Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

[SWJED]

Should FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency be updated?

[SWJED]

As one point of reference concerning this issue please see "Gentile: How I would revise the Army's counterinsurgency manual (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/15/gentile_how_i_would_revise_the_armys_counterinsurg ency_manual)" at Tom Ricks' Best Defense.

[William F. Owen]

As one point of reference concerning this issue please see "Gentile: How I would revise the Army's counterinsurgency manual (http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/15/gentile_how_i_would_revise_the_armys_counterinsurg ency_manual)" at Tom Ricks' Best Defense.

With the greatest respect to Gian Gentile, I think he's slightly over complicating the solution. The aim to is Kill, Capture, and Deter any armed opposition to central authority and/or the policy in place at the time. That's it. You need a pretty slim manual to get that across.

Basically FM3-24 needs burning because it should never have been required and the solution does not require it either. A "Small Wars / Irregular Enemy" manual would more than suffice.

If the enemy is dead, any clown can "re-build" because no one is going to stop him doing it. To paraphrase the Sultan of Oman, "Defeat the rebels SO THAT, we can begin development."

[Fuchs]

The aim to is Kill, Capture, and Deter any armed opposition to central authority and/or the policy in place at the time.

Maybe I don't get the meaning in English, but I would certainly add "violent" as required criterion. Otherise you'd need to kill, capture and deter millions.

[SteveMetz]

Personally I don't huge value in changing military doctrine so long as the deeply flawed, essentially colonial strategy that is it designed to execute persists. And only civilian leaders can do that.

[Bob's World]

Steve makes a great point. Will better strategy overcome bad policy? Not likely. Does bad strategy enable policy makers to avoid reform? Possibly, but this really needs a comprehensive approach.

My vote, however, is yes, we must revise the "Zombie COIN" of FM3-24. It lacks a soul, and that soul is a clear understanding of insurgency itself.

Not sure what I would call our controlling, naive approach to foreign policy that is so blinded by our inflated positive self-image that we either cannot see, or refuse to acknowledge when we do see, how it is perceived by friend and foe alike. It is definitely time to break the cycle.

We need to fix both, but confused perceptions of duty and overly narrow concepts of where the limits of advance are for military input to policy are will likely keep the military from leading the way.

[Steve the Planner]

Oh, what a tangled web we weave when we ask the Big Army to become a nation builder/political gap closer.

They are a force designed to kill, capture, etc... and, on the side, do short-term immediate response humanitarian relief/disaster recovery efforts where their unique logistical structure is both appropriate and irreplaceable.

Somehow, the lines got crossed so that the Pentagon took on missions not do-able through UN, DoS/USAID, and nobody had the gumption to say anything other than "Hua!," when they should have said "Hooey!."

The FM is a result of the political/admin/mission creep confusion that brought us to this point.

Where I disagree with Gentile is the level of critique/reassessment.

I think that Iraq today forms an excellent lab to compare what we did to what resulted. No need to draw inaccurate correlations to obscure alternatives.

The analysis, though, should be done by competent civilians, and not military, or they will just miss the whole point (over-and-over).

Steve

[Entropy]

Steve does make a good point however, better, more realistic doctrine can potentially improve militry advice given to policymakers.

Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?

[William F. Owen]

Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?
3-4 years for an Irregular Warfare TTP manual? Nothing about so-called COIN needs "inventing" or much "thinking about." It's a "how to kill the bad guys - AND ONLY THE BAD GUYs - book," and context would be very important so it probably deal in very broad brush strokes, because what really matter is "Theatre Specific" Manuals like the CATOM.

[Bob's World]

Steve does make a good point however, better, more realistic doctrine can potentially improve militry advice given to policymakers.

Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?

IMO the problems, while significant, are largely nuance. If one just went through the current manual and addressed those points of nuance it would only take 3-4 weeks.

So, 3-4 weeks to make the fixes, 3-4 years to get such a manual approved.

Or, as WILF suggests, merely label all citizens who support violent opposition to the government as enemies of the state (regardless of the fact that they often have no legal options to effectively oppose the state) and kill them. Simple and effective. These are problems that can be easily suppressed if we would simply man up and deal with them. 4 out of 5 dictators endorse this option (the 5th was assassinated by his royal guard and unavailable for comment).

[slapout9]

Or, as WILF suggests, merely label all citizens who support violent opposition to the government as enemies of the state (regardless of the fact that they often have no legal options to effectively oppose the state) and kill them. Simple and effective. These are problems that can be easily suppressed if we would simply man up and deal with them. 4 out of 5 dictators endorse this option (the 5th was assassinated by his royal guard and unavailable for comment).

Bob, sometimes Wilf is right. There are situations where that may be the best option.

[Polarbear1605]

Just of interest...I recently attended a book signing for David Kilcullen. At the beginning of his comments to the attendees (SWJ/Quantico sponsored event 60 - 80 folks were there) he stated the FM needs to be re-written and is out of date (he also stated that it was out of date from day one because things are always changing and we are always learning). He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that. :D

[Bob's World]

Bob, sometimes Wilf is right. There are situations where that may be the best option.

Slap,

No worries, Wilf on warfare is typically spot on. It's when he applies warfare to COIN where he starts to drift off track. Our reasonable (or unreasonable, as its really up to others to assess that status) minds will differ, but it is such public differing that makes SWJ such a handy tool.

The killing of certain insurgents absolutely needs to be a strong, well resourced, supporting effort of any COIN campaign. Main effort must be the repair of governance and re-earning the support of the populace through change, not charity.

As to the FID force (that intervening role we find ourselves in), I would strongly advise staying out of the insurgent killing business altogether, and to keep our focus on guiding governmental reform and mediating the popular voice into that process (or staying out of the mess altogether unless national interests truly demand our presence).

AQ and non-state UW organizations like them that seek to employ such insurgent organizations and populaces to conduct their acts of terror for them are another matter altogether, and for them we should show now mercy or respite, wherever they might hide. (Just don't listen to the Intel guys who paint everyone they talk to with their same stink, as that throws us right back into killing nationalist insurgents 9 times out of 10).

[slapout9]

As to the FID force

We really gotta come with a better name....sounds like a girls softball team:D

[JMA]

3-4 years for an Irregular Warfare TTP manual? Nothing about so-called COIN needs "inventing" or much "thinking about." It's a "how to kill the bad guys - AND ONLY THE BAD GUYs - book," and context would be very important so it probably deal in very broad brush strokes, because what really matter is "Theatre Specific" Manuals like the CATOM.

This FM 3 -24 is designed for battaluion level and above "leaders and planners". So it's not a TTP manual.

What about something for the guys battalion level and down who actually are there to do the business? A doctrinal gap?

Start with what the private soldier needs to know to effectively fight this type of war and then take it from there. It doesn't matter what the colonels know if the soldiers on the ground know Jack.

[Ken White]

What about something for the guys battalion level and down who actually are there to do the business? A doctrinal gap?It's marginally adequate, way too big and overly pedantic but that seems to be the trend nowadays...:rolleyes:

Follow the link provided by Cav Guy on this page (LINK - big .pdf) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=68379&postcount=22). Not much of any import in the rest of the thread...:wry:

[Infanteer]

No need for a "tactics in COIN" manual - tactics in COIN and tactics in a conventional fight are the same, just applied to a different environment (here comes the METT-TC thing again).

Offensive and defensive operations and patrolling, patrolling and patrolling. That and learn how to eat with the locals.

[JMA]

No need for a "tactics in COIN" manual - tactics in COIN and tactics in a conventional fight are the same, just applied to a different environment (here comes the METT-TC thing again).

Offensive and defensive operations and patrolling, patrolling and patrolling. That and learn how to eat with the locals.

As simple as that? Now I am begining to understand where it is all going wrong out there...

[William F. Owen]

No need for a "tactics in COIN" manual - tactics in COIN and tactics in a conventional fight are the same, just applied to a different environment (here comes the METT-TC thing again).

Offensive and defensive operations and patrolling, patrolling and patrolling. That and learn how to eat with the locals.
only correct IF you got trained right in the first place. When I was doing my basic in 1980, all the training was peppered with Northern Ireland TTPs. The problem was that by 1988 when I was doing Recce Commanders, NI TTPs had washed out what you needed to fight a Soviet MRR.

[William F. Owen]

At the beginning of his comments to the attendees (SWJ/Quantico sponsored event 60 - 80 folks were there) he stated the FM needs to be re-written and is out of date (he also stated that it was out of date from day one because things are always changing and we are always learning).
I used to have great respect for Dave, back in the day, but I think he's wrong these days, unless I am not understanding what I keep reading.
a.) FM3-24 was not out of date. It was wrong and bad.
b.) We keep learning? Sorry, what crushes a rebellion hasn't really changed. What has changed is the constraints place by policy.
NOW, - I admit, my ideas have changed. I have learnt. I have publicly viewable record of my though in the 3,000+ posts here, BUT my ideas now all conform to what got taught back in the old days and was written down a long time ago. The problem with the COIN-fusion is that is simply ignored history to pursue either the avant-garde or reputations.

He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that. :D
....yet clearly that was the source of the problem because they weren't killing the right people and only the right people.

[William F. Owen]

Slap,
No worries, Wilf on warfare is typically spot on.
Thank you, but I think you overstate your case.. :)

The killing of certain insurgents absolutely needs to be a strong, well resourced, supporting effort of any COIN campaign. Main effort must be the repair of governance and re-earning the support of the populace through change, not charity.
The population will support who ever has POWER, by having the monopoly on armed violence. ONCE that is done, then the political fixing can start.

[JMA]

It's marginally adequate, way too big and overly pedantic but that seems to be the trend nowadays...:rolleyes:

Follow the link provided by Cav Guy on this page (LINK - big .pdf) (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=68379&postcount=22). Not much of any import in the rest of the thread...:wry:

OK, now we are making progress. FM3-24-2 "establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level."

Now for platoon and section/squad level, anyone?

[Fuchs]

ONCE that is done, then the political fixing can start.

It wouldn't, though.

[Bob's World]

Thank you, but I think you overstate your case.. :)

The population will support who ever has POWER, by having the monopoly on armed violence. ONCE that is done, then the political fixing can start.

Time and again it is the "power" of a populace seeking liberty from tyranny that over comes the power of even the strongest and most effective of governments.

As to the trite catch-phrase of "monopoly on armed violence," I gladly toss it to the same bone pile where so many half-right phrases commonly associated with the efforts of intervening powers to suppress such popular uprisings duly belong.

The American populace was guaranteed freedoms of speech, the press and assembly so that movements such as the Civil Rights, and now the Tea Party, could not be deemed treason or insurgency by the sitting government; and were guaranteed the possession of our arms to ensure that they never grew too bold in their possession of some concept of "monopoly" on armed violence. It is the lack of such monopoly that leads to (ultimately) the stability of good governance. It is the presence of such monopoly that leads to the stability born of oppression.

[William F. Owen]

Time and again it is the "power" of a populace seeking liberty from tyranny that over comes the power of even the strongest and most effective of governments.
Not true. Cambodia in the 70's, Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, Saddam's Iraq, A'stan under the Taliban, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, North Korea etc etc etc.

This "power from the people" is not a reality in the real world, unless they do a lot of killing to get it, and unless they are prepared to keep killing, they can loose it.


As to the trite catch-phrase of "monopoly on armed violence," I gladly toss it to the same bone pile where so many half-right phrases commonly associated with the efforts of intervening powers to suppress such popular uprisings duly belong. Then you don't understand it. It means "Man on the ground with a gun." It's not presented as a "system of Government". It is a means by which control - for both good and bad - is gained and maintained for the Government to function.

It is the lack of such monopoly that leads to (ultimately) the stability of good governance. It is the presence of such monopoly that leads to the stability born of oppression.
All sounds good, till you look at Somalia, the Congo, Sierra Leone, parts of Colombia, Thailand etc etc etc. It's the competition for the monopoly that creates the problem and it is frankly ridiculous to suggest the US citizens owning guns gives them the capacity to defend themselves against their government. Never seems to work and never has.

[Infanteer]

As simple as that? Now I am begining to understand where it is all going wrong out there...

Well, in 7 months of COIN I did three things:

1. Employed Basic Infantry Doctrine;

2. Tried, as much as possible, to know my backyard; and

3. Respected/Observed Afghan culture.

To me, nothing here requires a new manual. If I'm missing anything, please enlighten me.


only correct IF you got trained right in the first place.

Well, that is sort of implied. If I send a poorly trained person to do something, I'm probably not going to get the results I want.


b.) We keep learning? Sorry, what crushes a rebellion hasn't really changed. What has changed is the constraints place by policy.

Agreed - anyone can be defeated, we just aren't willing to acknowledge or accept much of that threshold these days (Jim Storr said that in a conversation we had). I think today's junk-COIN is an effort by the military to find something around that. Unfortunately, in my opinion, it's just farting around with no real solution (because you aren't approaching that threshold).

[Bob's World]

Not true. Cambodia in the 70's, Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, Saddam's Iraq, A'stan under the Taliban, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, North Korea etc etc etc.

This "power from the people" is not a reality in the real world, unless they do a lot of killing to get it, and unless they are prepared to keep killing, they can loose it.

Then you don't understand it. It means "Man on the ground with a gun." It's not presented as a "system of Government". It is a means by which control - for both good and bad - is gained and maintained for the Government to function.

All sounds good, till you look at Somalia, the Congo, Sierra Leone, parts of Colombia, Thailand etc etc etc. It's the competition for the monopoly that creates the problem and it is frankly ridiculous to suggest the US citizens owning guns gives them the capacity to defend themselves against their government. Never seems to work and never has.

It is not that I fail to understand, rather that I refuse to agree with your understanding. I merely point out that reasonable minds can differ, and that the model you profess while often applied, is not, IMO, one that can produce enduring, positive, effects.

[Bob's World]

or said another way, as posted on Doctrine Man's (I am a fan) Facebook

http://www.facebook.com/#!/photo.php?fbid=1531112839166&set=o.110598432306650&pid=1439647&id=1275108793

or this:

http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1531112839166&set=o.110598432306650&pid=1439647&id=1275108793#!/photo.php?fbid=1471572704286&set=o.110598432306650&pid=3364833&id=1082681298

[slapout9]

Maybe the new manual has already been written...it is called the Armor Manual.....now we are talking:)link to article below.


http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/19/afghanistan.tanks/?hpt=T2

[JMA]

Maybe the new manual has already been written...it is called the Armor Manual.....now we are talking:)link to article below.


http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/19/afghanistan.tanks/?hpt=T2

Tanks before more gunships???? That will take some explaining from the Marines.

[slapout9]

Tanks before more gunships???? That will take some explaining from the Marines.

I don't know (I am a gunship/SPECTRE guy myself) but the article says it was the Marines that wanted the Tanks, so I guess we will see how it works out.

[JMA]

The population will support who ever has POWER, by having the monopoly on armed violence. ONCE that is done, then the political fixing can start.

Exactly... and that is why western or civilised countries can't "win" counterinsurgencies or suppress rebellions.

Take Zimbabwe for example. Mugabe, that darling of western liberals (in the US sense of the word) faced a rebellion of sorts in Matabeleland through the actions of a number of armed dissidents.

Didn't take him long to suppress that rebellion and not a word of protest heard from the West or anywhere.

Mugabe saw the dissidents as fish swimming in the water (of the general population). Kind of hard to find the dissidents if the population won't report them (through support or fear) so leave the fish and focus on the "water".

IF you "poison" the water so that the "fish" can't survive in it then you win... yes?

Yes.

Conservative estimates were that Mugabe's (North Korean trained) 5th Brigade killed 30,000 men, women and children until the Matabele population reached tipping point. The Matabele were crushed.

