Mechanized Infantry Perceptions 2010

[Seerov]

I left the army in Dec 2003. I remember before Iraq many people were certain (especially in the light infantry community) that vehicles could not work in cities and other difficult terrain. Mechanized infantry was truly morally inferior to light infantry. Even during basic training light infantry 11b drill SGTs would advance anti-mech stereotypes and proclaim the superiority of light infantry. APCs and tanks were "coffins." It wasn’t even the same Army in "mech world." Finding out you were 11m was like finding out you were born into a lower caste.

Of course, sometimes there is a hint of truth in stereotypes. It was possible to find more out-of-shape soldiers in mechanized units, than in light infantry units. Some of these people were just more skilled with their Bradley job than with infantry skills.

At that time (while in the Army), I somewhat looked down on these people. But now I think I may have been wrong, in that maybe, that was just what they were good at? I had no interest in being a Bradley gunner or driver and made it perfectly clear(I only served in dismount squads). So I was basically the same thing. Maybe some people should be allowed to spend their career just being a Bradley crew member(driver, gunner, BC, platoon sgt)? Maybe some people should never have to do the jobs on a Bradley (they would spend their whole career in light infantry units)? The best platoon SGT I had in the Army was one of these guys. He would fall out of the company run, but knew everything about the Bradley and his platoon sgts duties.

Anyway, I’m wondering if this divide (between mech and light infantry) is still as deep today (2010) as it was in 2003 when I left the army? Since 2002 or 2003, the Army started force integrating these groups. So now infantry soldiers have to serve in both. Has this decreased the cultural biases towards mech? What about striker units? Are striker units "in between" mech and light on the "true infantry morality metric?" With the large scale use of humvees, isn't it all just blurring (the line between mech and light infantry) anyway? Is the fitness level of the average soldier negatively correlated with vehicle size? lol

Most important, how have the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan changed solider perceptions of mech infantry, and amour in general? Are there still soldiers/leaders who insist that APCs and tanks are useless in cities?

Are mech infantry soliders still just "tankers" to the light infantry world, or are they real infantrymen now?

[Infanteer]

Begrudging a useful tool due to chauvinism is foolish.

Unless your fighting in the mountains or in swamps, vehicles have some utility and "lightfighters" can abandon them to their own folly.

In our own Army the sails from the "lightfighter" ship deflated when, after proclaiming that COIN was a lightfighters environment, the utility of a LAV in surviving and fighting in an environment like Southern Afghanistan was apparent to all - the fact that a Canadian battle group had to pull out a besieged British "light" force that was, in some places, resorting to drinking ditch water was instructive.

[Ken White]

Begrudging a useful tool due to chauvinism is foolish.True.
Unless your fighting in the mountains or in swamps, vehicles have some utility and "lightfighters" can abandon them to their own folly.Among other places...:wry:

Jungles, cities and your taiga forests can be problematic as well. So can sandy desert -- or heavily fenced farmland (not even counting what newly plowed fields can do in a rain).
...the utility of a LAV in surviving and fighting in an environment like Southern Afghanistan was apparent to all...Emphasis added, KW
...resorting to drinking ditch water was instructive.As one who's drunk a good bit of ditch and rice paddy water, I really have to ask, what's your point? :D

Amazingly, before there was bottled water and ROWPU, that was de rigueur. However, vehicles do enable hot coffee often and that's a major plus. ;)

For all else, METT-TC applies...

[reed11b]

Anyway, I’m wondering if this divide (between mech and light infantry) is still as deep today (2010) as it was in 2003 when I left the army? Since 2002 or 2003, the Army started force integrating these groups. So now infantry soldiers have to serve in both. Has this decreased the cultural biases towards mech? What about striker units? Are striker units "in between" mech and light on the "true infantry morality metric?" With the large scale use of humvees, isn't it all just blurring (the line between mech and light infantry) anyway? Is the fitness level of the average soldier negatively correlated with vehicle size? lol

Most important, how have the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan changed solider perceptions of mech infantry, and amour in general? Are there still soldiers/leaders who insist that APCs and tanks are useless in cities?

Are mech infantry soliders still just "tankers" to the light infantry world, or are they real infantrymen now?

Having served in both time periods 94-97 and 01 to present in the Infantry I will attempt to answer. Yes the divide has diminished, though yes, PT scores are still negatively correlated to vehicle size. Big armored vehicles take a lot of training time, time not spent training in other things. Knowing how to operate a Bradley is almost like having a second MOS (like say a 19 series MOS, just sayin'). However opinions of the support that armor provides has improved.

Strykers are viewed as an in between and well liked by most light infantry types that I have spoke too. Strykers provide additional support, but do not use up all the resources for infantry training. Even the mythical Ragnars use them down range often and tend to like them. That was probably as clear as mud, sorry for necroing an old thread.
Reed

[ganulv]

Yes the divide has diminished, though yes, PT scores are still negatively correlated to vehicle size.
I’ve seen a couple of write-ups of studies comparing pre- and post-deployment physical fitness (LINK (http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA496351) to one of them). The research designs aren’t perfect—no idea how one would get a control group for such studies—and the findings differ a bit, but the ones I have seen all report some loss in aerobic fitness. Would that seem to be a testament to most units operating as de facto mechanized infantry, or would it be more likely to be about lack of PT?

[reed11b]

I’ve seen a couple of write-ups of studies comparing pre- and post-deployment physical fitness (LINK (http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA496351) to one of them). The research designs aren’t perfect—no idea how one would get a control group for such studies—and the findings differ a bit, but the ones I have seen all report some loss in aerobic fitness. Would that seem to be a testament to most units operating as de facto mechanized infantry, or would it be more likely to be about lack of PT?

Not an expert, but I would hazard a guess that it has more to do with lack of PT, poor rest plans, and poor nutrition downrange then it does with riding in vehicles. There are incredibly fit mechanized infantrymen and sandbagging lightfighters. My comments have more to do with the culture and training focus of said units.
Reed

[nightowl]

A good friend of mine is a Platoon Leader with a Mechanized Infantry unit here in Korea and he said that even within his Platoon, the "light is glory mentality is all pervasive." Very few of his Soldiers view themselves as Mechanized Infantryman. Instead, they are merely true-blue, 11B, light infantrymen who happen to be trapped in mech purgatory for the time being.

[Ken White]

There was a good reason for that MOS and no reason to eliminate it other than to make life easier for the Personnel Management types. There are very different skill sets and attitudes involved and the two approaches to ground combat, both needed, do not mesh at all well...

It also is, in Korea, partly due to the fact that a lot of Airborne types, light to a fault, go there on an unaccompanied tour in order to get returned to Bragg or to jump status somewhere rather than go for a leg long tour and ending up elsewhere. ;)

[Distiller]

Would it be possible to have a basic, standardized infantry unit ("light"), and put it on trucks or HMMVVs (making it "mot"), APCs or IFVs (making it "mech" or "heavy"), and helicopters (making it "airborne/air assault"), just as the operations require? Making the mobility component a modular attachment to a standardized infantry building block, say a platoon? Could that work? And going one step further, making it "amphib", and thus taking the same standardized basic infantry unit all across the ground combat environment?

[Fuchs]

Would it be possible to have a basic, standardized infantry unit ("light"), and put it on trucks or HMMVVs (making it "mot"), APCs or IFVs (making it "mech" or "heavy"), and helicopters (making it "airborne/air assault"), just as the operations require? Making the mobility component a modular attachment to a standardized infantry building block, say a platoon? Could that work? And going one step further, making it "amphib", and thus taking the same standardized basic infantry unit all across the ground combat environment?

http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/docs/Owen_Universal_Infantry.pdf


Possible? - sure.

Good idea? - Probably only for small armies (smaller than corps-sized).

[reed11b]

Would it be possible to have a basic, standardized infantry unit ("light"), and put it on trucks or HMMVVs (making it "mot"), APCs or IFVs (making it "mech" or "heavy"), and helicopters (making it "airborne/air assault"), just as the operations require? Making the mobility component a modular attachment to a standardized infantry building block, say a platoon? Could that work? And going one step further, making it "amphib", and thus taking the same standardized basic infantry unit all across the ground combat environment?

Modern IFVs are fairly complicated and take some serious training to operate. So if you had a separate unit with a MOS that specialized in being an IFV crewman, then yes you could, and unlike Fuchs, I think that is a good thing. Otherwise no, like Ken says, mechanized infantry and "light" infantry often have different skill sets (like knowing how to operate an IFV) and attitudes.
Reed

[Tukhachevskii]

Modern IFVs are fairly complicated and take some serious training to operate. So if you had a separate unit with a MOS that specialized in being an IFV crewman, then yes you could, and unlike Fuchs, I think that is a good thing. Otherwise no, like Ken says, mechanized infantry and "light" infantry often have different skill sets (like knowing how to operate an IFV) and attitudes.
Reed

Which is probably why the British army got rid of the arms plot (rotating units through different roles). Personally I always thought it was a good idea rotating units which acquired experience of different roles and equipment. Perhaps those with experience of the arms plot would like to chime in? Wilf's idea seems similar in intent although I don't know if it would work (sounds a little too SF inspired) plus the cost may be prohibitive (which was one , if not, the reason it was cancelled IIRC).

[Infanteer]

Modern IFVs are fairly complicated and take some serious training to operate. So if you had a separate unit with a MOS that specialized in being an IFV crewman, then yes you could, and unlike Fuchs, I think that is a good thing. Otherwise no, like Ken says, mechanized infantry and "light" infantry often have different skill sets (like knowing how to operate an IFV) and attitudes.
Reed

People know my views - I disagree with this statement. The skills to operate a modern IFV are not really serious - nothing more serious than learning to operate any dismounted piece of kit. For example, a Delco turret with a 25 mm Bushmaster requires that one learn a new weapon and some sequencing for turning on optical devices, but that's about it.

It ain't rocket science, and I've seen soldiers that are more than able to handle "light" and "mech" missions equally well without any significant skill loss.

As for the Arms plot, Tukhachevskii raises an interesting point. I wonder what was deemed more difficult - having guys rotate on different specializations or transfering kit all over the place ever few years?

[Ken White]

It can be done in war time as well -- if one is winning as were the Allies in Europe 1944-45. Whether it can be safely done in other aspects of major war is arguable.

The real issue is not whether it can be done -- as most anything can be if one wants it badly enough -- the issue is should it be done. I'd say for a small well trained Army under most circumstances it makes a great deal of sense. For a large, mobilizing Army, perhaps a little less sense. There is also the issue of affordability; all well and good to train broadly but if either time or funds or constrained, it may be inadvisable to train soldiers in skills they may never use...

A point to recall is not the raw skills, they're easy -- it's the cognitve skill enhancement and, even more importantly, muscle memory that become important to survival and success in intense combat and that argues for specialization.

Yet again, it's a METT-TC and situational issue -- there is advisedly NO one size fits all in warfare.

[Infanteer]

That's a good point Ken. We have a small, long-service Army up here so it is easy to pile on the skills.

[ganulv]

A point to recall is not the raw skills, they're easy -- it's the cognitve skill enhancement and, even more importantly, muscle memory that become important to survival and success in intense combat and that argues for specialization.
Within the U.S. military is there good recognition of the perishability of skills? Even fairly gross motor skills like swimming and skiing that are there to stay once acquired require maintenance to be done well at the drop of a hat.

[Compost]

Would it be possible to have a basic, standardized infantry unit ("light"), and put it on trucks or HMMVVs (making it "mot"), APCs or IFVs (making it "mech" or "heavy"), and helicopters (making it "airborne/air assault"), just as the operations require? Making the mobility component a modular attachment to a standardized infantry building block, say a platoon? Could that work? And going one step further, making it "amphib", and thus taking the same standardized basic infantry unit all across the ground combat environment?
Your questions have been often asked. They were particularly well examined and answered by commentators like Ogorkiewicz and Simpkin in their books and also articles in Military Technology published several decades ago.

And the general answer is ‘yes’. To do anything else would be careless because all infantry are firstly trained to be resourceful and aggressive when fighting on their feet, essentially as light infantry. Fighting from within vehicles demands a different type of endurance and a different skill set including maintenance. Neither of those require a vehicle crew of eight or more men. And a standard section of about eight infantry is about the minimum for versatility and staying power. A section of that size can also be augmented by a three or four–man weapon team from the platoon or company without becoming too cumbersome to control and manoeuvre.

However, light infantry operations can – without exception – benefit from vehicle support as a means of rapid, less tiring and protected transport, sometime source of observation and offensive/defensive fire, systems support and mobility and also as an arms-room, Q-store, kitchen and casevac post. What varies is the distance between dismounted infantry and their supporting vehicle – whether that be a GS truck or light-medium-heavy ground-based armour vehicle or watercraft, or in another context a STOL or VTOL aircraft. And a standard infantry section of about eight enables the overall size of that vehicle to be restrained.

Light infantry/armour co-operation was around for more than a millennia before Hannibal and his elephants. Modern infantry/armour co-operation has been productive in most environments since WW I and generally the closer together the better. Armour – MBTs, AEVs and APCs - proved unexpectedly useful in heavily vegetated areas in WWII and more recently in South Vietnam.

The result is that close coordination of armour and dismounted infantry is generally regarded as beneficial in defence and productive in offence for all environments and all forms of conflict – extending from prompt delivery of heavy firepower, combat engineering resources and concentrated and diffused infantry manoeuvre to passive overwatch and less vulnerable sentry in peacekeeping operations. APC concepts and capabilities have also been enhanced to produce not only AIFVs but also heavier armoured ‘battle wagons’ such as the German Lynx and Israeli Namer. And there are Ogorkiewicz and Simpkin concepts that have yet to be realized.

Usage improves with applied training, familiarity and frequent exercise but that does not require the infantry-carrying armoured vehicle to be operated by infantry. As implied by you, the mobility component or crew – driver, vehicle commander and gunner(s) or systems/weapon operator(s) - is better composed of personnel from an Armoured Corps. Most armoured vehicles have specialised systems and weapons and the vehicles themselves need attentive maintenance. So who better to crew infantry-carrying armoured vehicles than those specialists who already crew generally similar armoured vehicles that transport cavalry scouts. And the pool of Armoured Corps personnel can anyway be boosted by cross-corps recruiting of infantry who may have ‘lost’ some agility or fitness due to age or accident such as to an ankle during a parachute jump. That and other types of accident are prevalent in active training and often result in premature retirement.

It is in the nature of campaigns that after operating with one type of armoured vehicle for some period, a light infantry unit might be deployed to another operational area as light infantry, or as infantry mounted in another type of armoured vehicle more suited to that operational area. That type of rota is especially likely during operations conducted on a basis of periodic deployment or re-deployment.

There is the old furphy that an Armoured Corps crew may lack the knowledge and drive to deliver the infantry section where and how it needs to go. So some stalwarts strenuously argue that the infantry section commander should - instead of advising the vehicle commander – have command until the infantry dismount. However, after basic training and reasonably frequent exercise together (plus in some instances specific-to-operation rehearsal) the typical vehicle commander and typical section commander are likely to function well enough regardless of which is in substantive command.

But there is almost always an exception. And here is one such. There are several distinct types of infantry carrying armoured surface vehicle: light, medium and heavy wheeled and tracked. The least capable but also the least expensive to procure and operate is the light (less than 20 tonnes) wheeled APC. The Australian Army has decided that it is generally adviseable to transport an infantry section in an armoured vehicle. As a result many of the GS trucks in its regular and in some reserve light infantry battalions are being effectively replaced by about 800 Bushmaster 4x4 Protected Mobility Vehicles: an austere type of APC with V-shaped hull, blow-off external lockers and sacrificial wheel stations, some with Platt mounts but all currently without a shield or small turret. ( There are also two so-called armoured infantry battalions equipped with a mix of obsolescent M113A1 and modernised M113A3 APCs with an extra wheel station and upgraded engine, systems, spall liner and turret.)

The exception is partly due to the Bushmaster PMV having only ten seats. Hence - whenever it is required to carry a standard 8-man infantry section plus a 2-man command, engineer or other special team - an infantryman from the section has to be the designated driver and vehicle minder. And that seems to anyway be standard procedure in order to avoid having to increase battalion strength by about 100 drivers.

However, it is pleasing to note that AustArmy are ahead of the pack at the lightweight end of the protected mobility field. The US Army and USMC might find it convenient to employ the lighter variants of their MRAV vehicles in much the same way, provided they have independent springing rather than beam axles.

Unfortunately as a bitter aside AustArmy have mucked up the heavy end. It has only 59 M1A1(AIM)D Abrams MBTs on strength and not even one squadron can be deployed because for mobility support there is only a batch of M88A2 Hercules ARVs that rely on dissimilar spares. There is strangely not one AEV nor AVLB. So AustArmy may continue to perform at the light end but will have to rely on some other force such as the US Army and/or USMC to do any heavy lifting.

Returning to the basic question, it is generally preferable for each infantry battalion to be trained and primarily equipped as light infantry ? The answer has to be 'YES'.

If a battalion is issued with austere wheeled PMV-type vehicles then the unit might itself provide the driver and any weapon/systems operator for each vehicle. All other types of wheeled and tracked armoured infantry-carrying vehicles should be crewed by specialist drivers, commanders, gunners etc from an Armoured as opposed to the Infantry Corps. And groups or units of such vehicles should be attached to infantry units for periodic training and exercise, for specific operations and for more extended periods of use.

[Fuchs]

And the general answer is ‘yes’. To do anything else would be careless because all infantry are firstly trained to be resourceful and aggressive when fighting on their feet, essentially as light infantry.

That kind of training is awfully outdated, and on top of that pretty much ignorant of actual historical infantry missions. Aggressive actions are sometimes called for, but that's extremely rare in comparison to what infantry does during war overall.


I'd emphasize self-discipline (especially patience, thoroughness in camouflage and observation) and elusiveness instead - even and especially for offensive purposes.
These traits are required for vehicle crews as well, and it's more difficult for them since their vehicle's size makes it more difficult to meet the requirements.

[jcustis]

Would it be possible to have a basic, standardized infantry unit ("light"), and put it on trucks or HMMVVs (making it "mot"), APCs or IFVs (making it "mech" or "heavy"), and helicopters (making it "airborne/air assault"), just as the operations require? Making the mobility component a modular attachment to a standardized infantry building block, say a platoon? Could that work? And going one step further, making it "amphib", and thus taking the same standardized basic infantry unit all across the ground combat environment?

The Marine Corps already does this. We train our infantry lieutenants and captains as such to operate precisely as trainer/leaders for this sort of optimum utility force.

When we motorize infantry in mine-resistant vehicles, it is typically through the use of infantrymen trained as incidental drivers. With amphibious tracked vehicles, those crewmen originate in a separate military occupational specialty.

