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gute
01-05-2011, 07:05 PM
I'm interested in cost comparisons between AC and RC forces, armor and infantry and wondering if someone might point me in the right direction? Also, the Army has talked about fielding a lighter force and plans to replace two HBCTs with SBCTs. To me it would make sense to replace IBCTs because SBCTs may also function as light infantry. Can the U.S. afford to transfer most of the armor force to the reserves/ARNG and still field a high quality, combat ready force? Or, should the AC Army keep all armor battalions and the reserves/ARNG convert their HBCTs to IBCTs?

Bob's World
01-05-2011, 08:04 PM
That is a loaded question, but I'll offer a couple initial thoughts from my experience.

1. The Guard has huge political clout, so that will play a factor in any solution that is ultimately reached.

2. The Guard is designed to be an auxiliary war fighting force, so logically should be focused on units designed for fighting wars. I would not classify current operations in Iraq or Afghanistan as "wars" that meet that criteria. The guard should be more focused on the type of warfare that Gian Gentile advocates. Deterring in peace, but prepared to ramp up training, deploy and fight in time of war.

3. Training beyond basic individual and team levels is very difficult in the Guard. With the growth of simulators this is easier than it used to be. One can build incredibly effective teams in the Guard and individual skills. Tank crews, howitzer crews, FDCs, Forward observers, can become very adept. Collective operations at Platoon and above, as well as the command and staff synch are more difficult to hone pre-mob. Ironically, when large Active Duty training units are employed, as they were post Gulf War, it makes it worse. In large, they come in trapped in their paradigm of how to train active duty soldiers and units; and most have little empathy or creativity for this type of domestic FID work. They don't seek to establish rapport with the locals, they stay in little cliques, they are highly critical of the skills that they see as sub-standard based on their perspective, and often come armed with agendas from pissed off senior Army leadership (see item one above regarding the Guard's political clout). We can do better at training Guard units than we have in the past, and will need to.

4. What governors want though, are engineers, and ground and aerial transportation units. Not very sexy, but F-22s and M1A1 tanks aren't much help when a hurricane hits, or some hiker gets lost on Mount Hood. A smart TAG seeks balance. A couple high-end combat units and a couple of robust combat support units. This ensures a good stream of federal training funds, ammo, etc; as well as an ability to augment state emergency workers when disaster strikes.

The Guard is a great American institution. We are lucky to have it. Most don't appreciate that even long before 9/11, that leadership in "Enhanced Brigades" were routinely putting in 2 weekends a month and 3-4 weeks of Annual Training, in addition to another 4-6 nights driving 50 miles after work to attend training and planning meetings each month. Most AC soldiers find it too hard to be a soldier and a civilian and quit after a year or so; though to be fair, many quit because they are late comers to a club, and the two grades where marginal performers "stick" and serve for years in the Guard are E-6 and O-4. Getting stuck under one of these low-caliber Guard-lifers is understandably demoralizing.

Most of this is background from a guy who spent a great deal of time serving and leading on both sides of the fence. The RC has been rode hard by the GWOT since I went back to the active force, so I'm not sure how they stand now; and even that varies greatly by state.

TheCurmudgeon
01-05-2011, 08:57 PM
This might provide some of what you are looking for, as well as some background on the difficulties of keeping Guard combat units sharp and fully staffed.

Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force
September 2009

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09898.pdf

William F. Owen
01-07-2011, 12:38 PM
This may help (http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/docs/Owen_Universal_Infantry.pdf). It's relevant to a force structure argument. Indeed this is why I wrote it.

Ken White
01-07-2011, 04:24 PM
Bob's World:

That's as good a summation as I've seen. I think it's quite accurate and I also think it's a shame that the US Army does not realize the inherent accuracy in your comments. The Guard and Reserve bring a lot to the table but the bulk of the AC do not realize that and thus all too often fail to take advantage of their strengths.

The current idea of using the RC as an augmentation to the active force isn't wrong but it doesn't accept some realities and it is in need of some major structural (and political) changes if it is to be continued.

I have no idea where Gute is headed but back in the day, the general rule of thumb was that RC units cost about 25% as much to maintain as a like AC unit. That may have changed a bit but I suspect not much. It also should be recalled that overall the Federal government pays for between 75
and 90% of the basic costs for the Guard and 100% for the USAR. Thus, Congress has an, uh, intense -- yes, that's a good word, intense -- interest in the Guard and Reserve.

TheCurmudgeon:

A suggestion. Be very leery of citing the GAO report on most any topic. Those folks have agendas when they start and their 'audits' are designed to produce the Congressionally desired results. Congroids, unfortunately, do not always have a good grasp of reality...

For example, this quote from the Report you linked is, IMO, hilarious: "Best practices have shown that effective and efficient operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks, metrics and timelines to measure success, and a comprehensive and realistic funding strategy." That's a good an accurate statement -- made by an organization that is beholden to the Congress that funds it (quite well...) and who know that Congress will jiggle funding and refuses to allow DoD to fund the Army for more than a year or two without significant changes and jerk arounds...

IOW, said best practices are impeded by the reality of the budget system. You cannot get there from here. :rolleyes:

Wilf:

I'd read that before, good article and the way to go IMO. However, due to factors Bob's World cites and others, it is not likely to work with the US and particularly not with US Reserve Components. It could work with the Active Force but then one is confronted with that training problem you cite. The Active force trains one way, the Reserve forces must train another. That is achievable but it complicates things considerably. In large measure, some of the issues cited by Bob and the GAO as well as more subtle inter organizational and interpersonal would preclude its adoption by the US. Size matters, it dictates simplistic approaches... :wry:

One consideration, for example, is Gute's moving most of the Armor to the Guard. That makes operational sense, but Bob's cited political impact make it problematical and when you add the fact that with little or no Active component Armor the development of training and doctrine is inhibited somewhat you are in essence opting for possibly decreased combat readiness and that has potential military and political ramifications induced by the training factors.

Infanteer
01-08-2011, 04:04 AM
I love how Wilf's article was right below one titled "Stabilizing Complex Adaptive Systems: Using Complexity Theory for Operational Design in Stability and Support Operations".

Bob's World
01-08-2011, 03:36 PM
96% was the number I saw. Guard budgets are 96% federal, 4% state.

The state pays the other 4%, mostly armory maintenance, and a handful of state employees that essentially are there to manage that state interest. When a governor declares an emergency, he signs his state up to pay for whatever the costs of use are for this federal equipment and personnel (You should see the jaws drop when you hand a state bureaucrat a bill for 8 hours of blade time on a CH-47...). Expensive, but still a tremendous bargain to every state. Much like US foreign policy, civilian state workers are 100% tapped out in day to day efforts, so do not "surge" for emergencies (other than road crews, emergency workers, LEA - all for overtime pay), so when some crappy job, like standing waist deep in sewage filling sandbags, comes up, they turn to the guard as their only reserve of "extra" manpower that comes organized, trained and equipped for action. So the rally cry is always "call up the guard" (pulling men and women away from their civilian jobs and creating hardships for them, their families, and employers) rather than "shut down the bureaucracy and focus on the emergency this week."

Some states do this very well, and have an "emergency fund" to pay these costs. Oregon does not, so every physical emergency is followed by a corresponding fiscal emergency.

Bob's World
01-08-2011, 04:37 PM
Ok, Ken has poked my training button. METL. Too often RC units carry a different METL than a like AC unit. METL is essential warfighting tasks, so they should be the same. Problem is that our training doctrine is written by and for the AC (with word "RC" sprinkled in, much like PC writing styles that say "He/she should then...") The fact is that

A. RC METL should = AC METL

B. RC units actually need what I called "mETL" for mobilization essential task list. A foundation of skills that a unit needs that are focused on creating skilled individuals and teams; and that are both atainable, and can be quickly buit upon once mobilized. Too many units attempt to train to larger unit collective tasks, which they invariably suck at, which also takes so much time that the individual and team skills fade as well. So upon mobilizaton a unit shows up that has to start from scratch. I told my general who was dead set that Brigade would do movement to contact and defend (but also thought that if every platoon could do those tasks, then the Companies, Battalions and the Brigade were a "T" in them as well" ) that upon careful review of the SQT manual for light infantry that I recommended that our focused task for training should be "Maintain Operational Security." (yes, I have always been that guy who can't just accept the status quo). It was, and I suspect is, the perfect pre-mob task for building that foundation of skills that prepares an RC unit to quickly ramp up to whatever mission it is that they have been mobilized to perform. (As the Brigade training officer I was then put to work developing lanes training on the high end collective tasks, with each lane being dumbed down to the point of irrelevance by our AC trainers, and with very few units getting "T"s even still because the AC Colonel convinced this same general that "all leader tasks should be "essential" tasks as well, so therefor any time a leader task was missed, the units would get a "U". Ok, I'm still pissed about both that lame general (who later picked up a second star before the Governor finally caught on and fired him), and the A-hole AC Armor Colonel who led the training bde and whose primary mission was to prevent Guard BDES from filling their CTC rotations, thereby denying some more worthy AC unit from getting an opportunity to go. I should let it go, but but guys who place their careers ahead of their nation really bug me.