That's the way you do it... and you don't have to fix the political thing because even today if the people of Matabeleland hear of soldiers in the area wearing red berets the whole nation has a collective bowl movement. All you need to say if they become problematic again is "do you some some more of the same"?

Then (in a tamer example) we see Sri Lanka first securing support from China (that great nation with supposedly thousands of years of civilisation but still no human rights conscience) then they too apply a little "poison" to the water in which the (Tamil Tiger) fish were swimming. The rest is history.

That's how you put down rebellions and win counterinsurgency wars... brute force.

Now which western country would dare employ such an approach? So that is why in most cases one has to give away the farm to "win" the war. Always a Pyrrhic victory to be sure.

[JMA]

Well, in 7 months of COIN I did three things:

1. Employed Basic Infantry Doctrine;

2. Tried, as much as possible, to know my backyard; and

3. Respected/Observed Afghan culture.

To me, nothing here requires a new manual. If I'm missing anything, please enlighten me.

I'm told by the smart guys that no matter how good the tactics are if the strategy is bad then the whole exercise is pointless. How did your efforts measure against this?

[JMA]

I don't know (I am a gunship/SPECTRE guy myself) but the article says it was the Marines that wanted the Tanks, so I guess we will see how it works out.

Well I'll have to look up how it went with the Soviets when they had tanks in Afghanistan.

[slapout9]

Well I'll have to look up how it went with the Soviets when they had tanks in Afghanistan.

I already did.....it was bad.....really bad.

[JMA]

I already did.....it was bad.....really bad.

There you go then... what are the marines thinking?

[Ken White]

The Canadians and the Danes have had Tanks there for some time - with good success and no real problems or 'bad' things...

[William F. Owen]

I already did.....it was bad.....really bad.
Well yes, when tanks are used by a 3rd rate army.
Tanks are just a tool. Skilfully employed, they solve a vast array of problems.

[JMA]

The Canadians and the Danes have had Tanks there for some time - with good success and no real problems or 'bad' things...

Found this piece (http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_4/CAJ_vol10.4_03_e.pdf) on the Canadian use of armour in Afghanistan enlightening.

... but if I hear the word risk again I think I will scream.

[William F. Owen]

The Canadians and the Danes have had Tanks there for some time - with good success and no real problems or 'bad' things...

To quote Para 6-84, of FM3-24


"In COIN operations, having many versatile vehicles that require simple maintenance is often better than having a few highly capable armored
vehicles or combat systems that require extensive maintenance."

So no MBT or IFV? Thanks for bad advice FM3-24 writers.

[William F. Owen]

Exactly... and that is why western or civilised countries can't "win" counterinsurgencies or suppress rebellions.

Whoah there Mudhara! ;) You're about 50% right, but....

Western or civilised countries can suppress rebellions IF they recognise the limit of the military instrument, to using armed force against armed force, and the employment of criminal convictions to those sustaining it.

The political problem may continue, BUT you use violence (military AND Police) to ensure it remains a political problem that the rebels will not seek to resolve by force. The ONLY thing armed force does is stop the other guy (rebels) using armed force. That is the key thing FM3-24 doesn't get.

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf:

Today's KGS Nightwatch does a pretty good job of summing up the new changes:

Return to Air Power, Tanks and a higher war tempo as the way to break the stalemate, and actually impact the Taliban by returning US "invincibility," at the expense of "hearts and minds."


A fourth consequence is that the coalition might begin to start making its own luck. Diligent prosecution of the fight in a more warlike fashion is more likely to shorten the conflict than the mixture of fighting with development projects to win hearts and minds. Under the pressure from no withdrawal date and increased losses, the Taliban inside Afghanistan might be more receptive to negotiations.

If the changes are implemented consistently, and are not just piecemeal, spot fixes, they should improve security conditions. However, they also are likely to produce significant negative consequences in property damage, civilian and militant casualties and bad press, all consistent with a war. On the other hand, the stalemate will continue if the most important change is a longer conflict.

I suspect that the above, if accurate, speaks strongly against the mixed concept of nice guys gently extricating evil from an otherwise happy and democratic Lake Wobegon.

Reality. People in war zones must respect those in power---the goal is to protect yourself/family. Period.

Security is much more important than obscure western concepts, which might be great to think about once security and minimal life-safety/food security is in place.

Steve

[JMA]

There you go then... what are the marines thinking?

Been thinking about this. Maybe there is a ROE connection to this?

If you can't get CAS without a whole bunch of confirmations with attendant delay then it is better to have the direct fire power of tanks immediately available where they deem it necessary at that moment?

[Cavguy]

Highly recommend discussing (and reviewing) the emotion over tanks spilled in this thread:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3951

You'll see where I stand.

Armor has no inherent goodness or badness in COIN, only effects by the user.

[slapout9]

Highly recommend discussing (and reviewing) the emotion over tanks spilled in this thread:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3951

You'll see where I stand.

Armor has no inherent goodness or badness in COIN, only effects by the user.

Yea,you guys understand Maneuver almost by some kind of genetic adaption, so do most guerrillas, sadly a lot of infantry don't:eek:

[JMA]

Highly recommend discussing (and reviewing) the emotion over tanks spilled in this thread:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3951

You'll see where I stand.

Armor has no inherent goodness or badness in COIN, only effects by the user.

I guess the supposed need for armour tends to indicate that the insurgency is moving to Phase 3 where the insurgents are holding ground and launching counter offensives. Maybe it means things are not going so well for the Marines in Helmand?

[Bob's World]

I guess the supposed need for armour tends to indicate that the insurgency is moving to Phase 3 where the insurgents are holding ground and launching counter offensives. Maybe it means things are not going so well for the Marines in Helmand?

Actually, I suspect it reflects the restrictions on the use of close air, attack air, and indirect fires; the very real need to minimize innocent casualties; and the insurgent tactic of occupying and fighting from compounds where such innocent parties reside.

The tank provides a very effective way to deal with such problems short of ordering a squad to conduct fire and maneuver across 100 yards of knee deep much in an open field; or to try to move an MRAP down a narrow IED laden roadway.

This insurgency fluctuates with the season and by location, but it is no where near phase III; nor would I expect the Taliban to even attempt surging to Phase III tactics so long as the coalition is present. Phase I and II tactics are far more effective against effective Phase III forces like ours.

Plus, it is always wise to remember that the insurgent can prevail in any phase, and flows up and down between them as best suits his purposes. There is no requirement to progress, but such progression is natural in certain circumstances. (I.e., the Taliban is not intellectually burdened by dogmatic adherence to doctrine like some western military personnel/organizations can tend to be. They simply fight the fight before them.)


The real danger in bringing in Tanks is that, like the Strykers, like the MRAPs; (like patrol cars for policemen) they separate the soldiers from the populace and also lead to Means-based approaches to problems.

Can anyone imagine a Stryker commander leaving his Strykers in the motorpool? Or an Armor commander leaving his tanks? I have not talked to any Marines about their intent, but I would expect that they would plan to use these tanks in infantry support mode, much like the way we employed armor in WWII.

[Cavguy]

The real danger in bringing in Tanks is that, like the Strykers, like the MRAPs; (like patrol cars for policemen) they separate the soldiers from the populace and also lead to Means-based approaches to problems.

Can anyone imagine a Stryker commander leaving his Strykers in the motorpool? Or an Armor commander leaving his tanks? I have not talked to any Marines about their intent, but I would expect that they would plan to use these tanks in infantry support mode, much like the way we employed armor in WWII.

Bob,

Left 8 of my 14 tanks at home in 2006. Rest of tankers walked or took HMMWV's. It's actually very common the past 5-6 years for tankers, artillerymen, and mech infantry to act dismounted without vehicle overwatch.

In a Stryker unit now, training heavily to operate with and without them. We expect to do both, as have the previous two stryker units. A Stryker IN company is basically same as an Airborne IN Company when you subtract the vehicles.

As Ken would say, METT-TC rules. Problem is the vehicles bring unique capabilities (protection, long range comms, digital connectivity, advanced sights, mobility) you lose when you separate from them.

Contact with the population is mainly influenced by command climate and training - for example, one TTP is to lager the vehicles outside the town and foot patrol in, keeping the vehicles for QRF. More than one way to do it.

[Bob's World]

Niel,

I know, everyone is out there doing their best. Personally I don't read too much into the tanks, the guys need something to compensate for the reduced ability to employ indirect fires. There is a place for a 120mm sniper on this battlefield.

My bigger concerns is the lack of interest to bring in the policy version of tanks to put some heavy pressure on Karzai reconcile the issues of poor governance that pour out of his government; to reform the constitution that codifies and enables so much of the corruption and illegitimacy, etc.

Similar concern is that I didn't see anything about tanks for the ANA. I thought this was their fight...

[Cavguy]

Niel,

I know, everyone is out there doing their best. Personally I don't read too much into the tanks, the guys need something to compensate for the reduced ability to employ indirect fires. There is a place for a 120mm sniper on this battlefield.

My bigger concerns is the lack of interest to bring in the policy version of tanks to put some heavy pressure on Karzai reconcile the issues of poor governance that pour out of his government; to reform the constitution that codifies and enables so much of the corruption and illegitimacy, etc.

Similar concern is that I didn't see anything about tanks for the ANA. I thought this was their fight...

Agree all. As someone commented - this is a tactical solution to a tactical problem, nothing more. The coax is also precision to 1100m, which is useful.

I think those who see this as something other than a solution to a problem in one particularly brutal area are over-reaching.

[Sargent]

The problem with these cases is that you are trying to compare how regimes behave in their own backyards with how the US or any other western nation can behave in a foreign country. The lessons of what Mugabe was able to get away with are not tenable for American armed forces in Afghanistan, for example. Perhaps the conclusion you want to make is that it is very difficult for a foreign power to deal successfully with insurgencies and rebellions because they cannot, in the end, utilize the sort of force necessary to defeat them. In this case, the example would be the Japanese in China during WWII and their infamous "Three Alls" campaign -- which made the Rape of Nanking seem like a loving embrace. Despite every form of brutality applied against the Chinese population they continued to contest the Japanese occupation of their country, bleeding the IJA white and softening up the enemy to the best advantage of the Allies in the war as a whole. At the end of the day, the historical record significantly favors the foreign army that is intelligent and as benign as possible in its treatment of the locals.

And for what it's worth, whatever reprieve Mugabe has gained for his regime, the brutality he has visited upon segments of his country will be repaid at some point. Unfortunately, it will likely result in even greater chaos and brutality for that country, to nobody's benefit.

Finally, I do not agree with your conclusion that the concessions that must be made by a foreign power in order to win are pyrrhic. Again, I look to WWII, and the tremendously effective post-hostilities COIN campaign that was conducted in Germany/Western Europe and Japan. We did end up giving our opponents in the war just about everything they had sought to obtain through force, and it was a smashing success to the ultimate policy aims of the war.

Jill


Exactly... and that is why western or civilised countries can't "win" counterinsurgencies or suppress rebellions.

Take Zimbabwe for example. Mugabe, that darling of western liberals (in the US sense of the word) faced a rebellion of sorts in Matabeleland through the actions of a number of armed dissidents....

Conservative estimates were that Mugabe's (North Korean trained) 5th Brigade killed 30,000 men, women and children until the Matabele population reached tipping point. The Matabele were crushed.

That's the way you do it... and you don't have to fix the political thing because even today if the people of Matabeleland hear of soldiers in the area wearing red berets the whole nation has a collective bowl movement. All you need to say if they become problematic again is "do you some some more of the same"?

Then (in a tamer example) we see Sri Lanka first securing support from China (that great nation with supposedly thousands of years of civilisation but still no human rights conscience) then they too apply a little "poison" to the water in which the (Tamil Tiger) fish were swimming. The rest is history.

That's how you put down rebellions and win counterinsurgency wars... brute force.

Now which western country would dare employ such an approach? So that is why in most cases one has to give away the farm to "win" the war. Always a Pyrrhic victory to be sure.

[JMA]

The problem with these cases is that you are trying to compare how regimes behave in their own backyards with how the US or any other western nation can behave in a foreign country.

That is not the problem with what I am saying but rather an indication of the scale of the counterinsurgency challenges for "foreign" troops.


The lessons of what Mugabe was able to get away with are not tenable for American armed forces in Afghanistan, for example. Perhaps the conclusion you want to make is that it is very difficult for a foreign power to deal successfully with insurgencies and rebellions because they cannot, in the end, utilize the sort of force necessary to defeat them.

Can't see the US allowing its troops to use "extreme" measures to pacify the local population can you? Even in the case of Sri Lanka they first had to secure support from China (knowing that they would not get support from the West) before implementing their strategy.

What I am in fact saying that it is near impossible for for a (western) foreign power to win a counterinsurgency war or put down a rebellion given the self imposed restraints they apply.

It worked better when the US trained up 1,000s of soldiers from South American countries at the School of the Americas and then let them go home and do what they needed to do themselves.

Then of course the west too often gets it wrong with the training of local forces (as is happening right now in Afghanistan). Read Kilcullen's Twenty-Eight Articles (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/28articles.pdf) No 22: Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves.

So the US and Britain and NATO should be realistic about what can be achieved in a place like Afghanistan... and not send young soldiers into that theatre with the insane belief that they can win the hearts and minds of the locals over their own kith and kin.


In this case, the example would be the Japanese in China during WWII and their infamous "Three Alls" campaign -- which made the Rape of Nanking seem like a loving embrace. Despite every form of brutality applied against the Chinese population they continued to contest the Japanese occupation of their country, bleeding the IJA white and softening up the enemy to the best advantage of the Allies in the war as a whole. At the end of the day, the historical record significantly favors the foreign army that is intelligent and as benign as possible in its treatment of the locals.

Would you be so kind as to share this "historical record" with me?

I would say again that western armies today would not and could not conduct a war on that basis just they could not do what Mugabe did nor what Sri Lanka did. That limits the options and the likely outcomes on any counterinsurgency war.


And for what it's worth, whatever reprieve Mugabe has gained for his regime, the brutality he has visited upon segments of his country will be repaid at some point. Unfortunately, it will likely result in even greater chaos and brutality for that country, to nobody's benefit.

Maybe. Too late for the victims and their families and I suppose no chance of an apology from Jimmy Carter either. (At least Bill Clinton has shown some remorse over his failure in Rwanda).


Finally, I do not agree with your conclusion that the concessions that must be made by a foreign power in order to win are pyrrhic. Again, I look to WWII, and the tremendously effective post-hostilities COIN campaign that was conducted in Germany/Western Europe and Japan. We did end up giving our opponents in the war just about everything they had sought to obtain through force, and it was a smashing success to the ultimate policy aims of the war.

Jill

From Iraq through Afghanistan there are thousands of KIAs and even more severely wounded soldiers suffered by the US and NATO forces. So what constitutes a "victory gained at too greater cost"? IMHO that which happened in Iraq and what is now happening in Afghanistan... that is if the end result actually reflects a "victory".

[JMA]

Bob,

Left 8 of my 14 tanks at home in 2006. Rest of tankers walked or took HMMWV's. It's actually very common the past 5-6 years for tankers, artillerymen, and mech infantry to act dismounted without vehicle overwatch.


Don't see the point in this.

When you have enough problems with the quality of infantry training what (for crying out aloud) is the point of taking armour trained soldiers all the way to a foreign theatre to act in the infantry role?

If there is a need for a handful of tanks in Afghanistan then deploy them and leave the rest of the regiment at home.

It just gets stranger and stranger.

[JMA]

Whoah there Mudhara! ;) You're about 50% right, but....

Western or civilised countries can suppress rebellions IF they recognise the limit of the military instrument, to using armed force against armed force, and the employment of criminal convictions to those sustaining it.