[Compost]

German experience was that APCs (SdKfz 251 mostly) halved infantry losses. APCs were only employed in motorised/armoured formations which tended to use aggressive (offensive) tactics, of course.
Above is quote of four weeks old item 177 on MRAP JLTV concept of infantry mobility thread. Followed here by:

That kind of training is awfully outdated, and on top of that pretty much ignorant of actual historical infantry missions. Aggressive actions are sometimes called for, but that's extremely rare in comparison to what infantry does during war overall.
At least we agree that infantry-carrying armoured vehicles can be/are useful.

[JMA]

A point to recall is not the raw skills, they're easy -- it's the cognitve skill enhancement and, even more importantly, muscle memory that become important to survival and success in intense combat and that argues for specialization.

The development of this muscle memory requires repetitive and ongoing practical/physical training.

Is there enough time (and live ammunition) being made available for this purpose or is there a tendency to focus on the more 'sexy' aspects of soldiering?

[Tukhachevskii]

Which is probably why the British army got rid of the arms plot (rotating units through different roles). Personally I always thought it was a good idea rotating units which acquired experience of different roles and equipment. Perhaps those with experience of the arms plot would like to chime in? Wilf's idea seems similar in intent although I don't know if it would work (sounds a little too SF inspired) plus the cost may be prohibitive (which was one , if not, the reason it was cancelled IIRC).

The funny thing is I seem to recall that one of the reasons the arms plot was cancelled, apart from cost, was that it disrupted soldiers lives having to relocate constantly thereby destroyed family life. But intriguingly I don't recall the Army ever saying that the arms plot WASN'T a good idea. I never could figure out why the equipment couldn't be rotated rather than the troops. But as the great Ken White has pointed out long service troops can not only handle it its a good thing for the forces.

[Fuchs]

There's a psychological problem associated with rotating equipment.

I'll explain this with the same story as used to teach it to me years ago:

There were two large taxi cab companies in a city. One company is known for its nice, clean taxis and the other one for rotten, smelly taxis. The vehicle types are the same, the drivers are quite exchangeable (age, gender, ethnicity ...).
The difference? The clean taxi cabs belong to one driver, while the other company lets its drivers drive a different taxi every day.


Similarly, the (if I remember correctly) USN solved its major aircraft readiness issues decades ago by assigning one or two aircraft to one senior mechanician each, giving him responsibility for it. The mechanicians who previously worked based on assigned tasks (sent to aircraft x to replace spare part y) began to care about the state of "their" aircraft. This extended into black market activities to scrounge spare parts and working much more hours per week than official.


Equipment that requires care or is exposed to much wear should NEVER be rotated, but be assigned to a organisational unit (if not individuals) permanently.

[Firn]

On a sidenote I think the Luftwaffe used a system in which 1-2 mechanics were assigned to a pilot rather then to his aircraft. (Aircrafts losses IIRC being higher then those of pilots). Only specialized tasks would be addressed by specialists at various levels of the organization. According to the various pilots the system worked well and the bonds between the pilots and 'their' groundcrew were usually very strong with all the resulting positive results...

[reed11b]

There's a psychological problem associated with rotating equipment.

I'll explain this with the same story as used to teach it to me years ago:

There were two large taxi cab companies in a city. One company is known for its nice, clean taxis and the other one for rotten, smelly taxis. The vehicle types are the same, the drivers are quite exchangeable (age, gender, ethnicity ...).
The difference? The clean taxi cabs belong to one driver, while the other company lets its drivers drive a different taxi every day.


Similarly, the (if I remember correctly) USN solved its major aircraft readiness issues decades ago by assigning one or two aircraft to one senior mechanician each, giving him responsibility for it. The mechanicians who previously worked based on assigned tasks (sent to aircraft x to replace spare part y) began to care about the state of "their" aircraft. This extended into black market activities to scrounge spare parts and working much more hours per week than official.


Equipment that requires care or is exposed to much wear should NEVER be rotated, but be assigned to a organisational unit (if not individuals) permanently.

Holy crap, I agree with Fuchs on something. The end is near. :eek:
Reed

[Ken White]

As... Ken White has pointed out long service troops can not only handle it its a good thing for the forces.Mmm. If I said that, it wasn't exactly what I meant. Yes, they can handle it and yes for a small long service Army it makes sense from an economic and versatility standpoint -- but for the reasons Firn, Fuchs and Reed11B mentioned as well as in line with JMA's comment above it is not universally a good thing. It is also not even possible much less advisable in periods of intense war and high casualties.

These bear repeating: "Yet again, it's a METT-TC and situational issue -- there is advisedly NO one size fits all in warfare." and "...it's the cognitve skill enhancement and, even more importantly, muscle memory that become important to survival and success in intense combat and that argues for specialization."

Regrettably the answer to JMA's question is, as I expect he knows, all too often the emphasis is on the more 'sexy' aspects -- and the things that are easier and cheaper to train. The US Army did a good job for a while in providing enough Ammo and the right kind of training but my sensing is that it will too easily slip back into old and bad habits of mediocre training. Good units will persevere, the poorer ones will not.. :mad:

[Fuchs]

Holy crap, I agree with Fuchs on something. The end is near. :eek:
Reed

Resistance is futile.


On a sidenote I think the Luftwaffe used a system in which 1-2 mechanics were assigned to a pilot rather then to his aircraft. (Aircrafts losses IIRC being higher then those of pilots). Only specialized tasks would be addressed by specialists at various levels of the organization. According to the various pilots the system worked well and the bonds between the pilots and 'their' groundcrew were usually very strong with all the resulting positive results...

I did not see any such thing in the modern Luftwaffe, and I was in close combat with a ground crew unit for a while during the 90's. I never saw them in contact with pilots, never saw them leave for meetings with pilots - what I saw was that the small unit leader assigned tasks and an Oberfeldwebel, possibly an Unteroffizier and one enlisted helper went with a toolbox and a spare part to the bunker where the minor repairs would happen. Bigger repairs (such as replacing an engine) were done in a large maintenance building and there was still rather a tasking top-down by the small unit leader.

[Compost]

There's a psychological problem associated with rotating equipment.

I'll explain this with the same story as used to teach it to me years ago:

There were two large taxi cab companies in a city. One company is known for its nice, clean taxis and the other one for rotten, smelly taxis. The vehicle types are the same, the drivers are quite exchangeable (age, gender, ethnicity ...).
The difference? The clean taxi cabs belong to one driver, while the other company lets its drivers drive a different taxi every day.
However to make money that clean cab with regular driver have to carry passengers who use all the cab's amenities but are not involved in its maintenance. A better analogy would involve a back-country tour bus with driver and leader/organiser/cook because then the passengers – like an infantry section – do lots of dismounted work except maintaining the bus.

Similarly, the (if I remember correctly) USN solved its major aircraft readiness issues decades ago by assigning one or two aircraft to one senior mechanician each, giving him responsibility for it. The mechanicians who previously worked based on assigned tasks (sent to aircraft x to replace spare part y) began to care about the state of "their" aircraft. This extended into black market activities to scrounge spare parts and working much more hours per week than official.

Equipment that requires care or is exposed to much wear should NEVER be rotated, but be assigned to a organisational unit (if not individuals) permanently.
It's easy to erect a straw target and promptly knock it over but suggest you read what was written. My item stressed that - except for the austere trucklike and closely held PMV - infantry-carrying APCs, AIFVs and 'BW's should be operated and operationally maintained by specialist 'armoured corps' crews.

The concept that a particular crew of driver, vehicle commander and gunner(s) should be rotated together or individually across vehicles or vehicle types is entirely your idea.

By contrast the infantry does most of its work dismounted and at a short to very long distance from its armoured transport vehicles. If that absence is prolonged then it makes operational and financial sense for that unit of vehicles together with crews to be re-tasked and attached elsewhere.

[Fuchs]

The talk was also about units rotating roles, and consequently rotating equipment.

[Ken White]

... My item stressed that - except for the austere trucklike and closely held PMV - infantry-carrying APCs, AIFVs and 'BW's should be operated and operationally maintained by specialist 'armoured corps' crews.However, the US Army tried that for a number of years after World War II and while not totally unsatisfactory, two glaring problems did occur causing the concept to be discarded.
By contrast the infantry does most of its work dismounted and at a short to very long distance from its armoured transport vehicles. If that absence is prolonged then it makes operational and financial sense for that unit of vehicles together with crews to be re-tasked and attached elsewhere.That's one and it's the biggest problem. The concept places the carriers at the whim * of not only the organization that owns the carriers but the next higher headquarters. Carriers tended to be yanked or moved at inopportune times occasionally leaving units both exposed and relatively immobile as well as Carriers sometimes being left 'unprotected.'

A second problem was the Carrier organization naturally placed a premium on protecting its vehicles (and crews) while the transported unit was more concerned with their folks and the their mission. This led to discord at Squad / Section, Platoon, Company and higher levels on occasion -- said discord extending to deliberately damaged carriers by uncontrolled transported Troops and precipitous and unauthorized abandonment of transported troops by carriers units. A side issue was that individual carrier crews often had no real grounding in the mission and thus, in event of loss of their transported Infantry were often at a loss on what should be done.

A minor issue is that in event of a thrown track or other mechanical problem where help to the crew from the transported element would have been beneficial, the transported lacked the knowledges and skills needed and so, often, several Carriers were out of action so that the crews could combine to work on one while the hapless Infantry just stood and watched.

None of that is to say that such a system does not work at all, it merely indicates that as is true of any compromise, there are minor issues that affect outcomes. A smaller, more cohesive Army might not have any of those issues. Then again, it might...

* One can say that whim (or misplaced priorities) has no place in combat operations, that all troops should be better disciplined and that the joint mission should drive the behavior of all concerned. One can say all that. Whether one can get a bunch of random, thrown together humans under the stress of combat and with no particular loyalty to each other as occurs in large Armies to behave so properly is another issue...

[Fuchs]

Well-trained infantry can furthermore make use of the mothership concept (additional equipment in the vehicle) in order to be versatile without carrying all stuff all the time.

The mothership concept doesn't work well if dismounted element and vehicle element are separated much. You might end up having the heavy AT stuff in a vehicle 20 km behind and higher command expecting you to set up an ambush against armoured recce because your TO&E tells them that you're capable of it.

[Compost]

The talk was also about units rotating roles, and consequently rotating equipment.OK now realise you were writing about post 22. And agree rotating complex equipment without trained operators is counter productive.

However there is at least one ready alternative. In some garrison districts (US) and in any small heavily populated country (Germany and UK) some light infantry battalions presumably receive useful familiarisation in infantry-armour operations by regularly training and exercising with a tank company/squadron plus AEVs, ARVs and possibly AVLBs. All of that heavy armour would invariably come with crews.

Surely such short duration loan, attachment or whatever of heavy armour could be productively complemented by similar loan or attachment of armoured carriers complete with crews from an armoured or mechanised infantry battalion. And if the loan involved a 6-passenger (!!) Lynx, then the ‘excess’ from two light infantry sections might be combined in a third such vehicle.


http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/docs/Owen_Universal_Infantry.pdf

Possible? - sure.

Good idea? - Probably only for small armies (smaller than corps-sized).
Looking back at post 10 can see that you were in part correct there also but with bolded provisos as below. (How’s that for a restrained type of compliment ?)

Small armies should standardise on ‘light’ infantry units and employ them interchangeably (with frequent training and exercise) as light when foot-mobile and/or motorised in PMVs, as mechanised when in APCs (crewed by armour specialists), and armoured when in AIFVs and ‘BCs’ (similarly crewed by armour specialists).

Obviously believe larger armies would be well advised to do the same. Why ? Because presumably if they are consistent AEVs and AVLBs are crewed by combat engineers, while ARVs (with driver, commander and mechanics) are entirely crewed by auto mechanics.

Similarly if AIFVs and APCs are entirely crewed by infantry then the vehicle crew for artillery observation carriers consists entirely of artillerists etc etc. So before long almost every specialised arm is operating and maintaining its own carriers. That makes for a large number of sub-specialties.


However, the US Army tried that for a number of years after World War II and while not totally unsatisfactory, two glaring problems did occur causing the concept to be discarded.That's one and it's the biggest problem. The concept places the carriers at the whim * of not only the organization that owns the carriers but the next higher headquarters. Carriers tended to be yanked or moved at inopportune times occasionally leaving units both exposed and relatively immobile as well as Carriers sometimes being left 'unprotected.'
My comment was
If that absence is prolonged then it makes operational and financial sense for that unit of vehicles together with crews to be re-tasked and attached elsewhere.
Prolonged was intended to mean days or weeks rather than hours. However, concede such exposure and reduced mobility could occur but only if that type of staff work had not previously managed to cause a unit’s destruction.


A second problem was the Carrier organization naturally placed a premium on protecting its vehicles (and crews) while the transported unit was more concerned with their folks and the their mission. This led to discord at Squad / Section, Platoon, Company and higher levels on occasion -- said discord extending to deliberately damaged carriers by uncontrolled transported Troops and precipitous and unauthorized abandonment of transported troops by carriers units. A side issue was that individual carrier crews often had no real grounding in the mission and thus, in event of loss of their transported Infantry were often at a loss on what should be done.

A minor issue is that in event of a thrown track or other mechanical problem where help to the crew from the transported element would have been beneficial, the transported lacked the knowledges and skills needed and so, often, several Carriers were out of action so that the crews could combine to work on one while the hapless Infantry just stood and watched.

None of that is to say that such a system does not work at all, it merely indicates that as is true of any compromise, there are minor issues that affect outcomes. A smaller, more cohesive Army might not have any of those issues. Then again, it might...

* One can say that whim (or misplaced priorities) has no place in combat operations, that all troops should be better disciplined and that the joint mission should drive the behavior of all concerned. One can say all that. Whether one can get a bunch of random, thrown together humans under the stress of combat and with no particular loyalty to each other as occurs in large Armies to behave so properly is another issue...
The change to all-volunteer regulars and ‘genuine’ reservists has presumably assisted in reducing such unnecessary abandonment and also vandalism.

But perhaps infantry designated as mechanised or armoured do tend to behave like travellers on a luxury busline, where each crew and passenger seat can cost more than $500K or E500K......

Nonetheless that sort of thing is unlikely on a back-country tour bus because there – excepting any sick or decrepit – dismounted passengers are commonly expected to help with wheel changes and with levering and pushing the bus out of muddy ground.


Well-trained infantry can furthermore make use of the mothership concept (additional equipment in the vehicle) in order to be versatile without carrying all stuff all the time.

The mothership concept doesn't work well if dismounted element and vehicle element are separated much. You might end up having the heavy AT stuff in a vehicle 20 km behind and higher command expecting you to set up an ambush against armoured recce because your TO&E tells them that you're capable of it.
Light infantry do not have to move extra loads by backpacking. There are many types of small self-powered load carrying vehicle such as the 2-wheel cross-country motor bike and ATVs with 3, 4 and 6 wheels. If such vehicles are not available or usable then – provided the AT load is breakbulk to say 80kg - infantry can use manually pushed/pulled load carriers with side-by-side wheels that resemble foldable golf trolleys or in-line wheels that look like stripped down mountain bikes.

The small self-powered vehicles may have to be moved in a truck or on a trailer. The conceptual push/pull load carriers might when unladen be simply tied onto the sides, roof or rear of a GS truck, PMV, APC or whatever.

After this its time to get back to my mound of books, notes etc and get gassed up for some other topic.

[Ken White]

Similarly if AIFVs and APCs are entirely crewed by infantry then the vehicle crew for artillery observation carriers consists entirely of artillerists etc etc. So before long almost every specialised arm is operating and maintaining its own carriers. That makes for a large number of sub-specialties.Yes it does and it is noteworthy that Armies in peacetime tend to reduce the number specialties for ease of 'management' and then increase the number exponentially in war due to need (and training time available)...:rolleyes:

Generalists work acceptably in peacetime; they do not do well in heavy combat or long duration wars -- one cannot get enough of them.
However, concede such exposure and reduced mobility could occur but only if that type of staff work had not previously managed to cause a unit’s destruction.Been my observation that the general quality of Staff work is in fact that poor -- but that's not poor enough to lead (too often...) to the destruction of units. :wry:
The change to all-volunteer regulars and ‘genuine’ reservists has presumably assisted in reducing such unnecessary abandonment and also vandalism.Actually, the reverse is true. Conscription provided US Forces with a more mature and better behaved force. However, the issue of abandonment is not predicated on the character of the force but a flawed premise that external support is as good as organic capability. It never is. As for the vandalism, not so much that as it is:
But perhaps infantry designated as mechanised or armoured do tend to behave like travellers on a luxury busline, where each crew and passenger seat can cost more than $500K or E500K......Yes... :eek:

Unless it's their bus... ;)

On this,
Nonetheless that sort of thing is unlikely on a back-country tour bus because there – excepting any sick or decrepit – dismounted passengers are commonly expected to help with wheel changes and with levering and pushing the bus out of muddy ground.Of course -- but changing a power pack isn't muddy ground. Neither is replacing a thrown track simply a matter of manual laborers.

The larger point is that transported troops do not own the transport and thus tend to feel little to no responsibility toward it nor do they know how to do the various tasks involved with keeping the vehicle running well. Consider also that a two or three man crew is not of adequate size to care for any vehicle other than a designed for purpose (and thus expensive) a simple wheeled vehicle. A Squad or Section that has to care for their vehicle can and will do so.
Light infantry do not have to move extra loads by backpacking. There are many types of small self-powered load carrying vehicle such as the 2-wheel cross-country motor bike and ATVs with 3, 4 and 6 wheels. If such vehicles are not available or usable then – provided the AT load is breakbulk to say 80kg - infantry can use manually pushed/pulled load carriers with side-by-side wheels that resemble foldable golf trolleys or in-line wheels that look like stripped down mountain bikes.

The small self-powered vehicles may have to be moved in a truck or on a trailer. The conceptual push/pull load carriers might when unladen be simply tied onto the sides, roof or rear of a GS truck, PMV, APC or whatever.That's all been done by many Armies. I've loaded and driven walking alongside Mechanical Mules and pulled Machine Gun Carts. None of those work all that well either. Great theoretically but practical failures.

[SethB]

The issue should not be the driving. Driving is fairly easy.

Maintenance is a much bigger issue.

When my unit goes to the field we average one mechanical failure every four hours. If I didn't have crews that knew their tracks, we'd never get them repaired. The maintenance section doesn't have enough people to do the work. I've watched my crews repair damage in hours, with no mechanic on site.

Single tracking Soldiers (11B, 11M, 11H, etc) is a great idea. It lets them be experts. Single tracking NCOs would work. Single tracking Officers would work, until they assume a BN or BDE CMD that they don't understand. As long as we track every officer as though he might one day be CJCS, we have to provide a well rounded experience for them.