TAH
01-19-2011, 05:10 PM
I'm interested in cost comparisons between AC and RC forces, armor and infantry and wondering if someone might point me in the right direction? Also, the Army has talked about fielding a lighter force and plans to replace two HBCTs with SBCTs. To me it would make sense to replace IBCTs because SBCTs may also function as light infantry. Can the U.S. afford to transfer most of the armor force to the reserves/ARNG and still field a high quality, combat ready force? Or, should the AC Army keep all armor battalions and the reserves/ARNG convert their HBCTs to IBCTs?

Today, the costs for AC versus RC for equipment are essentially the same as they both will generally have the same types and amounts of equipment.

It costs the same for training, both individual and collective, but many RC units will end up costing more for training as their level of proficiency starts low. More reps cost more. Overall, HBCTs are the most expensive to train and IBCTs are the cheapest. The major costs for training are: Ammo, Fuel and repair parts. Tanks = lots, 11Bs not so much :)

For personnel, RC units are a hugh bargain, you only pay us/them when we are in some kind of official status. Generaly, 4 days pay per RC Soldier per month + 14/15 days once each year for Annual Training/Summer Camp.

OEF/OIF changed alot on the amount of training time available/required, but RC still costs less.

Today, the breakdown of AC versus RC by BCT type is something like

HBCT AC = 17, RC (National Guard only) = 8
SBCT AC = 6, RC (National Guard only) = 1
IBCT AC = 23, RC (National Guard only) = 20

To answer the question a different way, how many BCTs of which type does the Army project it will need in the future? If you can get that one 100% right, let me know. I want stock tips next. :wry:

I think the conversion plan was for one AC HBCT to SBCT and the 3rd ACR (once back from deployment) is supposed to be the other. With only one "True" ACR remaining, the last part makes sense.

If based simply off Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) the AC numbers should/could be divisible by 3 (one deployed for two at home) and the RC/NG by 5 (one deployed for four at home).

Tyree
08-07-2011, 04:11 AM
I am coming to this discussion a little late in the game. About six months late by the looks of the last post. But I see the last question is still out there hanging so I thought I would apply my two pence worth.

My basic heartburn is with the construct of all of the non-Stryker Brigades, both heavy and light. I feel that it is a fundamental error to have only two maneuver battalions in these brigades, rather than three. Three that is, along with the cavalry squadron.

I am also not sure about the combined arms battalions in the heavy brigades. On paper they look great, and certainly would seem better, again on paper, than the task organization nut roll we did for sixty plus years. We did all of this in the midst of deployments, and I don't think the concept has been throughly vetted. It should be. I would never advocate a backward step, and I am not doing that here. I just want to be sure that the balance is right before we go any further forward.

Now back to the main point. The changes in structure that I propose would mean that the numbers of brigades in both components be reduced. That is a given based upon authorized end strength. I feel though that that would be acceptable, if the resulting brigades were more robust and could dominate more battlespace per brigade.

Reducing each division down to three brigades, with MTO&E strengths at about the 4500-5000 level should fit within the confines of current constraints. That would produce a picture of something like the following:

Active Component:

1st ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT
2nd ID------- 1 HBCT
3rd ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT
4th ID ------- 2 INCT, 1 HBTC
7th ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT (Activate Hqs at Lewis)
9th ID ------- 3 HBCT (Inactivate 1st AD - Activate 9th ID)
10th MD ----- 3 IBCT
24th ID ------ 2 HBCT (Activate Div Hqs in Germany)
82nd ABD ---- 3 IBCT
101st ABD --- 3 IBCT
1st CD -------3 Stryker Cavalry Brigades
173rd Airborne Brigade
2nd Stryker Cavalry Brigade
3rd Stryker Cavalry Brigade
6th Stryker Cavalry Brigade
11th Cavalry Stryker Brigade

Army National Guard

26th IBCT (New England)
27th IBCT (NY)
28th INCT (PA)
29TH IBCT (MD&VA)
30TH IBCT (NC & TN)
31st IBCT (AL&MS)
32nd IBCT (WI&MI)
33RD IBCT (IL&KY)
34th IBCT (IA&MN)
36TH IBCT (TX)
37th IBCT (OH&WV)
38th IBCT (IN)
39th IBCT (AR&LA)
40TH IBCT (CA)
41st IBCT (OR&WA)
42nd IBCT (NY&NJ)
45th IBCT (OK)
48th IBCT (GA)
53rd IBCT (FL)
56th Stryker Cavalry Brigade (TX)

All National Guard Divisions would be inactivated and their places taken in the force structure by coordinating headquarters co-located with FEMA Regions.

I believe that this would result in a balanced force struture capable across the spectrum. Glad I had a chance to put this on paper. You may fire when ready

82redleg
08-07-2011, 03:53 PM
...
My basic heartburn is with the construct of all of the non-Stryker Brigades, both heavy and light. I feel that it is a fundamental error to have only two maneuver battalions in these brigades, rather than three. Three that is, along with the cavalry squadron.

Everybody agrees we need the third maneuver bn, the trick is how to pay for it.


I am also not sure about the combined arms battalions in the heavy brigades. On paper they look great, and certainly would seem better, again on paper, than the task organization nut roll we did for sixty plus years. We did all of this in the midst of deployments, and I don't think the concept has been throughly vetted. It should be. I would never advocate a backward step, and I am not doing that here. I just want to be sure that the balance is right before we go any further forward.

We tested this on multiple occasions. 1CD did a test in the late 80s, reorganizing a 2 tank/1 mech (IIRC) into a balanced TFs and 2 AR Heavy (3 tank CO/1 mech CO) TFs. They called them CAMBs (Combined Arms Maneuver BNs). The issues noted in the Armor or Infantry magazine article all had to do with the temporary test bucking the Army bureaucracy (inability of the BN to conduct adminstration for its attached companies) and inability to split certain things three ways (certain low density MOSs, etc) to support across the BDE. Both of these are corrected by making the organization permanent. There is the possibility of training issues, but I think they are balanced by the benefit of building a cohesive team. I think that starting from a mixed organization makes task organization easier, because the BN level support structure is used to supporting both types of companies- the balance of work might change in supporting a 3 mech, 1 tank TF instead of a 2 mech, 2 tank TF, but the supporters are trained in supporting both without having to task organize the support.


...
Active Component:
1st ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT
...11th Cavalry Stryker Brigade

You moved flags around for some reason that I don't understand. We are bad enough about that already. Minimal change in flagging of type units is preferable.


Army National Guard
26th IBCT (New England)
...56th Stryker Cavalry Brigade (TX)

Even more issues here- we just trained a BCT in PA on the Stryker, why convert them back to IN and train TX on the Strykers? PA supports two BCTs now, NY doesn't. Rationalizing is good, but there are intangibles of unit history and heritage that are important. Plus, the above doesn't seem to match the realities of the currently supported force structure. Finally, why all IBCTs? IBCTs are more useful in less than full scale war, that might come up without warning, and are capable of rapid deployment, which is not a strong point of reserve components. My ideal balance is active component balanced 1/3-1/3-1/3 (or a little less for the H and I) between H/S/I BCTs, while the reserve component is about 40-60 H-S. I've written this on the blogs here before, my reasoning is that, in a emergency, the ARNG units with heavy equipment can train on training sets while their equipment deploys. IBCTs, for rapid deployment, wouldn't have the time to conduct post-mobilization training. There's some more details in my ideas, but I don't want to repeat the other posts.


All National Guard Divisions would be inactivated and their places taken in the force structure by coordinating headquarters co-located with FEMA Regions.

There's a SAMS monograph on the CARL website about the future of ARNG divisions. Might be worth a read.


I believe that this would result in a balanced force struture capable across the spectrum. Glad I had a chance to put this on paper. You may fire when ready

Shot, over.

Tyree
08-07-2011, 05:09 PM
Well, I did not expect all of what I have to say to be received with a bouquet of daisys. If everyone were to agree then there would be a heck of a lot of people not thinking.

I am familiar with the experimentation at Fort Hood in the late 80's Valuable groundwork was done and a treasure trove of lessons learned.

The only way to pay for a third maneuver battalion across the board is to decrease the number of BCT's.

I would have no objection if some of the Guard BCT,s were heavy. In fact some should be. I would leave it to the Guard Bureau and the various states to decicde,

Reasons for the flags:

A division headquarters in Germany would be valuable in exercising C&C over the 170th - 172nd -173rd and 2nd SCR.

A division headquarters at Lewis for the same reason.