The political problem may continue, BUT you use violence (military AND Police) to ensure it remains a political problem that the rebels will not seek to resolve by force. The ONLY thing armed force does is stop the other guy (rebels) using armed force. That is the key thing FM3-24 doesn't get.

Its all about timing isn't it.

By the time the army gets involved its too late already as the shooting has already begun. And to stop the shooting you either have to pull a Mugabe on the population or give away the farm.

[Cavguy]

Don't see the point in this.

When you have enough problems with the quality of infantry training what (for crying out aloud) is the point of taking armour trained soldiers all the way to a foreign theatre to act in the infantry role?

If there is a need for a handful of tanks in Afghanistan then deploy them and leave the rest of the regiment at home.

It just gets stranger and stranger.

Simple - necessity. We can't afford to leave the rest at home.

Simple fact is we didn't have enough infantry/dismounts to support repeated Iraq rotations, and therefore routinely have converted tankers, artillery, and sometimes engineers into ad hoc infantrymen. They did pretty well too - at a cost to their core skillsets which are beginning to get rebuilt.

None of it is ideal. We did this from the occupation phase of OIF 1 forward because of the decision to go in with a "light footprint". My Stryker CAV squadron will fundamentally act as infantrymen in Afghanistan next year. The cavalry hasn't trained actual recon in about 5 years, but have served as another infantry unit.

[William F. Owen]

Its all about timing isn't it.

By the time the army gets involved its too late already as the shooting has already begun. And to stop the shooting you either have to pull a Mugabe on the population or give away the farm.

Well the UK effectively suppressed the rebellions in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and even South Arabia, without measures that - at the time - drew large scale international criticism.
The success of the Rhodesian Armed Forces was that the transition to majority Government took place, under a negotiated peace, and not by force of arms as intended.

[JMA]

Well the UK effectively suppressed the rebellions in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and even South Arabia, without measures that - at the time - drew large scale international criticism.
The success of the Rhodesian Armed Forces was that the transition to majority Government took place, under a negotiated peace, and not by force of arms as intended.

I suggest all those "victories" came at a high cost.

Yes to Rhodesia and the same with the efforts of the South Africans in Namibia/South West Africa.

[Graycap]

Contact with the population is mainly influenced by command climate and training - for example, one TTP is to lager the vehicles outside the town and foot patrol in, keeping the vehicles for QRF. More than one way to do it.

Just like the Russian concept of bronegruppa? I refer to the soviet tactical use of their mechanised items like reported in Lester Grau books.

Cheers

[William F. Owen]

I suggest all those "victories" came at a high cost.

OK, but in what sense? Certainly "victories" as military force achieved the political objective set for it. As to cost, the British Army lost <750 men across all four campaigns.
Other "human costs" may have been much higher.

[JMA]

OK, but in what sense? Certainly "victories" as military force achieved the political objective set for it. As to cost, the British Army lost <750 men across all four campaigns.
Other "human costs" may have been much higher.

The thousands of (all) lives lost in the respective struggles... and Britain lost the colonies (on a take it we're out of here basis).

... now I wonder why you did not include the suppression of the Boer insurgency in your list? Some skeletons in that cupboard on that one? ... and in the Sudan?

[Bill Moore]

Two of Wilf's posts tend to ring true to me:


Not true. Cambodia in the 70's, Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, Saddam's Iraq, A'stan under the Taliban, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, North Korea etc etc etc.
This "power from the people" is not a reality in the real world, unless they do a lot of killing to get it, and unless they are prepared to keep killing, they can loose it.


The political problem may continue, BUT you use violence (military AND Police) to ensure it remains a political problem that the rebels will not seek to resolve by force. The ONLY thing armed force does is stop the other guy (rebels) using armed force. That is the key thing FM3-24 doesn't get.

I read every page of FM 3-24 when it first came out, but have rarely looked at it since. The manual has much wisdom in it based on years of COIN experiences, but it also definitely has a slant to it that IMO is misleading by excessively focusing on the populace to the extent of almost ignoring the enemy. While I understand Bob's points about force being a temporary solution at best, I think Wilf trumps that point by stating until we get the enemy (in this case the insurgents) to stop using force, a political settlement will remain a pipe dream.

In Afghanistan the populace doesn't know who will win at this point, and again as Wilf stated in much of the real world "power from the people" without force doesn't exist. We won't have a Ghandi like peace movement in Afghanistan. For us to confuse less developed, non-democratic States with the U.S.'s mature democratic bureaucracy and associated social norms is a dangerous mistake on part, and will result in the development of ineffective policy. The Khmer Rouge and other thug groups didn't obtain power by waging a peaceful election based on new ideas, but rather by employing brute force. The Taliban post-Soviet era obtained power by employing brute force, and now they're attempting to do the same (although this time they're also applying a fair amount of political savvy). IMO you can't effectively counter brutality with a peace movement and economic development. I know others disagree, but again I ask for historical examples of where the counterinsurgent effectively offered an olive branch without first establishing tactical dominance?

At the tactical level do we really need more than a manual on how to "defeat" the insurgent militarily? We all recognize this is not a victory in the traditional sense, but it sets security conditions for a real political settlement. The key is to aggressively pursue and surgically kill the enemy without alienating the populace, and yes defending the populace remains a key line of effort. That means we need to kill the enemy, take and "hold" territory (not return to base camps), and protect the populace, and do so at a fast enough pace to overcome the enemy's ability to reconstitute.

This goes back to the tank issue, if the Marines want tanks, then give them tanks. They have a tactical mission to accomplish and they know what tools they need to do it. They're not the Soviets and any comparison with the Soviets is simply foolish and misleading. People questioning their request reminds of the experts in the rear who questioned the TF's request for armored vehicles in Somalia, and then the subsequent Black Hawk Down situation. Higher gives lower a mission based on policy, and then lower best determines how to accomplish it, which includes determining what tools they need. We don't need a snoty nosed State Department employee in his young 30's influencing that decision by stating sending tanks sends the wrong message. Put the kid back in his lane, the right message is ensuring our forces dominate the enemy militarily. That enables the diplomats to more effectively negotiate as required. Based on my relatively short experience in Afghanistan I can see several cases where tanks could be effectively employed and if I was in the Taliban I would be plently worried if the Marines brought in some M1's.

Where I disagree with Wilf is that there are many unique aspects of Small Wars that differ significantly from conventional combat, so a good Small Wars TTP manual and associated doctrine is required, but in the end the common military objective between conventional and small wars remains the same and that is to take away from the enemy the option of using force to obtain their goals. It is political and psychological warfare so there is more involved than just shooting, but on the other hand that doesn't mean the shooting war takes a back seat while we experiment with a broke IO program, civil military projects, and economic development. We sure has hell aren't going to deter the North Koreans with our civil-military projects and economic development (we tried). They understand the deterrence of might, and so do many hard core insurgents.

Back to Bob's excellent points, which ultimately are the right answer, but they're the right answer at the policy level, and while the lines between the military and policy wonks are admitedly gray, I think we would be better off if our military doctrine focused on defeating the enemy (the tactical fight), and then re-emphasizing (once again) the whole of government approach to achieving a a strategic political settlement. We seem to be out of balance with our current approach. I state the above with some apprehension, because I have little faith in the Department of State to develop effective in lieu of politically correct policy. DOS has some exceptional diplomats, but unfortunately that isn't the prevailing norm, and for one I hate to see our troops committed to a fight where they're trying to support a lame policy that feels good (democracy and economic development for everyone) instead of a policy that is achievable, so from my view it is understandable why the military has over stepped into this role.

In a more perfect world we would have realistic policies and an interagency doctrine based on realsim (not simly idealism) for these types of conflicts. Based on our political system, I realize that is a pipe dream, but I still think our doctrine for small wars manual should focus on how to defeat the insurgent at the tactical level. We would probably use 60% of what is in the current FM, but the slant would be different this time.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Nice post. This is always the big question, of what to do first, and what to prioritize. The majority position in military circles is to establish security first. Some come to that because, like Tranquier, they see security as the entire issue. Some because they see the populace as the prize, but rationalize that they can't get at them effectively to bring them under control until they have a reasonable degree of security in place. Like a sinking boat with a large hole in it: does one bail or plug the hole?? There may be too much water to get at the hole, or the water may be threatening to swamp the boat. But the bailing may not be able to keep up with the amount coming in the hole, or perhaps is only marginally faster, so the process is guaranteed to be long and tiring, but water never tires... Security first is bailing the boat. Balance and prioritize.

I ran into a similar circumstance when I left the regular army to go to law school. Wanting to stay in the military in some capacity I joined the Guard. Going from an ODA Commander in 5th SFG to being the new guy in a Guard Light Infantry Brigade was a bit of a culture shock. Lesson one was that the AC is a training readiness focused organization, while the Guard is a personnel readiness focused organization. Success of Commanders, Budget decisions, what states get what units and what equipment, etc are all made based upon the ability to produce units with a high percentage of available MOS qualified personnel. Period. How well they could perform was not a factor. This led to the great debate: should one train to unit capability, or should one focus on recruiting and individual capability? The standard Guard position was that a unit could not train until it was well manned, so focus on recruiting and individual training. The problem was they never got there, so they never trained. Also, as units spent so much time at the armory doing boring individual tasks, or events and parties intended to attract recruits, most really good soldiers would give up after a few years, and the organization in a Darwinian way became predominated by guys who saw it more as a social club than a military organization (with notable exceptions of course).

Ever the iconoclast, myself and another young major took the position of "train to retain"; and pushed for aggressive collective training and maximization of drill weekends. We soon build a cult following of young soldiers and junior leaders who really wanted to soldier. Social soldiers went to other units or got out, and soldiers who wanted to really soldier were drawn to the units that made training a priority. I never saw a unit that focused on hard, realistic training suffer for long for low numbers. The key was in determining the decisive point.

For Guard recruiting and retention I determined that the decisive point was when the soldier returned home following a drill weekend, and when he went to work. It was how he answered the question of "how was your weekend" by a spouse whose sister's wedding she had attended alone that weekend, or by a child who had a big ball game, or by a co-worker who had gone on a big hunting or skiing trip. If his answer was "I had to go to drill and we hung out at the armory" I knew the follow-on question would be fatal "so why do you do it?" Recruit the soldier, but retain the wife. If he had great war stories to tell with fire in his eye about how hard it was the wife and kids would support him and his buddies would want to join. By focusing on the decisive point the "recruit or train" question was easy to answer.

But what is the decisive point for COIN?

But what if the populace is not the "prize" and the insurgent is not the "cause"??? Perhaps we are all focused on the wrong problem. I just read the great French piece on Galula to Petraeus http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/11/from-trinquier-and-galula-to-p/ and it lays out the key points of Tranquier, Galula, Kilcullen and Petraeus. Tranquier is great for those doing CT; but is not COIN. The other three are all in the beaten zone for COIN, but in my opinion miss two critical points:

1. All saw/see the intervening power as the "counterinsurgent." In the current globalized environment I believe this is even more of a fatal mistake than it has been historically. But in the colonial era the role of the intervening power was to sustain in power a government that answered to them first, and then to the populace. Today this just is not the case, and is a habit we must break. This is the flaw of all colonial COIN, be it French, British, or USMC Small Wars Manual. The intervening power today does NOT want "control" over the Government or the Populace either one. To do so, to even create the Perception of Control is to:
A. Render the Host Nation Government Illegitimate in the eyes of the populaces, thereby stoking the flames of insurgency, and
B. Make the intervening power the target of terrorist attack, at home as well as in the host nation.

2. All fail to identify the government as the principal factor of causation. Tranquier placed all blame on external UW actors. The rest place blame on a populace that yes, questions legitimacy, but more importantly does so due to the effects of insurgent ideology and lack of effective government services.

So, I think this causes us to mis-identify the decisive point, and therefore make poor decisions as what to prioritize and how to balance our efforts. I say make fixing the government the priority, balance that with information operations that admit to past failures of government, agree with and co-opt vast swaths of the insurgent's message, and proclaim hard internal fixes being made to address all of the above. Only third after this comes security efforts focused on key elements of governmental outreach and key nodes of the insurgency itself.

A long post, I realize, but these two points of the intervener not being the counterinsurgent and the repair of governance as the decisive point largely missed in mainstream COIN doctrine and theory is critical. More so than ever in today's information age of empowered populaces.

[William F. Owen]

Where I disagree with Wilf is that there are many unique aspects of Small Wars that differ significantly from conventional combat, so a good Small Wars TTP manual and associated doctrine is required, but in the end the common military objective between conventional and small wars remains the same and that is to take away from the enemy the option of using force to obtain their goals.
Agree a 100%. I cannot see where we disagree. Suppressing armed rebellions requires some unique TTPs - and those tend to be theatre specific.

[Dayuhan]

The intervening power today does NOT want "control" over the Government or the Populace either one.

One hopes this is so. At the same time, though, it raises the question of what the intervening power DOES want. Nobody intervenes for the sake of the country being intervened in: if somebody's intervening they are doing so because they have very significant interests at stake. The intervention is generally shaped by these perceived interests, not by the interests of the government, populace, or insurgents of the country being intervened in.


I say make fixing the government the priority, balance that with information operations that admit to past failures of government, agree with and co-opt vast swaths of the insurgent's message, and proclaim hard internal fixes being made to address all of the above.

That raises other questions...

What brief have we to run about fixing other people's governments? What if the government doesn't want to be fixed, or the populace doesn't want us involved, or both? How do we go about inserting ourselves into another country and declaring that we propose to fix anything, let alone the government...

Given that we are not the government, how do we admit to the past failures of government? Are you suggesting that we force or influence the government to admit to what we believe to be its failures, or that we just go ahead and admit to someone else's failures, which amounts to an accusation. What if the government doesn't share our perception of failure?

If the primary message of the insurgent is "get the @#$%& furriners out", how do we co-opt that?

Do we proclaim "hard internal fixes", or do we actually produce them? Isn't producing a hard internal fix a governance function? How do we do this without actually taking over governance?

Overall, I think this overlooks the difficulty - and potential undesirability - of trying to control the government of another country. I know you said we don't or shouldn't want control, but how do you fix a government without control?

I suspect that much of the difficulty we have in applying our traditional COIN discourse to Iraq and Afghanistan traces back to the reality that our traditional COIN discourse tends to be based on the premise that we are intervening to support an allied government threatened by insurgency. What we're doing in Iraq and Afghanistan is quite different, and might better be described as "phase 3 regime change".

Assume regime change has 3 broad phases:

1. Remove previous government (generally fairly easy)

2. Install new government (easy to do badly, hard to do well)

3. Suppress armed resistance to new government and support it until is able to govern (very hard, especially if phase 2 was done badly).

There are significant commonalities between traditional COIN and phase 3 regime change, but also very real differences, particularly in the perceived and actual relationship between the intervening power and the Government of the host country. Pretending that they are the same thing is self deception, and while the lessons of one may at times apply to the other, it's important to maintain awareness of the differences.

[Bob's World]

When and where the U.S. engages in such governmental-populace disputes is every bit as important as how.

This is why the assessment of national interests based on the current and emerging geopolitical dynamics is so critical. Too often we are driven by 60 year-old Cold War positions; or for the GWOT by flawed concepts of AQ and their role and relationship with insurgent populaces, coupled with an Intelligence-driven perspective that builds an ever growing threat picture that is then painted as being our critical interest to defeat.

The troubled regions where we have the greatest true national interests are, ironically, the locations where we are actually the least likely to engage directly as we have long relations with those "friendly" governments, preferring to engage in locations where we have few interests, and weak or strained relations with the government.

This brings us to another aspect of Decisive Points: We have made AFPAK our focal point for the GWOT, yet if one focus on the heart of the causation of GWOT, rather than merely the current location the current manifestations of this causation are operating out of; the decisive point shifts, IMO, to Saudi Arabia.

