Clausewitz in Wonderland [Archive]

SWJED

09-09-2006, 11:57 PM

9 September Real Clear Politics commentary - Clausewitz in Wonderland (http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/clausewitz_in_wonderland.html) by Tony Corn.

"Amateurs talk about strategy, professionals talk about logistics." In the five years since the 9/11 events, the old military adage has undergone a "transformation" of its own: Amateurs, to be sure, continue to talk about strategy, but real professionals increasingly talk about -- anthropology.

In Iraq as in Afghanistan, real professionals have learned the hard way that -- to put it in a nutshell -- the injunction "Know Thy Enemy, Know Thyself" matters more than the bookish "Know Thy Clausewitz" taught in war colleges. Know thy enemy: At the tactical and operational levels at least, it is anthropology, not Clausewitzology, that will shed light on the grammar and logic of tribal warfare and provide the conceptual weapons necessary to return fire. Know thyself: It is only through anthropological "distanciation" that the U.S. military (and its various "tribes": Army, Navy, etc.) will become aware of its own cultural quirks -- including a monomaniacal obsession with Clausewitz -- and adapt its military culture to the new enemy.1

The first major flaw of U.S. military culture is of course "technologism" -- this uniquely American contribution to the phenomenon known to anthropologists as "animism." Infatuation with technology has led in the recent past to rhetorical self-intoxication about Network-Centric Warfare and the concomitant neglect of Culture-Centric Warfare. The second structural flaw is a Huntingtonian doctrine of civil-military relations ideally suited for the Cold War but which, given its outdated conception of "professionalism," has outlived its usefulness and is today a major impediment to the necessary constant dialogue between the military and civilians.2

Last but not least, the third major flaw is "strategism." At its "best," strategism is synonymous with "strategy for strategy's sake," i.e., a self-referential discourse more interested in theory-building (or is it hair-splitting?) than policy-making. Strategism would be innocuous enough were it not for the fact that, in the media and academia, "realism" today is fast becoming synonymous with "absence of memory, will, and imagination": in that context, the self-referentiality of the strategic discourse does not exactly improve the quality of the public debate. At its worst, strategism confuses education with indoctrination, and scholarship with scholasticism; in its most extreme form, it comes close to being an "intellectual terrorism" in the name of Clausewitz...

Much more at the link - the above was only the intro...

aktarian

09-10-2006, 07:57 AM

Interesting read but I sense some deep hatred toward clausewitz. I wonder why.

Some points:
-He largely ignores Clausewitz's "war is continuation of policy with different means" dictum. Which can be translated into "if you don't have clearly defined long term political goals military actions don't matter". and I think this is main problem in Iraq as golas of "making Iraq democratic" and such are not defined what exactly that means and can mean anything or nothing.
-The article gives the impression that US military is like medrassah where only Clausewitz is taught. while I don't have any first hand experience with such institutions I seriusly doubt this is the case.
-author argues for abandoning Clausewitz. I disagree. He is still relevant though it's necessary to define works that are relevant as well. If you identify guerilla/insurgency/LIC as "next thing" then Mao, Che, Lawrence etc are relevant but Clausewitz should not be ignored. Specially military-policy relations which are extremly important in such conflicts

CR6

09-10-2006, 12:02 PM

A lot of post-Vietnam American military thought is informed by the ideas of Clausewitz.

American officers first turned seriously to Clausewitz in an attempt to understand the failure of American policy in Vietnam. Christopher Bassford illustrates this point with the example of the official 1981 Army War College Study on American policy towards Vietnam, On Strategy, authored by Colonel Harry G. Summers. Using Clausewitz’s concept of “the trinity of army, government and people” to demonstrate that the United States had violated Clausewitz’s logic and became involved in Vietnam “without first being clear what (was) intended to be achieved by that war and how (it was to be) conducted.”

On Strategy is an example of the fruit of the armed services’ consideration of On War in the years after Vietnam. As early as 1976, Admiral Stansfield Turner introduced the book to the curriculum of the Naval War College. The Air War College and Army War College followed suit in 1978 and 1981 respectively. As America’s military leaders examined Clausewitz’s theories, his words soon found their way from the seminar rooms of war colleges to the maneuver areas of combat training centers.

At the same time that American war colleges were examining Clausewitz, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), under the leadership of General Donn Starry, was at work developing a doctrine that would allow American forces in Europe, along with their NATO allies, to deal with the threat of the second and third echelon forces of the Warsaw Pact in the event of a conflict against the Soviet Union in Western Europe. The existing doctrine of active defense made no provision for dealing with the battlefield in depth and oriented on terrain rather than enemy forces. General Starry turned his lower ranking “action officers” at the TRADOC installations of Forts Monroe and Leavenworth to develop a doctrine “where the orientation is on the enemy, the action is fluid, and independent action and maneuver could lead to the collapse of the enemy.”

The resulting “AirLand Battle Doctrine”, enunciated in FM 100-5, Operations, contained several of Clausewitz’s concepts. According to Romjue, “Clausewitz's idea that ‘when we speak of destroying the enemy's forces . . . nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must also be considered’" informed AirLand Battle’s offensive tenant of maneuvering strength against weakness through “initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.” Likewise, the defensive concepts of protecting oneself through a “shield of blows” is included in FM-1005, as well as Clausewitzian notions of friction and military action (i.e. war) being the continuation of policy by other means. FM 3-0 retains much this flavor IMO.

So, even if they haven't read On War, a lot of American officers are exposed to Clausewitz through doctrine.

The idea of professionals talking "anthropology" has some merit, but I am unsure of the level of anthropology we can teach to our leaders and troops. Lawrence spent much of his pre-war adulthood on the Arabian penninsula, and was the right man in the right place for the uprising. His success had little to do with officer PME.

Ironhorse

09-10-2006, 03:43 PM

Wow. Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play?

I have a soft spot in my heart for old Carl, dialectic approach and all. At one level, he provides a thorough taxonomy. At another, I find his truisms to be generally true. More like the Encyclopedia Britannica than <pick your favorite scholar/pundit with an axe to grind>. And he wrote as excellent historical analysis, not trying to displace Nostradamus or Jean Dixon.