A flag change for the 1st AD, would eliminate one of the type divisions were have around that are in fact not required in that the division is a modular control headquarters. In elimination of the 1st AD I would consolidate its history and lineage with the 1st ID. I would do the same for all of the inactive armored divisions and consolidate them with a like numbered infantry division. There is little chance that any of these units will ever be called off the inactive rolls and it would seem that this would be a rather straightforward method of preserving their histories. Not an ideal solution, but better I think then having the only memory of these fine units, being a file locked away in some drawer at CMH

The First Cavalry Division would remain but in a new role as the unbrella force for the various Stryker Cavalry Brigades. By the way I call them that, not only because of the conversion of the 2nd Cavalry to the Stryker construct, or the impending conversion of the 3rd. I do so because they to me are more like the cavalry of old, the mounted dragoon. It is nothing more than my personal interpretation of history. I realize what a nut roll this would be in reorganization. It may possibly be cost prohibative. That is also the reason I would like to see two more created/converted/restationed. perhaps one at Fort Polk and one at Fort Sill. That is also the reason for my wishing to move a freshly trained Stryker brigade from Pennsylvania to Texas, proximity to a proposed Stryker community. Then there is the Mexican Border.

So in the end I have reasons for all I have proposed. Perhaps some will find agreement.

PS: Of course there is a more straightforward means of accomplishing this:

Reflag all of the existing division headquarters as Corps headquarters. Down echelon all of the now larger brigades with the division designations (1st Infantry Division lineage become 1st Infantry Brigade). A few of the traditionally seperate brigades would be required also (i.e 173rd and more).I would think it appropriate for the larger (approx 5000 +/-) brigade to be commanded by a BG. It would be a way of preserving history which I look upon, if used correctly, as an unquanifiable force multiplier. Such an action would fit in nicely with the present modular construct of the Army. Just another thought on a bright Sunday morning.

82redleg
08-08-2011, 03:46 AM
...The only way to pay for a third maneuver battalion across the board is to decrease the number of BCT's.

Agreed, and I think everyone understands this. If you're going to go to big BCTs, you might as well go with big BCTs, and make them 4 maneuver BNs, plus the Recon, FA, BSB and STB/BEB. I fall back on the Military Review article "Small BCTs Undermine Modularity" from about 2005.


I would have no objection if some of the Guard BCT,s were heavy. In fact some should be. I would leave it to the Guard Bureau and the various states to decicde,

Did you get a chance to look up my other post?


Reasons for the flags:
A division headquarters in Germany would be valuable in exercising C&C over the 170th - 172nd -173rd and 2nd SCR.

Agreed. With 45 BCTs, 4 BCTs per division would seem to justify 11 divisions, but we only have 10. Germany would be the logical choice. Of course, if 170th and 172nd go away (as planned), that logic is weakend.


A division headquarters at Lewis for the same reason.

Agreed, but I don't see where I Corps is doing such a horrible job. Since BCTs are employed individually anyway, the tie between BCT and DIV is not as important- they are supposed to be able to plug into any DIV or CORPS HQ.


A flag change for the 1st AD, would eliminate one of the type divisions were have around that are in fact not required in that the division is a modular control headquarters. In elimination of the 1st AD I would consolidate its history and lineage with the 1st ID. I would do the same for all of the inactive armored divisions and consolidate them with a like numbered infantry division. There is little chance that any of these units will ever be called off the inactive rolls and it would seem that this would be a rather straightforward method of preserving their histories. Not an ideal solution, but better I think then having the only memory of these fine units, being a file locked away in some drawer at CMH

There is not cost to having a division called 1st AD vice having one called 9th ID. They are the same- the only difference is a different color flag. You'll create more cost changing than by holding what you have.


The First Cavalry Division would remain but in a new role as the unbrella force for the various Stryker Cavalry Brigades. By the way I call them that, not only because of the conversion of the 2nd Cavalry to the Stryker construct, or the impending conversion of the 3rd. I do so because they to me are more like the cavalry of old, the mounted dragoon. It is nothing more than my personal interpretation of history. I realize what a nut roll this would be in reorganization. It may possibly be cost prohibative. That is also the reason I would like to see two more created/converted/restationed. perhaps one at Fort Polk and one at Fort Sill. That is also the reason for my wishing to move a freshly trained Stryker brigade from Pennsylvania to Texas, proximity to a proposed Stryker community. Then there is the Mexican Border.

Your logic is fine, and I agree with your historical analysis. However, 2CR and 3 CR have nothing (or very little) to do with 1st CD, other than a common name. Moving SBCTs to FT Hood (and the TXARNG) based on the very unlikely possibility of employment on the Mexican border seems silly to me. We have posse comitatus and all that. Moving the ARNG BCT would almost certainly be cost prohibitive- you won't move many (if any at all) of the Soldiers, so you've wasted the last 5 years of human capital development.


...Reflag all of the existing division headquarters as Corps headquarters. Down echelon all of the now larger brigades with the division designations (1st Infantry Division lineage become 1st Infantry Brigade). A few of the traditionally seperate brigades would be required also (i.e 173rd and more).I would think it appropriate for the larger (approx 5000 +/-) brigade to be commanded by a BG. It would be a way of preserving history which I look upon, if used correctly, as an unquanifiable force multiplier. Such an action would fit in nicely with the present modular construct of the Army. Just another thought on a bright Sunday morning.

This is another idea that has been brought up- in fact, it was proposed to the CSA GEN Schoomaker when the modular force was created. The decision brief was floating around, were he was given the three options of (1) minimal change (what he selected), (2) elevated echelon (what your describe) and (3) hybrid regiment. Since we are already doing option (2) in the ARNG, I think that was a better choice, with the advantage of removing a visual connection between DIV and BCTs that isn't supposed to exist. I'd still support executing that option, as I think I discussed here. I'll see if I can find the link.

Tyree
08-08-2011, 05:39 AM
Everything I wrote above the PS in the above post is nothing more than a mental exercise, well really a yellow legal pad and pencil exercise to bring back a sense of historical structure. I believe you have discovered my strategms. Now I will get really serious

I would welcome a forced based upon brigades, that carry the flags of former divisions. I have the presentation of the three options on my desk as I write this. Of course at lot of that presentation has been overcome by events, particularly in the Guard.

The elevated option would be my preference. A BCT with four maneuver battalions, along with everything else would be a very formidable force. It would probably top out in the 5000-5700 range. I would favor that over all other options.

I want to thank for your response to my straw man. Everything you have said is quite well thought out and I do appreciate all you have contributed.

I would like to see a link to you previous post in this area. In fact I would like to see everything you have written which touches on this subject matter. It seems I have found a kindred soul.

82redleg
08-08-2011, 07:37 AM
Here a couple of threads that touch similar concepts.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10546&highlight=BCT

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=11521&highlight=BCT

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10386&highlight=BCT

Fuchs
08-08-2011, 08:32 AM
(1) Reserve forces get usually less training time / year.

(2) Reserve forces belonging to a small active force with long-serving (volunteer, not conscript) troops will not be able to draw fully from trained former AC personnel.


Both in combination leads me to the conclusion that reserve forces (or most of them) should focus on not very training-intensive missions.
This in turn leads to my preference for relatively small stand-alone reserve forces, such as a regional battalion battlegroups. Training in larger formations and training deployments to foreign terrains and climates should be skipped until a time of crisis.

Such reserve forces could then augment active forces after a brief period of additional training or be assigned rather auxiliary tasks.

The concept of reserve / national guard brigades that go to war on short notice is for me as great wars-concerned guy (who thinks that small wars are usually a stupidity) simply an unacceptable negligence.

ganulv
08-08-2011, 04:26 PM
Training in larger formations and training deployments to foreign terrains and climates should be skipped until a time of crisis.

Anyone who says the United States Government doesn’t do anything well undersells its knack for engineering crisises.

http://www.why-war.com/files/1weekend.jpg

Tyree
08-08-2011, 04:31 PM
82REDLEG: Thanks for the links. Over the next few days or so I will review them, and let you know what I think. Right now it is drywall and light fixture time down in the old mess hall , oops dining facility.

gute
10-07-2011, 04:49 PM
I would imagine that some have read this report, which really does not get too specific. What I do question is the idea of shifting the majority of heavy forces to the reserves/national guard - what does that mean? If the Army was forced to shift heavy forces to the national guard where do the heavy forces go? Do we re-set the national guard brigades back to armor brigades that were "transformed" into IBCTs? Or do we look to change existing IBCTs west of the Mighty Miss into HBCTs because there is more room to train?

Link to cited report:http://www.cnas.org/hardchoices

Ken White
10-08-2011, 01:24 AM
They are actually -- logically and militarily -- fairly easy. Unfortunately, they are, politically, a number of varying size Rice Bowls all full of a mass of worms -- or worse.