Now, this is not a call to send our military to remove a government, or to help a government control its populace. Nor is it a call to conduct a massive program of helping upgrade government effectiveness. Clearly such approaches seem as ridiculous when considered for a modern, friendly state as they seem obvious for a more primitive, or less friendly state; but are quite possibly equally inappropriate for both. The issues that must be addressed at the decisive point are those in the nature of the relationship between the Saudi government and their populace; and those in the relationship between the US Government and the Saudi Government. Both are wildly dysfunctional and are the burning core of causation for the GWOT that must be extinguished to rein this problem in.

[slapout9]

This brings us to another aspect of Decisive Points: We have made AFPAK our focal point for the GWOT, yet if one focus on the heart of the causation of GWOT, rather than merely the current location the current manifestations of this causation are operating out of; the decisive point shifts, IMO, to Saudi Arabia.



Thats right from an LE perspective they were,are,and will be the primary suspect, except they aren't even suspects IMO they are flat out guilty. First thing we should do is send them a bill for about 25 Trillion dollars!!!

[Bill Moore]

Bob's World,

I think you're so focused on trying to convince that the audience that the decisive point in COIN is the government that you tend to hijack threads in the SWJ council that are not focused on strategy and policy to change the topic to one of strategy and policy issues. This is actually, though unintentionally I suspect, a little on the rude side. Many of us have our pet issues and we argue them in the "appropriate" threads. I think you may some valid points, but the discussion in this thread is FM 3-24, which is COIN doctrine for the military (which does mean warfare). It isn't the military's role to reform host nation governments (though we all too frequently get sucked into that role due to the ineptness and capacity short falls within the State Department).

It doesn't matter whether you embrace DIME, DIMEFIL or some other method to explain the whole of government approach, a FM focuses on the M, the military's role, which is defeating the insurgent using military force, or at a minimum deterring the insurgent from using force to compel the HN government to its will.

The policy debates for Afghanistan, Pakistan and the WOT continue to spin in the muck of political correctness (Islam is a religion of peace, we need to have more patience with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia is an ally on the WOT, etc.), and in the meantime our fighting force is fighting at the tactical level trying to construct something meaningful from the bottom up. I agree that ideally there shouldn't be a tactical level fight without first identifying the national policy and supporting strategy, but that isn't the world we live in, and that isn't what the FM should be about.

As to your other points the fight in Afghanistan is very much about external influences, and even if we could "fix" the Afghanistan government it wouldn't bring the insurgency to a close. Your recommendation to co-opt part of the insurgent's narrative could be effective if none skillfully, but it won't work if the HN government does it from a position of military weakness. The facts are if they are perceived to be losing the fight militarily and they co-opt part of the insurgent narrative it will be seen as a weakness and further reinforce the perception that the government won't win. That usually doesn't equate for a mass movement in support of the government.

I agree with Dayuhan's tone that we need to be very careful with the attitude that we're here to fix your government as a matter of policy (even worse if expressed in one our FMs). We deploy forces in a FID role to "assist" the HN government, not "undermine" their government by attacking their legitimacy. What you're proposing seems to be a combination an odd combination of FID and UW (FID we're here to help, UW we're here to conduct subversion and sabotage to bring your government down), and again maybe if this approach was executed skillfully it would work, but most likely it is an approach that would simply collapse on itself, because we're not sophisticated enough to pull it off, and we have too many divisive points within our government that would work at odds against one another instead of collaboratively towards a common purpose. We can only work together at the tactical level (where the real heroes are, the people that actually give a crap about the their peers and the people they interact with daily). Understanding the limitations of our government will help us define a more realistic strategy in my opinion.

[Bob's World]

Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.
Sun Tzu

Bill, you are right, of course. I am a strategist who focuses on understanding insurgency. This is what I do and it is, indeed, what I bring to the discussion. There are thousands of NCOs and junior officers with far more to offer than I in regard to nuances of tactical approaches to the fights we have placed them in. My focus has been, and will remain, seeking to ensure that when us old guys put them into such a fight, it is in a time, manner and place designed to contribute to solving the problem that led us to deploy them in the first place.

What I am suggesting is not an approach rooted in a combination of UW and FID, though that would certainly be the lion share of the tactical supporting actions. What I am suggesting is that we are currently applying a military solution to attack/defeat the symptoms of problems rooted in foreign policy.

As I have pointed out before, FM 3-24 takes a fork in the road in the very first sentence of the first paragraph of the first Chapter: "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare." At that point we have committed ourselves to a military solution and just granted the Policy/Governance community a pass.

I would make this the first thing to change in the re-write of this manual. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of governance."

[Dayuhan]

As I have pointed out before, FM 3-24 takes a fork in the road in the very first sentence of the first paragraph of the first Chapter: "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare." At that point we have committed ourselves to a military solution and just granted the Policy/Governance community a pass.

Possibly I'm channeling Wilf here, but the document in question is a military field manual and does not concern the policy/governance community. If the military is involved, the policy decision to use armed force has already been made. If the military is not involved, the manual is irrelevant. For the purposes of military involvement, presumably the purpose for which the manual was written, the definition is adequate.

Governance issues are of course critical to effective COIN, but they are beyond the scope of the military and do not need to be covered in a military manual. The military's only appropriate role is the military aspect of COIN; if we're asking the military to "do governance" we're putting ourselves in a corner form which no manual can effectively extricate us.


When and where the U.S. engages in such governmental-populace disputes is every bit as important as how.

Certainly, but you omit "why", probably more important than any of them.

I think the points I made above are not being adequately addressed. You wrote:


I say make fixing the government the priority, balance that with information operations that admit to past failures of government, agree with and co-opt vast swaths of the insurgent's message, and proclaim hard internal fixes being made to address all of the above.

and subsequently:


The issues that must be addressed at the decisive point are those in the nature of the relationship between the Saudi government and their populace; and those in the relationship between the US Government and the Saudi Government. Both are wildly dysfunctional and are the burning core of causation for the GWOT that must be extinguished to rein this problem in.

Put those together and the problems come into focus. We cannot "fix" the Saudi government. We can't even substantially influence the Saudi government: they are not a dependency or protectorate. We cannot "admit to past failures of governance" or compel or persuade the Saudis to do so. We can make accusations, but we can't "admit" to someone else's failings. Agreeing with the supposed "insurgent" message won't help us much, because the message of the would-be "insurgent" was never really adopted by the populace: they have their own concerns, but AQ does not represent them. Neither do we, and neither can we. We can neither proclaim nor implement "hard fixes" to Saudi problems: it's not our country.

On the one hand you tell us to renounce control, on the other you propose a program that cannot be implemented unless we have control.

The relationship between the Saudi government and its populace may be dysfunctional, but it's none of our business and nobody, least of all the Saudi populace, wants us meddling in it.

Our relationship with the Saudi government is within our control, but proposed revisions must be based on the reality that we are dealing with a sovereign state that is not under our control, and that our influence over that State is slim to nonexistent. Realistically, the Saudis have more leverage over us at this point then we have over them... so how do you propose to go about fixing their government, admitting their failures, or proclaiming "hard internal fixes" to their problems?

[Bob's World]

Possibly I'm channeling Wilf here, but the document in question is a military field manual and does not concern the policy/governance community. If the military is involved, the policy decision to use armed force has already been made. If the military is not involved, the manual is irrelevant. For the purposes of military involvement, presumably the purpose for which the manual was written, the definition is adequate.

Governance issues are of course critical to effective COIN, but they are beyond the scope of the military and do not need to be covered in a military manual. The military's only appropriate role is the military aspect of COIN; if we're asking the military to "do governance" we're putting ourselves in a corner form which no manual can effectively extricate us.



Certainly, but you omit "why", probably more important than any of them.

I think the points I made above are not being adequately addressed. You wrote:



and subsequently:



Put those together and the problems come into focus. We cannot "fix" the Saudi government. We can't even substantially influence the Saudi government: they are not a dependency or protectorate. We cannot "admit to past failures of governance" or compel or persuade the Saudis to do so. We can make accusations, but we can't "admit" to someone else's failings. Agreeing with the supposed "insurgent" message won't help us much, because the message of the would-be "insurgent" was never really adopted by the populace: they have their own concerns, but AQ does not represent them. Neither do we, and neither can we. We can neither proclaim nor implement "hard fixes" to Saudi problems: it's not our country.

On the one hand you tell us to renounce control, on the other you propose a program that cannot be implemented unless we have control.

The relationship between the Saudi government and its populace may be dysfunctional, but it's none of our business and nobody, least of all the Saudi populace, wants us meddling in it.

Our relationship with the Saudi government is within our control, but proposed revisions must be based on the reality that we are dealing with a sovereign state that is not under our control, and that our influence over that State is slim to nonexistent. Realistically, the Saudis have more leverage over us at this point then we have over them... so how do you propose to go about fixing their government, admitting their failures, or proclaiming "hard internal fixes" to their problems?


What I have always stood for is that we must change ourselves, not work so hard to change others to suit us. When I say the US must change the nature of its relationship with the Saudis I mean we must change our end of it. As to the relationship between the Saudi government and their own populace, that is a conversation for the President to have with his counterpart in private. But the primary reason he does not have it is because the military has kidnapped COIN as warfare and their domain.

To claim that military can simply declare some aspect of governance as warfare, write a manual about it and thereby convert it to warfare is absurd. Stable governments with solid relationships with their populaces are conducting COIN every single day and we don't call that warfare when they are doing it effectively. It is only when the civil leaders lose control of the populace to such a degree that violent challengers emerge and calls upon the military to help defeat the products of their failures that we recognize the condition as insurgency, declare it to be warfare and pass the lead off to the military. That clean break and conversion from governance to warfare is a fiction. Manuals such as 3-24 contribute to that fiction.

What is next? Will the military publish a manual that declares that support to natural disasters, or smaller civil emergencies such as the LA riots are warfare as well? When insurgency goes violent it is indeed often warfare by the populace against the state; but it is the rare situation that I would recommend to a government conducting COIN as warfare against their own populace.

But this gets us back to the role of an intervening power and what their mission is in that intervention. The intervening power is supporting the COIN force (the Host Nation), even when they have decimated that host nation government as we did in Iraq. Simply because the Host Nation government ceases to exist it does not suddenly make the intervening government the host nation. They have the mission, but not the status. To assume the status is create impossible conditions of illegitimacy that will feed the insurgent movement.

So long as we continue to look at COIN in the context of warfare and a mission that an intervening government has the status to implement we will struggle with this mission. Similarly, until we hold our allies to task for their responsibility in creating conditions of insurgency within their states; and hold ourselves responsible for the role US foreign policy over the past 100+ years has played in contributing to the conditions leading to current illegal violence directed at the US we will struggle with the GWOT as well. I really don't see a down side in demanding greater accountability in civil government.

[Ken White]

Strategy is good. So is Policy. Hopefully the two cross reference each other but mixing them up in a stew is inadvisable. Similarly, Executive Chefs and Chefs de Partie are both important but each has to do his or her job, mix 'em up and poor chow results. :(

I have to agree with Bill Moore and Dayuhan -- when you try to change the first sentence in the first paragraph of the first chapter of a Field Manual -- no matter how poor it is -- to reflect what is and should be a civilian policy decision you are going to lose and you just get yourself consigned to the 'Disregard all before Huh' pile. Governance is a civilian, foreign policy concern. It is not and should not be a US Army -- to include SF -- concern. If the Armed Forces are committed, then in our nation a civilian ordered that and the Army's job is to conduct combat operations suitable to the mission.

As several of us keep saying, you have the right idea but keep shooting at the wrong target. :eek:

Same thing is true of going after the Saudis. It plays well to the populists here and there but it's not going to happen and we all -- including the populists -- know a half dozen or more good reasons why. So what purpose is served by beating it into the ground? To show that you are an independent thinker? We know that.

As someone far wiser than I (lot of them about... :o ) once said, there's a fine line between admirable persistence and deplorable bullheadedness. You aren't there yet -- but I really don't think going there will do your cause one bit of good...

[Dayuhan]

I honestly don't see how this:


What I have always stood for is that we must change ourselves, not work so hard to change others to suit us. When I say the US must change the nature of its relationship with the Saudis I mean we must change our end of it.

can be reconciled with this:


I say make fixing the government the priority, balance that with information operations that admit to past failures of government, agree with and co-opt vast swaths of the insurgent's message, and proclaim hard internal fixes being made to address all of the above.

Please explain: how do those two prescriptions fit together? They seem to be opposites, unless there's something there that I'm not seeing.



As to the relationship between the Saudi government and their own populace, that is a conversation for the President to have with his counterpart in private. But the primary reason he does not have it is because the military has kidnapped COIN as warfare and their domain.

I think the primary reason he doesn't have is that it's none of our business, and if he tries to raise the point he will be told exactly that.


To claim that military can simply declare some aspect of governance as warfare, write a manual about it and thereby convert it to warfare is absurd.

No aspect of governance is a military concern unless it involves warfare. If an aspect of governance has been handed over to the military, it has been declared warfare by the civilian government, and the military has every right to treat it as such.


Stable governments with solid relationships with their populaces are conducting COIN every single day and we don't call that warfare when they are doing it effectively.

You can't do COIN unless there is an insurgency; you can't counter something that isn't there. Certainly insurgency can be prevented or preempted by addressing potential causes before insurgency breaks out, but that is not the role of the military. Certainly it is not wise for the US or any other intervening power to get involved in every insurgency or potential insurgency, but that decision is not up to the military. If an insurgency has reached the point where armed force is required, and if the civilian government has decided to intervene, then yes, warfare is involved. If these conditions do not apply, the military isn't involved anyway. From the military perspective - the perspective from which the manual was written - COIN may be called warfare because the only aspect of COIN, and governance, with which the military should be dealing is the part that involves the use of armed force.

I agree that in any case the military aspect will only be one part of COIN, but the non-military aspect is not and should not be the realm of the military. Our problems with the non-military aspect of COIN is not that the military is excessively focused on the military aspects: that's exactly what they should focus on. Our problem is that we have no equivalent organization with the capacity to address the non-military aspects, which are either ignored or passed off to those who are not trained or equipped to manage them.

The answer to our neglect of governance concerns is not to get the military involved in governance: that's a recipe for disaster. The answer is to let the military do its job, and develop a separate but coordinated capacity for dealing with the governance concerns.

[Ken White]

But the primary reason he does not have it is because the military has kidnapped COIN as warfare and their domain.I think that's a specious comment with little grounding in reality. I can think of many reasons such a conversation has not probably not taken place with regard to several recent Presidents but that 'reason' you give isn't one of them -- even if it were true. I suggest there's a difference between 'default' and 'kidnap'...

IMO and I suspect that of many other -- not all -- Americans, such a conversation should not occur. I don't think you can say on the one hand:
When I say the US must change the nature of its relationship with the Saudis I mean we must change our end of it. As to the relationship between the Saudi government and their own populace...and suggest in the next breath that we should insert ourselves via the President in a private conversation saying to the King he must change his ways to do what we want. I'm inclined to believe that is, if not hypocritical, at least a very conflicted proposition.
To claim that military can simply declare some aspect of governance as warfare, write a manual about it and thereby convert it to warfare is absurd.Sweeping statement. "Absurd." Really? At the risk of being rude, allow me to point out that just because Robert C. Jones claims governance is the root of all insurgency and blithely ignores any evidence to the contrary does not portend that the world is going to convert to that view in the near future. I know you're aware that more people disagree with you than agree on that governance bit and while you may discount them and their opinions, your approach leads them to believe ignoring your opinions is possibly prudent.