Clausewitz's shortcomings stem less from him than from our own reckless application of his subtle nuances into steadfast bumper-sticker principles. Since he presents the pros and cons of just about all conflict, it is painfully easy to grab a sound bite from him saying whatever you want. And I'm not even one of those "read him in the original German and split hairs about translation" geeks.

Indictments in Tony Corn's commentary re expecting a clean, over-simplified, technological fix to all problems are viable. Symptomatic of American culture today. We've had it too good for too long, and are getting weak. We do, however, have a generation of young warriors who have seen the ugly side of things. I pray that, as they rise in rank, they will apply well the cold hard truths they have learned.

marct

09-10-2006, 04:41 PM

Thanks for posting this. I think I am going to assign it as required reading for my 3rd year theory students.

Aktarian, you noted that

He largely ignores Clausewitz's "war is continuation of policy with different means" dictum. Which can be translated into "if you don't have clearly defined long term political goals military actions don't matter". and I think this is main problem in Iraq as golas of "making Iraq democratic" and such are not defined what exactly that means and can mean anything or nothing.

I'm not so sure that he ignored it so much as tried to reformulate it. Certainly that dictum can be interpreted as a requirement for a clear engineering plan for goals. It also should be interpreted that way when it comes to planning specific operations such as OIF.

I think what Corn is trying to do is to look at the next level or two above operational planning - i.e. geo-political strategy. As such, I think it is probably a very useful conceptual exercise to avoid black box conceptual thinking. If we treat "war as a continuation of policy" and "policy as a continuation of war", both "by other means", then it may be possible to set up and train for multiple operational situations. By way of example, if we can train people to recognize when to shift from conventional to COIN, that increases operational flexibility.

CR6, you ended your post with what I think is a really interesting observation.

The idea of professionals talking "anthropology" has some merit, but I am unsure of the level of anthropology we can teach to our leaders and troops. Lawrence spent much of his pre-war adulthood on the Arabian penninsula, and was the right man in the right place for the uprising. His success had little to do with officer PME.

Certainly Lawrence got his "training" by doing - and that included his anthropology (he had no formal training in it). Holding him up as an example of what can be done with appropriate cultural knowledge is a good idea. Using him as an example of what an Anthropologist could do to help out in operations is, I'm afraid, a mistake.

Let me expand on this a bit. I am an Anthropologist and I have taught courses in the history and theory of Anthropology. There are certainly some good examples of Anthropologists working well with the military - Ruth Benedict's analysis of Japanese culture, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, that became the US occupation plan for Japan at the end of WWII is an example. I think more germain examples would be The Nuer by E.E. Evans-Pritchard or Montaignard Tribal Groups of the Republic of Vietnam, US Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg (2nd Ed. 1965). One little known, and rarely mentioned, fact is that during WWII, over 60% of people with Ph.D.'s in Anthropology in the US were working either for the military or for the State department. There are an aweful lot of really good works produced from 1939-1946 or so that deal with using Anthropology in a political military situation.

If we come into the recent present, however, we find a very different story. In 1968, Project Camelot blew up in the news and led to a reaction against using Anthropology within the military. At the 1968 meeting of the American Anthropology Association, a new code of ethics was created (see Handbook on Ethical Issues in Anthropology Chapter 1 - http://www.aaanet.org/committees/ethics/ch1.htm - for some of the history on this). Probably the most import effect of this debate was to influence an entire generation of Anthropologists away from anything to do with the military. Indeed, I have been at conferences where I have been told by a senior professor with a completely straight face, that the military are "a bunch of fascists who are even worse than their capitalist exploiting bosses". The message is quite clear - don't have anything to do with the military and don't have anything to do with businesses. The Corn article talks about Clausewitz being the "scripture" of the military - for Anthropology, the "scriptures" became Marx, Gramsci, and Foucault.

What I am trying to get at here is that, as an institution, Anthropology in North America is pretty strongly opposed to the military. There are very few Anthropologists who are willing to work for the military - it's professional suicide. This situation is slowly changing, but it is going to be difficult to find Anthropologists who are willing or able to work with the military (I exclude myself from this generalization since I am already unpopular for working in the area of business (Organizational Culture) and I'm too interested in military history for most of my colleagues).

All of this is a round about way at trying to answer CR6's uncertainty about "... I am unsure of the level of anthropology we can teach to our leaders and troops". I am quite certain that enough Anthropologists can be found to work with the military on training to give a pretty good structural grounding in the theories and methods in order to conduct analyses. What will probably be missing, at least for the present, is the area specialists who can flesh those structures out into operation information such as that which shows up in Montaignard Tribal Groups of the Republic of Vietnam. And, in all honesty, that is probably exactly the type of analyses that are needed.

Marc

Tc2642

09-11-2006, 09:44 AM

Having read through this article it does appear that the writer has not even taken any time to read through Clausewitz (why bother if you think he is redundant?). In terms of theory far from being redundant I would state that he is very much relevant to today’s and future wars. There are a number of inconsistencies in this text, I doubt Clausewitz would have disagreed with ‘know thy enemy and know thyself’, but this does not suggest that Clausewitz is dogmatic, his work was meant as a tool for learning not the end in itself.

He also made very clear in his work that each age war would have its own characteristics particular to that age, that theory should be there to show how things are not how they should be.

Like the aging Marxists with a Karl of their own, the Clausewitzians today are more interested in exonerating their idol from the evil perpetrated in his name than in demonstrating what good he could bring to the current challenges facing the military. It may well be that Marx and Clausewitz were indeed mostly "misread" by most people most of the time, but if the risks of "misreading" are statistically greater than the chances of getting it right, what's the point of making it required reading in the first place?

Yeah, why bother reading something if it is too difficult to understand first time around, this from my point of view is lazy thinking, the ideas and concepts are complex but by rereading certain parts over and reading “On War” in it’s entirety you can avoid misreading it.