Hard to say how it'll work out, we'll see -- but your comment about west of the Mississippi is very appropriate. The issue is not training room per se -- the NTC provides more maneuver space than is neccessary -- but range fans. Twenty years ago I tried to point out to folks that after 2020 or so, the likelihood of having adequate ranges for 105mm much less 120mm and above east of that river was quite slim. The antiwar Squirrels have been using and will continue to use environmental, heritage and other pretexts to shut down impact areas and live fire in general on both coasts -- they will not stop. They would totally ban training if they thought they could. Fortunately, the folks in flyover country are more sensible.

I also strongly believe it in the interest of the Nation that the 1980s concept of combat arms units only in the ArNG be revisited. While the Guard slickly co-opted the 'Militia' title as theirs alone, that's a politically beneficial belief and a flaky law, not a Constitutional clause. The Nation can do recruiting, training, location, employment and mission things with the Guard it cannot do with the USAR -- and vice versa. That versa indicates that some USAR combat units would be beneficial so also would some currently USAR peculiar skills be beneficial to the Guard and the States. Laws can be changed...

gute
11-24-2011, 04:55 PM
I've heard a rumor that the 81st HBCT might be converting to a SBCT - anyone here have info?

Happy Thanksgiving!

gute
12-28-2011, 11:46 PM
It's my understanding that round-out battalions were used in the 70's, but did suffer from readiness and recruitment issues. In today's fight are round-out battalions practical/feasible? Would it work to place all RC maneuver battalions and attached CS/CSS under operational command of an AC BCT for combat, but RC divisions would have administrative control of the battalions for drills, natural disasters, etc?

reed11b
12-29-2011, 07:25 PM
I've heard a rumor that the 81st HBCT might be converting to a SBCT - anyone here have info?

Happy Thanksgiving!

While it would make sense (We get a LOT of guys from 2ID and even our 2nd batt guys are familier with Strykers) we just got upgraded to a new type of Bradley and are going through a year plus cycle to get everyone "qualified" on it. This is one of the reasons I disagree with Ken about HBCT's belonging in the NG. Light Infantry, Aviation, MP, Medical, Engineering, etc, all have dual use ability (How exactly are you going to use M1's and M3's during a state emergency?) and are units that we typically have understrength after a shooting war turns to OOTW, UW or COIN. HCBT's also cost quit a bit to maintain becouse the equipment maintanaince needs don't change much, nor does the required rounds fired per year... SO I'm of the opinion that AC should be Heavy units, especially on the old armoured Cav model and rapid deployment forces to augment the USMC's ability in that area, and RC should be primarly the types of units mentioned above.
Reed

btheives
01-25-2012, 03:51 AM
As long as we keep the Guard relevant during ARFORGEN cycle green years, by sending them to NTC/Hoenfels/JRTC, the HBCT will work in the National Guard. If there's not a goal to work towards, it doesn't what type of BCT is out there.

I still think a handful of HBCTs should be kept on the AC side though - just for mobile operation. Maybe rotate the funds per quarter or 1/2-year for each AC HBCT to be completely ready and capable to conduct tank-on-tank battle, and allow the others to perform maneuver/tank tables less. This may sound absurd to some AC guys, but ARNG does this all the time.

Ken White
01-25-2012, 06:29 AM
I still think a handful of HBCTs should be kept on the AC side though - just for mobile operation. Maybe rotate the funds per quarter or 1/2-year for each AC HBCT to be completely ready and capable to conduct tank-on-tank battle, and allow the others to perform maneuver/tank tables less. This may sound absurd to some AC guys, but ARNG does this all the time.The AC used force on force training constantly -- produced better units more able to operate flexibly IMO. Canned stuff has its limitations even with a 'world class OPFOR'. Donated training has some advantages; it also has some disadvantages...

One size fits all does not work in fairly intense combat. :eek::rolleyes:

What Reed says above makes sense. If the Army Reserve still had combat units, that would be the ideal place for RC HBCTs and the Guard could have light Inf, MPs aEngineers and Medics for State missions. However, the ArNG didn't want the USAR to have such units and won that battle (another example of "be careful what you want..."). So the ArNG gets stuck with some HBCTs -- since that heavy stuff is a Federal need and since the Feds pay about 90% ± of the total cost of the Guard, I guess it's a fair trade... ;)

Generally, RC units cannot train as thoroughly and have some problems with readiness compared to AC units (though I've seen RC units that could outperform some AC elements...) but that's okay -- an RC HBCT can get trained up and deploy a whole lot faster than the AC could recruit, equip, train and deploy one from scratch. Typically, RC elements cost about 25% of their AC counterparts costs, you get what you pay for and what we get is more than good enough -- far better than a lot folks active units. :cool:

Bob's World
01-25-2012, 09:45 AM
Lending my concurrence to Ken's comments.

When I left the Regular Army to attend law school I joined the Oregon Guard and was assigned to a light infantry brigade. I have to admit I went through a couple years of shock as I adjusted to the different mission, different priorities, and different strengths and weaknesses between Regular and Guard units. Many soldiers don't survive that transition, a few of us, however actually come to understand and appreciate the differences and then work to use our skills and experience gained in the regular force to help make things better, without falling into the trap of thinking the AC way is the only way.

I found that (prior to AC trainers descending in mass and demanding that Guard units train to AC standards of collective training) Guard units were full of soldiers who had superior skills in certain areas. Forward observers who could drop a round on your helmet; howitzer and FDC crews who had worked together for years and, while a motley mob moving from position to position, were lights out at working their gun or generating data. Pilots with the innate skills of one who both loves what he does, and has done it for a long time. Then came the Readiness Training Brigades of AC soldiers who could only see the lack of collective training (which is a post-mob task, but try explaining that to some AC Major-Colonel with all the answers). It was sad to watch individual and section skills fade as scant training time was shifted to efforts focused on higher-level collective tasks. We broke up the solid foundation of these units in order to build a shaky structure of collective skills on top. It looked better to the AC trainers, but to me it looked like the Western town in the movie Blazing Saddles: All false fronts with little behind it that was real. Even today we see the conventional force seeking to build such a force with the ANA. Instead of helping them better at being an Afghan Army (which probably would have been largely militia-based and recruited, trained and employed at the local level), we have set about attemting to build a much less effective version of an American Regular Army.

Having been on the receive end of GPF FID/SFA I came to appreciate very much the difference in approach between what I had been selected, trained and employed to do as an SF officer and what I was getting from my former conventional peers. SF tends to accept people as they are, seek to understand their culture and situation, and then incorporate into the same while helping them to be as good as possible within that construct. GPF soldiers tend to judge others by the standard of how similar US units perform a task, with little consideration for why the unit they are working with might be different, and then assesses the unit to be inferior. They then isolate themselves in little enclaves and proceed to attempt to push the unit to the same tasks, but dumbed down to a level within in the means of such an inferior organization. Eight years of being on the receive end of GPF FID is one of the main reasons why I am not optimistic at all about the big push in recent years for SFA...

But for all its faults, the Guard is a great American institution. Great Americans, great soldiers, and many of my closest lifelong friends. They own the domestic mission of supplementing our civil service in times of domestic emergency; and they also own the mission of supplementing our Regular military and draftee armies in times of foreign emergency. Sad that the Regular force sees the Guard as a threat to the Regular force, rather than as a vital component of our national security in both peace and war.

I hope we can shake off the bad habits of the past 15 years of mobilizing and deploying Guard and Reserve units for peacetime deployments. Counter intuitively, I think it will be through making the Regular Army smaller that we break this habit. Keeping a war fighting army on the shelf tends to make it a COA we use too often. We make better decisions when Presidents have to ask Congress to mobilize or build an army before they can employ it. It is time to finally bring the Cold War army home and return to a more normal, appropriate, American approach to national security. Large standing armies have little place in that model.

Ken White
01-25-2012, 04:38 PM
Those Readiness Training Brigades are a beautiful example of unintended consequences and flawed training strategies.

They were created in the wake of Desert Storm during which the Active Army fough stupidly and successfully to avoid deploying ArNG comabt units by insisting they had to go through the NTC. One Brigade was about to be declared operationally ready -- much to the chagrin of Binny Peay and Carl Vuono -- when the war ended, thus the issue became moot. That fiasco resulted in Congress passing a law that instituted those Readiness Training Brigades and a very wrong emphasis on collective skills. One AC GO called a Congressional Staffer he knew and asked what on earth Congress meant by that convoluted law. The response was that Congress wanted to make sure that in future wars, the ArNG was used as that would justify the costs. The GO replied "Well, you've screwed the pooch. You should have passed a law that said that. What you've done is create a monster that won't do what you want, will be terribly expensive, will harm both the AC and the RC and will create as many problems as it solves." He was horrifyingly right...:(

We simply do not train the basics well, AC or RC. We insist on teaching folks how to run before they can crawl, much less walk. I recall watching the 1-17th Infantry make a heliborne assault at Nightmare Range in the ROK some years ago. Great job, looked like a Benning training film. This from a Battalion that did not know how to employ, maintain or even dismount its M113s or conduct competent dismounted patrols.