And example would be the BDE CDR that expects every vehicle in the BDE to be inspected by the BDE SDO and SDNCO, twice every night. That works when you command a light unit that has some LMTVs and HMMWVs.

When you have 800 pieces of rolling stock, it doesn't work. It simply illustrates the disconnect between the light and heavy worlds.

[Compost]

Originally Posted by Compost
Similarly if AIFVs and APCs are entirely crewed by infantry then the vehicle crew for artillery observation carriers consists entirely of artillerists etc etc. So before long almost every specialised arm is operating and maintaining its own carriers. That makes for a large number of sub-specialties.
Yes it does and it is noteworthy that Armies in peacetime tend to reduce the number specialties for ease of 'management' and then increase the number exponentially in war due to need (and training time available)...:rolleyes:

Generalists work acceptably in peacetime; they do not do well in heavy combat or long duration wars -- one cannot get enough of them.
Understand you believe light infantry should be able to packpack everything, yet make expedient use of transport units that operate ATVs, GS trucks, utility helicopters etc.

However, light infantry may on occasion have to operate in conjunction with heavy armour. In that role particularly, and also in others, it would be useful for light infantry to have expedient use of armoured vehicles such as APCs and AIFVs that are better protected and more capable than austere PMVs.

How are light infantry to train and exercise for and operate in such roles if the temporary detachment of APCs and AIFVs from mechanised and armoured infantry units is nor appropriate, permissable or whatever ?

One solution would be some (small) number of armoured transport units equipped with APCs and AIFVs.

Are there other solutions that do not involve some degree of sharing with mechanised and armoured infantry units ?

[Ken White]

However, light infantry may on occasion have to operate in conjunction with heavy armour. In that role particularly, and also in others, it would be useful for light infantry to have expedient use of armoured vehicles such as APCs and AIFVs that are better protected and more capable than austere PMVs.First, we need to define exactly what 'light' Infantry happens to be. To me, the word light means just that. They are lightly equipped to include few to no assigned vehicles and are more highly trained than normal infantry. They are expected to be foot or opportunity mobile. They are incapable of extended operations and their use is conjunction with Armor should be extremely rare. A US example would be airborne units and the former 7th Inf Div (and not the Tenth Mountain Division which is a hybrid)

Just plain Infantry, OTOH, is a different case. They posses and routinely use vehicles, have greater staying power and will frequently work with Armor (most US Infantry prior to 1980 fit this, today the closest US fit to this category are the Stryker Brigades). Armored Infantry (or Mechanized Infantry) is yet another variation ans they have even more staying power, more and heavier assigned vehicles and routinely work with Armor. Today, most US infantry is in this category today though we seem to continue adding Stryker Brigades....

We can then proceed to this:
How are light infantry to train and exercise for and operate in such roles if the temporary detachment of APCs and AIFVs from mechanised and armoured infantry units is nor appropriate, permissable or whatever ?For true Light Infantry, the answer is rarely and with the aid (and vehicles) in training of heavier Infantry units. Pretty much the same for Infantry while Mech Infantry has organic carriers and could / would assist the others.
One solution would be some (small) number of armoured transport units equipped with APCs and AIFVs.We tried that and it did not work well for us. Other Armies may have more success -- or a greater need to do something along that line.
Are there other solutions that do not involve some degree of sharing with mechanised and armoured infantry units ?Not of which I'm aware.

We have, from time to time, successfully 'mounted' Light Infantry for specific operations -- the 82d Airborne Division elements in Iraq (but not so much in Afghanistan other than the dangerous and unnecessary MRAP...) come to mind, they were assigned and successfully employed vehicles in Iraq then reverted to pure light infantry tasks and few to no vehicles when elsewhere.

As always, METT-TC.

[B.Smitty]

First, we need to define exactly what 'light' Infantry happens to be. To me, the word light means just that. They are lightly equipped to include few to no assigned vehicles and are more highly trained than normal infantry. They are expected to be foot or opportunity mobile. They are incapable of extended operations and their use is conjunction with Armor should be extremely rare. A US example would be airborne units and the former 7th Inf Div (and not the Tenth Mountain Division which is a hybrid)


Since the utility of pure, un-augmented light infantry seems to be rather limited. Perhaps we need to look at reconstituting most of them as "just plain infantry" units. I realize we are doing this, to some extent, with the Stryker brigades, but even these are "deployability challenged", fairly expensive, and not suited to certain types of conflicts (e.g. Afghanistan).

Maybe we need to look at a TOE that mounts most or all "light" infantry on HMMWVs or trucks.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_1_95/ai_n16346579/?tag=content;col1
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA339420
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada370233.pdf&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

The resulting organization would train to fight dismounted, but also have organic vehicular mobility. HMMWVs are much lighter and cheaper than Strykers, and have more utility as logistics platforms.

[Chris jM]

Since the utility of pure, un-augmented light infantry seems to be rather limited. Perhaps we need to look at reconstituting most of them as "just plain infantry" units.

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).

If one uses Loss-Exchange-Ratios as a guide, one light-infantry platoon placing an ambush deep in Indian country can be worth an entire Bn of Mech Inf who are limited to driving back and forth along a single route for a month.

It is very situationally dependent, but the flexibility and utility offered by light inf should, I strongly believe, be retained. Keep the 'MRAP mentality' out of the picture, and aim at being able to raise, train and deploy a range of competent and audacious infantry forces (SF/Cdo, light, motorised, mech, armd). Inevitably the roles will never be as clear cut in practice, but I would much prefer re-rolling a Light Infantry unit into a motor or mech role than trying to tell Mr Back-seat-Trooper that he needs to re-enact Marius's mules.

WRT the culture of equipment care, tough force-on-force training will drive home the validity and necessity of combined-arms operations and even the dumbest grunt will realise that those APC-things are actually really good if he doesn't want to assault 600m on his guts, deflect 7.62mm on his own accord and wants a lift home afterwards. A competent and professional unit will be able to care for the equipment they employ if they have sufficient 'belonging' to the wider group. There are problems if units are affected by tribal divisions that see little universal cohesion, and this will manifest itself in both poor tactical/technical performance and poor equipment maintainence. While Fuchs is right that reassigning ownership and responsibility will work some of the time, it won't always be a possible solution. Good training, on the other hand, will always be a relevant solution.

[gute]

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).

I was reading some comments made by Mike Sparks (I don't know much about him, but he seems to be controversial) regarding infantry and it's use. He doesn't seem to have much use for light infantry claiming only about 10% of the earth's land mass is not easily accessible, which would require true light infantry. His reasoning seems sound.

[ganulv]

He doesn't seem to have much use for light infantry claiming only about 10% of the earth's land mass is not easily accessible, which would require true light infantry.
10% of a dollar is .10¢ but 10% of our planet’s surface area is about 51,000,000 km2.


If I didn't have crews that knew their tracks, we'd never get them repaired. The maintenance section doesn't have enough people to do the work. I've watched my crews repair damage in hours, with no mechanic on site.
I know a fellow who was an LAV crewman and he has described a relationship with the mechanics that didn’t sound to me to be outright antagonistic but apparently wasn’t exactly cozy, either.

[Ken White]

Chris jM:

Truly excellent and thoughtful post.

Gute:

Assess anything from Sparks with caution. He's wedded to the M113 as the epitome of mil tech. :rolleyes:

With reference to terrain, as ganulv illustrates, 10%, even if accurate is relative. I doubt that figure is accurate and it's in any event totally immaterial. Terrain is but one item in the METT-TC dictum and that dictum should always be assessed in totality and applied to forces to be committed.

You do not fight terrain, you fight people. There are over 400 cities in or on accessible terrain worldwide that have over a million people; in 2008, roughly half the world population was classified as urban. One can use heavy forces in cities but there's a cost and Light or regular Infantry is better suited. That doesn't even address jungle, the Taiga or Mountains where vehicles can go but are sometimes tactically disadvantageous.

There's a place and use for all and too many wars have proven that "One size fits all" is not a good solution. A parochial approach similar to the one espoused by Sparks and too many others as well as the equally bad 'universalist' approach is unwise.

[B.Smitty]

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).


Assuming most light infantry deployments require significant vehicular augmentation anyway, wouldn't it make sense to design most infantry TOEs to reflect this? Perhaps even add drivers and gunners so you don't have to dedicate squads to vehicle security while the rest of the unit dismounts.

In the rare situations where vehicles are unsuitable, deploy without them.

From the first link in my last post,


To be able to focus our efforts on the population, the task force had to get its maneuver forces to where the people lived. Unfortunately, for a light infantry unit, nothing was within walking distance. Paktika is 19,101 square kilometers, with over 600 kilometers of border with Pakistan. The "box" at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the Army's premier light infantry training area, is approximately 800 square kilometers, only about one-sixth of which is used by a light infantry battalion during a rotation. According to the MTOE, the primary maneuver forces in a light infantry battalion, the rifle companies, have no internal transportation assets. The only vehicles it has are assigned to headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and consists of approximately 40 cargo HMMWVs which are used to transport the battalion headquarters, staff, specialty platoons, and limited supplies across the battlefield. This lack of vehicles presented a significant problem for missions that demanded rifle companies and platoons to move hundreds of miles for weeks at a time. Anticipating this sort of challenge prior to deployment, the battalion reorganized and deployed 27 organic HMMWVs, and once in theater, the task force signed for more vehicles that had become installation equipment from previous rotations. The task force signed for approximately 25 M1114, up-armored, five-person models, most less than three years old with improved engines, suspensions, and drive trains. To supplement these gun trucks, the task force also signed for approximately 65 M998, M1038, and other miscellaneous unarmored cargo models, capable of carrying up to 11 Soldiers, their weapons, and supplies. These vehicles, as well as the 27 from Hawaii, had an average age of 15 years and had no improvements to the major stock components. These cargo versions were modified with Kevlar blankets and sheeting to improve survivability, and units strapped M240B machine guns on tripods to the top of the vehicle's cab to create a makeshift weapons platform. With a hodgepodge collection of tactical vehicles, TF 2-27 became motorized.

While creating a fleet of vehicles for the mission in Paktika and motorizing TF 2-27 worked, it was far from ideal. The cargo HMMWV, which made up well over half of the vehicles used by the maneuver elements in the task force, was never meant to be a tactical troop carrier, and its use as such had a variety of disadvantages. The number of vehicles assigned to each company, between six to eight M1114s and 10-15 cargo variants, required companies and platoons to put an average of 10 Soldiers in a cargo variant, and the limited space in the cargo area made carrying the necessary food, water, parts, and equipment to sustain operations challenging at best. The lack of room in the cargo space made firing weapons or defending the vehicle difficult as well.



Another problem with reorganizing as a motorized battalion when TF 2-27 arrived in Paktika was the lack of tactical and technical training and experience with vehicles throughout the task force. Though the battalion was a well-trained infantry unit, there was a significant dearth of experience working as a mounted force. The task force lacked qualified drivers and qualified M2 and Mk19 gunners, and few, if any, had conducted a mounted live-fire exercise. As with most infantry tasks, this lack of experience could have been overcome had the task force had vehicles to train with prior to deployment. Although there are a limited number of vehicles in a light infantry battalion, it was not possible to get every company trained in mounted tactics prior to our departure. Once in Paktika, the tactical learning curve was steep, but the battalion accepted a large amount of risk in the first month, using vehicles that the operators were just not trained to use. The technical learning curve was not as steep, and it had greater longterm effect. Maintenance on any piece of equipment is important to ensure that it works when it is needed. It is especially true with vehicles, and that truth is magnified when those vehicles are operating in the conditions mentioned above. Trained vehicle operators are taught to inspect the vehicle before every use, monitor its condition during operation, and check the vehicle every time it stops. The majority of the Soldiers operating vehicles did not receive formal training on the maintenance required for a HMMWV, and this had a major impact on the vehicles. In the first month, operator errors resulted in vehicles breaking down at an extremely high rate. Simple mistakes such as failing to tighten loose half-shaft bolts before operation and putting the wrong kind of fuel in the engine were common, and these mistakes could have been avoided with proper training prior to deployment. Had the rifle companies spent even one month with their vehicles prior to deployment, many of the problems the task force experienced could have been avoided.

[gute]

Chris jM:

Truly excellent and thoughtful post.

Gute:

Assess anything from Sparks with caution. He's wedded to the M113 as the epitome of mil tech. :rolleyes:

With reference to terrain, as ganulv illustrates, 10%, even if accurate is relative. I doubt that figure is accurate and it's in any event totally immaterial. Terrain is but one item in the METT-TC dictum and that dictum should always be assessed in totality and applied to forces to be committed.

You do not fight terrain, you fight people. There are over 400 cities in or on accessible terrain worldwide that have over a million people; in 2008, roughly half the world population was classified as urban. One can use heavy forces in cities but there's a cost and Light or regular Infantry is better suited. That doesn't even address jungle, the Taiga or Mountains where vehicles can go but are sometimes tactically disadvantageous.

There's a place and use for all and too many wars have proven that "One size fits all" is not a good solution. A parochial approach similar to the one espoused by Sparks and too many others as well as the equally bad 'universalist' approach is unwise.

I probably did not explain things well enough. I think Sparks was trying to make the point that most of the world population is located in areas which are accessible to "Stryker like" infantry (in M113 Gavins I would assume).

So, light and regular infantry are better suited for urban warfare? It seems that after the Thunder Runs and battles of Fallujah 11/04, Mosul, Najaf there were many (not saying here at SWJ) advocating heavy armor in cities - that we had made it work unlike the Russians in Grozny?

[Compost]

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).
Most commentators seem to come from the same camp area, and that is one which can be used for light infantry and similar units with ready access to heavier equipment.

Such camps can be useful if well provisioned but austere, and situated for supporting extended operations ‘outside the wire’ and not used merely for brief forays into ‘indian county’.

[Ken White]

So, light and regular infantry are better suited for urban warfare? It seems that after the Thunder Runs and battles of Fallujah 11/04, Mosul, Najaf there were many (not saying here at SWJ) advocating heavy armor in cities - that we had made it work unlike the Russians in Grozny?M E TT-TC (emphasis added / kw). It can work, just as armor can be employed in the jungle -- but in both cases, you better know what you're doing and / or be significantly more competent than your opponent.

We made a terrible mistake -- one which many in the Army warned against -- in basing many things on the flawed learning of 'lessons' from Operation Desert Storm. One hundred casualties in 100 hours is not a war and the only lesson is that it's unlikely to be repeatable...:mad:

On the first item you mentioned, "accessible" and effective conduct of combat operations are not always synonymous activities. Rarely are, in fact. Regardless, I still question the figure -- and still contend it's immaterial...

[ganulv]

So, light and regular infantry are better suited for urban warfare? It seems that after the Thunder Runs and battles of Fallujah 11/04, Mosul, Najaf there were many (not saying here at SWJ) advocating heavy armor in cities - that we had made it work unlike the Russians in Grozny?M E TT-TC (emphasis added / kw). It can work, just as armor can be employed in the jungle -- but in both cases, you better know what you're doing and / or be significantly more competent than your opponent.
Am I correct in assuming that the decision to employ armor in Fallujah might have been different had the adversary possessed cutting edge anti-tank weapons?

[jmm99]

Example: WWII in the Ardennes - 1/117-30ID vs SS-Pz.Abt. 501 and its attached PzGrenadiers (mech inf), 12 18 44 Stavelot; Cutting Off Peiper:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/picture.php?albumid=35&pictureid=180

The 1st Bn (117th Inf. Regt.) was simply a bunch of foot-sloggers - who did arrive North of Stavelot in trucks; but who infiltrated into the town on foot. So, they were infantry - just infantry (not light, heavy or medium) - and National Guard infantry to boot (as was the rest of the 30th Div.).

A bit more here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/album.php?albumid=35) (I need to complete the comments - someday). However, I like to look at this small engagement from the standpoint of the German opponent, schwere SS-PanzerAbteilung 501 in the Battle of the Bulge (http://www.ss501panzer.com/), the independent heavy tank battalion of the 1. SS-Panzerkorps.

The bottom line is that an infantry unit (with some AT and arty support) in an urban environment can clean the clock of an heavy armor unit (with attached mech. inf.) if the latter units are not employed properly.

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

Clean the clock and scatter the parts. The determinant is the quality of the opponent with respect to training and will (thus the emphasized 'E' -- Enemy). The number of people on each side and the equipment used are secondary though obviously more and better is an improvement over enough and good enough. Fallujah was hard enough with the relatively poor quality of opposition, had they been better, it would've been even more difficult. Lacking that, the cutting edge AT weapons would've made little difference. :wry:

[gute]

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_1_93/ai_n6123806/

I found the article listed above and it explained quite a bit about the use of armor and light infantry.

[KenWats]

Example: WWII in the Ardennes - 1/117-30ID vs SS-Pz.Abt. 501 and its attached PzGrenadiers (mech inf), 12 18 44 Stavelot; Cutting Off Peiper:


The 1st Bn (117th Inf. Regt.) was simply a bunch of foot-sloggers - who did arrive North of Stavelot in trucks; but who infiltrated into the town on foot. So, they were infantry - just infantry (not light, heavy or medium) - and National Guard infantry to boot (as was the rest of the 30th Div.).

<Snip>

Regards

Mike

As a historical aside, my old unit was involved enough in the fighting in that portion of the battle to get a presidential unit citation. I dug around and couldn't find much on my old battalion specificly, but I recall that The Damned Engineers (http://www.amazon.com/damned-engineers-Janice-Holt-Giles/dp/B0030MHG3E/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1327677659&sr=8-1) discussed the fight for St. Vith and Stavelot quite a bit for those who might be historically inclined.

[RJ]

Would it be possible to have a basic, standardized infantry unit ("light"), and put it on trucks or HMMVVs (making it "mot"), APCs or IFVs (making it "mech" or "heavy"), and helicopters (making it "airborne/air assault"), just as the operations require? Making the mobility component a modular attachment to a standardized infantry building block, say a platoon? Could that work? And going one step further, making it "amphib", and thus taking the same standardized basic infantry unit all across the ground combat environment?

Distiller,

I do believe you just outlined a typical Marine Line Company. you just forgot to ad the extra fireteam per squad.:wry:

[Firn]

Example: WWII in the Ardennes - 1/117-30ID vs SS-Pz.Abt. 501 and its attached PzGrenadiers (mech inf), 12 18 44 Stavelot; Cutting Off Peiper:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/picture.php?albumid=35&pictureid=180

The 1st Bn (117th Inf. Regt.) was simply a bunch of foot-sloggers - who did arrive North of Stavelot in trucks; but who infiltrated into the town on foot. So, they were infantry - just infantry (not light, heavy or medium) - and National Guard infantry to boot (as was the rest of the 30th Div.).

