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View Full Version : Counter-narratives and Info Ops: Debating Jihadi YouTube Videos



Erich G. Simmers
11-07-2010, 07:53 PM
As you have likely read, YouTube has pulled selected videos featuring Anwar al-Awlaki under pressure from the American and British governments (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11/youtube-yanks-jihadi-videos-marginally-inconveniencing-terror-wannabes/). Pauline Neville-Jones, the British Minister of Security, argued that the material is a major component of recruitment and radicalization, providing an impetus for acts of terror and should be pulled. In response, Adam Rawnsley of Danger Room argues that removing the videos
is a losing battleand that
Britain and America would be better off addressing the content of jihadi media with similar urgency to its distribution. (Link in Post No. 3) Even if the material is made unavailable on YouTube, there will be other sources for distribution including sites dedicated to counterterrorism such as this one. Howard G. Clark of FREEradicals goes even further. In "10 Reasons Why Blocking Awlaki Youtube Speeches is Counter-Productive (http://icsr.info/blog/10-Reasons-Why-Blocking-Awlaki-Youtube-Speeches-is-Counter-Productive)" (HT "Thoughts of a Technocrat (http://djtechnocrat.blogspot.com/2010/11/10-reasons-why-blocking-awlaki-youtube.html)"), he suggests that blocking the message adds credibility, prestige, and attention to individuals such as Awlaki. It is as if being blocked is itself a force multiplier. While I did not agree with all Clark's points, two struck me:


6) Front page news will also make Awlaki seem like an ideological pinnacle to English speakers susceptible to radicalisation, when in fact his lectures—although slick, simple, and in easy-to-understand colloquial Americanized English—reek of academic slothfulness, lack of historical understanding, and a sophomoric education on Islam’s original texts.

7) Over the past four years over two dozen terrorist attack plotters were found to have viewed Awlaki’s videos before their planned attacks. But not in one case is there proof that his speeches actually inspired these conspirators. It may be more logical that those already considering violent extremism would naturally watch his and other videos. Listening to Awlaki may be a symptom instead of driver of radicalisation.

This made me wonder whether or not removing the videos was beneficial from the viewpoint of combating terrorism. In point 6, Clark implies that there an open space for constructing a counternarrative. By leaving the more radical Awlaki videos online, we can exploit the weaknesses in his argument and pose a viable alternative. In fact, simply removing the videos may sabotage our counternarrative from the beginning, giving radicals ammunition to say, "See, they talk about 'freedom' when all they really want to do is silence opposition [as they do in regime X, regime Y, etc.]" At the very least, we need to know what radicals are saying to combat their message. In point 7, he suggests that removing the videos constitutes a failure to address the underlying causes of Jihadi radicalization rather than a mere "symptom." From a COIN perspective, American interests may be better served in acknowledging and addressing select grievances in Awlaki's message rather than silencing the messenger. To me, removing the video seems to be the digital equivalent of counterterrorism without the COIN.

Many may object that the U. S. should not cede the Internet to terrorists. Certainly, I do not advocate 'ceding' the Internet. Rather, we should engage an ideological contest rather than 'cat and mouse' technological battle with terrorists doing what is essentially a denial-of-service attack against sites that host their message via lawfare, government pressure, or offensive 'cyber' action. However, I wonder if this approach isn't one method to separate the population from insurgents in the 21st century. What, then, is the proper balance between denying terrorists a soap box and countering their message? What are your thoughts and concerns?

Moderator's Note: title amended and cyber war removed. PM to author.

Brett Patron
11-07-2010, 08:12 PM
I'm noticing the proliferation of the use of "cyber" the way "COIN" was the buzzword du jour a few years ago.

This is not "cyberspace" we're talking about here. This is an information war. Whether IO is appropriately categorized as a cyberspace operation has yet to be settled. But what "IO" is certainly has more fidelity.

What is described in post #1 is IO, not cyber. What is discussed does not involve defending or attacking virtual/computer networks or devices. (Ceding the Internet implies letting hackers have their way with US and other networks.)
Blocking a site, while a network operations function, is a decision made regarding content, not network security.

BJP

Moderator's Note: title amended and cyber war reference removed.

davidbfpo
11-07-2010, 08:54 PM
The Danger Room article cited by Erich is:http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11/youtube-yanks-jihadi-videos-marginally-inconveniencing-terror-wannabes/

This is worth citing:
jihadi wannabes can still find such content on counterterrorism research sites. The most recent issue of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s America-focused Inspire magazine actually warned readers to stay away from jihadi websites and visit terrorist research sites such as the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) and SITE Intelligence Group to find al-Qaeda material and avoid attracting the attention of intelligence agencies.

YouTube stepping up enforcement of its policies against extremist content isn’t a bad thing. But policymakers in the United States and Britain should be clear about what this will achieve and what it won’t. Limiting videos from al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers on the most popular online video site simply means placing it just a few inches off prime shelf space — not taking it off the internet entirely.

davidbfpo
11-07-2010, 09:28 PM
I am curious that this pressure on You Tube to remove some content took place now, even if the videos feature the feared cleric al-Awlaki.