However, they had good PT scores, could do great dog and pony shows and sent all their Platoon Leaders to Motor Stables. :rolleyes: :mad:

Mayhap if we force the AC to become smaller, we can find time for everyone to become better...

gute
01-26-2012, 09:09 PM
Mayhap if we force the AC to become smaller, we can find time for everyone to become better...[/QUOTE]


I believe this ties into the mechanized infantry thread and whether or not the U.S. Army should have the 11B mos and the 11M mos. IMO, if the AC army downsized and RC infantry specialized, a large portion of the heavy forces could be moved to the RC and there would not be a loss of fighting ability/effectiveness.

gute
11-26-2012, 01:49 AM
As many here know the British Army is downsizing and going though a reorganization in which it will have a reaction force of three active mechanized brigades (1xarmor, 2xmech, 1xcav, 1xmotorized) and the 16th air assault brigade; and an adaptable force consisting of active light infantry and TA light infantry and cav.

See:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16516

The Australian Army is reorganizing into three active duty multi functional brigades with each active brigade supported by two reserve brigades. The Canadian Army has something similar.

Could this be the future of the U.S. Army - 14-15 AC brigades supported by 28-30 brigades? Is this a feasible future Total Force structure?

GLADsapper
04-30-2013, 01:34 AM
This thread has gone quiet for a while now so I figure that I would stir the pot. And just for brevity's sake I will be referring to the Reserves because that is what I know, but most of what I am talking about includes the National Guard as well.

I left the regular AC army and went straight into a RC Training Support Battalion (CS/CSS). I have now witnessed this whole issue first hand. During my first year at my unit (2010-2011), it was a ghost town. Half the unit was mob'd to the nearest readiness center (pulling guard duty or some BS) and the other half was sitting on their fourth point of contact with no mission because the Reserves hadn't validated its own units since 2004/5. To make matters worse, our unit was so understrength at our home station that our AC numbers were just about even with the RC. Forget about training. In those circumstances, the culture shock alone is enormous. The officers are usually pretty politic and understanding, but the NCO's....lets just say we had one SFC come straight from Drill Sergeant duty and it was a rough couple of BA weekends. I know as a Captain, I just breathed deeply, kept my opinions to myself, and shifted my “no major changes rule” from 90 days to a year.

Break to 18 months ago. We reflagged under a new brigade and were told that we would be supporting Reserve unit training. We ramped up our basic soldiering skills and then tackled the essential unit non-specific platoon collective tasks along with our OC/T specific tasks (you have to know what to look for before you can evaluate it, and some NCO and Officers needed some refreshing). End result, our unit just helped train a bunch of Reservists for the first time in 8 years. Job well done.

Here some preliminary impressions:

-All Reserve units are eaten alive by “DA Mandatory Annual Training”, its insane. I think we lose the equivalent of two to three Battle Assemblies in a year to these classes. I wish they were biennial for us part-timers.
-Reservists operate at a much faster tempo than the AC, we always try to cram 4 days of events in one weekend (and sometimes we succeed). AC can tend to waste time (make work).
-Maintaining individual and team skills is really all that should be expected from Reservists during the year. The two weeks of annual training are for raising a prioritzed list of collective tasks (METL) from a U to a P. I don't believe in double standards and there is no circumstance where a unit that only works together 38 days a year can be called a “T” on collective tasks when compared to the Active Component or deployed Reservists. A “T” is earned through repetition, repetition, repetition. Realistic expectations shared by all would be appreciated.
-The Active Component is valuable for training Reservists, but holy carumba, they need to remember that weak leadership is not the same as absent leadership. People forget how long it took them to develop leadership skills. It is an organic process that cannot be taught, only trial and error experience works.

My last comment is more general. Except for a few time/resource intensive units (airborne, air assault, special forces, etc.) the Army and the Nation would be well served by keeping a 4:3:3 (Active:Reserve:Guard) ratio of all unit types. Besides ensuring that skills and equipment are spread throughout the force there is a political motive. Too much Active Component and you end up in situations where we are fighting three wars simultaneously with no democratic incentive to stop the fighting. Not enough Active Component and you could lose the next war.

I have many more thoughts on the matter but this is starting to drift into a rant and I will stop right there. For those who thought this was a rant a while ago, my apologies. I am curious to hear any other stories about the AC/RC clash of cultures.

gute
04-30-2013, 07:02 PM
Not a rant - quite interesting comments. Some I did not understand, but for the most part I was tracking. I did time in the Marine Corps AC/RC from 88-96. I do agree with the faster pace. We crammed more crap into a weekend then we did in a couple of weeks on the active side - outside of field training.

How the future force is organized and ratio of active to reserve will be interesting to see. How did you come up with a 4:3:3 ratio?

TAH
05-01-2013, 01:11 PM
Been awhile but saw something I wanted to comment on...

Background 12 years of active-duty followed by 18 years of RC duty (all Army Reserve). Three years with an AC/AR Training Support Bn.

a. Very different "cultures" across all three compos, AC, USAR and Army Guard (have a son with them). AC is very "its our way or the highway" focused. Have little to no appreciation (or concern) for what it takes to be an "RC guy/gal". No AC unit has to recruit its own folks. No AC troop has another career/job that impacts on decision making. AC folks normally don't have to pay the cost of traveling to and staying with their unit.

b. RC guy and gals who stay past 12-15 years have a greater level of dedication and committment. For many, the rest of their life (family, job school ect) fills up their plate and they leave. And the RC losses experienced commpetent mid-grade NCOs and officers. We operate with whats left...

c. Two days a month to get 20+ days (AC guys get weekends off) of stuff done is a b!tch. Not going to change.

d. Lots of RC folks are better at their job then their AC counter-parts due to being in the job longer or doing the same thing as a civilian. Especially true of E4s and E5s.

e. RC folks and their units bring a second set of skills with them. Whatever their "regular job" is. Need an IT geek ask jones over in 3rd squad. Need a carpenter go see Fred in 1st platoon ect. They also tend to be older (I know) and more mature then their AC compadres.

f. 4:3:3 may be good for some types of units but not "all". Does the AC need 40% of the water production capability on a daily basis or just the ability to get it within 30 days? Same for Civil Affairs, construction engineering, internment/re-settlement ect. If we stay with the current execution of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) where an RC unit gets mobbed about once every 4-6 years for up to a year we can probably do OK. 40/60 split for Combat Arms (Armor, Infantry & Artillery) OK (No ADA! Do away with it or send it to the Air Force), 40/60 split for Combat Support (MPs, Engineers, Chem, MI, Aviation) OK, 40/60 split for CSS (Finance, Postal, Personnel ect) no way.

g. Struture of the three compos is VERY political. (Duh). AC wants near instant access to whatever they need whenever they need it. Guard wants whatever the governers want/need and whatever NGB gives them. USAR just wants to survive.

h. After a 30-60 day training period, most if not all RC units can and do preform at least as well as their AC counter-parts. After the third time I heard "Wow you don't act like a reservists" I started to get PO'ed.

GLADsapper
05-01-2013, 09:31 PM
TAH,
I am so glad that it is not just my unit that sees the same things. On your points A-E, G and H... I agree 100%.

Getting to the theme of this whole thread. Point F. Here are my juicy details for my vision of a 4:3:3 split (as requested, gute).

So I have started by breaking the whole Army into 10 (very rough) parts. I start with the ARFORGEN cycle. So we keep the AC units on the reset/train, ready, available cycle. These are parts 1, 2, and 3. If you view the cycle like this then you will have a trio of every kind of unit. Then I add part 4, the whole non-deployable, but completely essential apparatus of the Army. Pentagon staff, drill sergeant battalions etc.

Next comes the Reserves and National Guard. Why make the Reserves the same size as the National Guard? Money. The AC always wants more troops and equipment. Are they going to get it? Of course not. That isn't how beans and bullets work in Congress. So increase the Reserves for 25% of the price. If a future war requires more soldiers, mobilize the reserves first. There is so much AC/RC integration going on nowadays it isn't that much of a stretch. When things get worse, you can call up the National Guard.

Now to the issue of force composition. When you take out the AC non-deployable units we actually have a 3:3:3 structure. I agree with TAH, there are some units that just don't belong in the RC. Airborne brigades go to the AC, Special Forces are much more numerous in the AC. Aviation units are definitely more numerous in the AC. The common theme is that these units are high training tempo with very perishable skills. Because of this, the RC will have a few more CS and CSS units to maintain a personnel balance.

Despite my last point, I disagree with TAH on his point about the support elements. The decision to fill up the Reserves with the CSS units the AC didn't want anymore is reflective of old thinking which no longer holds after the last 10 years of experience. I am of the opinion that CSS units, because they are constructive not destructive, are the only tool that can be used to maintain stability and security. All of the tools needed to fight every type of conflict should be as evenly distributed as possible. The end result would be something like 25-30% of the CSS units would be AC. The big change would be leveling out the Guard and Reserve.

