Suppressive Fire [Archive] - Small Wars Council

Blah

12-08-2010, 10:33 AM

Greetings SWC,

Infantry tactics has always been a topic of interest to me, and here has always been a certain aspect that has been of particular interest me. As you can probably guess from the thread title, that aspect is suppressive fire.

I've read about the value of suppressive fire in an attack in order for the maneuver element to close in and destroy the enemy. I have little doubt regarding the validity of such a statement.

There is one particular point I'm having some difficulty wrapping my head around however, and it has to do with what I believe is the US doctrine on the matter. I believe the US instructs its infantry to fire in the general direction of the incoming during a contact with the enemy in order to suppress them.

The problem in my mind arises with the fact that suppression is psychological in nature, therefore, what if the individual(s) receiving said suppressive fire simply... don't keep their heads down. I imagine that the more disciplined the soldier, the more accurate the fire would need to be in order to successfully suppress them.

The way I understand it, there are two facets to suppressive fire: volume and accuracy. I have no doubt that both in tandem are the most effective means of suppression, but I cannot help but feel that accuracy is the more effective of the two.

While the threat of being hit with a stray bullet is ever present when one is taking a high volume of inaccurate fire, would not the discipline soldier realize that being "pinned down" is a more long-term danger against an enemy of similar capabilities, as it allows the enemy to freely maneuver. Not to mention making him a ripe target for indirect fire. Therefore, would the disciplined soldier not will himself to be unsuppressed?

Accurate fire on the other hand, is a significant danger. A near miss has a reasonable chance of turning into a hit within the next 1 or 2 rounds. As the threat to his life is more immediate if he stays exposed, he has an incentive to take cover over remaining unsuppressed.

I feel that there is a danger in the mere firing of one's weapon without effect as well. Firing your weapon makes you more visible to the enemy through your muzzle flashes If the enemy is not suppressed, then you have just presented him with a (more) visible target.

Which brings us back to the US... What I've gleaned from the testimonies of soldiers returning from Iraq/Afghan is that many of the riflemen carry around 500-600 (some have claimed as many as 1000) rounds of 5.56 ammunition with them on patrols, not to mention all of the other munitions and equipment they have to carry. This seems awfully excessive to me, and I wonder if this is due to the nature of their approach to suppression. I wouldn't be surprised if "firing in the general direction of the enemy" works on the insurgents there, however I wonder if it would work if the US were to face a similarly capable military.

Of course, I have never been in combat, nor do I claim to know what it's like, so everything I've just written could be a load of garbage for all I know. In that event, I apologize. Regardless, I'd be interested in hearing your opinion on the matter.

Thank you for reading, hope my thread is to the standards of this fine forum. :)

Fuchs

12-08-2010, 11:41 AM

You'll be interested in this (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Real_Role_of_Small_Arms_RDS_Summer_09.pdf).

Accuracy can be overstated, though. U.S. infantry was trained to shoot aimed fire when it arrived in Europe in '42-'43. The semi-auto Garand rifle had twice the practical rate of fire of bolt-action rifles and this required increased fire discipline because of limited ammunition.

The infantrymen didn't see much of their enemies on the battlefield, though. Consequently, they shot less and were often suppressed. In the end, they had to be allowed to be more active and shoot into the general direction of the enemy, through concealment and inadequate cover.

My greatest concern with suppression is that at times you might not even guess the general direction of incoming fire right because you're not prepared to expect fire from all directions. That's most of the trick behind parapet and flanking fighting positions, after all.

I remember a report of an infantry regiment's river crossing in France. The river crossing's success was delayed for half an hour with many losses by a single light machine gun which was well-sited in a building for flanking fire along the river. They simply didn't identify that fighting position until the third or fourth attempt or so (I have no clue why the flanking nature of the fire wasn't obvious because of the small fountains on the water surface.)

Ken White

12-08-2010, 04:13 PM

Which brings us back to the US... What I've gleaned from the testimonies of soldiers returning from Iraq/Afghan is that many of the riflemen carry around 500-600 (some have claimed as many as 1000) rounds of 5.56 ammunition with them on patrols, not to mention all of the other munitions and equipment they have to carry. This seems awfully excessive to me, and I wonder if this is due to the nature of their approach to suppression. I wouldn't be surprised if "firing in the general direction of the enemy" works on the insurgents there, however I wonder if it would work if the US were to face a similarly capable military.The significant overuse of automatic fire by Riflemen is one such habit. The US Forces 'learned' to do that in Viet Nam and it became embedded. It is, as you discern, a terrible waste of ammunition and -- probably really more importantly, load carrying and general logistic capability. Basically, I'm firmly convinced that your perception is quite accurate and that pun is intended. Volume of fire is not nearly as important as the accuracy of that fire. A nominal basic load of seven Mags, 210 rounds, per rifle is more than adequate for most things but the carrying of an additional 3-400 rounds started in Viet Nam and is still allowed. It should not be.

As Fuchs writes, accuracy can be overstated but not by much -- the real issue is location of the correct targets --as the Storr article linked by Fuchs states and as the anecdote on the river crossing illustrates. The issue is not pinpoint, one shot - one target accuracy, the issue is the amount of relatively accurate fire placed on or near the correct target area. As you note, well trained opponents will not be deterred for a second by poorly place fire, no matter the volume.

The US failure is to adequately train in two areas; fire discipline or control and target detection. The old target detection ranges, created as a result of hard won WW II experience, essentially fell into disuse after Korea and the availability of a full automatic individual weapon and tons of ammunition in Viet Nam effectively killed the knowledge of the importance of the skill. The Army's adoption of the terribly flawed Task, Condition and Standard 'training' system -- it is not training, it is instruction and a poor instructional methodology at that -- mean that we send folks off to war missing essential, life saving skills. Doctrine states that NCOs and Officers control fire -- reality states they cannot actually do that all too often, thus Joe has to know what to do -- and he has to be trained in order to do that. Unfortunately, it's easier to 'train' him to "Fire when and where your Squad Leader tells you..."

We should generally preclude full automatic fire unless the METT-TC factors call for it and in my experience that is relatively, even surprisingly, rarely. Correctly assessing the METT-TC factors is critically important, basic individual skills provide the ability to do that, every lowly Rifleman should be able to do that and we do not train them to do so -- they have to learn by doing in combat and that kills too many needlessly before they figure it out. We should better train both target detection AND marksmanship; the Troops are capable of doing more than we allow them to do...

We should also reduce the allowable amount of ammunition. :rolleyes:

Getting rid of the SAW / M249 would also be a step forward. The Marines are on the right track with an Automatic Rifle, one per fire team... :wry:

Granite_State

12-08-2010, 05:54 PM

Getting rid of the SAW / M249 would also be a step forward. The Marines are on the right track with an Automatic Rifle, one per fire team... :wry:

Beat me to it. OP, you might be interested in reading up on the IAR:

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/12/marine-infantry-automatic-rifle-deploying-to-afghanistan-120610w/

I have no combat experience, but can say as a very recent graduate of the USMC infantry officer training pipeline that accurate suppression is what is being taught and stressed.

Granite_State

12-08-2010, 05:55 PM

The US failure is to adequately train in two areas; fire discipline or control and target detection. The old target detection ranges, created as a result of hard won WW II experience, essentially fell into disuse after Korea

Can you explain how those functioned?

Pete

12-08-2010, 06:22 PM

During the First World War in the U.S. Army suppressive fire had a precedent, marching fire. I'm not sure whether the term made it into official doctrine or if it was an innovation made on the spot. The Pedersen Device that converted the M1903 rifle into a semiautomatic weapon was intended to make marching fire possible but the device was only made in small quantities and not used in combat. Patton uses the term marching fire several times in his WW II memoirs War As I Knew It.

Ken White

12-08-2010, 10:22 PM

Can you explain how those functioned?Take about a square Kilometer of local terrain either with or modified to have some wooded areas, some scrub or low brush areas and some open gently rolling terrain and emplace at selected locations and various distances and angles from a base point or line silhouette targets and / or items to represent targets insuring that they range from little to much concealment and none to significant cover -- varied degrees of difficulty to locate being the object -- and, if available, firing simulators (or support personnel who can fire blanks) for some sets of targets. Ideally, a few buildings might be present, lacking them, CONEXs, MilVans or containers could be used.

Troops are placed on a base point or firing line like location and are tasked to locate a set number of targets. The training must be repeated a minimum of three times, more is better -- and it should be progressive. Start with 10 target fairly visible to be located, then got to fifteen with slightly more obscured targets, then 25 with about half being pretty well concealed. They should be shown targets they missed or did not report, particularly the ones that were most likely to be significant threats.

Even though it is a non-firing effort, the use of some covered targets is necessary so the Troops learn what cover looks like from their side and how difficult it can be to get to targets who have adequate cover. This integrates terrain appreciation, target detection, reporting, use of the map, observation and other skills.

That's the generic, peacetime training approach as it used to conducted. Obviously, if the training is to be theater specific as it should be in war time, then modifications for that theater and terrain set should be made.

After the minimum three repetitions a week or so apart, move on to a field firing range / trainfire like setup that combines target detection AND live firing. That also should be for a minimum of three repetitions. US Field Firing (prehistoric stuff, that...) preceded the Rhodesian developed Drake shoot (LINK) (http://selousscouts.tripod.com/drake_shoot.htm). there are a lot of variants. Training requires only a little imagination and a lot of work.

Here's the Army's current Field Firing idea (LINK) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-22-9/c06.htm). It's okay but it should be preceded with the non-firing target detection effort -- it also should be conducted at least three times. My perception is that is done once and my suspicion is that a lot of the integrated training is often not conducted and the goal merely becomes to get the Troops to fire acceptable scores one time. I could be wrong and I hope I am.

This (LINK) (http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD0487891) may have some good info.

Pete:

Marching fire efforts are things that are beloved of Generals and movie makers because they look neat. It's really a holdover from an idealized and stupidly ultra romantic view of the wars of the early 19th Century. The US Civil War proved it to not be a good idea -- and yet as late as Viet Nam, some still tried it. :eek:

A long skirmish line of Infantry moving forward, firing from the hip or pausing briefly to aim (and get shot... :( ) looks impressive, particularly if vehicles are in the line and also firing on the move (before there was Stab... :rolleyes:). Awesome. Also incredibly stupid, it only looks impressive, it is not actually so.

In practice, they're a huge waste of ammunition and are a really dumb attempt to tie mobility (marching) and mass (volume of fire) together and they do not impress halfway trained opponents even a little bit. Said opponents are likely to thank the idiot who orders it for the target array presented. Agility is greatly preferable to a blunt force frontal assault. :rolleyes:

Pete

12-08-2010, 11:52 PM

I haven't read about anything like marching fire in Civil War accounts, but Patton in War As I Knew It is emphatic about having all weapons firing at the objective during an assault. In a way he parallels what SLA Marshall said about soldiers not firing their weapons, even though what Marshall wrote was exaggerated. Had he lived longer I'm pretty sure Patton was enough of a master of his craft to have seen when suppressive fire reaches the point of diminishing returns.

This leads us back to the old FM 22-5 tactics drill tactics of the Civil War and First World War that nobody has ever been able to answer -- how do junior officers and NCOs re-establish fire control after the initial bursts of suppressive fire? What next after that? Find a flank? Call in artillery?

Fuchs

12-09-2010, 12:21 AM

The Germans also experimented with all-assault rifle platoons and attacks using full auto assault rifle fire of the attack element. Some enthusiastic officers even asserted that success in battle showed no need for machine guns on the attack any more.
These reports were from about the same time when more normal mechanized infantry squads were strengthened by a second MG42...

It appears that the effect of suppressive fires is first and foremost dependent on the enemy. Late 1944 Germans attacking Russian infantry in a local surprise attack probably met much more brittle opposition than was usual in other conflicts.

The post-war German army didn't even attempt anything like that, in fact it introduced the FAL and then the G3. These battle rifles were less well-suited for a high volume of fire and more generally combat out to about 200 or 300m (I forgot the exact figure from the relevant early 90's test which compared G3 and AKM) than the StG 44 and similar weapons.

Ken White

12-09-2010, 12:24 AM

I haven't read about anything like marching fire in Civil War accounts...Not with muzzle loaders, of course not. The broader point though is that the power of the even poorly dug in defense and the relative rapidity of reloading with the Minie Ball plus the few repeaters made frontal assaults bloody as all get out.
...Patton in War As I Knew It is emphatic about having all weapons firing at the objective during an assault.That's the issue isn't it -- assaults. They are a particularly poor way to do business and the Armed forces of the US use the and have used the 'techniques' entirely too often. Patton was almost as fond of them as Grant...

T.J.Jackson, John Buford, Walter Kreuger and James Gavin had more sense.
Had he lived longer I'm pretty sure Patton was enough of a master of his craft to have seen when suppressive fire reaches the point of diminishing returns.I wouldn't bet on that. He was a master at manipulating people. I'll give him that. Consider the fact that a good many Majors today have more combat experience than Patton had.
This leads us back to the old FM 22-5 tactics drill tactics of the Civil War and First World War that nobody has ever been able to answer -- how do junior officers and NCOs re-establish fire control after the initial bursts of suppressive fire? What next after that? Find a flank? Call in artillery?It hasn't been answered to your satisfaction you mean? Colud that be because it, as you state it, is a big open ended question lacking in any context and specificity and -- wait for it -- METT-TC applies. Always.

Our marginally trained troops may seem to need such NCO / Officer control and do in some units. Realistically in combat they have to know what to do at first contact and most figure it out after a couple of contacts. After that first rattle, they must know to look for and keep an eye on their leaders to watch for hand and arm signals -- the advent of individual troopies having radios will not totally change that aspect. Any good unit will develop that capability internally and since all leaders are different, most will do it in different ways. As for flank, call for fire, etc. -- all very much situation dependent.

The real constant is proper training and response to fire while keeping an eye on the leaders for cues. For the leaders, it should all be about what they need to have done to keep people alive and get on with the job. That can entail anything from a rapid departure from the area; to just going to ground; to trying to flank left or right (left or right are bad ju-ju, leaders should always use Compass directions, N,E,S,W, NW, etc. to preclude confusion which is generally around when under fire); to establish a base of fire; to a suicidal frontal assault supported by three DS and two GS Arty units -- and everything in between. It's really simple... ;)

Old Eagle

12-09-2010, 12:49 AM

Suppressive fire doesn't.

Infanteer

12-09-2010, 12:52 AM

Getting rid of the SAW / M249 would also be a step forward. The Marines are on the right track with an Automatic Rifle, one per fire team... :wry:

We've had the weapon for some 20 years and I've never had a problem with it. If a LMG Gunner is well trained in fire control (as all machinegunners should be) I don't see what advantage would be accrued by replacing the LMG with an AR - and yes I've read all of CWO Eby's stuff.

Pete

12-09-2010, 01:08 AM

Ken White

12-09-2010, 03:36 AM

We've had the weapon for some 20 years and I've never had a problem with it.It's employment as a Squad /Section weapon is the problem -- and if you've never had a problem, I'm happy for you. Personally, I've never seen any belt fed weapon that did not have problems with feeding, often belt problem caused, at least occasionally and with breakage of the feeding mechanism parts once in a while, much more so than with mag fed weapons. Anyway you couch it, belt fed weapons are more expensive, less mechanically reliable, often less accurate (a particular M249 problem) and require more training. Machine guns are necessary and important -- too important to allow proliferation to a level where high casualties in a more intense combat will eventually result in untrained machinegunners...

I won't even mention the logistics and ammunition expenditure for results gained. :D
If a LMG Gunner is well trained in fire control (as all machinegunners should be) I don't see what advantage would be accrued by replacing the LMG with an AR - and yes I've read all of CWO Eby's stuff.I have not read any of Eby's stuff, whoever he is. My comments are based on my own observations and experience. The advantages are simplicity, less weight, more reliability, less maintenance, no spare barrels (much less tripods) to carry at Squad / Section level, lessened ammunition consumption (waste???), hopefully and probably a more durable weapon and the ability to put your Machine Guns where they belong, in a dedicated MG Platoon (YMMV ;) ).

Every one does not take the time that Canada does to train folks. Perhaps they should but most do not and are unfortunately not likely to do so. Nor do most get the long service, multi skilled Corporals that Canada has. Hopefully that will continue for you because it has merit, however, the probability in high intensity conflict is more turnover, abbreviated training and less experienced leaders and gunners. Military weapons should be selected with that probability in mind, not peace time optimal conditions, training time and support.

Ken White

12-09-2010, 04:12 AM

Oh well, it seems that military leadership in the Infantry all boils down to bringing order out of chaos. It's almost as though because in combat they're all improvised solutions that are all unique, there are no larger lessons or solutions to be derived. Damn, all those Vu-Graph slides in '77-'78 in Infantry Hall were for nothing.In reverse order, probably true on the Vu-graphs as is true for most of the foolishness that comes out of Bunker 4. :D

Not just the Infantry. Armor and Cavalry have exactly the same sorts and sets of problems -- as do Attack and Scout aircraft crews and the Engineers on occasion. The other combat and combat support arms can have the same sort of problems every now and then but those are rather rare and they seldom train for such efforts. Thus they tend to be more orderly and less chaotic. They tend to seek and use checklists, metrics and can actually apply larger lessons effectively and can also generally apply derived or patterned solutions

Maneuver combat OTOH is indeed a series of really unique situations and essentially undiffrentiated chaos requiring rapid assessments and intuitive responses and thinking. The problems of leadership and command in combat are many for all branches -- but those problems are far less structured and much more diverse for the maneuver arms and they are ferociously exacerbated for those guys BECAUSE we foolishly try to encapsulate 'doctrine' in larger lessons and solutions derived from other situations that were just enough different to be problematic...:(

At about the time you were cruising the Snack Bar in Muskogee County, Georgia that is the meeting place of the Army, had you instead gone to Leavenworth the Tactics Department there would have informed you first thing something along this line: "What we are going to teach you will work in gently rolling open terrain on a mild June day against a peer competitor with approximately equal strength and equipment provided you have all your authorized personnel and equipment and they are trained and it is all operational. If any of those factors differ, you will have to adapt."

That means that if it is raining pitchforks, you've got a problem. If the opponent is a mess of Go-rillas instead of a generally like unit, you've got problems. If you are short 20% of your folks and have only a 70% OR, it's snowing and you have to fit those guerrillas AND a like sized and equipped opponent, you got bi-i-g-g-g problems. Like I said, it's simple... :wry:

Pete

12-09-2010, 08:15 PM

... the Snack Bar in Muskogee County, Georgia that is the meeting place of the Army ...
Pick up your cheeseburger and 'Follow Me'
We are the Building Four Infantry

Pete

12-10-2010, 12:50 AM

My thoughts aren't completely clear on this subject, so the point I've been trying to make is probably obscure. When we fought the First World War the old FM 22-5 way of doing things was how we deployed for combat -- column for traveling, line for fighting, with many permutations in between-- platoons in column, etc.

Our doctrine during WW II is said to have been oversimplified so it could be taught in a hurry -- one element puts down a base of fire, the other finds a flank. Decades later, in a speech at Fort Benning Gen. DePuy said the main thing his company during WW II did was to transport his forward observer from one hill to another.

I've heard a lot about SOPs and battle drills. Given that 70 years ago what later became FM 22-5 was relegated to parades and change-of-command ceremonies, isn't it time to come up with a similar manual for infantry combat? It's as though the old way to fight -- how to move around and fight -- was rescinded and replaced with oversimplified talking points. We need a new way of doing it by the numbers. A new manual could be like DePuy's basic tactical formations in the old FM 100-5, but much more detailed.

Please forgive me -- I'm merely a broken-down old cannon-cocker.

Fuchs

12-10-2010, 01:16 AM

Pete

12-10-2010, 02:57 AM

Ken White

12-10-2010, 03:43 AM

When we fought the First World War the old FM 22-5 way of doing things was how we deployed for combat ... Our doctrine during WW II is said to have been oversimplified so it could be taught in a hurry -- one element puts down a base of fire, the other finds a flank...Yes and that started being questioned after Kasserine Pass and after the Bulge really fell by the wayside and had been totally discredited (at that time, not by the Bulge specifically). We in essence fought WW II with WW I tactical precepts until the tail end, by then we had so much mass employed that tactical nicety wasn't required.. Good thing because we did not know how to do that...

I'm not at all sure we can do it today -- I know there are units and people than can and do operate with excellent tactical acumen but I'm not at all sure the broader US Army does or can. Or even wants to, the tendency to rely on mass an firepower is strong -- because its easy. Unfortunatel, all the hard earned lessons of WW II were discarded and a return to 'real peacetime soldiering' took place. Our training and personnel system today are both flawed -- badly -- and both are relics of WW I and WW II -- just as tha dumbe 22-5 is. No parade ever won a war, no good haurcut ever killed a bad guy and unless someone has strangled one with it, neither has a stupid Reflective Safety Belt (NSN 8465-01-163-8835). :mad:
Decades later, in a speech at Fort Benning Gen. DePuy said the main thing his company during WW II did was to transport his forward observer from one hill to another.Rather than slam De Puy for ineptitude and say that was his fault if he was the Commander, since I wasn't there and do not know if that's correct, I can and will say that comment applied to him and his Company in one small area in one large Theater in an even larger global war. Having talked to and served under a number of people who commanded Companies in that war, my sensing is that most would not agree with him. I know those from the Pacific Theater would grin, mirthlessly, at the absolutely dangerous naivete of the comment.

That principle almost certainly did not apply to most Companies in that War -- yet, it got embedded in the mind of a young Captain and years later, he tried as a General to structure an Army based on his brief experience in one geographic area, in one command in one war. :rolleyes:

I do not think that was wise. Recent history proves it was far from helpful.

Thus my point earlier: ""...those problems are far less structured and much more diverse for the maneuver arms and they are ferociously exacerbated for those guys BECAUSE we foolishly try to encapsulate 'doctrine' in larger lessons and solutions derived from other situations that were just enough different to be problematic..."" (emphasis added /kw).
I've heard a lot about SOPs and battle drills.That's a function of the Army in which you served. It trained to Tasks, Conditions and Standards and had a large quantity of less than stellar soldiers and few experienced NCOs to train those folks because way too many of the good and experienced got killed in Viet Nam. Those SOPs and Battle Drills were seen as a cheap and easy way for marginally competent trainers to train marginally competent individuals. Those days, fortunately, are gone --but too many are still trying to 'train' much smarter and more capable people the same way.

Drills are necessary but not the simplistic type that we picked up in the 80s. What's needed are complex, multi scenario drills that force the inclusion of multiple tasks and no pre-determined outcome.

"No pre determined out come" is what happens in combat...
Given that 70 years ago what later became FM 22-5 was relegated to parades and change-of-command ceremonies, isn't it time to come up with a similar manual for infantry combat?There's one out there. (LINK) (https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/23583-1/FM/3-21.8/toc.htm). It's only three years old and it's not too bad. Go to Chapter 3, Tactical Movement. It's fair. It's greatest problem as would be true with any doctrinal pub or technique is that it must be very generic in tone. For example, look at Figure 3-15. It suggests a 20m interval between Teams. That's okay for many places and times -- that "rolling open terrain on a mild June day" but it will not work in the jungle where less than five meters is necessary -- it is poor for place like much of Afghanistan where 60 to 100m would be better. METT-TC HAS to be considered by the guy fighting but the Book cannot do that, too many variables.