To call a consensual approach absurd while proclaiming to have the only correct answer only makes you seem strident at the very least.
Stable governments with solid relationships with their populaces are conducting COIN every single day and we don't call that warfare...That clean break and conversion from governance to warfare is a fiction. Manuals such as 3-24 contribute to that fiction.Is it a fiction or is that merely a simplification for your purpose. Most of the several insurgencies in which I've been involved on four continents resulted from anything but a '"clean break" and no one I knew or know has claimed such clarity in transition other than you in that statement. Most of 'em are more than muddy. Unintended consequences rule...
What is next...their own populace.I don't see anything sensible to respond to in that paragraph so I just truncated it. :D
But this gets us back to the role of an intervening power...To assume the status is create impossible conditions of illegitimacy that will feed the insurgent movement.True. We can agree totally on that. We can agree that we would not have done it the way W. decided to do it. We may or may not agree that once he had so decided, the ball was in the court of the US of A Army -- and they blew it. We may agree that the Army should not have had to pick up that ball -- but we both have to acknowledge that they had to do that. So. Bad move but it's partly over and the Army simply did, not too poorly, what they had to do. We have elsewhere agreed several times it should not get to that point -- hopefully, ever again -- and you plead for a coherent grand strategy.

I keep telling you that is not going to happen, the best you can get in our political system is a fairly coherent long term policy. Instead of shooting for that, you wish to try for the Gold Ring. Have at it and I'll get to tell you as I have dozens of other old Colonels "I told you..." ;)
...and hold ourselves responsible for the role US foreign policy over the past 100+ years has played in contributing to the conditions leading to current illegal violence directed at the US we will struggle with the GWOT as well. I really don't see a down side in demanding greater accountability in civil government.Bad news, Bob -- we've been at it for over 220 years, not 100+. It's who we are, what we are. Our collective attention span doesn't grasp two decades, much less two centuries. You simply are not going to change that. Shame you can't accept that and work within logical parameters and American realities for achievable goals...

ADDENDUM:

I type slowly, should have reloaded the page and looked before I posted. Dayuhan said it faster and better, I agree with him. You really ought to consider that...

And this, from Dayuhan, is most important and got left out:

""The answer to our neglect of governance concerns is not to get the military involved in governance: that's a recipe for disaster. The answer is to let the military do its job, and develop a separate but coordinated capacity for dealing with the governance concerns"" (emphasis added / kw)

[Bob's World]

Man, rough night. As an Oregon State alum lets just say the game against Stanford is not going well... (next week against Oregon not likely to go much better).

Then the defenders of the status quo pile on here at the journal!:p

First, the US efforts in a Global war on terrorism and insurgency are two separate, yet related things.

Just asf nationalist insurgency feeds off of causation the emanates from the governments of those nations; the War on Terrorism against the US feeds off of causation that emanates from US foreign policy.

So, we do have total control over our approach to foreign policy. By understanding what aspects of it create the most causation for acts of terror against us, and adjusting those components we in effect "turn down the heat" on terrorism. By continuing to support the very governments that are most challenged by insurgent populaces we keep that heat on high when that support enables them to continue to act with impunity toward their people.

Second; I don't pick on the Saudis, I pick on the US-Saudi relationship. The difference is a substantial one. Our entire Middle Eastern policy is long overdue for a major overhaul. But a many say, this is all policy stuff and not the domain of the military to worry about. The problem is that the policy types see insurgency and counterinsurgency as warfare and not the domain of policy types to worry about. We are at a stalemate, and something has to break that stalemate.

What I propose is that the military stepping up clarifying the roles of host nation, intervening nations, and what violence is warfare and what violence really isn't warfare is a critical initial step in breaking this cycle. To simply salute and say "we got it" is not helpful.

What I find interesting is that people can see regime change as ok; but employing a little firm, backroom influence between state leaders as inappropriate. I aways thought that warfare was supposed to be the "final argument of kings." We've gotten way too used to making it our opening statement.

[Pete]

The answer to our neglect of governance concerns is not to get the military involved in governance: that's a recipe for disaster. The answer is to let the military do its job, and develop a separate but coordinated capacity for dealing with the governance concerns.
CIA did that in the Philippines from after WW II until the 1960s. Although the morality of it might make one uncomfortable, the result was most likely better than the potential alternative. Few remember it now, but in the 1950s we were determined that the Philippines not go Communist; the result was that Marcos and the old big landowner Japanese collaborator crowd held on to power. There were some marginally leftist Filipinos who were good guys whose reputations were destroyed by U.S. paid-for and sponsored black propaganda and psyops. See Smith, Joseph B., Portrait of a Cold Warrior -- he was there for many years.

[Dayuhan]

Then the defenders of the status quo pile on here at the journal!:p

I don't see anyone defending the status quo. The status quo can be (and is) beset with all manner of stupidities, but that doesn't mean an alternative proposal is necessarily a solution.



Just as nationalist insurgency feeds off of causation the emanates from the governments of those nations; the War on Terrorism against the US feeds off of causation that emanates from US foreign policy.

So, we do have total control over our approach to foreign policy. By understanding what aspects of it create the most causation for acts of terror against us, and adjusting those components we in effect "turn down the heat" on terrorism.


To some extent, yes. But US foreign policy is by no means the only cause of these problems, and many of the causative factors that do exist are in the past and relate to policies that no longer exist. We cannot change the past. The relationship between AQ, nationalist insurgency, and US policy is, I suspect, not quite as clear and linear as you make it out to be.



By continuing to support the very governments that are most challenged by insurgent populaces we keep that heat on high when that support enables them to continue to act with impunity toward their people.

Where does our support enable anyone to act with impunity toward their own people? Certainly not in Saudi Arabia.


Second; I don't pick on the Saudis, I pick on the US-Saudi relationship. The difference is a substantial one.

Again, how do you reconcile that with this:


I say make fixing the government the priority, balance that with information operations that admit to past failures of government, agree with and co-opt vast swaths of the insurgent's message, and proclaim hard internal fixes being made to address all of the above.

They seem to be two completely different things. Do you want to focus on fixing the government, or fixing our relationship with the government.



What I find interesting is that people can see regime change as ok; but employing a little firm, backroom influence between state leaders as inappropriate. I aways thought that warfare was supposed to be the "final argument of kings." We've gotten way too used to making it our opening statement.

You certainly won't find me saying regime change was ok; I think it was one of the stupidest policies we've adopted in the last 50 years, which puts it in some pretty rarefied company. But you can't apply "firm, backroom influence" unless you have it, and we don't. If we start lecturing the Saudis on their relationship with their populace, do you really think they are going to change that relationship? Or will they gently remind us that the $60 billion they propose to spend on the products of our munitions industry might very easily be spent elsewhere... or will they simply ignore us? Not like they need to listen.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/11/27/world/asia/AP-AS-Pakistan-Making-Deals.html?_r=1&ref=world


The bloodletting peaked in 2007 when Shiites drove Sunnis out of Parachinar, the regional government headquarters. Sunni Muslims retaliated by denying Shiite Muslims access to road. In some instances, Sunni militants have stopped buses on the road, taken out Shiite passengers and executed them.

The Shiite militias had to turn to the Haqqanis to strike a deal "because they are so strong. No one else is as strong," Bangash said.

This is one recent example of hundreds available. Warfare is about power, not good governance. No about CMO, IO, economic development in a situation like this will distract from those who hold coercive power. The military has a very valid role to play in COIN, and they a need a FM that tells provides guidance on how to be good at applying military force against these insurgent groups.

Some argue we're doing the same old thing, but I would argue we forfeited the use of effective military force starting in 2002, and then in 2004 in Iraq. We became overly focused on winning hearts, not convincing the populace that we held the most coercive power and intended to win.

[Dayuhan]

CIA did that in the Philippines from after WW II until the 1960s. Although the morality of it might make one uncomfortable, the result was most likely better than the potential alternative. Few remember it now, but in the 1950s we were determined that the Philippines not go Communist; the result was that Marcos and the old big landowner Japanese collaborator crowd held on to power. There were some marginally leftist Filipinos who were good guys whose reputations were destroyed by U.S. paid-for and sponsored black propaganda and psyops. See Smith, Joseph B., Portrait of a Cold Warrior -- he was there for many years.

I've been there for many years too... 30+. Might point out that the big landowners collaborated with the Americans as well as with the Japanese, and that they rather effectively persuaded the Americans that anyone who wanted to rock the good ol' boat was a communist. The Americans may have thought that they were opposing Communism; in actuality they were supporting feudalism, and setting the stage for the far more effective Communist uprising that began in the 1970s.

Could say a good deal more; it's a pet period of mine, but it has precious little to do with FM 3-24 and I'd better stop before I start running on!

[slapout9]

The military has a very valid role to play in COIN, and they a need a FM that tells provides guidance on how to be good at applying military force against these insurgent groups.



Why no go back to good old basic SF theory where we raise and train a guerrilla force instead using conventional forces. We need the equivalent of an Islamic Los Pepe's like they used to Kill Pabelo.

[Ken White]

What three people are doing is suggesting that Bob's Way is not the only way to achieve some needed changes, that Bob's Way may be in fact a good idea that is simply incorrectly aimed, that Bob's Way would have a better chance of success if it posed fewer contrapositions. One cannot mind one's own business and not impose one's will on another and at the same times try to cajole him into doing it one's way...

Either we stay out of other government's business or we intrude or interfere in some way. Since the latter is the more likely course, I believe you and I would agree that militarily interfering is the last resort and generally not a good choice. Where we seem to disagree is how the Armed Forces should go about getting that point across to the policy makers. You appear to want the FlagOs to be pro-active and bulldoze the civilians into doing it the 'right way.' I contend that they should not try that (it will backfire, it always has every time we've tried it) and that the personnel turnover among said policy makers means your ideas will get little traction unless you produce a coherent, realistic, non contradictory approach that provides them political cover. IMO, you have not yet done that, in fact seem to refuse to even consider it.
Second; I don't pick on the Saudis, I pick on the US-Saudi relationship. The difference is a substantial one. Our entire Middle Eastern policy is long overdue for a major overhaul. But a many say, this is all policy stuff and not the domain of the military to worry about. The problem is that the policy types see insurgency and counterinsurgency as warfare and not the domain of policy types to worry about. We are at a stalemate, and something has to break that stalemateTrue on the first point, for brevity I shortchanged that point which I did and do understand. I agree on the second point. On the third point, I disagree -- it is NOT the place of DoD or the Armed Forces to dictate to the civilian heirarchy what policies should be.

You'll likely respond you do not intend to dictate. So you might say but your words written here do not convey anything less. Think about that.
What I propose is that the military stepping up clarifying the roles of host nation, intervening nations, and what violence is warfare and what violence really isn't warfare is a critical initial step in breaking this cycle. To simply salute and say "we got it" is not helpful."Stepping up" equals dictation? Suggesting? Suggesting more strongly? Hinting? What? Precisely what do you propose the military do to get those points accepted?

Your "not helpful" comment, like the 'absurd' earlier is not going to help your sale pitch... ;)

Further, FWIW, the US Army has not simply saluted and started off on its own in my lifetime. They have generally resisted almost to the point of insubordination. If you can give me an instance where they have done what you say, I'd appreciate it.

Here's the crux of the seeming pile on (I can't help you with the Fussball games...) :wry:
What I find interesting is that people can see regime change as ok; but employing a little firm, backroom influence between state leaders as inappropriate. I aways thought that warfare was supposed to be the "final argument of kings." We've gotten way too used to making it our opening statement.No one here has said that or anything close to it -- what we are saying is that YOU contend we should not dictate to others and then consistently proceed to spell out the dictation that should be given. IOW, you appear to be talking out of both side of your mouth. Be nice in public, we must let them do it their way -- and if we don't like their way lambaste the hell out of 'em in private??? You contradict yourself on that issue.

Aside from the basic fact that privately urging can be publicly ignored, thus forcing a public action -- like regime change -- your proposals all seem to be overly idealistic, not reality based and as noted, contradictory. In one sense, it's the walk softly and carry a big stick bit, ala T.R (who was a hypocrtical little dickens almost as devious as his cousin...) and that's a good catch line -- it does not work well with people who do not bluff if they sense the nominal stick wielder is a bluffer. Our problem in the US is that the electorate sometimes goes for bluffers. Our History of evil doing as you see it is also a history of poor bluffs and follow through. Those things have arguably done us more damage than any of or all the evil. A series of no or poor use of the Armed Forces and poor bluffs and follow through by four prior Administrations from both parties almost certainly led to the latest two cases of regime change. You may not agree with regime change, I disagreed strongly with the previous sluffing. Regime change works. Sloppy but it does work. The backroom stuff has a fairly poor track record unless it is backed up with credible regime change capability - and will to use it.

On the final point; we lead with force too often -- I totally agree and further agree with many of your proposals to change that.

However, I respectfully suggest that your methodology in getting your approach to change adopted by the Armed Forces or the US Government will not sell in Peoria -- or Washington. IOW, yet again, I'm suggesting you have some good thoughts but some rather jarring contradictions and a sales approach that is unlikely to succeed. So this isn't so much a pile-on as a fourth or fifth suggestion to consider that. Consider it my semi annual contribution. ;)

[slapout9]

This is an old article on the Moral imperative of 4th generation warfare. Before we update the manual maybe we should take a look at other concepts that may have seemed strange at the time, but seem to be very relevant in understanding the enemy we are fighting.


http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/pdf/4gw_and_the_moral_imperative.pdf

[Bob's World]

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/11/27/world/asia/AP-AS-Pakistan-Making-Deals.html?_r=1&ref=world



This is one recent example of hundreds available. Warfare is about power, not good governance. No about CMO, IO, economic development in a situation like this will distract from those who hold coercive power. The military has a very valid role to play in COIN, and they a need a FM that tells provides guidance on how to be good at applying military force against these insurgent groups.

Some argue we're doing the same old thing, but I would argue we forfeited the use of effective military force starting in 2002, and then in 2004 in Iraq. We became overly focused on winning hearts, not convincing the populace that we held the most coercive power and intended to win.

Bill,

I don't say the military has no role in helping to resolve insurgency; my point is simply that I believe much of the GWOT violence aimed at the US is due to perceptions of populaces in primarily Muslim countries where such insurgent movements are active or growing is that the blame for much of their current grievances with their governments lies with the US. Be that a co-option of natural legitimacy processes; be it the concerns that media-delivered US "culture" is eroding Islam in dangerous ways, etc.

For the US to go from insurgent spot fire to insurgent spot fire and assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies primarily serves to make these GWOT-feeding perceptions WORSE.

We're chopping up starfish and throwing them back into the sea with our current military-led approach.

Bringing this back to my two points: The conventional wisdom (of governments, btw) is that insurgency is "caused" by insurgents, ideology, or some external actor drives our current approaches. I simply suggest considering, just for a moment, what if that planning assumption is wrong, and in fact that causation is something that comes from governmental domestic policy for nationalist insurgencies; and for the US/GWOT, from governmental foreign policies? If the military is the cure, then one should turn the military on the government (which sadly, too often happens). But no, the military is part of the government. The military is often as much part of the problem as it is part of the solution as the military too often becomes the lead face of the government with the populace as insurgency worsens. This will always be true due to the security concerns. The key then, is the military merely reinforcing and enforcing the same domestic/foreign policies that are the causal root of this problem, or is the military reinforcing and enforcing the new policies crafted to address the real and (material to insurgency) concerns of the populace??

Next time you sit down to do planning for an OEF-P way ahead, have one group do a COA that:
1. Adopts the planning assumption that insurgency causation comes primarily from the government of the Philippines and their domestic policies toward the south; and that the risk of those groups supporting acts of terrorism against the US and our interests derives its causation from US foreign policy in general, but more specifically toward Muslim governments/populaces globally, and to the governments/populaces of SEA.