A bit more here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/album.php?albumid=35) (I need to complete the comments - someday). However, I like to look at this small engagement from the standpoint of the German opponent, schwere SS-PanzerAbteilung 501 in the Battle of the Bulge (http://www.ss501panzer.com/), the independent heavy tank battalion of the 1. SS-Panzerkorps.

The bottom line is that an infantry unit (with some AT and arty support) in an urban environment can clean the clock of an heavy armor unit (with attached mech. inf.) if the latter units are not employed properly.

Regards

Mike

The standpoint form the German opponent seems that a part of it's dispersed armored and mechanized forces operated in a very unfriendly tank country with a lot of blown bridges with increasing limited supplies in fuel and spares under an umbrella of enemy air supremacy interrupted by bad (good) weather against fresh light infantry supported by far superior artillery firepower and a good amount of AT support holding an urban patch called Stavelot in which the heavy tanks barely could move. So while the mission was to striker further west it had to be changed to secure the supply line, part of miscalculation which touched pretty much every aspect of the METT-TC. Then again the person in charge was chosen by a person in charge equally known for it's military wisdom for it's political reliability...

So while in general it doesn't show the superiority of light infantry in such a setting as much as it shows the influence of factors like leadership, troop quality, terrain, the goal of the mission and the overall supporting ressources of both sides.

[kaur]

Hard Fighting
Israel in Lebanon and Gaza



Like Israel in 2006, the United States today is likely ill prepared for hybrid warfare after years of focusing on irregular adversaries. To identify lessons that the U.S. military might learn from the Israeli experience in Lebanon, the author examines the following: the state of the Israeli military before the Second Lebanon War, the challenges that Hezbollah's hybrid warfare posed, the lessons the Israelis learned from the 2006 war, the reforms the Israeli military undertook to address its deficiencies, and how Israel fared during Operation Cast Lead three years later.

The author finds that, in facing hybrid opponents, joint combined-arms fire and maneuver are necessary; precision, stand-off fires are critical (but not sufficient); and responsive and adequate air, artillery, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support are vital. Finally, heavy forces — based on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles — are key to fighting sophisticated hybrid opponents because they reduce operational risk and minimize friendly casualties.

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1085.html

[Fuchs]

I wrote a long text and then ditched it. The short form is that I am sure that a division of infantry is justified.



One branch of infantry should be a mix of light infantry, snipers, LRRP and scouts. It would receive area missions and play its role with low force densities.

Another branch should be armoured infantry (on wheeled APC/MRAP, tracked APC, HAPC, IFV or if necessary trucks) and be coined in its mindset, tactics and training by being a combined arms component and close security element of heavy battlegroups. This would be a part of the Schwerpunkt force.

Finally, a third branch should be optimised for easy (time and money budgets, KISS equipment) training and moderate requirements (fitness). This would be the voluntary reserve (national guard, militia, territorial army - whatever) component that adds much quantity and can be assigned infantry-heavy tasks such as occupying or capturing objectives in infantry-friendly terrain with support (for example by armoured recce, non-organic arty).
It would achieve relatively high force densities.
This personnel could also be tasked with lots of auxiliary jobs, such as guarding POWs or helping construction engineers.


The training requirements vary a lot for this, and unifying it into a single infantry force would cost a lot, fall short of desirable quantities (and thus be weak in terms of deterrence) and would leave only a small share of recruits eligible (a problem, since infantry is usually losing against other branches in the competition for the best recruits anyway). It's telling that the SWC's most vocal proponent of a unified infantry comes from the UK, a county with a history of a usually small and relatively highly trained army.



@kaur:
What RAND described are the needs against a conventional opponent with a very limited repertoire - and the "vital" requirements can be met to good satisfaction only in fair weather conflicts (facing an inferior opponent who by this nature is most likely defending his country, not invading yours or one of your allies').

[jmm99]

Hey Firn,


from Firn
The standpoint form the German opponent seems that a part of it's dispersed armored and mechanized forces operated in a very unfriendly tank country with a lot of blown bridges with increasing limited supplies in fuel and spares under an umbrella of enemy air supremacy interrupted by bad (good) weather against fresh light infantry supported by far superior artillery firepower and a good amount of AT support holding an urban patch called Stavelot in which the heavy tanks barely could move. So while the mission was to striker further west it had to be changed to secure the supply line, part of miscalculation which touched pretty much every aspect of the METT-TC. Then again the person in charge was chosen by a person in charge equally known for it's military wisdom for it's political reliability...

So while in general it doesn't show the superiority of light infantry in such a setting as much as it shows the influence of factors like leadership, troop quality, terrain, the goal of the mission and the overall supporting ressources of both sides.

Esp. "leadership, troop quality" - Stavelot was the second time 1 SS Pz had run into 1/117. The first was at St.-Bart near Mortain in Aug 1944. There, the Panzers and their Grenadiers were also stacked up, but it was a close call. See here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/album.php?albumid=35&pictureid=177) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/album.php?albumid=35&pictureid=178).

As to "overall supporting resources", those were also present at Stavelot - perhaps more good circumstance (luck) than exact operational planning. 1/117 (organically, 3 rifle coys, a heavy weapons coy - MGs & 81mm mortars, an HHC with a pioneer platoon and an AT platoon) had an attached AT Coy (towed) since Aug 1944 (with them at Mortain). That coy had been pulled back to its Bn (along with its other coys) for refitting and retraining with M-10 SPs. It just got back with 1/117 in time for the Stavelot infiltration.

In addition, 1/117 had attached combat engineers (also with them at Mortain), who eventually managed to blow the Stavelot bridge. Further close support were the 117th's regimental mortars and arty. They happened to be plunked down in close proximity to Stavelot - good logistics or luck.

Thus, the US force at Stavelot was de facto a "combined arms task force" - even though not formally designated as such. I've never claimed, BTW, that infantry alone is superior to armor:


my BLUF (from my post above - with now added bolding)
The bottom line is that an infantry unit (with some AT and arty support) in an urban environment can clean the clock of an heavy armor unit (with attached mech. inf.) if the latter units are not employed properly.

The Germans did not co-ordinate their panzers and grenadiers. There were good reasons for that (as you've pointed to in the SS 501 articles). Of course, even if they had and eventually wiped out 1/117 and its attached units, that would have taken too long. The Germans were FUBAR because of the "M" and last "T" in METT-T (again as you pointed out).

Regards

Mike

[Firn]

Hey Firn,

Esp. "leadership, troop quality" - Stavelot was the second time 1 SS Pz had run into 1/117. The first was at St.-Bart near Mortain in Aug 1944. There, the Panzers and their Grenadiers were also stacked up, but it was a close call. See here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/album.php?albumid=35&pictureid=177) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/album.php?albumid=35&pictureid=178).

As to "overall supporting resources", those were also present at Stavelot - perhaps more good circumstance (luck) than exact operational planning. 1/117 (organically, 3 rifle coys, a heavy weapons coy - MGs & 81mm mortars, an HHC with a pioneer platoon and an AT platoon) had an attached AT Coy (towed) since Aug 1944 (with them at Mortain). That coy had been pulled back to its Bn (along with its other coys) for refitting and retraining with M-10 SPs. It just got back with 1/117 in time for the Stavelot infiltration.

In addition, 1/117 had attached combat engineers (also with them at Mortain), who eventually managed to blow the Stavelot bridge. Further close support were the 117th's regimental mortars and arty. They happened to be plunked down in close proximity to Stavelot - good logistics or luck.

Thus, the US force at Stavelot was de facto a "combined arms task force" - even though not formally designated as such. I've never claimed, BTW, that infantry alone is superior to armor:


The Germans did not co-ordinate their panzers and grenadiers. There were good reasons for that (as you've pointed to in the SS 501 articles). Of course, even if they had and eventually wiped out 1/117 and its attached units, that would have taken too long. The Germans were FUBAR because of the "M" and last "T" in METT-T (again as you pointed out).

Regards

Mike

Thanks for this very good post. My aim was to point out the implications of the bigger picture and you did a better job then me at that. I might add that they were also FUBAR because of the ET and locally of the second T as well in those circumstances.

In any case it once again shows the importance of quality of leadership at all the levels of a unit. The ability to act and react quickly in times of crisis, taking the initiative is one of the greatest attributes persons and units can have in times of deep and sudden crisis.

Regards

[kaur]

It's all about METT, but ...


After several days of fighting by daring but lightly armed opposition forces, the army, equipped with tanks and heavy weaponry, was forced to pull back on January 18th. Residents hailed their “liberated city” and hung pictures of the dead in a tree. They waved placards and shouted slogans ridiculing the regime. Civilians guarded checkpoints usually manned by the security forces.

http://www.economist.com/node/21543538

[jmm99]

it gets down to "the importance of quality of leadership at all the levels of a unit."

Bob Frankland, a National Guardsman from East Tennessee, commanded Curlew (1/117). While decorations are far from an absolute measurement of the man, we find for him: Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star (w/ Oak Leaf Cluster), Bronze Star (w/ 3 Oak Leaf Clusters). He led from the rear - and from the front ! - and retired in grade of Major General:

http://www.oldhickory30th.com/FranklinRobert60s.jpg

Leadership goes beyond officers. Charlie Coy (Co C) was Curlew's tip of the spear for the Siegfried Breakthrough (map here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/album.php?albumid=35&pictureid=179)). When the going got rough for Charlie, a PFC from West Virginia, Frank C. Brakefield, got going. First individually and then (after proving it could be done) led a composite squad which he formed - thereby giving heart to the remainder of the company to move forward. As Curlew History notes: "In this situation, a First Platoon man performed in an exceptionally heroic manner." Awarded the Silver Star and promoted to Sgt., Brakefield was available to lead at Stavelot (WIA, 24 Dec 1944).

As important as leadership and individual heroics is training. The 117th Inf. Regt. was the demonstration regiment at the Ft. Benning Infantry School for five months. Curlew (1/117) was the demonstration Bn for the problem "Battalion in a River Crossing". This "make believe" training resulted in a "belief made" attitude which carried over in Curlew.

See, Breaching the Siegfried Line, the XIX Corps in Germany (done) (http://www.eucmh.com/2011/12/24/breaching-the-siegfried-line-the-xix-corps-in-germany/) (emphasis added to paras re: Curlew):


This study is a General Staff analysis and record of the most important operational details of the XIX Corps’ successful attack on and penetration through the Siegfried Line. This successful attack against the Siegfried Line should be treated largely as a tribute to the superb fighting ability of our infantry and armored soldiers, well supported by artillery and engineers, intelligently led in a well-planned action. It has demonstrated that thorough planning, determined leadership and aggressiveness in battle, can overcome what otherwise seems to be insuperable obstacles. Both, the 30th Infantry Division and 2d Armored Division were battle experienced with able leadership throughout their echelons. The 29th Infantry Division, which came in during the latter phases of the operation, was also a battle experienced Division.
...
(d). Training and Preparation

The assault on the Siegfried Line by the 30th Infantry Division was preceded by intense training all the way down to squad tactics. Despite the fact that units were in the line during this period of training, a reshuffling of reserves enabled all battalions of the 117th Infantry, 119th Infantry and 3d Bn of the 120th Infantry to withdraw behind the lines for reviewing assault tactics. All three battalions of the 117th and 119th Infantry Regiments went through a two day training period in training areas west of the line which they had been holding. The 3d Bn of the 120th Infantry spent most of its time in assault training while in Division reserve. The first and second Bns of the 120th Infantry rotated companies in assault training areas.

The work covered the use of demolitions, flame throwers, bazookas; tactical review of the coordination of assault detachments; practice firing of all weapons; and dry runs in storming the pillboxes and crossing the Wurm River. Engineers, Tank and TD units also rehearsed for the attack, the engineers constructing bridges with the tanks and TDs crossing and fanning out to support the infantry. The practice river-crossing was done in a gully with stagnant water about the width of the Wurm and with the same steep banks. Improvised foot bridges were constructed, two feet wide and 15-30 feet long, with ridged cleats to aid the footing.

Lt Col Robert E. Frankland, battalion commander of the 1st battalion of the 117th, says that “training for the river crossing paid off, because the enemy was surprised and overwhelmed by the sheer aggressiveness of our crossing”.

Under Col Frankland’s direction, an elaborate sand table was constructed, showing in detail the location of the pillboxes, river, wire, roads, ridges, draws, houses and trees. As each reconnaissance patrol returned, changes were made on the sand table to conform with what it had observed. Company commanders were assigned their areas; platoon leaders were shown which pillboxes they were to reduce; squad leaders were drilled in their mission, and before the training had been completed, every man in the assault companies of the battalion was shown the sand table and had his exact route thereon explained to him. Not only the riflemen, but the heavy weapons men, the engineers, the tank destroyer and tank commanders, all studied what was to be their role.

The training was so thorough that, according to S/Sgt Howard King of A Co, 117th Inf Regt, “even when we got a new pillbox to take we just pushed out our support and assault detachment mechanically. The men were also well prepared psychologically. They were inculcated with the necessity for high speed in advancing to the river, crossing, and attacking the fortification. Many men testify that they remembered this when they attacked on October 2, and double-timed through heavy artillery and mortar fire.

BTW: To the extent that I make any sense in the military area is due to following Ken White. My sins here are totally my own.

Regards

Mike

A better and more complete version of the staff report on Siegfried (including links to its nine appendices; last 4 not completed) is here (http://www.xixcorps.nl/Breaching_the_Siegfried_Line.htm) !

[Compost]

Rex Brynen on the Platoon Weapons Thread made the eminently sensible observation that when we are looking at Squad, Section, and Platoon roles, weapons, and compositions, we should be considering the larger tactical circumstances in which they are operating. Here are Rex's proposals:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=35341&postcount=32

A couple of questions...
________________________________________
... occur to me as I follow this thread (avidly, I must say, for a non-infantryman).

First, what thoughts do people have on what support weapons should be grouped at the platoon level, what should be grouped at company, and what should be grouped at both (or at battalion)? There has been some discussion of this in passing both here and in the thread on squads/sections, but I've yet to see anyone fully articulate a logic for how one would best decide this.

Second, can we really have a discussion of platoon weapons without more fully discussing APC/IFV issues? Here, I'm less interested in the perennial tracked vs wheeled and heavy versus light issues, and more on the optimal APC/IFV armament. Are 0.50 MGs enough? Should they mount 25/30mm cannon for punching through cover and providing some capability against light AFVs? What about ATGM mounts? (Of course, this also relates to light vs heavy, but let's try to leave that aside for now.)

That was a good question about APC/AIFV armament. Particularly for people like me who believe that all infantry in an industrialised army should be supported wherever practicable by vehicles – preferably armoured vehicles – for all combat and CS tasks and roles. The question was partly addressed in following posts on the Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons, and Organization thread. But the content of those posts was limited because it’s awkward to discuss vehicle armament without also considering vehicle weight. Approximate weight actually makes a good starting point. So here is an abbreviated extract from an unused study of modern armour.

Armoured vehicles are commonly referred to as light, medium, heavy to indicate their combat loaded weight. Historically those same terms have been confusingly used to
secondly describe the calibre of a main armament and thirdly the nature of armour protection. However, the specific calibre of a gun in millimetres has become increasingly used as a descriptor. Similarly, homogeneous or layered protection is now often described in terms of the actual or equivalent thickness in millimetres of rolled steel plate opposing kinetic and chemical attack respectively.

Below for example are the STANAG 4569 protection levels for steel armouring of logistic and light armoured vehicles against KE, artillery and blast threats. With steel at 7,850kg /cb-m, protecting Level 2 ballistic and artillery threats at 105kg/sq-m would require an armour thickness of about 13mm. And to protect a vehicle of M-113 size to Level 2 requires about three tonnes of homogeneous steel, or some equivalent armour.

[Compost]

To conserve weight and reduce corrosion the M-113A1 was built with aluminium alloy armour that has a density of about 2750 kg/cu-m. The thickness of that armour was approx 40mm which provided almost the same degree of ballistic protection as would 13 mm of steel. However the increased thickness and stiffness of the aluminium plate meant that it was largely self-supporting and hence the hull needed few structural beams and ribs. The overall result was much lower vehicle weight than an M-113 built with steel armour.

During the 1960s aluminium armour became less popular because it tends to tear when subject to mine blast and also melts at a lower temperature than steel. Upgraded versions of the M-113 carry a steel belly plate and many have an outer skin of flat or corrugated aluminium or steel. Vehicle weight of the M-113A2 increased from 12 to about 15 tonnes in the M-113A3. The extended M-113A4/MTVL (Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light) with an extra wheel station and more powerful engine has a maximum all-up weight of about 18 tonnes.

Despite the formalisation of ballistic, shrapnel and mine blast threats there are still no commonly agreed meanings or boundaries for light (weight) as opposed to medium (weight) or heavy (weight) armoured vehicles. In some contexts the term light is used to mean vehicles weighing up to about 7 tonnes but in others the term is applied to vehicles such as the M-113 that weigh twice as much and more. So vehicle weight or mass is often discussed using relative terms without boundaries or a clearly understood specification.

The use of weight descriptors with agreed meanings is important because the all-up-weight of an armoured vehicle is a major factor in determining its primary attributes of armament, mobility and protection. Also weight highlights – again indirectly – some of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of armoured vehicles and units. Additionally it makes it easier to assess an armoured vehicle in one weight category against a generally similar vehicle in another category.

Various categorisations of weight can be devised using arbitrary or incremental limits but each is artificial and can become complex as in Table 1. And any such rigorous system of categories is likely to be acceptable only to pedants or Queensbury-style enthusiasts.

[Compost]

As a complicating factor military units are often referred to as light, mediumor heavy. In that context light means a unit that is readily portable by virtually any means and particularly by airlift. Heavy means a unit equipped for maximum combat power with few if any concessions toward weight or portability. Medium describes every unit in between. For example most of the vehicles such as GS trucks issued to a light unit would weigh less than 10 tonnes whereas a heavy unit would have many weighing several times that much.

Currently an upper limit for ready portability of a vehicle by fixed-wing aircraft is generally held to be 18 to 20 tonnes. That limit seems to have become accepted because it approximates the load of the widely used C-130 Hercules freighter at normal maximum take-off weight.

Of course 20 tonnes may seem too heavy to be referred to as light. However, a scan across the current variety of armoured vehicles suggests there could be natural boundaries predicated on weight, and that two such boundaries occur at about 20 and 40 tonnes all-up weight. Perhaps that is simply the result of subjective bias rather than Darwinian-style analysis. And even if the latter applies there could be other natural boundaries. But regardless of observation or analysis it is anyway convenient to postulate 20 tonne intervals between three main classes of armoured vehicle described by weight as light, medium and [/B]heavy[/B].