In neither the Home Secretary's in London or her junior Security Minister's speech in Washington DC, were the videos explicitly referred to (speeches:http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N4CD17AFA05486/ and http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2010/1028_great_britain/20101028_uk_security_strategy.pdf

Yes, the impact of such videos featured in the radicalisation of a woman who stabbed a MP:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11682732

An "easy win" and some helpful headlines I fear. Almost reminiscent of the action taken to stop Irish republican speakers during 'The Troubles', with their voices silenced and dubbed over. A policy that didn't last that long, long enough to be cited decades later.

Maybe it is all politics; this article offers an explanation:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/oct/31/andrew-rawnsley-coalition-terrorism-laws

Where is the counter-offensive in Info Ops? Yes, some of it will be covert, IMHO not much sign of activity in the open. One drawback is that those who wish to view such material may already be far too far along the radicalisation process, or the "snakes & ladders" model (espoused by NYPD's study) to listen to the counter-narrative.

Is the counter-offensive principally aimed at the vast "silent" majority, retaining their loyalty or at a minimum neutrality; the "vulnerable" to radicalisation even those already radicalised?

Erich - there is an earlier thread 'Countering online radicalisation: Is government censorship effective?' and link:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7528

Joske
11-08-2010, 07:13 PM
This is an interesting article about Zachary Adam Chesser.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/11/watching_the_watchers

About the question if it is a good strategy to take down these videos instead of countering them with info-ops of ourselves, you should first determine the reason why these "facebook-terrorists" post them online and what effects they have.
On another note this world of jihadi-websites and would-be internet terrorists, could provide an excellent opportunity to do psuedo-operations and locate would-be terrorists.

Rex Brynen
11-09-2010, 02:51 PM
If anyone has ever followed the quality of "debates" on YouTube, they'll see the immediate flaw with the notion that you could use it as a forum to counter jihadist propaganda...

...namely, that any intelligent counter-argument that one might frame and post would soon be lost in the deluge of marginally semi-literate racist anti-Muslim posts by other YouTube users. These, in turn, would only strengthen the jihadist narrative that we're in the midst of a civilizational war, with Islam pitted against a hostile (and rather moronic) West.

YouTube political discussions probably rank among the stupidest, most depressing things on the planet. I sometimes want to shower after accidentally reading them.

Taiko
11-12-2010, 12:48 AM
If anyone has ever followed the quality of "debates" on YouTube, they'll see the immediate flaw with the notion that you could use it as a forum to counter jihadist propaganda...

...namely, that any intelligent counter-argument that one might frame and post would soon be lost in the deluge of marginally semi-literate racist anti-Muslim posts by other YouTube users. These, in turn, would only strengthen the jihadist narrative that we're in the midst of a civilizational war, with Islam pitted against a hostile (and rather moronic) West.

YouTube political discussions probably rank among the stupidest, most depressing things on the planet. I sometimes want to shower after accidentally reading them.

We are also assuming that fanatical islamist will conduct a 'rational' debate on the 'flaws' in their argument with westerners.

Erich G. Simmers
11-24-2010, 08:53 PM
Sorry to be slow to respond. I have been buried in traveling, my own research, and grading students' papers. Also, sorry I missed that previous thread. Apparently, my search terms were not thorough enough. However, I had read ICSR report previously and I am a big fan of Tim Stevens' work including his blog Ubiwar when it was still available.

The reason why I posted this using terms that I did was as a kind of intellectual exercise. Recently, I had been re-reading Kilcullen's The Accidental Guerrilla and Counterinsurgency, and his notion of counterterrorism as a defensive strategy has been bouncing around my head. When I saw the previously-mentioned article on Danger Room, I began thinking about how pulling the YouTube video--whatever terms we apply to it--was an example of counterterrorism as defensive strategy. My questions for you all are these:

Do you agree that blocking the content can be described as a defensive strategy of counterterrorism? Is it possible to take a more strategically offensive, COIN perspective on cyber operations?


I'm noticing the proliferation of the use of "cyber" the way "COIN" was the buzzword du jour a few years ago.

This is not "cyberspace" we're talking about here. This is an information war. Whether IO is appropriately categorized as a cyberspace operation has yet to be settled. But what "IO" is certainly has more fidelity.

What is described in post #1 is IO, not cyber. What is discussed does not involve defending or attacking virtual/computer networks or devices. (Ceding the Internet implies letting hackers have their way with US and other networks.)
Blocking a site, while a network operations function, is a decision made regarding content, not network security.

BJP

Moderator's Note: title amended and cyber war reference removed.

Brett and others, I appreciate the correction on "IO" terminology. Perhaps, it is a better term. At least as it is laid out in US military doctrine, IO is not something I have not studied. However, I have spent a great deal of time studying securing and attacking computer networks. My argument is that no matter how you remove a video from YouTube or other site you are performing a denial-of-service on what is undeniably a network resource. I won't disagree that the term "cyber-" is overused, but it is the term that the U. S. national security community--including the DoD (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/?zoom_query=cyber&zoom_sort=0&zoom_per_page=10&zoom_and=1)--has chosen to embrace.