Fuchs
05-01-2013, 10:38 PM
Question: If the Reserves / National Guard can train up to almost active forces level within 60 days, why bother with active forces in the army at all?

The pointless expeditionary stuff is being done by Marines, and the quickest relevant response to a crisis will come from the USAF and naval aviation anyway.


Why not upgrade the NG to THE army (with two weekends per month, one two-week exercise per year and by constitutional amendment no compulsory deployment outside of the 50 states without a declaration of war)?

Steve Blair
05-01-2013, 10:42 PM
Question: If the Reserves / National Guard can train up to almost active forces level within 60 days, why bother with active forces in the army at all?

The pointless expeditionary stuff is being done by Marines, and the quickest relevant response to a crisis will come from the USAF and naval aviation anyway.


Why not upgrade the NG to THE army (with two weekends per month, one two-week exercise per year and by constitutional amendment no compulsory deployment outside of the 50 states without a declaration of war)?

You'd have to use the Reserves for your idea. Plainly put, the NG has two chains of command. And a constitutional amendment? Good luck with that.

gute
05-01-2013, 10:53 PM
Question: If the Reserves / National Guard can train up to almost active forces level within 60 days, why bother with active forces in the army at all?

The pointless expeditionary stuff is being done by Marines, and the quickest relevant response to a crisis will come from the USAF and naval aviation anyway.


Why not upgrade the NG to THE army (with two weekends per month, one two-week exercise per year and by constitutional amendment no compulsory deployment outside of the 50 states without a declaration of war)?

Good idea, but we have a lot of people who already question why we have a Marine Corps. Others have floated the idea here and other places about maintaining the Spec Ops command as organized and relying on large reserve/ng for protracted, conventional high end conflict. My issue with that idea is finding enough qualified people to fill all the ranks. The Navy doesn't seem to have too much of a problem bringing in new tadpoles and raising frogman, but what about SF and Delta or CAG or whatever they are called now? Rangers have been young guys for years so that's easy.

Two weekends a month might be too disruptive for a normal life, especailly if one is already working a full-time job. If we were to go to a shorter work week like 32 hours it would probably be more attractive.

ganulv
05-02-2013, 02:04 AM
Good idea, but we have a lot of people who already question why we have a Marine Corps. […] Rangers have been young guys for years so that's easy.

The Marine Corps has been around for 237 years, the Ranger Regiment for 27 years. Which one is more dispensable? :confused:

TAH
05-02-2013, 12:30 PM
Asked/said another way....

Why a USMC AND a AC Army AND a Army NG AND a USAR?

Do we need and can we afford all four?

Really is the Army NG is not going to go away. 50 governers and the DC plus Puerta Rico and Guam will stop that.

The Army brings capabilities to the table the USMC do not. Ability to do battalion and larger airborne ops, the ability to do bigger then a division heavy/armored ops, LOTS of CSS and medical. USMC relies alot on both the Navy and the Army for "overhead". Who does USMC medical? The Army supports the USMC by providing training base support (tankers and artilleryman for a start).

Why not a USMC that is 100% AC at 250K (or so) and an Army?Army Guard at 300K AC and 700K NG. No USAR (too much redundant overhead). Continue current ARFORGEN to allow Army to "right size" itself through mob, not AC end strenght.

Army would end up with:

1.An AC division HQs in Europe with two AC BCTs and some number of NG BCTs rotated in/out.

2. An AC division HQs in Korea with troops as is

3. An AC division HQs either in Hawaii or Fort Lewis for Pac Rim forces.

4. Two AC divisions HQ for Army first responders (82nd and a heavy/armored division).

GLADsapper
05-04-2013, 12:11 AM
As mentioned earlier, the Constitution and politics will ultimately prevent the dissolution of the National Guard. In addition, the Reserves will probably always be around to some degree or another because it is a nice place to store unwanted, but necessary, capabilities when money gets tight (it applies to every branch).

To add some anecdotal evidence to another debate... logistical issues will always necessitate the existence of the Army. I worked for a logistics Major who would tell stories about how the Marines were begging Army log units for support during the initial weeks of the Iraq Invasion. Once the Marines get too far from the Navy, their CSS situation goes down the toilet. That is how they are able to maintain such a large tooth to tail ratio on paper. By the same token, there will always be a force that looks like the Marines and it will occupy that 200 mile strip of land between the ocean and the interior. I am willing to accept that fact and let them do their own thing (but can we please standardize weapons and uniforms between Army and Marines?)

Back to AC/RC structure. I am surprised that nobody in this thread has brought up Tom Barnett and the Leviathan/System Administrator structure. If you agree with his views of globalization and the US's role in the world system, it would seem that the AC/RC structure would be a great place to start tailoring the armed forces to perform those duties. His TED talk is a great summary of his line of thinking and offers a quick and dirty breakdown of AC/RC forces which is pertinent to this thread.http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_barnett_draws_a_new_map_for_peace.html

If you followed Barnett's plan the AC Army would have the large majority of the Leviathan units (Special Forces, Maneuver BCTs, Fires, Combat Aviation, and Battlefield Surveillance) and the RC/NG would have most of the Sys-Admin units (Maneuver Enhancement Brigades, Sustainment Brigades, etc.) I can see MP and Engineer units being particularly valuable for a Sys-Admin force because of their dual nature (MP's and Combat Engineers relish their secondary “Fight as Infantry” mission.) When paired up with the Marines we have a force that could handle just about anything in a low-intensity conflict zone. The AC Army divisional headquarters' would be spread out by region roughly as TAH described it and paired with a joint-interagency Sys-Admin headquarters (which helps with contingency planning). The RC component and Marines would fall under the Sys-Admin joint headquarters during the mobilization.

I don't see this force mixture occurring anytime soon because the end result would make the AC Army much smaller (same size as AC Marine Corps perhaps?). This would be possible because there would be no need for 12 month deployments. The Leviathan force would crush countries like Iraq in a couple months and come straight back home. The RC/NG and the Marines would be a far larger component, personnel wise, because they would have to sustain long deployments repeatedly.

The more I write about it, the more I have to give Barnett credit. It seems like an elegant solution to many problems. Maintaining the skill sets and collective tasks needed to perform low-intensity warfare at a high level requires far less time and resources than maintaining those needed for high-intensity ops.

gute
05-05-2013, 08:01 PM
I read Barnett's book when it first came out and I have watched the linked video before. Personally, I have not mentioned Barnett or his ideas because I don't agree with him. IMO Barnett has spent too much time traveling around the world hearing about what our military should be from people that don't necessarily have our best interests in mind and it has clouded his judgement.

I believe the U.S. has been at war since 1950 and the major threat collapsed in 1989. IMO the total maneuver force of AC, USANG and USMC would be the size of the pre-9/11 AC Army - roughly 100 maneuver battalions. All divisions become one large brigade (10xAC, 8xRC, 3xUSMC, 1xUSMCR) plus the 173rd, 2ACR, 3ACR and 11ACR. Special Ops Command would slim down a little by eliminating redundant mission sets.

The tricky part now is the ratio of heavy to light. What takes more training an ABCT (HBCT) or IBCT? Do we need 12 airborne battalions? Is it easier to go from heavy to light than light to heavy? Can the heavy force size be based on OIF in 2003 - is more armor necessary?

Bob's World
05-06-2013, 01:14 AM
Slightly different take:
- At peace since '45.
- Required to sustain a warfighting military in peace due to decision to use a containment strategy to counter / compete with the Russians.
- Existence of such a military resulting in two very dangerous and detrimental effects on the very nature of US governance:
A. Empowering Presidents to commit the nation to a long string of "conflicts of choice" without the cooling off period and public debate that the founders intended; and
B. A corresponding shift from the intended balance of power, with the executive robbing from the Congress, and Defense robbing from State.
- Critical task now is to recognize both the reality and the danger of this drift, and to then get back on track.
- recognize we are a nation at peace with no immediate existential threats.
- convert the military to a size and mix of forces designed for the strategic and routine security missions of peace.
- produce new policies and tune up out-dated treaties better suited to the world we live in today and thereby free the military from many of most expensive and difficult quandries driving much of the current force structure debate.

We are our own worst enemy in so many ways.

gute
05-06-2013, 06:22 PM
Slightly different take:
- At peace since '45.
- Required to sustain a warfighting military in peace due to decision to use a containment strategy to counter / compete with the Russians.
- Existence of such a military resulting in two very dangerous and detrimental effects on the very nature of US governance:
A. Empowering Presidents to commit the nation to a long string of "conflicts of choice" without the cooling off period and public debate that the founders intended; and
B. A corresponding shift from the intended balance of power, with the executive robbing from the Congress, and Defense robbing from State.
- Critical task now is to recognize both the reality and the danger of this drift, and to then get back on track.
- recognize we are a nation at peace with no immediate existential threats.
- convert the military to a size and mix of forces designed for the strategic and routine security missions of peace.
- produce new policies and tune up out-dated treaties better suited to the world we live in today and thereby free the military from many of most expensive and difficult quandries driving much of the current force structure debate.