Those boundaries were in fact suggested – originally or otherwise – by MAJ John C. Larminie in ‘The operational requirements of light armoured vehicles,’ International Defense Review , 11/1987, p 1487-1492. Having never met Larminie this is a good time to comment on the pleasure of reading his articles.

If his suggested boundaries are accepted then light can be used to describe any armoured or unarmoured vehicle which has a maximum combat laden weight of less than 20 tonnes. Light could be similarly used to describe a military unit in which every item of equipment weighs less than 20 tonnes. The term heavy could be used to mean a vehicle weighing more than 40 tonnes, and also a unit which has many such vehicles and other similarly heavy items of equipment. In the middle a medium vehicle would weigh at least 20 tonnes but less than 40 tonnes, and a medium unit would have mostly medium and also light vehicles, but might additionally have a relatively small number of heavy vehicles as in Table 2.

Boundaries at 20 and 40 tonnes are much easier to remember than a contrived Queensbury-style classification. And exceptions for light vehicles and light units under say 10 tonnes could be described in specifics. For example a parachute unit could be described as X-tonne meaning than each of its vehicles and items of equipment weighed at most X tonnes.

The 20 and 40-tonne boundaries have been described and adopted here for convenience. It is not additionally implied that tracks become superior to wheels at either boundary. As a general observation wheeled vehicles are well suited to on-road/on-track movement and are particularly useful for operational mobility. However, for off-road movement, obstacle crossing and tactical mobility it is apparent that track laying vehicles – despite the hazard of breakage – become superior to wheeled vehicles at some weight well below 40 tonnes and probably below 20 tonnes.

Such superiority can be argued against. But it is well supported from historical times by the assessments of various analysts and commentators such as:
CAPT Edwin W. Besch, “Armoured reconnaissance Vehicles”, Interconnair –II-81, p B1-B8;
Paul Hornback, “The Wheels Versus Track Dilemma”, Armor, March-April 1998,
re-printed Defender, Winter 1998, p 19-20;
Maj. J. C. Larminie, “Soft-ground performance of military vehicles”,
International Defense Review, 4/1988, p 383-386;
Don Loughlin, “Wheels vs. Tracks: Rebuttal”, Aviation Today, 2000,
[www.c4inews.com/reports/wheelsvtracks.htm (cache)] d-l 21July2006.

Anyway back towards the thread. The purpose in this post was to develop the concept that there are three basic classes of armoured vehicles: light up to say 19.9 tonnes, medium from 20 to say 39.9 tonnes and heavy from 40 tonnes and upward. At the lower end below 10 tonnes, the X-tonne convention or classification can be used for specific vehicles and units.

The ‘Larminie’ weight-based classification may be thought contentious or unnecessary. However, a following post will use it as a framework against which to consider the types and armament of infantry carrying armoured vehicles. As an extension to ‘perceptions of mechanised infantry’ that post is likely to be contentious.

[Fuchs]

In regard to vehicles it's in my opinion more reasonable to divide between medium and heavy AFVs on basis of the compromise:
focus on (road) march mobility or focus on sturdiness in battle

The whole 8x8 medium AFV fashion was primarily about the race to Pristina, incited by Shinseki et al, secondarily about tight budgets in the many countries with smaller armies which wanted to modernize but lacked good AND affordable off-the shelf MBT and IFV choices and tertiarily about the widespread perception of tracked AFVs (especially MBTs) as Cold War dinosaurs.

It's so difficult to separate them nicely from light AFVs of the 10-15 ton range because the medium AFV (sans IFV) category is not founded on a consistent idea. It's a strange compromise. Wheeled APCs such as the Fuchs were nothing special during the Cold War, yet they were up-armoured, got better gun and lots of electronic whiz-bang and became the new hype.


To me there are three kinds of sensible army vehicles really small ones that are very agile and very easy to hide, very large trucks that allow for an unusually small vehicle count of formations and combat vehicles.
Combat vehicles (fully armoured, not just cab) again should be divided into a long-range wheeled category somewhat similar to French armoured recce, a medium tank (~40-45 tons, as the new Jap MBT) family for the greatest heat of battle and a carrier vehicle family supporting the latter (conceptually ~ stretched M113, SEP).

I can easily lay out better justifications for these categories than all the hype and buzzword rain about Strykers and other 8x8 MAFVs that I've seen published in 1999-2006 offered.

---------

On MechInf; the real difference is not about which ride they use, but about the combined arms setting they're expected to accomplish their mission (and what mission?).
Infantry fighting together with MBTs and indirect fire AFVs can and should be totally different from infantry that merely drives to a region of ops, dismounts and fights then without AFVs support.
The latter is not going to make very swift operational moves; a 150 km dash in one day through multiple defensive positions and surprised red columns is not to be expected. MBT cooperation infantry on the other hand is supposed to be rather reckless, to accomplish its offensive missions quickly and to provide security when the battlegroup is not on the move. It doesn't need much organic support weaponry such as Carl Gustaf or sniper rifles. In fact, an all-very light machinegun armament is a strangely interesting setup for them.
Any ride that can keep up with a mechanized battlegroup and not get shot to pieces too often by the encountered threats would be good enough, albeit not necessarily affordable.

Mechanised / armoured infantry that's not meant for quick offensive success with dismounted advance of less than 2 km is not going to have a consistent concept that meets operational needs.

[Compost]

In regard to vehicles it's in my opinion more reasonable to divide between medium and heavy AFVs on basis of the compromise: focus on (road) march mobility or focus on sturdiness in battle.
Your opinion is somewhat different to that being implemented by the French and German armies. They seem intent on also procuring light wheeled armour vehicles to fit every level or niche in some Queensbury/Queensberry classification scheme.


The whole 8x8 medium AFV fashion was primarily about the race to Pristina, incited by Shinseki et al, secondarily about tight budgets in the many countries with smaller armies which wanted to modernize but lacked good AND affordable off-the shelf MBT and IFV choices and tertiarily about the widespread perception of tracked AFVs (especially MBTs) as Cold War dinosaurs.
Agree the Euro trend toward medium 8x8 autobahn/route/strada armour is aimed at producing AFVs (as distinct from APCs and armnoured CS vehicles) with march mobility as their main attribute. That probably results from EEC concern that security problems can develop almost anywhere with little warning. In other words they don’t know where they will be called on to go next, but hopefully it won’t be a nextdoor country.

At the more forceful level that “widespread perception of tracked AFVs ....” has been narrowing rapidly.

Neither of those - especially the latter - can be credited to GEN Shinseki. But at least his term did result in the US Army getting some of its cavalry and infantry back into wheeled armour. And he can hardly be blamed for excess production of the larger types of MRAV.


On MechInf; the real difference is not about which ride they use, but about the combined arms setting they're expected to accomplish their mission (and what mission?).
Infantry fighting together with MBTs and indirect fire AFVs can and should be totally different from infantry that merely drives to a region of ops, dismounts and fights then without AFVs support.
The latter is not going to make very swift operational moves; a 150 km dash in one day through multiple defensive positions and surprised red columns is not to be expected. MBT cooperation infantry on the other hand is supposed to be rather reckless, to accomplish its offensive missions quickly and to provide security when the battlegroup is not on the move. It doesn't need much organic support weaponry such as Carl Gustaf or sniper rifles. In fact, an all-very light machinegun armament is a strangely interesting setup for them.
Any ride that can keep up with a mechanized battlegroup and not get shot to pieces too often by the encountered threats would be good enough, albeit not necessarily affordable.

Mechanised / armoured infantry that's not meant for quick offensive success with dismounted advance of less than 2 km is not going to have a consistent concept that meets operational needs.
Suppose you meant ‘aggressive and determined ’ instead of ‘ rather reckless ’ but we still disagree on the likely nature of future combat. The era of huge armoured encounter battles and encirclements has passed - for some unknown period at least. However, believe all infantry units may need to be rapidly transported and deployed over short or long distances, preferably in the security of armoured transport. And when they get to wherever, their subsequent dismounted operations will often benefit from the availability – but not invariably the use – of heavy armour such as MBTs and AEVs supported by ARVs and AVLBs. Historically such vehicles have been very useful in reducing strongpoint complexes in urban zones and especially useful in reducing bunker complexes in jungle environments such as SVN where they dramatically reduced the expected rate of casualties of accompanying light infantry.

In short it is back to the inception of the ‘tank’ and its use in ‘penny packets’ for the intimate support of infantry operations, with some ancillary use for long-range sniping. There may even be a future need for the assault gun.

[Fuchs]

"Decisive and determined" doesn't sound as if I would ever write it. Sounds too superficial. No, mechanised forces will have great opportunities and the loss of 100 or 200 infantrymen will be risked and acceptable to their commander in such a situation. The most successful ones will be reckless and focused on an objective. Mechanised forces need to be the realm of officers who provoke the HQ to frantically try to hold them back, not to push them forward.
---------

Yeah sure, armour battles period is over. That's why the regions with a combination of decent economic output and high perceived risk of war are bristling with main battle tanks...

Mechanised forces are still the only ones which can advance swiftly and bring decision by operational manoeuvre.
Helicopter-mobile armies are too flimsy and too expensive. Airborne is similar. Motorised forces with focus on dismounted fight and support fires are slow in combat and easily slowed down by delaying actions when on the move.
The only exception is the desert; a place where ambushes are extremely difficult and where wheeled AFV-motorised columns can roam quickly over vast distances.

I agree that assault gun tactics (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/06/assault-guns-past-and-future.html) experience a revival and have a reason fro their existence despite portable infantry guns (bazookas) and despite portable radios for calling in mortar support.
Nevertheless, that's an application in small wars and for older MBTs in great wars. The unique selling proposition of tanks is still the operational manoeuvre, even if it's down to battlegroup (~between Bn and Bde) scale.

----------

The European 8x8 trend isn't really about quick fast and long marches; the Strykers are about that.
The Europeans had wheeled AFVs in quantity even during the Cold War (Italy, Germany), purchased them because of tiny budgets and lack of alternatives etc. The Boxer MRAV is pretty much a Cold War concept, including DPICM protection requirement.
The Piranha vehicle range comes from a country that doesn't think about deploying its forces to the European frontiers the slightest (Switzerland).
The Finns use wheeled AFVs apparently because even tracked vehicles have only minimal off-road capability on their terrain.

The Stryker mess created the fashion and was the primary driver of it. The other factors enabled the spreading of the fashion in the entire Western world, with some influence even in E/SE Asia.

[Firn]

'Reckless' sounds a bit like Rommel or Guderian storming forwards with guns blazing to take the next objective by handstreich just to keep going for next one, determined to risk men and material in the short run, by not sacrificing speed for time-consuming scouting while keeping the overarching goal in mind hoping will safe a lot men and material in the long run.

This goes back to the old Saber or Stealth debate, I guess.

[Fuchs]

During recent small wars casualty aversion has been general.

In a great war, casualty aversion means to sacrifice few to not need to sacrifice many.
This means that often times commanders need to be reckless in their use of few in order to do their job right, to keep casualties relatively low.
Examples are the use of small and weak scouting teams (aggressive armoured reconnaissance, for example), the use of LRRP without a huge institution of heliborne extraction on call, the reckless push disregarding losses in the three digit range in order to seal the fate of an entire opposing peer force brigade.

It's a different military culture, one in which recklessness has a justified role.


This doesn't change that away from highly important actions, extreme caution and often even outright refusal of combat may be a very good idea.

[Distiller]

'Light' is easy. Walking men with everything they might possibly need in their rucksacks, in units without organic technical mobility assets. Focus tactical mobility and low signature, but with man-portable missiles and other systems very dangerous in the infight. And I think to maximize effectiveness such units have to be organized almost irregularily and very flat. Mobility and fire support assets as needed.

But then it becomes complicated, so lets start with the upper end. I think the real place these days for heavy mech inf is urban combat. Vehicles are rolling fortresses with protection far outweighing mobility. Bringing infantry directly and under fire to the close-in combat. Here also the assault gun would come into play, as part of the direct-indirect fires mix. Such units are way too unwieldy for fast open terrain movements and their standard effector portfolio not suited for long range combat. But equipped with guided missiles also very good for defensive operations over longer ranges.

And for 'in between' I'm not sure infantry is the right tool. Rather I'd think of cavalry. Focus on mobility (also air portable and amphibious - so let's keep under 15/18 tons) and (missile) firepower. Very important aerial ISR, primary fire support via air power, also logistics support primarily via air. Think VDV and think BMD-4. A reduced infantry contingent can be valuable for some tasks, but dismounted combat should not even be tried as it robs the units of its greatest assets speed and mobility. Designed for rapid maneuvers in rural and vehicle-compatible environment. These are the units for 'recklessness'.

[Compost]

This short version summarises conclusions on the armament of infantry carrying armoured vehicles developed in a 3-part version which follows. The attributes for an armoured vehicle that carries infantry in and near combat zones can be generally ranked in order as protection, mobility and then armament. The minimum load has been set as an 8-man squad/section. The vehicles considered are the tracked and wheeled light and medium APCs used mainly by mechanised infantry, the wheeled PMV used by light infantry, and the medium tracked AIFV and the heavy BW used by armoured infantry.

Installation of a heavy armament on an infantry carrying vehicle is - excluding the AIFV - a hazard to be carefully avoided. Being able to deploy and manoeuvre powerful weapons is the role of purpose-designed AFVs that have the space and weight capabilities needed to keep such weapons in operation.

APC – General. An APC needs a defensive armament for use against ambush and for local security when in overwatch and laager. That armament might also be employed offensively while infantry dismount. Stabilisation is useful but increases weight, complexity and cost. Development of effective systems for operation of external weapons and skeletal RCWS mounts has been accompanied by a trend to remotely operated turrets. With ready magazine(s) included in the turret the need for bulky trunking is reduced. However the turret itself tends to become bulky and there is still a need for manual or mechanical replenishment of magazines from lower in the hull.

Alternatively a weapon can be in an external mount above a mini-turret or cupola or independently mounted as a RCWS. Both those types of overhead mount avoid in-board concerns such as bore evacuation and venting, but magazine arrangements and clearance and reloading of overhead external mounts are more complex than in a turret. And for a RCWS, there is the further difficulty that its pedestal must include the traversing and elevating mechanisms that can for an external mount be included as part of a mini turret or cupola.

Similar to the 1-man turret on a light APC, the cupola or mini-turret or unmanned turret on a medium or heavy armoured vehicle can be offset to one or other side of the roof centreline. And to reduce the intrusion of trunking or cable runs any 2-man turret or large unmanned turret might be installed near the forward bulkhead of a troop cabin

Light wheeled and tracked APCs – mechanised infantry. The APC was mainly developed to transport infantry and their equipment and stores in the vicinity of - but not actually into - close combat. The appropriate main armament for a light tracked or wheeled APC is a semi or fully stabilised AGL/MMG combination in an electrically driven 1-man turret occupied by the commander of a 2-man crew.

Alternatively the armament could consist of an AGL and MMG or possibly a 12.7mm HMG, with the AGL mounted in a 1-man turret and the MG on an overhead mount. To minimise the intrusion of trunking the turret should be located at the front of the cabin and/or offset to one side. If heavier weapons were required then it would be necessary to employ light scout cars or scout carriers or else medium or heavy armoured vehicles.

The secondary armament of light (and also of medium and heavy) infantry carrying armoured vehicles should include vehicle and turret or cupola mounted 76mm multi-tube dischargers for smoke and other types of grenade. Additionally, pintles or even swing-arm mounts should be available beside some rooftop hatches to support weapons such as MMGs and mounted infantry launchers for recoilless weapons including especially any standard LATGW.

Medium wheeled and tracked APCs – mechanised infantry. Medium tracked vehicles typically weigh more than 30 tonnes and have a HV cannon of 25 to 35mm calibre in a 2-man turret and are clearly intended for use as an AIFV rather than an APC. On that empirical basis, tracked vehicles are not further considered under this medium APC heading.

With a lesser proportion of its weight allocated to carrying and protecting a powerful cannon and its ammunition, a medium wheeled APC can be protected by homogeneous, composite and spaced armour to all-round S-4569 Level 4 with bow and forward protection in excess of Level 5. That passive protection can be complemented by installation of a defensive aids suite. Further protection can be provided by operating whenever practicable hull down and behind cover. That requires a means of observation by means of devices elevated above or extended to either side of the vehicle.

Extensible masts and articulated booms are already used to elevate equipment pods ten and more metres above stationary armoured communications and reconnaissance vehicles. Use of a raisable weapon pod has already been implemented in the limited elevation of a multi-tube TOW ATGM launcher on a modified M113 vehicle. Prospective use of multi-capable sensor and weapon pods that can be manoeuvred on articulated booms of several – say four to five - metres overall length has been discussed in technical journals for several decades. The base mechanisms for manoeuvring the boom would probably need to be installed in a small unmanned cleft turret, and the pod would have to be operable in high and low profile modes.

Assuming that such a boom and manoeuvrable pod can be engineered in the fairly near future, a useful armament for a medium wheeled APC with a 3-man crew would have for the commander an unmanned cleft turret with articulated boom and pod containing observation devices and a MMG with ready ammunition. That could be complemented by 1-man gunner’s turret armed as on the light APC with a stabilised AGL/MMG combination, or with an AGL in the turret and a HMG overhead. Despite the risk of over-tasking the vehicle commander the boom might also be arranged to carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

If the boom were not feasible then the commander should be provided with a cupola fitted with overhead observation devices and a MMG. The gunner should then have a 1-man turret armed as above and also able to carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

PMV - light infantry. The PMV is a simple but carefully engineered type of light or medium wheeled infantry-carrying vehicle that can be provided with protection of its lower hull protection to at least S-4569 Level 4 and of the upper hull to at least S-4569 Level 2. Some commentators consider tracked and wheeled APCs too intimidating and provocative for use in security operations. Depreciating that viewpoint is one reason to include well armoured truck-like PMVs in a balanced fleet of armour vehicles. And some armament can be installed provided it is clearly of small calibre.

Ultimately the need for a PMV - in addition to other and more capable wheeled APCs – is predicated on its being relatively inexpensive to procure and operate. In accordance with that austerity and ostensible appearance, the suitable armament for a PMV is a readily-removable/installable MMG flexibly mounted and protected against sniper fire: in a manually or electrically traversed 1-man all-round gunshield rather than a turret or RCWS.

Medium tracked AIFV – armoured infantry. The AIFV is a hybrid intended to transport, accompany and support armoured infantry in close combat zones where it will be exposed to adversary fire. Typically it is expected to be capable of some types of operation without intimate support from more heavily armed and armoured vehicles such as tanks. So the AIFV is expected to combine the capabilities of an APC together with a more powerful armament, and the ranking of its big three attributes is modified to become protection, armament and mobility.