Let's think outside the box for a moment. Consider this an intellectual exercise to think of content control under a COIN vs. CT framework in that removing said content is an offensive tactic but a defensive strategy (to borrow an idea from Kilcullen). As such, I would contend blocking a site has everything to do with network security.

YouTube is by no means unique in terms of hosting this type of content. For a moment, let's imagine al-Awlaki videos were not on YouTube but a YouTube clone hosted on a server located in a country unwilling to cooperate on issues of counterterrorism. Could we block the site from being viewed within the United States? With sufficient legal support and the cooperation of ISPs, we could. However, this is a fundamentally defensive act. This block is easily bypassed by any number of measures including but by no means limited to using Proxy Servers (https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Proxy_server) or Tor Hidden Services (https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en). Moreover, it would still be viewable outside the United States.

Now, we could apply any number of diplomatic and legal pressures--a kind of lawfare, if you will--to the host country to have the content removed from that YouTube clone site. Even if we are successful, the content could easily reappear on another site in another country.

If we are determined to "block" the content, we will have to take more extreme measures. I am not privy to USCYBERCOM's (or other departments/agencies') actual offensive 'cyber' capabilities, but let us assume they or some other group has a botnet (https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Botnet) capable of disrupting that server via DDoS attack (https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/DDoS). Sure, we have disrupted that server for the time being, but that will tie up resources that could be used in other capacities when the content could be moved to another server yet again.

Let us assume that we are even more determined to ensure that content is never seen again. In this imaginary scenario, intelligence indicates that the individuals who maintain the software behind this YouTube clone site and the individuals who maintain the hardware that hosts the site will be on site at the server farm to perform a number of tasks. A MQ-9 Reaper has been assigned to confirm that all the individuals have arrived and kill the individuals, destroy the server, and emphatically remove content with a Hellfire missile.

Even in this extreme scenario, al-Awlaki could still host the video somewhere else. Even if al-Awlaki was killed in that strike or a separate strike, there are thousands of other radicals to fill the vacuum and there are thousands of other outlets and media to give them a forum. Whether you use lawfare, offensive 'cyber' capabilities, or a Hellfire, you are performing a denial-of-service on what is undeniably a network resource. Furthermore, I say this is defensive because there will always be another al-Awlaki and another YouTube.

All these points are in line with the ICSR paper and Tim Stevens' posts mentioned in the other thread.


If anyone has ever followed the quality of "debates" on YouTube, they'll see the immediate flaw with the notion that you could use it as a forum to counter jihadist propaganda...

...namely, that any intelligent counter-argument that one might frame and post would soon be lost in the deluge of marginally semi-literate racist anti-Muslim posts by other YouTube users. These, in turn, would only strengthen the jihadist narrative that we're in the midst of a civilizational war, with Islam pitted against a hostile (and rather moronic) West.

YouTube political discussions probably rank among the stupidest, most depressing things on the planet. I sometimes want to shower after accidentally reading them.

Again, YouTube isn't the only site that people are using for radicalization/counter-radicalization. Are you going to concede any means to combat the message on the whole of the Internet?


We are also assuming that fanatical islamist will conduct a 'rational' debate on the 'flaws' in their argument with westerners.

I, for one, am not arguing about creating a counter-narrative for radicalized Muslims. The target audience should range from fundamentalist (but not radicalized) to moderate (but not unsympathetic to global insurgency against the West) Muslims.

So long story short, is there a way to take cyber operations or IO or way strategically offensive? Or do we just give up the Internet as a space where we can perform counterinsurgency-minded techniques?

Ron Humphrey
11-24-2010, 10:39 PM
but it seems like the best counter-narrative is and always has been right in front of any and all who experience the supposed "great fight " by the islamic insurgents/freedom fighters. When rather then bringing about any of their supposedly better lives they instead turn life-givers into life takers.

Look at the history,

Somolia- where many of those countries who would give inordinate amounts of money and services to help them dig out of their miserable condition have instead become those who have to dedicate armed forces and military equipment to assist with fighting gangs and fighters who attack anyone they can in order to gain more control for themselves not the populace they live among.

Naval ships from multiple countries where one can see them bearing food , medical assistance, etc to countries without those fighters but instead must come armed to the teeth to deal with the pirates in the Somali area . Where is that helping their country?

Yemen - Same story these fighters will try to say they come wearing a badge of honor fighting a good fight yet the only thing they actually bring is the destruction which must ultimately come from the very actions they take.

IRAQ - The SURGE very much exemplifies what happens when a populace realizes exactly what the fighters have to offer and instead chose to side with those who would help them to work for a better life in which they have a voice in their future. Not guaranteed to be perfect but undeniably better then anything AQ and/or others had to offer.

Afghanistan- Much the same throughout their history the people have been in continual search for a path towards individual freedom as can be seen by the fact that they as a general rule will fight any and all they percieve to threaten their family/tribal structures- regardless of whether they can win or not. Herein lies the greatest difference between the past and current battle. They will all at some point recognize that the NATO/ISAF forces only seek to allow them the opportunity to choose their own future without the torture and violence crushing of dissent that the Taliban have historically shown they have to offer.

The list could go on and on but hopefully it at least expresses the point I'm trying to make.