2. Assume the current insurgent groups are largely symptoms of this causation and that ideology is merely an essential component of any such movement.

3. Include honest best effort assessments of how we think the populaces these groups emerge from feel about the role of US foreign policy on Philippine, Indonesian and Malaysian domestic policies.

4. Also assess popular perceptions of the legitimacy of their government at all levels, any institutionalized biases or discrimination, any disrespect of those who deserve respect, and finally how much voice the people feel they have to effectively address any of these concerns short of insurgency.

5. Consider fully if the most critical issues are best addressed through military-led approaches in the south, or if they are best addressed through diplomatic approaches in Manila? (not saying one does not exist currently or that one needs to go away entirely, just if they are properly understood, balanced, prioritized and resourced).

Does that change the proposed approaches? (And OEF-P is the one OEF where we the least abusive of the rights, authorities and legitimacy of the local government; and the most respectful of lives and property of the populace.)

100% of responders to this thread think the current COIN manual needs a re-write. One has offered substantive changes for consideration. I'll even come out and work as a consultant with this group to help them work through the nuances of these issues and to face the full range of challenges to developing such a perspective. Happy to work with the Leavenworth team as well, even if as a red cell to a main effort that is looking at much more moderate adjustments to the manual.

[slapout9]

Bringing this back to my two points: The conventional wisdom (of governments, btw) is that insurgency is "caused" by insurgents, ideology, or some external actor drives our current approaches. I simply suggest considering, just for a moment, what if that planning assumption is wrong, and in fact that causation is something that comes from governmental domestic policy for nationalist insurgencies; and for the US/GWOT, from governmental foreign policies?

This is where I disagree with you somewhat, many times what you say is true but not always. Warden was right all along the Enemy is a System....not a country. Some Insurgencies/movements don't believe in governments at all and that is a really big problem that is not going to be solved with negotiations or building them a new country or a good government for that matter. How do you deal with a movement or group that dosen't even believe in Government....alll they believe in is force to get what they want.

[Bob's World]

This is where I disagree with you somewhat, many times what you say is true but not always. Warden was right all along the Enemy is a System....not a country. Some Insurgencies/movements don't believe in governments at all and that is a really big problem that is not going to be solved with negotiations or building them a new country or a good government for that matter. How do you deal with a movement or group that dosen't even believe in Government....alll they believe in is force to get what they want.

Slap,

But that is implicit in this position of insurgency as govenance rather than warfare. The entire dynamic is internal to the relationship between a populace and its governance, and manipulated and shaped by external parties seeking to maintain, enhance or create inroads with some element of that internal dynamic for their own interests.

There is a lot of wisdom in Warden's work, but not all of what was derived for warfare applies to insurgency. Warfare is temporary and is between separately governed bodies. Insurgency is continuous and is within a single governed body and only rarely rises to a state where it appears much like warfare.

Does your heart become your enemy when your poor lifestyle choices and genetics combine to enable the development of disease within that segment of your body? No, it is part of you. It is not the problem, it is merely the part of you where this combination of factors has resulted in a problem. Just as evil men will exploit a populace weakend by conditions of insurgency, so too will disease exploit a heart weakened by conditions of poor health. This is not a problem that can be resolved through surgery or medicine alone, but requires taking respsonsibility for ones own role in causation and adopting a comprehensive program of treatment that is heavy in lifestyle changes. Ironically, when the patient refuses to accept such responsibility or adopt such changes in his own behavior and the heart stops functioning it is a disaster for the entire body and we call it "heart failure." It is not the heart the failed the patient, it is the patient that failed the heart.

[slapout9]

There is a lot of wisdom in Warden's work, but not all of what was derived for warfare applies to insurgency. Warfare is temporary and is between separately governed bodies. Insurgency is continuous and is within a single governed body and only rarely rises to a state where it appears much like warfare.

I don't agree, in fact that is the main problem, there are know boundaries,it is a movement (a philosophy of life) and the only boundaries are the ones inside the guerrilla fighters head (and they don't have many boundries) not a country or government.

PS: all good cops smoke and drink large amounts of coffee, it is not poor lifestyle choices it is Genetics:D

[Bill Moore]

I'm pretty sure I recall FM 3-24 stating that "every" situation is different. The communist insurgency and the Muslim separatist movement in the Philippines have little to do with the war on terrorism and in this almost everything to do with poor governance. The CPP and NPA have remained isolated from external due to choice and geography, and while the Muslim separatist movement has some degree of international support, it is mostly moral and financial in character.

On the other hand, the threat we responded to were the terrorist groups in the Southern Philippines (JI and ASG), and at the time we responded they were relatively strong and their strength was growing. They were suppressed by a combination of aggressive security force operations and civil-military operations (CMO wouldn't have worked without the aggressive security measures), and equally important a great effort was made to separate the Muslim separatist movement from its illegimate brother the terrorist groups (ASG and JI), so we didn't artificially conflate the issues. Of course, like most things dealing with politics, social movements and conflicts (or more simply, people) there are gray areas, so you can point to exceptions where there were links.

Like every prolonged conflict, the character of it changes over time. For the most part the threat of Islamic radicalism in the Southern Philippines has been suppressed (not defeated), but the issues of separatism and communism remain and will remain until the government reforms "itself". IT isn't our role to reform their government, but as allies we can provide a helping hand if asked. It is important to note that the Southern Philippines could easily slip back into the dark days if "security forces" can't effectively apply pressure.

IMO the greatest threat of terrorism in the Philippines (outside of insurgents using terrorism as a tactic) is the growing Balik movement that can potentially be radicalized. The threat of Islamist based terrorism is not restricted to the Southern Philippines.

The JI has also been under a lot of pressure in the Indonesia by its security forces, so right now it appears the organization is having a hard time finding its balance; however, if that pressure if removed they'll reconstitute because the underlying driver has nothing to do with "good governance" and everything to do with radical ideology, and the desire to establish a caliphate. What most of us would call "good governance" they hate with a passion and it is the reason they're fighting. They don't have popular support and probably never will, but they have a cause they believe in, and the only way for those who oppose that cause to have an acceptable level of security is to conduct aggressive security operations to suppress the radicals. The basic rule applies here, the side that most effectively (means skillful application of force, not brute force) applies coercive force wins. There isn't a happy middle ground with these organizations that their opponents can negotiate, because their views are extreme, which is why we label them as extremists.

While there may be some similiarities or even parallels to Afghanistan, there are many more differences, which is why I cringe when I hear we should apply the Philippine model in Afghanistan. The Philippine model (if indeed it is effective) is only effective in the Philippines. The ideal Afghanistan model hasn't been developed yet, and when it is it will be based on the real dynamics in that region (not our politically correct view of the way it should be), not in the Philippines.

Long way of getting to your question, but in short the terrorists in the Southern Philippines were suppressed by effective security operations that were enabled through CMO. What we're talking about is warfare, and warfare has never been restricted to simply the application of violence, but the application of violence always plays a role.

[Dayuhan]

I believe much of the GWOT violence aimed at the US is due to perceptions of populaces in primarily Muslim countries where such insurgent movements are active or growing is that the blame for much of their current grievances with their governments lies with the US.

AQ has very little to do with populaces or nationalist insurgency. It is not a populace based movement and has only very tenuous connection to nationalist insurgency. It's good to remember that AQ's initial prominence and much of its residual legitimacy emerged from a struggle against the Soviet Union, not the US, and that it has only achieved meaningful popular support for struggles against direct foreign intervention. To declare a linear causative relationship among US policy, nationalist insurgency, and AQ terrorism is to assume what has yet to be demonstrated, and to excessively simplify a very complex causative environment.


For the US to go from insurgent spot fire to insurgent spot fire and assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies primarily serves to make these GWOT-feeding perceptions WORSE.

Are we doing this? If so, where? Certainly not in Iraq or Afghansitan... we didn't go to those places to assist governments threatened by insurgency, we went there to replace governments we dislike, and the insurgencies we now face grew from that process. We didn't go there because of insurgency, the insurgency is there because we went there.

Where exactly do we "assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies"? Is there any government out there that we support that would talk to its own people and address issues if we ceased to support it? I can't think of any, offhand. In most cases a withdrawal of US support and associated conditionalities would simply generate more vigorous suppression.

I think you're vastly overestimating our assistance, and the degree to which we enable anything.


Bringing this back to my two points: The conventional wisdom (of governments, btw) is that insurgency is "caused" by insurgents, ideology, or some external actor drives our current approaches. I simply suggest considering, just for a moment, what if that planning assumption is wrong, and in fact that causation is something that comes from governmental domestic policy for nationalist insurgencies; and for the US/GWOT, from governmental foreign policies?

Largely true, but of questionable relevance to GWOT, which is not fundamentally a fight against insurgents. Our COIN fights in Iraq and Afghanistan are collateral burdens, products of fundamentally flawed (IMO) GWOT policy decisions, not an integral part of the supposed GWOT.

Part of our problem in imposing COIN models, whether FM 3-24 or the Jones model, on GWOT is that it's not essentially a COIN fight: it's not a fight against insurgents. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan there is no insurgency that requires US intervention in more than a limited FID role, and Iraq and Afghanistan are less the traditional insurgencies that these models are designed to confront (intervention to support an allied government threatened by insurgency) than a natural and inevitable part of the regime change process. The issue is not entirely governance,it's also about foreign intervention.

We may be looking less at a case of flawed models than at a case of models being applied to situations they were not designed to cover.


Next time you sit down to do planning for an OEF-P way ahead, have one group do a COA that:

1. Adopts the planning assumption that insurgency causation comes primarily from the government of the Philippines and their domestic policies toward the south; and that the risk of those groups supporting acts of terrorism against the US and our interests derives its causation from US foreign policy in general, but more specifically toward Muslim governments/populaces globally, and to the governments/populaces of SEA.

Certainly causation in this case comes from the Philippine government; I think that's universally recognized. Despite our long-term relationship with the Philippine government, though, these groups have not generally acted against US interests, and have acted against US citizens only in opportunistic situations that are less terrorism than criminality. To the limited extent to which anti-US rhetoric is embraced, it's little more than a nod to groups who occasionally send a little money. It's very difficult to draw any causative line between US policy and terrorist or insurgent activity in the Philippines. Both insurgent groups and their popular base in the Philippines generally approve of us; they see us as a moderating influence on their enemies.

US planners in the Philippines actually did go through a process much like that which you describe. Unfortunately it was very badly done, and considered very few of the factors and influences involved. The outcome was American support for an ill considered "peace process" that was doomed from the start and managed to make things a good deal worse.

One problem with the approach you suggest is that "diplomatic approaches in Manila" are not going to produce any meaningful change. No matter how diplomatic we are (generally not very) we can't make policy for the Philippine government, nor can we persuade or compel the Philippine government to follow our policy recommendations. It's another country, and our influence is not that great.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,


US planners in the Philippines actually did go through a process much like that which you describe. Unfortunately it was very badly done, and considered very few of the factors and influences involved. The outcome was American support for an ill considered "peace process" that was doomed from the start and managed to make things a good deal worse.

One problem with the approach you suggest is that "diplomatic approaches in Manila" are not going to produce any meaningful change. No matter how diplomatic we are (generally not very) we can't make policy for the Philippine government, nor can we persuade or compel the Philippine government to follow our policy recommendations. It's another country, and our influence is not that great.

Our interagency and military planning is frequently done poorly, and our nation and especially our troops have to live with the results of this poor planning all too often. Sometimes the poor results are due to arrogance and ineffective personalties leading the planning effort, but just as often I think the root of the problem is the planning process itself and the associated expectations.

I think we plan poorly because (at least in the military) we're focused on the process instead of correctly defining the problem. We almost casually give our planners a mission to plan, which often means we told them the problem to solve, and probably without putting much intellectual rigor in it. Then the planners take the mission given to them and with religious zeal adhere to the MDMP steps believing they'll come up with the right answer. Usually the over worked majors will quickly identify some bogus centers of gravity again without intellectual rigor, because the expectations are you'll have to give a brief on your plan development according to the timeline. So now we have most likely have the wrong mission and wrong centers of gravity. Obviously if we define the problem incorrectly, our plan won't be helpful, and most likely it will just make the situation worse.

IMO one of the changes we need to address in FM 3-24 is the importance of slowing the train down during planning. We need to invest the time required to research the situation and truly talk (and more importantly listen) to the experts who understand the dynamics in that nation. Once we identify the right problems to solve (or help the HN solve), then maybe we can use something along the lines of MDMP that is modified for interagency purposes. Perhaps in the end we know how to plan, but we don't how to identify the right problem to address? Regardless, I still think the process is too restrictive and consequently stifles the development of creative solutions.

Insurgencies are relatively slow processes, we have the time to really think this through before we commit to a course of action. After we commit we need to constantly reassess to monitor when the character of the conflict changes and adjust our plan accordingly. Seems we have trend of starting to get things right after 7 or 8 years of involvement in these types of conflicts. Maybe we can do better?

[Dayuhan]

Our interagency and military planning is frequently done poorly, and our nation and especially our troops have to live with the results of this poor planning all too often. Sometimes the poor results are due to arrogance and ineffective personalties leading the planning effort, but just as often I think the root of the problem is the planning process itself and the associated expectations.

True, but I think a great deal of the trouble is at the policy level. Screw up there and it's very difficult to fix things at the strategic or tactical levels.

[Bob's World]

I recommend that John M. Collins' (Colonel, US Army, Retired) on "Military Strategy - Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives" be included as a reference in the next version of this manual.

John's text is clear, complete, and logical. A great desk reference for anyone who deals with military or policy issues much. His section on "Specialized Military Strategies" that drills into a wide range of subtopics material to this discussion is of particular note.

[slapout9]

I think we plan poorly because (at least in the military) we're focused on the process instead of correctly defining the problem. We almost casually give our planners a mission to plan, which often means we told them the problem to solve, and probably without putting much intellectual rigor in it. Then the planners take the mission given to them and with religious zeal adhere to the MDMP steps believing they'll come up with the right answer. Usually the over worked majors will quickly identify some bogus centers of gravity again without intellectual rigor, because the expectations are you'll have to give a brief on your plan development according to the timeline. So now we have most likely have the wrong mission and wrong centers of gravity. Obviously if we define the problem incorrectly, our plan won't be helpful, and most likely it will just make the situation worse.

IMO one of the changes we need to address in FM 3-24 is the importance of slowing the train down during planning. We need to invest the time required to research the situation and truly talk (and more importantly listen) to the experts who understand the dynamics in that nation. Once we identify the right problems to solve (or help the HN solve), then maybe we can use something along the lines of MDMP that is modified for interagency purposes. Perhaps in the end we know how to plan, but we don't how to identify the right problem to address? Regardless, I still think the process is too restrictive and consequently stifles the development of creative solutions.



As the ultimate Field manual and Mapping freak I would say you hit it on the head. And if I was the Field Manual Czar for a day I would create a field manual that had 50 pages of the best known analysis techniques and 50 BLANK pages for the solution. On another thread we were talking about the Galula manual which has Insurgency analysis methods that are as valid today as they were back then........but he has only one solution, not a good ideal against a dedicated and creative enemy.

[slapout9]

Ideal, why dosen't the Army have a contest and put up some cash to see who could write the best new update for the manual.:)

[Sargent]

JMA --

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions. Where bad comparisons are knowingly used, the objective is usually to prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time. It seems to me that the point you want to make, especially with the closing comment, is that it is bad policy, either generally or in the specific case of Iraq or Afghanistan, and that the US should not participate in COIN operations. There may in fact be good arguments for this, but to argue that COIN can only be best pursued with a doctrine of brutality is not one of them. The mass slaughter of civilians is not war. Brutal though the experience of war may be, brutality, on its own, is not war.

