different takes. Most of them are quite theoretical and are frankly outliers to the legal practitioner.

The closest "school" fitting the practitioner is probably that of Legal realism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_realism) - Wiki:


The essential tenet of legal realism is that all law is made by human beings and is therefore subject to human foibles, frailties and imperfections.

In accord with that soundbite, legal realists and legal practitioners are an unruly bunch of cats, whose "philosophies" and "logic systems" tend to be more or less "fuzzy" (see Fuzzy Logic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzzy_logic) - Wiki).

That description fits the granddaddy tiger of US realism, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oliver_Wendell_Holmes,_Jr.), whose best soundbite was this one, tailored especially for Ken:


Holmes, in his last years, was walking down Pennsylvania Avenue with a friend, when a pretty girl passed. Holmes turned to look after her. Having done so, he sighed and said to his friend, "Ah, George, what wouldn't I give to be seventy-five again?" Isaac Asimov, (writing as "Dr. A"), The Sensuous Dirty Old Man (1971).

Of course, Holmes was very much shaped by his brief, but bloody military career as a Lt. and Cpt. in the 20th Massachusetts, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Magnificent Yankee" (http://harvardregiment.org/holmes.html). That experience lay behind another of his soundbites (more pertinent to the present thread):


This responsibility will not be found only in documents that no one contests or denies. It will be found in considerations of a political or social nature. It will be found, most of all in the character of men.

In that, Holmes was cognizant of the Heroes (e.g., as described by Brian Linn (http://www.amazon.com/Echo-Battle-Armys-Way-War/dp/0674034791/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top)), but also the Anti-Heroes.

From the legal practitioner's standpoint, the most important Holmesian soundbites are these:


The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.


General propositions do not decide concrete cases.

Those satisfy me; probably will satisfy Wilf; but probably will not satisfy he or she who demands: "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

Adding to this same train of thought are some longer Holmesianisms:


...men make their own laws; that these laws do not flow from some mysterious omnipresence in the sky, and that judges are not independent mouthpieces of the infinite. The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky.


The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race. The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good men. When I emphasize the difference between law and morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of learning and understanding the law.


The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.

I don't want this to turn into a three-sided debate; but I felt obligated to the readers who are not into legal philosophy (jurisprudence) to point out that legal practice is a very different breed of cat - to whom, the theorists are generally very much outliers.

None the less, I'm looking forward to a debate between philosophers about Just Law Theory, duties and rights (or should it be rights and duties ?). I leave one last Holmesianism (http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/o/oliver_wendell_holmes_jr.html) for our philosophers:


Any two philosophers can tell each other all they know in two hours.

Cheers and regards

Mike

[Chuck Grenchus, CAPE]

All - - - Great discussion to this point!

I'd like to try and toss another topic out there on an important aspect to our Profession that I believe all of you will have an opinion on:

Who is a member of the Profession of Arms?

As we go forward and examine ourselves as a profession, as described and intended by the Army Chief of staff below in the quotation below, we need to ensure that ALL members of the profession are included in any such discussion, analysis, and eventual follow-on recommendations. To do so ensures a complete and thorough effort.

But I ask all of you: In your opinions, who really makes up our Profession of Arms?

Just those who wear the uniform today? Or some subset of those serving today? Only combat branches? What about support branches?

Are Dept of Army civilians included in the profession? Army Retirees? Or for that matter, anyone who has served honorably?

Are Army civilians serving in combat theaters members of the profession?

And are spouses to be considered as well?

Where are the boundaries?

Quote from initial posting: " . . . The Army Chief of Staff acknowledges the importance of this to our profession’s future: “ . . . it is essential that we take a hard look at ourselves and ensure the we fully understand what we have been through, how we have changed and how we must adapt to succeed in an era of persistent conflict. I encourage all leaders to think about how to accomplish this. It is essential to the continued effectiveness of our profession and to ensure that our young leaders are prepared for success in the decade.”

[Scotty]

For your interest:

http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/cfli-ilfc/doc/DutywithHonourTheProfessionofArmsinCanada2009Engli sh_001.pdf

[William F. Owen]

However, simply because they thought it was smart doesn't make it so. (cf. below).

I'm not especially worried about the eyes of those holding power. Simply because somebody has the power to do something does not make it right for them to do it.
OK. So what are you saying we should do to remedy this?


Read Plato, or Clausewitz, or Fuller, or Fahrenbach et al.
Not well read in Plato. Adhere to and study Clausewitz. Fuller was a clown and needs to be ignored. Only read one book by Fahrenbach - This Kind of War - excellent!
[/QUOTE]

[Pete]

Chuck G., what does CAPE stand for?

[davidbfpo]

Chuck G., what does CAPE stand for?

Carefully Assessing Professional Education
Capable Amateur Pursues Education
Charting America's Professional Evolution
Communist Activity Proletariat Executed

Back to breakfast.:D

[Bill Jakola]

Carefully Assessing Professional Education
Capable Amateur Pursues Education
Charting America's Professional Evolution
Communist Activity Proletariat Executed

Back to breakfast.:D

CAPE stands for the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic
This is a modified acronym that recently changed from ACPME.

See this Stand-To article for more background.

http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2010/01/05

Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic

What is it?

West Point and its Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic (ACPME) serve as the Army's professional military ethic executive agent to increase Army-wide understanding, ownership and sustained development of the Army professional ethic through research, education and publication. ACPME broad objectives are: (1) assess, study and refine the professional military ethic of the force; (2) create and integrate professional military ethical knowledge; (3) accelerate professional military ethic development in individuals, units and Army culture and (4) support the socialization of the professional military ethic across the Army culture and profession.

[Bill Jakola]

CAPE stands for the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic
This is a modified acronym that recently changed from ACPME.

CAPE is now part of TRADOC and no longer owned by the USMA, so the name change helps to distinguish this change.

[Jason Thomas]

I think a part of this discussion goes back to LTC Milburn's article "Breaking Ranks". His central theme is; “There are circumstances under which a military officer is not only justified but also obligated to disobey a legal order.” I believe part of this discussion has to address civil-military relations. How do we as professionals give our best advice, provide a wide range of reasonable options and still remain non-politicized?

If we embrace LTC Milburn's concept of moral justification for disobeying then I would suggest that we are setting ourselves up dysfunction and incoherence not only with our civilian bosses but in our own ranks as well.
What is troubling to me is the murky concept of morality that is laid out in the article. It appears to me that each officer’s moral code would allow him or her to openly disobey a legal authority at the first hint of disagreement. If a military officer can cite morality as a reason to disregard legal orders why can’t the officer also cite the authorities’ popularity or political affiliation? Bringing personal morality into the equation erodes the military concepts of discipline and support to civil authorities.

Richard Kohn hits the nail on the head by repudiating the argument; “The responsibility officers have is to execute the lawful orders of their superiors, not to weigh each one against their own system of morality or their own calculation about whether they are good for the country, the military, or their subordinates.” I think Mr. Kohn is exactly right.

Officers are responsible to execute the legal orders of civilian authorities. More dangerously, bestowing that kind of moral independence upon officers will simply serve to be corrosive to civil-military relations and erode the confidence and trust of the American people. Furthermore, the moral exceptionalism that is advanced in the article would only create a chasm between the military and society that it has sworn to serve.

I don't want to replow the field with an old article but I think it is relevant to the ongoing dialogue.

Just my two cents.

[Ken White]

Good post, Jason.

[ChipColbert]

I'm glad Jason brought up the Milburn piece. I think there are some interesting points in his article and it is definitely a useful piece to generate discussion on civil-military relations.

Where I disagree with Milburn is on his notion that military officers have some sort of "moral autonomy" because of our position. While I think we all have our own individual moral code that we adhere to, I don't think military officers as a whole have a higher or "better" moral autonomy by which we should judge our civilian masters. To me that smacks of military elitism and exacerbates civil-military tensions.

I also agree with one of the critiques made by Dr. Kohn (I believe) on Milburn's piece about the false dichotomy Milburn lays out of "either acceptance of responsibility or wholehearted disobedience." I personally don't like the use of the term disobedience. I think the piece is much more palatable if you replace disobedience with dissent. It is always an officer's right to dissent if an order is illegal, immoral, or unethical. That individual should give voice to their dissent and if they feel strongly enough, take actions commensurate with the strength of their convictions. However, the use of the term wholehearted disobedience, at least to me, implies some type of active subversion.

Lastly, I disagree with Milburn's piece when he states, "military leaders are committed to challenge their civilian masters if the policy appears to be unconstitutional, immoral, or otherwise detrimental to the institution." My problem is with that last clause "otherwise detrimental to the institution." To me that is far too broad and if every officer in the Army must evaluate every order on whether or not he or she thinks it will be detrimental to the institution (according to whose judgment or standards by the way), we would never accomplish a mission.

On this not, if you haven’t had the chance, I highly recommend the following article:

http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/1028/Pentagon-had-red-flags-about-command-climate-in-kill-team-Stryker-brigade

I won't comment on the speculation of the article that his personal doctrinal views possibly cultivated a dangeorous command climate that resulted in higher casualties and the killing of civilians. I wasn't there and I don't think you can comment on that unless you had the experience of being in the unit.

However, reading this article made me think of the "detrimental to the institution" line. Did this CDR view the COIN doctrine and ISAF guidance as "detrimental to the institution" and therefore blow it off in favor of his own personal doctrinal ideas? And is that OK? What does it mean for our profession when we have a BDE CDR in combat that apparently blew off higher's guidance to focus on what he deemed “right” or important: counter-guerilla and guerilla hunter killer teams. If you believe Milburn’s argument, I guess this is OK? I'm not so sure.

[Ken White]

in its concluding paragraphs contained the thought that failure of the Germans was due in large part to the fact that "...Generals became more concerned with protecting the institution than they did with their mission" or words to that effect. I read that book so many years ago I do not even recall the title but I recall that the author was German and had been there. Regardless, I readily recall the comment to this day. That is principally because in 45 years in and with the US Army and Marines, I saw evidence on a frequent basis over the last 20 or so years of that time that in both organizations the syndrome was and is alive and well .

I have always believed that if an institution was reasonably competent and did, as an organization, what was right then there would be no need for it to 'protected.' Nothing over the past couple of decades has caused me to change my mind on that score.

Long way of agreeing with ChipColbert. Morality is an individual construct so everyone's entitled to their own. Organizations cannot have morals though their leaders can insure they operate in accordance with group morals that mesh with those of the society in which that organization lives or operates. Sometimes the moral construct of an organization and the nation or that of some individuals and the organization may differ.

In the case of an Armed Force, the organizational moral construct should never differ greatly in substance from that of the nation to which the force belongs. Individuals in that force may be at variance on some aspects -- and if those differences are significant, then the individual should work for change or leave. At no point should the protection of the institution be an issue for the institution per se or for individuals in that institution. IMO that particularly applies to the more senior people whose concern should be insuring the organization hews to the national norms and improving the institution, not protecting it.

Yes, I realize self protection is a base trait of all bureaucracies.

I think that's my point...

[jmm99]

Briefly with reference to the articles by Milburn, Breaking Ranks - Dissent and the Military Professional (http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59_101-107_Milburn.pdf), and Yingling, Breaking Ranks? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/562-yingling.pdf).

He who disobeys an order takes a legal risk - and may find that the courts (military and civilian) are not very charitable, especially if they treat a military order in a manner akin to a court order. A second lesson learned from legal litigation is that appeal remedies within the system have to be exhausted.

Thus, where a court orders an injunction, the injunction will normally be obeyed until it is stayed or reversed by a higher court, as Richard Harding (http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/10/14/air-force-jag-advises-officers-to-comply-with-injunction/) recently advised in the interim betwixt District and Circuit Courts in the DADT case:


Email from Richard C. Harding, The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force:

Members of The Judge Advocate General’s Corps,

On 12 October 2010, a federal district judge of the Central District of California issued an injunction barring the enforcement or application of 10 USC 654, commonly known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” statute. A copy is attached. At present, the United States Government is contemplating whether to appeal and to seek a stay of the injunction. In the meantime, effective 12 October, the Department of Defense will abide by its terms, as follows:

The District Court “permanently enjoins defendants United States of America and the Secretary of Defense, their agents, servants, officers, employees, and attorneys and all persons acting in participation or concert with them or under their direction or command from enforcing or applying the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Act and implementing regulations, against any person under their jurisdiction or command.”

The District Court further “orders defendants United States of America and the Secretary of Defense immediately to suspend and discontinue any investigation, or discharge, separation, or other proceeding, that may have been commenced under the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Act or pursuant to 10 USC 654 or its implementing regulations, on or prior to the date of this Judgment.”

Further guidance on this and related issues will be provided as it is made available by DoD. Inform your commanders of this injunction and its terms. Direct any questions to the Administrative Law Division, AF/JAA

There is a good reason for the JAG's caution - Generally, the substance of a court order cannot be attacked in a subsequent contempt proceeding (http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/933/933.F2d.1012.89-2802.html):


Jansen initially argues that the district court erred in issuing the preliminary injunction order, since Central States had an adequate remedy at law (apparently because Express Freight Lines possessed an unencumbered piece of real estate). This is a collateral attack on the underlying order for the contempt proceeding and may not be contested on appeal from a civil contempt citation.


"It would be a disservice to the law if we were to depart from the long-standing rule that a contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed and thus become a retrial of the controversy. The procedure to enforce a court's order commanding or forbidding an act should not be so inconclusive as to foster experimentation with disobedience."

United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 756-57, 103 S.Ct. 1548, 1552 (1983) (quoting Maggio v. Zeitz, 335 U.S. 56, 69, 68 S.Ct. 401, 408 (1948)). Express Freight Lines could have challenged the preliminary injunction in the district court, since it had notice that the proceeding was about to occur; furthermore, the preliminary injunction could have been appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(1).[1] Thus, we decline to consider Jansen's arguments regarding the validity of the underlying order.

[1] If the preliminary injunction had been a non-appealable order, then it could be challenged on appeal from a contempt citation. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1157 (7th Cir.1984), but we will not review the underlying order when it could have been appealed initially.

Even if collateral attack is allowed, the grounds are usually limited to whether the order was "void" - as opposed to merely "erroneous".

-------------------------------
I also will follow ChipColbert's lead:


I won't comment on the speculation of the article that his personal doctrinal views possibly cultivated a dangeorous command climate that resulted in higher casualties and the killing of civilians. I wasn't there and I don't think you can comment on that unless you had the experience of being in the unit.

and refrain from comments about COL Tunnell (http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/1028/Pentagon-had-red-flags-about-command-climate-in-kill-team-Stryker-brigade).

But, I will briefly comment on the reason for the "speculation" - and that is the "Yama$hita Rule", based on Application of Yama$hita (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=327&invol=1#t1), 327 U.S. 1 (1946). There, Yama$hita's conviction and death sentence were affirmed, with two dissents. One was by another (like Holmes) former Cpt. of Inf., Frank Murphy, who was strongly against the large expansion of a remote commander's criminal liablity for atrocities committed under battlefield conditions:


The petitioner was accused of having 'unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes.' The bills of particular further alleged that specific acts of atrocity were committed by 'members of the armed forces of Japan under the command of the accused.' Nowhere was it alleged that the petitioner personally committed any of the atrocities, or that he ordered their commission, or that he had any knowledge of the commission thereof by members of his command.

The findings of the military commission bear out this absence of any direct personal charge against the petitioner. The commission merely found that atrocities and other high crimes 'have been committed by members of the Japanese armed forces under your command ... that they were not sporadic in nature but in many cases were methodically supervised by Japanese officers and noncommissioned officers ... that during the period in question you failed to provide effective control of your troops as was required by the circumstances.'
....
International law makes no attempt to define the duties of a commander of an army under constant and overwhelming assault; nor does it impose liability under such circumstances for failure to meet the ordinary responsibilities of command. The omission is understandable. Duties, as well as ability to control troops, vary according to the nature and intensity of the particular battle. To find an unlawful deviation from duty under battle conditions requires difficult and speculative calculations.