We are our own worst enemy in so many ways.

Okay, WWII was "war" compared to last 60 years in that it involved the country as whole and the size of the conflict. I agree with what you wrote about how the nation has strayed from the original intent of the founders, but times do change. So with what you wrote what are your ideas for force structure?

gute
05-06-2013, 06:27 PM
Bob I'm reading your older posts about this topic so if you previously posted your ideas I apologize.

gute

Bob's World
05-06-2013, 07:37 PM
Gute,

Times do indeed change, and yet, in so many ways how we frame and approach problems is still stuck in the Cold War. How we approached problems during the 165 years prior to WWII is far more relevant to the world of today than how we approached them from '45-90.

Containment demanded control and land force deterrence. The current world demands neither. Today we need influence and are back to our historic maritime nation primary mission-set and can once again relax somewhat in our own geostrategic security now that we are no longer carrying the adopted geostrategic vulnerability of Western Europe in the face of a real land threat to the same.

This means we need a Navy designed to conduct strategic deterrence missions and to ensure freedom of the high seas for our merchant fleet and those of others that service our economic requirements. This means we need a small, but potent, expeditionary capability such as provided by the USMC and a handful of Army units. This means we need a SOF force fully capable of rapid DA anywhere in the world if necessary, but primarily out and about in the areas where our strategic interests are most reliant, ensuring we have the degree of understanding and the solidity of personal relationships necessary to prevent what is preventable, and to deal effectively (and appropriately) with what is not. We also need to refocus our air power on strategic/deterrence missions. We can probably skip a generation on tactical fighters. The Army needs to migrate warfighting missions to the Guard, and the Active force needs to get very lean and stay home more to do the training and maintenance that they have been deferring the past 15 years.

Mostly though, we need to take the "We can go to war now" COA off the table for the President. This will force us to lead with diplomacy or punitive expeditions; but will allow time for a public debate prior to committing the nation to long, costly violence to force our will upon some government, people or place.

I realize senior leadership in DC is full of "good Cold Warriors," so the forces of inertia are strong. Those old dogs show little inclination to learn new tricks. We also are battling the military industrial complex and powerful lobbies from places like Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel who warp our policies in their favor. It is a riptide that may drown us.

GLADsapper
05-07-2013, 07:33 AM
Bob's World,

I agree. That was the exact response I was going to write. Plus, it lets me take the idea a little further into detail. I would make the assertion that the Iron Triangle of politics which governs our Active and Reserve components, along with their composition, can only truly be influenced by the President, Secretary of Defense (advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and acts of Congress. Economic downturns have the nice effect of forcing consolidation (for better or for worse) but otherwise Congress is useless.

If I were the Secretary of Defense during a decade of stagnant or declining economic prospects, I would do the following:


Apply the High-Low capability mix to the Navy and Air Force:


Navy: 6 Large Carriers, 6 “Jeep” Carriers, 12 Boomers, 12 “Blue Water” attack subs, 12 “Brown Water” attack subs, 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers per Carrier, 24 Frigates, start producing as many cheap “Corvette” class patrol ships as all other combat ships combined (6+6+12+12+12+12+24+24=108,) and all necessary support ships...Reserve would have all ships leftover from reorganization (nuclear reactors powered down and under guard).

Air Force: As many ICBMs as the Navy. Same amount of money spent on UAVs/missles, as piloted combat aircraft. Plenty of aerial support (airlift included) capability. Reserves have 50-50 mix of piloted combat aircraft and aerial support aircraft. No AFNG, only Reserves.


Special Operations Command (Direct Action): Consists only of a small mission tasking office run from directly under the Joint Chiefs. Personnel and equipment still comes out of each branch.

Synch the Marine Corps with the Navy: 3 extra-strength MEFs (4 MEU each), and necessary additional personnel (training, embassy guards etc.) Reserves have another extra-strength MEF.

Army focuses on 1) maintaining a large, well-equipped, well-trained NG, 2) performing on call joint operations with Marines, 3) and on call joint ops with Allies...in that order.

Army undergoes massive consolidation with all surviving brigades adding personnel and necessary equipment until roughly between 4500-5000 soldiers strong. All companies are between 150-200 strong. Officer and NCO corps purged, increased use of Warrant Officers (Generals retired first, redundant field grades pushed into the IRR or National Guard). Reclass/Rebranch as necessary. Integrate National Guard Installations with AC Div. HQ's for joint training.


AC: 40 Division HQ's, 8 Training & Support Brigades, 4 Sustainment BDEs, 3 Combat Aviation BDEs, 4 Maneuver Enhancement BDEs, 3 Special Forces BDEs, 3 IBCTs (Airborne), 3 IBCTs, 3 SBCTs, 3 ABCTs, 3 Fires BDEs, 3 Battlefield Surveillance BDEs. 40 Brigades and 40 Div HQ's on 40 Bases= ~200,000 (including Pentagon and civilian staff).

Reserves: Only maintains IRR, 1 Div HQ, 2 Training & Support Brigade, 1 Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, 1 Sustainment Brigade...all other TPU units transferred to National Guard based on geography. 4 Brigades= ~20,000

National Guard: 30 Sustainment BDEs, 22 Combat Aviation BDEs, 30 Maneuver Enhancement BDEs, 22 IBCTs, 22 ABCTs, 15 Fires BDEs, 15 Battlefield Surveillance BDEs. 156 Brigades= ~780,000...No overseas deployments without State approval. Check on Executive Power. Capabilities distributed evenly by region.


All companies are deployable as modular units under different battalions on an ad hoc basis. (MAGTF concept)

Set Army recruit intake goals at twice the replacement level for enlisted and officers. Ensure that each rank requires half as many soldiers to staff as the next lower rank. Emplace an aggressive up or out policy for Active component with skills testing before every promotion (you must be proficient in the skills of the rank you will be promoted into...team leaders can run squads, lieutenants can run companies.) Soldiers who don't get promoted quickly enough are forced into the Reserves or National Guard (contingent on MOS shortages.) The end result is a Reserve force with a large supply of junior enlisted ready to become an NCO, and many excellent platoon leaders, ready to become Captain.


It saves money (assuming NG costs 1/4th active), reduces the President's capacity for unlimited warfare, and makes the AC more proficient. It is also career suicide, but I wouldn't care.

gute
05-07-2013, 03:13 PM
Gute,

Times do indeed change, and yet, in so many ways how we frame and approach problems is still stuck in the Cold War. How we approached problems during the 165 years prior to WWII is far more relevant to the world of today than how we approached them from '45-90.

Point well made.

gute
05-07-2013, 08:21 PM
Bob's World,

I agree. That was the exact response I was going to write. Plus, it lets me take the idea a little further into detail. I would make the assertion that the Iron Triangle of politics which governs our Active and Reserve components, along with their composition, can only truly be influenced by the President, Secretary of Defense (advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and acts of Congress. Economic downturns have the nice effect of forcing consolidation (for better or for worse) but otherwise Congress is useless.

If I were the Secretary of Defense during a decade of stagnant or declining economic prospects, I would do the following:


Apply the High-Low capability mix to the Navy and Air Force:


Navy: 6 Large Carriers, 6 “Jeep” Carriers, 12 Boomers, 12 “Blue Water” attack subs, 12 “Brown Water” attack subs, 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers per Carrier, 24 Frigates, start producing as many cheap “Corvette” class patrol ships as all other combat ships combined (6+6+12+12+12+12+24+24=108,) and all necessary support ships...Reserve would have all ships leftover from reorganization (nuclear reactors powered down and under guard).

Air Force: As many ICBMs as the Navy. Same amount of money spent on UAVs/missles, as piloted combat aircraft. Plenty of aerial support (airlift included) capability. Reserves have 50-50 mix of piloted combat aircraft and aerial support aircraft. No AFNG, only Reserves.


Special Operations Command (Direct Action): Consists only of a small mission tasking office run from directly under the Joint Chiefs. Personnel and equipment still comes out of each branch.

Synch the Marine Corps with the Navy: 3 extra-strength MEFs (4 MEU each), and necessary additional personnel (training, embassy guards etc.) Reserves have another extra-strength MEF.

Army focuses on 1) maintaining a large, well-equipped, well-trained NG, 2) performing on call joint operations with Marines, 3) and on call joint ops with Allies...in that order.

Army undergoes massive consolidation with all surviving brigades adding personnel and necessary equipment until roughly between 4500-5000 soldiers strong. All companies are between 150-200 strong. Officer and NCO corps purged, increased use of Warrant Officers (Generals retired first, redundant field grades pushed into the IRR or National Guard). Reclass/Rebranch as necessary. Integrate National Guard Installations with AC Div. HQ's for joint training.