Erich G. Simmers
11-30-2010, 05:31 PM
but it seems like the best counter-narrative is and always has been right in front of any and all who experience the supposed "great fight " by the islamic insurgents/freedom fighters. When rather then bringing about any of their supposedly better lives they instead turn life-givers into life takers.

First, I would urge some caution on framing this discussion in "Islamic insurgent" vs. would-be life-givers/sometimes life-takers. In all your examples, religion is secondary to actual political control. Insurgents may claim that it is a contest between "Islam" and "the West," but the actual realities are very different.



Look at the history,

Somolia- where many of those countries who would give inordinate amounts of money and services to help them dig out of their miserable condition have instead become those who have to dedicate armed forces and military equipment to assist with fighting gangs and fighters who attack anyone they can in order to gain more control for themselves not the populace they live among.

Naval ships from multiple countries where one can see them bearing food , medical assistance, etc to countries without those fighters but instead must come armed to the teeth to deal with the pirates in the Somali area . Where is that helping their country?

This example isn't so much about message as it is control of the country. Aid isn't being applied, because the government is very weak. Al-Shabaab with support from Hizb al Islam owns most of Mogadishu (http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/mogadishu-map-al-shabaabs-ramadan-offensive) and has strengthened its positions since Ethiopia's withdrawal (http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/somalias-second-islamist-threat-backgrounder-hizb-al-islam). Much of the 'public discourse'--if it can be called that--is happening between "Islamist" factions as they jockey for control of the country. I put scare quotes around "Islamist," because the religious issues are at the very least secondary concerns in what is a contest for political control of the country. They aren't choosing between life-giving and life-taking; they are fighting to be in charge--in this case, between "Islamist" factions. Refusal, misuse, etc. of aid is not because they aren't getting a message but because control is not established. Given this environment, the only thing unreasonable is that anyone should expect aid to be effective.



Yemen - Same story these fighters will try to say they come wearing a badge of honor fighting a good fight yet the only thing they actually bring is the destruction which must ultimately come from the very actions they take.


There are other factors besides religion that make this a ripe place for radicalization: extremely poverty, limited resources including water, and ethnic divisions. Plus, there are safe havens for radical groups.



IRAQ - The SURGE very much exemplifies what happens when a populace realizes exactly what the fighters have to offer and instead chose to side with those who would help them to work for a better life in which they have a voice in their future. Not guaranteed to be perfect but undeniably better then anything AQ and/or others had to offer.


Again, I would say this has more to do with local choosing between governance rather than any Islamic vs. Western life-giver/taker divide.



Afghanistan- Much the same throughout their history the people have been in continual search for a path towards individual freedom as can be seen by the fact that they as a general rule will fight any and all they percieve to threaten their family/tribal structures- regardless of whether they can win or not. Herein lies the greatest difference between the past and current battle. They will all at some point recognize that the NATO/ISAF forces only seek to allow them the opportunity to choose their own future without the torture and violence crushing of dissent that the Taliban have historically shown they have to offer.

Whatever the Taliban represent, Afghans are making a choice between two sides offering their brand of law and order. At the recent MCA Dinner, David Kilcullen laid this out very well (http://www.mcafdn.org/event/10/11/mcaf-2010-annual-dinner). I won't recount the whole talk, but the Taliban have been able to deliver a message that they are less corrupt and offer a swift if brutal justice. Again, that message is enabled because ISAF and the Afghan government need to do a better job delivering on the promise of good governance than the Taliban is doing. Again, religion--in my view--is secondary.



The list could go on and on but hopefully it at least expresses the point I'm trying to make.

The global discourse on US involvement in the world will go on no matter whether we are engaged in military invention or not. The US will be presented as a bogey-man, and there will be legitimate grievances against the US. Choosing to not address them is dangerous in my view.

What I want to debate is how to go about counteracting that message. If that means disengagement in favor of local actors debating and/or fighting it out among themselves, that is a valid option. However, there is no denying we have interests in these regions and, as such, have a stake in the local political discourse. Do we cut our losses?

More important than the local discourse are the global networks of insurgent groups that use media such as YouTube to support the political aspect of their missions. How do we go about disrupting that flow of information? Do we take a "CT"-esque approach using lawfare and denial of service to close down these sites as they pop up? Or do we engage in the discourse? Personally, I think we should acknowledge the limitations of the former and do much more of the latter in terms of trusted local partners.

Ron Humphrey
12-01-2010, 12:05 AM
But for starters I agree with pretty much everything you stated. And Had I not "Framed" my statements the way I did would you have had the opportunity to separate the wheat from the chaff so to speak, in pointing out that in all of the examples religion is a secondary if not tertiary problem.

If your narratives don't tell it like you see it your not really giving your audience a chance to make that same determination for themselves in correcting your mistatements;)

Once they (audience) start telling you Thats not what its about then you'll know your on the right track

anonamatic
12-01-2010, 09:15 AM
It's a very good idea I think to frame this issue in terms of IO. Technical woo-woo about disrupting computers aside, this is very much an issue of information dissemination.