FM 27-10 (rev. 1944) did not support expanded criminal liabilty of the remote commander; nor did our own experience from the Philippine Insurrection, according to Justice (CPT) Murphy:


Paragraph 347 of the War Department publication, Basic Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare, FM 27-10 (1940), states the principal offenses under the laws of war recognized by the United States. This includes all of the atrocities which the Japanese troops were alleged to have committed in this instance. Originally this paragraph concluded with the statement that 'The commanders ordering the commission of such acts, or under whose authority they are committed by their troops, may be punished by the belligerent into whose hands they may fall.' The meaning of the phrase 'under whose authority they are committed' was not clear. On November 15, 1944, however, this sentence was deleted and a new paragraph was added relating to the personal liability of those who violate the laws of war. Change 1, FM 27-10. The new paragraph 345.1 states that 'Individuals and organizations who violate the accepted laws and customs of war may be punished therefor. However, the fact that the acts complained of were done pursuant to order of a superior or government sanction may be taken into consideration in determining culpability, either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment. The person giving such orders may also be punished.' From this the conclusion seems inescapable that the United States recognizes individual criminal responsibility for violations of the laws of war only as to those who commit the offenses or who order or direct their commission. Such was not the allegation here. ....

There are numerous instances, especially with reference to the Philippine Insurrection in 1900 and 1901, where commanding officers were found to have violated the laws of war by specifically ordering members of their command to commit atrocities and other war crimes. [cites omitted]. And in other cases officers have been held liable where they knew that a crime was to be committed, had the power to prevent it and failed to exercise that power. [cites omitted] In no recorded instance, however, has the mere inability to control troops under fire or attack by superior forces been made the basis of a charge of violating the laws of war.

Murphy's opinion was ignored; Yama$hita was executed; and, sometimes, "victors' justice" comes back to bite you.

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Richard Kohn hits the nail on the head by repudiating the argument; “The responsibility officers have is to execute the lawful orders of their superiors, not to weigh each one against their own system of morality or their own calculation about whether they are good for the country, the military, or their subordinates.” I think Mr. Kohn is exactly right.

I agree with Ken White. Good point, well made. - but I would further add, that I find it very disturbing that this debate even got going.

You cannot teach "ethics" and morality. You teach Law. You teach what is written. Policy is always ethical. That is what policy "is."

I think there is very great danger that TRADOC has managed to elevate something pretty simple, into a pseudo-science, which lacks a grounding in the simple and classical teachings that have proven effective historically.

[Chris Case]

I agree with Ken White. Good point, well made. - but I would further add, that I find it very disturbing that this debate even got going.

You cannot teach "ethics" and morality. You teach Law. You teach what is written. Policy is always ethical. That is what policy "is."

I think there is very great danger that TRADOC has managed to elevate something pretty simple, into a pseudo-science, which lacks a grounding in the simple and classical teachings that have proven effective historically.

Is this hyperbole? An inside joke? I want to check before someone takes my comments about it the wrong way.

[Bob's World]

I thought about this a lot as junior officer who had the pleasure to work for a few officers that were dreadfully weak. I came to the philosophy of staying focused on the mission and my men; and using as my guiding context that "while it is sometimes right to do the wrong thing, it is never wrong to do the right thing." Just be prepared to stand tall and take the consequences when one makes that conscious decision to deviate of the directed path.

To blindly follow stupid orders (not inartful ones, but ones that put the mission or your men at risk) is a brand of careerism encouraged by the senior rater profile system. But those who break rules just to be a maverick or for self-serving reasons never impressed me much, nor those who would attempt to dodge responsibility when caught.

[Chris Case]

The profession of arms serves policy. Understand the limits. Do not probe the boundaries!

Name me a politician or leader who has ever set forth a policy he states to be "un-ethical?" Policy comes from politics. Politics is power over people. Power is always ethical in the eyes of those holding it.


The first claim seems descriptively false and based on some aspirational notion members of the "profession of arms" hold about themselves. The "profession of arms" helps create policy. Not only that, but it is through the actions of the military that we come to know what policy is doing in order to create more new policy. See Afghanistan for illustrations of this and how the military "can-do" attitude creates policy. Denying this reality seems odd after the earlier invocation to Clausewitz.

For example, take Afghanistan: Is the military preparing to get out of Afghanistan in 2011 like the President said we were going to do when he formulated his policy? Have they been preparing for it, or have they been trying to convince him to stay the course? Does anyway in the military believe we will leave? If not why? Is it because the President lied about his intentions to leave to begin with, that the military convinced him to do otherwise, or something else?

The second claim seems either trivial or a repudiation of much of western thought. What are we to take away from this? Is it that whoever is in power decides what is ethical because they are powerful and therefore we ought not question it? Or does this only apply to people who are members of the power apparatus, in this case members of the "profession of arms?" Are their thoughts on ethics supposed to reduce to might equals right? If so, what does the American "profession of arms" think it can achieve in a counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan and Iraq? Might equals right conjoined with COIN seems to lead to interesting outcomes and actually might be the result of "anthropolgizing" war. That being the case, Americans ought not be surprised when they are accused of being imperialists by those subject to this use of power.

[William F. Owen]

Is this hyperbole? An inside joke? I want to check before someone takes my comments about it the wrong way.

Not a joke. Why would anyone start wanting to debate "ethics" and "morality" in a profession that should be bounded by "Law." What is "ethical" is delineated by "Policy." Un-ethical actions undermine policy.

[William F. Owen]

The "profession of arms" helps create policy. Not only that, but it is through the actions of the military that we come to know what policy is doing in order to create more new policy.
Huh? So Policy only comes into being when the "profession of arms" starts acting?

See Afghanistan for illustrations of this and how the military "can-do" attitude creates policy.
Policy has to exist in order to frame the actions needed to set it forth. Yes, policy is "modified" by actions. So what?

Denying this reality seems odd after the earlier invocation to Clausewitz.
Show me any text of Clausewitz discussing "ethics."

The second claim seems either trivial or a repudiation of much of western thought. What are we to take away from this? Is it that whoever is in power decides what is ethical because they are powerful and therefore we ought not question it? Or does this only apply to people who are members of the power apparatus, in this case members of the "profession of arms?" Are their thoughts on ethics supposed to reduce to might equals right? If so, what does the American "profession of arms" think it can achieve in a counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan and Iraq? Might equals right conjoined with COIN seems to lead to interesting outcomes and actually might be the result of "anthropolgizing" war. That being the case, Americans ought not be surprised when they are accused of being imperialists by those subject to this use of power.
What has any of this do to with my assertion that "all policy" is ethical and the military has duty to set forth policy - NOT make ethical judgements.
IF an action undermines policy - then it is probably "un-ethical." - thus what is "ethical" flows from the Policy.

Soldiers need to understand the relationship of their actions to policy, because they serve policy makers.

[Chris Case]

Huh? So Policy only comes into being when the "profession of arms" starts acting?

No. I thought the context of the discussion would make it clear that here I only mean to discuss policies of using military force to achieve goals. I apologize if you somehow thought that my comment meant that I think that other government policies (education, Social Security, Medicare, etc.) somehow could not be created or enacted without military actions.

Now that it is clear that I am referring to policies regarding the use of military force, my claim is that it is political policy and that military professionals do have a part in creating it and advocating for or against it. This is just to deny your earlier claim that the "profession of arms" merely serves policy. That claims is just not true. For example, GEN Powell proactively took the use of force off the table for other policy makers by going to the press with his doctrine on when the US should resort to force. He was so popular and influential that this guided political policy. GEN Abrams tried to do the same thing with his reforms after Vietnam and GEN Petraeus influenced policy prior to the surge based on his influence and popularity as well. If you think strategic military leaders do not create, but only carry out policy, fine. I just don't see the evidence that this is true.


Policy has to exist in order to frame the actions needed to set it forth. Yes, policy is "modified" by actions. So what?

Show me any text of Clausewitz discussing "ethics."

First, I did not claim that Clausewitz discussed "ethics," this is related to the previous point about the relationship of military professionals to policy creation. War is an extension of politics according to Clausewitz and military professionals do create policy. This point is merely to say that I find it odd that you posted this:


Read Clausewitz!

and


Adhere to and study Clausewitz.

followed by this:


The profession of arms serves policy.

For Clausewitz war is policy and politics. My claim, based on actual actions from military professionals, is that they don't just serve policy, they create it as well. That is all. You can disagree, but I don't see evidence that strategic military leaders only serve policy. If your claim is that for soldiers at lower levels this is different, fine. But I think the blanket claim about "the profession of arms" is false.


What has any of this do to with my assertion that "all policy" is ethical and the military has duty to set forth policy - NOT make ethical judgements.
IF an action undermines policy - then it is probably "un-ethical." - thus what is "ethical" flows from the Policy.

Soldiers need to understand the relationship of their actions to policy, because they serve policy makers.

None of the above has anything to do with this. This is from a different post. That post was an effort to begin questioning your assertions in regards to the the difference between something being legal, ethical or moral. You said:


I find it very disturbing that this debate even got going.

You cannot teach "ethics" and morality. You teach Law. You teach what is written. Policy is always ethical. That is what policy "is."

I think there is very great danger that TRADOC has managed to elevate something pretty simple, into a pseudo-science, which lacks a grounding in the simple and classical teachings that have proven effective historically.

I think the second and third sentences are false. TRADOC may try to do pseudo-science (I don't know), but the "classical" teachings (if you mean in western civilization) challenge your claim in the second sentence. I take the "classical teachings" to be precisely about trying to teach what you claim can't be taught. I take them to be attempts to reflect on what we think is right in order to reconcile what is legal with what is right--in other words, creating a civil order in which we can be good people while also being good citizens. Or, maybe I just don't know how to read Plato, Aristotle, etc., or they are not "classical teachings," or maybe all the "classical teachings" worth reading are just about the law and why we should just follow it without reflecting on its correctness because it is based on what the powerful want and there is nothing we can do about it.

Further, if this discussion is disturbing to you I would refer you to what Hannah Arendt called "the banality of evil." I am guessing that you mean something different in your use of the term "ethical" than I do. I am sure Eichmann and those at Nuremberg would have loved it if the juries decided that doing what is ethical just reduced to whatever the law and policy happened to say. Or are these just examples of "victor's justice?" Is it that might equals right, the ethical reduces to the legal and the only thing Eichmann and his compatriots did wrong was to lose--is that the simple lesson of history?

This is all just to say that the law may be influenced by what we take to be ethical at any point in time, but to say that the ethical is reduced to law is not a view I find appealing. You are obviously free to disagree and think that I am missing the simple lessons of classic teachings and history. I think it is an interesting discussion and not disturbing at all.

Regard,
Chris

[slapout9]

Chris Case, I think CvC did talk about ethics,cain't remember the passages but he talked Moral COG's and the Military virture of the Army and it's commander.

[William F. Owen]

Now that it is clear that I am referring to policies regarding the use of military force, my claim is that it is political policy and that military professionals do have a part in creating it and advocating for or against it. This is just to deny your earlier claim that the "profession of arms" merely serves policy. That claims is just not true.
...and once you get told "get on it," with go do it. It is then the Policy makers job to alter the military objectives to fit an altering policy - again, soldiers can advise at to Ways and Means. - Witness Allenby who was given more to do with less forces and just did it, without complaint.

For example, GEN Powell proactively took the use of force off the table for other policy makers by going to the press with his doctrine on when the US should resort to force.
Proves my point. Powell was dead wrong and crippled US Foreign Policy as a result. He should have stuck to his pay grade.

If you think strategic military leaders do not create, but only carry out policy, fine. I just don't see the evidence that this is true.
The evidence would thus show most of the military men who seek to dabble in policy are misguided.

War is an extension of politics according to Clausewitz and military professionals do create policy.
As far as I know, Clausewitz never said "extension." He did say "continuation" on two occasions. In 1827, on his 10 July Note, and on page 605.
....but the military serves policy, once it is in place. These actions "cost" so you see a modification and adaptation. If the military start formulating policy then to what end would they craft to policy? To be better served by war?
War is a very blunt instrument. It can only serve certain policies. To quote Ashkenazi "Do not ask me what to do. Tell what you wish done and I will tell you if it is possible."


For Clausewitz war is policy and politics. My claim, based on actual actions from military professionals, is that they don't just serve policy, they create it as well. That is all.
Well aware and my point is that this does not work well.

Further, if this discussion is disturbing to you I would refer you to what Hannah Arendt called "the banality of evil." I am guessing that you mean something different in your use of the term "ethical" than I do.
I live amongst a good few Shoah survivors, so I am well aware of the path I tread. Hitler believed himself to be entirely ethical, as did Eichman, and all the Nazis. THAT IS MY POINT. The Nazis' "taught" ethics. Ethics is politics. Law is what generally what prevents the Holocausts (which is why Hitler changed to law to allow it), but when you want to have a holocaust you have to get people to believe it is "Ethical" to do it. - those ethics get taught. Rwanda would seem to provide good example. The US believed it served Policy = thus ethical - do deny it was genocide to avoid involvement. The men doing that saw their actions as "ethical."

I think it is an interesting discussion and not disturbing at all.

That is why I find the discussion disturbing. Teach Law! - Written Law )not perfect, but best). Do not teach "morality and ethics." They are products of prejudice and fashion.

What was "ethical" in the minds of a US citizen, on Sept 9th 2001 had changed by Sept the 14th.

[Chris Case]

Chris Case, I think CvC did talk about ethics,cain't remember the passages but he talked Moral COG's and the Military virture of the Army and it's commander.

Slapout9,

My recollection of Clausewitz is that he refers to "morale" and that it is sometimes conflated with "moral." I am pretty sure that the passages you are referring to are about "morale" by which he means something like "spirit" or "esprit." He does think this is vital, but I don't think his usage has anything to with what is moral or ethical necessarily unless what is ethical or moral reduces to being successful. Some may think this is true, I just don't think it is. I could also be wrong and am open to being corrected on this.

Also, he may have discussed ethics in something I have not read--it is clearly possible. I think that if he did, it would be important to understand what he means when he uses the term and in order to do that one would have to have an understanding of Kant and Hegel. That said, I think understanding Kant and Hegel (to some extent) is important for understanding Clausewitz in general, not only in regard to any ethical or moral theory that Clausewitz may hold.

Regards,
Chris

[slapout9]

Chris,
here is a link to an article by Dr. Joseph L. Strange called "Centers of Gravity: What CvC really meant." About halfway through the article you will see a pretty extensive discussion on Moral Centers of Gravity.



http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0735.pdf

[jmm99]

From Book 8, Ch 6 (1873 Graham trans; Paret's at home and too much to type out anyway) (emphasis added):


Influence of the Political Object on the Military Object (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/Bk8ch06.html)
......
In one word, the art of war in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles, instead of writing notes.

According to this view, to leave a great military enterprise, or the plan for one, to a purely military judgment and decision, is a distinction which cannot be allowed, and is even prejudicial; indeed, it is an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of a war, that they may give a purely military opinion upon what the cabinet should do; but still more absurd is the demand of Theorists that a statement of the available means of war should be laid before the general, that he may draw out a purely military plan for the war or for a campaign, in accordance with those means. Experience in general also teaches us that notwithstanding the multifarious branches and scientific character of military art in the present day, still the leading outlines of a war are always determined by the cabinet, that is, if we would use technical language, by a political not a military functionary.

This is perfectly natural. None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made without an insight into the political relations; and, in reality, when people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy on the conduct of a war, they say in reality something very different to what they intend. It is not this influence but the policy itself which should be found fault with. If policy is right, that is, if it succeeds in hitting the object, then it can only act on the war in its sense, with advantage also; and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the object, the cause is only to be looked for in a mistaken policy.

It is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain military means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it can exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes. Just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant sometimes says what he does not intend, so policy, when intending right, may often order things which do not tally with its own views.