Hence, a useful AIFV armament would consist of an offset 1-man or unmanned turret with a fully stabilised automatic cannon of 30 or 35mm calibre plus coaxial MMG. Assuming any major problems relating to an articulated boom can be solved in the fairly near future, the turreted armament should be complemented by a boom-mounted pod controlled by the vehicle commander. That manoeuvrable pod should contain observation and target acquisition devices and a MMG. Additionally the pod should – despite the risk of overtasking the vehicle commander - be able to carry an attachable launcher for a light AT or assault missile with command or semi-active guidance.

Pending availability of such an articulated boom the commander of an AIFV should in its place be provided with an independent cupola carrying an external MMG, with the gunner in a 1-man turret with 30mm cannon and MMG and arrangements to carry an attachable launcher for a light AT or assault missile with command or semi-active guidance.

BW – armoured infantry. Battle Wagon is the term used here to describe a heavy tracked vehicle designed to transport armoured infantry and also combat engineers operating in close conjunction with MBTs and particularly during entry into heavily defended localities.

For its escort and assault role a BW would be usefully armed with a stabilised cupola-mounted MMG or HMG plus a commander’s partly or fully stabilised observation and weapon pod with MMG on an articulated boom for elevation overhead and to the sides. That pod operable in both high and low profile modes might also carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile. However, to provide redundancy for observation and supporting fire it might be practicable to install two such booms. In that case the second boom operated by a fourth crewman should be arranged to carry an AGL or MMG, and also the launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

[Compost]

Here it is in six sections because of the 10,000 char limit.

Every infantry unit can for some tasks benefit by working dismounted alongside armoured vehicles and by making routine and expedient use of armoured vehicles for infantry mobility and transport of stores. The initial question to be asked when planning an infantry carrying armoured vehicle is ‘ how many dismountable infantry should it carry ? ’ And the immediate answer that comes to mind is ‘ a complete section/squad ’. The alternate and final answer is probably ‘ a complete squad plus a support element ’.

However infantry are organised and equipped in different ways. Some armies – including the American, British and German – have several types of infantry mounted on armoured vehicles. Firstly they employ a 6- to 8-strong infantry squad in a tracked vehicle armed with a powerful turreted cannon. The vehicle is intended for combat and together with its crew of two or more can function as a weapon team and support the squad after it has dismounted. Units mounted on such vehicles are usually described as armoured infantry.

Secondly there are mechanised infantry units that when dismounted are expected to sometimes operate independent of fire support from their vehicle. Each mechanised squad typically includes a dismountable weapon team, and a whole squad of 8 to 10 or sometimes as many as 12 dismounts is transported in one tracked or wheeled armoured vehicle, or in two such vehicles.

Thirdly for operational and local mobility it can be useful to provide light infantry with armoured transport vehicles. Light infantry squads in most industrial armies vary in size from as large 13 in the USMC to as small as 8 in other forces. The larger squads of 10 or 12 often include a weapons team of three or four which may deploy close to or at some distance from the rest of the squad. Similar to mechanised infantry the whole squad may be transported in one armoured vehicle. Alternatively 8 or 9 infantry could be in one vehicle with a 3- or 4-man weapon team in another vehicle. Forces organised with smaller light infantry squads of 9 or fewer dismounts usually employ those squads in conjunction with weapon teams detached from platoon and company level that are transported in the same or accompanying vehicles.

Is it necessary to provide different vehicles for armoured and mechanised infantry, and similarly for mechanised and light infantry ? The common needs applying across different types of organisation are that a mounted squad or part squad be small enough to restrain the size of its transport vehicle, big enough to put a useful number of infantry on the ground, small enough to enable some commonality of sub-unit doctrine across different types of infantry, and big enough to limit average procurement and operating costs for each crew and infantry seat.

Those size-related considerations together with the attributes of protection, mobility and armament and dollar costs are essentially determined by doctrine and the extent of interaction between infantry and their vehicle in combat and in the vicinity of combat. If doctrine has established a need for three distinct types of infantry based on such interaction, then it is probable that three distinct types of squad carrying armoured vehicles will be required. However, for flexibility those vehicles - or at least those intended for mechanised and light infantry - should be able to transport all manner of customary squads.

Most seats for dismounts are arranged to face inwards or outwards. With each seat shock-resistant and spall-protected the length of an armoured transport vehicle’s cabin can increase by at least 70cm for each pair of seats. From an organizational perspective, having seats in one vehicle for 10 infantry would enable transport of a 6-man to 8-man squad or part squad plus a 4-man to 2-man weapon or command team or other specialised element Seating for twelve infantry might seem to be a reasonable maximum as it would allow for a large 12-man squad, or an 8-man squad plus a 4-man weapon team or other element, or two 6-man squads.

But if 12 why not 13 to provide for squads organised with three 4-man teams and a squad commander as in the USMC ? There is a practical limit beyond which the dimensions of a vehicle become so large and its armour protection so stretched that it becomes an unnecessarily bulky and vulnerable target. Also it is impractical to squeeze extra infantry into a small vehicle by using foldable jump seats instead of shock-resistant and contoured seating. One certain result of the former is to deliver infantry whose fitness has been degraded by the inadequacies of cramped and uncomfortable seats.

Here in order to simplify things it is supposed that a squad carrying armoured vehicle should be restricted in size and designed to carry its basic crew and at least eight dismounts. That minimum capacity would provide for any squad - or part squad - up to 8-strong, or alternatively two 4-man weapon teams or other combinations such as a weapon team with an engineer, HQ or other element.

An alternate minimum of 10 would enable transport of an 8-man squad plus a 2-man element but would still not suit the needs of the USMC. Transport of its complete 13-man squad implies a needed capacity for up to 15 dismounts and a large increase in vehicle size. Hence in order to reduce potential vulnerability and despite any loss of co-ordination it is also supposed here that the maximum capacity for an infantry carrying armoured vehicle should be the vehicle crew plus 12 dismounts.

The capability to deploy and manoeuvre powerful weapons is a role for purpose-designed AFVs that have the space and weight arrangements to keep such weapons in operation. Infantry-carrying vehicles - including to some extent the AIFV - need a restrained form of armament because the weight and space of a substantial armament modifies the armour and protection that can be provided for the crew and mounted infantry. Prospective and actual use of weapons can also distract a vehicle commander, and additionally encourage inappropriate manoeuvre in hazardous zones.

The vehicles considered are the tracked and wheeled light and medium APCs used mainly by mechanised infantry, the wheeled PMV used by light infantry, and the medium tracked AIFV and the heavy BW used by armoured infantry.

APC – General

The Armoured Personnel Carrier was mainly developed to transport infantry and their equipment and stores in the vicinity of - but not actually into - close combat. That covers transport of mechanised infantry and occasionally light infantry but not armoured infantry. However, roles and priorities vary and some armies persist in confusing the APC concept with that of an AIFV suitable for use by armoured infantry.

Early APCs such as the German SdKfz 251 and US M3 halftracks used during the 1940s were open-topped but - within a loaded weight of about 10 tonnes – they could carry an upper belt of frontal and side armour protection equivalent to about S-4659 Level 2 standard. Their typical armament consisted of one or more MMGs on pintles attached to the vehicle’s front or sides, and sometimes a HMG on a pintle or ringmount.

More recently airburst and other fuses enable artillery shells, rockets and bombs to reliably produce downward and radial destructive affects instead of cratering the landscape. Open-top APCs may also be subject to overhead attack by EFP, liquids, aerosols and gas. And every APC is liable to all-round roof to wheel attack by kinetic and chemical energy warheads delivered by guided missiles, direct-fire guns and rockets. Additional attack especially on vehicle sides and belly can be made by bomblets and buried and off-route blast and EFP mines detonated by pressure-plate, tilt-rod, vehicle counters and other sensors or remote command. Hence most recent APCs have a fully enclosed 6-sided armoured body, and many have a roof-mounted turret for observation and defensive fire. Protection when closed up can also include filtered over-pressurisation.

The deployment and manoeuvering of powerful weapons is a task for purpose-designed AFVs that can be built with the space and weight arrangements to keep such weapons in operation. And it can be supposed that the mobile forces of an industrialised army will be equipped with a mix of small and larger AFVs. Also access to and movement within operational areas is important for all vehicles. Hence, the attributes of an infantry squad-carrying vehicle or APC can be clearly ranked in order as protection, mobility, armament.

[Compost]

Each member of an APC crew and each embarked infantryman needs about one cubic metre of protected volume. With additional space for movement that becomes more than 10 cubic metres for a minimum size crew of driver and commander and a squad of eight, and makes the squad-carrying APC a quite bulky vehicle. Some APCs have upper and lower sides that are inward sloping but a sculptured and confining bodyshape such as on the 1950s Alvis Saracen has become uncommon because it does little to conserve the area and weight of armour.

To protect its crew and mounted infantry with their equipment - and separately the engine compartment and fuel tank(s) - the armoured surface area of an APC is typically more than 40 sqm. Hence within the light category it is feasible to shape and protect a modern light APC to all-round S-4569 Level 3 with homogeneous steel armour and to obtain a somewhat higher protection for its underbelly and over its frontal aspect. Getting to all-round Level 5 with homogeneous armour protection is impossible for a light APC but almost possible for a medium APC.

Higher general levels of protection can be passively achieved by use of composite layered armour and spaced armour. These armours can have their outer surfaces augmented by ablative arrangements and explosive reactive armour (ERA). A major problem with ERA is that it cannot be de-activated before infantry dismount. Also stand-off protection against shaped charge projectiles can be extended by attaching see-through steel or aluminium screens with close-set bars or slats. Using modern passive armour techniques - and without resort to ERA - the general protection provided to a medium vehicle of APC size can be raised above S-4569 Level 5, and the forward part of the hull can be further protected to withstand threats such as 30mm cannon fire.

Research has been conducted into reactive electric armour but without apparent employment to date. Research into active/passive defensive aids suites has been more successful. Numerous suites are being developed and some have been installed to provide early-warning and intercept or disruption of various types of anti-armour threat. However, many such systems are problematic because they are signature dependent. Also a wide spectrum suite can be costly and provide only limited multi-shot protection. Use of ERA and defensive aids radiation and interceptors can also be hazardous to dismounted infantry. But - unlike ERA - defensive aids suites or selected sub-systems can be deactivated whenever appropriate.

An APC needs a defensive armament for use against ambush and for local security when in overwatch and laager. That armament might also be employed offensively while infantry dismount. Stabilisation is useful but increases weight, complexity and cost. And it is appropriate to emphasize that notwithstanding its armament an APC is mainly intended for use as CS vehicle rather than for routine employment as a lightly-armed AFV. With protection and mobility as its main attributes it is apparent that the appropriate defensive/offensive weapon or weapons for an APC should be unobtrusive in terms of in-board volume and length, and that the weight of each weapon and ammunition should also be constrained.

A one-man 360 degree rotatable cupola or turret can provide top-mounted all-round viewing by the vehicle commander. If located near the front centreline of the cabin the increase in cabin length might be reduced below 0.7m but could still equate to suppression of probably two infantry seats. A location offset to one side anywhere down the cabin can similarly mean that head clearance will not be obstructed by cable runs. And an offset 1-man turret can be accommodated in little more than the space needed for one infantry seat. The ‘second’ seat in a 2-man turret was sometimes promoted on the basis that it could be interchangeably used by an infantry squad commander to see outside the vehicle. However, episcopes and electro-optics such as CCTV now enable such viewing by infantry seated anywhere in a vehicle.

Development of effective systems for operation of overhead weapons and skeletal RCWS mounts has been accompanied by a trend to remotely operated turrets. With ready magazine(s) included in the turret the need for bulky trunking is reduced. However the turret itself tends to become bulky and there is still a need for manual or mechanical replenishment of magazines from lower in the hull. Provision for head-up – but not simultaneous all-round – direct viewing by a vehicle commander and/or gunner and also manual operation of any ancillary external weapon such as a MMG can then be arranged by means of roof-mounted hatches or cupolas forward and aft of the turret. Overall an unmanned turret is more suitably mounted on a medium than on a light APC.

Alternatively a weapon can be in an external mount above a mini-turret or cupola or independently mounted as a RCWS. Both those types of overhead mount avoid in-board concerns such as bore evacuation and venting, but magazine arrangements and clearance and reloading of overhead external mounts are more complex than in a turret. And for a RCWS, there is the further difficulty that its pedestal must include the traversing and elevating mechanisms that can for an overhead mount be included as part of a mini turret or cupola.

Similar to the 1-man turret on a light APC, the cupola or mini-turret or unmanned turret on a medium or heavy armoured vehicle can be offset to one or other side of the roof centreline. And to reduce the intrusion of trunking or cable runs any 2-man turret or large unmanned turret might be installed near the forward bulkhead of a troop cabin

For head-up operation on a light, medium or heavy vehicle, the vehicle commander or gunner may also be provided with a flexible MMG or AGL mounted on a swing-arm or a ring and skate around a hatch or an otherwise unarmed cupola.

Light APC – mechanised infantry

Initially there is the question of wheeled or tracked. The important difference is that of operational or tactical mobility. The army of any large industrialized state will tend to have both wheeled and tracked light APCs, with the wheeled APCs concentrated in cavalry/reconnaissance and early entry units and the tracked APCs used for main force infantry and CS units. Examples of well configured light APCs are the Rheinmetal Tpz-1 Fuchs 6x6 and GDLS Stryker 8x8, and the tracked Steyr 4K7 and - despite slab sides - the UDLS M-113A3 and M-113A4/MTVL.

The largest readily installed and operated defensive/support weapon for a light APC is the 12.7x99mm HMG or - for approximately the same weight and space - a 40mm AGL combined with a 7.62mm rifle-calibre MMG. As a general purpose DF weapon the choice is either a 7.62mm MMG or a 12.7mm HMG. However a 40mm AGL is clearly superior to either for bombardment tasks and also useful for DF and anti-armour fire. Hence instead of a single HMG, a combined armament of AGL and MMG would provide a vehicle commander with useful choice. Due to their different characteristics it would not be practicable to use both weapons simultaneously, and concern to keep one or other weapon in use at any particular time would reduce the risk of overtasking. For flexibility also an AGL/MMG combination is preferable to the short-term prophylaptic benefits of twin MMGs and the complexities of an alternate rotary MG.

So an appropriate armament for a light APC could have a 40mm AGL and MMG in a 1-man turret. If a capability for hull-down fire were rated as essential, then somewhat less satisfactorily the MG could be on an overhead mount carried above a 1-man turret mounting the higher trajectory AGL whose feed and re-loading/replenishment is also more problematic. Regardless of the increase in weight and despite its cost, stabilisation of the armament for elevation/range should be rated as essential with full stabilisation rated as desirable.

A more powerful armament would have a 12.7mm HMG combined with a 40mm AGL. However, an AGL/MMG combination provides more flexibility for counter-ambush and harassing fire than the HMG/AGL and also the HMG/MMG alternative. Additionally a 40mm AGL and a MMG can be more readily dismounted and deployed on tripods than a 12.7mm HMG that weighs about 40kgs plus the weight of its tripod. Also the 12.7mm HMG with its ammunition may not already be in service with a
supported infantry unit. Finally, arming an APC with all three weapons would overtask the commander in a 2-man crew and hence necessitate a third crew member and an additional cupola or turret. The result would over-crew a light APC and increase its weight and bulk.

[Compost]

Depending on the operational environment and the armaments of friendly and adversary vehicles - and possible threat of attack by fixed or rotary wing aircraft – some armies have nonetheless considered it necessary to arm a light APC with a cannon of typically 20mm calibre in a 1-man or 2-man turret. A 1-man turret with cannon and by necessity an MMG would be larger than a 1-man AGL/HMG turret but would occupy much the same volume in the cabin. Top weight would be larger but a 20x139mm cannon only weighs about 90kg or twice that of a HMG. The troublesome needs would be the increased volume and weight allowances needed for replenishment ammunition.

Installing a 2-man turret would be much more demanding. The space occupied by the trunk of a 2-man turret has a minimum diameter of about 1.5 metres. Accommodating such a turret in an APC can due to the limits of practical cabin width occupy the same cabin length and space as three or four infantry seats. The weight of a 2-man turret, cannon, ammunition and a necessarily larger vehicle also results in a lower degree of armour protection.

A useful example is to compare two of the older types of tracked APC, the high and wide slab-sided Giat AMX-10 with 2-man 20mm turret against the slope-sided Steyr 4K7 with 1-man turret armed with a single 12.7mm HMG. The Steyr APC has similar all-up weight but is narrower and lower and has thicker and better sloped armour protection. However and partly explaining the differences, the AMX-10 is amphibious and was probably developed for DP use by cavalry and mechanised units.

With usually a 2-man crew of driver and a commander - also functioning as a gunner and controlling the turreted or cupola or RCWS mounted weapons - there is little point in fitting other permanent armament. If doctrine absolutely requires that a light APC have a 3-man crew of driver, commander and gunner then the commander could be provided with a separate cupola located away from a 1-man turret. Masking of the turret by a weapon mount on the cupola would apply on a temporary basis depending on the offset nature of the mount on its cupola. That restriction - and the reciprocal loss of the commander’s direct all-round vision from the cupola might not be acceptable. Alternative all-round vision could be provided by electro-optics relayed from the turret roof. Also the armament at a cupola might anyway be lowerable or displaced for re-loading and clearance of the turret arc. Failing that and unless some masking is accepted it is back to the problems inherent in a 2-man turret.

A light APC with a 20mm or larger calibre cannon does have a nominal capability to function as an AFV. It might be considered suitable for use as an accompanying fire support vehicle - presumably with infantry already dismounted or as a scout carrier. However, both those capabilities are illusory. A cannon-equipped light APC is certain to be somewhat less well protected than the scout carrier widely used by cavalry as a light AFV. And a purpose-designed scout carrier – though likely to be built on the same light chassis as an APC – can be readily armed with a 20mm or larger cannon because its cabin need only accommodate a 4 or 5-man scout team.

Many older types of APC had provision for infantry to fire weapons and particularly MMGs through ports in the sides and rear of the vehicle. All mounted infantry small arms and support weapons including shoulder-fired LATGW and other recoilless launchers could also be fired through roof hatches where pintles were sometimes provided. Such use of roof hatches is certain to continue because the potential use of ports is being increasingly obstructed by addition of full height spaced and bar/slat armour on the sides and rear of vehicles.

And finally some APC-type vehicles include a ball-mounted forward-firing MMG for use by an already busy driver or another crew-member. One example is the Russian BMP-3 light tracked vehicle. It has a rear-mounted engine, 3-man crew with two in a turret with a 100mm medium velocity gun and co-axial 30mm cannon and MMG, plus two ball mounted MMGs in the forward hull controlled by a 7-man mounted infantry squad. The BMP-3 is also amphibious and was clearly developed as a rapid exploitation vehicle with exceptional armament and correspondingly poor protection that is below that reasonably expected of an APC.