That's where the Task, condition and Standard of BTMS fails -- the conditions vary widely. Task: Clear a building. Conditions: Fragile mud hut in Viet Nam? Hardened, tough mud hut in Afghanistan? Frame house in Central America? Reinforced Concrete Police Staion in Iraq? Ten Story Apartment? The Tower of Dubai?...

You, as they said at Leavenworth in the old days, have to adapt. :wry:

The problem with manuals is they embed thoughts and images in minds and then when folks get in a scrap in places and ways the manual did not depict (or often could not predict...), they simply don't know what to do. Training -- repetitive conduct of combat like activities in different settings and against differing opponents is the answer, manuals are not. Tha training should be harder, more diifcult and more complex than is most combat, then combat will be easy. right now because the training is marginal, combat is more difficult than it should be.
It's as though the old way to fight -- how to move around and fight -- was rescinded and replaced with oversimplified talking points.I disagree. Strongly. That old way to fight got people killed and we've gotten a bit smarter, we should not regress, we should improve even more. 'METT-TC' and 'depends on the situation' are not talking points, they are very real concerns. An even greater concern is too rigid adherence to doctrine...
We need a new way of doing it by the numbers. A new manual could be like DePuy's basic tactical formations in the old FM 100-5, but much more detailed.Scary thought. You cannot fight by the numbers. Period.

That "by the numbers rationale" is predicated on the dumb enlisted swine model. It may be needed for mobilization but it is absolutely wrong for a supposed professional force.

Not to mention that100-5 was a very flawed document...
Please forgive me -- I'm merely a broken-down old cannon-cocker.No forgiveness required. As Brother Dave Gardner used to say, "Dear Hearts, you can't tell someone if they haven't never..." :D

Sadly, even some who have and should know better still produce flawed items. Witness DePuy who did a lot of good, really. He also did some harm...

As Fuchs said:

""Self-discipline, confidence and wit of its NCOs and officers are decisive for survival and mission success.""

Ken White

12-10-2010, 03:56 AM

Fuchs, it has to do with how likely contact with the enemy is. The more probable it is the more important it becomes to have one's weapons able to fire at the enemy. When a traveling element makes contact it often has to change formation for fire and maneuver. There is also an advantage to being able to form without the need for detailed instructions about how to do it.You're right -- and the key to ability to do that is to train units in varying situations against varying opponents. You need a book to tell you the basics -- and we have one -- but you need to practice doing it and you need to be able to do it in triple canopy rainforest, in a cottonwood thicket at Fort Sill or the bare hills of Camp Pendleton, in the river bottom of the Chattahoochee, in downtown Baghdad, in the bare desert of Fort Irwin or in the mountains of the Hindu Hush. Ability to do it in an open field at mainpost at Benning isn't adequate.

The book exists, it's adequate. Formations are known and taught -- they just are not trained or practiced adequately.

Ability to adapt a formation is present. What that does not cover goes back to your earlier question; suppressive fire? flank? artillery? The formation and what Joe needs to do are the easy part and really are not a problem -- what the Leaders do is the problem.

jcustis

12-10-2010, 04:24 AM

The problem with manuals is they embed thoughts and images in minds and then when folks get in a scrap in places and ways the manual did not depict (or often could not predict...), they simply don't know what to do. Training -- repetitive conduct of combat like activities in different settings and against differing opponents is the answer, manuals are not. Tha training should be harder, more diifcult and more complex than is most combat, then combat will be easy. right now because the training is marginal, combat is more difficult than it should be.

And we rarely train as hard as we should at night.

Just when someone should be getting a foot broken off in their you-know-what, we tend to ratchet things down, or at least pay lip service to reverse cycle ops.

Want to impress me that you can do something? Do it to standard in the dark.

Good post Ken!

Compost

12-10-2010, 04:40 AM

Two articles by CWO3 Eby were published in the Marine Corps Gazette during 2004. The articles - summarizing trials for effective employment of platoon crew-served and individual weapons in CQB - are not currently retrieveable via the Gazette index. Versions available elsewhere on the web either lack tables or have poorly formatted tables. Attached (hopefully) is a fair copy formatted in Word.

Interesting to note that current USMC planning for its Infantry Automatic Rifle is apparently focussed on using the IAR as a replacement (rather than as a complement) for the LMG/M-249 with suppression to be provided by the M-240 and other heavy crew-served weapons.

Compost

12-10-2010, 06:31 AM

Two-part item in almost original format.

William F. Owen

12-10-2010, 02:32 PM

Just some basics to tighten the discussion:

a.) Suppression is action which causes the enemy not to act through fear of being harmed.
b.) So a sniper rifle can suppress just as well as a machine gun, given a specific context. It is effectiveness versus efficiency.
c.) As an action, "Killing" is what best delivers suppression. Not shooting.
d.) Suppression is not a viable action within itself. You suppress the enemy so as you can do other things, - of which killing him should be top of the list.

All very obvious, but I hope that helps.

Rex Brynen

12-10-2010, 06:02 PM

Just some basics to tighten the discussion:

As usual, straight to the point. You'll never make it as an academic, Wilf :D

Kiwigrunt

12-10-2010, 08:38 PM

Spud reminded me of the existence of the Australian Army Journal in another post. The latest one is not available online yet but the first article in the July (http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/AAJ_VII2.asp) one would support this:

As usual, straight to the point. You'll never make it as an academic, Wilf :D

Pete

12-11-2010, 12:23 AM

As usual, straight to the point. You'll never make it as an academic, Wilf.
Wilf is no fan of Liddell Hart's "indirect approach."

Ken White

12-11-2010, 03:45 AM

Two-part item in almost original format.Thanks for posting it.

JMA

12-11-2010, 10:30 AM

I fail to see the point of formations.

Self-discipline, confidence and wit of its NCOs and officers are decisive for survival and mission success.

It's about the attitude, not about formations and recipes.
We had way too many stupid fashions and specialised 'solutions' since the mid-90's and need to have a close look at OPFOR HE-frag effects again.
The "AK+RPG" opposition led to tailored responses that would be suicidal even against a 1944 army.

OK, this is what I was taught and agree with:

Sound patrol formations are necessary in order that:
1. Control is exercised.
2. Movement is facilitated.
3. The patrol is ready for immediate action.

OK, so how do soldiers move from one place to another... in a blob?

JMA

12-11-2010, 10:32 AM

Wilf is no fan of Liddell Hart's "indirect approach."

Can't think why, its a good read.

JMA

12-11-2010, 10:36 AM

Tukhachevskii

12-11-2010, 10:37 AM

Ok. Admittedly, I may have grasped the wrong end of the stick (it's a habit:D) but there's stuff I don't quite get. Perhaps it purely an editorial thing but the tables and the text are confusing me.

Using a gunner and assistant gunner for each LMG became a variant on the LMG FT. This variant allowed the LMG to be manned and enjoy the same benefits as a medium or heavy machinegun. Rather than merely carry extra ammunition and a spare barrel, the assistant would load, direct impacts, help move the gun, and observe for maneuver encroachment on the gun target line. (See Table 2.)

Billet Weapon

3d FT Leader M16A2
SAW M249
SAW M249
A-SAW M249
Table 2. LMG FT: Variant 2.
So, does the above mean that the assitant SAW/LMG gunner is also armed with a SAW/LMG?

Secondly,

The third platoon in each company consolidated their LMGs at the platoon level; i.e., the platoon organized itself into two rifle squads armed with test variant ARs, and the nine LMGs were placed into an LMG section.
Am I to undertand that in the LMG section/squad there are only four men not armed with SAWs/LMG (thre TL and a SL). If so who is helping to load and carry the extra ammo for this section/squad's SAWs/LMGs?

Overall I was quite impressed, it's almost a USMC version of Wigram tactical principles.

William F. Owen

12-11-2010, 03:36 PM

As usual, straight to the point. You'll never make it as an academic, Wilf :D

Don't want to be an "Academic". I just want to be useful. :wry:

jcustis

12-11-2010, 09:37 PM

No Tuk, the standard arrangement is not like that. That construct was used during experiments only, as the IAR concept was worked through out At 29 Palms. Eby led that experimentation effort.

Pete

12-11-2010, 10:49 PM

Up 500.
Say again last transmission. That's awfully high for a height-of-burst correction, over.

Ken White

12-12-2010, 02:03 AM

Say again last transmission. That's awfully high for a height-of-burst correction, over.from that airburst. :D

Pete

12-12-2010, 04:06 AM

I guess that's what they mean when they say you should stay flexible. I never went into the "Adjust Fire" mode with that type of round before.

Ken White

12-12-2010, 04:29 AM

I guess that's what they mean when they say you should stay flexible. I never went into the "Adjust Fire" mode with that type of round before.As the Actress said to the Bishop -- she was a Howitzer fan. :D

The 155mm had a 100t yield IIRC. With the 203mm you had dial-a-yield. Or assemble a yield, actually and got from three kt to 40 kt. A 40kt airburst EMP would knock out every unprotected electronic device within a healthy radius with a 1,600' or more airburst. Make a few people sick, too...

Tukhachevskii

12-12-2010, 12:53 PM

No Tuk, the standard arrangement is not like that.
Knew that, but thanks anyway.

That construct was used during experiments only, as the IAR concept was worked through out At 29 Palms. Eby led that experimentation effort.
Ok. So it was just a one off. I just wondered how the logistics of something along those lines would work. Very interesting implications though. Thanks again for the clarification. Although I do wonder wether it wouldn't have been a better idea to run an experiment with two platoons, one using the LMG/SAW mix as per Eby and another replacing the LMG section with a HE projector equipped section, say with M32s or some such. The percentages of hits for no. of rounds fired really opened my eyes (i.e., do soldiers really need to be carryign huge amounts of ammo for such miniscule hit rates- yes, I know, suppression isn't just about hitting the target- when surely SHOCK would be better, in which case HE is the way to go?)

jcustis

12-12-2010, 06:17 PM

I don't think we had M32s in use back then, and certainly not any ELRP ammunition that would have made the experiment truly beneficial.

Pete

12-13-2010, 12:21 AM

The majority opinion here seems to be that the only suppressive fire that really is effective is that which nearly kills the enemy, which is to say aimed fire that barely misses the mark. Spray-and-pray makes sense for the first minute or so of a meeting engagement, but after that fire control needs to be asserted, not always easy to do in the noise and confusion. The distinction is to shift to disciplined fire at known or suspected enemy locations, not to fire indiscriminately in a general direction.

During my day in the Field Artillery we had "Immediate Suppression" fire missions, High Explosive rounds with Variable Time fuzes (HE/VT) fired at enemy Anti-Tank Guided Missile positions. The idea was to make the ATGM gunner flinch during his aim. That was back in the DePuy FM 100-5 days of the Fulda Gap scenario.

jcustis

12-13-2010, 02:46 AM

Spray-and-pray makes sense for the first minute or so of a meeting engagement, but after that fire control needs to be asserted, not always easy to do in the noise and confusion.

I don't even think we can realistically say that the first minute makes sense.

I think one of the reasons why people are having a hard time getting their head around the concept of the IAR is due to our notion of not just suppressive fire, but how we see it factoring into our TTPs.

Fuchs

12-13-2010, 03:06 AM

Ken White

12-13-2010, 05:07 AM

Kiwigrunt

12-13-2010, 05:31 AM

JMA

12-13-2010, 08:54 AM

There's an exception.

A small unit might be suppressed and rise at command for a few mad seconds before one after another switch to normal suppressive fires (or run to next cover or whatever).

The sudden and probably unexpected volume of fire in combination with the acoustic effect (especially if the previous suppressive fire was quite ammunition-saving) can have a lot of psychological effect for a short time and break the previous suppression.

Such a response would likely not require the normal degree of accuracy for suppression.

Lets return to the basics and then move on from there, yes?

First we have the standard stuff where there is some distance between our troops and the enemy. Remember fieldcraft and fire control orders?

The type of fire variations are:

Deliberate. (1 shot every 6 seconds) used for long range or
sustained engagements.

Rapid. (1 shot every 2 seconds) most commonly used type of
fire. Ideal for keeping the enemies head down while not using
excessive ammunition.

Burst. (2-3 Round bursts on automatic) Used for close range
engagements or where a high volume of fire is necessary. (Probably issued to the LMG group only)

Watch and Shoot. Used when the commander wishes members
of the section to fire at any enemy they see at the given location
without further instruction.

The heavy firing would involve contacts at close to very close range (< 50m). Then actually you would be carrying out the applicable encounter action drill

But then if ambushed one does not go to ground in the killing ground but uses maximum fire together with movement to either assault the enemy or to get the hell out of Dodge.

If trapped in the open as it seems often happens in Afghanistan the use of smoke to cover yourselves from direct view may well be a better bet than emptying a magazine into the general direction of the enemy fire.

And remember... when in doubt check the manua (http://www.arniesairsoft.co.uk/articles/basic_fieldcraft.pdf)l.

William F. Owen

12-13-2010, 09:30 AM

The type of fire variations are:

Deliberate. (1 shot every 6 seconds) used for long range or
sustained engagements.

Rapid. (1 shot every 2 seconds) most commonly used type of
fire. Ideal for keeping the enemies head down while not using
excessive ammunition.

Burst. (2-3 Round bursts on automatic) Used for close range
engagements or where a high volume of fire is necessary. (Probably issued to the LMG group only)
I've never been comfortable with these. I find GRIT, "Group, Range, Indication," useful, but not T= type of fire. If you see the enemy, in the are indicated, fire in what ever way you can to kill him. Rate is irrelevant. When you can't see him any more, stop firing.
So:-

Watch and Shoot. Used when the commander wishes members of the section to fire at any enemy they see at the given location
without further instruction. is basically all you need.

The only other fire control order I want is for someone to actively suppress an identified enemy position. So "Charlie Team, 200, left corner of house, be prepared to suppress that trench. Await my command."

And remember... when in doubt check the manua (http://www.arniesairsoft.co.uk/articles/basic_fieldcraft.pdf)l.
Some of us have issues with the manual! :wry:

JMA

12-13-2010, 09:37 AM

rapid -- not necessarily automatic weapon -- fire in some ambush counteraction or surprise situation. However, in my observation, there's no 'rule of thumb' as to when and where to use the technique. Each situation and terrain set poses variables. For example, in a jungle setting, a turn into the ambush positions and rapid semi-aimed (never spray and pray -- so jcustis is also right IMO) and an assault will often be beneficial.

Yes in the main but... IMHO you can't leave it to commanders down to fire team level to figure it all out in the heat of the battle.

For guidance we look to the Brits:

From Land Operations Part 2 - Jungle (code 70736 - part 2) we get:

Immediate Action Drills Troops moving through close country are likely to encounter the enemy very suddenly at very short range. To ensure that they react immediately and sensibly and to give the commander time to carry out a quick battle appreciation, immediate action drills must be laid down to allow for contact with the enemy from any direction. The drills must be:

a. Simple So that they can be clearly understood by every man and carried out automatically without any further orders.

b. Immediate So that the enemy is caught off balance and the the initiative is regained or exploited.

c. Aggressive In order to inflict the maximum casualties and retain or gain the initiative.

Working from this base the Rhodesians formulated/developed/refined Encounter Actions as follows:

The Encounter Actions

1. It is important to note that although encounter actions are usually taught on a section basis, they can be adopted for use by a platoon. These actions are applicable to the varied forms of terrain and in all cases normal infantry minor tactics or section and platoon battle drills usually apply after the initial contact. These encounter actions are a sound framework on which leaders at all levels should build as their experience dictates. it should be remembered, however, that no action, drill or order will achieve success unless the leader and men have practiced them to a stage of instinctive action, reflex and immediate reaction to firm and confident initiative on the part of the leader.

2. If a patrol is accompanied by persons who have little or no knowledge of encounter actions, e.g., guides, informers, surrendered terrorists, etc., the patrol leader should keep them strictly under control and in his view. These persons should be briefed as thoroughly as possible before the patrol starts. It may prove as well to rehearse encounter actions for these persons or even for inexperienced troops before a patrol moves out on operations.

3. Encounters with enemy could fall under one of the following headings:

Situation A. The initiative is with the military forces (terrorists seen first). Reaction: Immediate ambush.

Situation B. The initiative is split between the military forces and the enemy (simultaneous sighting). Reaction: Immediate offensive action.

Situation C. The initiative is with the terrorist (military forces are fired on with small arms or are ambushed). Reaction: Immediate offensive action to an enemy ambush.

Read more here (http://selousscouts.tripod.com/foot_patrols.htm)

With (combat) experience commanders can develop and refine this drills to suit local conditions (enemy and terrain). And by experience I mean experience and not only having been on the receiving end of the odd angry shot.

JMA

12-13-2010, 10:44 AM

I've never been comfortable with these. I find GRIT, "Group, Range, Indication," useful, but not T= type of fire. If you see the enemy, in the are indicated, fire in what ever way you can to kill him. Rate is irrelevant. When you can't see him any more, stop firing.
So:- {Watch and Shoot}
is basically all you need.

I point I suggest is for the commander to decide what is needed (in terms of fire power) and issue a specific fire control order accordingly... to prevent the troopies just doing their own thing.

The only other fire control order I want is for someone to actively suppress an identified enemy position. So "Charlie Team, 200, left corner of house, be prepared to suppress that trench. Await my command."

That is a different type of fire control order - being DELAYED, have no problem with that.

Some of us have issues with the manual! :wry:

And yes with some good reason.

I would however suggest that the manual is designed as a training aid so that when in a time of mobilisation your canon fodder can at least be given stock standard good basic training.

I would suggest that the manual never be allowed to become negotiable among the current operational units where a handful of 20-30 year olds with a few tours and a handful of contacts suddenly know it all - and want to rewrite the script.

In my time the closest I came to giving a formal (as per manual) fire control order was to the CAS pilots. What I and most others did often (probably due to range of contacts) to indicate a target or area where we wanted fire to be concentrated was the use of "watch my tracer" and "watch my strike". (Were these of Brit origin?)

So at the right level and in the right place, yes, certainly the manual needs to be reviewed and revised and updated.

Now back to the fire control issue. I remember that the aim of the whole exercise is to win the fire fight. That is what the commander must achieve. He has some leeway in how to achieve this. But allowed a free for all firing frenzy is not one of them.

Blah

12-13-2010, 12:41 PM

I have linked this (http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/Docs/aaj_autumn_09.pdf) article some time ago and do it again because I think it makes for an interesting read. Its ‘Bang on target’ on page 139.
Also note the ‘role of the infantry’ early on. Hehehe.

It certainly was an interesting read, as I've heard much more disapproval over full-auto in an M16 than praise for it.

I personally think that a 7.62x51 rifle would be better for jungle fighting, although I suspect I'm in the minority. My rationale is that the 7.62 will penetrate dense vegetation better than the 5.56, and would thus provide a greater killing/suppressive effect.

William F. Owen

12-13-2010, 01:41 PM

What I and most others did often (probably due to range of contacts) to indicate a target or area where we wanted fire to be concentrated was the use of "watch my tracer" and "watch my strike". (Were these of Brit origin?)
I strongly concur. "Watch my tracer/strike" is about the only form of fire control order you actually ever hear veterans mention.

I remember that the aim of the whole exercise is to win the fire fight. That is what the commander must achieve. He has some leeway in how to achieve this. But allowed a free for all firing frenzy is not one of them.
Again I strongly agree. Fire must be controlled. Very simple ways of controlling fire seem to have substantial merit over complicated ones. I really only want the troopies to engage targets they can see, or engage at a rate that stops the enemy moving or sticking his head up. Slow, fast, stop is all you really need.

Fuchs

12-13-2010, 02:06 PM

The Bundeswehr has a fetish with pointing directions with a straight arm.I've always laughed about that. I wonder how such a stupid thing developed.

We even do it when nobody of relevance can actually see the gesture. (http://www.luftwaffe.de/fileserving/PortalFiles/02DB060000000001/W26LKKYN504INFODE/NP_20030518_001_220.JPG)

Rifleman

12-13-2010, 02:22 PM

"Watch my tracer/strike" is about the only form of fire control order you actually ever hear veterans mention.

Seems to be a common theme in accounts of SOG one-zeros. :cool:

Fire must be controlled. Very simple ways of controlling fire seem to have substantial merit over complicated ones.

Heard a funny story about a Mike Force SF NCO who once stood up during a fire fight and ran down a line of Montagnards yelling, "No, no, no, bang, bang, bang - yes, yes, yes, bang.....bang.....bang." :eek:

I reckon sometimes ya gotta do what ya gotta do. :wry:

Infanteer

12-13-2010, 02:31 PM

I strongly concur. "Watch my tracer/strike" is about the only form of fire control order you actually ever hear veterans mention.

Actually, there is a Youtube video of Canadians in a firefight in Helmand and you can hear one of the section commanders calling out a target indication. In the first 10 seconds here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_S9P1kMNuM

We worked a lot on verbal target indication in training and the most effective way was for section commanders to christen the ground frequently. "Big grapehut", "orchard" - in Pl patrols I'd give these over the PRR.

Of course, the first time my platoon got engaged was by a guy with an RPG and the only guy who saw it was the guy with the Minimi, so it was tracer indication for that one!

M-203 smoke is awesome as well for both ground and air support. Just fire a round and tell the Apaches they're cleared hot.

Ken White

12-13-2010, 04:31 PM

The Bundeswehr has a fetish with pointing directions with a straight arm.I've always laughed about that. I wonder how such a stupid thing developed.We have the same dictum but it isn't followed very well...:wry:

Pete

12-13-2010, 10:57 PM

With a Spencer armed unit it may have happened ...
By the way, the inventor of the Civil War Spencer rifles and carbines, Christopher Spencer, took his tube-feed idea one step further circa 1880 when he invented the pump-action shotgun. Winchester wasted no time and came up with its own model a few years later. Spencer's invention is still with us.

Blah

12-14-2010, 03:54 AM

Would you guys disapprove or approve the use of full-auto in rifles during Vietnam? Considering that that article quoted above states that the line of sight was often not much more than 5 meters in front of them, and that many engagements were around 15 meters.

Ken White

12-14-2010, 05:01 AM

It certainly was an interesting read, as I've heard much more disapproval over full-auto in an M16 than praise for it.As a Reconnaissance Platoon Sergeant in 1966, I enforced a firm no automatic fire rule for that reason. No problems once I bounced a Steel Helmet off one guys back in a firefight because he violated the rule...

I personally think that a 7.62x51 rifle would be better for jungle fighting, although I suspect I'm in the minority. My rationale is that the 7.62 will penetrate dense vegetation better than the 5.56, and would thus provide a greater killing/suppressive effect.I very much agree but would note that the 7.62 was a big problem for the little Viet Namese. For most western troops, the 7.62 would be a better pick in heavy vegetation for the reason you mention.
Would you guys disapprove or approve the use of full-auto in rifles during Vietnam? Considering that that article quoted above states that the line of sight was often not much more than 5 meters in front of them, and that many engagements were around 15 meters.First, I would disapprove -- full auto fire is only rarely effective and therefor rarely beneficial. Techniques always have to be adjusted to operating modes and METT-TC. That adjustment must be constant, you've got to assess each day and change modes when appropriate..