This has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of political commerce.
.......
If war is to harmonise entirely with the political views and policy, to accommodate itself to the means available for war, there is only one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are not combined in one person, which is, to make the chief commander a member of the cabinet, that he may take part in its councils and decisions on important occasions. But then again, this is only possible when the cabinet, that is the government itself, is near the theatre of war, so that things can be settled without a serious waste of time.

The bottom line here is "CIMIC" (Civil-Military Coordination/Cooperation) - in effect, some kind of "executive committee" system. The devil is in the details, especially getting down to the field level (e.g., CORDS in Vietnam).

Regards

Mike

[Chris Case]

Chris,
here is a link to an article by Dr. Joseph L. Strange called "Centers of Gravity: What CvC really meant." About halfway through the article you will see a pretty extensive discussion on Moral Centers of Gravity.



http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0735.pdf

Thanks for the link. The argument in the article is focused on what Clausewitz meant by "centers of gravity." While it uses the word "moral" I don't see anything in it that differs from my interpretation of Clausewitz's use of the term as something akin to "spirit" or "esprit" and its relation to his concept of "will."

The discussion of moral centers in the article is a discussion of the popular will and its relation to centers of gravity. The article calls the "moral centers": the leaders, the ruling elites and a strong-willed population.

For example:

"Two central elements common to these moral centers of gravity are the will to fight and the ability to command resources." (p.26)

I don't see how this has anything to do with "moral" in the way that the term is used in discussions of ethics or moral philosophy. The authors give the example of Saddam Hussein as a "moral center of gravity" that the coalition forces failed to adequately address in the first Gulf War (p. 26). This may be true, and it may be a good interpretation of Calusewitz's concept, but I would argue it has nothing to do with moral theory qua moral theory and everything to do with success in achieving policy objectives.

Regards,
Chris

[Chris Case]

Proves my point. Powell was dead wrong and crippled US Foreign Policy as a result. He should have stuck to his pay grade.

The evidence would thus show most of the military men who seek to dabble in policy are misguided.

Well aware and my point is that this does not work well.

If you were making a claim about what ought to be the case, great. The point I was challenging was the descriptive claim that the "profession of arms serves policy." I claimed that it creates policy. You are now saying that it causes problems when it does that. Fine, but that is not I was challenging. If the point of your earlier post that I disagreed with was just to say that it ought to X because when it does Y it leads to bad results then I wouldn't have responded the way I did. What I am trying to be clear about is that many in the military hold the view that there is an absolute distinction between creating and carrying out policy and that the military does only the latter. This is descriptively false whatever we may think about what ought to be the case.


I live amongst a good few Shoah survivors, so I am well aware of the path I tread. Hitler believed himself to be entirely ethical, as did Eichman, and all the Nazis. THAT IS MY POINT. The Nazis' "taught" ethics. Ethics is politics. Law is what generally what prevents the Holocausts (which is why Hitler changed to law to allow it), but when you want to have a holocaust you have to get people to believe it is "Ethical" to do it. - those ethics get taught. Rwanda would seem to provide good example. The US believed it served Policy = thus ethical - do deny it was genocide to avoid involvement. The men doing that saw their actions as "ethical."

That is why I find the discussion disturbing. Teach Law! - Written Law )not perfect, but best). Do not teach "morality and ethics." They are products of prejudice and fashion.

What was "ethical" in the minds of a US citizen, on Sept 9th 2001 had changed by Sept the 14th.

I still don't find this argument convincing at all. In fact I think you have it precisely 180 degrees wrong. Also, I think your examples prove my point rather than yours. The Nazi's may have taught ethics, big deal, that doesn't mean they were right about it. However, they also taught law and they used that law to murder innocent people legally as you point out. This seems to make the case that the law is more dangerous because it has the force of government behind it and can license all variety of immoral behavior. I think law is more the product of prejudice and fashion and that your Nazi example shows this. I also think that it is through moral theory and the study of ethics that we try to improve the law (ideally) in order that the force of law does not license such immoral behavior. It is not a knock against ethics or morality that Nazis were so confused and barbaric.

Rwanda don't prove your argument unless you think that what is right reduces to whatever some person happens to think is right. Bill Clinton thought he was right to ignore genocide, now he thinks it was wrong. What does that have to do with the fact of whether what happened was actually right or wrong? Does the moral status of the Genocide in Rwanda really depend on what people believe?

If your claim is that we just can't know if anything is ever right or wrong and all we have to rely on are people's beliefs, fine. And further, that these beliefs should not be subject to reflection outside of what the law says, I don't see how that view makes the law any more appealing than anything else. In fact, to me it seems that it should be less appealing because you are giving power to the state in matters where all actions it takes according to the law will be (in regards to questions of right and wrong) either arbitrary, capricious, indeterminate, or based on beliefs which may be either true or false depending on what people happen to believe at a given time absent any further reflection. How has the law changed if it is not subject to reflection outside its own mode of thinking? In addition, at least here in the US, you are giving that state power over people's lives while acknowledging that there is no way to know right or wrong other than opinion. If there is nothing but what people happen to believe and to enshrine in law to determine right and wrong than it seems to me that we should really be careful about how much power we give to the law.

Regards,
Chris

[slapout9]

This is from the article and is a direct quote from CvC but it does not cite the exact passage.

“The moral elements
are the most important in war.
They constitute the spirit that permeates
war as a whole, and at an early
stage they establish a close affinity
with the will that moves and leads the
whole mass of force. . . . History provides
the strongest proof of the importance
of moral factors and their often
incredible effect.”


But here is my interpretation of that. Moral is what is right and wrong and if you are morally right you will have high morale (spirit to fight for what is right)
and the physical manifestation of both Moral and Morale will be your Leaders and the enemies Leaders. And that would make them COG's for both physical attacks and propaganda attacks (morally wrong war).

[Chris Case]

This is from the article and is a direct quote from CvC but it does not cite the exact passage.

“The moral elements
are the most important in war.
They constitute the spirit that permeates
war as a whole, and at an early
stage they establish a close affinity
with the will that moves and leads the
whole mass of force. . . . History provides
the strongest proof of the importance
of moral factors and their often
incredible effect.”


But here is my interpretation of that. Moral is what is right and wrong and if you are morally right you will have high morale (spirit to fight for what is right)
and the physical manifestation of both Moral and Morale will be your Leaders and the enemies Leaders. And that would make them COG's for both physical attacks and propaganda attacks (morally wrong war).

slapout9,

That may be your interpretation, but I don't think it has anything to do necessarily with what is right or wrong. I think it is a charitable interpretation and would be happy if that is what it actually meant. I just don't see the evidence in Clausewitz. It may be there and he may mean that the right side will win because their morale will be high, again, I just haven't read that part. Even given your interpretation, I don't know how from any of this (the quote + the interpretation) we can determine anything about what is "right and wrong" other than through "history" and the "effects" of the spirit and its close affinity to the will. If you are correct, does it mean that Clausewitz is telling us either that the good will always win because they will have high morale or whoever wins just is good because they had high morale, based on the right morals and we discover those things based on who won a contest of wills? How does the relation between morale and the moral work to determine what is right or wrong? Or, am I missing the point?

If we interpret Clausewitz as saying something about the will in reference to Kant and "the Good Will" then we may be on to an interpretation that could include determining "right and wrong." But, I don't think that is the point of this discussion or whether the texts support that view.

Regards,
Chris

[slapout9]

Chris,
1-I think CvC is saying that is why we have wars. Right and Wrong is often just somebodies opinion.

2- Which is why I believe in situation ethics. I posted this on another thread but I think it has bearing here. Especially important to the military because what is right or wrong will depend on the situation, A moral METT-TC if you will. This was popular in the 60's so you will see that the ultimate moral is "God is love" I learned it from my grandfather as God = good, close to the Kantian idea of Good will as a duty but you may not agree.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Situational_ethics

[Pete]

... the Army and it's commander.
Halt, this is the Apostrophe Police. The word "its" only has an apostrophe when it is a contraction of "it is." Drop and give me two zero and go and sin no more.

[slapout9]

Halt, this is the Apostrophe Police. The word "its" only has an apostrophe when it is a contraction of "it is." Drop and give me two zero and go and sin no more.

Forgive me Father for I have sinned.

[Ken White]

:wry: Me too... ;)

[Pete]

From Wikipedia:


General Sir Charles James Napier, Order of the Bath (August, 10, 1782 – August 29, 1853), was a general of the British Empire and the British Army's Commander-in-Chief in India, notable for conquering the Sindh Province in what is now Pakistan.

[Paragraphs omitted]

In 1842, at the age of 60, Napier was appointed Major General to the command of the Indian army within the Bombay Presidency. Here Lord Ellenborough's policy led Napier to Sindh Province (Scinde), for the purpose of quelling the insurrection of the Muslim rulers of this region. They had remained hostile to the British Empire even after the end of the First Anglo-Afghan War. Napier's campaign against these chieftains resulted in victories in the Battle of Miani (Meanee) and the Battle of Hyderabad, and then the subjugation of the Sindh Province, and its annexation by its eastern neighbors.

His orders had been only to put down the rebels, and by conquering the whole Sindh Province he greatly exceeded his mandate. Napier was supposed to have despatched to his superiors the short, notable message, "Peccavi", the Latin for "I have sinned" (which was a pun on I have Sindh). This pun appeared in a cartoon in Punch magazine in 1844 beneath a caricature of Charles Napier. Later proponents of British rule over the East Indians justified the conquest thus: "If this was a piece of rascality, it was a noble piece of rascality!"

[Paragraphs omitted]

General Napier put down several insurgencies in India during his reign as Commander-in-Chief in India, and once said of his philosophy about how to do so effectively: "The best way to quiet a country is a good thrashing, followed by great kindness afterwards. Even the wildest chaps are thus tamed."

[Paragraphs omitted]

[Ken White]

From your quote, Pete:

""The best way to quiet a country is a good thrashing, followed by great kindness afterwards. Even the wildest chaps are thus tamed.""

Some things don't change much. The passage of time does not insure subsequent generations are more advanced in all aspects...

[Pete]

True, but Napier also said, "So perverse is mankind that every nationality prefers to be misgoverned by its own people than to be well ruled by another."

[wm]

. . . one in a teapot, the other not.

A lot of debate in this thread is going on about moral versus ethical. I think this is the tempest in a teapot as there is here a distinction without a real difference. Morals and ethics are pretty much synonymous. From an academic perspective, this quotation extracted from the article on morality in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morality)holds true:

Ethics (also known as moral philosophy) is the branch of philosophy that addresses questions about morality. The word 'ethics' is "commonly used interchangeably with 'morality' to mean the subject matter of this study; and sometimes it is used more narrowly to mean the moral principles of a particular tradition, group, or individual."[7] Likewise, certain types of ethical theories, especially deontological ethics, sometimes distinguish between 'ethics' and 'morals': "Although the morality of people and their ethics amounts to the same thing, there is a usage that restricts morality to systems such as that of Kant, based on notions such as duty, obligation, and principles of conduct, reserving ethics for the more Aristotelian approach to practical reasoning, based on the notion of a virtue, and generally avoiding the separation 'moral' considerations from other practical considerations."[8]

The second tempest---whether the source of "the right" is the law or morality--is not so trivial. One can be right in many ways. But when it comes to conduct, we tend to narrow that down to two categories--doing what is morally right and doing what is legally right. However, let us not forget that some things that are morally right are nor necessarily legally right and vice versa. Whether the source of what is morally right is what is legally right is open to serious debate. Likewise with whether the origin of legal rectitude is moral rectitude. I happen to disagree with both positions but do not think this thread is the place to rehearse the reasons for that position. I will note that sometimes it happens that a given action is both legally and morally right (or wrong), but it may also be the case that a legally right action is morally wrong and vice versa.

The review of the professional ethic needs, in my opinion, to consider what is the basis of right and wrong in the formulation of the ethic. In other words, is the ethic based on law or is it based on morality. It may based on both. If so, then in those cases where the two sources may conflict, the ethic nees to specify which has primacy. If neither, then the ethic needs to expalin what other way(s) members of the military should resolve the conflict.

We also need to remember that right and wrong do not perfectly divide the world of judgments about actions. Actions may be morally/legally required, prohibited, and permitted. I think that judgments about right and wrong in the third category--permitted--are usually inappropriate. For example, were I walking down a dark street alone at night, I might decide to whistle. Unless I happen to live in some odd place where a law has been passed that forbids whistling, my choice is neither required nor forbidden, is neither right nor wrong. The review of the military ethic should try to make sure that it captures this threefold distinction and not stop with delineating just what the profession requires and forbids.

One other thing to keep clear is the following. How we judge acts and and how we judge those who perform them may be very different. It may well be that we find an act that produces the greatest good for the greatest number is the right action. However, we may also judge a person who produces the greatest good for the greatest number to be a very bad person. Suppose, following an example from John Stuart Mill, we hear of a person who has saved someone from drowning. Most would say the lifesaver was a good person because saving a life is usually a good thing. But suppose the person was saved because the savior intended to practice waterboarding techniques on the victim. Now what judgment does one want to make? I submit that most of us would say the action was still a good one, but our judgment about the rescuer would now be quite different.

Whatever else the review of the professional ethic does, I think it needs to make sure that the bases for making both sorts of judgements are considered.

[slapout9]

Watch this by Chief Elders on the Moral Question as the Governing process. You can skip to about 4:30 and watch that part or watch the whole thing. A lot of situation ethics in here.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9piIziXU9RE&feature=related

[jmm99]

wm makes an excellent practical point:


The second tempest---whether the source of "the right" is the law or morality--is not so trivial. One can be right in many ways. But when it comes to conduct, we tend to narrow that down to two categories--doing what is morally right and doing what is legally right. However, let us not forget that some things that are morally right are nor necessarily legally right and vice versa. Whether the source of what is morally right is what is legally right is open to serious debate. Likewise with whether the origin of legal rectitude is moral rectitude. I happen to disagree with both positions but do not think this thread is the place to rehearse the reasons for that position. I will note that sometimes it happens that a given action is both legally and morally right (or wrong), but it may also be the case that a legally right action is morally wrong and vice versa.

The review of the professional ethic needs, in my opinion, to consider what is the basis of right and wrong in the formulation of the ethic. In other words, is the ethic based on law or is it based on morality. It may based on both. If so, then in those cases where the two sources may conflict, the ethic nees to specify which has primacy. If neither, then the ethic needs to expalin what other way(s) members of the military should resolve the conflict.

We also need to remember that right and wrong do not perfectly divide the world of judgments about actions. Actions may be morally/legally required, prohibited, and permitted. I think that judgments about right and wrong in the third category--permitted--are usually inappropriate. For example, were I walking down a dark street alone at night, I might decide to whistle. Unless I happen to live in some odd place where a law has been passed that forbids whistling, my choice is neither required nor forbidden, is neither right nor wrong. The review of the military ethic should try to make sure that it captures this threefold distinction and not stop with delineating just what the profession requires and forbids.

It follows along with what I looked at last night. I've not for a long time looked at the question of a conscientious objection to an otherwise lawful order. If we posit that the conscientious objection is genuinely held, then we have a clear collision between what is morally right (to that person) and what is legally right (to his or her superiors).

So, I hit the 2010 Criminal Law Deskbook, vol II, Crimes and Defenses, The Judge Advocate General’s School, US Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, Summer 2010 (Military Legal Resources (http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/military-legal-resources-home.html)).