I think it's a very good idea to remove this information whenever possible, wherever it is found. It's not that the material will somehow cease to exist, but containing it within a narrative that explains what's wrong with it is an important contextual difference. In this instance the truth is poison to these people & their process. Real knowledge is a counter-weapon to their goals. It's not that the people seeking answers and solutions to their problems are somehow overly biased against alternatives that don't involve logically deficient fantasies about death & virgins. They really are not, but if they mistakenly see that as their only alternative because it's the only one given then they will be vulnerable to the exploitation being attempted by people seeking to weaponize their vulnerabilities.

Disrupting the activities of extremists helps to marginalize both their abilities and the acceptability of their message. This is an enemy that lives to create strife, and efforts to reduce those abilities are worth taking.

I think it's a mistake to wrap online stuff up in it's own special context, these are really all just ways of communicating information. I can talk at length about making computers do bad things, but once you get past the button pushing you must look at the goals and the reasons for these things. From what I've seen, that's when you start talking about information, knowledge, and life offline.

I concur with a lot of what Mr. Simmers has said. I also don't think it's very easy to make this type of information just go away. However between chasing these people down online & offline (I consider the latter more important too), using their propaganda against them becomes important.

In a historical context it's simply ludicrous for them to expect a triumph of their bad ideas. That just doesn't happen, and at best increases in the dissemination of knowledge and information all about how broken they are can serve to accelerate their failure much better than it can be used to enable any victories.

These people are enraptured with violence, utterly stuck ideologically, & don't know what to do with themselves even when they do manage short term wins. Iran is a great example of the revolutionary immobilization that goes with jihad. Thirty years down the road from their revolution, and what do they have to show for it? Well not very much as it turns out. That's in large part because outside of blazing guns to effectively put themselves in power they're inept. This is a rather common failing of revolutionaries, jihadist or otherwise.

It's important to differentiate between making computers do bad things (that which they were not designed, or intended to do), and using them to do bad things. The former activity in many ways has the exact sort of limitations that have been noted in the conversation so far. The latter I think of as literally everything else. That because it's about the doing of other activities. When building a house, pretty rapidly you're going to get tired of talking about what drill to use, & will want to talk about the house itself. The whole `cyber' thing is like that drill, it's just a tool. Granted I may be able to unplug it from across the world, but there needs to be some reason for that before it becomes worth bothering to do. The drill is also not an end unto itself, but the house sure is. COIN cares about the house, cyber is just another power tool.

Erich G. Simmers
01-01-2011, 11:23 PM
But for starters I agree with pretty much everything you stated. And Had I not "Framed" my statements the way I did would you have had the opportunity to separate the wheat from the chaff so to speak, in pointing out that in all of the examples religion is a secondary if not tertiary problem.

If your narratives don't tell it like you see it your not really giving your audience a chance to make that same determination for themselves in correcting your mistatements;)

Once they (audience) start telling you Thats not what its about then you'll know your on the right track

Thank you for your thoughts. I suspect we are not far apart in terms of ideas about controlling information, IO, etc.


It's a very good idea I think to frame this issue in terms of IO. Technical woo-woo about disrupting computers aside, this is very much an issue of information dissemination.

I think it's a very good idea to remove this information whenever possible, wherever it is found. It's not that the material will somehow cease to exist, but containing it within a narrative that explains what's wrong with it is an important contextual difference. In this instance the truth is poison to these people & their process. Real knowledge is a counter-weapon to their goals. It's not that the people seeking answers and solutions to their problems are somehow overly biased against alternatives that don't involve logically deficient fantasies about death & virgins. They really are not, but if they mistakenly see that as their only alternative because it's the only one given then they will be vulnerable to the exploitation being attempted by people seeking to weaponize their vulnerabilities.

Disrupting the activities of extremists helps to marginalize both their abilities and the acceptability of their message. This is an enemy that lives to create strife, and efforts to reduce those abilities are worth taking.

I think it's a mistake to wrap online stuff up in it's own special context, these are really all just ways of communicating information. I can talk at length about making computers do bad things, but once you get past the button pushing you must look at the goals and the reasons for these things. From what I've seen, that's when you start talking about information, knowledge, and life offline.

I concur with a lot of what Mr. Simmers has said. I also don't think it's very easy to make this type of information just go away. However between chasing these people down online & offline (I consider the latter more important too), using their propaganda against them becomes important.

In a historical context it's simply ludicrous for them to expect a triumph of their bad ideas. That just doesn't happen, and at best increases in the dissemination of knowledge and information all about how broken they are can serve to accelerate their failure much better than it can be used to enable any victories.

These people are enraptured with violence, utterly stuck ideologically, & don't know what to do with themselves even when they do manage short term wins. Iran is a great example of the revolutionary immobilization that goes with jihad. Thirty years down the road from their revolution, and what do they have to show for it? Well not very much as it turns out. That's in large part because outside of blazing guns to effectively put themselves in power they're inept. This is a rather common failing of revolutionaries, jihadist or otherwise.