AC: 40 Division HQ's, 8 Training & Support Brigades, 4 Sustainment BDEs, 3 Combat Aviation BDEs, 4 Maneuver Enhancement BDEs, 3 Special Forces BDEs, 3 IBCTs (Airborne), 3 IBCTs, 3 SBCTs, 3 ABCTs, 3 Fires BDEs, 3 Battlefield Surveillance BDEs. 40 Brigades and 40 Div HQ's on 40 Bases= ~200,000 (including Pentagon and civilian staff).

Reserves: Only maintains IRR, 1 Div HQ, 2 Training & Support Brigade, 1 Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, 1 Sustainment Brigade...all other TPU units transferred to National Guard based on geography. 4 Brigades= ~20,000

National Guard: 30 Sustainment BDEs, 22 Combat Aviation BDEs, 30 Maneuver Enhancement BDEs, 22 IBCTs, 22 ABCTs, 15 Fires BDEs, 15 Battlefield Surveillance BDEs. 156 Brigades= ~780,000...No overseas deployments without State approval. Check on Executive Power. Capabilities distributed evenly by region.


All companies are deployable as modular units under different battalions on an ad hoc basis. (MAGTF concept)

Set Army recruit intake goals at twice the replacement level for enlisted and officers. Ensure that each rank requires half as many soldiers to staff as the next lower rank. Emplace an aggressive up or out policy for Active component with skills testing before every promotion (you must be proficient in the skills of the rank you will be promoted into...team leaders can run squads, lieutenants can run companies.) Soldiers who don't get promoted quickly enough are forced into the Reserves or National Guard (contingent on MOS shortages.) The end result is a Reserve force with a large supply of junior enlisted ready to become an NCO, and many excellent platoon leaders, ready to become Captain.


It saves money (assuming NG costs 1/4th active), reduces the President's capacity for unlimited warfare, and makes the AC more proficient. It is also career suicide, but I wouldn't care.

That's a lot of information and you obviously put some thought into this topic. What I question is the need for the military to be the size it is now. Don't get me wrong I believe the military is one of the last honorable institutions and professions in this country but we seem to be looking for monsters abroad to jusify size and big ticket items. I'm getting off on another subject anyways, but I do believe downsizing and moving capabilities to the reserves should be done s....l...o...w...l...y. First and foremost it involves peoples lives and livelihood. Heck the way this country is going we will not have enough qualified people who can meet military standards. Not when guys have bodies by Xbox .

Question: Could we maintain a 12 battalion airborne force that could use Stryker vehicles when necessary and serve as the infantry for armored brigades?

gute
07-05-2013, 04:02 AM
I typed a big long post about a recent article in Military Rview with the same above title, but it went poof in the cyber universe. What the author proposes is interesting and I recommend reading it: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130831_art012.pdf

I have a question for the more knowledgeable posters at SWJ - could the HBCT (now ABCT) and IBCT brigades serve in both heavy and light assignments? I believe some HBCTs did shed the heavy equipment and serve as light forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but is it possible to train all armor, mechanized infantry and light infantry as just armor and infantry?

The HBCT combined arms battalion has 2xM1 and 2xM2. The IBCT maneuver battalion consists of 3xinfantry and 1xweapons. I propose changing the IBCT maneuver battalion design to 2 by 2. Armor companies when not assigned the heavy mission would serve as motorized weapons companies and the Bradley infantry would be light infantry. Should the Bradley crews be separate from the rifle platoon or utilize the weapons squad as crew members?

For example in the recent announcement from the Army the force structure will be cut by nine brigades - 4xHBCT, 1xSBCT and 4xIBCT. The 25ID will keep all four brigades. 4ID will have 2xHBCT and 1xIBCT. With my proposal, which I'm sure has been brought up before, all three brigades of the 4D would be capable of either the heavy or light mission. The Army would have combat arms troops trained primarily as M1 crew members, Bradleys and infantry. The 4D brigade assigned the light mission would still be able to train on heavy equipment at station to maintain a level of profficiency.

I would also propose keeping all the teeth in the AC and increasing the numbers of CS and sustainment in the RC. The RC combat brigades would consist of cadre forces that could be brought to full strength in a time of major war. Would this work or would it be detrimental to the RC?

Tukhachevskii
07-05-2013, 12:00 PM
For example in the recent announcement from the Army the force structure will be cut by nine brigades - 4xHBCT, 1xSBCT and 4xIBCT.

They'd be better off taking the manoeuvre battalions from defunct or deactivated BCTs and attaching them to existing brigades to beef up their manoevre capability. Getting rid of those redundant staffs is a good idea. Getting rid of their manoeuvre formatins is not. It's silly.

TAH
07-08-2013, 12:34 PM
Which is basically what is being done. The inactivation of BCTs is really a shell game. Each remaining BCT will get: a third maneuver Bn, a third Arty firing Btry, a second Eng Co and plus ups to CSS to acount for these additions. I/ABCTs get a forward support company for their re-org'ed Special Troops/Engineer Bns and SBCTs will get a Bn Hqs for that purpose.

From what I've seen, the biggest lose from the BCTs is/was the deletion of their MP platoons.

TAH
07-08-2013, 02:44 PM
Gute:

Bad idea trying to train tank and Bradley crewmen to rotate between ABCTs and IBCTs. Tasks are too differnent between an M1/M2 and a armored HMMWV.

IMHO, 2X2 Infantry Bn also not a good idea, not enough infantry.

Regarding RC cadre units for CS and CSS. A hat trick. When you need these units, you need them and don't want to wait while they get filled and trained up.

With another 100K of personnel cuts possible out of the Army, we have only seen the tip of this iceberg.

gute
07-08-2013, 03:07 PM
Which is basically what is being done. The inactivation of BCTs is really a shell game. Each remaining BCT will get: a third maneuver Bn, a third Arty firing Btry, a second Eng Co and plus ups to CSS to acount for these additions. I/ABCTs get a forward support company for their re-org'ed Special Troops/Engineer Bns and SBCTs will get a Bn Hqs for that purpose.

From what I've seen, the biggest lose from the BCTs is/was the deletion of their MP platoons.

What is the reasoning for eleminating the MP platoon? Will MPs be attached as needed in the future?

gute
07-08-2013, 03:50 PM
Gute:

Bad idea trying to train tank and Bradley crewmen to rotate between ABCTs and IBCTs. Tasks are too differnent between an M1/M2 and a armored HMMWV.

IMHO, 2X2 Infantry Bn also not a good idea, not enough infantry.

Regarding RC cadre units for CS and CSS. A hat trick. When you need these units, you need them and don't want to wait while they get filled and trained up.

With another 100K of personnel cuts possible out of the Army, we have only seen the tip of this iceberg.

I will have to take your word for it since I don't have experience in that area, but I do wonder why a four man tank crew would have difficulty operating as a four man crew in a HMMWV. The driver drives, the TC becomes the VC, the gunner mans the .50 or MK19, or TOW and the loader assists the gunner, etc. But, again, that is why I asked to hear from those of you with the experience. Yes, definetely light on dismounts, especially for protracted combat. I don't think turning tank crew men into infantry is a smart idea.

So in your opinion should the Bradley platoon crews remain separate from the rifle platoon or could the weapons squad in the rifle platoon serve as the M2crew members?

The cadre units would be for the NG BCTs maneuver battalions and not the CS and sustainment units.

TAH
07-08-2013, 04:25 PM
What I've heard was that MPs are getting "pooled" at higher levels. BCTs will either get a Co (or in some extreme cases a Bn) or none.

TAH
07-08-2013, 04:35 PM
Easy for a tank crew to take over as a HMMWV crew. Much harder for them to go back to being a tank crew. Lots of "muscle memory" involved in getting a tank crew up to speed. Pretty sure its the same for a Bradley crew.

The idea of transfering between IBCT & SBCT is a better fit regarding vehicle crewman. Manning a Bradley on this assignment foloowed by being an MG or Javelin gunner on the next, not so much.

An issue with cadre units is that they end up being mostly chiefs and very few (if any indians). As nearly all of the combat arms units in the US Army are in the National Guard, you end up with where do the chiefs come from if there weren't any indians in the first place.

gute
07-08-2013, 10:02 PM
Easy for a tank crew to take over as a HMMWV crew. Much harder for them to go back to being a tank crew. Lots of "muscle memory" involved in getting a tank crew up to speed. Pretty sure its the same for a Bradley crew.

The idea of transfering between IBCT & SBCT is a better fit regarding vehicle crewman. Manning a Bradley on this assignment foloowed by being an MG or Javelin gunner on the next, not so much.

An issue with cadre units is that they end up being mostly chiefs and very few (if any indians). As nearly all of the combat arms units in the US Army are in the National Guard, you end up with where do the chiefs come from if there weren't any indians in the first place.

Ahhh, kemosahbee.