Secondly, the linked article must be analyzed with caution. The Australian Area of Operations was unique in several respects and the Australian and US Armies had differing operating philosophies.. Note that most of their contact were in ambushes or reactions to them -- negligible 'hot LZs.' Most American units had different experiences, more helicopter assaults, fewer ambushes and more meeting engagements.

I read that article last year and I understand what they say -- but I have reservations about their conclusion. Strong reservations. Much depends on the enemy and the terrain / vegetation but as a general rule, massive volume fire in several varieties of all that are in my observation rarely as effective as a smaller volume of accurate fire -- accurate not being one shot, one kill but fire directed very near the proper target. One problem with the high volume of fire folks is that most of that fire will go in places where no opponent is located. It's wasted. If it's automatic, about 2/3 of it will be high...

JMA

12-14-2010, 11:29 AM

I strongly concur. "Watch my tracer/strike" is about the only form of fire control order you actually ever hear veterans mention.

Again I strongly agree. Fire must be controlled. Very simple ways of controlling fire seem to have substantial merit over complicated ones. I really only want the troopies to engage targets they can see, or engage at a rate that stops the enemy moving or sticking his head up. Slow, fast, stop is all you really need.

I believe we are 99% in agreement.

I would suggest that controlled firing into likely cover as practiced in the Drake/Cover shoot often will cater for the RPD gunner lying low and waiting for the right moment to engage. (note I said controlled)

I must admit I watch many of the videos on YouTube of Afghanistan fire fights/contacts in horror where there seems to be a distinct lack of control in all respects. (Where have all the hard ass'd sergeants gone?)

JMA

12-14-2010, 12:31 PM

First, I would disapprove -- full auto fire is only rarely effective and therefor rarely beneficial. Techniques always have to be adjusted to operating modes and METT-TC. That adjustment must be constant, you've got to assess each day and change modes when appropriate..

I once fired one magazine on automatic (2LTs do the craziest things). Learnt enough from that never to do it again ... nor to allow any of my troops to do that either. We carried the FN MAG on a ratio of 1:4 so we really got all the firepower we needed from that baby. The riflemen were fillers, always (at least) one facing backwards and unlike the conventional training where the machine gun was deployed on the higher ground flank we pushed it right up front to be there and operating in those first critical seconds when contact is made.

So how does the gunner fire? - bursts of 2-3 rounds in a controlled fashion.

So how did the riflemen fire? - single rounds or at most double taps in a controlled fashion.

Secondly, the linked article must be analyzed with caution. The Australian Area of Operations was unique in several respects and the Australian and US Armies had differing operating philosophies.. Note that most of their contact were in ambushes or reactions to them -- negligible 'hot LZs.' Most American units had different experiences, more helicopter assaults, fewer ambushes and more meeting engagements.

With caution indeed. I have a massive problem with averaging the number of rounds fired per kill achieved. Not sure what the point is as every contact is unique and different in one way or tuther enough to question the value of the finding.

I read that article last year and I understand what they say -- but I have reservations about their conclusion. Strong reservations. Much depends on the enemy and the terrain / vegetation but as a general rule, massive volume fire in several varieties of all that are in my observation rarely as effective as a smaller volume of accurate fire -- accurate not being one shot, one kill but fire directed very near the proper target. One problem with the high volume of fire folks is that most of that fire will go in places where no opponent is located. It's wasted. If it's automatic, about 2/3 of it will be high...

I would add that for raw unexperienced troops the noise of battle can be intimidating. However, combat experienced troops know and are able to differentiate between the odd stray round and really close stuff. One just needs to watch the difference in reaction to battlefield "bangs" between new guys and the old soldiers.

In a fire force setting where one could be close to a contact but not personally and physically involved the last thing you needed was troopies ducking and flinching every time a high miss or ricochet passed overhead. We needed to upgrade the battle inoculation part of our training.

Simply put find a piece of bush which will pass for a range. Get the troopies to lie (section at a time) on the firing point. Get your sergeant to fire over their heads high and close so that they can differentiate between stray shots and the real deal. (The Health and Safety Gestapo will never allow this - so that is why I suggest you just disappear into the bush somewhere.) Let the distances vary from 100-150m to 10m. And close is as close as possible.

Also use different weapons (theirs and ours) so that they learn to ID the various weapons at various ranges.

The need result is that you realise when you can clearly hear the shots they are probably not aimed at you but when the noise (of the crack) turns into a "sensation" then you know he wants to convert you into a notch on his buttstock.

Fuchs

12-14-2010, 03:22 PM

JMA

12-14-2010, 09:29 PM

I actually took price at the fact that on the firing range I was able to put four to five rounds into a kneeling target at 30 m with my G3 on full auto. The first impact was usually low left (hip), the last one in the opposite shoulder.

Such a burst coupled with the quality of the German 7.62NATO bullet ends every doubt about "stopping power".

There are different people with different skills. The fact that a small minority of soldiers are capable of the controlled, accurate and discriminate use of automatic rifle fire should not open the door for the indiscriminate use of automatic fire in panic or otherwise by soldiers who find themselves in difficult circumstances.

It is rather when the crunch comes that the quality of the training should come out.

If you want to know what can go wrong read the Wanat study (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/csistudywanat.pdf)

A few quotes:

... Bogar had fired about 600 rounds at the cyclic rate of fire when his “SAW jammed, basically it just got way overheated because he opened the feed tray cover and I remember him trying to get it open and it just looked like the bolt had welded itself inside the chamber. His barrel was just white hot.”

and

McKaig began to experience problems with his M4. “My weapon was overheating. I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn’t charge my weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and threw my weapon down.”

Soldiers should train as they intend to fight. If you believe that automatic fire is OK then make the additional ammo available for training. No training on auto, use of it on ops... end of story.

Lets get back to the hotdog posers who insist on using an AK-47. I would suggest that they pony up the cost of 1,000 rounds of the ammo and pass a shooting table and weapon handling (stoppage drills etc) then their request can be considered.

The stopping power of the NATO 7.62 is undisputed. Can't think what the Americans were thinking when they introduced that pea-shooter firing 5.56?

Fuchs

12-14-2010, 10:02 PM

Oops, I meant "pride", not "price". I #§$% my typos.

12-15-2010, 03:08 AM

When it comes to suppressive fire two things are need, accuracy and volume. Just because an infantryman is dumbing rounds in the general area, it is not enough to ensure suppressive ability. As mentioned, seasoned fighters will not duck simply at the sound of fire, but look to see where the rounds are landing. If the shots are accurate, than the enemy knows he is fighting a trained, seasoned, and disciplined fighter. The second function is volume. The standard load carried is for doctrine patrol - where one fight is expected, max. After contact is made, the patrol is ended and all return to the patrol base. The reality is that on deliberate attacks, where more ammo is required, the 1SG will have more ammo, (or at least the platoon sergeant). I hope this helps clarifies the issue

-Robert Cumbo, SGT US ARMY INFANTRY

Ken White

12-15-2010, 03:26 AM

The standard load carried is for doctrine patrol - where one fight is expected, max. After contact is made, the patrol is ended and all return to the patrol base.Could you expand on that? Do you mean that comment to apply to all combat generically, to a particular theater / war / operation, or to specific unit(s)?

The reason for my question is that while a patrol can be made specifically to gain contact based on intel and that contact becomes the mission of the patrol or unit, many if not most patrols are going to be purpose (reconnaissance, etc.) patrols where contact may or may not be made and if it is, that may not satisfy the purpose of the patrol and there may not be a return to a patrol base, rather there may be more movement and thus possibly additional contacts.

There is also the possibility that hypothetical contact patrol having made and successfully concluded their contact could while in process of returning to the patrol base have a meeting engagement or get ambushed and thus also have one or more additional contacts...

jcustis

12-15-2010, 05:05 AM

The stopping power of the NATO 7.62 is undisputed. Can't think what the Americans were thinking when they introduced that pea-shooter firing 5.56?

It is in fact fairly well-documented exactly what designers were thinking. We;ve killed a lot of knuckleheads with it in the days that have ensued. Is it the best? Depends on way too many points of view to cover in a single thread here.

JMA

12-15-2010, 10:51 PM

It is in fact fairly well-documented exactly what designers were thinking. We;ve killed a lot of knuckleheads with it in the days that have ensued. Is it the best? Depends on way too many points of view to cover in a single thread here.

Jon with respect the decision is poor in retrospect (and it does not matter whether that is wisdom in retrospect). There can be no reason to defend a poor decision (even if seemingly made in good faith at the time).

What we see in this thread is that one of the key supposed positives of the 5.56, being the weight of ammo and the ability to use greater volumes of fire in contact, has actually developed into to specific operational problem in today's armies using the 5.56.

In my experience I never heard a soldier complain about the weight of the FN FAL or its ammo - I don't know what that tells me considering the M4 with all the "extras" must now weigh about the same as the FN? Even if not if a soldier can't carry a ten pound (loaded) personal weapon they are not physically up to being a combat soldier IMHO.

Then we have the fallacy of the weight of the ammo. (5.56 = 4.01 gm, 7.62 = 9.7 gm) So one Nato 7.62 weighs the equivalent of 2.4 5.56 rounds. So the theory is that you can carry 2.4 times the number of 5.56 rounds as opposed to 7.62 NATO. Now the perceived benefit of that is clearly lost if the M4 is used on automatic fire, yes?

Jon the simple truth is that the pea-shooter and its BB style ammo has very little redeeming value. A bad decision then, confirmed time and again since.

selil

12-15-2010, 11:00 PM

I don't know if it has been mentioned but in civilian applications of the .223 (following based on bs sessions not evidence!) pass through has been significant variable as the round travels through a body. Defining an entrance path to exit for reduced secondary casualties is supposedly an issue. This was one reason a department I worked with a long time ago went to the .308. However, you're not packing it around more than a few 100 yards. There hasn't been significant change in the weapons systems in the last few years that I know of. I have an open invitation to go train with the local SWAT team and do qual fires with them. I'll have to look into that and see what state of the art is today.

Pete

12-16-2010, 12:04 AM

That doesn't make sense. Are you saying 5.56mm goes through walls but 7.62mm doesn't?

Kiwigrunt

12-16-2010, 12:52 AM

That doesn't make sense. Are you saying 5.56mm goes through walls but 7.62mm doesn't?

No. Through hard cover like walls and foliage 7.62 is far superior to 5.56.
However, through armour (think helmets and Crisat) SS109/M855 is superior to 7.62 ball because of the steel penetrator, which means we are comparing a ball round to a semi-armour piercing round.

The issue that Selil brought up pertains to the behaviour of the rounds through tissue (bodies). Both M193 and SS109/M855 behave very inconsistently. 7.62 ball does too but to a lesser extent.
I have hunted goats with both M193 and SS109 with very different results. If the round is allowed to travel a fair distance through the tissue, or hits bone, than it will tumble and disintegrate (provided the velocity is adequate). When that happens it tends to turn the goat inside out (I exaggerate somewhat). If not, and that is most of the time, it will indeed just drill a pretty little 5.56 mm hole clean through. I have stopped using these rounds for hunting because it is not very goatistically correct. Softpoint is way more consistent and will start to mushroom pretty much straight away.

So this is really more a function of bullet design rather than calibre. Mk262 is apparently more consistent and far superior to M193 and M855. And a few others have recently been designed to help overcome these shortcomings. With a well designed 5.56 bullet it is likely that it will outperform the old 7.62 NATO, in tissue anyway. Destroying hard cover and the ability to maintain its trajectory though foliage are still a different matter. There you can’t beat the mass of 7.62.

Ken White

12-16-2010, 01:26 AM

and applauded...:D

selil

12-16-2010, 01:58 AM

and exactly the issues as described to me Kiwigrunt

JMA

12-16-2010, 08:53 AM

Not sure if it is still the case, but for our recon platoons it was SOP for the first man in a contact to empty a mag on full auto in the general direction, after that everyone went to semi.

A few excerpts from “Sleeping with your ears open” by Gary Mckay, about Australian SAS in Nam.

I suggest that one needs to be aware of the difference between "small team" recce work and standard infantry patrolling (even for line infantry battalion recce platoons).

There is a real danger that line infantry try to emulate SF and this leads to their missing the boat.

I will try to stay within a response to what you quoted.

Page 43: The amount of ammunition carried by the SAS on patrol in Bornea was far less than they carried in Viet Nam, as the threat of enemy contact was far greater in the Viet Nam campaign. Because there was little chance of resupply once a contact started, the troopers used to carry whatever they thought they would need to get out of trouble.

The troopers personally decide how much ammo to carry? Like we hear that they should be able to decide what weapon they want to carry?

Ridiculous. The patrol commander must dictate the ammo load each man carries.

The second is the attitude (probably correct for a SAS 5 man recce patrol deep in Indian territory) that having a contact represents "trouble". For the majority of line infantry patrols that is what the purpose of the patrol is (or at least should be) and presents the opportunity to close with and kill the enemy.

... [These wepaons] gave a very good initial burst of fire in a contact and gave the SAS patrol considerable firepower for a five-man group. An SAS contact drill often sounded like a 30-man platoon in contact when they opened fire instead of just five men.

The intention was [for the 5 man team] to break contact so spray and pray was the order of the day. Even if the formation did not allow for each of the 5 men to fire in the direction of the enemy the drill was probably to empty a magazine or whatever and break contact and start to withdraw.

A line infantry patrol would not select a formation suitable for a shoot and scoot breaking of contact but rather one which will allow them to best follow up with the required offensive action. I have mentioned before that with the kind of low level enemies we see these days the initial exchange of fire is critical to 1) win the fire fight, and 2) to get some kills before they can get away. That is why machine guns should be positioned and distributed among the formation to apply an accurate volume of fire in the opening seconds of the contact (for the purposes mentioned and not in order to break contact like an SAS patrol typically would).

Page 97: The SLR was actually designed with a holding open device so that on the last shot of the magazine it held open and so you could carry out an immediate action drill really easy, but that’s no good for a parade ground, you can’t have people messing around on the parade ground like this. So, the hierarchy of the Australian army [and the NZ and I think also the UK] said remove the pin. Our armourers put a pin where it was supposed to be..

I don't know what the point of this is? Troopies (even in the mighty SAS) should be made/trained to count their rounds. If you start with recruits and sustain the requirement with trained soldiers it works. Actually peer pressure
takes over and sustains it. The troopie who is seen to "flinch" on the trigger of an empty weapon was subjected to merciless ribbing from the other troopies - nothing a troopie likes less than being called a *#@$*#@ wanker by his mates. So don't alter the weapon... train the soldiers.

Page 187: The expression that ‘bull#### baffles brains’ is very true in the SAS notion of throwing as much lead at the enemy to get him to keep his head down while the patrol took off. The other thing that also helped was the reports from the weapons. The 7.62 SLR was a noisy beast which didn’t go bang, it went boom! […] when you get these beasts firing on automatic and in unison, the noise level was dramatic.

On automatic? Maybe good for a SAS 5 man recce team when they desperately need to break contact but for the line infantry? This is not something line infantry should try to emulate.

…and if you had those bloody SLRs on fully automatic, firing a 30-round magazine, and if the flash eliminator was taken off it, you would think, ‘####! What have I hit here?’ Because it sounded heavy, and fast, and automatic, and it would just make old Charlie think, ‘####, I’ve hit something big here’ and it would stop them, rather than race in and try to take you out. Because they think they have hit so much firepower, it’s at least a bloody company, and by that time we’ve got ourselves on a back bearing and ####ed off out of there. But, once that first magazine was gone, from then on that was our rules, you fired well aimed, single shots.” “…if you’ve got three SLRs on fully automatic with a 30–round magazine, s##t flies everywhere.

That sounds like what they would like to believe the enemy are thinking. The problem always is that if you don't kill the enemy involved in the contact they learn from it too. They may be saying OK if you contact the SAS they wildly and blindly fire a magazine each then pull back down their line of approach. Give then a couple of such contacts and even low grade enemy will figure out a counter measure.

But again this is not a feasible tactic for line infantry patrols of section and platoon strength (METT-TC considered of course). That said if the drill is (for line infantry) to break contact with the Taliban rather than press home an attack then that development and emasculation of the infantry is a good enough reason to pack up and go home.

In summary then. What is/was good tacticlly for 5 man SAS recce patrols is unlikely to be good for a standard line infantry patrol. Different roles and missions require different tactics.

JMA

12-16-2010, 09:42 AM

Actually, there is a Youtube video of Canadians in a firefight in Helmand and you can hear one of the section commanders calling out a target indication. In the first 10 seconds here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_S9P1kMNuM

I watched that video a number of times and (as Pete will tell you) I have an opinion on that (and on most things).

First, maybe it was the audio quality or my service damaged hearing but I was unable to hear whether that was a target indication or a fire control order.

Pretty sure GRIT and CLAP were not correctly applied though. (GRIT - group, range, indication, type of fire, and , CLAP - clear, loud, as an order, with pauses)

Saw the bunching and as Fuchs will tell you the Canadians back in 1944 wouldn't have tried that... more than once. (Where was the sergeant and why was he not kicking ass?)

The use of grenades and the follow up thereafter was noted.

I would have thought that it would have been realised that the 4-5 second delay on a HE grenade is too long to be so used into a room/bunker/trench. I assume the Canadians have practice grenades. Probably never had a grenade thrown back out - which in that hard open ground would be a problem for sure.

The trick (and there are probably other methods) is to turn the grenade in the hand so that instead of the striker lever being in the palm of the hand it is against the fingers. Once the pin is pulled and the striker lever is released the thrower counts one, two, three or whatever and throws the grenade and then he positions or his buddy positions to follow up immediately on the grenade exploding and clear by fire.

Back to the video.

In the first case the soldier threw the grenade and left the scene only returning some seconds after the blast to fire into the room (or whatever). No delay before throwing the grenade, left the area with fingers in his ears like a kid playing with fire crackers, no positioning ready to enter fire immediately after the blast and then when firing the weapon remained in the horizontal plain whereas he should have fired high, low and everywhere and even entered to clear around any corners. (A buddy should have been right behind him to pull him out immediately if he got shot (or got stuck) on entering.)

The second I noted the barrel of the weapon in the dirt. No delay before throwing, slow approach after blast... no more visuals.

And the comments say "hardcore". Sad.

Blah

12-16-2010, 10:39 AM

Another example of a firefight in Afghan: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBd8Fl6gGdI
Although it's from MSNBC, so take it with a grain of salt.

Then we have the fallacy of the weight of the ammo. (5.56 = 4.01 gm, 7.62 = 9.7 gm) So one Nato 7.62 weighs the equivalent of 2.4 5.56 rounds. So the theory is that you can carry 2.4 times the number of 5.56 rounds as opposed to 7.62 NATO. Now the perceived benefit of that is clearly lost if the M4 is used on automatic fire, yes?

My sources indicate that M885 weighs 12.31 grams, and M80 weighs 25.4 grams. So just a smidge more than 2* the weight.

JMA

12-16-2010, 11:25 AM

My sources indicate that M885 weighs 12.31 grams, and M80 weighs 25.4 grams. So just a smidge more than 2* the weight.

OK, well spotted. I will try to fix that.

The standard 7.62mm M59 ball round has the following applicable characteristics:

Cartridge Weight: 393 gr (25.47 g)
Projectile Weight: 150.5 gr (9.75 g)

The standard 5.56mm M193 ball round has the following applicable characteristics:

Cartridge Weight: 182 gr (11.79 g)
Projectile Weight: 56 gr (3.63 g)

So dealing with cartridges (rather than bullets) the 7.62mm is 2.16 x the weight of the 5.56mm cartridge.

Source: Gary's U.S. Infantry Weapons Reference Guide (http://www.inetres.com/gp/military/infantry/index.html)

It just gets worse for the 5.56mm BB round.

The calibre debate from the Brit angle can be found here:

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/09/the-small-arms-calibre-debate/

Problems with 5.56 mm ammunition fall into four categories:

1. Lack of effective range. More than 50% of infantry engagements in Afghanistan take place at ranges above 300 meters. When 5.56 mm ammunition was adopted, it was believed that 90% of combat engagements would take place under 300 meters. It frequently results in situations where ISAF troops cannot return fire when engaged by enemy snipers. 5.56 mm ammunition is meant to be effective at 500 metres, but combat feedback suggests that this is not the case.

2. Inconsistent lethality. There have been instances where enemy combatants have not been neutralised by 5.56 mm bullets, sometimes despite receiving multiple hits. This has happened at longer ranges, but also, surprisingly, at shorter ranges.

3. Poor barrier penetration. In certain situations, 5.56 mm ammunition has been defeated or deflected by barriers obscuring a target, including car windows, car doors, light masonry and woodwork. Even when a 5.56 mm succeeds in penetrating an intermediate barrier, its energy may be depleted so that lethality is compromised.

4. Inadequate suppressive effect. The UK MoD’s own analysis suggests that insurgent forces are not suppressed by 5.56 mm ammunition, whereas larger calibres have a more notable psychological effect.

So I say again... what were the Americans thinking?

Fuchs

12-16-2010, 01:57 PM

Much about suppression:

Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat
Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Australian Army

http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/AAJ_I1.asp

JMA

12-16-2010, 11:41 PM

Much about suppression:

Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat
Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Australian Army

http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/AAJ_I1.asp

This seems to be a little dated now - circa 2003.

Got to hand it to Kilcullen for having the chutzpah to attempt a doctrine change based on his experience through a training attachment to the UK and one contact in Timor.

I would respond by saying that he should go back and read the Brit Infantry Platoon in Battle (don't know what is in the Australian version) as its all there for him to see what the doctrine actually says.

I now see Wilf's point about the danger of training people on drills and expecting them to adapt them to the tactical situation on the ground. Here we have a major who was writing as a Lt Col who seems to see the guidelines in the manual as being hard and fast.

So yes Wilf, if majors and Lt Cols don't get it we have a problem.

Back to the issue.

I would suggest that the US forces that were in Iraq are the most current on warfare in urban terrain. Lets wait and see what they have to say on the matter.

Fuchs

12-16-2010, 11:59 PM

I would suggest that the US forces that were in Iraq are the most current on warfare in urban terrain.

Only partially. They didn't encounter a competent and well-equipped opposition.

JMA

12-17-2010, 12:01 AM

No. Through hard cover like walls and foliage 7.62 is far superior to 5.56.
However, through armour (think helmets and Crisat) SS109/M855 is superior to 7.62 ball because of the steel penetrator, which means we are comparing a ball round to a semi-armour piercing round.

The issue that Selil brought up pertains to the behaviour of the rounds through tissue (bodies). Both M193 and SS109/M855 behave very inconsistently. 7.62 ball does too but to a lesser extent.
I have hunted goats with both M193 and SS109 with very different results. If the round is allowed to travel a fair distance through the tissue, or hits bone, than it will tumble and disintegrate (provided the velocity is adequate). When that happens it tends to turn the goat inside out (I exaggerate somewhat). If not, and that is most of the time, it will indeed just drill a pretty little 5.56 mm hole clean through. I have stopped using these rounds for hunting because it is not very goatistically correct. Softpoint is way more consistent and will start to mushroom pretty much straight away.

