Air Power in the New COIN Era

[Jedburgh]

Air Power in the New COIN Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG509.pdf)

With insurgency growing in importance as a national security problem, it is receiving new interest across the services, in the Department of Defense (DoD), and elsewhere in the U.S. government. Although ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq give particular immediacy to the problem, the challenge of insurgency extends well beyond these specific conflicts. It is important, therefore, that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) consider how to meet the growing demand for air power in joint, combined, and interagency counterinsurgency operations and that other services’ and DoD-wide reassessments of the subject take the potential roles of air power in counterinsurgency fully into account. In particular, airmen should take the lead in exploring how air power might work in combination with other military and civil instruments to help avert the development of an insurgency or perhaps to check a growing insurgency long enough to allow political and social initiatives (the heart of any successful counterinsurgency strategy) to take hold.

To address these and related policy challenges, RAND Project AIR FORCE conducted a fiscal year 2005 study entitled “The USAF’s Role in Countering Insurgencies.” This study addressed four major policy questions:
(1) What threat do modern insurgencies pose to U.S. interests?
(2) What strategy should the United States pursue to counter insurgent threats?
(3) What role does military power play in defeating insurgencies?
(4) What steps should USAF take to most effectively contribute to counterinsurgency?

This work builds on more than 40years of RAND Corporation work on insurgency, peace operations, and other types of lesser conflicts. This monograph has several purposes and audiences. First, it seeks to be a short primer on the problem of insurgency, counterinsurgency principles, and the role of air power in countering insurgencies. It is hoped that it will be a valuable introduction for airmen new to the topic. Second, it is hoped that the analysis on the potential demand for advisory assistance, as well as the data collection and analysis of recent 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS) missions, will offer new insights to counterinsurgency practitioners in USAF. Finally, the monograph seeks to offer senior USAF leaders a way ahead to develop increased capability in this area without sacrificing the Air Force’s edge in major combat operations...

[Steve Blair]

Now let's just hope that the Air Force reads the study and actually learns something from it.

[Tom Odom]

I will reserve judgement until I read it but some key word searches are not encouraging. Very little on Africa--especially none on use of COIN air in 1960s Congo. A single mention of an AF FAO program to enhance regional understanding. No hit on air attache. A single hit on embassy as it relates to a country team. No hit on "FAC". No hit on "CAS". 6 total hits on airlift.

I will read and post a review.

best
Tom

[selil]

I’ve only read about 120 pages of the monograph, but it seems that the Air Force is hampered by an expectation and equipment issuance problem. The Air Force community according to the monograph neither realizes its place in the anti-counter insurgency effort, nor has an expectation of change to meet counter insurgency missions. I find the basic economics issues stated as officers are not incentivized to fill roles in Air Force special operations billets and that special markers may be needed to fill those billets with officers. So, in summary the Air Force does not have the knowledge, skills, or ability to meet counter insurgency missions (with few exceptions like the AC-130), and in fact the argument could be made that the Air Force is unwilling to change and adapt to the changing landscape and war environment.


Still reading, but that’s what I’m getting after gutting the document.

[RTK]

the argument could be made that the Air Force is unwilling to change and adapt to the changing landscape and war environment.

Possibly because they would be marginalized in the current COIN structure to flying CAP in the possibility of TIC support and not much more. In essence, everything that we've built the Air Force up to be in the last 30 years would turn out insignificant.

[SWJED]

It is a terrible, terrible fact that "transformation" has been high-jacked by those who see high-ticket, high-technology solutions to every problem-set we now, and will for the foreseeable future, face. I have been working these issues (urban, asymmetric, IW, COIN, etc...) for ten years. Every time I think we have turned the corner and the light bulbs are popping on someone or some “program” flips off the switch. IMHO, the USAF and USN are most guilty – but others are too. Programs that have emanated out of JFCOM’s J9 over the last several years smack of inmates taking charge of the insane asylum. Moreover, as has been posted on another thread here today (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=4242#post4242) – our ground forces are still struggling for solutions – and not necessarily at the tactical level…

[Steve Blair]

I agree, Tom, that the report doesn't touch on some important considerations, but you need to consider that the target audience doesn't even *think* about COIN anymore. I'd consider this more of a lead-in: something to get USAF leaders thinking about basic COIN and then (hopefully) being followed up with more detail. This is directed at an audience that has little background in the subject.