A decade ago already, U.S. Army War College professor Steven Metz remarked: "Like adoration for some family elder, the veneration heaped on Clausewitz seems to grow even as his power to explain the world declines. He remains an icon at all U.S. war colleges (figuratively and literally) while his writings are bent, twisted, and stretched to explain everything from guerilla insurgency (Summers) through nuclear strategy (Cimbala) to counternarcotrafficking (Sharpe). On War is treated like holy script from which quotations are plucked to legitimize all sorts of policies and programs. But enough! It is time to hold a wake so that strategists can pay their respects to Clausewitz and move on, leaving him to rest among thehistorians."7

I refer to, http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/METZSLAM.htm,

Does the obsession with Clausewitz really matter that much? You bet it does. As the military-educational complex (150 institutions, of which the Naval War College is the crown jewel) takes in interagency education, the danger is that "strategism" and "Clausewitzology" will spread to other agencies and may aggravate already dysfunctional civil-military relations at the working level. The Iraqi precedent, in that respect, does not bode well.

I don’t like this term strategism, strategy in the simplest terms is using battles to achive the political objective of the war that is being fought. Not strategy for the sake of strategy, who would fight a battle for the sake of it?

But the successor generations should have logically benefited from the "lessons learned" in Vietnam as well as the growing literature on counterinsurgency. Yet instead of being exposed to the policy-relevant Clausewitzian realism of Osgood's Limited War Revisited (1979), the new generation of officers was force-fed with the Clausewitzian "surrealism" of Summers's On Strategy (1981) -- the true beginning of strategy for strategy's sake in America.

So he has more of a problem with Clausewitz being taught in a ‘surrealist’ way than the policy relevant realism of Clausewitz? Hold on, I thought Clausewitz should be confined to the dustbin of history? Not taught from a different perspective

Not really sure about the military educational establishment so will pass without comment.

Yet, while the Osamas of this world were issuing fatwas against "Jews and Crusaders" and defining their own struggle in terms of "Fourth-Generation Warfare," our Clausewitzian Ayatollahs were too busy turning Vom Kriege in a military Quran and issuing fatwas against the theoreticians of 4GW, Netwar, and other postmodern "heresies." If that attitude does not qualify as "dereliction of duty," what does?

I would again state, that from my point of view as a Clausewitzian and someone who belives that Fourth Generational war is with us that the two are not mutually inconceivable together, that they can be conflated.

‘if the Clausewitzian text is indeed so filled with fog and friction, if On War is so hard to teach from that even most educators can't teach it properly, then surely thought should be given to retiring Clausewitz, or the educators -- or both.

I would disagree, may have taken a bit of time but I now have a better understanding of Clausewitz and a broader conception of his ideas and some of the more nuanced points of his work

If, as Gray rightly points out, "strategy is -- or should be, the bridge that connects military power with policy," what kind of a bridge is On War, which devotes 600 pages to military power and next to nothing to policy?

Clausewitz was a soldier, not a politician, thefore why should he write anything about policy, that’s left up to the government.

Why such an irrational "resistance" (in the Freudian sense) on the part of military educators? After all, it does not take an Einstein to realize that, from Alexander the Great to Napoleon, the greatest generals for 20 centuries had one thing in common: They have never read Clausewitz. And conversely, in the bloodiest century known to man, the greatest admirers of Clausewitz also have had one thing in common: They may have won a battle here and there, but they have all invariably lost all their wars.

Hm, Lenin, Mao, Lawerence?

As of this writing (August 2006), it is too early to tell whether Baghdad will be America's Battle of Algiers -- or Battle of Jena. But it is not too early to call for a Renaissance in Strategic Education -- for military and civilians alike. In diplomacy as in academe and in the media, there is unquestionably a need for greater strategic literacy, and the military can play a constructive role; but by the same token, the military will have to free itself from the Clausewitzian straitjacket if it ever wants to make a significant contribution to grand strategy.

http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Keegan/KEEGWHOL.htm

I will try and make a go of going through the rest, but those are my thoughts so far

SWJED

09-12-2006, 12:07 AM

On Clausewitz in Wonderland (http://austinbay.net/blog/?p=1412)...

RDangerfield

10-20-2006, 01:46 AM

Chris Bassford, who is on the faculty at the National War College and is editor of The Clausewitz Homepage, has posted a somewhat disdainful reply to Tony Corn at http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/OnCornyIdeas.htm. I've got to admit, it is hard to understand why a writer like Corn, who is apparently trying to influence the strategic debate, would launch so many snide ad hominem attacks on people who might otherwise be influenced--which does not include old Carl, of course. I wonder if Tony knows the guy reached room temperature 175 years ago.

SWJED

10-20-2006, 03:11 AM

Here is an excerpt from Dr. Bassford's reply A Response to Tony Corn's "Clausewitz in Wonderland" at the The Clausewitz Homepage:

... Nor is Clausewitz responsible for the smothering political correctness that makes it virtually impossible even to discuss things like the strategic history of Islam. Personally, I am still recovering from the high-pitched institutional whining that ensued when I made remarks on that subject virtually identical to Corn's a few weeks ago at one of the nation's premier institutions for strategic education. And almost every PME effort to discuss the "anthropology" of Islam that I have experienced has immediately degenerated into an utterly irrelevant analysis of the finer points of Koranic theology. Corn makes some (seemingly) favorable allusions to the potential value to strategists of understanding modern evolutionary theory (i.e., to Richard Dawkins and his memes). Great stuff! But mention evolutionary theory to a US-government audience and you'll spend the next hour debating the Book of Genesis with folks on the right side of the room; a week later you'll be reading articles by lefties in the Washington Post accusing you of advocating new eugenics laws banning reproduction by racial minorities.

The errors Corn describes originate in American cultural attitudes that certainly do not derive from Clausewitz. Iindeed, it is those cultural attitudes that drive the frequently ludicrous manner in which Clausewitz's ideas are used and taught. Those attitudes will not magically disappear once every copy of On War has been safely burned. If anthropology becomes the new strategic rage, then educators who may be "men of one book" (or even "men of one set of Cliffs notes") will be subjecting students to equally misleading doctrinal discourses on Margaret Mead. (I'm not joking here: Read John Keegan's anthropological absurdities in his A History of Warfare, which are every bit as asinine as his comments on Clausewitz.)