So this is really more a function of bullet design rather than calibre. Mk262 is apparently more consistent and far superior to M193 and M855. And a few others have recently been designed to help overcome these shortcomings. With a well designed 5.56 bullet it is likely that it will outperform the old 7.62 NATO, in tissue anyway. Destroying hard cover and the ability to maintain its trajectory though foliage are still a different matter. There you can’t beat the mass of 7.62.

The 5.56mm was introduced into Vietnam in 1963... and nearly 50 years later they are still attempting to find the right ammo to use. You go figure.

Granite_State

12-17-2010, 01:33 AM

Only partially. They didn't encounter a competent and well-equipped opposition.

OK, but who has then? The Russians in Chechnya?

JMA

12-17-2010, 08:49 AM

I watched that video a number of times and (as Pete will tell you) I have an opinion on that (and on most things).

First, maybe it was the audio quality or my service damaged hearing but I was unable to hear whether that was a target indication or a fire control order.

Pretty sure GRIT and CLAP were not correctly applied though. (GRIT - group, range, indication, type of fire, and , CLAP - clear, loud, as an order, with pauses)

Saw the bunching and as Fuchs will tell you the Canadians back in 1944 wouldn't have tried that... more than once. (Where was the sergeant and why was he not kicking ass?)

The use of grenades and the follow up thereafter was noted.

I would have thought that it would have been realised that the 4-5 second delay on a HE grenade is too long to be so used into a room/bunker/trench. I assume the Canadians have practice grenades. Probably never had a grenade thrown back out - which in that hard open ground would be a problem for sure.

The trick (and there are probably other methods) is to turn the grenade in the hand so that instead of the striker lever being in the palm of the hand it is against the fingers. Once the pin is pulled and the striker lever is released the thrower counts one, two, three or whatever and throws the grenade and then he positions or his buddy positions to follow up immediately on the grenade exploding and clear by fire.

Back to the video.

In the first case the soldier threw the grenade and left the scene only returning some seconds after the blast to fire into the room (or whatever). No delay before throwing the grenade, left the area with fingers in his ears like a kid playing with fire crackers, no positioning ready to enter fire immediately after the blast and then when firing the weapon remained in the horizontal plain whereas he should have fired high, low and everywhere and even entered to clear around any corners. (A buddy should have been right behind him to pull him out immediately if he got shot (or got stuck) on entering.)

The second I noted the barrel of the weapon in the dirt. No delay before throwing, slow approach after blast... no more visuals.

And the comments say "hardcore". Sad.

After posting this I called my troop sergeant from 1976-8 to wish him down to his grandchildren a happy Christmas... and to thank him for being such a damn fine soldier... as the battalions welterweight boxing champion he looked the part but had (on top of the skill at arms) the right balance... knowing when to kick ass and knowing when to play "mother hen". Man I was fortunate to have that man beside me through some pretty tough times.

Fuchs

12-17-2010, 10:46 AM

OK, but who has then? The Russians in Chechnya?

Nobody knows really how to defeat a competent, well-equipped opponent in battle because there was no such conflict between first rate forces after 1945 (possibly not even after 1943).

William F. Owen

12-17-2010, 01:37 PM

The calibre debate from the Brit angle can be found here:

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/09/the-small-arms-calibre-debate/

The rebuttal to that can be found here. (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/owen_RDS_feb2010.pdf)

You guys may also want to look up M855A1, the new issue 5.56mm round. I got a briefing on this a month or so back in London and its data is impressive.

William F. Owen

12-17-2010, 01:39 PM

Nobody knows really how to defeat a competent, well-equipped opponent in battle because there was no such conflict between first rate forces after 1945 (possibly not even after 1943).

I could quibble that, but I could not do so usefully. This is an essentially correct observation in terms of the US and UK/ABCAN forces. I think Korea might be worth some detailed examination, but the broad thesis is essentially correct.

Rex Brynen

12-17-2010, 02:00 PM

I could quibble that, but I could not do so usefully.

A possible SWC quote of the day directed at would-be quibblers, if you ask me.

selil

12-17-2010, 03:21 PM

Nobody knows really how to defeat a competent, well-equipped opponent in battle because there was no such conflict between first rate forces after 1945 (possibly not even after 1943).

I would take issue with this. It is rapidly becoming apparent that the drug cartels have the financial capability to run damn fine militaries.

Rex Brynen

12-17-2010, 04:42 PM

I would take issue with this. It is rapidly becoming apparent that the drug cartels have the financial capability to run damn fine militaries.

Which ones? In a proper stand-up force-on-force fight against a well-trained, well equipped military? I don't think so.

Fuchs

12-17-2010, 05:06 PM

I'd like to see a militia which can
* call in a guided rocket from 80 km away to destroy a specific house
* support infantry in urban combat with assault gun tactics (tanks)
* equip all of its infantry with night sights and class IV body armour
* use sophisticated encrypted frequency-hopping radio networks that ensure almost 100% connectivity even in a city
* supply its troops with all necessary ammunition and tools (such as proper protection for movements in the sewer system) because of proper preparations
* provide first aid, quick evacuation and quality medical treatment to the wounded
* enforce discipline over months of campaigning

Actually, I would not like to see such a militia. I meant I don't think there's such a thing.

JMA

12-17-2010, 06:06 PM

Fuchs

12-17-2010, 06:20 PM

About a dozen, soon probably two dozen armies can do it if you loosen a bit the precision artillery range requirement.

JMA

12-17-2010, 06:34 PM

Which ones? In a proper stand-up force-on-force fight against a well-trained, well equipped military? I don't think so.

Come on Rex. The Taliban is largely a proceeds of drug trade funded organisation and they are quite capable with much less logistic and training supply/support than the Mujahideen before them to keep the US and NATO on the back foot. More than that there is the growing view that they are in fact "winning".

Now why would an "irregular force" want to take on, say the US military, in a face-to-face knock down drag out fight to the death when they can indulge in the war of the flea and bleed the US military dry?

Did you not see what the US did to Fallujah? 36,000 houses, nine thousand shops, sixty five mosques, sixty schools... etc were demolished. The US claimed 1,350 killed and around 1,000 captured (yea maybe). But here it was the decision to stand and fight against the US might that cost lives, had they withdrawn (as most apparently did) it would have been a hollow victory indeed.

You forget what they used to say during WW2.

when the british shoot, the germans duck.

when the germans shoot, the british duck.

when the americans shoot, everybody ducks.

So a clever enemy will not offer the US machine a target... it will disperse and sit back and watch it self destruct through frustration.

JMA

12-17-2010, 06:43 PM

About a dozen, soon probably two dozen armies can do it if you loosen a bit the precision artillery range requirement.

...well yes, but more important how many (even of the initial dozen) would be able to function over months of campaigning and at what scale?

Rex Brynen

12-17-2010, 06:48 PM

Come on Rex. The Taliban is largely a proceeds of drug trade funded organisation and they are quite capable with much less logistic and training supply/support than the Mujahideen before them to keep the US and NATO on the back foot. More than that there is the growing view that they are in fact "winning".

The Taliban is decidedly not a drug cartel. They certainly finance themselves (in part, certainly not in whole) from parasitic and symbiotic drug financing. Most insurgencies engage in illegal and extra-legal fundraising/extortion/smuggling/etc. to some degree. However, the Taliban's tactical competence (such as it is, and I think the picture is rather mixed) would remain near its current level even if the drug money dried up. Equally, I suspect that the Afghan war would still be a tough fight even if everyone in Afghanistan grew carrots.

The original suggestion, you'll remember, was this:

It is rapidly becoming apparent that the drug cartels have the financial capability to run damn fine militaries.

The Taliban are not, by any stretch of the imagination, "a damn fine military." Then again, I would be the first to admit that one doesn't need a "damn fine military" to win wars, or that having one means that you'll emerge victorious--something you'll know well from your Rhodesian experience.

Now why would an "irregular force" want to take on, say the US military, in a face-to-face knock down drag out fight to the death when they can indulge in the war of the flea and bleed the US military dry?

I agree with you. That, however, was not the point I was commenting on.

Blah

12-17-2010, 06:51 PM

You guys may also want to look up M855A1, the new issue 5.56mm round. I got a briefing on this a month or so back in London and its data is impressive.

I'm highly skeptical of the M855A1. It seems like a semi-AP round that leans further towards the AP end of the scale than M855.

selil

12-17-2010, 07:29 PM

The Taliban are not, by any stretch of the imagination, "a damn fine military." Then again, I would be the first to admit that one doesn't need a "damn fine military" to win wars, or that having one means that you'll emerge victorious--something you'll know well from your Rhodesian experience.

I agree with you. That, however, was not the point I was commenting on.

i think we're quibbling about militaries. The United States Military is a TRILLION + dollars a year. Dwarfing everybody else. Is it worth it? Who knows. Even then the SOF of the United States military is bigger than some armies. Toss it an the next five biggest out the door. The drug cartels though ARE giving the Mexican military a good fight. Is it stand up and take your whackings? Heck no... Only fools and Englishmen believe in stand up and trade blows fighting. I thought this was a COIN forum? Take it back into the rest of the world and you've got a few other fights where drug cartels and others are doing quite handily.

Rex Brynen

12-17-2010, 07:38 PM

i think we're quibbling about militaries. The United States Military is a TRILLION + dollars a year. Dwarfing everybody else. Is it worth it? Who knows. Even then the SOF of the United States military is bigger than some armies. Toss it an the next five biggest out the door. The drug cartels though ARE giving the Mexican military a good fight. Is it stand up and take your whackings? Heck no... Only fools and Englishmen believe in stand up and trade blows fighting. I thought this was a COIN forum? Take it back into the rest of the world and you've got a few other fights where drug cartels and others are doing quite handily.

Fuch's original comment, however, was this:

Nobody knows really how to defeat a competent, well-equipped opponent in battle because there was no such conflict between first rate forces after 1945 (possibly not even after 1943).

Quibbles aside, he's right. That was my only point (and Wilf's too).

__________________

SethB

12-18-2010, 12:41 AM

The 5.56mm was introduced into Vietnam in 1963... and nearly 50 years later they are still attempting to find the right ammo to use. You go figure.

Your hit and run posts are a bit aggravating.

7.62N has gone through as many iterations as 5.56N.

In fact, it has been through more. M80, M993, M852, M118, M118LR, the newer M118LR...

In the mean time, it was discovered that the Mk 12 with Mk 262 can hit a target at 950M.

selil

12-18-2010, 02:14 AM

Fuch's original comment, however, was this:

Quibbles aside, he's right. That was my only point (and Wilf's too).

__________________

Ahhh too true. My assumption that we were straying. Apologies.

JMA

12-18-2010, 10:32 AM

I'm highly skeptical of the M855A1. It seems like a semi-AP round that leans further towards the AP end of the scale than M855.

According to Lt. Col. Jeffrey K. Woods, the program’s product manager, the new M855A1 ammo is “the best general purpose 5.56mm round ever produced. (http://bulletin.accurateshooter.com/2010/06/u-s-army-issues-new-m855a1-ammo-to-troops-in-afghanistan/)

http://accurateshooter.net/Blog/m855a104.png

This is all good and well but the penetration ability of what is required in Afghanistan right now?

JMA

12-18-2010, 11:50 AM

The Taliban is decidedly not a drug cartel.

The original point was that with the enormous funds generated by the drug cartels they would have the financial capability to run damn fine militaries.

Is there any doubt that the Taliban's military capability is greatly increased through their drug related income?

They certainly finance themselves (in part, certainly not in whole) from parasitic and symbiotic drug financing. Most insurgencies engage in illegal and extra-legal fundraising/extortion/smuggling/etc. to some degree.

Yes agreed but the issue here was that a near bottomless supply of money can buy the drug cartels the means to run damn fine militaries.

However, the Taliban's tactical competence (such as it is, and I think the picture is rather mixed) would remain near its current level even if the drug money dried up. Equally, I suspect that the Afghan war would still be a tough fight even if everyone in Afghanistan grew carrots.

Not sure about that I suspect that had the US not funded the supply of weapons and equipment to Afghanistan they would still be using Lee-Enfield 303s.

[QUOTE]The original suggestion, you'll remember, was this:

[QUOTE]It is rapidly becoming apparent that the drug cartels have the financial capability to run damn fine militaries.

The operative word was capability... as in possible/potential/ability.

The Taliban are not, by any stretch of the imagination, "a damn fine military." Then again, I would be the first to admit that one doesn't need a "damn fine military" to win wars, or that having one means that you'll emerge victorious--something you'll know well from your Rhodesian experience.

Then of course there is the political and the military and in the absence of one the other will fail. (I really thought that would be known)

It appears increasingly obvious that like in Rhodesia the best that can be hoped for (by the US and NATO) is for a political solution.

JMA

12-18-2010, 12:37 PM

Your hit and run posts are a bit aggravating.

7.62N has gone through as many iterations as 5.56N.

In fact, it has been through more. M80, M993, M852, M118, M118LR, the newer M118LR...

In the mean time, it was discovered that the Mk 12 with Mk 262 can hit a target at 950M.

As aggravating as they may be to you Seth nearly 50 years ago now the 5.56 was selected as the calibre and it still requires to be justified. To make another change now would require far more evidence than is currently available as to the limitations of the 5.56 and the advantages and benefits of what it should be replaced with.

Then after the calibre issue we have the weapon itself. We have seen that the M4 is a below average weapon at best - see The USA’s M4 Carbine Controversy (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-m4-carbine-controversy-03289/)

The selection of the 5.56mm, the M16 and the M4 are case studies on how not to do it. One needs to accept this and move on.

William F. Owen

12-18-2010, 12:49 PM

This is all good and well but the penetration ability of what is required in Afghanistan right now?

How much is a suit for an Orphan? The round is the round. It's a tool. Apply with skill. Of note is the fact that penetration is the primary performance criteria on which small arms terminal effect can be consistently judged.

Blah

12-18-2010, 01:00 PM

According to Lt. Col. Jeffrey K. Woods, the program’s product manager, the new M855A1 ammo is “the best general purpose 5.56mm round ever produced. (http://bulletin.accurateshooter.com/2010/06/u-s-army-issues-new-m855a1-ammo-to-troops-in-afghanistan/)

http://accurateshooter.net/Blog/m855a104.png

This is all good and well but the penetration ability of what is required in Afghanistan right now?

Well, my skepticism comes from the fact that it is touted as both penetrating better and more lethal.

It is apparently a dual-core projectile, with a steel "arrowhead" penetrater with either a copper or bismuth-tin slug behind. I've read both mentioned, not sure which one it is.

The powerpoint slide I saw seems to imply that it breaks into 2 pieces when it hits a windshield, so I imagine it'd do the same when impacting a person. If the slug is made of copper, then it probably won't fragment. The bismuth-tin slug might however.

That said, it seems like a good "general-purpose" round, just not the amazing wonder-round the press release makes it seem.

William F. Owen

12-18-2010, 01:02 PM

As aggravating as they may be to you Seth nearly 50 years ago now the 5.56 was selected as the calibre and it still requires to be justified.
Not in my book. Good training, organisation and tactics will/should apply the tool effectively. As long as I have GPMG, Snipers (with 7.62), and HE projection in the platoon, I care very little close quarter weapon the rest are carrying.

The selection of the 5.56mm, the M16 and the M4 are case studies on how not to do it.
Says who? All we have is wooly bodies of opinion, where folks resort to ballistic charts, and not actual comparative troop trials with weapons - which have yet to be done.

I am amazed this even gets talked about. It's a complete non-subject. It's like folks arguing about 9mm v .45.

Blah

12-18-2010, 01:25 PM

Of note is the fact that penetration is the primary performance criteria on which small arms terminal effect can be consistently judged.

I agree. While our opinions may differ on what round the average infantryman should be equipped with, my reason for the preference of 7.62 is purely penetration based (not range or "stopping power").

As armour technology improves, the standards of penetration must consequently be raised. This was evident in WW2 with practically everything above infantry, however infantry remained mostly armour-less (except for a relatively ineffective helmet).

If we are to hypothesize about a modern enemy, then we must assume that they will be able to equip their troops with eSAPI-grade armour. From this assumption, there are 2 choices: We may either concede that we cannot penetrate the plate with IWs, or we can develop ammunition designed to penetrate the plate. Both choices have their pros and cons, with weight and cost being an advantage of the first choice.

In terms of physics, similarly designed armour-piecing 5.56 and 7.62 would be fairly similar in their penetration of armour (with 7.62 being slightly better). They both have similar energy densities (energy per frontal area of the bullet).

A modern 7.62 (in my mind), would be a sub-caliber steel or tungsten "dart" wrapped in a sabot. For an IW, a configuration like that would necessary for there to be enough increased penetration to be worth the extra weight. A .22 sabot 7.62x51 would probably weigh ~150% - ~160% of a standard 5.56.

The M948 7.62x51 comes to mind. I believe it was a 52.5 gr tungsten .22 round at close to 4000 ft/s. I've also read that it can penetrate 30mm of RHA at 100m, although that's all second-hand info.

JMA

12-18-2010, 01:30 PM

Well, my skepticism comes from the fact that it is touted as both penetrating better and more lethal.

It is apparently a dual-core projectile, with a steel "arrowhead" penetrater with either a copper or bismuth-tin slug behind. I've read both mentioned, not sure which one it is.

The powerpoint slide I saw seems to imply that it breaks into 2 pieces when it hits a windshield, so I imagine it'd do the same when impacting a person. If the slug is made of copper, then it probably won't fragment. The bismuth-tin slug might however.

That said, it seems like a good "general-purpose" round, just not the amazing wonder-round the press release makes it seem.

I agree with you. And I don't go with the general purpose approach either. With this approach something has got to give in the form of trade offs. I am quite happy that there are a range of rounds available in the calibre which can be selected for use in a given war/theatre/circumstance.

JMA

12-18-2010, 01:46 PM

How much is a suit for an Orphan? The round is the round. It's a tool. Apply with skill. Of note is the fact that penetration is the primary performance criteria on which small arms terminal effect can be consistently judged.

Wilf please. The penetration of what?

You do see a ballistic difference between standard issue ball ammo (NATO: SS109; U.S.: M855) and AP (armour piercing - M995) don't you?

Use my analogy of a set of golf clubs. If you require soft tissue penetration then you go for ball ammo but if you may require "hard target penetration" then go for AP ammo of this new M855A1 "wonder round" type... or you select another weapon for the task... just like with golf clubs.

In a given war/theatre/circumstance soldiers may be required to carry a suitably marked magazine (or more) of AP to cover the likelihood on that aprticular need.

No amount of skill will get a 5.56x46mm ball round to penetrate a vehicle engine block at operational ranges.

BTW: I understand that certain special forces are now starting to carry the odd G3 type weapon with AP rounds for the very purpose of stopping vehicles from driving through road-blocks or ambushes through putting rounds through the engine block.

Oh yes and what has prompted the development of the new M855A1 round were the following:

Specific complaints include: 1) inability to effectively penetrate vehicle windshields; 2) poor long-range performance; and 3) failure to fragment even in short-range anti-personnel use.

I don't believe it to be responsible to just blow off these complaints as if the are irrelevant. I'm surprised at the USMC, i thought they would have had the balls to throw the BB rounds and the pea-shooter back at the suppliers.

JMA

12-18-2010, 02:09 PM

Not in my book. Good training, organisation and tactics will/should apply the tool effectively. As long as I have GPMG, Snipers (with 7.62), and HE projection in the platoon, I care very little close quarter weapon the rest are carrying.

You are drifting off the issue here. I accept that in the great British tradition of "Keep Calm and Carry On" one has to make the best of the current situation. All this has nothing to do with the selection of the 5.56mm calibre back in the early sixties. I am prepared to wager you that the promoters never laughed off the capabilities of 5.56mm nor accept its relegation to the status of the so-called "close quarter weapon". Like this new round they are touting they are telling everyone its the best thing since sliced bread. So it was with the introduction of the 5.56 calibre.

http://www.ochigo.co.uk/acatalog/keep-calm-tea-towel-2.jpg

Says who? All we have is wooly bodies of opinion, where folks resort to ballistic charts, and not actual comparative troop trials with weapons - which have yet to be done.

People on the other side of the debate are asking the same questions... and you are telling me that the 5.56 calibre was introduced before these trials you mention were carried out? You see what I mean? Surely the onus is upon those who made the change and those who support the continued use of the BB round to provide the proof?

I am amazed this even gets talked about. It's a complete non-subject. It's like folks arguing about 9mm v .45.

It gets talked about because the decision to select this BB round and a series of pea shooters to fire it is quite bizarre.

William F. Owen

12-18-2010, 02:32 PM

The penetration of what?
That is the question I am asking. What and why? I opt for CRISAT, not because it's particularly good, but because its a good comparative medium. No one has been able to describe a better standard. Therefore, "good enough."

If you require soft tissue penetration then you go for ball ammo but if you may require "hard target penetration" then go for AP ammo of this new M855A1 "wonder round" type... or you select another weapon for the task... just like with golf clubs.
I suggest you just need a round that is mostly adequate. 5.56mm and 7.62mm ball will do 90% of what might be required.

No amount of skill will get a 5.56x46mm ball round to penetrate a vehicle engine block at operational ranges.
Agreed. I've never heard of any infantry targeting the engine block. I would just train them to shoot the centre of mass.

All this has nothing to do with the selection of the 5.56mm calibre back in the early sixties. I am prepared to wager you that the promoters never laughed off the capabilities of 5.56mm nor accept its relegation to the status of the so-called "close quarter weapon".
Actually the story of how the US selected 5.56mm has been covered in exhaustive detail.
By close quarter weapon, I mean 200m, which is really the maximum range I would ever bother to teach your average bod to engage with, as an individual, from the standing position.

Fuchs

12-18-2010, 02:46 PM

That is the question I am asking. What and why? I opt for CRISAT, not because it's particularly good, but because its a good comparative medium. No one has been able to describe a better standard. Therefore, "good enough."

It's the last relevant standard because there's no such obstacle on any battlefield. You could as well simply use sectional energy and hardness factor for comparison.

SethB

12-18-2010, 05:55 PM

Why shoot through an engine block when we have radiators, oil pans and drivers close at hand?

Some things reek or arbitrariness.

I've met exactly one person, face to face, who thought the 7.62N was more effective in combat than the 5.56N. An old SBS guy.

He still managed to like both, however.

JMA

12-19-2010, 06:03 AM

Why shoot through an engine block when we have radiators, oil pans and drivers close at hand?{/QUOTE]

I can't believe this question. Think roadblock, think stop vehicle dead, ... think

[QUOTE]Some things reek or arbitrariness.

I would suggest that the people who have identified this need are people who have given it some thought and had the experience on the ground. They are certainly not like those who dredge up any lame excuse for a poor decision made nearly 50 years ago.

I've met exactly one person, face to face, who thought the 7.62N was more effective in combat than the 5.56N. An old SBS guy.

heh heh... and your sample size was?

He still managed to like both, however.