Summarising, the appropriate main armament for a light tracked or wheeled APC is a semi or fully stabilised AGL/MMG combination in an electrically driven 1-man turret occupied by the commander of a 2-man crew. Alternatively the armament could consist of an AGL and MMG or possibly a 12.7mm HMG, with the AGL mounted in a 1-man turret and the MG on an overhead mount. To minimise the intrusion of trunking the turret should be located at the front of the cabin and/or offset to one side. If heavier weapons were required then it would be necessary to employ light scout cars or scout carriers or else medium or heavy armoured vehicles.

The secondary armament of light (and also of medium and heavy) infantry carrying armoured vehicles should include vehicle and turret or cupola mounted multi-tube 76mm dischargers for smoke and other types of grenade. Additionally, pintles or even swing-arm mounts should be available beside some rooftop hatches to support weapons such as MMGs and mounted infantry launchers for recoilless weapons including especially any standard LATGW.

[Compost]

Medium APC – mechanised infantry

Almost all recently designed medium wheeled armoured vehicles are built with an 8x8 driveline, and most are offered in an APC and also an AIFV configuration. The APC variants include the 30-tonne GDELS/Mowag Piranha 5 with crew of 2 plus 9 dismounts armed with 12.7mm HMG in a RCWS, the 33-tonne KMW/Rheinmetall Boxer with crew of 3 man plus 8 dismounts and overhead 12.7mm HMG above a 1-man turret, and the 30-tonne BAE/OMC RG41 with crew of 3 plus 8 dismounts armed with two LATGMs on each side of a low-profile unmanned turret that also carries an overhead MMG or HMG.

Medium tracked vehicles typically weigh more than 30 tonnes and have a HV cannon of 25 to 35mm calibre in a 2-man turret and are clearly intended for use as an AIFV rather than an APC. There are few medium weight tracked APCs. Those that have been built are of comparatively low weight (20 to 25 tonnes) and hence protected to much the same level as light APC. On that empirical basis, tracked vehicles are not further considered under this medium APC heading.

With a lesser proportion of its weight allocated to carrying and protecting a powerful cannon and its ammunition, a medium wheeled APC can be protected by homogeneous, composite and spaced armour to all-round S-4569 Level 4 with bow and forward protection in excess of Level 5. That passive protection can be complemented by installation of a defensive aids suite. Further protection can be provided by operating whenever practicable hull down and behind cover. That requires a means of observation by means of devices elevated above or extended to either side of the vehicle.

Extensible masts and articulated booms are already used to elevate equipment pods ten and more metres above stationary armoured communications and reconnaissance vehicles. Such masts and booms generally enhance LOS access by enabling observation over and to some extent around solid or other cover. Use of a raisable weapon pod has already been implemented in the limited elevation of a multi-tube TOW ATGM launcher on a modified M113 vehicle. Prospective use of multi-capable sensor and weapon pods that can be manoeuvred on articulated booms of several – say four to five - metres overall length has been discussed in technical journals for several decades. The base mechanisms for manoeuvring the boom would probably need to be installed in a small unmanned cleft turret, and the pod would have to be operable in high and in low profile mode.

The electro-mechanical or hydraulic means of rapidly orienting and manoeuvring such a boom and its pod are generally similar to those employed in current RCWS and hence might already be capably engineered. Arranging full or even part-stabilised observation and target acquisition on the move could be difficult but that should be reducible by using wide angle viewing arrangements. If a podded MG was included then the boom and pod could be also used to deliver elevated or round-the-corner fire. Stabilised fire on the move might require an impractical increase in pod weight. Other difficulties would include along-the-boom or podded supply of ready ammunition, replenishment of ready ammunition, and vulnerability of the pod and boom systems.

Assuming that such a boom and manoeuvrable pod can be engineered in the fairly near future, a useful armament for a medium wheeled APC with a 3-man crew would have for the commander an unmanned cleft turret with articulated boom and pod containing observation devices and a MMG with ready ammunition. That could be complemented by 1-man gunner’s turret armed as on the light APC with a stabilised AGL/MMG combination, or with an AGL in the turret and a HMG overhead. Despite the risk of over-tasking the vehicle commander the boom might also be arranged to carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

If the boom were not feasible then the commander should be provided with a cupola fitted with overhead observation devices and a MMG. The gunner should then have a 1-man turret armed as above and also able to carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

PMV – light infantry

The Protected Mobility Vehicle is an austere form of wheeled APC to provide protected mobility in place of an unarmoured GS truck. It is essentially intended for use by light infantry and by CS and CSS units. The South African army was effectively the first to experience an unrestricted landmine campaign. And it went on to write the definitive book on PMV design as exemplified by the skeletal and V-bottomed 12-tonne Reumech Casspir 4x4. The British failed to recognise the merits of that vehicle and instead developed a poorly configured and top heavy 4x4 of similar loaded weight known as the GKN Saxon. It was mainly procured to transport Territorial light infantry battalions from the UK into Europe, and might have adequately performed that limited role. The French produced a somewhat better PMV with the amphibious GIAT VAB 4x4 that weighed about 13 tonnes. However, it may have been relatively expensive.

An important attribute of a PMV is that it should - in comparison to more capable wheeled and tracked APCs - be cheap to procure and operate. For economy combined with resistance to mine blast that means a PMV will be a specialised type of truck, usually a 4x4 truck. Protection of its lower hull can reach at least S-4569 Level 4 with the upper hull protected to at least S-4569 Level 2. That protection is typically based on homogeneous and spaced armour and engineered features such as a monocoque chassis, V-shaped hull and sacrificial wheel stations.

Some commentators consider tracked and wheeled APCs too intimidating and provocative for use in security operations. Depreciating that viewpoint - regardless of its validity - is one reason to include well armoured truck-like PMVs in a balanced fleet of armour vehicles. And some armament can be installed provided it is self-evidently of small calibre.

Examples of well configured PMVs are the International/Navistar MaxxPro DXM 4x4 and the Thales Bushmaster 4x4 each of which weigh less than 15 tonnes. For transport of more than 10 dismounts there are also some overgrown medium weight PMVs of more than 30 tonnes such as the BAE RG-35 6x6 and some similarly large MRAVs that been built or upgraded with independent suspensions. In time almost every industrialised army is likely to provide its light infantry battalions with PMVs rather than GS trucks. Those PMVs will probably be complemented by light armoured weapon carriers for a proportion of a unit’s support weapon teams.

In keeping with austerity and to reduce any tendency to employ a PMV like an AFV, its basic armament should consist of a MMG complemented by ubiquitous 76mm multi-barrel dischargers. Again to minimise complexity, weight and cost a semi-permanently fitted MMG or a MMG provided by embarked infantry can be flexibly mounted in a manually or electrically traversed all-round gunshield or small turret on top of the PMV. The sometime practice of instead fitting a complicated multi-function turret or an expensive RCWS can be kindly said to be illogical but is more accurately described as misplaced and irrational.

Ultimately the need for a PMV - in addition to other and more capable wheeled APCs – is predicated on its being relatively inexpensive to procure and operate. In accordance with that austerity and ostensible appearance, the suitable armament for a PMV is a readily-installable/removable MMG flexibly mounted and protected against sniper fire: in a manually or electrically traversed 1-man all-round gunshield rather than a turret or RCWS.

[Compost]

AIFV - armoured infantry

The Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle is a hybrid intended to transport, accompany and support armoured infantry in close combat zones where it will be exposed to adversary fire. Typically it is expected to be capable of some types of operation without intimate support from more heavily armed and armoured vehicles such as tanks. So the AIFV is expected to combine the capabilities of an APC together with a more powerful armament, and the ranking of its big three attributes is modified to become protection, armament and mobility.

In order to carry that more powerful armament an AIFV has to be more bulky and less well protected by passive armour than an APC of similar weight and the same number of infantry seats. For those reasons the homogeneous, composite and spaced armour of a modern AIFV is likely to be complemented by an active defence system that further protects especially its upper sides and roof. Thus and although the passive protection of a medium AIFV may well be less than S-4569 Level 5, its effective all-round protection can be at a higher level.

One underlying rationale for the AIFV is that it can enable some reduction in the total number of APCs and AFVs or weapon carriers and also crews that would otherwise be needed to provide the same overall force of mounted infantry and vehicle mounted firepower. But any need for a light armoured vehicle with a heavier armament than an APC and carrying less than a squad of infantry is already met by the scout carrier. The scout carrier is outside the scope of this post. However it can be noted that - notwithstanding its limited troop capacity - a scout carrier might be considered a satisfactory substitute for a fully-fledged AIFV in the light category.

On that basis the remaining issue is the type and size of weapons suitable for mounting on a medium weight AIFV that can carry an 8-man infantry squad. To combat fixed strongpoints and adversary vehicles whilst moving it is essential that an AIFV have a fully stabilised main armament. The need for hitting power and extended operation can best be met by a small to medium calibre cannon rather than by larger and heavier guided missiles or unguided rocket-type projectiles.

Most contemporary AIFVs are armed with self-loading or auto cannon of 25x137 to 40x225mm calibre in a 2-man turret. It has been suggested by some commentators that developments in cased telescopic ammunition (CTA) could result in an increase in calibre to at least 50mm. However, those larger calibres can be more readily kept in operation when mounted on AFVs and weapon carriers that have hulls and magazines arranged for that single purpose.

An appropriate main armament for a medium weight AIFV is a fully stabilised high-velocity cannon complemented by a co-axial MMG. A cannon of 30-35mm calibre would be optimum when supplied with say 150 to 250 rounds of ammunition and complemented by a squad of 8 infantry. A semi-automatic cannon might be satisfactory in the larger calibre but a capability for short burst automatic fire can be generally useful and especially against fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. So a stabilised automatic cannon of 30x170mm, 30x173mm or 35x227mm calibre would seem suitable.

The 35 tonne BAE/Hagglunds CV90 with a cannon of 35mm or optionally 40mm calibre, and the 30 tonne GDELS/Stehr-Santa Barbara ASCOD/Ulan-Pizarro with 30 mm cannon are examples of current tracked AIFVs. Both those vehicles have 2-man turrets.

For reasons that are not immediately clear, many of the modern medium weight 8x8 wheeled vehicles developed in Europe - such as the Iveco/Oto Melara Freccia, Nexter/Renault VBCI and Patria AMV - are uniformly armed with a 25x137mm in a 20man turret. Each of the vehicles is promoted by its manufacturer as an AIFV but the 25mm main armament is not adequate for that classification. There are some near exceptions such as the AIFV variant of the KMW/Rheinmetall Boxer which is armed with a 30x173mm cannon in a 2-man turret. But despite its size it - like several other 8x8 AIFVs - carries only 6 dismounts and hence fails to meet the local criteria for a squad carrying vehicle. Its large size and intermediate armament would also prejudice alternate use as a medium scout carrier if such were contemplated.

More fundamentally wheels are well suited to movement on roads and hence offer operational mobility that appeals to European armies. But wheels are inferior to tracks for crossing rough terrain and obstacles. Also the typical 8x8 driveline provides high ground clearance that results in a bulky and high profile target. That might be addressed by a kneeling suspension. But the empirical limitation on the size of their cannon armament when arranged to carry an 8-man squad suggests that 8x8 vehicles are inherently unsuited for use as an AIFV. Hence wheeled vehicles are not further considered here although some might become marginally suitable if fitted with an 1-man or unmanned main armament turret as described below.

Mounting a cannon in or above a 2-man turret invariably means large diameter trunking and loss of cabin space. That can be minimised by using sidewall trunking in any of three ways: fitting the cannon in or on top of an offset 1-man mini-turret or in an unmanned and probably offset turret. Target designation and fire control might seem more difficult to achieve with a 1-man or unmanned turret. However, there are at least two good reasons to place the vehicle commander outside a main armament turret.

First, an AIFV commander - having initially identified and handed off a target to the gunner – needs to continue all-round and route-oriented observation. For that purpose some vehicles such as MBTs have a contra-rotating commander’s cupola. For co-ordination and next target designation the commander’s position and the electro or hydro-mechanicals in the 2-man turret of a MBT - and in any similarly equipped AIFV – are arranged with overriding or lockout-delayed controls that can direct the turreted armament onto a new target. Contra-rotating optics are apparently less practical or more disorienting than a contra-rotating cupola. And if the latter is not provided for weight, space, complexity or other reasons then the vehicle commander in that turret is re-oriented

Second and alternatively, a vehicle commander located anywhere in a vehicle can now be provided with all-round viewing by use of observation and target acquisition devices installed on the turret roof, or possibly from such devices carried in a boom-mounted pod as described above. And in either case that commander can be provided with controls to alert the gunner and re-direct the armament of the smaller 1-man or unmanned main armament turret.

Hence, a useful AIFV armament would consist of an offset 1-man or unmanned turret with a fully stabilised automatic cannon of 30 or 35mm calibre plus coaxial MMG. Assuming any major problems relating to an articulated boom can be solved in the fairly near future, the turreted armament should be complemented by a boom-mounted pod controlled by the vehicle commander. That manoeuvrable pod should contain observation and target acquisition devices and a MMG. Additionally the pod should – despite the risk of overtasking the vehicle commander - be able to carry an attachable launcher for a light AT or assault missile with command or semi-active guidance.

Pending availability of such an articulated boom the commander of an AIFV should in its place be provided with an independent cupola carrying an overhead MMG, with the gunner in a 1-man turret with 30mm cannon and MMG and arrangements to carry an attachable launcher for a light AT or assault missile with command or semi-active guidance.

[Compost]

BW – armoured infantry

Battle Wagon is the term used here to describe a heavy tracked vehicle designed to transport armoured infantry and also combat engineers operating in close conjunction with MBTs and particularly during entry into heavily defended localities. Currently there are two dissimilar types of BW in production, and also one conceptual type with two different forms of main armament. All three are based on heavy tank-like tracked vehicles but with a front-mounted engine contributing to forward protection. Hence, each is configured similar to an AIFV with a rear door/ramp and is better suited also for ancillary tasks such as combat retrieval of casualties and personnel than are the AIFV and the sometimes used but rear-engined heavy ARV. The composite and spaced protection of each BW is or would – instead of ERA – be complemented by an active defence system.

First of the BWs is the Israeli IOC/GDLS Namer. The Namer uses the extensively modified hull of a 65 tonne Merkava 4 MBT and has a turtle-back roof and sides. Namer entered production in 2008, reportedly weighs about 60 tonnes, has a crew of 3 and carries an infantry squad of 8 or 9. It does not have a large and heavy turreted armament and its most important characteristic is that the crew and infantry squad have all-round and particularly frontal protection at least equivalent to that of a MBT. On the right front of its roof Namer has a RCWS with 12.7mm HMG in front of a gunner’s cupola. Alternative weapons for the RCWS have been reported to be a 40mm AGL or 7.62mm MMG. On the left front of the roof is a commander’s cupola with a MMG on a ring and skate mount for head-up use. There has as yet been no indication of fitting additional cupolas or further weapons on cupolas or as RCWS.

Second is the German KMW/RmLS Puma. In its basic configuration for transport without side arrays Puma weighs about 30 tonnes but addition of applique panels increases that to at least 44 tonnes. The vehicle is arranged for a crew of three and six infantry. That is the same crewing and capacity as its predecessor the 34-tonne Marder AIFV which had a 2-man turret with overhead 20mm cannon and a rear cupola carrying an overhead MMG. Puma has a remotely operated turret with stabilised 30mm cannon and co-axial 5.56mm LMG. All-round remote viewing is apparently arranged via an armoured pod on the turret roof. The prototype version of Puma as planned to enter service with the Bundeswehr had five irregularly spaced road wheels per side but there is another version with six road wheels. Its hull does not appear to have been lengthened but the KMW website mentions an export version for up to 9 infantry.

Third is a pair of heavy vehicles devised by Richard Simpkin in about 1986 and based on the front-engined hull of a[Merkava120mm MBT but carrying a less powerful turreted armament. Both vehicles were proposed as complements to the MBT. Each was to have a crew of four and capacity for an 8-man infantry squad, although Simpkin also discussed reduction to a 4-man infantry team. One vehicle was to be armed with a medium calibre gun of 60 to 90mm in a low profile turret and was intended to double as a form of assault gun. The other vehicle had an overhead cannon of 30 to 40mm calibre externally mounted on top of a small turret and was in that respect different to the German Puma. (Richard Simpkin, A Triumvirate of Heavyweights ?, Military Technology, 10/86, p 149-159).

Of those three concepts it is the Namer which has the single minded focus of the heaviest armour protection for its crew and squad of infantry or engineers. In accordance with Simpkin’s views such a vehicle might frequently carry less than an 8-man squad. Together with its MBT-plus protection Namer has the lightest armament. That does seem incongruous. But provided doctrine expects a BW to operate in conjunction with MBTs or other heavy gun or cannon-armed vehicles, then a HMG in a remote-controlled mount could be adequate for opportunity and prophylactic fire.

However, a Namer-type BW would be better equipped and armed if it had a forward gunner’s cupola carrying a stabilised HMG or MMG plus a commander’s partly or fully stabilised observation and weapon pod on an articulated boom as described under the medium APC heading. The latter should be feasible because the vehicle hull has sufficient capacity to accept even onerous weight and space requirements that might be expected of an early prototypical armoured boom. A BW with a single boom carrying a pod of viewing and ranging devices and a MMG could be a useful companion for a MBT armed with a turret-bound 105 or 120mm HV gun and coaxial MG. The pod operable in both high and low profile modes might also carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

To provide redundancy for observation and supporting fire it might be practicable to install a second boom. That boom operated by a fourth crewman should be arranged to carry a MG or interchangeable AGL and also – instead of the commander’s boom - the launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

[Infanteer]

Have you read Richard Simpkin's "Mechanized Infantry"?

[Compost]

Have you read Richard Simpkin's "Mechanized Infantry"?
No. What I have read are his articles in Military Technology. So if my stuff seems to copy him that was the source.

[Compost]

“ Wrong Technology for the Wrong Tactics, The Infantry Fighting Vehicle “ by William F. Owen in The Journal of Military Operations, V1-3 Winter 2012,. Owen strongly advances the view that the utility of the AIFV be critically assessed. His general argument deals with the exposure of mounted infantry to avoidable and hence unnecessary hazard, and with the effective employment of tanks and dismounted infantry.

The argument was brief and clearcut and it is easy to agree with his conclusion which is essentially that employment of the AIFV be constrained. His argument ended there. Probably because he considered it preferable to leave the reader to progress to the follow-on conclusion.