There are a great many ideas in Corn's article that, however disjointed, are worthy of discussion. Rather than respond with my own theory-of-everything, let me focus briefly on Corn's very positive comments on thinking inside the US Marine Corps. Though I am evidently one of the "Clausewitzian petits maitres" Corn finds so objectionable, I know something at least about USMC doctrine, since I wrote small pieces of the current MCDP 1, Warfighting, and virtually all of MCDP 1-1, Strategy and MCDP 1-2, Campaigning (not to mention the Aviation Operations and Reconnaissance manuals…). The MCDPs did not spring full-blown from the pen of any academic, but emerged from an energetic debate within the Corps' leadership. They are, in fact, supremely eclectic works drawing on a vast array of ideas and influences. But only a poseur who had never even looked at the famous Warfighting manual's table of contents (for which I bear no responsibility whatsoever—its primary author, John Schmitt, is a self-professed "Sun Tzu guy") could write that they are "largely exempt from the Clausewitz regimen." Just look at the chapter and section titles: "Nature of War," "Theory of War," "Friction," etc., etc. Or scan the source documentation...

Jimbo

10-20-2006, 03:50 AM

I have some problems with Tony Corn's article. The first problem I have is he gives Clauswitzian Theory too much credit for driving U.S. military strategy and doctrine. The U.S. Army has traditionally been driven by Jominian theory as opposed to Clauswitzian. Jomini can be summed up as telling somebody how to fight, and Clauswitz can be summed up explaining the why. The real misunderstanding of Clauswitz is that his work is assumed to be purely a work for military people. Many sections of his work ought to be read by political leaders because I feel he does an outstanding job of explaining the political leadership aspects of startegic decision making. That is why I believe that Clauswitz is more relevant than ever. Furthermore, Clauswitz defined his success as theorist based on timelessness and universiality. Both of which apply. I would argue that 4GW is not a theory. It has merely taking Maoist theory and added the concept of mass media to it. Maybe I can meet corn, since I am supposedly going to work in DC for 6 months from january to june on COIN issues.

Steve Blair

10-20-2006, 12:58 PM

I agree, jimbo. Old Carl was writing more of an overarching theory than a simple prescriptive study. Clausewitz also never finished "On War," which is something the detractors tend to overlook.

marct

10-20-2006, 03:32 PM

To much commentary on Anthropology for me not to jump in;)

Nor is Clausewitz responsible for the smothering political correctness that makes it virtually impossible even to discuss things like the strategic history of Islam. Personally, I am still recovering from the high-pitched institutional whining that ensued when I made remarks on that subject virtually identical to Corn's a few weeks ago at one of the nation's premier institutions for strategic education. And almost every PME effort to discuss the "anthropology" of Islam that I have experienced has immediately degenerated into an utterly irrelevant analysis of the finer points of Koranic theology.

No question in my mind that Clausewitz isn't responsible for the current PC attitudes, and I can certainly understand the "institutional whining" reaction - I see that frequently enough <wry grin>. Without being there, I honestly couldn't say whether the analysis of Koranic theology was irrelevant or not (probably, but there's always a chance it might not have been).

What is to clear to me is that Bassford got trapped in a debate where theologians (broadly construed to include both deistic and non-deistic theologies) set the rules of discourse. I'll admit to engaging in theological debates myself, usually over Port and/or Brandy. They can be a lot of fun, but the true enjoyment in them comes from one fairly simple fact - they have no immediate relevance to the material world. As such, they really should be exlcuded from discussions dealing with immediate, real world activities unless their relevance can be demonstrated.

Corn makes some (seemingly) favorable allusions to the potential value to strategists of understanding modern evolutionary theory (i.e., to Richard Dawkins and his memes). Great stuff! But mention evolutionary theory to a US-government audience and you'll spend the next hour debating the Book of Genesis with folks on the right side of the room; a week later you'll be reading articles by lefties in the Washington Post accusing you of advocating new eugenics laws banning reproduction by racial minorities.

Too true! I remember applying for a position in one US university and being asked if I would give Intelligent Design theory the same weight as Evolutionary Theory. Being 99% sure I wouldn't get the job, and being pretty sickened by the rampant PC attitude of the interviewer, I told her that I would be more than happy to teach a course that included ID theory - along with every other creation myth I was aware of: an "Anthropology of Origin Myths". You can imagine the reaction...

Bassford is also quite right in his comments about Dawkins meme theory - it has a direct relevance to the GWOT. Part of the problem, however, is that he (and the rest of us who use any neo-evolutionary theory) is up against is an institutional reaction within Sociology and, to a lesser extent, Anthropology against anything to do with studying biology in addition to the Genesis crowd. This reaction comes out of a general, post-WWII reaction against the Nazis and their state-sponsored "racial science". The unfortunate problem is that it has, de facto, destroyed a very profitable line of research.

If Bassford really wants to get lambasted in the press by "lefties", he should try integrating Dawkins work with that of Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby and, just for fun, toss in the works of Charles Laughlin. Of course, he would also end up with a theoretical model that actually models mediaspace warefare and how it ties in to insurgency warfare. Obviously, this would be too useful to actually get published in any academic setting...:rolleyes:

The errors Corn describes originate in American cultural attitudes that certainly do not derive from Clausewitz. Iindeed, it is those cultural attitudes that drive the frequently ludicrous manner in which Clausewitz's ideas are used and taught. Those attitudes will not magically disappear once every copy of On War has been safely burned. If anthropology becomes the new strategic rage, then educators who may be "men of one book" (or even "men of one set of Cliffs notes") will be subjecting students to equally misleading doctrinal discourses on Margaret Mead. (I'm not joking here: Read John Keegan's anthropological absurdities in his A History of Warfare, which are every bit as asinine as his comments on Clausewitz.)

Well, I suspect that the doctrinal discourses would be on Clifford Geertz and Clifford and Marcus, with hermeneutic strategies derived from Foucault, but I can't disagree. Too much of Anthropology teaching has moved towards a non-deistic theology - probably an inevitable consequence of institutional vectors following WWII. On this line, I posted an article that appeared in the Times Higher Education Supplement that is relevant in another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=5173#post5173).

Marc

Ray Levesque

10-20-2006, 08:14 PM

I believe the biggest problem that most have with Clausewitz is that his book (as if he wrote only one) is selectively read, anecdotally quoted, and rarely thought about in a critical manner. One of the basic problems with Clausewitz is that he died before he actually finished ON WAR. He had the draft, realized he needed to adjust it in light of his thinking about the influence of politics on war, and only had time to finish the first chapter before passing on.