Oh goodie... I'm so pleased for the 5.56mm... everybody likes the 5.56 BB round.

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 06:13 AM

It's the last relevant standard because there's no such obstacle on any battlefield. You could as well simply use sectional energy and hardness factor for comparison.
So a better one would be?

JMA

12-19-2010, 06:34 AM

It's the last relevant standard because there's no such obstacle on any battlefield. You could as well simply use sectional energy and hardness factor for comparison.

Yes it is ridiculous.

I would assume that many like Wilf want a standard, any standard to work from. Understandable. But to set such an irrelevant standard is unprofessional and to accept it is poor judgement.

There are clear differences between the requirement to measure the penetration of :

1. soft tissue
2. bricks concrete and wood
3. armour/steel
4. etc

The 7.62x51mm NATO ball round meets an acceptable general standard there is also the option of the AP (armour piercing) round where hard targets are likely to be encountered.

Unfortunately they seem to be all over the place with the 5.56 round. I would love to see the demonstration they do for recruits comparing the 5.56 and the 7.62x39mm (as the enemy calibre). It must be written somewhere for both the US and Brits in English.

Probably starts something like this... "Good news for the junk-food generation is that the ammo the army gives you is half the weight of the old... (nothing about it being half as effective).

The commercial vested interest in the 5.56 and its delivery weapon means its here to stay... but it would be nice if the armies that have inflicted this BB round on their soldiers could summon up the honesty to say to their soldiers that "we have crap ammo and a crap weapon and we are just going to have to make the best out of it". Is that too much to ask?

...or maybe the conspiracy of silence (don't-ask-don't-tell) extends to ammo and weapons as well?

JMA

12-19-2010, 06:56 AM

So a better one would be?

The USMC seems to have done some work on this here (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lprGoEpDXJQ) ... and the bad news is the 5.56mm failed the tests... but as they say keep clam and carry on regardless.

One assumes that they and the Brits would have done similar tests in Afghanistan against locally found barriers to establish the penetration potential of their various weapons to establish which weapons to use in certain applications.

What's that I hear colonel? You have done no such tests? That's OK I have a place for you on an aircraft heading stateside this afternoon... you are out of here!

JMA

12-19-2010, 06:56 AM

It's the last relevant standard because there's no such obstacle on any battlefield. You could as well simply use sectional energy and hardness factor for comparison.

Exactly!

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 07:16 AM

The USMC seems to have done some work on this here (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lprGoEpDXJQ) ... and the bad news is the 5.56mm failed the tests... but as they say keep clam and carry on regardless.
Not really anything based on scientific method here. I don't see how you can say 5.56mm failed. That was very, very poor mechanical experimentation.

One assumes that they and the Brits would have done similar tests in Afghanistan against locally found barriers to establish the penetration potential of their various weapons to establish which weapons to use in certain applications.
Yes, they have found that an earthen wall that stops 30mm will stop 5.56mm. Also 5.56mm will not perforate old T-55 tanks hulls. ...but 5.56mm will kill a member of the Taliban at 800m - If you have a 20 inch barrel on your M-249!

In 1944, it was found that .303 didn't penetrate 14th century church walls commonly found in northern France. Scandal!

There's a difference between, requirement and performance. Knowing the performance of a round should be part of training. Creating a requirement is a whole other ball game.

Stan

12-19-2010, 07:48 AM

Why shoot through an engine block when we have radiators, oil pans and drivers close at hand?

Seth,
The point is to bring the vehicle to an immediate stop. A .50 round will do just that in addition to going through most commercial bricks and cinder blocks, and light armor.

Shooting the radiator (assuming there even is one located behind the grill) will not stop the vehicle. Shooting the oil pan ? Not sure how I would accomplish that from 4 to 800 meters away ?

Shooting the driver (assuming you could get a clean shot) still does not mean the vehicle comes to an abrupt dead stop (which is why we have decelerators and dead man switches on bulldozers - heart attack equals flooring the gas pedal :eek:).

SethB

12-19-2010, 08:18 AM

JMA

12-19-2010, 08:21 AM

That is the question I am asking. What and why? I opt for CRISAT, not because it's particularly good, but because its a good comparative medium. No one has been able to describe a better standard. Therefore, "good enough."

Not good enough. Certainly the US could do a better job if they wanted... but there is no incentive at the moment as all that would achieve is to prove how substandard the 5.56mm calibre is that they foisted on their own military and NATO.

I suggest you just need a round that is mostly adequate. 5.56mm and 7.62mm ball will do 90% of what might be required.

No Wilf. I remember as a recruit and later as an officer cadet been taken to the field firing range to watch a demonstration of our weapons vs their weapons. Apart from which ammo/weapon was better I certainly left knowing more about the capabilities of our weapons and that gave confidence. No doubt what thickness of tree the FN (firing 7.62x51mm NATO) could penetrate.

Agreed. I've never heard of any infantry targeting the engine block. I would just train them to shoot the centre of mass.

OK, think about it. What happens if the internals of the engine block are damaged on an in gear moving vehicle?

Actually the story of how the US selected 5.56mm has been covered in exhaustive detail.

So now what is outstanding is the investigation into how they got it so wrong and what to do about it.

By close quarter weapon, I mean 200m, which is really the maximum range I would ever bother to teach your average bod to engage with, as an individual, from the standing position.

Since when has the infantry's individual weapon been down graded to 200m? Since they introduced the BB ammo?

But seriously the Brit training is that even with the SA80 (family) there can be effective section fire out to 600m. Should that be revised?

JMA

12-19-2010, 08:25 AM

Seth,
The point is to bring the vehicle to an immediate stop. A .50 round will do just that in addition to going through most commercial bricks and cinder blocks, and light armor.

Shooting the radiator (assuming there even is one located behind the grill) will not stop the vehicle. Shooting the oil pan ? Not sure how I would accomplish that from 4 to 800 meters away ?

Shooting the driver (assuming you could get a clean shot) still does not mean the vehicle comes to an abrupt dead stop (which is why we have decelerators and dead man switches on bulldozers - heart attack equals flooring the gas pedal :eek:).

Thank you.

And the vehicle stops where you want it to (in the killing zone) and as the enemy troops debus you hit the clacker and detonate the claymores... and send your enemy on their merry way.

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 08:25 AM

The point is to bring the vehicle to an immediate stop. A .50 round will do just that in addition to going through most commercial bricks and cinder blocks, and light armor.

12.7mm may stop an small engine with one hit. I very much doubt 7.62mm AP would stop a truck engine, immediately, even if you managed to his the block, multiple times. I also very much doubt that the round would even reach the block, still stable enough to do good work.

What would stop it, is destruction of the sub-systems, especially ignition and HT leads, etc. This was certainly the case with aircraft engines in WW2. Fact is, firing at where you think the engine is, is essentially a "statistical approach."

JMA

12-19-2010, 09:05 AM

Not really anything based on scientific method here. I don't see how you can say 5.56mm failed. That was very, very poor mechanical experimentation.

I said the USMC had done some work on the matter, I did not say it was definitive. OK, so if you remove the test where the weapons fire at the walls from 45 degrees then the 5.56 passes. Happy now?

Yes, they have found that an earthen wall that stops 30mm will stop 5.56mm. Also 5.56mm will not perforate old T-55 tanks hulls. ...but 5.56mm will kill a member of the Taliban at 800m - If you have a 20 inch barrel on your M-249!

Was this the result of a proper testing process or just the result of casual observations? Do you not believe that soldiers when arriving in theatre should be informed of (amongst many other things) what their weapon is capable of in the local conditions?

In 1944, it was found that .303 didn't penetrate 14th century church walls commonly found in northern France. Scandal!
No they knew that before they landed in France. The scandal is that later - in 1963 - on the basis of lighter weight ammo the penetration ability was downgraded and the troops were sold a cock and bull story that the change was in fact an improvement.

There's a difference between, requirement and performance. Knowing the performance of a round should be part of training. Creating a requirement is a whole other ball game.

Knowing the performance in Afghanistan conditions? Is that being done... or do the troops rely on learning through trial and error?

Once that is learnt then yes perhaps a requirement for a weapon capable of filling the penetration gap may be identified.

As far as the primary penetration test for a infantryman's bullet is concerned it applies to soft tissue. It is difficult enough to hit a target in a fire fight and you need to issue your soldiers with a weapon that will put the enemy on his ass first time and then he stays down... and does not have a chance to take a shot at you through not being fully incapacitated.

JMA

12-19-2010, 09:18 AM

12.7mm may stop an small engine with one hit. I very much doubt 7.62mm AP would stop a truck engine, immediately, even if you managed to his the block, multiple times. I also very much doubt that the round would even reach the block, still stable enough to do good work.

What would stop it, is destruction of the sub-systems, especially ignition and HT leads, etc. This was certainly the case with aircraft engines in WW2. Fact is, firing at where you think the engine is, is essentially a "statistical approach."

I told you that among a certain set of SF this is being done. We must assume they have identified the need and done their homework.

If you feel the need to be convinced then why not run some tests yourself ... and then do an exercise on engine block placements in vehicles likely to be encountered for this purpose.

Oh yes the ammo:

http://www.inetres.com/gp/military/infantry/rifle/7.62mm/M993.gif
Cartridge, 7.62mm, Armor Piercing, M993

Used by M60 and M240 machine guns, and the M24 Sniper Weapon System. Intended for use against current and future light armored targets. The M993 offers the capability to defeat these targets at ranges 2 to 3 times that of previous AP ammunition.

The projectile assembly consists of a tungsten core penetrator contained in an aluminum cup and jacketed by tombac (similar to standard gilding metal, 90% copper, 10% zinc) clad steel. The shaped tungsten core provides enhanced armor penetration, representing a key departure from the current 7.62mm ball service round. The Bofors CGAB produced cartridge utilizes a conventional brass cartridge case with a Berdan primer. The propellant is a single base type manufactured by Bofors and the primer is manufactured by Dynamit Noble.

The M993 7.62mm AP Round is capable of penetrating a 7mm thick high hardness armor (HHA) plate at a distance of 500 meters from the muzzle of the weapon. This corresponds to 1/4" armor plate at a distance of 550m.
Source (http://www.inetres.com/gp/military/infantry/rifle/762mm_ammo.html)

Stan

12-19-2010, 09:43 AM

I'm well aware of what he was trying to say.

I am equally aware of the difficulty of actually hitting an engine block. At any distance.

I've seen them missed when shooting from 20M aware at a stationary target on a balmy day on the flat range.

Forgive me, because I was not getting that impression from your previous post.

Somewhat echoing Wilf's post below, firing into the engine bay means the fuel system, block, ignition components, etc. ... a much larger target if you will.

Wilf, I wouldn't use a .30 caliber round on anything but deer. And, you are quite correct (which is what I thought I made clear), you need to know your aircraft and vehicles before you begin to fire at gay abandon :D

JMA,
Claymores ? Now I'm getting a woodie :eek:

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 02:00 PM

I told you that among a certain set of SF this is being done. We must assume they have identified the need and done their homework.
I have a very good friends with UK SF background and I would make no such assumption. IIRC, the AP ammo requirement from UK SF in Ulster was to do with improvised armour fitted into cars and vans used by the IRA.

If you feel the need to be convinced then why not run some tests yourself ... and then do an exercise on engine block placements in vehicles likely to be encountered for this purpose.
...and what would the purpose of the test be?
Soldiers will basically shoot where they think they can hit. Good enough to get the engine compartment on a moving vehicle, let alone the block.

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 02:09 PM

Knowing the performance in Afghanistan conditions? Is that being done... or do the troops rely on learning through trial and error?
So you assume that the Afghan environment has unique characteristics? Is there a standard Afghan tree trunk? Door? Rural Wall? You cannot have one set of weapons for Afghanistan and another set for somewhere else.

Once that is learnt then yes perhaps a requirement for a weapon capable of filling the penetration gap may be identified.
So how would you identify that gap? Describe the process for me.

As far as the primary penetration test for a infantryman's bullet is concerned it applies to soft tissue.
Not in the UK. Most small arms doctrine has used CRISAT data since about 1995.

I have seen nothing in last 10 years from the last 40 years to show that the correct mix of 5.56mm and 7.62mm at the platoon level is deeply flawed, or that anyone can present better data to make more informed decisions.
Time was when the platoon was 9mm and .303. Worked well enough.

Blah

12-19-2010, 02:33 PM

Out of curiousity, Mr. Owen, what would be the "correct mix" of 5.56 and 7.62?

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 02:43 PM

Out of curiousity Mr. Owen, what would be the "correct mix" of 5.56 and 7.62?

a.) Call me Wilf.

b.) "Correct mix" will be the one proven just about right by experience and dependant on the operation. For a 30 man platoon, 2-3 x M-240/GPMG, and maybe 2-3 (7.62mm)"Sniper/Sharpshooter rifles." Everyone else can just carry an 5.56mm IW, some with the M203 attached.

I'd actually suggest what optics and sensor fits the weapons have to be just as important.

Blah

12-19-2010, 02:57 PM

"Correct mix" will be the one proven just about right by experience and dependant on the operation. For a 30 man platoon, 2-3 x M-240/GPMG, and maybe 2-3 (7.62mm)"Sniper/Sharpshooter rifles." Everyone else can just carry an 5.56mm IW, some with the M203 attached.

Ahh, does that mean you don't believe in the SAW concept? (unless you consider those IWs as well)

I believe there was an article near the beginning of this year that stated that US soldiers deploying to Afghanistan would be getting 2 DMRs per squad equipped with M14 EBRs.

Here it is: http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/03/army_m14_032210w/

William F. Owen

12-19-2010, 03:35 PM

Ahh, does that mean you don't believe in the SAW concept?
I am certainly a SAW sceptic. I did some interviews of Afghan veterans last month and the UK's L110 LMG is called "the noise maker." Given the choice the boys want to carry the GPMG. The problem seems to be the 10-inch barrel.

Now I've played on the range with IDF's Negev, and it's a very impressive weapon, at least in its most recent iteration. Good as it is, I'm not sure I want to have the weight and trouble of 2 x belt fed weapons types in a platoon.

The weight carried in TI-sights and NV would seem a better choice.

jcustis

12-19-2010, 05:27 PM

Ok, we seem to finally be drifting back to the original topic. Blah, I'd like to offer a few comments to your original post.

Which brings us back to the US... What I've gleaned from the testimonies of soldiers returning from Iraq/Afghan is that many of the riflemen carry around 500-600 (some have claimed as many as 1000) rounds of 5.56 ammunition with them on patrols, not to mention all of the other munitions and equipment they have to carry. This seems awfully excessive to me, and I wonder if this is due to the nature of their approach to suppression. I wouldn't be surprised if "firing in the general direction of the enemy" works on the insurgents there, however I wonder if it would work if the US were to face a similarly capable military.

I am not sure where you have seen these testimonials, but I can tell you that from a Marine Corps perspective, the 500-600 round count is patently not true, and anyone who said they carried 1,000 rounds is an outright liar and should be shot himself.

What you are talking about here is a loadout of 18 magazines, and the average infantryman has neither the quantity of pouches (issued to him) to carry that many magazines, or the real estate on his armor carrier to place the pouches.

If a larger quantity of ammunition is carried, that is typically because of difficulties with resupply, and the prospect of lengthy contacts in sequence. It is NOT because doctrine tells them to carry that load and use un-aimed fire to suppress the enemy.

Fuchs

12-19-2010, 05:44 PM

Depends.
Part of those 500-600 could be belted or still packaged in cardbox or stored in the backpack.

(I'm no fan of huge ammunition loads, though.)

Infanteer

12-19-2010, 05:56 PM

10 Mags (300 rounds) is what I've seen kicked around as the "standard". Some carry a few more, some a few less. I've never heard or seen someone try to carry 1000 rounds of rifle ammunition. This is 33 mags.

Over and above the 300 rounds, tack on something for the crew-served weapons (belt of 7.62mm, mortar bomb).

Soldiers with the LMG would typically carry 3-4 boxes; 600-800 rounds. Now, that being said this takes me back to a conversation I had with Ken White. We haven't had issues with the thing in Canada, but we employ it like a rifle - operated by a single soldier within "section level" tactics. It is usually not employed as a machinegun using the unique characteristics of a machine gun. Makes me wonder if there is any real advantage gained to the extra weight and rounds carried if it is employed as a Rifle?

Blah

12-19-2010, 05:57 PM

I am not sure where you have seen these testimonials, but I can tell you that from a Marine Corps perspective, the 500-600 round count is patently not true, and anyone who said they carried 1,000 rounds is an outright liar and should be shot himself.

They weren't all loaded into magazines. Around 7 - 10 magazines, the rest were stored in their pack for reloading the mags.

Regardless, I've never really personally heard someone say they carried less than 300 rounds overall that I can recall.

Infanteer

12-19-2010, 05:59 PM

In 7 months I never carried 300 rounds. My standard load-out was 210 rounds in 7 mags along with 4 smoke, 1 frag and either an M-72 or a belt of 7.62.

Blah

12-19-2010, 06:04 PM

Well, regardless, there was one person who claimed he wouldn't leave the FOB if all he could carry were 300 rounds.

It's good to see that isn't the norm though, although it seems to be more common with American troops.

jcustis

12-19-2010, 06:22 PM

:wry: Well, that takes the anecdotal information from "many" to a lone guy.

Oh, and I was tracking on the additional ammunition as likely being stowed in a pack or such, and that pack stowed back in a vehicle, not on our backs on a daily basis.

Blah

12-19-2010, 06:30 PM

I've heard more than one person claimed well over 300 among people who claimed close to basic load, but you're right, it is anecdotal. Which was partly why I made this topic.

jcustis

12-19-2010, 06:39 PM

Understood...

The Marine's basic issue of magazines from the supply channels does not allow for ready access/use of those 300 rounds. Any additional ammunition is for resupply during a longer lull.

JMA

12-19-2010, 10:51 PM

JMA,
Claymores ? Now I'm getting a woodie :eek:

Ah... a claymore enthusiast.

It did not take me long to figure out that the means of springing an ambush by tapping the LMG gunner on the shoulder then relying on the accuracy of a bunch of riflemen to make the kills was a pretty bad option.

Rhodesia had it own home-made claymores the mini and the maxi which we used to a lesser extent until the South Africans coped the US M18A1 (or equivalent of the early 70s) and the R1M1 became available to Rhodesian forces.

I was sent along to the introduction demonstrations which was mainly attended by the SAS. The SAS at the time were mainly doing daylight ambushes in Mozambique so were quite happy to position and aim the claymores perpendicular to the path/track and position the ambush party 50 metres from the path. The RLI and all other forces when ambushing did so internally and at night and with 4 man groups/sticks/call-signs.

At night even with an African full moon there was no chance of seeing anything from 50m off the path (we had no night vision equipment). So I adapted the "recommended" siting of the mines as per the image below (which became official policy in the army).

http://farm6.static.flickr.com/5243/5275321436_0aa46596b2_z.jpg

A few notes:

1. By positioning the claymores at 45 degrees from the path the ambush group can get closer to the path to see and then finish off what may survive.

2. Use of paces rather than metres is practical for field work.

3. With a 4 man stick the commander faces forward and has the clacker/initiator, one rifleman faces backwards, the other rifleman and the LMG gunner face down the two directions of the path (beyond the killing ground) with the LMG on the most likely approach side to engage those not caught in the killing ground and discourage any thought of their interfering or any heroics. (Even with two claymores we used Cordex initiated by one clacker.)

4. Additional claymores could be daisy chained outwards with the use of Cordtex (det cord) to include more of the insurgents in the fun.

5. The detail above makes no mention of the clacker (as initiator) as a number of the other units were using the older stuff (minis and maxis) which did not come with a clacker.

6. I set a demonstration using 50 paces of hessian cloth (burlap) at 6 foot high stretched taught between wooden posts. Then fired the claymores as per the detail above one at a time. After firing the first one troopies marked each of the 700 pellet strikes on the hessian with one colour of blackboard chalk. Then I got them to fire the second one and marked the strikes with a different colour chalk. I then positioned a troopie in the killing ground and had two others position at the two claymore detonation points. In this manner we were able to figure out how many strikes an insurgent would receive from either or or both claymores. No survivors in the 40 pace killing ground using two claymores.

7. The siting of the ambush must take into account ground levels, vegetation and rocks and things which may shield areas of the killing ground from hits and in addition and importantly obstacles which would interfere with the explosive gass flow and thus upset the predictable pellet spread.

8. At the initial demonstration we saw the effect of the 3.2mm (1/8 inch) steel ball on ballistic clay and the holes made were equivalent to the cavitation effect on soft tissue. Awesome.

9. For a time I was flown out to all ambushes sprung using a claymore to asses the effect. Again Awesome. (In one case where a less than perfect siting of the mine had happened the lead scout got one pellet in the back. First we found his weapon, a few steps later the sling bad he was carrying then his jacket (he pulled off on the run) with one hole with a little blood then him with a bloodied shirt. Must have made 30 metres before he ran out of luck.)

10. In this way and in a millisecond every living thing in the killing ground pays the ultimate sacrifice. This is the way to wage war.

JMA

12-19-2010, 11:16 PM

Ok, we seem to finally be drifting back to the original topic. Blah, I'd like to offer a few comments to your original post.

I am not sure where you have seen these testimonials, but I can tell you that from a Marine Corps perspective, the 500-600 round count is patently not true, and anyone who said they carried 1,000 rounds is an outright liar and should be shot himself.

What you are talking about here is a loadout of 18 magazines, and the average infantryman has neither the quantity of pouches (issued to him) to carry that many magazines, or the real estate on his armor carrier to place the pouches.

If a larger quantity of ammunition is carried, that is typically because of difficulties with resupply, and the prospect of lengthy contacts in sequence. It is NOT because doctrine tells them to carry that load and use un-aimed fire to suppress the enemy.

Interesting discussion.

I believe we have discussed this before here. Our loads were 100 rds minimum (5x20) for riflemen (I always carried 9x20). Machine gunners FN MAG always carried 500 rounds themselves.

I had sight of the Op Dingo Op Order a while ago and noted that riflemen carried 260 rounds (13x20) and 100 (2x50 rd belts for the gunner) and the gunner had 500 rds himself all in 50rd belts.

The idea of the 5.56 was to be able to carry twice the ammo for the same weight (or the same amount of ammo at half the weight). But it seems with the increasing use of auto fire there would be a need to carry in excess of 300 rds to have enough ammo for a good slug fest, yes?

jcustis

12-20-2010, 12:12 AM

But it seems with the increasing use of auto fire there would be a need to carry in excess of 300 rds to have enough ammo for a good slug fest, yes?

No. That's the wrong correlation to make.

JMA

12-20-2010, 12:24 AM

No. That's the wrong correlation to make.

Yes that was somewhat tongue in cheek... but it follows my position that the use of auto fire negates the benefit of any weight savings made by selecting a lighter round.

...but do tell, what is the correct correlation then?

jcustis

12-20-2010, 12:48 AM

Yes that was somewhat tongue in cheek... but it follows my position that the use of auto fire negates the benefit of any weight savings made by selecting a lighter round.

...but do tell, what is the correct correlation then?