In it, we find a number of citations which are unfavorable to the conscientious objector in refusing an otherwise lawful order:


pdf p. 66 -
8. Conscientious objection is not a defense to disobedience of lawful orders. United States v. Johnson, 45 M.J. 88 (C.A.A.F. 1996); United States v. Walker, 41 M.J. 462 (1995); United States v. Austin, 27 M.J. 227 (C.A.A.F. 1988).


pdf p. 70 -
B. Disobedience. A superior’s order is presumed to be lawful and is disobeyed at the subordinate’s peril. To sustain the presumption, the order must relate to military duty, it must not conflict with the statutory or constitutional rights of the person receiving the order, and it must be a specific mandate to do or not to do a specific act. In sum, an order is presumed lawful if it has a valid military purpose and is a clear, specific, narrowly drawn mandate. United States v. Moore, 58 M.J. 466 (C.A.A.F. 2003). The dictates of a person’s conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot excuse disobedience. United States v. Stockman, 17 M.J. 530 (A.C.M.R. 1973).


pdf p. 265 -
3. The processing of a conscientious objector application does not afford an accused a defense against his obligation to deploy, even if the orders to do so violate service regulations concerning conscientious objections. United States v. Johnson, 45 M.J. 88
(C.A.A.F. 1996).

The most recent case cited in the Deskbook makes it very clear that legal right will prevail over moral right in the CO area:


pdf p. 270 -
F. Religious Convictions. United States v. Webster, 65 M.J. 936 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2008). The accused pled guilty to missing movement to Iraq by design and disobeying orders from two superior commissioned officers to deliver his bags for deployment. The accused had converted to Islam in 1994 and had doubts about whether he should participate in a war against Muslims. After consulting Islamic scholars on the Internet, the accused determined that the consensus was that Muslims are not permitted to participate in the war in Iraq. By participating as a combatant, the accused believed that he would be placed “in an unfavorable position on the Day of Judgment.” The accused filed a conscientious objector packet prior to the deployment, but withdrew it. He filed another conscientious objector packet on the same day that he missed movement. During the guilty plea inquiry, the military judge ruled that his religious beliefs would not provide a defense to disobeying orders. The ACCA first held that the accused’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and provident. First, the accused confirmed that the defense of duress did not apply to him. Second, there is no authority for the proposition that conscientious objector status provides a defense for missing movement or violating lawful orders. Third, under AR 600-43, conscientious objector requests made after an individual has entered active duty will not be favorably considered when the objection is to a certain war, which was the case here. Finally, it is irrelevant that the offenses involving missing movement and failure to obey orders were based on religious motives where such motives and beliefs did not rise to the level of a duress defense and did not constitute any other defense. The court then held that the First Amendment does not require anything more to accommodate the accused’s free exercise of religion than was offered here, and the accused’s rights were not violated. The ACCA first identified the applicable standard for analyzing alleged government infringement on the free exercise of religion. Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, the state must have a “compelling state interest” before it can burden the free exercise of religion. Additionally, courts are enjoined to apply judicial deference when strictly scrutinizing the military’s burden on the free exercise of religion. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). Applying these two standards, the ACCA concluded that the government had a compelling interest in requiring soldiers to deploy with their units. The government furthered this compelling interest using the least restrictive means. The Army offers soldiers an opportunity to apply for conscientious objector status, and in this case, his command offered the accused the opportunity to deploy in a non-combat role. In applying the duly required judicial deference, the ACCA concluded that the Army furthered its compelling interest in the least restrictive manner possible. The accused “had no legal right or privilege under the First Amendment to refuse obedience to the orders, and the orders were not given for an illegal purpose.” (citing United States v. Barry, 36 C.M.R. 829, 831 (C.G.B.R. 1966) (internal brackets omitted).

Thus, creating a "safe harbor" for moral-ethical objections would require an extensive revision of the UCMJ and its underlying philosophy as to lawful orders. That could be done, but I've yet to see from any proponent (such as LTC Milburn) the legal provisions that would allow moral-ethical primacy.

A similar (but even larger) problem exists if one asserts that "Just War Theory" (which one, of course) should prevail in the Laws of War (LOAC, IHL; both treaty and customary). That is so, especially in the rules governing the conduct of warfare (jus in bello); where the ICRC casebook, vol I (http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/How-does-law-protect.html), says:


Any past, present, and future theory of just war only concerns ius ad bellum and cannot justify (but is in fact frequently used to imply) that those fighting a just war have more rights or less obligations under IHL than those fighting an unjust war.

This comment by LTC Milburn is simply wrong:


The United States and its allies are committed by treaty and policy to conduct military operations within the framework of just war theory.[14] Just war criteria fall into two categories: jus ad bellum, the reasons for going to war, and jus ad bello, the manner in which war is conducted.[15]

14. Just War theory is embodied in the United Nations Charter and the Law of War. Its intent is also reflected by the wording of the National Security Strategy.

15. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

and frankly could mislead the non-expert reader. NOT :cool:

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

jmm99, the UCMJ should be revised and include concepts of qualified immunity and exigent circumstances which are based on situational ethics and that is also why I believe it should be taught as part of Officer PME.

[jmm99]

I can't say whether I agree or disagree - not because my new nickname is "John Kerry"; but because I'd have to see the actual proposed legal revisions that incorporate "concepts of qualified immunity and exigent circumstances which are based on situational ethics."

That's no different than saying we need: a new weapons system, armored vehicle, fighter-bomber, etc., etc. The devil is always in the details - design and implementation. So, such projects, including proposed legal provisions, are up to the proponents of revision.

Frankly, the present UCMJ and Laws of War don't look bad to me - perhaps some "tweaking" as Tom Hanks might say. :)

Regards

Mike

[Pete]

In 1982 when I was in a 105mm howitzer battalion I was given the assignment of interviewing one of our soldiers who had decided he was a conscientious objector and wanted to be released from the Army. He was a mechanic or spare parts clerk who had discovered Jesus. I thought he was sincere in his convictions but also very naive, and that's what I said in my typewritten report.

For a few months of 1971 I had been an 18-year-old Vietnam War protester and I always wondered whether the Army gave me that job of interviewing the CO to smoke me out on that issue. In hindsight My Lai was a disgrace but it didn't condemn the entire U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. What the hell, I was 18 at the time. Had I been looking for an easy billet I wouldn't have enlisted for combat arms in the Army in 1977, so I've paid my dues.

[slapout9]

Frankly, the present UCMJ and Laws of War don't look bad to me - perhaps some "tweaking" as Tom Hanks might say. :)

Regards

Mike

More likely what it would look like. In situation ethics the Law is still supreme UNTIL you encounter a situation where there is no governing law or the law can make the situation worse, at which time the principle of what is best for the people is applied until the law can be changed or updated. Or situations where the Enemy will consciously try to manipulate the law and use it as a weapon against you like COINfusion warfare. Not much else to it. The original book was only like 50 pages because it was no where near as radical as people thought it was, but the 60's were like that, everyone under 30 was considered a radical.:D

[slapout9]

For a few months of 1971 I had been an 18-year-old Vietnam War protester .

You old Hippie:wry:

[Pete]

Oh wow man, kinda makes you want to freak out, you know? :eek: :confused:

[Bill Jakola]

...and once you get told "get on it," with go do it. It is then the Policy makers job to alter the military objectives to fit an altering policy - again, soldiers can advise at to Ways and Means. - Witness Allenby who was given more to do with less forces and just did it, without complaint.

Proves my point. Powell was dead wrong and crippled US Foreign Policy as a result. He should have stuck to his pay grade.

The evidence would thus show most of the military men who seek to dabble in policy are misguided.

As far as I know, Clausewitz never said "extension." He did say "continuation" on two occasions. In 1827, on his 10 July Note, and on page 605.
....but the military serves policy, once it is in place. These actions "cost" so you see a modification and adaptation. If the military start formulating policy then to what end would they craft to policy? To be better served by war?
War is a very blunt instrument. It can only serve certain policies. To quote Ashkenazi "Do not ask me what to do. Tell what you wish done and I will tell you if it is possible."


Well this is a discussion worth having.

Colin Gray addresses the military role in policy formulation and execution in his book "Another Bloody Century", published in 2005, pg 363.

"The question, 'who controls whom' in the conduct of war, does not admit of a simple answer, except as a matter of principle. There is no dispute over the theoretical primacy of policy and policymaker in relation to the military instrument. In practice, though, different cultures and changing historical contexts can ignite, or re-ignite, ancient difficulties in civil-military relations. To cite just one recent example, in the summer of 2002 Eliot Cohen argued in his major study of Supreme Command that war is much too important to be left to the generals. 36 Political leaders need to assert themselves over the military conduct of war if they are to be certain that war will be waged as vigorously as policy requires."

Gray uses the analogy of a doctor patient relationship with the Army profession of arms represented by the medical profession and the political leadership as the patient.

"It is argued that just as a person with a brain tumour is obliged to trust his expert brain surgeon, so a society at war should be obliged to take the military advice of its military experts."

I see a very blurred distinction between doctor and patient roles and responsibilities, at least in practice. It seems to me, the profession, either medical or 'of arms', must dialogue with the patient or the political leaders in our case. Each must complement the other influencing policy, strategy, operations, and at time even tactics. However clearly these roles are spelled out in purely legalistic terms in practice the distinctions are far less recognizable. For example, political leaders are still ultimately responsible for setting policy and strategy but these are developed with the advice and often advocacy of the military.

The acts of setting and developing strategy are so intertwined and inseparable that the political and military leaders must do this as a combined team effort and not, as Bob Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" depict, military leaders making strategy irrespective of political input.

Is our profession of arms role to provide advocacy or merely advice?

[Ken White]

The acts of setting and developing strategy are so intertwined and inseparable that the political and military leaders must do this as a combined team effort and not, as Bob Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" depict, military leaders making strategy irrespective of political input.And to do that means the answer to this:
Is our profession of arms role to provide advocacy or merely advice?Must be yes to both.

Both are required today due to the lack of military knowledge on the part of most professional * politicians today; their relative ignorance helped place us where we are today. The failure of the Armed Forces advocate sensible solutions and to just do what they were told with only minimal advice provided is also partly responsible.A question thus formed is at what point the advocacy must cease and the Guidon becomes planted.

That's really the question...

* They aren't really professional other than in the sense that's what they do for a living. Some of them are Professionals, Doctors and Lawyers. The Armed Forces are not themselves professionals, warfare it is not a profession, it an endeavor and it can be a trade for some or even for many but it isn't a profession any more than playing baseball, basketball or football for a living is a profession. Attempts to make it a 'profession' are in fact a part of the problem this thread discusses. Professions are allowed to have their own rules and to police themselves -- armed forces are not really permitted to do either.

[Bill Jakola]

* They aren't really professional other than in the sense that's what they do for a living. Some of them are Professionals, Doctors and Lawyers. The Armed Forces are not themselves professionals, warfare it is not a profession, it an endeavor and it can be a trade for some or even for many but it isn't a profession any more than playing baseball, basketball or football for a living is a profession. Attempts to make it a 'profession' are in fact a part of the problem this thread discusses. Professions are allowed to have their own rules and to police themselves -- armed forces are not really permitted to do either.

Right, "warfare it is not a profession"; but that is not what we are talking about. We are attempting to define the profession of arms, a group that specializes in the application of lethal force to achieve political ends. Because there are many things a military can do that other non-military organizations can do as well, e.g. build roads, schools, or provide humanitarian relief. However, only the profession of arms speciallizes in the application of lethal force, (and yes, there are exceptions, like police and mercenaries). And there are times when these other groups cannot operate due to security considerations and only the military will do. In these cases, where we require an organization that can build infrastructure while also providing secuirty and conduct combined arms maneuver or counterterrorism, in such cases only the profession of arms will do.

I agree, "warfare it is not a profession". Quoting Gray pg 37, "war is a relationship between beligerants, warfare is the conduct of war", but neither is a profession. War is such dangerous business that we need a profession of arms to maximize our ability to conduct war; that is, rather than warfare as a profession, the profession is expertise in warfare.

The problem is how do we develop, cultivate, standardize, evaluate this expertise. If the military is to provide advice and advocacy to the political leaders, when and how do we learn to do this. Do we learn in any coherent manner or is this largely self taught? If we are to be this profession of arms that is truely the expertise in warfare, how does the profession gain this expertise?

[slapout9]

The problem is how do we develop, cultivate, standardize, evaluate this expertise. If the military is to provide advice and advocacy to the political leaders, when and how do we learn to do this. Do we learn in any coherent manner or is this largely self taught? If we are to be this profession of arms that is truely the expertise in warfare, how does the profession gain this expertise?

Bill,I don't think that is the problem. Your are very professional(expert), the Army is very professional(expert) but politicians are often temporally elected amateurs or opportunist and that can be deadly to a expert.

[Pete]

The problem is how do we develop, cultivate, standardize, evaluate this expertise. If the military is to provide advice and advocacy to the political leaders, when and how do we learn to do this. Do we learn in any coherent manner or is this largely self taught? If we are to be this profession of arms that is truely the expertise in warfare, how does the profession gain this expertise?
Most of our decisions to go to war are driven by domestic politics. Usually that translates into the ill-defined goal of "doing something" to solve or have the appearance of solving a foreign policy problem. In those situations it is the duty of flag officers when asked to explain what can and cannot reasonably be expected to be accomplished given a certain level of military force. One of the real dangers of using the military to "do something" is the danger of compromise solutions that send in forces but at the same time try to maintain a small footprint or level of engagement. It's like sending in the U.S. Cavalry to seek out the enemy and telling them not to become decisively engaged. When things like that go on for more than three years the American public tends to get fed up with it.

[Ken White]

Right, "warfare it is not a profession"; but that is not what we are talking about. We are attempting to define the profession of arms, a group that specializes in the application of lethal force to achieve political ends... In these cases, where we require an organization that can build infrastructure while also providing secuirty and conduct combined arms maneuver or counterterrorism, in such cases only the profession of arms will do.I respectfully submit that the trade of soldiering is what you mean but understand the desire to be a 'profession.' That carries a a far better cachet than 'trade.'

I would note the Talibs and others in South Asia are specializing in the application of lethal force and that they are not and do not aspire to be professionals.

I agree that armed force is necessary in many cases and there is much that cannot be done without it. That a requirement exists and that people fulfill it does not make those practitioners professional any more than a Plumber is a professional. A Profession requires a discrete vocabulary (we have that), dedication to its norms (we have that), a body of specialist knowledge (we have that), is trusted to be self regulating (not present) and self policing (also not present). Those items are listed in order of importance, least to greatest. The 'profession of arms' fails on the two most critical tests. Having said all that, I realize that too many are enamored with being accorded professional status in the fullest sense for me to turn the usage around and that's okay. I was a professional (small 'p') soldier for years. My son is one today -- but we both know we are or are practicing a trade and not a Profession.

If the occupation of soldiers was self regulating and self policing as are law and medicine, then it might be a profession. Since it is not those things -- and should not be if it is to serve the State -- then it doesn't really exist as a profession.
...rather than warfare as a profession, the profession is expertise in warfare.Much as a 'professional' beach volleyball player is expert in volleyball? :wry:
The problem is how do we develop, cultivate, standardize, evaluate this expertise. If the military is to provide advice and advocacy to the political leaders, when and how do we learn to do this. Do we learn in any coherent manner or is this largely self taught?Assuming that is not a rhetorical question, my answer based on a great many years of observation and participation would be a bit of both. All persons do not learn in a coherent manner, people differ. However most do learn when exposed to decent education -- and the US Army has that. Not great by a long shot, but decent and better than most. Still, an institution can only do such much and it is incumbent upon all who would be soldiers to learn a great deal on their own initiative. Therein lies the rub, as they say -- some people devote themselves to that learning and self development more than do others. Still other people have a natural talent for the trade. Thus every attempt to produce a number of square pegs that are identical will fail -- has failed -- and we are thus confronted with the fact that some folks make better advisers and / or better advocates (the two things are not synonomous) than others. Some in fact make better commanders or soldiers than others, yet they system makes no effort to place those people in positions where they can do the most good, it insists that all must take their turn in strange jobs and thus luck of the draw determines who is going to advise or advocate. :rolleyes:

As an example, Tommy Franks was an exceptionally poor advocate, David Petreaus is better. Luck of the draw. One could wonder what might have happened in 2001-3 had Anthony Zinni still been CinCCent or Hugh Shelton CJCS...
If we are to be this profession of arms that is truely the expertise in warfare, how does the profession gain this expertise?Not to be a smart aleck but true expertise is gained by practice in any field of endeavor. The US Army personnel system, aimed at producing generalists and with an 'up or out' promotion regimen is absolutely inimical to the development of expertise, all most can develop is competence -- and most do that; some few do better (in spite of the system) and actually develop expertise. Most do not.