So, are there inconsistencies in ON WAR? Certainly, which is one of the reasons it needs to be critically read and not mindlessly quoted. Having said that an officer can only be better off if he were to read the first book and thought deeply about “real” war, the fog of war, friction, the relationship of politics on war – he’s the only one that has truly tried to get to the nature of war regardless of its type. (Hmmmm...things that seem to have been ignored against the context of the so-called revolution in military affairs and the self-appointed gurus of transformation who focused on "capabilities-based" planning instead of on the real world threat.)

But, keep this in mind, Clausewitz clearly argues that any theory of war had to account for the fact that the majority of wars are limited in nature, and not the total "ideal" wars about which he had been writing. Clausewitz did not create the concept of “unlimited war” except as an ideal that could NEVER be achieved. Critically reading the first chapter of the book is key. So, although he didn’t write about insurgencies per se, his thinking on limited war and the need to align strategic goals (policy) with means still applies.

A pretty good book for understanding not just Clausewitz’ themes, but also how his writings, in particular ON WAR, were put together is READING CLAUSEWITZ by Beatrice Heuser.

However, what’s just as bad as criticizing Clausewitz without critically reading ON WAR is to accept what he says as dogma. He’s great food for thought and has a lot of application still today, but there are other strategic theorists out there that should be read in order to have a deeper understanding of the nature of war and so that you can modify your “lessons learned” to the situation at hand.

GlenWard

10-01-2008, 09:36 AM

hi,

To much commentary on Anthropology for me not to jump in

SWJED

10-01-2008, 09:39 AM

hi,

To much commentary on Anthropology for me not to jump in

Please introduce yourself here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=33) before you take the leap.

PhilR

10-01-2008, 11:40 AM

I'd highly recommend reading Jon Sumida's new book Decoding Clausewitz (Univ. of Kansas Press, 2008). It provides a new, and I believe useful, look at On War. Sumida makes a couple of propositions that put On War into a new light. The first is that the ordering of the "Clausewitz notes" has been mis-interpreted and that On War was substantially complete upon Clausewitz's death (not just Book I as many claim). The second is that Clausewitz was not trying to produce a "theory of a phenomenon", or to explain war, but rather to describe a "theory of practice", to describe a framework for examining and learning about war. In this light Book II, with its description of the process of critical analysis as a means to learn from history, is really the focus of the book.
Fully agree with it or not, I believe this is a good approach for members of this forum to consider. It especially comes to my mind as I track the current multiple SWJ discussion threads on various aspects of Maneuver Warfare, John Boyd and the OODA loop. What comes out is that the value isn't really in what a doctrine or theory says is, but rather the thinking and discourse it promotes. More thinking and discourse means better educated practitioners (whether they be military or civilian).

nathan3011

12-19-2008, 02:18 PM

William F. Owen

12-19-2008, 02:33 PM

Clausewitz is the essential grounding for all modern military thought. It's not as binding as Newtonian physics, but we have nothing else. I concur with the view that Tony Corn has either never read Clausewitz or has failed to discuss and understand what he says, with those who do.

Part of this comes from the increasing confusion caused by the current use of means which have no military purpose. (Building Schools, Aid programs etc) which fall outside the scope of the military instrument and are part of the policy, not the War. A vast amount of what is currently discussed about military thought is not military, or even "Warfare", so folks read Clausewitz and get confused.

Failing to understand Clausewitz is also central to a lot of John Boyd's insights, so again, adhering to one set of faulty argument sets you up for the next error in your OODA loop! - cheap shot, but it was too easy!! :)

AmericanPride

12-19-2008, 11:45 PM

In my understanding, the relevancy of Clausewitz in the contemporary operating environment has not eroded, but instead has moved "downwards" to where tactical decisions have the same political effects and aims of war as a whole. Anthropology in war is nothing new -- IIRC Caesar extensively exploited such knowledge in his conquest of Gaul.

SWJED

12-20-2008, 12:01 AM

Hey thanks for this i found it a very insightful and interesting read and im in agreement that it was not the reason for today's PC attitude but it could have helped a little bit.

Thanks for this though guys much appreciated and a good read!

Please do an intro (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=33) and, per our “house rules”, explain why you found this insightful and interesting... We tend to ask for substance here. Thanks in advance.

Backwards Observer

12-23-2008, 07:02 AM

Does the fractious debate on evolutionary theory more-or-less hamstring any effort at describing complex adaptive systems from a human perspective?:confused:

Merry Christmas

Bill Moore

12-23-2008, 03:59 PM

Does the fractious debate on evolutionary theory more-or-less hamstring any effort at describing complex adaptive systems from a human perspective?

The evolution of warfare is a fact, not a theory. I'm not sure there is any debate on that, and complex adaptive systems are systems that evolve in response to a changing environment, in other words co-evolution.

Previously I have been hard on the readers/followers of Clausewitz, but that was due to their interpretations and blind obedience to what they think Clausewitz meant to say, such as the debate on center of gravities (COG). The COG process normally results in a lot of wasted time that does nothing to address the real problem, but it results in a must have power point slide for most ring knockers and graduates of CGSC. Clausewitz was a trend setter, not a follower. His intellectual insights were far above most, if not all, other military theorists, but his hordes of worshipers do not fall in the same category.

Backwards Observer

12-24-2008, 04:58 AM

Cavguy

12-24-2008, 03:23 PM

The evolution of warfare is a fact, not a theory. I'm not sure there is any debate on that, and complex adaptive systems are systems that evolve in response to a changing environment, in other words co-evolution.

Just wanted to chime in and differentiate that no one argues against the idea warfare constantly evolves, but whether there are semi-linear "generations" of war (1/2/3/4 GW) is quite a subject of debate here and elsewhere. I, for one, hate the GW concept, for all the reasons outline in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6112).

I would also argue that whether the underlying nature of warfare is different today than in the past is open discussion.

CR6

12-24-2008, 03:31 PM

I would also argue that whether the underlying nature of warfare is different today than in the past is open discussion.

I am of the opinion that the nature of war is unchanging but its character may change based on the cultures, available technology, and motivations of the antagonists.

selil

12-24-2008, 03:57 PM

I agree with many that "generational" concepts of war are hugely disturbing (even if I've written about it). I've been doing a literature review on the topic and I'm coming to some ideas that may or may not be valid.