There is no increased use of automatic fire in the works, so there is really zero correlation between weight and quantity at this time. The fact that the IAR has a fully-automatic capability, if that is what your are thinking of, has no bearing on the issue.

jcustis

12-20-2010, 07:23 AM

Here's an interesting recent clip. Seems we can be easily suppressed when there isn't anything really going on, besides our own firing.

http://www.apacheclips.com/media/26156/V.O.T.D_Crazy_Ambush_in_Afghanistan/

JMA

12-20-2010, 10:36 AM

Ken White

12-20-2010, 03:29 PM

Sactical kill vs. tactical skill... :wry:

JMA

12-20-2010, 06:26 PM

Sactical kill vs. tactical skill... :wry:

I don't know Ken. Saw a number of soldiers there not firing their weapons. SLA Marshall revisited?

JMA

12-20-2010, 06:29 PM

There is no increased use of automatic fire in the works, so there is really zero correlation between weight and quantity at this time. The fact that the IAR has a fully-automatic capability, if that is what your are thinking of, has no bearing on the issue.

OK lets settle for increased rate of fire. See on that video and in just about every Afghanistan video that the idea of aimed shots has flown out the window... or at least not being enforced.

Half weight ammo used at twice (or more) the recommended firing rate surely negates the promised benefit, yes?

Steve Blair

12-20-2010, 06:31 PM

I don't know ken. Saw a number of soldiers there not firing their weapons. SLA Marshall revisited?

If you mean making up data to suit a particular research angle, then it's possible.

Stan

12-20-2010, 08:26 PM

Sactical kill vs. tactical skill... :wry:

Concur ..., and a great site for promoting exactly what (sans English) :wry:

Apaches,
It's that time of the month again were we ask the community to donate a little bit of their vast fortune to support Apacheclips - Use the donation button below to keep this webpage online.

Remember - You let the Terrorists win if you don't donate! ;)

JMA

12-21-2010, 10:23 AM

If you mean making up data to suit a particular research angle, then it's possible.

No, I was talking about SLA Marshall and not the guys who forced through the 5.56mm calibre.

Steve Blair

12-21-2010, 02:13 PM

No, I was talking about SLA Marshall and not the guys who forced through the 5.56mm calibre.

So was I. It's been widely noted that Marshall fabricated a major portion of his "research."

William F. Owen

12-21-2010, 03:50 PM

So was I. It's been widely noted that Marshall fabricated a major portion of his "research."

....and almost every insight he ever produced was wrong!!!

Ken White

12-21-2010, 05:46 PM

I don't know Ken. Saw a number of soldiers there not firing their weapons. SLA Marshall revisited?Does this mean you are a proponent of firing even if there is no apparent target? Why waste ammo?

I used to bean people with a helmet or a rock for doing that... :D

Worse sin to me was excessive firing, particularly the occasional full auto firing.

Fuchs

12-21-2010, 07:58 PM

Does this mean you are a proponent of firing even if there is no apparent target? Why waste ammo?

To be honest, some didn't even attempt to see anything!

It would be better if they took cover, used trench periscopes and returned fire only once they detected an opponent.

Even better would have been to add smoke to dust and to change position asap, for this could have been or become a killing zone for heavier weapons.

The video is among those which basically say
"They would have had 20-100% KIA with this behaviour if they had been on the Eastern Front."

The incompetence of small war opposition like the TB ruins Western tactical skills. These people will train and lead the next generation of soldiers!

There's on the one hand a great emphasis on casualty avoidance, but on the other hand many actions aren't guided by survivability at all because you don't need that survivability as the threat is so ineffective.

- - - - -

If I had been an Afghani refugee living in Germany for the last 15 years and returned to Afghanistan only recently to join the resistance:

I would have needed a bolt action rifle with open sights, a few dozen cartridges in clips, an afternoon for preparations, a buddy with an AK and a single magazine and I would have killed half of that squad in the video - easily!

jcustis

12-21-2010, 08:12 PM

it would be better if they took cover, used trench periscopes

Still digging that one eh Fuchs? :eek:

Fuchs

12-21-2010, 08:40 PM

I love the compact ones. They're so unfair and even TIs don't help against them.

Kiwigrunt

12-21-2010, 09:06 PM

I love the compact ones. They're so unfair and even TIs don't help against them.

And that is why we don’t use them. They are unfair and as such not PC:D…..until that becomes an acronym for peris-cope:confused:.

JMA

12-22-2010, 01:04 AM

Does this mean you are a proponent of firing even if there is no apparent target? Why waste ammo?

I used to bean people with a helmet or a rock for doing that... :D

Worse sin to me was excessive firing, particularly the occasional full auto firing.

Can you interpret that video Ken. It was training somewhere wasn't it?

JMA

12-22-2010, 01:29 AM

To be honest, some didn't even attempt to see anything!

True. And who was the poser with the headcam? If he could keep standing on the road why was everyone else taking cover and hiding?

It would be better if they took cover, used trench periscopes and returned fire only once they detected an opponent.

You only need a periscope when the risk of lifting your head is too great.

Even better would have been to add smoke to dust and to change position asap, for this could have been or become a killing zone for heavier weapons.

To close with and kill the enemy? Not sure they do that much these days.

The video is among those which basically say
"They would have had 20-100% KIA with this behaviour if they had been on the Eastern Front."

Once again it is this patrolling on open ground or along roads. Do they expect to come across the Taliban sitting on the road having a chat? I just don't understand the MO. (modus operandi) - Trying to draw fire?

The incompetence of small war opposition like the TB ruins Western tactical skills. These people will train and lead the next generation of soldiers!

Even if the enemy is poor (my experience) one can still apply the tactical basics so as to allow maximum control and maintenance of battle-craft standards because even in such circumstances on a given day you could walk into a hard core group which would test your skills.

Basic section battle drills were not followed. I would withdraw that section or platoon from battle for retraining and send the poser with the headcam home - he is a hopeless case.

There's on the one hand a great emphasis on casualty avoidance, but on the other hand many actions aren't guided by survivability at all because you don't need that survivability as the threat is so ineffective.

Well the Afghanistan casualties are in the main through IEDs. The reason GSWs are a lesser cause is evident from videos like this.

If I had been an Afghani refugee living in Germany for the last 15 years and returned to Afghanistan only recently to join the resistance:

I would have needed a bolt action rifle with open sights, a few dozen cartridges in clips, an afternoon for preparations, a buddy with an AK and a single magazine and I would have killed half of that squad in the video - easily!

Sad but true.

Kiwigrunt

12-22-2010, 02:22 AM

Basic section battle drills were not followed. I would withdraw that section or platoon from battle for retraining and send the poser with the headcam home - he is a hopeless case.

Heh, did you notice how far he removed himself from his rifle at one point?:eek: (and reloading with his master hand.)
Ah well, at least they won the firefight.....did they?:wry:

I already don't like those HK replacements for the 203 I think. One advantage of them is supposed to be the ability to use them separate from the rifle (which you can actually do with a 203). They appear that heavy and clumsy that you almost have to keep them separate.

jcustis

12-22-2010, 02:24 AM

Well the Afghanistan casualties are in the main through IEDs. The reason GSWs are a lesser cause is evident from videos like this.

JMA, this statement does not make sense.

I have my issues with the lack of battle drill executed in the clip, but that has nothing to do with the lower number of GSW wounds.

The equation runs something like this:

If IED events > Small arms fire atks THEN IED wounds > GSWs. Screwed up or not, the reaction to contact is not the correlation.

Maybe it just rubs me the wrong way and your usage is intended to convey another meaning, but why do you use the term "poser" when something draws your ire?

Fuchs

12-22-2010, 02:27 AM

Gunshot wound statistics and especially KIA are also influenced by the use of level IV body armour and the state of medical support.

Ken White

12-22-2010, 03:17 AM

Can you interpret that video Ken. It was training somewhere wasn't it?Not enough info to do any analysis or interpretation beyond the quite superficial -- in which you've already indulged. ;)

JMA

12-22-2010, 04:40 AM

JMA, this statement does not make sense.

I have my issues with the lack of battle drill executed in the clip, but that has nothing to do with the lower number of GSW wounds.

The equation runs something like this:

If IED events > Small arms fire atks THEN IED wounds > GSWs. Screwed up or not, the reaction to contact is not the correlation.

Maybe it just rubs me the wrong way and your usage is intended to convey another meaning, but why do you use the term "poser" when something draws your ire?

OK, Fuchs said:

There's on the one hand a great emphasis on casualty avoidance, but on the other hand many actions aren't guided by survivability at all because you don't need that survivability as the threat is so ineffective.

To which I replied:

Well the Afghanistan casualties are in the main through IEDs. The reason GSWs are a lesser cause is evident from videos like this.

So once the IED related casualties are subtracted from the casualty totals the number of GSWs as part of the whats left is not more than 40% of the total.

The predictability of patrol routes (leading to more IEDs), range at which contacts initiated (less likely to inflict casualties) and the seeming lack of offensive action (and basic contact drills) - other than spray and pray stuff allows the Taliban to safely withdraw without be closed with (which has a greater risk of sustaining GSW casualties).

I am not privy to all the contact reports and sitreps which would provide data as to what percentage of contacts result in no own force casualties or no casualties either side and whether the encounter actions are siltation A, B or C.

Most of the stuff I see on YouTube or other (and confirmed anecdotally from my contacts) is that most contact is where the initiative lies with the enemy.

All this after a lot of noise seems to end up in a kind of Mexican standoff where the Taliban know how long they have to exchange the odd shot before the air effort will react.

What is your definition of a poser?

JMA

12-22-2010, 04:43 AM

Not enough info to do any analysis or interpretation beyond the quite superficial -- in which you've already indulged. ;)

I don't blame you ;)

I wonder if anyone out there has a video which can be used as a positive example?

JMA

12-22-2010, 04:48 AM

Gunshot wound statistics and especially KIA are also influenced by the use of level IV body armour and the state of medical support.

Not privy to the statistics of what the body armour has stopped or where the body armour may not have been properly fitted resulting in casualties or indeed where the wounds were which were fatal.

jcustis

12-22-2010, 05:17 AM

0I wrote this in a totally unrelated thread (well, it was about the IAR, so somewhat related) on a different board. I may have already posted it elsewhere here.

The biggest counter-mobility issue that patrols have to face is in fact the IED, used by the insurgents to cover flanks or avenues of approach that coalition forces might use when counterattacking. Although the patrol had issues and did things that I would not have allowed, the matter of the IED is something that armchair observers often do not grasp when looking at the contacts we are having. It is an occupational hazard that I wish we could just clench our teeth against and drive on, but it is a booby trap by another name, and a very effective one when employed properly.

In the Afghan context (southern Helmand and populated areas of the green zone), I've seen that the enemy are very good at four things. 1) they hit us at a time and place generally of their choosing 2) they make superb use of covered and concealed avenues of approach to break contact and exfil at the precise moment when we either start to gain advantage or air checks on station. 3) they are able to move to the flanks because they can do a good job of moving on covered and concealed avenues of approach they have already rehearsed. 4) they use IEDs exceptionally well as fixing/blocking obstacles to support his contact. When they let the RPK or PKM engage, it's because they sighted that weapon in to cover a specific piece of dirt and to execute a specific mission as part of the contact they intend to initiate. When we get "outgunned" as so many internet know-it-alls like to call it, it's usually just a case of not being able to immediately get a direct fire weapon(s) oriented onto the source of the enemy fire. When we finally do, he has usually started his security drill and begun to beak contact. In my opinion, we are forced to deal with precision fires anyway, so why not shave what weight you can, avoid lugging the fully-loaded SAW around in 125 deg heat, and employ something half the weight but arguably more effective?

We typically train to "get the guns up, get the guns up!", and that is a good, solid battle drill. In a lot of instances, we have done it by wrote so much that we have a hard time seeing the ground for what it can do for us, and have a harder time just getting up and moving. There are usually a lot of AoAs where, save dealing with an IED, we could move unhindered for a while and do not need suppression to make that move. The hardest part is orienting on where that AoA is. Employing SAWs doesn't make that any easier. My mention of that night Iraq contact is another example of how training can get you goofed up sometimes - I was using fire control terms picked up on the qualification range

I can think of probably only one occasion where the fields of fire were over open ground, which could support setting a LMG/MMG in and employ a support-by-fire element to cover maneuver. The rest of the time, the boys had to fight across levee road and mud wall compartments to be able to maintain PID, get to a flank, and go to guns.

As for the predictability of the patrol routes, we patrol where the people are, because that is where the enemy is, plain and simple. It becomes an occupational hazard, that's all. We could be really random and patrol in the hinterlands, and it wouldn't affect the insurgent one bit...he is where the people are.

The rest of your information is generally correct. They rarely press attacks, and melt away once we begin to gain the advantage.

As for posers, this is a poser in my book:
http://i30.photobucket.com/albums/c309/deftac03/Cowboy.jpg

And so are these guys:
http://i30.photobucket.com/albums/c309/deftac03/83.jpg

If you could refrain from making openly disparaging comments about young men facing combat and taking on the enemy, it would be appreciated.

William F. Owen

12-22-2010, 07:58 AM

Not privy to the statistics of what the body armour has stopped or where the body armour may not have been properly fitted resulting in casualties or indeed where the wounds were which were fatal.

I recently attended and spoke at a body armour conference. The Turkish Army , based on 25 years of casualty statistics attributed body armour to 30%+ reduction in fatalities, and UK statistics from Afghanistan are very similar.

The evidence to date suggests that not issuing body armour would lead to about a 1/3rd more KIA.

I also asked a room full of British soldiers, all with multiple tours, if any had witnessed, were aware of, or had suffered small arms plate strikes, and the vast majority had. Again this jells with the statistics.

JMA

12-22-2010, 11:59 AM

Here are some photos ex-Rhodesia. Which are of genuine kids preparing for or having returned from doing the "business" and which is of a poser?

http://www.lonestarairsoft.com/forums/photopost/data/500/Rhodesia_RPD.jpg http://farm5.static.flickr.com/4058/4499965120_088f0c6c57_z.jpg http://farm5.static.flickr.com/4057/4641190423_b8c70eab2f_z.jpg http://farm6.static.flickr.com/5168/5282872956_90a532434f_z.jpg

Compost

12-22-2010, 01:51 PM

Part of those 500-600 could be belted or still packaged in cardbox or stored in the backpack.

They weren't all loaded into magazines. Around 7 - 10 magazines, the rest were stored in their pack for reloading the mags.

The Marine's basic issue of magazines from the supply channels does not allow for ready access/use of those 300 rounds. Any additional ammunition is for resupply during a longer lull.

These comments indicate that a lesson hard-earned many times is being ignored or disregarded. Here’s an example of one such.

In 1966 in SVN an Australian infantry company (D-Coy 6RAR) of about 100 men fought a day/night battle against a much larger force of NVA/VC. The battle was in and around a rubber plantation and for much of the time there was torrential rain. D Company was supported by artillery fire and received some small arms ammunition free-dropped from cargo helicopters until reinforced by ten M113 HMG-equipped APCs carrying most of A-Company 6RAR. The firearms and ammunition used by D-Company were later described in a commercial book that provided interesting details.

The outstanding weapon of the action was the 7.62mm self-loading rifle used by all riflemen. Only two failed, these with broken firing pins. The M60 GPMG failed in the extreme conditions, with seven out of nine out of action by the end of the battle. This was not because of internal mechanical breakdown, but because the belted ammunition could not be kept free of mud. Recommendations were made to overcome this, as well as for the resupply of ammunition in suitable form. ((Some ammunition belts were carried slung, and each riflemen had a sizeable proportion of his ammunition in clips rather than in loaded magazines.)) The Owen gun ((9mm SMG)) was not considered effective at ranges in excess of 25 metres and was at a disadvantage because it did not have tracer ammunition. The Armalite M16 rifle performed well but had a number of stoppages due to expanded cases. (McNeill, Ian; To Long Tan, Allen & Unwin 1993, p354-355)

A pertinent instruction arising from this action was that:

Riflemen would in future be required to carry a minimum of seven fully charged magazines (a total of 140 rounds) when large-scale contacts were possible. ........ Ammunition resupplied would also be in magazines.(ibid, p354)

The last quote clearly warns against reliance on rifle ammunition in clips. Ballistite rounds are probably no longer issued for launching grenades, or sensors or UAVs so what else has to be considered ? How about these as instructions on 5.56mm and 7.62mm ammunition and magazines for riflemen and designated marksmen ?

If AP, match, tracer or mixed is being carried then - at least until needed - each should be in a labelled magazine or magazines that are smaller than the magazine used for standard ball. All small magazines should be carried in a designated and suitably sized pouch(s).

At most 30 rounds of ball should be carried in clips for topping-up.

Tactical resupply should be arranged in magazines loaded as above.

And finally, ammunition in resupply magazines can be reloaded into any preferred magazine of the same size when time permits.

Ken White

12-22-2010, 02:47 PM

Here are some photos ex-Rhodesia. Which are of genuine kids preparing for or having returned from doing the "business" and which is of a poser?I do know you haven't been to Afghanistan and I do know you too frequently throw out the tag of "poser." That with no knowledge of who there is doing what. You get called on it every time.

All throwing that word out does is make you look ill informed and petty.

Nit like...:rolleyes:

JMA

12-22-2010, 03:49 PM

I do know you haven't been to Afghanistan and I do know you too frequently throw out the tag of "poser." That with no knowledge of who there is doing what. You get called on it every time.

All throwing that word out does is make you look ill informed and petty.

Nit like...:rolleyes:

Any war, any army, any generation, you can spot a poser a mile off. Have you considered the knee-jerk reaction may be as a result of a nerve being touched?

jcustis

12-22-2010, 04:19 PM

Any war, any army, any generation, you can spot a poser a mile off. Have you considered the knee-jerk reaction may be as a result of a nerve being touched?

Okay, here's the deal. It does not cause knee-jerk reaction, but it is pissing me the hell off. I'm not adding an emoticon because you need to focus on the words

We corresponded by PMs about an important historical topic to me, and I thought you had your stuff wired.

Right now you are simply becoming a very annoying poster who seems to relish in being contrary for the sake of being contrary. I would normally ignore the constant attempts to inflame the members of the board JMA, but 3/4 of your posts bring virtually nothing to this board, and frankly, that is the greatest shame of it all.

If you simply cannot control the impulse to get into a spat and use barbed language to start an argument here (and yes, you come across as doing it on purpose), I make the motion that you just go away and take a tactical time out.

This isn't a matter of closing ranks against you, but chrissakes man, in close to the year you've been here and 1,000+ posts you've managed to make, you still come across as an internet troll. I think I speak for a number of members here who do a face palm every time they see that you are the last member to post to a thread, because we know you will have typically ignored the spirit of the thread and started to go off on your own Quixote tangent.

Get some better decorum or please just go away and find a quorum of other folks who care to do nothing but bash right along with you. There are several of them. In fact, if you want a great forum to argue, go here: http://www.ar15.com/forums/board.html?b=3

Infanteer

12-22-2010, 05:27 PM

It's almost like that guy who keeps sitting on the "send" switch when you're trying to get on the radio.

Thank you for saying what many have been thinking....

JMA

12-22-2010, 06:08 PM

A pertinent instruction arising from this action was that:

Riflemen would in future be required to carry a minimum of seven fully charged magazines (a total of 140 rounds) when large-scale contacts were possible. ........ Ammunition resupplied would also be in magazines.

This is interesting. I wonder from what level was it increased to 140 rounds per rifleman and what the dates were?

A quick look indicates it could be 18 August 1966 – The Battle of Long Tan (http://www.6rarassociation.com/bnhistory.htm)

JMA

12-22-2010, 06:25 PM

I recently attended and spoke at a body armour conference. The Turkish Army , based on 25 years of casualty statistics attributed body armour to 30%+ reduction in fatalities, and UK statistics from Afghanistan are very similar.

The evidence to date suggests that not issuing body armour would lead to about a 1/3rd more KIA.

I also asked a room full of British soldiers, all with multiple tours, if any had witnessed, were aware of, or had suffered small arms plate strikes, and the vast majority had. Again this jells with the statistics.

Thanks for the update.

I guess we will have to wait for the declassification of the info relating to where these potentially lethal body armour strikes were and also the data that given the torso area protection and helmet of course where the fatal GSWs were.

I would have thought the protection was higher than 1/3.

SethB

12-22-2010, 07:01 PM

The evidence to date suggests that not issuing body armour would lead to about a 1/3rd more KIA.

Most of the SF and Ranger NCOs that I've talked to would choose to wear armor on in urban fighting or while mounted. Anything else and they would rather not have plates.

JMA

12-22-2010, 07:01 PM

Ah... a claymore enthusiast.

It did not take me long to figure out that the means of springing an ambush by tapping the LMG gunner on the shoulder then relying on the accuracy of a bunch of riflemen to make the kills was a pretty bad option.

Rhodesia had it own home-made claymores the mini and the maxi which we used to a lesser extent until the South Africans coped the US M18A1 (or equivalent of the early 70s) and the R1M1 became available to Rhodesian forces.

The Rhodesian made Mini-Claymore was carried in a bandoleer (probably inside a pack) were smaller than the R1M1. On difficult ground they could be used at greater density than the larger R1M1 to ensure full coverage of the killing ground. Easy to be carried by 4-man sticks could be used for LUP defence or to booby trap a route with a trip wire. The SAS using 13 mini-claymores on a cordex detonated ring main on a day ambush in Mozambique got 17 kills out of 21 insurgents circa around 1976 on the sixth day in ambush.

http://farm6.static.flickr.com/5043/5283078093_7b2b2eddd0_b.jpg

selil

12-22-2010, 07:33 PM

I also asked a room full of British soldiers, all with multiple tours, if any had witnessed, were aware of, or had suffered small arms plate strikes, and the vast majority had. Again this jells with the statistics.

Two of my line of duties injuries (law enforcement) were both shank blades below the body armor and only slightly slowed by the skirt below the armor. Not much to be done as we did everything by the book.

I've often said that the reason police fatalities increase in summer is because the body armor comes off in the heat. It is consistently argued that the real reason is because hostile contacts increase, but correlation is not causation.

JMA

12-22-2010, 08:26 PM

Okay, here's the deal. It does not cause knee-jerk reaction, but it is pissing me the hell off. I'm not adding an emoticon because you need to focus on the words

We corresponded by PMs about an important historical topic to me, and I thought you had your stuff wired.

Right now you are simply becoming a very annoying poster who seems to relish in being contrary for the sake of being contrary. I would normally ignore the constant attempts to inflame the members of the board JMA, but 3/4 of your posts bring virtually nothing to this board, and frankly, that is the greatest shame of it all.

If you simply cannot control the impulse to get into a spat and use barbed language to start an argument here (and yes, you come across as doing it on purpose), I make the motion that you just go away and take a tactical time out.

This isn't a matter of closing ranks against you, but chrissakes man, in close to the year you've been here and 1,000+ posts you've managed to make, you still come across as an internet troll. I think I speak for a number of members here who do a face palm every time they see that you are the last member to post to a thread, because we know you will have typically ignored the spirit of the thread and started to go off on your own Quixote tangent.