The dichotomy is that a really good, proficient Army will spend most of its time at peace, terrible place to develop warfighting expertise. The real experts are those who learn very quickly once committed to combat. In a sense, that's bad but since each war is different, it has the saving grace of not having everyone in lock step for the wrong war at the wrong time -- as we saw in the movement of folks from Iraq to Afghanistan. Different wars require different TTP -- and approaches; the really good tradesmen will cope, the others will not. That effectively means that if we want the 'experts' in the right places (Command, policy Advisory, mission advocacy) we can simply place the best people in the positions instead of using today's shotgun and duty roster approach. I believe that's what a profession would do and it seems we are not doing that...

ADDENDUM: Specific answers to Bill Jakola's comment below, posted just after this one.

The system is broken, the personnel processes suitable for WW I (and adapted to WWII) and mass armies does not work for a smaller volunteer force. The PME process is fairly decent but most courses are far longer than needed to give Officers and senior NCOs (in particular) some 'down' and family time. There are better ways to do that.

Everyone should not be, can not be, a true generalist. Required for officers are two Command tacks and two Staff tracks, both divided into Unit and EAC segments. All start in the unit segment and then advance to the EAC segment based on proven performance attested by senior, peer and subordinate ratings.

The process of routing all officers through large staffs -- a subterfuge to keep officer end strength and spaces as opposed to any real military need is incredibly wasteful. That process and 'up or out' need to go.

In fairness, the Army's hands are tied to an extent by Congress, DOPMS, OPM 21 and a bunch of arcane and silly laws. Frankly, some are unlikely to be abolished. However, the Army will never know until it tries. The Army can go into the business as usual mode and tinker around the edges or they can truly fix a broken personnel system and an equally broken training process.

[Bill Jakola]

Bill,I don't think that is the problem. Your are very professional(expert), the Army is very professional(expert) but politicians are often temporally elected amateurs or opportunist and that can be deadly to a expert.

Well you may have identified a problem, but beyond voting and individual participation in the political process members of the professions of arms are prohibited from political action as a group. So you are highlighting an issue that is both beyond the scope of this discussion and something the profession of arms cannot legally impact.

However, we can provide expertise in the conduct of war form the tactical through strategic, and as I attempted to argue before, our profession also informs, and often helps shape policy.

So again I ask, if we are to provide this expertise how do we credencial ourselves? How do we quantify or grade our expertise? Do general officers, who have a majority of thier experience and training in tactical command intuitvely gain this advisory expertise once they pin on their stars? Because a few weeks at charm school or even broadening educational experiences like the War colleges, or staff assignments are unlikely to build the expertise required of a profession of arms that is required to provide strategic and policy level guidance.

[Bill Jakola]

The US Army personnel system, aimed at producing generalists and with an 'up or out' promotion regimen is absolutely inimical to the development of expertise, all most can develop is competence -- and most do that; some few do better (in spite of the system) and actually develop expertise. Most do not

Ken, great point. So how do we change this for the better? As you say practice make perfect or expertise so how do we change the personnel system, I like to call is talent management, so that we maximize the development of expertise?

[Ken White]

I'm firmly convinced that a two track system is necessary, gut wrenching as that thought may be to many. The Per community will trot out Congressional objections to such a move, a partly valid complaint but their underlying objection to such a process will be that it is far more work, accusations of unfairness will be rampant and they would prefer to not have to deal with those. More importantly, they may make a mistake for which they might be held accountable. There are many arguments to oppose it and the only real argument for it is more combat effectiveness. How important is that? :wry:

A secondary argument for it is the opportunity all will have to truly develop expertise in a filed instead of being marginally competent generalists -- as one Generalist, a two star, once told me: "Every time I'd almost learned what I needed to know about doing a job, they moved me to new and different job..." If you want persons with expertise to advise and advocate, they need, as you noted, to be developed. The current system discourages that for too many.

We have padded the Staff numbers at all levels and Parkinson's Law is in effect. We did that to build an Officer strength cushion and a mobilization base -- something Congress generally opposes for some odd reason -- there are better ways to do that. As an aside, we're trying to make NCOES emulate the Officer system and that is really bad mistake which will adversely impact mobilization should it be necessary...

Up or out needs to go. In my last job, I had a problem with a rogue Colonel and needed to rope him in. We had a Major, due for mandatory retirement. I called him in and said "Bill, I need you to do this..." No dummy he, he said "Okay you figure since I've got to retire, he can't hurt me and I can rein him in a bit?" Yep. Worked quite well and no poor major got his career wrecked by a loose cannon. Point of all that is the current OER system and Army philosophy totally discourage initiative and risk taking. That is just flat criminal. Combat is a risk and initiative is necessary, it should be encouraged, not stifled. Peer and subordinate ratings should be required as well as senior ratings for all ranks (that will be even more gut wrenching than a dual track officer system :D) . The form should be a 3x5 card...

The Task, Condition and Standard system has developed a generation of leaders who can do certain tasks well but do not really know how to amalgamate tasks for mission accomplishment. Really smart guys figure it out and make it work -- too many do not because of that flawed training process which force concentration of enabling skills and knowledges and not on mission sets.

[Bill Jakola]

I'm firmly convinced that a two track system is necessary, gut wrenching as that thought may be to many. The Per community will trot out Congressional objections to such a move, a partly valid complaint but their underlying objection to such a process will be that it is far more work, accusations of unfairness will be rampant and they would prefer to not have to deal with those. More importantly, they may make a mistake for which they might be held accountable. There are many arguments to oppose it and the only real argument for it is more combat effectiveness. How important is that? :wry:

A secondary argument for it is the opportunity all will have to truly develop expertise in a filed instead of being marginally competent generalists -- as one Generalist, a two star, once told me: "Every time I'd almost learned what I needed to know about doing a job, they moved me to new and different job..." If you want persons with expertise to advise and advocate, they need, as you noted, to be developed. The current system discourages that for too many.

We have padded the Staff numbers at all levels and Parkinson's Law is in effect. We did that to build an Officer strength cushion and a mobilization base -- something Congress generally opposes for some odd reason -- there are better ways to do that. As an aside, we're trying to make NCOES emulate the Officer system and that is really bad mistake which will adversely impact mobilization should it be necessary...

Up or out needs to go. In my last job, I had a problem with a rogue Colonel and needed to rope him in. We had a Major, due for mandatory retirement. I called him in and said "Bill, I need you to do this..." No dummy he, he said "Okay you figure since I've got to retire, he can't hurt me and I can rein him in a bit?" Yep. Worked quite well and no poor major got his career wrecked by a loose cannon. Point of all that is the current OER system and Army philosophy totally discourage initiative and risk taking. That is just flat criminal. Combat is a risk and initiative is necessary, it should be encouraged, not stifled. Peer and subordinate ratings should be required as well as senior ratings for all ranks (that will be even more gut wrenching than a dual track officer system :D) . The form should be a 3x5 card...

The Task, Condition and Standard system has developed a generation of leaders who can do certain tasks well but do not really know how to amalgamate tasks for mission accomplishment. Really smart guys figure it out and make it work -- too many do not because of that flawed training process which force concentration of enabling skills and knowledges and not on mission sets.

Violently agree!

[slapout9]

However, we can provide expertise in the conduct of war form the tactical through strategic, and as I attempted to argue before, our profession also informs, and often helps shape policy.



That may be the answer, that may be the best you can do in a democracy. Reminds me of the movie "7 days in May" which is about a Military Coup of America by the Air Force and Army Special Forces:eek::eek: over the President signing a peace treaty with Russia. In the end a Marine officer prevents the Coup but he actually believes the Air Force has the right policy and strategy for our defense, but civillian decsion making vetos Miltary expertise:eek:

Scene from "7 Days In May"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6YLVOjTcHg

[Bill Jakola]

That may be the answer, that may be the best you can do in a democracy. Reminds me of the movie "7 days in May" which is about a Military Coup of America by the Air Force and Army Special Forces:eek::eek: over the President signing a peace treaty with Russia. In the end a Marine officer prevents the Coup but he actually believes the Air Force has the right policy and strategy for our defense, but civillian decsion making vetos Miltary expertise:eek:

Scene from "7 Days In May"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6YLVOjTcHg

Slap, interesting clip.

This movie gets at what I view as an extreme example of advocacy that clearly enters the realm of treason. However, we should be able to provide advice and inform policy in such a manner to complement and balance political leadership as a team. The profession of arms must stay well clear of even the appearance of treason or, as the president points out in this movie, we create a weak government and invite adversaries to attack us.

Though this is a fictional example of political military tension, General Lemay advocating strongly for the bombing of Cuba during the missile crisis is another real example of the type of advocacy that goes beyond informing or shaping policy. His role as a leader in the profession of arms was not to set policy that is the role of the President. However, I view General Lemay as acting outside the bounds of the profession of arms by attempting to set policy.

My question is how do we, as a profession of arms, establish clear roles and develop our military leaders to operate within those established boundaries?

Dr. Don Snider talks about the profession of arms.

http://m.youtube.com/index?desktop_uri=%2F&gl=US#/watch?xl=xl_blazer&v=dwQEP1CGY7E

Here is the full discussion:
http://www.fpri.org/audio/20071015.mindthegap.ethicsdissent.mp3

[slapout9]

My question is how do we, as a profession of arms, establish clear roles and develop our military leaders to operate within those established boundaries?



The Cuban Missile Crisis is an interesting example. The Army had another option to offer the President largely because it had a different Strategy on how to fight a war. The Army had a Missile-Counter Missile-Civil Defense Plan that was largely different than the other services. I saw this up close and personal and the Army has never received the proper credit for preventing WW3-IMO.

The point being if the Army concentrates on offering differant policy advice(option) than everybody else it will be easier to develop a proper curriculum for the PME of it's soldiers. It would also increase its ability to influence policy simply because it is differant. Just my opinion.

[William F. Owen]

This movie gets at what I view as an extreme example of advocacy that clearly enters the realm of treason. Slippery slope.

General Lemay advocating strongly for the bombing of Cuba during the missile crisis is another real example of the type of advocacy that goes beyond informing or shaping policy. His role as a leader in the profession of arms was not to set policy that is the role of the President. However, I view General Lemay as acting outside the bounds of the profession of arms by attempting to set policy.
Well that is exactly my point. Soldiers should not set policy. They should merely advise as to what is possible using violence or the threat of violence. That's it!


My question is how do we, as a profession of arms, establish clear roles and develop our military leaders to operate within those established boundaries?
Get them to study war and warfare. Their contribution is violence, and the control that brings. Make sure they understand that. You do not shape policy to better use violence. You better shape violence to serve policy.

[wm]

On the issue of advocacy and advice raised by Bill Jakola, I will offer the following:

A wise old colonel once told me, "Whether you are a staff officer or a subordinate commander (and you'll always be one or the other unless you get elected President) your job is to find the best solution you can to the problem and then convince the boss that your proposed solution is the best. Once the boss makes a decision on how to tackle the problem, it's time to stop arguing. Then, your job is to make sure the boss's decision gets implemented as best you can. If at any time you find you you can't do these things, it's time to get out." Until a decision is made, one advocates. Once the decision is made, one gives advice on implementing it.


I agree that Ken's assessment of the problem that is a significant contributor to lack of professionalism and support his proposed solution thereto. "Up or out" must be removed in order to have a force that is not suboptimized. As I see it, the policy "rewards" officers for being competent at a given level by promoting them until such point as they display incompetence and then throws them out--some reward. Rewarding competence is a suboptimizer--I'd prefer my force to strive for excellence, not just competence. Other ways besides promotion exist to reward excellence.

However, I must disagree with Ken's assessment of the military's status as a profession, epecially when compared to his two paradigms--physcians and lawyers.

A Profession requires a discrete vocabulary (we have that), dedication to its norms (we have that), a body of specialist knowledge (we have that), is trusted to be self regulating (not present) and self policing (also not present). Those items are listed in order of importance, least to greatest. The 'profession of arms' fails on the two most critical tests.

. . .

If the occupation of soldiers was self regulating and self policing as are law and medicine, then it might be a profession. Since it is not those things -- and should not be if it is to serve the State -- then it doesn't really exist as a profession.

The miltary is self-regulating to a high degree--if it weren't then what the heck are those ARs, AFIs, etc. all about. The military is also self-policing. After all it has its own code of justice--UCMJ--and its own police forces. I suspect Ken's main focus for denying that the military meets these two tenets is based on the phrase "is trusted." I submit that the military is trusted to be self regulating and self policing. However, limits exist to that trust. In similar fashion, limits exist to the self-regulating and self-policing of doctors and lawyers. Every state in the US regulates its doctors, and I believe its lawyers as well, through a governmental organization that is outside the profession. Doctors and lawyers must be licensed/admitted to practice in a jurisdiction--In Massachusetts at least, the state medical and bar associations (the self-regulating and policing arms of those professions) do not perform that function, state agencies do. The Mass. Board of Registration in Medicine is a state agency, not a physician's organization. In addition to licensing physicians, it also has the responsibility for disciplining them. The Mass. Board of the Bar Overseers performs a similar function:

The Board of Bar Overseers was established by the Supreme Judicial Court in 1974 as an independent administrative body to investigate and evaluate complaints against lawyers. Although both the Board is an official body subject to the supervision of the Supreme Judicial Court, no public funds are spent to support it. The Board's expenses come solely from the annual registration fees paid by lawyers.

The Board of Bar Overseers consists of twelve volunteer members who are appointed by the Court for four-year terms. Eight of the members are lawyers; the other four are public members. The activities of the Board are governed by Supreme Judicial Court Rule 4:01 and the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers. The Board acts as an administrative tribunal to consider disciplinary charges brought by Bar Counsel. When a lawyer is found guilty of misconduct the Board either imposes discipline or recommends to the Supreme Judicial Court that more serious discipline be imposed.

Fact of the matter is that the USA as a nation came to exist because of distrust of authority. As a result, just about every public activity in this country has some oversight by the citizenry, its elected or apppointed representatives, or both.

I concur that much of what the military does is very much tradecraft, but that does not yield the result that the military is not a profession. A platypus lays eggs like birds and reptiles, but that does not keep it from being a mammal.

[Ken White]

We can have one of our rare disagreements on this esoteric topic.

I sincerely hope the The Mass. Board of Registration in Medicine as a state agency is not unduly responsive to the State Medical Association as is ours in Florida (though we are getting better...). Nationwide, the various Medical Boards and Registries are effectively self regulating with minimal government oversight; that is not true of the Armed forces -- if it were, then OCLL would be a much smaller and far cheaper operation than it is.

I also note the Lawyers have assured themselves of a voting majority on the Board of Bar Overseers. One could wish for such representation on the two ASCs. ;)

One of the penalties of being old is that one recalls things. Like the screaming and wailing of old Marines, Officer and Enlisted, when the UCMJ was first promulgated in 1951. "Congress has sold us down the river..." :D

However, all that said, I do realize the desire and logical conclusions of many opt for the 'Profession' as opposed to trade -- and I really have no problem with that. I simply have another opinion and voice it on occasion by pointing out that a good many effective wielders of violence for political ends are not professionals in any sense and thus, I attempt to discourage the fatal flaw of allowing one's ego to impede common sense leading to underestimating one's opponents -- a too consistent American failure. :rolleyes:

The Platypus is an interesting allegorical choice, it is indeed a mammal -- but it does lay eggs. Venomous, too. Not many of them about, though... ;)

[Pete]

One of my main concerns about the Profession of Arms in the U.S. is that we now seem to be more concerned about the smooth functioning of our administrative and logistical processes rather than winning wars. During the past 30 years most of the military professionals I've known have reached the point that they're neither surprised nor indignant when the system screws up because they've seen it happen so many times. To get something done in the military you have to use the chain of command and each level of the hierarchy has its own internal processes, which means that by the time the chain of command has done its thing the situation that started things in the first place has changed and has been overcome by events. In tactical situations that process can and does snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

It reminds me of what a woman told me about being a clerk typist for the Bureau of Indian Affairs -- when she typed a piece of correspondence it would be sent around for review with a routing slip attached, and by the time everyone had reviewed it 12 months would have elapsed and the situation would be OBE. However, whether you're a lieutenant colonel, a master sergeant, or a typist, if you need your job you'd best keep your mouth shut and not say anything about it.