It's important to differentiate between making computers do bad things (that which they were not designed, or intended to do), and using them to do bad things. The former activity in many ways has the exact sort of limitations that have been noted in the conversation so far. The latter I think of as literally everything else. That because it's about the doing of other activities. When building a house, pretty rapidly you're going to get tired of talking about what drill to use, & will want to talk about the house itself. The whole `cyber' thing is like that drill, it's just a tool. Granted I may be able to unplug it from across the world, but there needs to be some reason for that before it becomes worth bothering to do. The drill is also not an end unto itself, but the house sure is. COIN cares about the house, cyber is just another power tool.

"Erich," please. :)

I am a little torn myself on this distinction. I will admit that everyone has a tendency to see incremental change as something radical new. However, globalization (in particular the Internet) has enabled "superempowered" individuals (see John Robb, et. al.).

For example, consider that Dove World Outreach Church that planned to burn the Qu'ran, which was set to happen literally down the road from my office at University of Florida. The cost to entry was very little: YouTube, Facebook, etc. From that little church, they reached millions and were able threatened our position in Afghanistan and the Muslim world significantly enough to warrant comment from GEN Petraeus and the highest levels of the Obama administration. Outrage and threats of violence came from all over the world, and some of my students were frightened enough to talk about leaving Gainesville.

A single bad actor can match, if not exceed, the "information operations" capability of the United States. Look at Julian Assange. He is not some unique individual; thousands upon thousands have his skills. All the law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the world combined lack the resources to monitor everyone who could replace him should he go to jail. More importantly, these people are amateurs.

This fact is exactly why it is a mistake to say "this is just IO, same as always." Whatever overlap in theory and doctrine, there needs to be a different mindset acknowledging that globalization has enabled bad actors in ways that very few have a full understanding.

William F. Owen
01-02-2011, 06:55 AM
More important than the local discourse are the global networks of insurgent groups that use media such as YouTube to support the political aspect of their missions. How do we go about disrupting that flow of information? Do we take a "CT"-esque approach using lawfare and denial of service to close down these sites as they pop up? Or do we engage in the discourse? Personally, I think we should acknowledge the limitations of the former and do much more of the latter in terms of trusted local partners.
Why discourse? This isn't a debate. You don't have a discourse with drug dealers do you?

Why not just do what harms them most within the constraints of the policy? Break their will. Make their life misery. Harass them.

Are they worth it and can you can change the law to allow it is another question.

Dayuhan
01-02-2011, 09:01 AM
Why discourse? This isn't a debate. You don't have a discourse with drug dealers do you?

No, but we do have discourse with the drug users that keep the drug dealers in business: a fair bit of effort (mostly ineffectual but still there) goes into education and persuasion aimed at getting people not to start using drugs and to persuade users to stop. Similarly we aim information at potential insurgents and insurgent supporters in an effort to get them to withdraw support and leave the insurgent exposed. Not an answer in itself, but useful as one tactic among many, and though we've done it badly often enough that's no reason not to try and do it better.

William F. Owen
01-02-2011, 09:42 AM
Similarly we aim information at potential insurgents and insurgent supporters in an effort to get them to withdraw support and leave the insurgent exposed. Not an answer in itself, but useful as one tactic among many, and though we've done it badly often enough that's no reason not to try and do it better.
Concur, but that is part of the normal political dialogue within any society, the same way as "don't smoke" is part of normal health education. Part of a normal political dialogue is the denigration of violence, as part of the political process.

You are not aiming to furnish them with information on which to make "informed choices". You are saying "cross the line and we'll f**k you up!" - so "sell drugs and we'll lock you away." I see this as no more than simply and clearly stating a policy.

Dayuhan
01-02-2011, 11:29 PM
Concur, but that is part of the normal political dialogue within any society, the same way as "don't smoke" is part of normal health education. Part of a normal political dialogue is the denigration of violence, as part of the political process.

Of course it's part of the normal political process... not just the denigration of violence but pointing out the advantages of non-violent options for achieving the same goals (assuming any exist, though in many insurgent-affected societies they don't). Why should we remove normal parts of the political process from our toolbox?


You are not aiming to furnish them with information on which to make "informed choices". You are saying "cross the line and we'll f**k you up!" - so "sell drugs and we'll lock you away." I see this as no more than simply and clearly stating a policy.

Then the insurgent slides up and whispers in their ear "see, all they can do is threaten you, we understand your problems and your grievances and we can help you snuff those arrogant threatening A-holes". Threats can be seen as a challenge, and sometimes people aren't intimidated. You might recall an old saying about how you catch more flies with honey than you do with vinegar...

William F. Owen
01-03-2011, 06:09 AM
Of course it's part of the normal political process... not just the denigration of violence but pointing out the advantages of non-violent options for achieving the same goals (assuming any exist, though in many insurgent-affected societies they don't). Why should we remove normal parts of the political process from our toolbox?
I would not. As you say it's "normal." I'd just do nothing. Normal is already there.

Then the insurgent slides up and whispers in their ear "see, all they can do is threaten you, we understand your problems and your grievances and we can help you snuff those arrogant threatening A-holes". Threats can be seen as a challenge, and sometimes people aren't intimidated.
..but that assumes that the insurgent has the bones of a legitimate grievance. In the case of the UK, if some young Muslim thinks the UK should leave Afghanistan, nothing the UK Government can say will stop him opting for violence, if he wishes, except the concept of sanction and/or retribution.