Get some better decorum or please just go away and find a quorum of other folks who care to do nothing but bash right along with you. There are several of them. In fact, if you want a great forum to argue, go here: http://www.ar15.com/forums/board.html?b=3

Will respond to this by PM

Compost

12-22-2010, 08:42 PM

This is interesting. I wonder from what level was it increased to 140 rounds per rifleman and what the dates were?

A quick look indicates it could be 18 August 1966 – The Battle of Long Tan (http://www.6rarassociation.com/bnhistory.htm)

A typical level was 100 rounds: 60 in magazines, 40 in clips.

That correlates with another reference.
The normal 60 rounds per rifleman, carried in three magazines, had been calculated taking into account the 3RAR usage rate.(McNeill, Ian; To Long Tan, Allen & Unwin 1993, p321)

Date of change was probably 19 August 1966.

JMA

12-22-2010, 09:03 PM

A typical level was 100 rounds: 60 in magazines, 40 in clips.

That correlates with another reference.
The normal 60 rounds per rifleman, carried in three magazines, had been calculated taking into account the 3RAR usage rate.(McNeill, Ian; To Long Tan, Allen & Unwin 1993, p321)

Date of change was probably 19 August 1966.

Thank you for that. As a matter of interest what is the rifleman's first line today?

I think these figures say a lot about the fire control and fire discipline of that time.

In the mid 70s in Rhodesia (RLI) we were still on 100 in 5 magazines and 50 in clips in a bandoleer for the FN.

This crept up and likewise resupply became always with loaded magazines and loaded belts (for the FN MAG).

The first line carried was left largely up to sub-units (but never to the troopie himself unless he wanted more within reason). On big ops it went up to 260 in magazines when contact was certain -1977-80

Blah

12-22-2010, 09:32 PM

A typical level was 100 rounds: 60 in magazines, 40 in clips.

That correlates with another reference. [/ QUOTE]The normal 60 rounds per rifleman, carried in three magazines, had been calculated taking into account the 3RAR usage rate.[/ QUOTE](McNeill, Ian; To Long Tan, Allen & Unwin 1993, p321)

Wow. 100 rounds seems pretty low to me (although those are just my uneducated "feelings"). I wonder how the troops felt about the amount of ammunition they carried.

Perhaps my perceptions are skewed due to the videos I see on youtube and such featuring engagements in Iraq/Afghan. A number of them contain troops firing streams of 5 - 10 rounds at a time, in which case I do not believe 100 rounds would be adequate at all.

Ken White

12-22-2010, 11:04 PM

Wow. 100 rounds seems pretty low to me (although those are just my uneducated "feelings"). I wonder how the troops felt about the amount of ammunition they carried.a basic load of 100 rounds, 5x20 mags (but many scrounged extra mags or carried a few boxes of 20 in their rucksack. seldom used the extras); with the later issue of 30rd mags (and larger ammo pouches for them) the basic load went to 210 rounds, 7 x 30
Perhaps my perceptions are skewed due to the videos I see on youtube and such featuring engagements in Iraq/Afghan. A number of them contain troops firing streams of 5 - 10 rounds at a time, in which case I do not believe 100 rounds would be adequate at all.No, it's not -- and that's why full auto firing should be prohibited under most circumstances. It's unnecessary, wasteful of ammo and rarely does much good. OTOH, held to semi auto, 100 rounds is adequate for most things, most days; the 210 nominally available is more than adequate provided no full auto other than for breaking contact or charging an ambush in close terrain and then no more than one mag (even that's unwarranted IMO).

Ken White

12-22-2010, 11:12 PM

Any war, any army, any generation, you can spot a poser a mile off. Have you considered the knee-jerk reaction may be as a result of a nerve being touched?One may be able to spot what you call a "poser" a mile off but so far you are 0 for 2 -- that means you've labeled someone a poser twice to my recollection and gotten called on it both times. You got called not due to your hitting a nerve but because you were just wrong.

Jon has warned you to modify your posting style and rhetoric. I've asked you twice to modify it. I'll not ask again.

Blah

12-23-2010, 12:02 AM

No, it's not -- and that's why full auto firing should be prohibited under most circumstances. It's unnecessary, wasteful of ammo and rarely does much good. OTOH, held to semi auto, 100 rounds is adequate for most things, most days; the 210 nominally available is more than adequate provided no full auto other than for breaking contact or charging an ambush in close terrain and then no more than one mag (even that's unwarranted IMO).

I wasn't referring to full-auto per se, although I can tell you hate it with a passion. :rolleyes: I was referring to really rapid semi-auto fire.

An example can be found here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhwDZUa01go
If my counting ability is accurate, he expended 65 - 70 rounds in 2 - 3 minutes. Not sure if that's considered "fast".

Ken White

12-23-2010, 02:29 AM

He's firing on full auto. Note that mostly he's firing over a large rock, I can't see what he might have seen but it appears from the video that he's just popping caps in unaimed fire. Hopefully not -- but...

Stupid

JMA

12-23-2010, 12:42 PM

One may be able to spot what you call a "poser" a mile off but so far you are 0 for 2 -- that means you've labeled someone a poser twice to my recollection and gotten called on it both times. You got called not due to your hitting a nerve but because you were just wrong.

Jon has warned you to modify your posting style and rhetoric. I've asked you twice to modify it. I'll not ask again.

Responded by PM.

jcustis

12-23-2010, 05:54 PM

I wasn't referring to full-auto per se, although I can tell you hate it with a passion. :rolleyes: I was referring to really rapid semi-auto fire.

An example can be found here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhwDZUa01go
If my counting ability is accurate, he expended 65 - 70 rounds in 2 - 3 minutes. Not sure if that's considered "fast".

It is not so much fast as it is an immediate reaction to enemy contact. That soldier (and not unlike many Marines and other soldiers) has it ingrained in his head to "seek cover and return fire". That's exactly what the schoolhouse textbooks say. Where those texts fail is in not describing it as "aimed fire."

There is a lot of full-auto fire going on, and it looks as though they really had not idea where to send it, as evident in the POV guy's lack of any commands or orientation until more rounds crack overhead and he finally calls out a direction. it's pretty clear that he isn't even achieving the stock weld necessary He alsi starts out firing at the hillside that looks to be close to 500m so that appears to be an attempt to satisfy some notion that getting rounds out - any rounds - is better that waiting to ID the threat target. That's an example of our training problem.

This also shows how, despite cracking closely overhead, close calls do not in fact always suppress. They could have walked off that hillside with probably little effect from further enemy fire.

jcustis

12-23-2010, 06:03 PM

It is not so much fast as it is an immediate reaction to enemy contact. That soldier (and not unlike many Marines and other soldiers) has it ingrained in his head to "seek cover and return fire". That's exactly what the schoolhouse textbooks say. Where those texts fail is in not describing it as "aimed fire."

There is a lot of full-auto fire going on (though not from him - even though at his speed it might as well be FA), and it looks as though they really had no idea where to send it, as evident in the POV guy's lack of any commands or orientation until more rounds crack overhead and he finally calls out a direction. It's pretty clear to me that he isn't even achieving the stock weld necessary He also starts out firing at the hillside that looks to be close to 500m so that appears to be an attempt to satisfy some notion that getting rounds out - any rounds - is better that waiting to ID the threat target. That's an example of our training problem. His call of "get some rounds," is disturbing in that there is nothing is the way of any fire direction

This also shows how, despite cracking closely overhead, close calls do not in fact always suppress. They could have walked off that hillside with probably little effect from further enemy fire.

We need to train these habits out of these warriors.

jcustis

12-23-2010, 11:02 PM

Can any of you vets remember the organization of the Marine Rifle Squad pre- M249 SAW? If it entered service around 1984, what were we using before that, and what TTPs were employed?

slapout9

12-23-2010, 11:22 PM

Can any of you vets remember the organization of the Marine Rifle Squad pre- M249 SAW? If it entered service around 1984, what were we using before that, and what TTPs were employed?

In the 70's it was like the Army(except marines still had 3 fire teams) there was a designated AR man (automatic rifleman) who carried an m-16 with the selector switch flipped to full auto,there was no 3 round burst mode back then. At least that is how I remember it when we cross trained with them.

Stan

12-23-2010, 11:23 PM

JC,
I could be mistaken, but I recall the modified M-14 with bipod to be the SAW's predecessor (in a rifle squad). In the early 70's the rifle squads still hung onto their M-14s although M-16s were already issued. Three fire teams with one each modified M-14 and two each M-14 and the squad leader with a M-79 :cool:

M-60s were part of machine gun sections back then ?

selil

12-24-2010, 12:04 AM

Can any of you vets remember the organization of the Marine Rifle Squad pre- M249 SAW? If it entered service around 1984, what were we using before that, and what TTPs were employed?

I entered in 1984, four man fire team (all M16s), sometimes 1 m203s, and we could upgrade in a squad to M60s.

I turned around and pulled my "Guidebook for Marines" (circa 1979) and what was issued to be in bootcamp off the shelf. It says (Chapter 29):

The current Marine Corps Rifle Squad... is made up of 13 men, a sergeant (squad leader) and three teams of four men each .. each fire team consists of a corporal (fire team leader), a lance corporal (automatic rifleman), and two privates or privates first class , one designated as grenadier/rifleman and the other as rifleman.

Picture included.

Rifleman

12-24-2010, 12:05 AM

Stan

12-24-2010, 12:14 AM

Stan,

I believe the M14E2 was shortlived. I don't think any were in use in the '70s.

Three fire teams? You must be talking about USMC squads because Army squads have always had two fire teams. 11 men for a long time, the change to nine men came in the mid-'80s when I was in Vicenza.

M60s have usually been part of a weapons squad per TOE but often showed up in rifle squads in the field.

Rifleman,
Thanks. IMO the E2 was to the Marines as the 1911 was to many Army SF well after replacements arrived. The M-16 came in around 68 ? but yet we still had the M-14s around in the mid-90s when Clinton wanted to burn them ?

Yes, three fire teams for the USMC. A bit confusing on how many soldiers now following Sam's post. I have 10, you have 11 and Sam has 13 :confused:

jcustis

12-24-2010, 12:16 AM

I entered in 1984, four man fire team (all M16s), sometimes 1 m203s, and we could upgrade in a squad to M60s.

I turned around and pulled my "Guidebook for Marines" (circa 1979) and what was issued to be in bootcamp off the shelf. It says (Chapter 29):

The current Marine Corps Rifle Squad... is made up of 13 men, a sergeant (squad leader) and three teams of four men each .. each fire team consists of a corporal (fire team leader), a lance corporal (automatic rifleman), and two privates or privates first class , one designated as grenadier/rifleman and the other as rifleman.

Picture included.

Excellent find Sam! That's just what I thought would be true. All M16s eh? I take it these were M16A1 models with a full auto sear assembly?

And does that guidebook offer any tidbits on employment of that automatic rifleman?

Stan

12-24-2010, 12:22 AM

I don't want to bitch, but if the SAW entered service in 84, then Sam's book from 79 is a smiggin old :eek:

So, how many were in a USMC rifle squad from say 69 (when the M-14E2 expired) to 79 and what exactly was the SAW's direct replacement ?

selil

12-24-2010, 12:45 AM

Excellent find Sam! That's just what I thought would be true. All M16s eh? I take it these were M16A1 models with a full auto sear assembly?

And does that guidebook offer any tidbits on employment of that automatic rifleman?

It says..

The Automatic Rifleman . He carries out the orders of the fire team leader. He is also the assistant fire team leader. He is responsible to the fire team leader for the effective employment of the automatic rifle and for the condition and care of his weapon and equipment. As assistant fire team leader, he assumes leadership for his unit whenever his fire team is not present.

Yes these were M16a1's ...

And to hold others off. It is (C) 1979, but this Fourteenth Revised Edition (Third Printing) 1 November 1982...

ETA: There is also an entire section on squad tactics if that was of interest.

jcustis

12-24-2010, 12:51 AM

Hmmm. I figured as much. Well, that doesn't lead me too many places...

slapout9

12-24-2010, 12:55 AM

The primary difference as far as the weapon is the selector switch for the AR man was always supposed to be on Automatic (full automatic) back then everyone else should switch to semi-auto. The AR man did or at least he was supposed to carry a light-weight aluminum bi-pod that could be easily attached to the M-16. It was M-16 A1 through E1 series if I remember E1 had (different flash suppressor). The 3 man fire team was really unusual to the Army, there whole squad formations and tactics were alot different. Used to have a thing called Fire Team in trace or something like that, maybe Sam knows. Pretty much the end of my memory. I do remember some marines still having the M-79 blooper as of 1973.

selil

12-24-2010, 12:56 AM

Hmmm. I figured as much. Well, that doesn't lead me too many places...

I did look through my NCO books (yes I kept all that stuff it's fun to scare children with), and a few of my tactical manuals. But, none of them really fit. I was a technical squad, and in a TOW company, which means we were by default heavy weapons (I carried an M60 most of the time because I was fat).

Stan

12-24-2010, 12:56 AM

It says..

The Automatic Rifleman . He carries out the orders of the fire team leader. He is also the assistant fire team leader. He is responsible to the fire team leader for the effective employment of the automatic rifle and for the condition and care of his weapon and equipment. As assistant fire team leader, he assumes leadership for his unit whenever his fire team is not present.

Yes these were M16a1's ...

And to hold others off. It is (C) 1979, but this Fourteenth Revised Edition (Third Printing) 1 November 1982...

ETA: There is also an entire section on squad tactics if that was of interest.

Thanks Sam !
I was more interested in the troop numbers and weapons prior to the SAW and according to this Vietnam-era history site (http://www.eleven-bravo.co.uk/the-war/organisation/usmc-rifle-cpy.php), there were 13 men and no sign of m-16s.

Kiwigrunt

12-24-2010, 01:41 AM

... Vietnam-era history site (http://www.eleven-bravo.co.uk/the-war/organisation/usmc-rifle-cpy.php), there were 13 men and no sign of m-16s.

Cool site. Under the rifle squad paragraph it does actually say this:

Each squad was broken down into three fireteams of 4 men. Each fireteam has an NCO as leader, an automatic rifleman (M-14 modified) and 2 riflemen (assistant automatic rifleman and scout) armed with the standard M-14.

Each Rifle Squad has an M-14 Modified, equipped with a bipod, for use as an automatic weapon. Unless otherwise noted all personnel are equipped with the M-14 prior to 1968. From 1968 on the USMC were issued with the M-16 though it was not uncommon for units to retain the Modified M-14's for their firepower.

The M-79 grenadier was usually directed by the squad leader.

Ken White

12-24-2010, 02:10 AM

The MarCorps 13 man squad, 1943-1962, had three BARs. From 1962 until 1964-5, it had three standard M-14s which were equipped with the full auto selector capability in lieu of the supposed to be issued M-15, a heavy barrel, permanent bipod M-14 with selective fire but which proved to be no better in the role than the full auto standard M-14s.

That led to the M-14E2 which later became the M-14A1(LINK) (http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.hk94.com/images/m14-var.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.hk94.com/m14.html&usg=__M9-cd695nrXX_tAB9uZfAxVt24k=&h=404&w=468&sz=33&hl=en&start=92&zoom=1&tbnid=QKZmXRVHvViP5M:&tbnh=144&tbnw=167&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dmarines%2BM-14E2%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dfirefox-a%26sa%3DG%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26biw%3D1233%26bih%3D901%26tbs%3Disch: 10%2C2052&um=1&itbs=1&iact=hc&vpx=583&vpy=414&dur=4200&hovh=209&hovw=242&tx=120&ty=111&ei=uv0TTe7rHNCinQeprPmGDg&oei=j_0TTZaeC4W0lQf235VA&esq=4&page=4&ndsp=30&ved=1t:429,r:3,s:92&biw=1233&bih=901). They were issued starting in 63-64 but weren't in place everyhwere prior to the replacement of the M-14 by the M-16.

Then in the mid 60s, the M-79 Grenadier working for the Squad Leader was introduced and shortly thereafter, depending on where you were in the world, the M-16 was issued, replacing the M-14s. No dedicated auto weapon other than the M-16appeared between then and introduction of the M-249 SAW. I heard some idiots even insisted that when in formation, the designated AR man must have had the removable M-16 Bipod (LINK) (http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=https://www.kbtacticalstar.com/images/GI_M16_Bipod.jpg&imgrefurl=https://www.kbtacticalstar.com/specials.php%3Fpage%3D2&h=402&w=600&sz=20&tbnid=eS0TZdU_AdG_pM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=135&prev=/images%3Fq%3DM16%2Bbipod&zoom=1&q=M16+bipod&usg=__a-8Ppy1uQ3ghnCERIwdtOPWMGq4=&sa=X&ei=FQAUTafRFIG0lQfytcntCw&ved=0CCYQ9QEwAQ) affixed to the weapon. :rolleyes:

Initially, each M-16 issued came with the Bipod. That didn't last long.

The M-14E2 /M-14A1 suffered from a weak stock at the wrist and a too-light barrel which would rapidly overheat so no one really cried when it left.

Since Sam's 1970s book amuses Stan, I guess it's a good thing I gave all my 40s stuff to the Library, huh... :D

slapout9

12-24-2010, 06:32 AM

Since Sam's 1970s book amuses Stan, I guess it's a good thing I gave all my 40s stuff to the Library, huh... :D

Thats great a lot of interesting stuff happened in the 1840's.

Stan

12-24-2010, 09:06 AM

Thats great a lot of interesting stuff happened in the 1840's.

Ooops, you're gonna be in lot of trouble when Ken wakes from his nap :eek:

Ken,
It wasn't so much Sam's aging book with 1,000 plus revisions rather the period in question before the SAW as the book (thankfully) stopped being revised well before the SAW was introduced.

In any case, you, Slap and me are Army dogs and no Marines herein are old enough to spell it out as you so eloquently did... beginning from 1840 :cool:

JMA

12-24-2010, 05:47 PM

http://i30.photobucket.com/albums/c309/deftac03/83.jpg

If you could refrain from making openly disparaging comments about young men facing combat and taking on the enemy, it would be appreciated.

Napoleon is reputed to have said: There are no bad soldiers... only bad officers.

These fine looking young men are therefore a mirror image of their officer corps.

Gen Bill Slim, that great Brit general, also had this to say:

"That the fighting capacity of every unit is based upon the faith of soldiers in their leaders; that discipline begins with the officer and spreads downward from him to the soldier; that genuine comradeship in arms is achieved when all ranks do more than is required of them."

and

"What has a soldier got? asks Slim, and answers it himself. "He has got his country, but that is far away. In battle, the soldier has only his sense of duty, and his sense of shame. These are the things which make men go on fighting even though terror grips their heart. Every soldier, therefore, must be instilled with pride in his unit and in himself, and to do this he must be treated with justice and respect."

http://www.burmastar.org.uk/slim1.gif

Slim on how to deal with officers:

Then Slim relates at one critical point in the retreat in a jungle clearing he came across a unit which was in a bad way. "I took one look at them and thought "My God, they’re worse than I supposed." then I saw why. I walked round the corner of that clearing and I saw officers making themselves a bivouac. They were just as exhausted as their men, but that isn’t my point. Officers are there to lead. I tell you, therefore, as officers, that you will neither eat, nor drink, nor sleep, nor smoke, nor even sit down until you have personally seen that your men have done those things. If you will do this for them, they will follow you to the end of the world. And, if you do not, I will break you."

Bought my first copy of Slim's Defeat into Victory in 1975 and treasured it. It should be required reading for every officer at every rank level as he advances (as one needs to absorb it as a lieutenant, a captain, a major and so on to gain full perspective). A magnificent book by a great general:

Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945 (http://www.amazon.com/Defeat-Into-Victory-Battling-1942-1945/dp/0815410220)

http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/510ZmZ31NnL._SL500_AA300_.jpg

Infanteer

12-24-2010, 06:25 PM

Napoleon is reputed to have said: There are no bad soldiers... only bad officers.

These fine looking young men are therefore a mirror image of their officer corps.

Those are airsofters. But nice ad hominem attack anyways.

Ken White

12-24-2010, 07:46 PM

........................:rolleyes:

Fuchs

12-29-2010, 05:16 PM

"What has a soldier got? asks Slim, and answers it himself. "He has got his country, but that is far away. In battle, the soldier has only his sense of duty, and his sense of shame. These are the things which make men go on fighting even though terror grips their heart. Every soldier, therefore, must be instilled with pride in his unit and in himself, and to do this he must be treated with justice and respect."

Slim echoes the German mantra about officers caring for their men and such (including a rule that nobody lesser than a general (or cook) can get away with eating better than ordinary soldiers).

His thoughts on the foundation of cohesion and morale are very different than the German army ones', though.
The German army praises the importance of the "kleine Kampfgemeinschaft" - small groups of comrades (squad to company) who stick together, help each other, fight and work for each other. Ranks play no real role in this concept.

A (in)famous booklet of the 80's, meant to motivate junior leadership to do its job and to transport WW2 lessons learned to the late 20th went so far as to give the example of soldiers with wounds and illnesses avoiding being sent to hospital in favour of sticking with their company (as they expected to fare best among their closest comrades).

Btw, the booklet became infamous and PC-incompatible because of is many WW2 anecdotes, was rewritten (some anecdotes less) and re-titled around 2000 and came again under PC fire. I wasn't able to spot a single offensive anecdote, but I know for sure that the PC outcry (apparently deliberately) didn't even mention the least PC content of the booklet!

Pete

12-29-2010, 09:31 PM

He [Patton] was a master at manipulating people. I'll give him that. Consider the fact that a good many Majors today have more combat experience than Patton had.
Patton was a cavalryman at heart, which during WW II meant he'd get there "the fastest with the mostest" during breakthrough and exploitation operations in places where the enemy wasn't. He did that in Sicily during his advance up the western part of the island, during the breakout from Normandy across France, and also after the Bulge when the Wehrmacht was on the verge of defeat.

However, during the Lorraine Campaign in September-December 1944 he made little progress in the area of Metz and Nancy in the heavily fortified part of France that had been German from 1870 to 1918. The Germans were masters of tactics and their reconstituted army had its fields of fire and artillery fire planning all worked out during that campaign. That was also when the Allied armies had outrun their logistic support from the Normandy beachead and fuel and ammunition had been diverted for the Market Garden operation in the Netherlands. Patton and Third Army also had to contend with heavy rains which flooded the rivers and led to the writing of the famous "Weather Prayer" later published during the Bulge as a Christmas card to his troops.

During the First World War Patton saw only one week of combat in command of troops before he was wounded, although he had been in-theater since Pershing had arrived in 1917, which is to say he'd spent a lot of time in combat zones but not very much in close combat. One might be able to add a few more days of combat to his resume from his Pancho Villa-chasing days in Mexico, but that fighting was more like Wild West gunfights against bandits rather than hard-core combat.

The point I was making about movement drills is that they should be trained often enough that they become second-nature -- perhaps saying "by the numbers" was a poor choice of words, but guys tend to remember things that have been taught that way. The idea is to be able to assume one of perhaps four or five formations instantly without the need for lengthy discussions about what needs to be done on the radio. It goes without saying that METT-TC will modify any and all template solutions the schoolhouse might devise. In schools we might also teach that fully automatic fire is to be discouraged except for certain Hail Mary situations.