I suppose that's okay because North Korea, North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, Afghanistan, and Iraq have never been threats to the survival of the U.S., but if we ever face a real enemy this sort of thing will really matter.

[Bill Jakola]

On the issue of advocacy and advice raised by Bill Jakola, I will offer the following:

your job is to find the best solution you can to the problem and then convince the boss that your proposed solution is the best.

WM my definition of advice and avocacy may be somewhat different than yours. I view our responsibility as providing courses of action, or strategies to our political leaders and not advocating for only one solution. Since providing just one answer, as you suggest, limits the commander's choice to either approve or not.

But also our profession requires us to maintain and profess expert knowledge. Part of professing this expertise is advocating and even dissenting when the gravity of the situation warrants.




I agree that Ken's assessment of the problem that is a significant contributor to lack of professionalism and support his proposed solution thereto...

However, I must disagree with Ken's assessment of the military's status as a profession, epecially when compared to his two paradigms--physcians and lawyers.


Here I must clarify the difference between behaving professionally or possessing professionalism and the profession of arms. Professionalism as you and Ken point out is not different in the military than it is in other areas, like plumbing. However, the profession of arms is uniquely different in that it derives power from society. In other words, society creates the profession of arms to maintain expertise in the management of violence in the resolution of social problems.

This contract between the society and the profession is what distinguishes the profession of arms from an occupation or trade. For example, as Dr. Snider points out, in 2003 the society asked the profession to conduct COIN but the profession did not have any COIN expertise. This was a failure of the profession and this is why we need to have this conversation. We need to ensure our profession of arms maintains the required expertise across the full spectrum of operations. This is our mandate from the society we serve.

[slapout9]

However, all that said, I do realize the desire and logical conclusions of many opt for the 'Profession' as opposed to trade -- and I really have no problem with that. I simply have another opinion and voice it on occasion by pointing out that a good many effective wielders of violence for political ends are not professionals in any sense and thus, I attempt to discourage the fatal flaw of allowing one's ego to impede common sense leading to underestimating one's opponents -- a too consistent American failure. :rolleyes:



Maybe Ken is right? One could say that the American Army is not a Professional Army in the sense that the fundamental definition of a Professional is one who renders a service for a fee, hence a true professional army is a mercenary army. But the American Army might be better considered a Citizen Army and they serve out of a sense of duty and love of country as opposed to monetary gain. Instead of being Professional, the American people expect them to be competent and expert at waging War and Warfare. Just a thought.

[Bill Jakola]

Maybe Ken is right? One could say that the American Army is not a Professional Army in the sense that the fundamental definition of a Professional is one who renders a service for a fee, hence a true professional army is a mercenary army. But the American Army might be better considered a Citizen Army and they serve out of a sense of duty and love of country as opposed to monetary gain. Instead of being Professional, the American people expect them to be competent and expert at waging War and Warfare. Just a thought.

Slap, this is exactly right. We are not talking professional, or professionalism but, as you say, a profession of arms "competent and expert at waging War and Warfare". The profession matins expert knowledge of war.

Also, your link to the old movie about the coup was spot on for depicting the civil military relationship. I see this part of the profession (civil/military) easier to envision and it has much clearer lines of demarcation. Whereas, the military/military (joint and foreign) relationships are
more challenging to describe.

[slapout9]

Also, your link to the old movie about the coup was spot on for depicting the civil military relationship. I see this part of the profession (civil/military) easier to envision and it has much clearer lines of demarcation. Whereas, the military/military (joint and foreign) relationships are
more challenging to describe.

A little tidbit about the movie President Kennedy personally pushed Hollywood to have the movie made, to include his arraigning to be away from the White house so part of the filming could be done in front of the White house. If you haven't seen the whole movie take a look some time it is worth it. The very same scenario could happen today, actually pretty scary:eek:

[jmm99]

We had Dr Strangelove (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dr._Strangelove) (released 29 Jan 1964) and the lesser-remembered Fail Safe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail-Safe_(1964_film)) (released 7 Oct 1964) (on cable a month or so ago), which were of the "Big Boom cuz of Screwup" genre.

We had Slap's Seven Days in May (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Days_in_May) (released 12 Feb 1964), of the "Big Conspiracy" genre - timely as being released a few months after JFK was killed.

We also had the 7 Sep 1964 Daisy Ad (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daisy_(advertisement)), which played on fears that the Dr Strangelove and Fail Safe scenarios would actually play out. That is, if the electorate allowed "conspiratorial nutcases" (i.e., Goldwater et al) to assume the reins of power.

Such was 1964 Hollywood's normative view of the military (scarcely in its eyes a profession of arms at flag officer level). While I hated that view then and now, I admit to some addiction with the films themselves. But, I also appreciate The Battleship Potemkin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Battleship_Potemkin) :D.

More recently, we find another fan of "Seven Days" in a high place:

Pentagon Memo: Gates Sees Fallout From Troubled Ties With Pakistan (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/world/asia/24military.html?_r=1)


By ELISABETH BUMILLER
Published: January 23, 2010

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Nobody else in the Obama administration has been mired in Pakistan for as long as Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. So on a trip here this past week to try to soothe the country’s growing rancor toward the United States, he served as a punching bag tested over a quarter-century.
.....
His final message delivered, he relaxed on the 14-hour trip home by watching “Seven Days in May,” the cold war-era film about an attempted military coup in the United States.

Too bad he didn't write a review for us.

Cheers

Mike

[Bill Jakola]

We had Dr Strangelove (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dr._Strangelove) (released 29 Jan 1964) and the lesser-remembered Fail Safe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail-Safe_(1964_film)) (released 7 Oct 1964) (on cable a month or so ago), which were of the "Big Boom cuz of Screwup" genre.

We had Slap's Seven Days in May (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Days_in_May) (released 12 Feb 1964), of the "Big Conspiracy" genre - timely as being released a few months after JFK was killed.

We also had the 7 Sep 1964 Daisy Ad (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daisy_(advertisement)), which played on fears that the Dr Strangelove and Fail Safe scenarios would actually play out. That is, if the electorate allowed "conspiratorial nutcases" (i.e., Goldwater et al) to assume the reins of power.

Such was 1964 Hollywood's normative view of the military (scarcely in its eyes a profession of arms at flag officer level). While I hated that view then and now, I admit to some addiction with the films themselves. But, I also appreciate The Battleship Potemkin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Battleship_Potemkin) :D.

More recently, we find another fan of "Seven Days" in a high place:

Pentagon Memo: Gates Sees Fallout From Troubled Ties With Pakistan (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/world/asia/24military.html?_r=1)



Too bad he didn't write a review for us.

Cheers

Mike

Mike,


Yes, too bad he didn't write a review in light of Bob Woodward's recent book "Obama's Wars" showing similar tension actually happening.

But it is difficult to know the full story having only read one side. Still it is Interesting that SECDEF Gates watched this movie.

[wm]

[A] good many effective wielders of violence for political ends are not professionals in any sense and thus, I attempt to discourage the fatal flaw of allowing one's ego to impede common sense leading to underestimating one's opponents -- a too consistent American failure. :rolleyes:

Maybe the reason that we feel the need to label ourselves as a profession is to separate ourselves from those other wielders of violence whom we tend to think do so illegitimately. The real tough nut to crack will be deciding whose use of violence is justified. I choose to say justified rather than legitimate because the former does not tend make one think only in terms of what is legal.

It might be the case that a moral justification trumps a legal one (and I submit that this is the case). Just war theory came into its modern form in the West by way of Hugo Grotius' writings (On The Law of Peace and War in Three Volumes, which is a legal interpretation. However, one of the earliest Western discussions of just war is in St. Augustine and tends to be more of a moral justification, albeit one derived from a religious basis for morality.


The Platypus is an interesting allegorical choice, it is indeed a mammal -- but it does lay eggs. Venomous, too. Not many of them about, though... ;)
Besides being a mammal that is egg-laying, venomous, duck-billed, beaver-tailed, and otter-footed, the platypus has another rather unique characteristic: it is a monotreme (along with the four species of Echidna or spiny anteater) .


Monotremes are the only mammals known to have a sense of electroreception: they locate their prey in part by detecting electric fields generated by muscular contractions. The Platypus' electroreception is the most sensitive of any monotreme.

But I digress. This is the Small Wars Council, not Animal Planet.

[wm]

This contract between the society and the profession is what distinguishes the profession of arms from an occupation or trade. For example, as Dr. Snider points out, in 2003 the society asked the profession to conduct COIN but the profession did not have any COIN expertise. This was a failure of the profession and this is why we need to have this conversation. We need to ensure our profession of arms maintains the required expertise across the full spectrum of operations. This is our mandate from the society we serve.

I think you have got this just backwards. The contract described in the quotation, if there is one, is what makes what armies do more like tradecraft. (BTW I doubt that such a contract has ever existed. Appeal to a contract here, just as in Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, is a useful fiction or myth not unlike the stories pre-scientific peoples tell to explain things like thunder.)

The armed forces of this country were unprepared to perform COIN because America "hired" its military to defend it from aggression--what the Preamble describes as "provide for the common defense." How conducting COIN in Iraq or Afghanistan provides for the common defense of the USA escapes me.

[Ken White]

Maybe the reason that we feel the need to label ourselves as a profession...Heh. That 'cachet' thing...:wry:
I choose to say justified rather than legitimate because the former does not tend make one think only in terms of what is legal.My belief is that all war is 'immoral' but some are necessary and a few lack that urgency but may still be desirable, thus, J'accord.
...Hugo Grotius' writings ...just war is in St. Augustine and tends to be more of a moral justification, albeit one derived from a religious basis for morality.Yes. Frankly, I think both were off a bit. War is really a very inefficient way of resolving disputes but it exists due to the irrationality of human emotions. It is not IMO ever 'just' but may be justified and is unlikely to be moral as I see morality but may still be the right thing to do. Conflicting emotions. As Lee said "It is well that war is so terrible -- lest we should grow too fond of it." Hard on people but can be fun. A trade best practiced by professionals or a profession dominated by tradesmen... :wry:
But I digress. This is the Small Wars Council, not Animal Planet.Umm, well, maybe... ;)

[Ken White]

The armed forces of this country were unprepared to perform COIN because America "hired" its military to defend it from aggression--what the Preamble describes as "provide for the common defense." How conducting COIN in Iraq or Afghanistan provides for the common defense of the USA escapes me.I'd cannot add to that but will comment the conduct of COIN anywhere short of an adjunct operation in a major war is neither the job of the Armed Forces or one best performed by them...

[slapout9]

Still it is Interesting that SECDEF Gates watched this movie.


You should really watch both together. "Fail Safe" and "7 Days in May".
In Fail Safe a limited Nuclear exchange takes place because of a glich in a tatally automated Defense system, kinda like what just happened a few weeks ago when the Air Force lost power? to some 50 ICBM's.

7 days in May takes place when the Miltary decides to have a "Secret War Game" where they intend to kidnap/or something else? the President while he is at a Secret Miltary Base.

Both are future scenarios of what could have happened or could still happen.

[slapout9]

Scene from Fail Safe, best part is towards the end.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-Q1rKFsHnQ

[Pete]

In the Summer 2010 issue of Parameters, the War College quarterly, there is an historic overview of the involvement of U.S. military officers in politics. According to the author:


The belief that the American military has been uninvolved in politics is traditional and long-held. In his magisterial work on the subject of civil-military affairs, Samuel P. Huntington stated flatly that “after the Civil War officers unanimously believed that politics and officer-ship did not mix.” This article has attempted to show that such an assessment is simply not true. Rather, senior military officers were continually and deeply involved in political affairs both before and after the Civil War. More importantly, such a relationship was not seen as either un-American or unconstitutional. On the contrary, for most of the nation’s history the close relation between soldiers and politics has been encouraged and accepted.

The article can be read by clicking here (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/2010summer/Meilinger.pdf).

[Pete]

American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era, edited by Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, is reviewed in the Spring 2010 issue of Parameters, available by clicking here (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/2010spring/40-1-2010_CombinedBookReviews.pdf).

[William F. Owen]

This contract between the society and the profession is what distinguishes the profession of arms from an occupation or trade. For example, as Dr. Snider points out, in 2003 the society asked the profession to conduct COIN but the profession did not have any COIN expertise. This was a failure of the profession and this is why we need to have this conversation. We need to ensure our profession of arms maintains the required expertise across the full spectrum of operations. This is our mandate from the society we serve.

So why doe the US Army consistently choose not to maintains the required expertise across the full spectrum of operations?

The failure to be ready to fight an Irregular Threat was a failure of training. Almost all US Officers knew they should be doing it. They just CHOSE to ignore it, because no one forced them to study their profession in an objective sense.

Failing to admit this has left the door wide open for the "COIN Club" and stuff like FM32-4, which are failures of exactly the same nature. Until the US Army understands that their job is WARFARE, then all the other sophistry and pontificating will make no difference. Being skilled at "fighting" - in it's broadest sense, is what counts. All else is rubbish.

....and let us not fall back on the idea that the US Army was "good at fighting regular threats." There is no evidence that they were. They managed to beat the Iraqi Army. That did not required great skill. They were 4th rate in 1991 and 10th rate in 2003.

[Bill Jakola]

So why doe the US Army consistently choose not to maintains the required expertise across the full spectrum of operations?

The failure to be ready to fight an Irregular Threat was a failure of training. Almost all US Officers knew they should be doing it. They just CHOSE to ignore it, because no one forced them to study their profession in an objective sense.

Failing to admit this has left the door wide open for the "COIN Club" and stuff like FM32-4, which are failures of exactly the same nature. Until the US Army understands that their job is WARFARE, then all the other sophistry and pontificating will make no difference. Being skilled at "fighting" - in it's broadest sense, is what counts. All else is rubbish.

....and let us not fall back on the idea that the US Army was "good at fighting regular threats." There is no evidence that they were. They managed to beat the Iraqi Army. That did not required great skill. They were 4th rate in 1991 and 10th rate in 2003.

Well said. Simply put we are pretty good but not as good as we think we are.

William you are getting at a core failure of our profession. We have managed to muddle through the last nine years not because the profession was expert in warfare or even adapted to areas where expertise lacked; but, rather any success came on backs of individuals who maintained personal professionalism in war.

It is a failure of imagination to attribute the professional success of individuals to the profession of arms. Part of being a profession is seeing ourselves clearly enough to recognize our failures and then fix them.

[Fuchs]

....and let us not fall back on the idea that the US Army was "good at fighting regular threats." There is no evidence that they were. They managed to beat the Iraqi Army. That did not required great skill. They were 4th rate in 1991 and 10th rate in 2003.


I'd like some remarks here:

* The ease with which the British trumped the Italians in 1940, only to be rightfully scared when the Germans arrived in Tripolitania.

* Storr's nice anecdote about Indian staffs vs. UK (~NATO) staffs

* The difficulties of the U.S.Army against poorly equipped infantry-centric forces in East Asia once the enemies weren't trapped on small islands

* The ridiculous military 'strength' of most enemies beaten by U.S. forces between 1945 and 1991.

* The rather limited impression which U.S. troops left in Germany during the 70's and 80's even when compared with or by conscripts.

* The fact that anglophone literature praising the professionalism of U.S. forces originates mostly from the U.S. and gained influence not the least because of its nummerical superiority over other anglophone or even other NATO-countries' literature on the subject.