If it is your intention to speak credibly on the matter of counterinsurgency, then it behooves you to be well acquainted with the historical record for yourself. However, when I spoke of it in my message, I was thinking of the history of foreign interventions in the domestic politics of other countries during the period since the rise of nationalism, which I would generally date to the American Revolution. The British failed to understand the extent to which a shared identity had developed, and behaved in a fashion likely only to alienate the populace they were attempting to pacify. New Jersey is the perfect example, as its population was not strongly patriotic, and could easily have been turned against the cause. However, the actions of the army in that state in the winter of 76-7 did a tremendous amount to spoil that opportunity. Let's not even discuss Burgoyne's horribly mistaken Northern campaign, stupid appeal to the populace, and failure to recognize that the Revolutionary ideal was quite strong outside of New England. On the other hand, it is instructive how careful Washington was in any actions the army would take that might make civilians and local populations unhappy. In fact, he let the army suffer rather than impress necessary goods to the level authorized by Congress, and did so only when such impressments would serve the dual good of providing for his men and depriving the British, as in those conducted arounded Valley Forge in the Winter of 77-8. Finally, how the French participated in that war was exceedingly savvy -- they did not come in as the leading army, to defeat the British for the Americans. They participated as an ally, as the second force in support of the primary, the Continental Army. It was a truly brilliant example of how to intervene in the matter of regime change, not to be repeated until the Allies retook and rebuilt Western Europe almost two centuries later. From the Revolutionary War on, foreign armies would operate at a tremendous disadvantage on foreign soil unless they were very careful. Short term brutality might gain ephemeral advantage, but it was always the rare case that it could endure.

There is not a particularly good record for successful foreign intervention because the temper of modern conventional warfare is not built for the needs of such wars. But rather than lacking in necessary brutality, I would submit that this model lacks the proper restraint, the willingness to sacrifice not for territorial or geographical advantage, but simply for the protection and betterment of local populations. It's particularly difficult for Americans because ours is a culture of doing, not sitting and waiting for something to happen. We are impatient. It has helped us in many things -- the exploration and settlement of the territory (at the cost of a terribly brutal campaign against the native tribes), the development of industry and mass transportation -- but it does not serve foreign counterinsurgency. Maybe that's a small price to pay -- or it is perhaps a weakness that enemies will note and play upon. So, it would be better if the US can figure out a means to effective COIN practices.

As for Kilcullen, I've seen the man speak. He seems intelligent. While I'm sure he believes that he has arrived at a good model, I can hardly believe he wants his ideas raised to the level of a religion to be quoted as dogma. Slapout got there before me with his point that doctrine ought to be a starting point, a thing to get personnel thinking, but it is not a prescription. Specifically as concerns the "mirror" point, to be nothing more than a photocopy of the insurgent would be folly, as the need is to be better. My impression is that good COIN practice requires that you address the issues of concern that the insurgent has raised and which resonate with the populace.

The problem for military doctrine and COIN is that, unlike conventional war, where you fight and defeat first, and then do the recovery piece second, in an insurgent war you must do both simultaneously. So, every piece of military activity must accord with the social, political, and economic policies that are simultaneously being pursued. This is mightily difficult.

Jill

[JMA]

On another thread we were talking about the Galula manual which has Insurgency analysis methods that are as valid today as they were back then........but he has only one solution, not a good ideal against a dedicated and creative enemy.

That has been my point.

No one person can provide a solution (or set of solutions) to cater for all eventualities. Use Galula to help hone analysis skills and if having studied as many sources to assist with such an analysis one can't come up with a custom solution then it should be left to those more able.

The level of this process should start at Command and Staff Course level and extend beyond. All those below should act under instructions and do the job their level demands/requires. It starts to get ridiculous when junior officers and NCOs start second guessing the COIN strategy for a particular campaign.

If faced with a dedicated and creative enemy you beat him by outdoing him in both aspects... or if you can't, better you just pack up and go home.

[Fuchs]

Ideal, why dosen't the Army have a contest and put up some cash to see who could write the best new update for the manual.:)

Because this kind of tender exists primarily (almost exclusively) for hardware ... for unknown reasons.

[JMA]

JMA --

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions. Where bad comparisons are knowingly used, the objective is usually to prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time. It seems to me that the point you want to make, especially with the closing comment, is that it is bad policy, either generally or in the specific case of Iraq or Afghanistan, and that the US should not participate in COIN operations. There may in fact be good arguments for this, but to argue that COIN can only be best pursued with a doctrine of brutality is not one of them. The mass slaughter of civilians is not war. Brutal though the experience of war may be, brutality, on its own, is not war.

My closing comment was to question whether in the light of history the US/Brits and others believe that what was/is being achieved was/is worth the cost. Time will tell and my gut tells me that history will judge the cost of the victory as too high.

In the case of foreign intervention (by a western power) against an insurgency one needs to accept that 1) there are grounds for a rebellion/uprising/insurgency, 2) that peaceful means to have these issues addressed would have already been exhausted. If sheer brutality was to be used to crash the aspirations of the people it would have already been done (like in Zimbabwe, Tibet and Sri Lanka for example).

Peace under such circumstances would require a political accommodation which would undermine the stated aims and objectives of the insurgents.

You are probably correct in that the US should not get involved to any great extent in counter insurgency wars... unless they start to accept there is a difference between conventional warfare (Dessert Storm) and what is needed in Afghanistan.

Can the US achieve this? Sure. It will just require a paradigm shift in the mental approach to warfare.


snip

There are many examples out there but not many recent ones where counterinsurgency wars were won without having had to give away the farm.


There is not a particularly good record for successful foreign intervention because the temper of modern conventional warfare is not built for the needs of such wars. But rather than lacking in necessary brutality, I would submit that this model lacks the proper restraint, the willingness to sacrifice not for territorial or geographical advantage, but simply for the protection and betterment of local populations. It's particularly difficult for Americans because ours is a culture of doing, not sitting and waiting for something to happen. We are impatient. It has helped us in many things -- the exploration and settlement of the territory (at the cost of a terribly brutal campaign against the native tribes), the development of industry and mass transportation -- but it does not serve foreign counterinsurgency. Maybe that's a small price to pay -- or it is perhaps a weakness that enemies will note and play upon. So, it would be better if the US can figure out a means to effective COIN practices.

Yes, I agree that the US will not allow itself the freedom to crush an insurgency but rather just assist the beleaguered country to reach some sort of peace through (eventual) negotiation. The US must know that there is no possibility of any great victory only a negotiated peace where their friendly regime will probably have to give the farm away to achieve that.


As for Kilcullen, I've seen the man speak. He seems intelligent. While I'm sure he believes that he has arrived at a good model, I can hardly believe he wants his ideas raised to the level of a religion to be quoted as dogma. Slapout got there before me with his point that doctrine ought to be a starting point, a thing to get personnel thinking, but it is not a prescription. Specifically as concerns the "mirror" point, to be nothing more than a photocopy of the insurgent would be folly, as the need is to be better. My impression is that good COIN practice requires that you address the issues of concern that the insurgent has raised and which resonate with the populace.

Kilcullen certainly has value. The more I read his stuff the more little gems I find buried in there. Read him read Galula, read McCuen, read the whole lot and fill your database with possibilities.

It is the government which needs to address the grievances which lie behind the insurgency. US/Brit/NATO intervention can merely assist to provide stability while this process runs its course. It might take a while for the regime to accept that the grievances need to be seriously/genuinely addressed.


The problem for military doctrine and COIN is that, unlike conventional war, where you fight and defeat first, and then do the recovery piece second, in an insurgent war you must do both simultaneously. So, every piece of military activity must accord with the social, political, and economic policies that are simultaneously being pursued. This is mightily difficult.

Jill

That difficulty lies at the top and at probably division and brigade level. By the time it gets down the line the troops have their RoE and their SOPs and the like and are free of the really sensitive "joint" planning and strategy headaches.

At platoon level it gets quite simple. "There are some insurgents in them thar hills, go find them and kill them, and make sure you don't kill any civvies or break their stuff in the process."

[Steve the Planner]

Policy School 101---An accurate PROBLEM DEFINITION.

Dayuhan's observation that, in Iraq and Afghanistan, we removed an unwanted government---opposition/conflict emerged in the wake.

Ambassador Crocker was recently quoted along the lines that, at last, the Iraqis can get on with the messy process of sorting out their differences, and future without us in the middle.

A lot of echos to above comments.

[Bill Moore]

I agree that the study of history for military professionals is critical for their development, but the study of history alone without classes on critical thinking and a command climate that fosters critical thinking can actually be a detriment.

Sargent wrote,


The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions. Where bad comparisons are knowingly used, the objective is usually to prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time.

All too often, especially today, we have military professionals who have a read a couple of books on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and based on this limited knowledge base they have formed biases that encourage them to bring preconceptions to the table (or as Sargent wrote, prove a conclusion arrived at ahead of time). Often, and without so much as a second thought, they'll spout out the center of gravity is the populace (or another accepted truth), and the planners will be directed to focus on methods to win their hearts, while ignoring other issues. Of course there is are no historical examples where we have won by solely focusing our efforts on winning the hearts of the populace, but that doesn't seem to matter when you have a limited understanding of history and are not required to think critically.

Steve the Planner got it right, policy 101 is correctly identifying the problem, but that so much easier said than done.

[Ron Humphrey]

Because this kind of tender exists primarily (almost exclusively) for hardware ... for unknown reasons.

pretty sure the reasons are widely known, and apparently accepted; at least to some extent.

Now whether their good ones or not is up for debate------

Constantly;)

[Ron Humphrey]

Policy School 101---An accurate PROBLEM DEFINITION.

Dayuhan's observation that, in Iraq and Afghanistan, we removed an unwanted government---opposition/conflict emerged in the wake.

Ambassador Crocker was recently quoted along the lines that, at last, the Iraqis can get on with the messy process of sorting out their differences, and future without us in the middle.

A lot of echos to above comments.



My closing comment was to question whether in the light of history the US/Brits and others believe that what was/is being achieved was/is worth the cost. Time will tell and my gut tells me that history will judge the cost of the victory as too high.

Although I'll admit that you may well be correct There is also a good possibility that the actual judging finds that the cost were higher then should have been, due mainly to our belated recognition or perhaps better stated recollection of many principles we should have remembered from the start.



There are many examples out there but not many recent ones where counterinsurgency wars were won without having had to give away the farm.

Yes, I agree that the US will not allow itself the freedom to crush an insurgency but rather just assist the beleaguered country to reach some sort of peace through (eventual) negotiation. The US must know that there is no possibility of any great victory only a negotiated peace where their friendly regime will probably have to give the farm away to achieve that.

There again; although in the end this may be an accurate description of end states, would that not in and of itself mean that those governments in question had re-established a position of great enough strength to have regained ownership of aforementioned farms.



Kilcullen certainly has value. The more I read his stuff the more little gems I find buried in there. Read him read Galula, read McCuen, read the whole lot and fill your database with possibilities.

It is the government which needs to address the grievances which lie behind the insurgency. US/Brit/NATO intervention can merely assist to provide stability while this process runs its course. It might take a while for the regime to accept that the grievances need to be seriously/genuinely addressed.

Agreed on both with addition of a question

Doesn't the latter sound an awful lot like what we are doing?



That difficulty lies at the top and at probably division and brigade level. By the time it gets down the line the troops have their RoE and their SOPs and the like and are free of the really sensitive "joint" planning and strategy headaches.

At platoon level it gets quite simple. "There are some insurgents in them thar hills, go find them and kill them, and make sure you don't kill any civvies or break their stuff in the process."

I'll leave that alone except to respectfully disagree





The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable examples. It is a simple and known principle. It exists so as to provide the best possible conclusions.

I'd personally put this differently

The goal in any analysis of past events to inform current policy is to find comparable principles.
It is a simple and known fact. It exists so as to provide
the most accurate list of possible conclusions or expected end states.

Thats just me though...

I have to agree heartely with the rest of your post,
especially--



It's particularly difficult for Americans because ours is a culture of doing, not sitting and waiting for something to happen. We are impatient. It has helped us in many things -- the exploration and settlement of the territory (at the cost of a terribly brutal campaign against the native tribes), the development of industry and mass transportation -- but it does not serve foreign counterinsurgency. Maybe that's a small price to pay -- or it is perhaps a weakness that enemies will note and play upon. So, it would be better if the US can figure out a means to effective COIN practices.



The problem for military doctrine and COIN is that, unlike conventional war, where you fight and defeat first, and then do the recovery piece second, in an insurgent war you must do both simultaneously. So, every piece of military activity must accord with the social, political, and economic policies that are simultaneously being pursued. This is mightily difficult.

Jill

[Bob's World]

AQ has very little to do with populaces or nationalist insurgency. It is not a populace based movement and has only very tenuous connection to nationalist insurgency.

This oft stated position is simply not the case. AQ has no populace, true. AQ also has no power without its ability to leverage the populaces of others. AQ takes sanctuary in it's non-state status and employs an Islamist ideology to leverage and incite both individuals and organizations experiencing conditions of insurgency to support actions that advance the AQ cause, while advancing their own causes at the same time. Without the existance of significant conditions of insurgency in the many distinct states that AQ leverages their influence, this movement would be little more effective than that of Tim McVeigh and his little group of buddies.


It's good to remember that AQ's initial prominence and much of its residual legitimacy emerged from a struggle against the Soviet Union, not the US, and that it has only achieved meaningful popular support for struggles against direct foreign intervention.

Also not the case. Certainly the Saudis have always encouraged the dissident members of their populace to take their issues elsewhere, and taking them to the AFPAK region during the Soviet invasion was a popular cause and destination. It is good to remember that the Cold War was still in full effect at this time, and that if the Soviets could invade Afghanistan, they could certainly expand into Iran and down into the Arabian Pen. as well. At that point in time the presence of the US in the Middle East was welcome to the degree that it was far superior to the alternative.

AQ really got going in the first Gulf War. The KSA rejected Bin Laden's offer to protect them and brought in a very overt Western, US-led presence for that mission. A significant presence remained following the defeat of Saddam's push south; and not insignificant in this is that the Soviet threat no longer existed. Tolerence for Western presence that deterred the Soviets waned just as quickly (if not more so) in the Middle East than it did in Europe. We vastly downsized our presence in Europe in response to this pressure, but actually increased it in the Middle East. This shifted the bullseye of AQ squarely onto the US; and also made the US the easy scapegoat for poor governance in the region.


To declare a linear causative relationship among US policy, nationalist insurgency, and AQ terrorism is to assume what has yet to be demonstrated, and to excessively simplify a very complex causative environment.

US policy is to GWOT as Domestic Policy is to insurgency. Just as each state shapes the degree of the conditions of insurgency within their populace through the domestic policies they adopt and enact; so too does the US shape the degree of the conditions of international terrorism directed against us through the foreign policies we adopt and enact. Some dynamics are indeed simple, though the facts of how they materialize are always going to be diverse and complex.

[Bob's World]

Are we doing this? If so, where? Certainly not in Iraq or Afghansitan... we didn't go to those places to assist governments threatened by insurgency, we went there to replace governments we dislike, and the insurgencies we now face grew from that process. We didn't go there because of insurgency, the insurgency is there because we went there.

Actually Afghanistan had a very active insurgency in the Northern Alliance vs. the Taliban. We picked side and helped them to prevail to suit our goals against AQ. But every insurgent always becomes immediately a counter insurgent upon "winning." Does the US have a hand in facilitating the current insurgency of the Taliban against the Northern Alliance? Absolutely. There was little insurgency by the Taliban until we enabled the current Karzai regime to emerge. Once it became clear what type of government we had enabled the Taliban insurgency quickly grew in strength to oppose it and our support to it.