I think Patton was one hell of a combat leader, and I'm unwilling to downgrade his accomplishments in order to compensate for the near-divinity some admirers have accorded him. I'm glad he was on our side.

jcustis

12-29-2010, 10:25 PM

I'm beginning to form the opinion, based on a good bit o first hand observation, and followed by spending a whole day watching youtube videos of US, Brit, Canadian, and Dane forces in Afghanistan, that there are two constants we can see.

The first is that maneuver under fire is easier to the rear, especially if it is along a covered and concealed route.

The second is that a massive amount of "suppressive" fire, applied at the enemy as you are about to conduct an assault or otherwise maneuver forward, provides a moral effect more than anything else. It may keep the enemy's head down, but that is not what provides the impact...it is the notion in the head of the man moving forward, that the enemy has his head down in the first place. As it gives him comfort the enemy is going to have less effect on him, he pushes forward.

Fuchs

12-29-2010, 10:42 PM

It may keep the enemy's head down, but that is not what provides the impact...it is the notion in the head of the man moving forward, that the enemy has his head down in the first place. As it gives him comfort the enemy is going to have less effect on him, he pushes forward.

That's an interesting thought.

Now add two ingredients: The morale effect of NIJ level IV plates and the incompetence of the opponent (inability to exploit the potential of modern infantry arms to inflict devastating casualties even when most troops are suppressed).

A really capable opponent could inflict so much damage even with a fraction of his forces and against hard body armour-equipped opposition that I decided to seek refuge in dreams of near-perfect self-discipline, camouflage, concealment (incl. obscuration) and deception years ago.

Armour battles and armour insights of the Cold War period might lead the way: It was understood back in the 70's (before Chobham armour gave some confidence in passive protection) that tanks that are being seen will be shot at. Tanks that get shot at will be hit. Tanks that get hit will be destroyed.
The armour community understood this, but also kinda threw this overboard asap in order to be able to keep at least some offensive tactics.
These offensive tactics rested heavily on a combination of casualty tolerance and combined arms efforts.

Ken White

12-29-2010, 10:56 PM

The point I was making about movement drills is that they should be trained often enough that they become second-nature ... The idea is to be able to assume one of perhaps four or five formations instantly without the need for lengthy discussions about what needs to be done on the radio. It goes without saying that METT-TC will modify any and all template solutions the schoolhouse might devise.Bad units have little to no idea what you're talking about...

That has to be a unit thing because many different approaches to the issue are available and used; the 'one size fits all' school model doesn't work well.
In schools we might also teach that fully automatic fire is to be discouraged except for certain Hail Mary situations.Can't speak to today; we used to do that but poorly trained -- and not really well selected -- junior leaders allowed it anyway and their bosses had other, weightier things on their minds so the proscription was ignored. Apparently still is...

Again, that's a unit thing. Too much time usually elapses between institutional training and combat application.

Pete

12-29-2010, 11:23 PM

The MarCorps 13 man squad, 1943-1962, had three BARs.
There are times when I think that when Captain Samuel Nichols put out the word for recruits for the new U.S. Marine Corps in 1775 in Philadelphia it went something like this -- the first recruit went to Tun Tavern and sat down on a bench to wait for his interview. After 20 minutes or so another guy came in and sat down next to him on the bench. That's when the first guy turned to the new guy and said, "Man, let me tell you what it was like in the Old Corps."

jcustis

12-29-2010, 11:44 PM

The morale effect of NIJ level IV plates

I think the the opposite is true, as the plates in fact cause greater fatigue, and fatigue tends to weaken morale for the most part.

Fuchs

12-29-2010, 11:50 PM

Hmm, morale or mood?

It's probably a hopeless case anyway, for we cannot measure the effect.

jmm99

12-30-2010, 12:39 AM

Pete, we have to give credit to Umar Al-Mokhtār and the Old Corps (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=99043&postcount=18).

Tun Tavern, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, November 11th 1775

Captains Nicholas and Mullens, having been tasked by the 2nd Continental Congress to form two battalions of Marines, set up the Corps' first recruiting station in the tavern.

The first likely prospect was, in typical recruiter's fashion, promised a "life of high adventure in service to Country and Corps". And, as an extra bonus: If enlisted now he would receive a free tankard of ale...

The recruit gladly accepted the challenge and, receiving his free tankard of ale, was told to wait at the corner table for orders.

The first Marine sat quietly at the table sipping the ale when he was joined by another young man, who had two tankards of ale.

The first Marine looked at the lad and asked where he had gotten the two tankards of ale?

The lad replied that he had just joined this new outfit called the Continental Marines, and as an enlistment bonus was given two tankards of ale.

The first Marine took a long hard look at the second Marine and said: "Damn boot, it was nothing like that in the old Corps!"

Cheers

Mike

Pete

12-30-2010, 01:05 AM

Pete, we have to give credit to Umar Al-Mokhtār and the Old Corps (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=99043&postcount=18).
No, that's an old story and I heard an earlier version of it from Major Dick Culver, USMC, Ret. He was a small-arms guy who after Vietrnam ran the USMC Sniper School before he retired. Dick is/was one of those eccentric Marine Corps characters who never really stopped being an enlisted man. For some of his Sea Stories click here (http://www.jouster.com/jouster_tales.html).

jmm99

12-30-2010, 04:34 AM

A mustang Marine Major who is somewhat eccentric - unheard of ! ;)

Since the link is titled "Welcome to Culver's Shooting Page", it actually seems relevant, and even material, to this thread.

Cheers

Mike

Pete

01-02-2011, 01:55 AM

Don't despair, high-tech may offer solutions for how to maintain control over small arms fire in the U.S. military. Imagine if you will a future infantry rifle with a chip inside that transmits ammunition consumption data to a database operated by the Defense Supply Agency. Whenever a rifle is switched to automatic fire the computer would capture how much ammo is fired off. On a monthly basis the cost of ammo fired in the automatic mode could then be deducted from the budget of the U.S. Army Infantry School and Fort Benning. I'll admit that some people thought I had some strange ideas when I was in the Army, but I think this one might work.

Blah

01-04-2011, 05:27 AM

http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/10/16/46629-upgrade-kits-for-m4-come-in-2011/

The article is a couple of months old, but it appears that the US Army M4s are being upgraded to M4A1s with full auto and a heavier barrel (among other improvements). Interesting to note that they're enabling full-auto again. I wonder why.

JMA

01-06-2011, 01:08 PM

Slim echoes the German mantra about officers caring for their men and such (including a rule that nobody lesser than a general (or cook) can get away with eating better than ordinary soldiers).

His thoughts on the foundation of cohesion and morale are very different than the German army ones', though.
The German army praises the importance of the "kleine Kampfgemeinschaft" - small groups of comrades (squad to company) who stick together, help each other, fight and work for each other. Ranks play no real role in this concept.

Not a purely German thing:

The Valour of Simple Men
Captain Thomas Kettle, Royal Dublin Fusiliers 8 Sept 1916
We are moving up tonight into the battle of the Somme. The bombardment, destruction and bloodshed are beyond all imagination, nor did I ever think the valour of simple men could be quite as beautiful as that of my Dublin Fusiliers. I have had two chances of leaving them - one on sick leave and the other on a staff job. I have chosen to stay with my comrades. I am calm and happy but desperately anxious to live.
- John Catton ed Letters from the Front (1973).

A (in)famous booklet of the 80's, meant to motivate junior leadership to do its job and to transport WW2 lessons learned to the late 20th went so far as to give the example of soldiers with wounds and illnesses avoiding being sent to hospital in favour of sticking with their company (as they expected to fare best among their closest comrades).

Btw, the booklet became infamous and PC-incompatible because of is many WW2 anecdotes, was rewritten (some anecdotes less) and re-titled around 2000 and came again under PC fire. I wasn't able to spot a single offensive anecdote, but I know for sure that the PC outcry (apparently deliberately) didn't even mention the least PC content of the booklet!

You have a copy of the infamous one? It should be published IMHO.

Fuchs

01-06-2011, 02:29 PM

http://www.scribd.com/doc/32949768/Kriegsnah-Ausbilden-Hilfen-fur-den-Gefechtsdienst-aller-Truppen

JMA

01-06-2011, 07:40 PM

http://www.scribd.com/doc/32949768/Kriegsnah-Ausbilden-Hilfen-fur-den-Gefechtsdienst-aller-Truppen

Now if the US had not intervened in WW2 I would probably have been able to read that.

At least it is in the public domain now and there may be a chance it will be translated sometime.

The book Communist Guerrilla Warfare by Dixon/Heilbron (1955) dealing with how the Germans dealt with Soviet guerrilla activity after the invasion of 1941 was useful reading in the 70s before COIN became an "industry". It is worth study even though some of the methods used against the guerrillas were considered war crimes at the time.

But having seen right here on SWJ someone advocate that the French efforts in Algeria are not worthy of study as the French used torture widely I assume the PC sensitive youth of today will be unable study what the terrible Germans did to the poor Soviets. It is their loss surely.

Fuchs

01-06-2011, 07:57 PM

JMA

01-06-2011, 08:50 PM

Sources like this - especially 50's and 60's sources - often praise certain qualities of the Soviet troops, especially their quick & deep digging, application of camouflage, ability in night combat, ability in night infiltration attacks and tenacity under adverse weather conditions even if ill-supplied.
This goes as far as criticizing a certain laziness of the own German troops in regard to these activities as well as to routine close reconnaissance & security efforts.

This is exactly why it is important to read what the Germans have to say themselves. They would have evolved their doctrine and tactics based on the abilities of their own soldiers.

The last great war involved the Germans who proved to be a formidable opponent to all comers. There is a significant danger that in recent wars against weak and near totally incompetent adversaries the kids who fought in the Gulf, Iraq and now Afghanistan will allow sloppy soldiering to pass unchecked as they would not have been punished for their errors (as they would have by the Germans).

But then each generation demands to reinvent the wheel. Each generation's 20-30 year olds have all the answers and are usually too clever by half and it is only when they come across a proper enemy that they catch a wake up call.

A Grim Price in Blood
Possibly, like most of our infantry, they (the battle school directing staff) suffered from the consequences of the pre-war shortage of creatively intelligent regimental officers. Too few of them were professionally dedicated to the extent that they could visualise how battles would be fought and identify the problems that might arise when planning them. They seemed to lack the capacity to think relentlessly through these things until solutions were found. Much of their time had been spent policing the British Empire. Also, unlike the Germans, we British instinctively avoid displays of keenness. The enthusiast, particularly if he is innovative, is an embarrassment. Thus the battlefield became our teacher and, inevitably, it exacted a grim price in blood and time.
Sydney Jary MC 18 Platoon (1987).

Firn

01-07-2011, 06:45 PM

Sources like this - especially 50's and 60's sources - often praise certain qualities of the Soviet troops, especially their quick & deep digging, application of camouflage, ability in night combat, ability in night infiltration attacks and tenacity under adverse weather conditions even if ill-supplied.
This goes as far as criticizing a certain laziness of the own German troops in regard to these activities as well as to routine close reconnaissance & security efforts.

Indeed the booklet shows in many anecdotes a hefty dose of harsh critic of the performance of German soldiers, which I personally think is an excellent thing. The fact that this errors were committed by your "own" people and army should help to take the lessons to the heart and to have a hard look at your unit. This kind of brutal critic is often missing, both in training and the various literature. As a German officer put it after WWI: "(Just) Personal experience comes usually at a too high price and too late".

Of course there are are also some examples were German soldiers and units performed very well. Wilf would be happy with all the CvC quotes and the anecdotes concerning the importance of the crew-served weapons (MGs). Ken might like the importance placed at target detection, observation and recce.

...

The "overall" qualities of the Soviet soldier as described by Fuchs were often painted by German propaganda as a consequence of the "primitive nature" (quick digging, excellent camo, great endurance, infiltration) and "fanatic indoctrination" (desperate resistance, etc) of the "Bolshevik".

Generally it can be said that the greater amount of warm bodies made it easier for the Soviets to have effective scouting, sniping, patrolling and observation. ( The devastating effect of the Soviet artillery is not only due to mass of material, as one might get the impression, but also beside other factors, due to the great effort in scouting and the capture of German "tongues".)

Fuchs

01-07-2011, 08:00 PM

Generally it can be said that the greater amount of warm bodies made it easier for the Soviets to have effective scouting, sniping, patrolling and observation. ( The devastating effect of the Soviet artillery is not only due to mass of material, as one might get the impression, but also beside other factors, due to the great effort in scouting and the capture of German "tongues".)

This line of reasoning appeared late in the war when leaders complained that they hadn't enough infantry left for scouting, patrols, security and such.

The post-war reply was that you need to place even more emphasis on recce and security if you're weak.

Firn

01-08-2011, 07:35 PM

This line of reasoning appeared late in the war when leaders complained that they hadn't enough infantry left for scouting, patrols, security and such.

The post-war reply was that you need to place even more emphasis on recce and security if you're weak.

Actually my maternal grandfather would have agreed wiht you, and had, as a very experienced NCO/officer a little, personal anecdote to offer to many a raw recruit concerning the importance of local security.

In 39' he was part of a German mountain division attacking P. from the south. After many a hard day fighting and marching, mostly as part of the recce elements, his platoon reached at nightfall a small p. village. After a quick search they dispersed themselves among some of the houses and sheds and posted relative few guardposts and only one patrol, having had no enemy contact this day and needing sleep very badly. He and three comrades hit the hay of a small shed on the outskirts. To avoid the snoring of his comrades, he choose to sleep in the most distant angle, in a little depression behind the main stack. He covered himself with the hay and slept, as usually very silently.

As he woke up after the morning call he came forward to wake up his comrades, which made no audible effort to get up. As he saw the first one he nearly broke down - his throat was slit open, just like the ones of his other two good comrades.

As that WWI German officer said:"Personal experience comes often at a too high price and too late. "

Needless to say that he later always insisted on good recce, observation and security discipline, which payed off for his new comrades and soldiers. It certainly is a good graphic warning for young recruits, and I really like the way this booklet integrates similar ones with lessons learned and well structured, easily understood, training advice.

JMA

01-08-2011, 08:00 PM

This line of reasoning appeared late in the war when leaders complained that they hadn't enough infantry left for scouting, patrols, security and such.

The post-war reply was that you need to place even more emphasis on recce and security if you're weak.

Lets introduce this MILITARY LEADERSHIP, AS THE GERMANS SEE IT (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/military-leadership/index.html) which fell into Allied hands.

Several months ago the commanding officer of the Third Panzer Grenadier Division assembled extracts from two German Army manuals, one dealing with military leadership and the other pertaining to the training of officers, and ordered that they be distributed as a single booklet to the officers of his command. In a foreword the commanding officer said, "This booklet should always accompany my officers. It should become an indispensable possession. I expect them to take it out again and again, and study it until its contents have become a guide for their lives and actions. It should force them to test themselves, over and over, to see whether they are adequately prepared to meet the high—and often merciless—demands which will be made upon them.This is a must read as is much (on the historical tactics) from the lonesentry.com (http://lonesentry.com) site.

and

A unit which has been formed only superficially, and which has not been welded together by hard training and education, may easily fail at critical moments or under the impact of unexpected events. Therefore, from the outset of a unit's training, extreme importance must be attached to promoting and preserving strong community ties, as well as to discipline.What constitutes hard training? (This seems to have changed over the years)

Then a footnote which resonated with my Rhodesian experience.

Superior combat efficiency can outweigh numerical superiority. The higher the combat efficiency of units, the greater the possibility of conducting forceful and mobile operations. Superior leadership and combat efficiency of a unit are the most reliable guarantees of victory.Exactly and that is why we were able to take on 10,000 trained and undertraining insurgents with 184 men, a handful of antiquated jets and 10 Allouette gunships on Op Dingo in November 1977. Killed thousands, wounded more.

And you get there by training hard. That's what the SAS did, that's what we did... and our insurgents were poor.

JMA

01-08-2011, 08:22 PM

Originally Posted by Fuchs http://208.101.38.56/council/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://208.101.38.56/council/showthread.php?p=113361#post113361)
Sources like this - especially 50's and 60's sources - often praise certain qualities of the Soviet troops, especially their quick & deep digging, application of camouflage, ability in night combat, ability in night infiltration attacks and tenacity under adverse weather conditions even if ill-supplied.
This goes as far as criticizing a certain laziness of the own German troops in regard to these activities as well as to routine close reconnaissance & security efforts.

Here is a scan of the first two pages of the applicable instruction (translated). Might help.

http://farm6.static.flickr.com/5205/5335746030_98df97c7cc_z.jpg

Larger image here (http://farm6.static.flickr.com/5205/5335746030_98df97c7cc_b.jpg).

Fuchs

01-09-2011, 03:31 PM

(I wonder why the forum tells me that your post is two minutes old when I remember it from yesterday?)

Administrator Note: -- no funny business, we had some IT issues and the post was recreated with an off timestamp. / Note.
About the German military leadership style (and this made no huge difference between leadership by NCOs and COs); the most famous source is the 1933 Truppenführung manual (HDv 300 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truppenf%C3%BChrung)/1), pp.9-36, including a typical German emphasis on the proper location of a leader - when forward and when with the staff?).

Firn

01-12-2011, 07:32 PM

JMA&others:

The German army collected quite a few reports from small unit actions for training and evaluation purpose. Some years after it, the US army selected the most interesting ones they could find and published them among other works to understand better the nature of this bloody conflict and, for then obvious reasons, the Soviet army. It makes for a very interesting read with quite thick chapters, for example one on anti-partisan actions. It also gives the Soviet soldiers a lot of credit in many areas.

You can download it here (http://www.scribd.com/doc/12981525/1953-US-Army-WWII-German-Small-Unit-Actions-in-Russia-313p?in_collection=2311444)

Check also the related documents, there are quite some works about anti-partisan warfare. Total resistance (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_Resistance_%28book%29) is a Swiss manual for the "Small War" which might have been waged against the (Soviet) invader, and deals thus with the anti-partisan warfare in WWII and shortly after. (It should be available online in English).

P.S: "Infantry in combat" is an American classic concerning WWI, as well as the German "Development of Tactics in the World War". Both are also available online.

The latter book is a bit heavy going and shows the German performances perhaps in too bright a light, but gives a good overview from a German point of view. It certainly was ahead of its times when it mentioned among the disadvantages of the radio, that it could lead to leading from the staff room at the cost of the speed and freedom of action of the front commander.

William F. Owen

01-13-2011, 05:37 AM

Check also the related documents, there are quite some works about anti-partisan warfare. Total resistance (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_Resistance_%28book%29) is a Swiss manual for the "Small War" which might have been waged against the (Soviet) invader, and deals thus with the anti-partisan warfare in WWII and shortly after. (It should be available online in English).

Ah... "Total Resistance" I have a "Von Dach Bern" copy in English, published in the 1970's. Actually a very interesting read, but would be very un-fashionable today. It's actually about fighting!

Fuchs

01-13-2011, 01:14 PM

I cannot describe how much politically incorrect that book is in Germany.
A book about DIY submachineguns and repros of the "Werwolf - Winke für Jagdeinheiten" booklet for the planned '45 Nazi guerrillas are on about the same level.

William F. Owen

01-14-2011, 08:02 AM

jtan163

01-16-2011, 02:19 PM

Wow. 100 rounds seems pretty low to me (although those are just my uneducated "feelings"). I wonder how the troops felt about the amount of ammunition they carried.

Perhaps my perceptions are skewed due to the videos I see on youtube and such featuring engagements in Iraq/Afghan. A number of them contain troops firing streams of 5 - 10 rounds at a time, in which case I do not believe 100 rounds would be adequate at all.

Until Long Tan, they probably felt all right.

Aussie Army experience up until that point had been mainly fleeting contacts at short range, (either contacts or ambush) and doctrine was to fire aimed shots are identified targets.

In fact even after Long Tan doctrine and from what I have read practice (in terms of the practice of aimed fire at identified targets) didn't change much.
As both Kiwi Grunt and Blah have identified the practice in what grunts were allowed to carry ammo wise did change. And despite (as far as I can tell) the fact that there was an official carry what you want policy, I am positive it would be tempered, by seccos, platoon sgts, common sense and experience.

Except for very occasional battles mainly in towns and assaulting bunker systems I get the impression that typcically only a few members of a company or platoon would fire in the majority of contacts.

After Long Tan experience they did plan for bigger scale contacts, even if they rarely encountered them.

Pete

01-17-2011, 01:34 AM

A book about DIY submachineguns and repros of the "Werewolf - Winke für Jagdeinheiten" booklet for the planned '45 Nazi guerrillas are on about the same level.
I'm glad that particular publication wasn't in greater circulation in 2003-04 when Rumsfeld and Rice claimed that the growing insurgency in Iraq was no different than the Werewolves in Germany post-April 1945, as though we'd been there before and done that earlier. As best I can tell the only thing the Werewolves managed to accomplish was the assassination of the mayor of Aachen in March '45 when the war was still going on and the ruined city was occupied by the U.S. Army. Hitler Jugend kids caused trouble for us in April and May '45 but there was little armed violence from the Germans after the surrender.

Blah

01-25-2011, 08:37 PM

Going back to the original topic...

I've been curious lately on the effects of suppression with the scaling of weapons, but I haven't been able to find much on it.

It's intuitively obvious to me how a scaling up of HE weapons would result in an increase in suppression, but less so for KE weapons. The way I see it, there are 2 main components that lead to the suppressive effects of kinetic energy weapons: audio and visual. The auditory component being the sound of the bullet zipping past, and the sound of the weapon firing if you were close enough. The visual component being the effects upon it striking something. Being hit by debris caused by the bullet would also suppress, so I guess that can be a third category.

It's easier to see how a scaled up bullet would have a greater visual signature, but what about audio? If bullets were merely zipping past, would a .50 BMG have any meaningful increase in suppression than, say, a 5.56? Even the visual signature is difficult to quantify in the increase in suppression it would have.

Thoughts on the matter?

Ken White

01-25-2011, 09:10 PM

Even the scale of HE has little effect on experienced troops. The only difference between a 60mm Mortar round and a 155mm Artillery shell in end effect is the amount of noise and the radius. If either causes few or no casualties, they'll be ignored. If either kills someone, they're dead and the size made no difference and others will pay attention.

Noise and visual clutter have some effect on the untrained or little experienced, very little on anyone not in those two categories. Sustained artillery fire that causes only insignificant casualties but continues for many hours can eventually have a psychologically debilitating effect on some even broadly experienced persons -- but they will relatively few in number. The possibility of small arms fire so doing is very slim -- not least because few have the ammunition available to sustain small arms fire for extended periods.

One good marksman who fires only once or twice a day but consistently gets hits will be more suppressive than an entire Company firing full automatic with few or no hits.

For reasonably competent troops, suppression is effected only by accurate direct or indirect fire that causes casualties in sight or hearing of the element involved. Everything else is assessed and mostly ignored within the parameters of common sense by such troops. All it takes for anyone is two or three of incidents to learn that noise and visual effects are annoying and can be distracting but on balance are not suppressive.

People around you becoming casualties is suppression -- everything else is just clutter.