AQ's M&A Strategy is a franchising network?

[davidbfpo]

An impressive, short commentary by Daniel Byman, in the FP Blog; full title being: Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy Is franchising a successful way to build a global terror network?

Early on:
much of al Qaeda's growth in the last decade has been the kind of expansion that any American businessman would recognize: They've systematically tried to absorb regional jihadist start-ups, both venerable and newly created, and convince them that their struggle is a component of al Qaeda's sweeping international agenda -- and vice versa.

Midway:
When groups embrace al Qaeda's "far enemy" logic, they are also embracing strategic absurdity. Terrorist groups that succeed politically, like Hezbollah and Hamas, are firmly anchored in local realities and politics, and their success comes in part because their ambitions are limited.

Ends with:
In all these cases, however, the United States should strive to separate the locals from the al Qaeda core. The organization's merger strategy is a double-edged sword: Al Qaeda has gained from its acquisitions, but it can also be hurt by them.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/07/al_qaedas_m_and_a_strategy

IIRC some of these business strategy terms have appeared before and indirect responses. David Kilcullen in particular comes to mind, having read his first book.

[Bob's World]

AQ conducts UW. This does not make those who affiliate with AQ part of AQ, even if they incorporate AQ into their name.

To call these groups that choose to affiliate with AQ "Jihadis" is to apply a pejorative label that is designed to shift responsibility off of the shoulders of the governments they rise up to challenge and to blame these problems on some form of mass ideological hysteria or mental illness.

The West took a very similar approach to Communism as (non-Muslim) populaces embraced that ideology to seek liberty from colonial-based systems of governance. Russian and Chinese governments conducted UW to leverage these nationalist movements, but it did not suddenly make those who affiliated with them and accepted their support into Russians or Chinese.

Most of these labeled as Jihadists today are also primarily nationalist insurgents. Similarly many of the "homegrown" terrorists are those who either affiliate with such nationalist movements; or that have become disillusioned with the role their own government as either played in shaping those conditions, is playing in helping to suppress those who rise up to challenge such conditions, or both.

In other words, most who are "radicalized" are motivated far more by the polices and actions of their own government than they are by any Jihadist ideology. This is classic blame-shifting on the part of governments, and failure to take responsibility for the negative effects of poor domestic (insurgency results) or foreign (international terrorism results) policies that contribute to this "radicalization."

This is not an assessment of "good vs. evil" or "right vs. wrong." Good or evil is a choice of the participants and will be assessed by the jury of public opinion. Right or wrong is dependent on the facts of any given situation. The only status that is certain is that the government is the "legal" actor and the insurgent/terrorist/Jihadist is the illegal actor; but that in itself has no bearing on good or evil, or right or wrong.

Countries faced with insurgency would do well to take a hard look at their domestic policies and make corrections. Countries faced with terrorism would do well to look at the foreign policies and make corrections as well. But this requires at least a moment of governmental responsibility, and such moments are all too rare.

[slapout9]

An impressive, short commentary by Daniel Byman, in the FP Blog; full title being: Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy Is franchising a successful way to build a global terror network?

Early on:

Midway:

Ends with:

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/07/al_qaedas_m_and_a_strategy

IIRC some of these business strategy terms have appeared before and indirect responses. David Kilcullen in particular comes to mind, having read his first book.


davidfpo, excellent article and thanks for posting. Franchising is how the Mafia grew to be so powerful for so long in America. And yes they do follow many business Strategies because Free(unregulated) markets always end up as criminal markets, that is why the world is the shape it is in.

[davidbfpo]

A follow-on by the same author, Daniel Byman, looking at AQ after a new lader is chosen:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/16/the_five_habits_of_highly_effective_terrorist_orga nizations?page=0,0

Hat-tip to FP Blog.

He ends with:
This list, while done with tongue firmly in cheek, does have some value for U.S. counterterrorism officials. As the above lessons suggest, al Qaeda is an organization prone to divisions, and Zawahiri will have his hands full keeping it even semi-unified in this time of crisis. Efforts like the drone campaign in Pakistan are vital because they kill skilled leaders, which are in short supply these days. U.S. information operations must take advantage of al Qaeda's blunders, making the terrorists defend their mistakes rather than gloat about their successes. And if the United States and its allies can decrease the number and scope of terrorist havens, it will be harder for them to form the in-person bonds they need to trust one another.

If there was a 'score card' to our post-9/11 response to the threat (there probably is somewhere) I'd rate information operations our weakest link.

[davidbfpo]

Leah Farrell, from Australia, has written an opinion piece on the new AQ leader and worth a read:http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/challenges-confront-new-al-qaida-chief/story-e6frg6ux-1226076650708

Her blog:http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/