1) The reasons for conflict remain the same. The reasons, the issues, the politics, the humanity of conflict is the same throughout history.

2) There are fundamental tactics that remain the same. Small unit to large army the ideas of movement, formation, are re-interpreted but fundamentally similar to previous eras.

3) Strategies appear to evolve but that is a false premise. Understanding and knowledge of the enemy and response techniques to the enemy actions evolve to follow consistent maturation models.

4) The fulcrum of many military eras is a fusion of technology and culture. New weapons cause a scramble to identify new defenses which result in new attack modes. That follow similar strategies of past eras just in newly interpreted roles.

I might suggest that industrial age harmonics rolling through our knowledge economic age have created a tension within military circles (e.g. Nagl v. Gentile). Generational and episodic explanations have a tendency to create waves of new/old thinking. Whereas, usually the point of view of each is increasingly in error as the window of time moves across both points of view. The only constant being change, the only reality being the independent view points of the participants.

Some meager ideas frittered away on Christmas eve.

Bill Moore

12-24-2008, 03:59 PM

I, for one, hate the GW concept, for all the reasons outline in this thread.

Concur, although I still think there are some worthwhile observations in the 4GW school of thought. I heard from a credible source that Hammes later wished he didn't attach his ideas to 4GW, because that association ended up discrediting an otherwise great work.

I concur that the character of war evolves primarily based on culture and techology, but I strongly suspect there are other factors. Furthermore, as we all know different cultures evolve at different rates and in different ways. If a particular foe (most of them), can't afford to evolve sufficiently to counter our advanced technological based force, they'll evolve their tactics and strategy in an attempt to mitigate it (co-evoluation), thus equating to what some call asymmetrical warfare. Seems all of our terms asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, etc. are far from ideal, yet those terms emerged for a reason.

Cavguy

12-29-2008, 04:07 PM

Concur, although I still think there are some worthwhile observations in the 4GW school of thought. I heard from a credible source that Hammes later wished he didn't attach his ideas to 4GW, because that association ended up discrediting an otherwise great work.

When I first read 'Sling and the Stone', it was an eye-opener that I learned a lot from. Even then (well before my SWC/IW/COIN/4GW/Hybrid War/etc education) I was uneasy with the concept. That didn't take away from the overall lesson of TX's book - these wars are about populations, narrative, and information.

That said, he spent the first 1/3d of the book making a foreceful argument for the GW concept, something that really detracted from my recent re-read.

For novices, the 4GW theory doesn't do any harm, it's just intellectually dishonest, and I still don't understand why Lind and Co. persist in promoting what is a bankrupt construct when other, more intellectually honest approaches are available.

William F. Owen

12-29-2008, 04:27 PM

Concur, although I still think there are some worthwhile observations in the 4GW school of thought. I heard from a credible source that Hammes later wished he didn't attach his ideas to 4GW, because that association ended up discrediting an otherwise great work.

Not to doubt the credible source, but having spent some days, a dining in night and a couple of hours on a train with TX, arguing about a whole range of stuff, I think he believes in the idea of 4GW, if nothing else as short-hand for the idea that somehow war is or has somehow changed.

This is the idea I disagree with.

4GW is like MW and EBO. It's a very blunt tool for trying to get an idea across quickly and without having to explain too much.

UrsaMaior

12-29-2008, 11:32 PM

Not only iranian but estonian and hungarian military academics have also embraced the 4GW modell. Their understanding of it is similar to those two PLA colonels', basically in this 'new kind of war' everythin' goes, but old fashioned firepower - so to say.

when other, more intellectually honest approaches are available.

May I ask you to let me know where I can find them?

William F. Owen

12-30-2008, 05:36 AM

Not only iranian but estonian and hungarian military academics have also embraced the 4GW modell. Their understanding of it is similar to those two PLA colonels', basically in this 'new kind of war' everythin' goes, but old fashioned firepower - so to say.

I think that just shows how poor the overall understanding of War and Warfare may be. It is simply ludicrous in the extreme to suggest that there is a "new kind of War" unless you didn't understand the existing forms of war in the first place.

UrsaMaior

12-30-2008, 07:34 AM

William F. Owen

12-30-2008, 08:45 AM

With all respect sir, I tend to agree with Steve Metz
Contemporary insurgencies are less like traditional war where the combatants seek strategic victory, they are more like a violent, fluid, and competitive market.

and Gen. Krulak "I feel it will be Stepchild of Chechnya.".

Please call me Wilf, and with equal respect I disagree with Steve on this one. I agree with Colin Gray. If an insurgency does not have a strategic (change of government?) then it's not an insurgency. People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational.

Good man though Krulak may be, lets not get lumbered with another simplistic analogy like "three-block war."

These 'new wars' or conflicts are not the "clean", collateral damage-free and strategically clear (objective: Defeat Hitler, or the Soviet Union) wars we westerners got used to fight. Especially when no future enemy will 'stand up' to a 'fair fight'.

I'm not sure I understand this. Defeating Hitler was not Collateral damage free. About 27,000,000 civilians died. Allied Forces killed 7,000 French civilians during the Normandy Campaign alone, and about 300,000 German civilians in Bombing raids. That Governments didn't care that much does not define a "new war now that Governments may pretend to care. What you are seeing is merely a form of operations that requires the restriction of force when and if appropriate. It's not new.

If you wish to believe that "no future enemy will 'stand up' to a 'fair fight'" then I would ask where you have found the evidence to support this idea.

Ken White

12-30-2008, 02:05 PM

...If an insurgency does not have a strategic (change of government?) then it's not an insurgency. People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational.True.I'm not sure I understand this. Defeating Hitler was not Collateral damage free...Very true and you just hit the tip of the old iceberg. Consider also the damaging (then to the war and future until today...) political interplay between the UK, US and USSR (among others) and the fact that one of Roosevelt's war aims was to strip the colonies from France and the UK, an attempt in which he was generally successful. WW II was a very big, very messy and not well conducted war, lot of failures military and political by all involved. It also was not totally supported by the non combatant population as many seem to believe.That Governments didn't care that much does not define a "new war now that Governments may pretend to care. What you are seeing is merely a form of operations that requires the restriction of force when and if appropriate. It's not new.Nope -- nor is it guaranteed to be the only venue...

selil

12-30-2008, 02:31 PM

I think that just shows how poor the overall understanding of War and Warfare may be. It is simply ludicrous in the extreme to suggest that there is a "new kind of War" unless you didn't understand the existing forms of war in the first place.