It is easy although somewhat tedious to examine each of the distinctive types of combat unit that currently do or might employ the AIFV. There are effectively three such types: armoured cavalry, armoured infantry, and the tank-infantry union as in the HBCT. The only one that survives even superficial examination is armoured cavalry that includes an infantry component for expedient scouting, harassing and ambush. For armoured infantry and also tank/infantry units it can be promptly seen that in manoeuvre, assault and defence the AIFV is grossly inferior and wasteful when compared to similar weighted but specialised gun and cannon equipped vehicles (tanks or limited-traverse weapon carriers) and a better protected though lesser armed medium or heavyweight APC.

The principal question which then remains is how to appropriately structure an armoured cavalry unit, say a platoon or troop. Dependent on vehicle size and capacity - a cavalry troop of four light or medium weight AIFVs (3 crew plus 4 or 5 scouts) could with 12 crewmen lift 16 or 20 infantry scouts. A similar troop of five AIFVs could with 15 crewmen lift 20 or 25 scouts. Alternatively a cavalry troop of two AIFVs and two similarly sized APCs (2 crew plus 7 or 8 scouts) could with 10 crewmen lift 22 or 26 infantry scouts. A similar troop with two AIFVs and three APCs could with 12 crewmen lift 29 or 34 scouts.

It is likely that the weapons issued to the larger group of scouts embarked in an APC could more readily include a LATGW suitable for dismounted/embarked use. In that case the mixed cavalry troop of two AIFVs with two or three APCs would seem more capable than a troop equipped only with AIFVs, or for that matter only APCs.

In the light of Simpkins (NATO-specific) and Owen’s analyses it interesting to speculate on the eventual output of the GCV project. Assuming something does emerge will it be configured as an AIFV or an APC ? Might it be a gamechanger and will it be intended for armoured infantry, tank-infantry and/or cavalry units.

[gute]

It is easy although somewhat tedious to examine each of the distinctive types of combat unit that currently do or might employ the AIFV. There are effectively three such types: armoured cavalry, armoured infantry, and the tank-infantry union as in the HBCT. The only one that survives even superficial examination is armoured cavalry that includes an infantry component for expedient scouting, harassing and ambush. For armoured infantry and also tank/infantry units it can be promptly seen that in manoeuvre, assault and defence the AIFV is grossly inferior and wasteful when compared to similar weighted but specialised gun and cannon equipped vehicles (tanks or limited-traverse weapon carriers) and a better protected though lesser armed medium or heavyweight APC.

I'm not getting your point. Why does the armored cavalry survive examination, but the combined arms battalion (HBCT)? Is it because the AIFV is only good for scouting?

I also found his article interesting and based on his view one could create combined arms battalions of Stryker ICVs and M1 tanks. Of course the most glaring drawback is mobility - Stryker can not go where a tank can, but does it need to?

[Compost]

I'm not getting your point. Why does the armored cavalry survive examination, but the combined arms battalion (HBCT)? Is it because the AIFV is only good for scouting?Yes, believe the compromises inherent in the ‘AIFV’ mean that it can be useful for scouting and also rapid exploitation but poor in any role which involves persistent contact or frequent/continued exposure. After reading Simpkin and Owen no longer believe any ‘AIFV’ has to carry an 8 (or 9) man squad. Adequate capacity for both lightweight and medium weight contenders would seem to be at least a 4-man team and at most a 6-man squad/team. With that role and capacity such vehicles might be described as scout carriers and so avoid the troublesome AIFV-label !


I also found his article interesting and based on his view one could create combined arms battalions of Stryker ICVs and M1 tanks. Of course the most glaring drawback is mobility - Stryker can not go where a tank can, but does it need to?Agree one glaring differential is mobility. The Abrams, Challenger and Leopard-2 tanks cannot be loaded into a C-130 nor cross a MLC20 bridge like the Stryker, nor an A400M or MLC40 bridge like the CV9035. Also it seems preferable that scouts be able to go close to and return from wherever adversary or friendly tanks might go. Hence the Stryker M1128 and CV90120T although each seems over powerful and problematic.

[jcustis]

Compost,

What's your background? Have you ever maneuvered in an APC or AIFV?

[Compost]

Compost,

What's your background? Have you ever maneuvered in an APC or AIFV?

My background is defence analysis. Started with Australian Defence Department in 1960s and also joined CMF (Army Reserve) infantry for more perspective. Did one year tour in SVN as civilian liaison officer. Resigned from CMF in 1970. Continued with Defence in technical areas, project analysis and management until 1990s when left to escape Canberra.

Have had numerous trips/many hours on board M113s in Oz and SVN. During a 1980s Staff College course did a rough track circuit in the turret and then the hull of an ASLAV-25. No experience inside other wheeled/tracked APCs, AIFVs or armoured scouts.

[Compost]

Jcustis,

Here’s a current example. ASLAV is operated by cavalry units in Armoured Corps. ASLAV-25 with 2-man turret is arranged for 3 crew and rated for up to 6passengers on two side-facing bench seats each accessed via a narrow rear door. However ASLAV-25 is operated with 3 crew and up to 4 scouts while ASLAV-25 (Recce) is often operated with just 3 crew. ASLAV-PC (turretless with pintle-mounted MG or RCWS) has 2 crew and cabin is arranged with 2 inward-facing benches for 7 scout troopers accessed via a rear ramp/door.

Stryker may be larger and heavier but wager its most used troop-carrying versions resemble ASLAVs in terms of function and capacity (with say at most 2 more seats). Similarly Bradley M3 has probably been assessed as more useful and successful than Bradley M2.

Interested to learn your view on APCs, AIFVs and armoured scouts.

[82redleg]

Stryker may be larger and heavier but wager its most used troop-carrying versions resemble ASLAVs in terms of function and capacity (with say at most 2 more seats). Similarly Bradley M3 has probably been assessed as more useful and successful than Bradley M2.

Interested to learn your view on APCs, AIFVs and armoured scouts.

Actually, the most common Stryker variant is the M1126 ICV (Infantry Carrier Vehicle) with a crew of 2 + a 9-man squad. There are 108+/BDE (4/PLT: 3 of 4 carry 9-man rifle squad, the last carries the 7-man weapons squad, FO and any attachments)[108 is the number in the 27 rifle platoons- there are additional M1126 in IN CO HQs, and other orgs that don't carry rifle squads, but I don't know exactly how they are employed]

The M1127 RV (Recon Vehicle) is used more like you describe. There are 51 in the BDE: 13 in each of 3 Recon Troops (3 x 4 + 1 for the CDR) + another 4 in each IN BN recon platoon. The Recon Troop platoons have a crew of 2+4 dismounts, the IN BNs have a crew of 2, plus 3 x 5-man recon squads that probably sit in 3 of the vehicles, with the last used by the PL for any attachments.

There are also Engineer Squad Strykers (which also carry a 9-man squad, but that includes the crew of the vehicle), Fire Support Vehicles (4-man crew, really a forward observer vehicle), Command Vehicles (heavy on commo, for headquarters types), MGS, Ambulances, ATGM carriers, Mortar Carriers and NBC Recon Vehicles.

[jcustis]

My background is defence analysis. Started with Australian Defence Department in 1960s and also joined CMF (Army Reserve) infantry for more perspective. Did one year tour in SVN as civilian liaison officer. Resigned from CMF in 1970. Continued with Defence in technical areas, project analysis and management until 1990s when left to escape Canberra.

Have had numerous trips/many hours on board M113s in Oz and SVN. During a 1980s Staff College course did a rough track circuit in the turret and then the hull of an ASLAV-25. No experience inside other wheeled/tracked APCs, AIFVs or armoured scouts.

I figured as much, and asked that because only someone who has been in M113s and MOWAG-type vehs would understand what it is like to be in one of those turrets.

I've been in M113s and went force-on-force at Shoalwater Bay with some of your 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment boys a bit ago (ASLAVs and Strykers vs. LAV-25s) and although no longer posted there, served in ourr Light Armored Reconnaissance Bns for some time.

I will say this, there's a reason why we joke that the Canadian-built LAV-25s could only fit six troops if they were Canadians. You're lucky to squeeze four pax in there amongst all the other gear and supplies required to fight with.

ETA: And for the record, I think the Corps' LAR units are pound-for-pound the most lethal units available.

[gute]

I'm currently reading the book Carnivore which is about a cav scout soldier and his units fight during the invasion of Iraq. The author writes about engaging T-72 tanks with the Bradley 25mm depleted uranium or DU rounds and killing the tanks. My question has to do with the Ground Combat Vehicle and arming it with a 25mm cannon and not something bigger. Could these type of experiences in Iraq had something to do with the idea of arming the GCV with a 25mm cannon? Or, is it simply about going with the status quo? Do U.S. Army armor thinkers believe that in the future the type of armor we are most likely to face will be Soviet design like the T-72 and the DU rounds will be sufficient to destroy the vehicles. The author did say that if the T-72 hit his Bradley with its 125mm the crew would be toast - no suprise there.

[Fuchs]

My question has to do with the Ground Combat Vehicle and arming it with a 25mm cannon and not something bigger. Could these type of experiences in Iraq had something to do with the idea of arming the GCV with a 25mm cannon?

Other armies went from 30 to 40 caseless (UK), from 20 to 30 (Germany), added a 100 mm next to their classic 30 mm (Russia) or kept using something in the 23-40 mm range. Most IFV purchases of the last few years appear to have been about 30-35 mm main guns.


I suppose the U.S.Army simply stuck with what's established in its training and ammunition stock system. I have yet to see or meet any source claiming that 25 mm is optimal. The problem is that the autocannon calibre choice is a choice between the devil and the deep sea. It's unsatisfactory in some regards, no matter what.
25 mm does not chew or bite easily through walls unless you use expensive APFSDS, and that's messy in infantry support because of all the sabots. 35 or 40 mm doesn't allow you to carry many rounds. Telescopic ammo such as used by the CTA 40 is more compact, but you could still carry more if you stuck with a smaller calibre.

[jcustis]

I would offer that there are clear distinctions between an infantry fighting vehicle, capable of killing comparable vehicles with its main cannon or ancillary ATGM, and an infantry support vehicle, capable of rendering support in any sort of built-up environment.

One needs to consider how the US Army has organized and equipped itself in the past to accomplish those two discrete tasks, before asking the question about caliber size for any main cannon.

When the Bradley was developed, side saddle TOW launchers were emplaced in the design, but the unit organizations still M1 tanks mixed in to provide the wall-busting support required, and the development of 120mm ammunition has followed an arc aimed at penetrating and reducing heavy cover.

As the Army transitioned to the Stryker and its remote weapon system of no larger than 40mm AGL or .50 HMG, it bought the 105mm Mobile Gun System variant to provide infantry support within those formations, since the M1's 120mm main gun was lost.

The US has never had a one-design-fits-all mindset when it comes to mechanized infantry operations, like the Russians have through the BMP-1 through -3 series of IFVs, and there is some inherent flexibility (and for sure some weaknesses) from that approach.

It seems the US Army stuck with what was in its training and ammunition system not so much out of a desire to avoid additional cost, but because that system and combination of capabilities has proven capable enough to meet the infantry's needs. If it were found woefully wanting, there would for sure be pressure to adjust and implement new systems, but the current crop of tools is generally adequate and the US Army mindset has recently trended towards C4ISR upgrades before ordnance changes.

I would guess that we won't see a main cannon for another couple of generations.

[jcustis]

I'm currently reading the book Carnivore which is about a cav scout soldier and his units fight during the invasion of Iraq. The author writes about engaging T-72 tanks with the Bradley 25mm depleted uranium or DU rounds and killing the tanks. My question has to do with the Ground Combat Vehicle and arming it with a 25mm cannon and not something bigger. Could these type of experiences in Iraq had something to do with the idea of arming the GCV with a 25mm cannon? Or, is it simply about going with the status quo? Do U.S. Army armor thinkers believe that in the future the type of armor we are most likely to face will be Soviet design like the T-72 and the DU rounds will be sufficient to destroy the vehicles. The author did say that if the T-72 hit his Bradley with its 125mm the crew would be toast - no suprise there.

It turned out to be abandoned the next day when we inspected it, but one night my gunner picked up a BMP-2 in his sights at about 800m, right after the vehicle came to a halt. He hit it with APDS-T (the non-depleted uranium AP round) and the penetrators still went through it like a hot knife through butter. It was a flank shot and not against the frontal armor, but I have no doubt we would have killed it just the same.

I've heard anecdotes of 25mm killing T-55s, but not -72s (or at least I never believed them).

One funny story was when one of our scout team leaders fired a HEAA round from a 83mm SMAW against the flank of an abandoned T-72 at a couple hundred meters. The first round flew over the turret by an inch or so because he failed to adjust a sight setting. The second round hit square in a sponson box, detonated, but barely scratched the hull he was trying to penetrate.

The whole situation was remedied when an industrious young combat engineer corporal and his two subordinates crawled inside with a satchel charge. The resulting explosion of the explosives, and every round and bit of propellant inside the hull, sent the turret somersaulting through the air by a hundred feet or so. This was followed by a dejected scout climbing back aboard his vehicle to face the ribbing of the crew. :D

[Fuchs]

I'm sure you meant "depleted uranium". It makes no sense to use non-depleted uranium for such a purpose.


T-55s have late WW2-like side armour and rear armour is even weaker. All MBTs have ballistic windows - sights, hatches, turret ring, barrel - and can occasionally be penetrated by really weak penetrators.
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-QNcoPfBwJmc/ULeQy7a91TI/AAAAAAAADvE/xJxUu8P3Zes/s1600/T-55-Armor-1.jpg
External equipment - including CITV and externally stored personal items - is even more generally vulnerable.

The ability to penetrate should thus not be judged by anecdotes, but by the ability to penetrate
front turret
upper and lower glacis
side turret
side hull

25 mm is quite unsatisfactory even against a T-55 if you look at these. Lower hull sides are the only large surfaces which an autocannon can penetrate reliably, and I doubt a 25 mm APDS or APFSDS could do so even at a perfect angle.


Basic BMPs are notoriously thin-walled. Their protection is APC-like; they keep most bullets, most fragments and AP mine effects out and that's about it.
Upgraded BMPs on the other hand can be loaded with so much extra protection that even 30 mm APFSDS and AT4s would not penetrate front or sides.

[jcustis]

Okay, yes--the APDS round that is not the one with a penetrator formed from depleted uranium. That is what I meant, though most can probably infer the point I was getting at.

To your point about 25mm and inadequacy against a T-55 (or any tank for that matter), it shouldn't be employed against a T-55, so inadequacy is irrelevant. If a BMP is approaching tank weight and protection, don't bother trying to kill it with an IFV direct-fire weapon. Get a Javelin, or a tank.

I guess you could say this goes back to gute's question about sticking with a 25mm, especially in light of the trend in BMP (and comparable AFV/IFV) protection. There is no way threat capabilities are ignored, but rather planners are looking at smarter ways to counter the threat. It also goes back to the point about trying to kill a monster IFV with another IFV. If the enemy wants to push the armor/weight boundaries, maybe we should just let them, but remain flexible with our task organization.

Vehicles look great when they are all pristine in a glossy manufacturer's pamphlet or an edition of Janes, but in the field, amidst the muck and the mire, advertised capabilities become an entirely different proposition. There are penalties to pay with the protection.

Ona slightly related tangent, has anyone been catching Russian-narrated videos of Syrian armor in the attack, or of the absolute havoc being wrecked on the tanks when they let their security down and the insurgents get to employ RPG-29s? Eye-opening for sure...

[gute]

Ona slightly related tangent, has anyone been catching Russian-narrated videos of Syrian armor in the attack, or of the absolute havoc being wrecked on the tanks when they let their security down and the insurgents get to employ RPG-29s? Eye-opening for sure...

Youtube?

[gute]

I watched a Youtube video of a Syrian tank hit by a RPG-29. It looked like the tank was hit on the very top of turret or the deck right behind the turret. Scary stuff. Smoke coming out of the hatches and the gun and then a flame shootin 30 feet in the air. I can't believe one dude got out or he was standing outside of the tank near the rear.

[jcustis]

On another forum I frequent, quite a few tankers ran the vid back and forth in slow motion. They agreed that the guy seen holding his charred arms in the air to his sides was previously inside the turret area (yup, with the hatches closed). When the round hit, the detonation blew hatches open and the tanker out of the vehicle.

The plume of fire rushing out is the propellant of the main gun's rounds burning. That's one of the design limitations of the T-72. It's going to go up like a Roman candle if that stuff is ignited, and it is susceptible to lighting because the semi-combustible cases are exposed at the bottom of the turret basket.

That guy must have died an especially gruesome and painful death.

[gute]

On another forum I frequent, quite a few tankers ran the vid back and forth in slow motion. They agreed that the guy seen holding his charred arms in the air to his sides was previously inside the turret area (yup, with the hatches closed). When the round hit, the detonation blew hatches open and the tanker out of the vehicle.

The plume of fire rushing out is the propellant of the main gun's rounds burning. That's one of the design limitations of the T-72. It's going to go up like a Roman candle if that stuff is ignited, and it is susceptible to lighting because the semi-combustible cases are exposed at the bottom of the turret basket.

That guy must have died an especially gruesome and painful death.

It blew him out of the turret? Holy Crap!

Do you mind mentioning the other forum? If so a PM is cool or if not I understand.

[jcustis]

It was on Lightfighter.net. It will require joining and posting a brief introduction is preferred before posting if you ever get around to it.

Give me a day and I'll get you the link to the discussion.

[jcustis]

Found it: http://http://www.lightfighter.net/topic/2843236916266323

Most members posting to the discussion are real deal, experienced tread heads.

[gute]

Found it: http://http://www.lightfighter.net/topic/2843236916266323

Most members posting to the discussion are real deal, experienced tread heads.

Already a member. Thanks for the information.

[ganulv]

That guy must have died an especially gruesome and painful death.

It amazes me he was able to was able to pick himself up off the ground, much less run for cover, given how concussed he must have been.

[Compost]

http://www.army.mil/article/131126/Researchers_focus_on_reducing_weight_of_Army_comba t_vehicles/

Operational and tactical mobility could be improved by reducing the design weight of armoured reconnaissance vehicles and early-entry AFVs. Reduction of design weight might also serve to reduce size as a target and also observability. But reducing or limiting the weight of main force AFVs reduces potential armour protection and the weight and bulk of sensors and munitions provided for combat performance and endurance.

Looking on the bright side, researching a blanket 40% reduction in the weight of AFVs might be a usefully memorable exercise in futility.

[Granite_State]

Since this thread has been resurrected, some good stuff in the online Journal of Military Operations lately. The last issue had an article by Jim Storr looking at armored reconnaissance (specifically the value of stealth) and Council member William F. Owen discussed the IFV as a doctrinal wrong turn in Issue 3. Both articles well worth a read, as is almost all of what they publish.

(Added by Moderator)

Link to cited journal, free after registration:https://www.tjomo.com/