The U.S. Army followed its own approach and was likely the best world-wide in its own approach. The superiority of its approach is questionable, though.
It appears to work fine against low quality leadership opposition and in open terrain. Its effectiveness in close terrain and in crisis situations is very dubious, though.

[William F. Owen]

It is a failure of imagination to attribute the professional success of individuals to the profession of arms. Part of being a profession is seeing ourselves clearly enough to recognize our failures and then fix them.

....my work here is done..... :)

[Ken White]

Let's see how the "fix" part of that goes... :wry:

Fuchs assessment is correct -- we have done okay, not great. Largely thanks to opposition of even lower quality than ourselves. The reason we aren't as good as many like to think we are is that we accepted -- nay, fostered -- mediocrity. :mad:

In fairness to the Army, a part of that is societally induced political correctness and an even large part is the fault of an intrusive, over politicized Congress. However, those contributions are exacerbated by the Army's too willing acceptance of those foibles and refusal to counteract them -- mostly in an effort to curry favor, popularity and an increased budget.

If you want to be a profession, you must act professionally and police yourself. The Army consistently avoids both those things, acting socially and trying to hide rather than fix shortfalls...

The object should not be to protect the institution, it should be to improve it.

[wm]

Let's The object should not be to protect the institution, it should be to improve it.

Another candidate for quote of the week.

But in order to improve the process we need to get a whole lot of changes made in many places.
One of my current favorites is the budget process. This has got to be one of the worsst offenders when it comes to ways that the Defense community suboptimizes its efforts. Other than to protect the various components of the institution (and therefore the institution as a whole), why does everyone in the community need to get a place at the funding trough?

[slapout9]

One thing that happened recently on how the Army can influence policy or be corrupted by it depending on your point of view was this. The entire studio audience of the Glenn Beck Show was made up of the Corps of Cadets from West Point, along with their faculty advisers. Beck then gave a short history of how much the Army Corps of Engineers contributed to the Physical development of this country.

Now I think is was a very good idea for West Point to be part of something like that but they really,really need to chose a better TV show to do it on. But maybe that was the only offer they had,which is really sad:(

[Bill Jakola]

In retrospect, clearly it was a mistake to not maintain COIN expertise in our profession, but what areas of expert knowledge are we now neglecting?

In short, what are we missing?

[William F. Owen]

In retrospect, clearly it was a mistake to not maintain COIN expertise in our profession, but what areas of expert knowledge are we now neglecting?

In short, what are we missing?
How long you got? Some consultant will charge you millions for stating what follows here, :D

Based on speaking to many US Officers and what gets written here, it seems to me you do not have a teaching as what War is, or any basic theory as to how to fight or how to conduct Warfare.

What you have in place is loose collections of concepts, opinions and TTPs, none of which are actually based on a coherent agreement as to the aim, purpose and limitations of armed force.

FM3 says

"Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success."
That is utterly wrong, and clearly proves that the US Army is confused as to its purpose, and the US Government does not understand the use of armed force. Fix that and the rest will fall into place.

[Bob's World]

We are missing a variety of things, but to get at them we need to gain a better perspective of both ourselves and the threats we face. In short "know our enemy and know ourself"

So, as a paradigm shift, if I want "know my enemy" in a tactical way, I ask the Intel guys. If I want to "know my enemy" in a strategic way, I need to tell the Intel guys to take a knee and go talk to my strategy guys instead.

As powerful nations transition from building Empires to holding Empires, their military capacity shifts from one designed, trained, organized and equipped for warfighting to one that is designed, trained, organized and equipped for maintaining control of the populaces and governments within that empire. I, for one, see a lot of that going on in the Pentagon in the post-Cold War era.

One factor that blinds us is the position that the US is not an Imperial power. Perhaps, but we sure act like one.

The challenges of Somalia, the Balkans, the OEFs and OIF, hell - even much of residual Cold War positions; are all rooted in this sustaining of a sphere of security and economic influence. That is a whole lot like sustaining an Empire.

What happens to these countries is that someone tends come along, or more often multiple someones team-up and come along, with a military designed specifically to defeat the Empire's Empire-sustaining military capability.

I would suggest to the Army:
1. Stop agonizing so much over how to build an Empire-sustaining army.
2. Stop being so Intel-Driven, and become more Strategy-Driven.
3. Make the focus of the military the capabilities needed to deter and defeat major threats to the US (A capability and intent to blow up an Embassy or a ship is not a major threat to the US, these are largely law enforcement matters).
4. Re-prioritize FID and other support to Department of State activities as a supporting activity.
5. Down-size the Intel community back to pre-9/11 levels
6. Begin identifying, training and employing strategists before the current Intro to Strategy that is given at the War College. Strategy is not just for Colonels and above, and frankly, those old dogs are not very good at picking up new tricks at that point.
7. Send the COS and the SECArmy into the SECDEF's office and demand that we stop calling Afghanistan and Iraq "Wars."
8. Submit a proposal at the same time that reduces General Officer billets by 50% and publicly challenge the other services to match that commitment and to implement it when they do. (Make it a 80% reduction for the Marine Corps as they are totally out of control in that regard).

Bill this list could go on and on, but the first 4 points are critical, the rest are important, but would naturally follow getting the first part right.

[Ken White]

I'd go for the loss of a higher percentage of Flags -- and Sergeants Major. :wry:

Wilf's succinct comment really encapsulates the problem well. He made it with respect to shaping the civil situation but it really applies far more broadly than to just that:
That is utterly wrong, and clearly proves that the US Army is confused as to its purpose, and the US Government does not understand the use of armed force. Fix that and the rest will fall into place. (emphasis added / kw)Absolutely correct on both counts.

That statement has been true for most, not all, of my adult life. That 'most' encompasses the vast majority of the last 50 years almost precisely (it'll be 50 years next January...) and it includes Administrations from both parties with only rare and tantalizingly brief interludes of good sense from some. :rolleyes:

In fairness to the Army, that is in part due to a series of unintended consequences mostly caused by Congress, due in large measure to their shameful pandering and to their budgeting chicanery. Not least of of the problems is the literal shoving of DoD into foreign affairs and civil policy roles they should not have. Congress may change; the voters are getting fed up with their foolishness (long overdue, that...) but it is incumbent upon DoD and the Army to take a hard look at themselves and totally scrap the outmoded World War models of mediocre to poor education, training and personnel mismanagement and the post World War excessive intrusion into the civil realm.

In summation, what we are missing is that the world has changed significantly since we instituted those models and tinkering around the edges has exacerbated all the problems and will not allow adequate adaptation, much less optimal adaptation.

Oh, and do NOT try to 'fix' it with a Congressional Panel, a massive QDR like effort, a PBAC / POM exercise, a GOSC or a Council of Colonels. Those are precisely what put us where we are... :mad:

[Wargames Mark]

I received a digital copy of the white paper the other day. Most of it is very good. One thing though, that will come across initially as lawyer-like nitpicking, but I think has gargantuan weight, especially if you are considering the role of our Army in the United States: On page 16, the white paper gets into the source of authority for the Army. It states -


All Soldiers swear to support and defend the Constitution. However, the Constitution alone is not the source of their authority. The source of military authority flows from the American people through the Constitution, through elected and appointed officials, to the officers they appoint, and finally to those Soldiers entrusted with executing orders. There is a dynamic relationship in this authority hierarchy. The people have the power to amend the Constitution and to elect the political leaders who both authorize and fund the military. The military remains loyal to the people and the Constitution by fulfilling its function in accordance with the guidance, laws, and regulations passed by those with the authority to do so.

This chain of authority argues against the idea that the ultimate loyalty for Army professionals is simply to the Constitution. Rather, Army professionals are loyal to the Constitution, and thus to the people, by being obedient to elected and appointed officials and the Commander-in-Chief. Thus, being willingly subordinate to civilian authority is based on loyalty to the source of its authority. This principle was perhaps best exemplified by General George Washington in his resignation to Congress at the close of the Revolutionary War. By this act he ensured that his immense national popularity as a military leader and hero would not overshadow the necessary power of the fledgling Congress. Thus the American military has long recognized and embraced a moral tradition of subordinating service to country.

The constitution and treaties signed by the president and ratified by the senate make up the highest law in the land. It is the constitution that establishes in the law the components of the federal government. It states how senators and congressional representatives are chosen, describes the powers of congress, describes the powers of the president, describes the means by which the constitution itself may be amended.

Most importantly, for this discussion, the constitution restricts the powers of the federal government to those things explicitly granted to it by the constitution which are not explicitly forbidden to the states or the people:


Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

The very existence of an armed forces controlled by the federal government requires explicit authority, which is given in Article I, Section 8:


The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

(...skipping through stuff not militarily-related...)

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

(...skipping stuff not militarily-related...)

You could also consider the powers granted to the president as commander and chief, but without the express authority to tax (and therefore spend) to fund a military, there wouldn't be one for the president to be commander-in-chief of. There is no legal way for the federal government to form and maintain such an armed forces except through the powers expressly stated in the constitution. So, it is illogical to see some other sources of authority - there aren't any.

What you have instead is a stream of authority that flows from the wellspring of constitutional law. Everything starts there. The appointment of officers, funding for operations, training, and the procurement of equipment, facilities, and materiel, the uniform code of military justice, so on and so forth...even the process for entering into, signing, and ratifying treaties that affect how our Army conducts itself originates with the constitution.

This is all very significant, and in opposition to the material on page 16, because congress and the president are bound by the constitution. (Again, look at the 10th amendment.) They don't have any "extra-constitutional" powers. If they did, then there wouldn't be any point to even having a constitution. The whole point of the constitution is to establish rule of law, rather than rule of man - aka mob rule. The whitepaper mentions that the "people" can amend the constitution through their representatives - yes, if it is done in the manner described in the constitution, but until they have done so, their whims don't mean diddly-squat.

Mob rule and populism are serious threats to the freedom of individual citizens. Rabble-rousing is a favorite tactic of murderous and oppressive strongmen the world over, the manic speeches of Hitler and Mussolini being the most famous, instantly-recognizable examples. The Soldier must have no confusion on the subject of constitutional supremacy. No order, if it violates constitutional law, is legal and no such order should be carried out.

When the Army starts writing about the profession of arms and the Army's position and role in our society, this stuff needs to be crystal clear and absolutely accurate.

[jmm99]

But ....

I'm attaching a pdf snip of 4 pages from the 2010 Crim-Law-Deskbook_V-2.pdf (available from CLAMO; navigate from here (http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/military-legal-resources-home.html) for the whole manual), which covers Lawfulness of Orders (A through E in the attached snip):


XI. THE LAWFULNESS OF ORDERS.

A. Presumption of Lawfulness. Orders from superiors requiring the performance of military duties are presumed to be lawful. MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 14c(2)(a)(i); United States v. McDaniels, 50 M.J. 407 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (order to not drive personal vehicle after diagnosis of narcolepsy); United States v. Nieves, 44 M.J. 96 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (order prohibiting discussions with witnesses); United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (order requiring soldier to wear United Nations blue beret and insignia).
....
(B through D provide specifics)
....
E. Litigating the Issue of Lawfulness of the Order. Lawfulness of an order, although an important issue, is not a discrete element of a disobedience offense. Therefore, it is a question of law to be determined by the military judge. MCM pt. IV, ¶ 14c(2)(a). United States v. Jeffers, 57 M.J. 13 (C.A.A.F. 2002); United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95 (C.A.A.F. 2001); But see United States v. Mack, 65 M.J. 108 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (while the lawfulness of an order is a question of law to be determined by the military judge, submitting the question of lawfulness to a panel is harmless error when the accused fails to rebut the presumption of lawfulness).

Now a question for you all (not just Mark) after reading through the snip - how many service members have the professional competence to determine whether an order is constitutionally lawful ?

Regards

Mike

[bumperplate]

From Bob's World - my comments in bold.
"We are missing a variety of things...

I would suggest to the Army:

1. Stop agonizing so much over how to build an Empire-sustaining army.

Aren't we now bound to act accordingly? I see no other alternative, considering the US is asked (tasked) to intervene in virtually every situation that arises. How we've stayed out of Africa thus far is remarkable. I don't really have an issue with your comment, however. Just don't know if it's a reasonable task for us at this time, to worry about whether we are or are not conducting ourselves as an empire-sustaining organization.

2. Stop being so Intel-Driven, and become more Strategy-Driven.

I do agree. However, I don't see us currently as an Intel-Driven unit, at least not at the lower echelons. We are Commander-Driven. I have serious issues with our IC, and their inability to provide information that drives operations at the CO and BN levels - however, that is the fault of that maneuver commander when it gets right down to it. I do feel at higher echelons we are intel-driven, but I read into that and determine the failing there is at the commander level, once again. Our senior commanders reduce their decisions to BUB/CUB slides and the GRINTSUM etc, and they are very much driven by those slides and presentations from "intell experts" and those other experts deemed to be related to the field of intelligence. After all, many of the items on those intell products are related to PIRs, which seem to be related more closely to OER SF items, rather than mission accomplishment items. And, it's that support form those careerist are working for - or so it seems. As for strategy driven, whole can of worms there.


3. Make the focus of the military the capabilities needed to deter and defeat major threats to the US (A capability and intent to blow up an Embassy or a ship is not a major threat to the US, these are largely law enforcement matters).

Not sure the force protection issue you bring up is something that can be ignored. I see it as an essential element. I see it as one of thousands of essential tasks that we must be able to do, simply because we cannot predict or count on our political leadership to send us to accomplish missions that are solely related to threats to the US.


4. Re-prioritize FID and other support to Department of State activities as a supporting activity.

Don't understand this one. Not really sure how this would work out.


5. Down-size the Intel community back to pre-9/11 levels.

Currently the IC is increasing in size. The throughput at MI BOLC for instance is still increasing. I'm all for that. However, I'd say the IC needs to restructure itself into just two communities - tactical and strategic intelligence. Currently there are too many identifiers and specializations, from HUMINT, to All source, etc. Intell people and some of their assets need to move lower. Take them from the top if possible. Perhaps the total number doesn't need to change, but the force tailoring definitely does. Too many GOs (literally too man as well) asking for too many products for their own personal SA, and that's why the IC is top heavy and cumbersome.


6. Begin identifying, training and employing strategists before the current Intro to Strategy that is given at the War College. Strategy is not just for Colonels and above, and frankly, those old dogs are not very good at picking up new tricks at that point.

I agree - to a point. I believe this is what the SAMS community is for. Maybe I'm wrong? I think we need to do this, but concomitantly we must focus on our tactical side as well. Our core skills are and have been suffering. This leads to some greater points brought up by others - regarding inflation of our capabilities, getting back to basics, and so forth.


7. Send the COS and the SECArmy into the SECDEF's office and demand that we stop calling Afghanistan and Iraq "Wars."[quote]

I find it hard to swallow this one down. I think the absence of a true war-time mentality is located mainly with our civilian leadership and our society, overall. I think our service members are certainly aware that we're in a war - not as many as I'd like. But, not so few as to refrain from referring to what we're currently in as a war. Minor stuff though. No one is going to lose sleep over this.

[quote]8. Submit a proposal at the same time that reduces General Officer billets by 50% and publicly challenge the other services to match that commitment and to implement it when they do. (Make it a 80% reduction for the Marine Corps as they are totally out of control in that regard).

Can't speak for the USMC issues, but I agree about the Army stuff - too many GOs and too many COLs doing nothing but hunting for that star. I think this war has so badly polluted promotion, awards, and the personnel selection methods that we are seeing truly awful leadership at the BN and CO levels, to a far greater extent than before. The "careerist" mentality has crept way far down the paychart and it's disgusting. Purging some GOs would be a great way to start fixing this. I would love to see some forced retirements. Getting rid of the up or out would help as well. All it does is encourage this careerist, rank-hunting mentality and that leads to 2nd and 3rd order effects, none of which are good for the military...."

[bumperplate]

My comments are in bold within Mr. Owen's quote.