That is a bit troubling. The advent of air power was a new kind of war, add in space operations and planning and new methods of war were adopted, never mind the idea of nuclear weapons opening an entire new form of war, cyber like it or not is likely a new domain even if built on the bones of other forms of war.

I imagine the first generals looking at boats saying "Navy? What? That is no way to wage war. You can't wage war from a boat!".

New or old they are changing and morphing.

Steve Blair

12-30-2008, 02:44 PM

That is a bit troubling. The advent of air power was a new kind of war, add in space operations and planning and new methods of war were adopted, never mind the idea of nuclear weapons opening an entire new form of war, cyber like it or not is likely a new domain even if built on the bones of other forms of war.

I imagine the first generals looking at boats saying "Navy? What? That is no way to wage war. You can't wage war from a boat!".

New or old they are changing and morphing.

I see most of these as being new dimensions of war, with the exception of nukes and cyber. Why? Nukes gave generals and politicians their first real weapon that could almost instantly annihilate an opponent. Cyber because it is really attacking different areas and operating with parameters that are considerably different from those of more traditional conflict.

And with the navy analogy...the Romans saw boats as just another way to get close to their opponents and send in the Legions. Boarding tactics were a major part of any of their naval engagements. The Athenians, by contrast, had a very different approach. But they were still different dimensions of the same conflict. Nukes and cyber change the boundaries, IMO.

Ken White

12-30-2008, 03:23 PM

is infinitely varied and changes constantly. Woe be to he who doesn't keep up with the changes... :wry:

War is a state of being; warfare is methodology and practice. That's not just semantic BS, the relevant difference is shown by all those who objected to the 'War on Terror' claiming one could not be at war with a tactical method.

William F. Owen

12-30-2008, 03:27 PM

UrsaMaior

12-30-2008, 05:43 PM

Please call me Wilf, and with equal respect I disagree with Steve on this one. I agree with Colin Gray. If an insurgency does not have a strategic (change of government?) then it's not an insurgency. People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational.

Wilf
If a rebellion, civil unrest etc. has a long term goal can we call it an insurgency? BTW as a newcomer to COIN is there any broadly accepted definition for IN/COIN?

Good man though Krulak may be, lets not get lumbered with another simplistic analogy like "three-block war."

I have not read his work, I only remembered he forecasted the 'new kind of war'. IMHO this urban guerilla, street gang, militia style MOUT war interwoven with the 24/7 media coverage is not something that has historic precedence.

I'm not sure I understand this. Defeating Hitler was not Collateral damage free. About 27,000,000 civilians died. Allied Forces killed 7,000 French civilians during the Normandy Campaign alone, and about 300,000 German civilians in Bombing raids.

The '1000 bomber raid' and similar operations were clearly NOT aimed at military objectives. The first Schweinfurt attacks yes. But not most of the attacks in 1945, and not the night ones. In that sense only the french casulties you mentioned can be called collateral damage. The rest were victims of intended genocide mostly by the nazis and the soviets. But let's stay on topic.

That Governments didn't care that much does not define a "new war now that Governments may pretend to care. What you are seeing is merely a form of operations that requires the restriction of force when and if appropriate. It's not new.

Wilf. An enemy whose actions are clearly aimed at reaching media coverage, and not at causing military losses (in the sense of seriously weakening the enemy warmachine), while at the same time hiding among the civilians hoping to avoid the reprisal, based on 'Human rights to everyone' is not something we have seen before. Of course elements of it yes. But not the whole picture.

If you wish to believe that "no future enemy will 'stand up' to a 'fair fight'" then I would ask where you have found the evidence to support this idea.

If I were a rational, thinking people I would consider my actions and their consequences before I act against a technically or numerically superior enemy. Of course religious fanatics appear from time to time, but get their a***es whacked real quick, after an inital surprise.

But you are right, I reformulate. No sane future enemy will stand up against say NATO and organize its fighting force into neat military units in uniforms ie to put up a fair fight.

In the age of information industrial age armies are as irrelevant as were pre-industrial ones to industrial ones. They still have their validity as deterring force, but the 'succesful' herero or boer war solutions of previous ages cannot be repeated.

Edit
Yours truly Carl has said war is a chameleon. Well it is.

AmericanPride

12-30-2008, 11:32 PM

zenpundit

12-31-2008, 04:59 AM

Wilf Owen wrote:

"People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational"

Instrumental for some. States, for example.

Arguably "recreational violence" is an end in itself and a point of recruitment for certain kinds of military forces from tribal raiders, to mercenaries to citizen soldiers where a public demonstration of martial prowess was integral to social concepts of "honor" or future individual political credibility. From counting coup to ethnic cleansing the neighbors who have marginally different customs, taking up arms throughout history has had other pretexts besides strategic political objectives.

I would also argue that some of history's more poorly conceived military ventures failed in part because they were gratuitous gestures of force lacking in a coherent purpose.

Ken White

12-31-2008, 05:34 AM

Instrumental for some. States, for example.

Arguably "recreational violence" is an end in itself and a point of recruitment...taking up arms throughout history has had other pretexts besides strategic political objectives.True but that does not indicate that such recourse to arms is recreational even though some, a small percentage and generally young and inexperienced may actually enjoy conflict it is unlikely that the majority of groups that take up arms do so for recreation.I would also argue that some of history's more poorly conceived military ventures failed in part because they were gratuitous gestures of force lacking in a coherent purpose.Also true but again, not a contradiction of Wilf's point. All Movies lack a coherent purpose IMO yet they are seen by some as recreation and by others as instrumental for achieving social change. Movies are not real and some have entertainment value. War is real, it is singularly lacking in entertainment value...:wry:

William F. Owen

12-31-2008, 05:48 AM

Arguably "recreational violence" is an end in itself and a point of recruitment for certain kinds of military forces from tribal raiders, to mercenaries to citizen soldiers where a public demonstration of martial prowess was integral to social concepts of "honor" or future individual political credibility.