As to Iraq, much like the Balkans under Tito, Iraq under Saddam was a powderkeg of suppressed insurgency. We took the lid off and lit the fuse when we took Saddam out, and then naively were surprised when the whole thing blew up.


Where exactly do we "assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies"? Is there any government out there that we support that would talk to its own people and address issues if we ceased to support it? I can't think of any, offhand. In most cases a withdrawal of US support and associated conditionalities would simply generate more vigorous suppression.

I think you're vastly overestimating our assistance, and the degree to which we enable anything."

Most of these states call their insurgents "terrorists" and if you think the US is not a big supporter of counter-terrorism programs across our allied governments in the Middle East you are not paying attention. We know these are some of the most despotic regimes on the planet, and yet we support them as by and large they have been willing to work with us in the pursuit of our national interests in the region over the years. This is a model that worked well during the Cold War while that Soviet threat hung over the region, and in an age where information technology was such that these governments could control their people through force and the control of information.

Times have changed, and the U.S. must change our policies in the region to match the times, and also to bring them more in line with our founding principles as a nation.

As to the U.S. having the right or the influence to get these governments to address their domestic policies? Excellent point. We certainly have no right, and our influence is shrinking daily. This brings us back to the example of man with the failing heart. If that man was your business partner, you also would have no right to make him change his lifestyle. But you definitely have an interest in him making those changes. He too has an interest in making those changes that he may not fully appreciate. Sometimes your partner needs some tough love to recognize the need for such change. Currently we are enabling destructive behavior. We need to change ourselves, and we need to then apply such tough love with our partners.


Largely true, but of questionable relevance to GWOT, which is not fundamentally a fight against insurgents. Our COIN fights in Iraq and Afghanistan are collateral burdens, products of fundamentally flawed (IMO) GWOT policy decisions, not an integral part of the supposed GWOT.

Part of our problem in imposing COIN models, whether FM 3-24 or the Jones model, on GWOT is that it's not essentially a COIN fight: it's not a fight against insurgents. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan there is no insurgency that requires US intervention in more than a limited FID role, and Iraq and Afghanistan are less the traditional insurgencies that these models are designed to confront (intervention to support an allied government threatened by insurgency) than a natural and inevitable part of the regime change process. The issue is not entirely governance,it's also about foreign intervention.

We may be looking less at a case of flawed models than at a case of models being applied to situations they were not designed to cover.



Certainly causation in this case comes from the Philippine government; I think that's universally recognized. Despite our long-term relationship with the Philippine government, though, these groups have not generally acted against US interests, and have acted against US citizens only in opportunistic situations that are less terrorism than criminality. To the limited extent to which anti-US rhetoric is embraced, it's little more than a nod to groups who occasionally send a little money. It's very difficult to draw any causative line between US policy and terrorist or insurgent activity in the Philippines. Both insurgent groups and their popular base in the Philippines generally approve of us; they see us as a moderating influence on their enemies.

US planners in the Philippines actually did go through a process much like that which you describe. Unfortunately it was very badly done, and considered very few of the factors and influences involved. The outcome was American support for an ill considered "peace process" that was doomed from the start and managed to make things a good deal worse.

One problem with the approach you suggest is that "diplomatic approaches in Manila" are not going to produce any meaningful change. No matter how diplomatic we are (generally not very) we can't make policy for the Philippine government, nor can we persuade or compel the Philippine government to follow our policy recommendations. It's another country, and our influence is not that great.

I will not argue against the fact that we have over-engaged, over-reacted in our GWOT response. We did not understand the problem then, and we still do not today. In a recent interview with President Bush he made the comment to the effect that "on 9/11 we were ruthlessly attacked when we had never done anything to anybody." Americans need to look in the mirror a bit more carefully. Ike once said the best thing about Containment was that we in effect contained ourselves. Since the fall of the Soviets we've been feeling a lot less contained, and the list of sovereign countries we have bombed, invaded, or economically attacked through sanctions is growing larger and larger, while the rationale for doing so is becoming smaller and smaller. But this goes to the causal effect of foreign policy on international terrorism. Its complicated true, but we are not blameless and we must evolve. Harder-Faster will not win this contest.

(As to the Philippines, every GCC was looking for some place to get into the fight. PACOM picked the Philippines as the Government agreed to allow them in under strict constraints and the auspicies of the training exercise "BALIKATAN". If not for 9/11 we would not be there in the manner we are today. I believe that the Government of the Philippines and their security forces have evolved in very positive ways through our intervention, but you are right, this was and remains largely a family squabble between a variety of distinct segments of the Philippine populace and their government. I fear that our presence enables the government to avoid making really hard decisions on substantive changes of domestic policies that could reduce the conditions of insurgency in a more enduring manner.)

[Dayuhan]

This oft stated position is simply not the case. AQ has no populace, true. AQ also has no power without its ability to leverage the populaces of others. AQ takes sanctuary in it's non-state status and employs an Islamist ideology to leverage and incite both individuals and organizations experiencing conditions of insurgency to support actions that advance the AQ cause, while advancing their own causes at the same time. Without the existance of significant conditions of insurgency in the many distinct states that AQ leverages their influence, this movement would be little more effective than that of Tim McVeigh and his little group of buddies.

AQ has been singularly ineffective at leveraging insurgency. What AQ has managed to leverage effectively is widespread resentment in the Islamic world toward foreign military intervention in Muslim lands. This is a very different thing. AQ’s efforts to muster insurgency against Muslim leaders they dislike have fallen flat on their faces: they have never drawn anything near the popular support needed to generate insurgency. The narrative that works for them is “expel the infidel from the land of the faithful”… they’ve tried others, but generally without much success. That’s why they have to keep provoking the infidel to make sure they keep intervening: without an intervening infidel to challenge, they have nothing.


AQ really got going in the first Gulf War. The KSA rejected Bin Laden's offer to protect them and brought in a very overt Western, US-led presence for that mission. A significant presence remained following the defeat of Saddam's push south; and not insignificant in this is that the Soviet threat no longer existed.

AQ really got going against us during the first Gulf War. They actually enjoyed far broader and deeper support during the anti-Soviet jihad, but we didn’t so much notice, because they were on our side.

The US presence in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s was only half of what AQ exploited. The other half, at least as important, was the global oil glut, the extremely low oil price, and the consequent extremely poor economic environment in Saudi Arabia. That created the perception, inaccurate but widespread, thet US troops were somehow forcibly keeping the price of oil low and impoverishing them. That was, of course, something AQ could and did exploit.

We do not, of course, have to change current policies to address this perception, because the conditions that generated it no longer exist. The US troops are no longer there, the oil glut is ancient history, oil prices are sky high, the Saudi economy is booming. The 1990s are gone, we no longer have to concern ourselves with that environment because it's already gone.

We may not like the Saudi government, but they know their people better than we do, and they know that if they provide security, stability, and prosperity, the vast majority of their people will not oppose them. As long as times are good, there will be no functional insurgency. A bit of terrorism here and there, but nothing they can’t handle, and as long as the boat has a solid tail wind the bulk of the populace won’t object if they lock up those who rock it.


US policy is to GWOT as Domestic Policy is to insurgency. Just as each state shapes the degree of the conditions of insurgency within their populace through the domestic policies they adopt and enact; so too does the US shape the degree of the conditions of international terrorism directed against us through the foreign policies we adopt and enact.

I think you vastly overestimate the degree to which we shape anything. There are many other influences out there, and many effects for which we are not the sole cause… and for which we are not the cause at all.


Actually Afghanistan had a very active insurgency in the Northern Alliance vs. the Taliban. We picked side and helped them to prevail to suit our goals against AQ....There was little insurgency by the Taliban until we enabled the current Karzai regime to emerge. Once it became clear what type of government we had enabled the Taliban insurgency quickly grew in strength to oppose it and our support to it.

I didn’t say there wasn’t insurgency in Afghanistan, I said we didn’t go there because of insurgency, certainly not to defend an allied government from insurgency. Realistically, the Taliban would have opposed any government we installed.


As to Iraq, much like the Balkans under Tito, Iraq under Saddam was a powderkeg of suppressed insurgency. We took the lid off and lit the fuse when we took Saddam out, and then naively were surprised when the whole thing blew up.

Again, there may have been insurgency, but that’s not why we went there… and while we may have removed the lid, what ensued was less “insurgency” than the very predictable armed competition to fill the vacuum left by Saddam’s removal. We may have backed one faction and called it “Government” and the others “insurgent”, but those distinctions existed in our minds, not in Iraq.


Most of these states call their insurgents "terrorists" and if you think the US is not a big supporter of counter-terrorism programs across our allied governments in the Middle East you are not paying attention. We know these are some of the most despotic regimes on the planet, and yet we support them as by and large they have been willing to work with us in the pursuit of our national interests in the region over the years.

They would say that you are calling their terrorists “insurgents”, and redefining the term “insurgency” to suit your arguments. How many of these states actually depend on US assistance to suppress their dissidents? Certainly not the Saudis.


As to the U.S. having the right or the influence to get these governments to address their domestic policies? Excellent point. We certainly have no right, and our influence is shrinking daily... Currently we are enabling destructive behavior. We need to change ourselves, and we need to then apply such tough love with our partners.

Tough love? Surely you jest… we’re not talking about cranky teens here, these are sovereign states, not our wards or dependents. We didn’t create their policies, we don’t meaningfully enable their policies, and we don’t have sufficient influence to force or persuade them to change their policies. Your proposition assumes that we hold a position of influence and authority that we simply do not have.


Since the fall of the Soviets we've been feeling a lot less contained, and the list of sovereign countries we have bombed, invaded, or economically attacked through sanctions is growing larger and larger, while the rationale for doing so is becoming smaller and smaller.

Is this really true? Add up our intervention rates pre and post cold war; it may be surprising.


(As to the Philippines, every GCC was looking for some place to get into the fight. PACOM picked the Philippines as the Government agreed to allow them in under strict constraints and the auspicies of the training exercise "BALIKATAN". If not for 9/11 we would not be there in the manner we are today. I believe that the Government of the Philippines and their security forces have evolved in very positive ways through our intervention, but you are right, this was and remains largely a family squabble between a variety of distinct segments of the Philippine populace and their government. I fear that our presence enables the government to avoid making really hard decisions on substantive changes of domestic policies that could reduce the conditions of insurgency in a more enduring manner.)

Questionable. The conflict in the southern Philippines is at root not a fight between “a variety of distinct segments of the Philippine populace and their government”. It’s a fight between two distinct and fundamentally irreconcilable segments of the populace. The government has failed to act as referee, and has taken the side of the segment from which it is almost entirely drawn and to which it is effectively accountable. Can’t address that conflict until we face up to the reality that it is populace vs populace, not populace vs government. The proposed "solution" that we supported failed to address that reality, and crashed in flames before it left the runway. If we'd opened at least one eye we would still have had no solution, but we could have avoided association with a dysfunctional proposal.

I don’t think the Philippine government and security forces have evolved at all. They’ve learned to tell us what we want to hear and show us want to see (actually they learned this long ago), but the moment we’re out of sight they reset to default mode. If our presence was removed there would be no substantive change, just a return to the status quo ante.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

Clearly you just want to argue rather than discus some very complex issues. My points are attempts to stay within the context of FM3-24. Not every problem in the world is a COIN problem for the U.S., most are policy problems for the US, but are certainly related to COIN problems for our allies.

I think we agree in general that US interventions can create more problems than they resolve. Where I think we disagree is in the causation of such problems in general. A US intervention shifting the focus of a problem onto the US is far different than the US intervention being the causation of a problem.

Meanwhile back to FM 3-24. IMO a good update of this manual would adopt a much more holistic understanding to the causation of insurgency in general; and then refine its current positions in line with that understanding. The key to moving forward in this world is to step away from controlling policies and to embrace empowering ones. The success of empowering ones will be based on how well they empower populaces as well as they do governments.

We agree in spirit, I suspect, far more than we agree in words. I'm ok with that, as it provides positions for many others to consider in their own pursuit of these issues.

[Dayuhan]

I thought I was discussing complex issues. Contentiously perhaps, but they are contentious issues.

I suspect that you're right that we agree in spirit more than we agree in words... but I still think there are some items in your model that need to be critically addressed. Most particularly I suspect that you drastically overstate the degree to which the US "enables" other governments to oppress their populaces, and I suspect that you're hugely overstating the degree of influence the US can bring to bear in any proposed effort to persuade or compel other governments to modify their domestic policies to suit our preference.

Overestimating our own influence and capacity is a very dangerous base for strategy.

I also can't see how to reconcile your criticism of US intervention with your frequent advocacy of openly interventionist positions. Trying to impose ourselves, uninvited, as "champion of the populace" in a dispute between a foreign government and its populace seems to me a recipe for disaster; I can't imagine that failing to blow up in our faces. A perfect example is the suggestion, on another thread, that we intervene in a dispute between the Chinese government and the Turkistani Islamic Party:


My recommendation is that we out-compete AQ for influence with this populace. They need an advocate to help them in their very real issues with the Chinese government.

I really can't see that pointing to anywhere we want to be. What reason have we to impose ourselves, uninvited, in a dispute between the Chinese government and a segment of its populace? Certainly we are not in a position to be laying any "tough love" on the Chinese government... they are not exactly a client state.

At least pretending to get back on topic... the problem I see with trying to address "the causation of such problems in general" is that any specific case may not reflect a general pattern: different insurgencies are going to have different causative factors, especially since we seem intent on expanding the definition of "insurgency". One example might be the southern Philippines, where a general model might lead us to assume a conflict between populace and government and overlook the populace-populace conflict that lies at the core of the dispute.

I don't think it requires any great insight to see that practices developed for cases where we are intervening as a response to insurgency, to assist an allied government threatened by insurgents, may not be entirely applicable to a regime change environment, where insurgency emerges as a response to our intervention.

[Compost]

I just returned the questionnaire inviting outside comments on the revision of FM 3-24. I thought the writing committee's decision to open the process to a wider range of civilians deserved a response. I look forward to learning the results and also the findings of Colonel Gentile's current study of counterinsurgency and generalship.

Interesting comment posted by DavidPB4 on 23 November 2011 at SW Journal on COIN is Dead: US Army must Put Strategy over Tactics.


Electrical copies of JP 3-24 and FM 3-24 each dated 5 Oct 2009 seem to be the prime publicly available references on American COIN doctrine. Until now I had assumed that those and other manuals were revised on a frequent basis to incorporate feedback from current operations and then securely distributed to military users. However, the above quote and the content of this thread suggest that update of doctrine and re-issue of manuals is ad-hoc and infrequent.

The work done by armed forces benefits from having an agreed current goal and plan of action usually guided by general instructions on what is to be done, and to some extent how it is to be done. Even when that general instruction or doctrine is erroneously referred to as COIN it must assuredly provide some mix of useful and less useful - or even uselessly out-of-area/context - guidance.

All problem-solving doctrine needs to be adaptive and to some extent it may also be anticipatory. To continue stuck at some time in the past can delay improvement and achievement. Medieval monks were comforted by the belief that what they dealt with was immutable and omnipotent. They laboriously completed, copied and distributed manuscripts in a leisurely manner. They also used colour to illuminate manuscripts and support superstition.

In this modern era it is possible to revise and widely distribute soft-copy doctrine in relatively quick time. Also colour can be readily used to highlight changes in text and to assist understanding and assimilation by showing both the ‘prior’ and ‘revised’ versions.

If the above comments are valid then it is past time to improve feedback and reissue of doctrine that is in heavy current use. That is feedback from any unit, signed off by and forwarded by the commander of that unit. It should be practicable for central staff with recent field experience to evaluate all such feedback and to revise, gain approval and re-issue doctrine on a regular and fairly frequent basis, say at four or six monthly intervals.