Dayuhan
01-03-2011, 07:12 AM
I would not. As you say it's "normal." I'd just do nothing. Normal is already there.

If the situation was "normal" you wouldn't be there, no? I'm assuming that your objective is to return an abnormal situation to something approaching normality.


..but that assumes that the insurgent has the bones of a legitimate grievance. In the case of the UK, if some young Muslim thinks the UK should leave Afghanistan, nothing the UK Government can say will stop him opting for violence, if he wishes, except the concept of sanction and/or retribution.

You're not only targeting the committed insurgent who has already make up his mind. If there's doubt in the mind of an insurgent or an insurgent supporter, you want that doubt to grow. If someone is considering joining or supporting, you want to provide reasons not to. Lot of people out there who are, to one extent or another, on the fence.

Of course in any given situation you need to know who you're targeting and what kind of information might have an impact on their decision-making process. Generalized "we're good they're bad" stuff is not likely to be effective, neither is coming off like a used car salesman.

William F. Owen
01-03-2011, 02:18 PM
If someone is considering joining or supporting, you want to provide reasons not to. Lot of people out there who are, to one extent or another, on the fence.
OK, but that assumes the person you are engaging with will make a rational choice, based on facts or argument. My experience is that folks almost never do that
....which is why I see very little utility in debating issues that people are trying to settle via violence.

Erich G. Simmers
01-13-2011, 07:47 PM
Why discourse? This isn't a debate. You don't have a discourse with drug dealers do you?

Why not just do what harms them most within the constraints of the policy? Break their will. Make their life misery. Harass them.

Are they worth it and can you can change the law to allow it is another question.

It seems as though you are assuming that the discourse is an "enemy-centric" one. Moreover, you seem to be assuming that the enemy tp be engaged is a monolithic, irreconcilable one. Not only are you engaging a discourse with friendly and neutral populations, you are also engaging elements of the enemy whose motives for joining the insurgency may be as varied as following the family tradition of fighting the Soviets, leveraging their own political ambitions, a source of income, or a genuine politico-religious calling. Or they may be a violent psychopath. In all of the above cases, we are going to have to engage the larger discourse which all of these actors (friendly, neutral, or enemy) are participating.

In this sense, I would argue it is very much a debate. Even at the most tactical level, there is a discourse that occurs in the battlespace between all elements of the population including those sympathetic, neutral, and hostile to American interests. If, as one example, the Taliban posits that they offer law and order in the face of American imperialism, then there is an absolute need to counter that message in words and deeds. This discourse will occur whether we engage or not--and not simply on a tactical level but also a strategic one. The Taliban makes their case to both a local and global audience. If we don't make an effort to control this discourse, then our enemies will.

After all, what is the goal of this harassment you mentioned? How close are we to breaking their will? Frankly, Al Qaeda has done a much better job harassing us than we have them. Those "printer" bombs shipped from Yemen were cheaper than the man-hours to operate a Reaper and the Hellfire dropped on some terrorist safe haven, and they have a more disruptive affect on our social and political system. Everyone who passes through domestic airline security is reminded of their global reach. Billions are spent reacting (and overreacting) to yesterday's threats. Whose will is closer to breaking? Of course, I am not speaking of warfighters' will but the larger, more diffuse American political will.

There are not enough missiles, bullets, and warfighters to kill everyone willing to do violence to the United States. More importantly, the threat of violence has done very little to deter any number of state and non-state actors whose very existence often depends on an antagonism with this country. Counterintuitively, I would argue it is cheaper and easier to erode their political base through a combination of words and action. This is particularly true in terms of engaging the populations in which insurgent groups receive support.

To return to the "cyber" element of this discussion, it is very difficult to disrupt an enemy's message via the Internet for reasons I have already stated. Isn't the point of counterterrorism to disrupt terrorist networks? What if that network is the Internet, a resilient, distributed global system designed to withstand nuclear attack and upon which the United State is increasingly dependent? We can't simply pull the plug. Our enemies are leveraging this system whether it be WikiLeaks' subversion, distributing bomb-making materials, or communicating a broader political message. Why not counter the message where we can? If we are going to mix in offensive action taking down sites and info ops, there is a need for a change in mindset.

On the U. S. Naval Institute Blog, poster "galrahn" had a great piece on this called "24th Air Force Defeated in Modern Information War (http://blog.usni.org/2010/12/15/24th-air-force-defeated-in-modern-information-war/)" point to the failures of the American military and civilian reaction to "cyber" information operations. It is very much worth reading.


OK, but that assumes the person you are engaging with will make a rational choice, based on facts or argument. My experience is that folks almost never do that
....which is why I see very little utility in debating issues that people are trying to settle via violence.

While I am not one to argue for the universal rationality of human beings, it is reductive to argue that all groups fight within--for example--Afghanistan are not making rational choices. What of the Afghan family who sends one son to fight with the ANA and another to fight with the Taliban to hedge their bets against all possible outcomes? What about the Afghan who turns to the Taliban because the central government is too corrupt? These choices seem hyper-rational to me. By denying any rationality, you are ignoring a tactical and strategic imperative in my humble opinion.