...and thus instrumental. Instrumental does not mean "fun free" it just means for a purpose.

If you want to talk movies, I'd say there is an object lesson to be had from studying "The Shield" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Shield) which is exceptional screen writing and where all violent actions have direct story consequences.

UrsaMaior

12-31-2008, 01:49 PM

Ursa,

What's 'new' about the nature of war and what makes it 'new'? How does a new tactic indictate a fundamental change in war itself?

Also -- what conditions exist now that compel an adversary to not pursue a conventional war? What makes those conditions enduring?

Excellent questions. In my humble and yet not thouroughly researched opinion

ad 1. War was/is/will be a social "activity" if we accept (I do) van Creveld's findings about it (even Keegan's examples in his falied yet interesting try to refute Clausewitz prove it) iMHO it is an inseperable part of human (or maybe male) nature. So it cannot be old new etc only different. New kind maybe.

Therefore it is a 'new kind' to us since the way it is fought (through media driven pseudo military actions), for it is fought (the suport of the popalation's majority), and by whom it is fought (militias, gangs not something we can call a military with OOB's and C4ISR etc.). Yet it is a war since it is waged on states with clearly defined strategic goals.

It is fundamental because it is irrelevant how big your arsenal is. I would quote Boyd here but in my perception he is not really welcome here, so I merely would like to quote a group called Human League (having lived behind the Iron Curtain while they were hip I only know their songs not their backgrounds). So here it goes "You cannot make friends with an M-16." The net effect of globalisation, the collapse of the colonial system not to mention the cold war is that you cant just invade a country and suppress its population with brute force. It's not a new tactic hit and run is as ancient as the ancient scythians or even older. It is a fundamental change in the circumstances. Industrial age is over and the information age is upon us. But it does not mean we must get more information on possible targets through sensors and share it with the others, rather ' He who has more information of the enemy's intents, support and objctives wins.' to paraphrase Sun Tzu.

ad 2. As I already said in one of my answer to wilf, any rational enemy would avoid a direct confrontation with the military technological, organizational superiority of the West. Why? Because it is obviously counterproductive. As long as we preserve a credible deterring force it wont stand a chance in a classical "clausewitzian" conflict. Therefore if it wants to pursue its goals (and again thanks to globalisation and UN etc. they can be non-state actors as well), it will have to resort to non-conventional means, in which we have a bit poor record.

If we unmake globalisation, and the watcher of human rights (the UN) I don't see any reason not to resort to the ol' victorian methods of brutal population suppression. I am too uniformed to see any of the above coming. But if these are to stay, then classical military operations with army groups and dozens of divisions have ended since any gain from such an industrial style war is insignificant compared to the level of damage evenn the winner has to suffer.

This is my pronouncedly humble opinion since I am yet to publish anything in this issue.

William F. Owen

12-31-2008, 02:02 PM

ad 2. As I already said in one of my answer to wilf, any rational enemy would avoid a direct confrontation with the military technological, organizational superiority of the West. Why? Because it is obviously counterproductive. As long as we preserve a credible deterring force it wont stand a chance in a classical "clausewitzian" conflict. Therefore if it wants to pursue its goals (and again thanks to globalisation and UN etc. they can be non-state actors as well), it will have to resort to non-conventional means, in which we have a bit poor record.

I take your point, if the rational enemy was rational and did not possess equivalent technology of his own. It may be different to ours but is may still be effective.

Don't dismiss 6,000 Toyota Land cruisers all armed with MANPADs and ATGMS

"Classical "clausewitzian" conflict.?" Clausewitz wrote about all conflict. Clausewitz applies equally well to COIN as he does "Big Wars".

selil

12-31-2008, 02:08 PM

William F. Owen

12-31-2008, 02:26 PM

Anybody who thinks in western civilization violence does not exist for the sake of violence has been in the disciplined world of the military for way to long. Detroit devils night (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devil's_Night) would be a good example. The assertion that people don't engage in violence for no reason other than political is a ludicrous as people rioting when their team wins (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5qkoD5Spgg)! Maybe that isn't war, or warfare, or diplomacy, but the assertion appeared to be that people don't engage in violence for acts other than those. To use a word from a previous poster that would be ludicrous.

Sure people beat their wives because it makes them feel good, and as Brit I have fairly good, and perhaps shameful personal experience of football violence. I would further add that I my experience, football violence was instrumental. It conferred status.

What I said was,

"People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational"

If you can show me any armed group that has organised for recreational violance and show it as a consistent and persistent trend, that undermines the validity of my comment, I will gladly retract it or re-consider it.

12-31-2008, 02:49 PM

Sure people beat their wives because it makes them feel good, and as Brit I have fairly good, and perhaps shameful personal experience of football violence. I would further add that I my experience, football violence was instrumental. It conferred status.

What I said was,

"People do not take up arms for fun. Violence is instrumental, not recreational"

If you can show me any armed group that has organised for recreational violance and show it as a consistent and persistent trend, that undermines the validity of my comment, I will gladly retract it or re-consider it.

I suspect that reflection on the second quotation in Wilf's signature block, to wit: "Pedants will be able to cite exceptions, and thus undermine useful (insightful) theory. Their depredations must be firmly resisted by one simple test: does the theory generally aid understanding of useful military problems? If so, then exceptions are permissible."
is worthwhile to both sides of this debate. Another way of stating this is the old saw "that's the exception that proves the rule."

BTW, I suspect that the comparison commits an error akin to trying to answer this question: "Is it colder in the winter or the country?"
A better framing of the debate would, IMHO, be: Do people routinely engage in violence as a means to some other end or is violence practiced without aim. Accepting the hypothesis that some folks engage in recreational violence still commits one to the position that the violence is not aimless. It is conducted as "a means of refreshment or diversion" to quote Webster's second definition for recreation.

Perhaps the debate should focus on whether the goal of the participation in violence is more or less noble, worthwhile, valuable, etc. Recreation as a goal of violence seems to imply that the end does not justify the means (but I'd be careful saying that at a World Wrestling Fenderation Smackdown event or a major professional boxing event :wry: ).