How long you got? Some consultant will charge you millions for stating what follows here, :D

Based on speaking to many US Officers and what gets written here, it seems to me you do not have a teaching as what War is, or any basic theory as to how to fight or how to conduct Warfare. If I remember correctly, in the WWI and WWII eras, German officers were taught theory and principles of warfare and began their education at the operational level by studying BN & BDE ops, and working their way down to Squad/Team levels. It is the opposite in the US, at least it was for me. I'd say you are correct. I believe the USMA approaches this topic. However, given the product I see coming out of the USMA, I'd say the majority of the efforts there are related to producing professional students and large underground networks for cheating. Exceptions are there, but exceptions create the rule.

What you have in place is loose collections of concepts, opinions and TTPs, none of which are actually based on a coherent agreement as to the aim, purpose and limitations of armed force. I've heard it said, more than once, that part of the success of US military forces relates to this loose collection and a loose adherence to doctrine, philosophical style of warfare, etc. However, on the graph relating rigor to effectiveness there is a definite inflection point where less rigor leads to less effectiveness. So, to your point, I think we could use a bit of education and rigor. Conversely, adhering too strongly to one brand of warfare or one philosophy also takes you to an inflection point where effectiveness suffers. But, so long as this education does not produce inflexibility then I believe such a point will not be an issue for our forces.

FM3 says

That is utterly wrong, and clearly proves that the US Army is confused as to its purpose, and the US Government does not understand the use of armed force. Fix that and the rest will fall into place.
FM 3-0 sucks, plain and simple. It has become a waste of paper. And yes, it certainly does highlight that the Army has lost an appreciation of purpose. I don't read 3-0 any longer and I pay no attention to the moronic and incessant changes released as some group of people, in some location, dissect mission command from command & control and create circular discussions rather than operationally significant documents.

I applaud GEN Dempsey for publishing this Profession of Arms document. There are good points in it. For instance, it mentions the "zero defect" mentality and the ills it produces. Also, it mentions the following, "A recent report suggests that today‘s operating forces after nine years of war, exhibit more the traits of a profession than the force-generating, or institutional, side of the Army." That's a pretty good rebuke of all that TRADOC does and is - the test will be whether or not TRADOC fixes this issue. It's good that it was pointed out though, albeit in the beginning and in passing.

Negatives to follow.

[bumperplate]

However, the document has serious flaws. As mentioned previously, posting the Constitution v. The will of the People is a dangerous proposition and one I find disgusting, misinformed, and just plain wrong. It’s disturbing that a senior officer in the US Army wrote that and the rest of that officer’s chain of command chopped it for approval. We are a republic, not a democracy.

The paper asserts that it is now, after ten years of war that our Army is
out of balance[quote].

Dead wrong. The imbalance was there and was present before 9/11...that imbalance is what brought us to where we are, not a decade of war. We are a warfighting organization. A decade of war should not take us out of balance. It should be what we are trained for. A decade of war results in problems if the problems were there beforehand. Our GOs need to go back and look at what paygrades they were at around 2003 or so - and look at their mentors (read as those raters and senior raters they said "yes" to repeatedly as they worked the system to get to where they are) - then ask themselves some tough questions about what they did to ensure "balance" was there and what they did or did not do that contributed to the problems we face today. That firsthand introspection will help steer them to problems we currently face.

One of the subject headings in the paper reads, [quote]How We Fight – With Values and by Ethical Principles. I guess Army Strong is out - now it's Army Forthright, or Army Ethical, or something. Perhaps I'm just too close to caveman than philosopher, but I'd like the words ‘violence of action’ to more closely resemble how we fight, rather than values and ethics. I'd always assumed the values and ethics to be a part of what makes me a proud citizen of this country, not something I had to fight with. I thought those values and ethics shaped the policies that determined whether I go fight, when, and where.

The position of morality and human rights as bedrock principles is also quite questionable. Morality is relative. So are human rights. The document mentions,
Adapting the Army as Profession of Arms After a Decade of War...To that end, sections of the paper have provided general understandings of the key attributes of the Army as Profession, its Culture, its Ethic, and its external relations. These concepts and definitions will be refined through dialog and later published in doctrine....[quote]

I find this disturbing. We are going to see elements from this paper and discussion, many of which base our profession and our professional actions on moral and human rights foundations, in our doctrine? We are going to doctrinalize morality? Are we going to come up with our own final solution? Is the UCMJ a poor representative of morals and laws to which we are held accountable? Do we not have enough wisdom written down from Xenophon and others to outline moral necessities for leadership and military service?

What is perhaps the best statement in the paper, stating the case for its own demise is the following from the footnotes, [quote]In order to establish a moral basis for the Army Ethic we need to examine the good the Army provides. Field Manual 1 states the Army is the defender of ―our way life.‖ However, achieving objectives or defending a ―way of life,‖ are goals that many organizations could adopt as their purpose. Drug cartels, the mafia, or Al Qaeda, could easily make the same factual claim. They too are defending their ways of life. Another view of the Army‘s purpose is that it provides for a ―common defense.‖ Again, other organizations that practice collective violence can make the factual claim that they act in their own ―common defense.‖ However, the defining difference between these organizations and the Army is the moral end, or purpose, which our use of collective violence seeks to achieve. The Army‘s purpose is the defense of the United States as a political nation that protects and respects human rights. This gives the American profession of arms its legitimate claim to employ coercive, and often lethal, force. This moral purpose separates the Army, and Soldiers within it, from organizations that practice unjustifiable collective violence. Not just any state can justifiably defend its power through violence or violence leading to no moral good would be permissible. Simply put, the Army‘s and its Soldiers‘ duty to provide for the ―common defense‖ is more than the simple protection of power.

This statement clearly shows how morality is relative. AQ could change AQ and Army and issue the same exact statement. I take issue with the description of the US as a political nation. Political entities are subject to the whims of voters, other political entities, and so forth. Sovereign nations are not. The Army's mission is not to defend any political body, be it a town hall or nation. The Army's job is to close with and destroy the enemies of the United States, to defend the the United States of America, drawing authority and legitimacy for these actions from the Constitution, and acting on orders from the President and Congress, who also derive their authority and legitimacy from the Constitution.

As to the issue of human rights, the paper admits those rights most closely affiliated with military operations are,
rights against torture, rape, unjustified killing, arbitrary imprisonment, access to basic subsistence, and personal liberty.

If we as an Army are to protect and respect human rights as outlined above, then why aren't we engaged within the borders of our own nation on a daily basis? Why isn't 2ID out stopping hunger, working to find rapists and human traffickers? Oh yeah...that pesky Constitution thing. I guess that in accordance with this paper, the Constitution matters when it is convenient for the agenda being pushed. I realize I’m splitting hairs a bit with this piece, but the author(s) really set me off by placing the Constitution below what could seriously be mob rule and “democracy in action”. Awful, awful, awful statement to make in an official military document.

I don't find the issue of morality to be completely irrelevant to military service. However, we fight where, when, and against whom our policy dictates. Our policy is guided in part by our morality as a sovereign nation. Many would argue that our policy is derived solely from our Constitution (or that it should be), which was derived from common, shared items of morality. So, to tackle the issue of morality in a way this paper does seems redundant and unnecessary.

My last comment (though I have many more from reading this paper) relates to the references. An example is footnote 23,
The landmark study in this field, of regional economic performance in Italy, found over a 20-year period that social capital in each region was a crucial factor in explaining differences in wealth creation, business innovation, entrepreneurship, and government performance. See Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

This footnote is related to the following,
A sense of community broadens Soldier‘s identity by developing the ‗I‘ into the ‗we.‘

Somehow the authors deduce that commentary related to Italian social capital is valid for application to US Soldiers. Any ethnographic or social commentary must be applicable to a given population in order to attain validity. The above example is a common occurrence within this paper. Such transfer of conclusions among vastly different populations calls into question the logic with which this paper was put together. It also hints at the desire to produce statements that support a forgone conclusion, at the cost of accuracy - rather than - allowing a thorough, thoughtful, and critical analysis of the available literature guiding the authors to a conclusion.

Finally, if this paper was meant to create discussion then I think it's a mission accomplished (under what moral pretext, I don't know - sarcasm intended). However, if the principles expressed in the paper are designed to steer the Army with and toward in the coming years, then we are in serious trouble. An immediate overhaul is necessary. The paper poses several questions at the end to get the discussion started. None of them mention the Constitution v. The People; Morality, Human Rights, or any other critical assumptions, declarations, and principles set forth. This leads me to believe that our leadership does intend use this as a steering document. I am not encouraged by that.

[bumperplate]

I apologize for the clumsy nature of my posts above. I was trying to format them in a point-by-point manner to make it easy to follow. The opposite occurred. Sorry for any confusion or frustration.

I am, at times, a huge idiot.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I am reopening an old thread because this is as close to the subject that I was interested in that I could find. Recent events in Iraq have brought out two types of news articles lately. They are the “Soldier’s worry about Iraq’s potential failure” or “Soldiers worry that they fought for nothing” type or the earlier “U.S. Soldiers died in vein” type. Here is an excerpt of a “fought-for-nothing” article:

Matt McGuire, a former Fort Bragg soldier, was among the first inside Iraq in 2003, and he was deployed there a second time two years later. He said many veterans are "sick and disgusted" to see the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria group quickly overrun much of Iraq.
"I think it's almost expected because we pulled out early, in my opinion, before the country was really stable," McGuire said Wednesday. http://www.wral.com/veterans-of-iraq-war-worry-they-fought-for-nothing/13745667/

These articles seem to bother me because they seem to be an affront on the idea of a Soldier being a professional. The problem I am having is I can’t articulate why. I know that, in this case, like the case of the Soldiers who came forward to say Bergdahl was a deserter, the Soldier is being used for political fodder. They are being used in order to invoke the ideal of the “Soldier” as a tool to forward a political agenda.


Despite what the Soldier’s Creed says we are not Professional Soldiers in the purer sense of the term – we are not mercenaries. U.S. Soldiers are not Professional Solders for Hire. We fight only for what our national leaders tell us to fight for.

Nor, would it seem, that we are professionals in terms of any oath of confidentiality with those leaders, except where we are making direct criticism while still in uniform. Still, there seems to be something oddly disturbing about Soldiers making these politically driven statements. It’s like the Revolt of the Generals.


In post #6 of this thread Bob’s World made the following observation:

Perhaps part of our current problem are our efforts to overly expand the "profession" of arms to all who bear arms in the defense of their country. Certainly this is not the historic approach in the U.S.

European "professionals" rightfully looked down upon American armies made up of armature citizen soldiers as lacking the doctrinal uniformity of training, dress, mannerisms and tactics found in their professional forces. We wore the fact of our military being made up of such armatures as a badge of honor, and similarly mocked them for their stilted, predictable, "professional" ways.

Too much of a good thing, however is a bad thing, so we created the military academies so as to always have a core of professionals to build our citizen armies around whenever the need for such a force drove its formation.

The current professional force, like the strategies of containment it was formed to implement, is as obsolete as the smooth bore musket. The challenge is to get senior leaders to embrace such thinking after the current model being "what right looks like" for three generations.

Americans like their army being a little rough around the edges, and they like it being something that good citizens form in times of need, and that melts back down to its professional core once that need is over. The irony is, that the "profession of arms" that prevents the formation of such a citizenry, is perhaps the group that grieves their fading from the American fabric the most.

Do the American’s really want a “professional” Army? Is that what we should be striving for? or should we remain "a little rough around the edges"? A little more human.

[AmericanPride]

Interesting questions. I think like most things, Americans want it both ways - with the option of not paying for it if at all possible.

The problem I see with the "professionalism" debate is that it's very narrow, and takes the existence of the Army as it is constituted today for granted. But that's not sustainable because of the fiscal constraints of decaying military purchasing power. I haven't seen a chart of military expenditures as a percentage of the federal budget since, say, 1945 but the numbers within the DoD budget's line items are, in a word, disconcerting. How do high operational tempos, an expeditionary posture with global commitments, and shrinking budget availability for personnel affect "professionalism"?

[TheCurmudgeon]

More ideal ramblings. The more I ponder this the more I think the American Soldier suffers from an identity crisis.

First, the professional Soldier is a tool of policy. War is an extension of foreign and domestic policy. Foreign policy will drive where and how he is used. His thoughts on that policy should be irrelevant. Being a professional, much like the attorney defending the person she knows is guilty; he must separate his personal feelings from the mission at hand. Otherwise he is not a professional and is useless to the civilian leadership he serves.

In domestic policy the Soldier is used as hero, martyr, and “America’s sons and daughters.” He is a hero in that he volunteers to risk his life in furtherance of the ideals of Freedom and the “American Way.” Here the first cracks in the veneer of “Professional Soldier” start to show. I read a letter to an editor recently allegedly by a Soldier who said that, while he deployed twice, because he was not an infantrymen who placed his life on the line every day he was not a “hero”. Sorry, but that is not your call. You can admit that amongst your peers, but to the outside world you carry the mantle of “hero” because that is what the public expects of you. Be gracious, be respectful, and suck it up, cause its part of the mission.

The “sons and daughters” one drives me the most crazy. It tends to be used in two ways. The first is to make clear who will shed the “blood” in “blood and Treasure”. The next generation - the future of America itself. Using this phrase is intended to give pause and make the politician think long and hard about the decision to use the military. I have no problem with that. The other way it is used is to force the military to buy stuff, a lot of which the Soldier ends up wearing or carrying. Giving the Soldier the “best equipment money can buy” helps relieve the guilt the people who are screaming for war might feel about sending America’s sons and daughters into harm’s way – it’s the Soldiers fault if they die of heat exhaustion from wearing all this crap.

The public has idealized the WWII Soldier. The average Joe who answers the call of duty, receives the best training we can come up with, marches off to war, wins, and then comes home to live on a farm in peace the rest of his life. The public does not really trust the Professional Soldier; the one tied into the “military-industrial complex” that uses the term “national security” as a shield to protect them from public scrutiny or disclosure.

I don’t think we prepare are Soldiers for the schizophrenic nature of their duty. I am certain that the fact that we tell them they are liberating people and spreading democracy does not square with what they actually do in places like Iraq and Afghanistan weighs on them. That the people in the village down the road you are protecting really don’t like you and want nothing to do with your culture - whith the American Way. A professional might be able to deal with that. Or maybe not.

[AmericanPride]

First, the professional Soldier is a tool of policy. War is an extension of foreign and domestic policy. Foreign policy will drive where and how he is used. His thoughts on that policy should be irrelevant.

I take issue with this because the Nuremburg Trials clearly established that a soldier's obedience to political orders is not a sufficient defense against charges of wars of aggression and crimes against humanity. The scope of international law is only expanding. The idea of a unquestioning military leadership is appropriate for 19th century states where no higher international legal regime existed that held individuals accountable for their actions. If a U.S. president ordered a war of aggression against a foreign state, should the military leadership obey that order?

I think there is something to be said about the mythologizing of military service, both within and outside the ranks. And to an extent, I think that process is harmful to the formulation and execution of strategy - you brought up some good examples toward that end.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I take issue with this because the Nuremburg Trials clearly established that a soldier's obedience to political orders is not a sufficient defense against charges of wars of aggression and crimes against humanity. The scope of international law is only expanding. The idea of a unquestioning military leadership is appropriate for 19th century states where no higher international legal regime existed that held individuals accountable for their actions. If a U.S. president ordered a war of aggression against a foreign state, should the military leadership obey that order?

AP, that's an interesting question. It was not my intent to go down that road, I was talking more in generalities. It should not matter if we are supporting a democracy or a dictator, only that it is in the interest of National Secuirty.

However, looking at waterboarding and other methods that could/should be considered torture under the Convention Against Toruture, is it not fair to say that we have already crossed that bridge - that the government has ordered Soldiers to either torture suspects or be complacient in that torture (at least until someone dies and it becomes public) [see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bagram_torture_and_prisoner_abuse]. I suppose it only matters if you lose.