Fuchs
01-13-2011, 10:29 PM
I misread
"Counter-narratives and Info Ops: Debating Jihadi YouTube Videos "
as
"Counter-narratives and Info Ops: Defeating Jihadi YouTube Videos "
and it reminded me of the G.I.Joe action figure "hostage" (http://wizbangblog.com/content/2005/02/01/terrorists-clai.php).
That was probably (the blueprint for) a great info war coup. :D

anonamatic
01-15-2011, 12:45 PM
Thank you for your thoughts. I suspect we are not far apart in terms of ideas about controlling information, IO, etc.



"Erich," please. :)

I am a little torn myself on this distinction. I will admit that everyone has a tendency to see incremental change as something radical new. However, globalization (in particular the Internet) has enabled "superempowered" individuals (see John Robb, et. al.).

For example, consider that Dove World Outreach Church that planned to burn the Qu'ran, which was set to happen literally down the road from my office at University of Florida. The cost to entry was very little: YouTube, Facebook, etc. From that little church, they reached millions and were able threatened our position in Afghanistan and the Muslim world significantly enough to warrant comment from GEN Petraeus and the highest levels of the Obama administration. Outrage and threats of violence came from all over the world, and some of my students were frightened enough to talk about leaving Gainesville.

I'm familiar with the concept, it's somewhat easier to find examples of it than actually act in that manner. However it's entirely possible to do it depending on ones goals, methods, level of effort, & timing.


A single bad actor can match, if not exceed, the "information operations" capability of the United States. Look at Julian Assange. He is not some unique individual; thousands upon thousands have his skills. All the law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the world combined lack the resources to monitor everyone who could replace him should he go to jail. More importantly, these people are amateurs.

This fact is exactly why it is a mistake to say "this is just IO, same as always." Whatever overlap in theory and doctrine, there needs to be a different mindset acknowledging that globalization has enabled bad actors in ways that very few have a full understanding.

I've known Julian since 1991 and am one of his peers in most respects. I diverge in opinion with both the harm he's done to the US, and to a lot of the strategy he's used with Wikileaks too. We've argued about it over the years, but up until he went completely off the rails with the Manning material I at least thought he was trying to head in the right direction. That direction changed a great deal. In prior discussions about potentially harmful leaks he'd asserted that he'd at least consider higher levels of discretion than he's since taken. He has something of a blind spot to consequences sadly enough in my opinion, and unfortunately has a bit too much `moth to a flame' instincts going on for anyones good.

That said, the whole `collateral murder' presentation was very propagandistic as well as openly deceitful. It took me a while to be able to do a thorough analysis without going to the site directly, but eventually it all ended up fully quoted elsewhere. The damage and dishonesty with that, as well as with the spin on the other stolen materials, well it's just damnable evil to me, more so because I know all about the more odious aspects of Julian's personality that others have observed.

Your observation that there is a great deal of the amateur to go with this is very accurate. It's true in the case of Wikileaks, but also in other instances where globalized IO has come from unexpected quarters. The impacts of these things are very hard to quantify. Information pressure, characterized by differences from whatever repressive dogma that's served as conventional wisdom in regions where leaders treat citizenry badly is quite the common complaint of quasi-failed states. The Taliban hopes rather vainly that if maybe they burn all those schools they can somehow keep that pesky internet away, and it's just not going to work for them. The result is there's them, and other piles of repressive nuts in nasty parts of the world who're all hating life more than they have in the past.

Information pressure means that when crazy bandit gangs roam the Sudan, it not only makes news, but more people can actually find the place on a map. More people have maps too, there's an ocean of information out there, as well as ideas that are new to people to go with the new devices.

There is a relationship too. One of the things I've done to try to get some grasp on this has been just using Google. Not to find stuff, but to compare by example the number of news articles about North Korea to that of those mentioning Wikileaks. It's also useful to compare conflict coverage since there's a pile of places in the world with various sized wars going on. I use googlefight.com for some things, others I use counts on news articles, and I also look at trends. They have some very nice tools for that, and it's interesting to see in some cases that nearly 100% of the internet search traffic coming from some rather distasteful locations in the world have been occupied by people looking for US Cable material. Tunisia at least is having a revolution thankfully rather than other potentially nastier outcomes.

It's safe to say the press does not understand IO or IW to a level that's worth valuing in a majority of instances. They don't understand that, or any of the myriad of other aspects of these issues. I think that contributes to the confusion & makes these issues a bit harder to work on than they otherwise might be.

AdamG
01-28-2011, 07:22 PM
Anwar al-Awlaki, the U.S.-born radical cleric with ties to al-Qaeda, is using his online magazine, Inspire, to urge jihadists to steal “booty”—money and property—from people or institutions that don’t believe in his holy war. And it’s not really theft, he adds, explaining that ill-gotten wealth is really just fuel for jihad. “The reasoning behind comparing booty to hunting and wood gathering is because the property which exists in the hands of the disbelievers is not considered to be rightfully theirs,” writes al-Awlaki

http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washington-whispers/2011/01/27/radical-cleric-urges-jihadists-to-steal