This is especially vital when you consider that this year Air Force ROTC *removed* OOTW instruction from their course syllabus. Granted, it only got one or two class periods before, but now it gets *none*. The terrorism module remains about the same, and the cultural sections did change somewhat. But the AF seems to be trying to change its focus to space war and touting the strengths of the F-22.

[Tom Odom]

Steve,

You are right in saying that the audience has a shallow background. And that was what I was saying in a different way. For a RAND study to talk airpower in COIN and not cover the issues I mentioned says volumes about the audience they are trying to reach.

One of my best friends is a senior officer in USAF SOF; he is bright, articulate, mission oriented, and flexible. He knows more about this realm of airpower than most. But as an MC130 driver, he is not a fighter jock and as a Herky bird piot, not even a "real" jet pilot.

Does he have a shot at CSAF? doubtful

In any case I finished reading the study and here are some thoughts:

The poor.

Initial chapter gets bogged down in attempting and distinguishing between a terrorist and an insurgent. Most of it is irrelevant as the study's definition of a pure terrorist is so limited as to be nearly useless.

The good.

The Chapter on COIN Imperatives is quite useful.

The great.

The Chapter on Grand Strategy is CRITICAL. Just some samples:


"One of the most distinctive—and challenging—features of making and executing counterinsurgency strategy is that “information operations” are central to strategic success, not merely an appendage of kinetic operations. It would be unfair to say that the U.S. armed forces pay mere lip service to the importance of propaganda, public affairs, psychological operations, and the other elements of information operations, but it is certainly true that these elements of military power are generally treated as useful appendages of the military apparatus, whose value is usually measured merely in terms of their ability to facilitate or enhance traditional combat functions.


The political battlefield that counterinsurgency operations must seek to dominate is one in which perceptions and beliefs are what matter. If people believe that U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency are attacking civilians indiscriminately, that their government is irredeemably corrupt, or that their streets are unsafe, it is irrelevant to the conflict whether these things are actually true except insofar as it may affect these impressions"


"Popular doctrinal concepts, such as “rapid decisive operations” that emphasize the merits of winning quick victories or achieving strategic-level shock and paralytic effects against conventional military opponents are intrinsically inconsistent with this reality, and seeking to apply them in counterinsurgency will often be counterproductive. Defeating any substantial insurgency requires sustained effort over years or even decades, which affects everything from
planning for appropriate force rotation to managing expectations when
the conflict is presented to domestic political audiences at home."

The intriguing.

The Chapter on 6th SOS as an advisory unit template is quite interesting. It is obvious that the Air Commandos used some of the basic SF structures, as models and I would say that is a good thing. Those structures work.

Where I did not get a clear sense of "fit" was in the realm of what is traditionally security assistance on the "air" side. That was a real problem for our efforts in Sudan while I was there: the Sudanese got 3 F-5s (one was a 2-seat trainer) and all 3 were smoking holes within a year or so. The same held even truer of our efforts in Zaire. In that case, when a rebellion did break out in the mid-60s, we threw together a Congolese "Air America" using US aircraft, expatriate Cuban pilots, and CIA/military advisors/support.

The doubtful.

Being a realist (cynic?) I doubt that the AF --without some kind of serious shove from above like JFK in the 1960s--is going to buy into this even if it does make sense.


Best

Tom

[Jedburgh]

Air & Space Power Journal, Fall 06:

Counterinsurgency Airpower: Air-Ground Integration for the Long War (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/fal06/belote.html)

Editorial Abstract: Unprecedented levels of joint cooperation have occurred in counterinsurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Colonel Belote documents the successes of increased joint coordination in both nations, particularly with regard to improving close air support and ensuring the security and legitimacy of national elections. The author also offers ideas for improving joint training opportunities and enhancing joint doctrine, tactics, and procedures.

[cuba]

Mr Odom I am new in this forum,I would like to know your opinion about the cuban pilots who fought in Zaire against Simbas.



Did they help to destroy simbas?

Was that war a victory for Mobutu?

I heard Laurent kabila continued the war after 1967.

Did the cubans help to defeat Schramme and allies?

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Tom, one of my and Old Eagle's buddies at JCISFA is a retired Talon pilot. He works the USAF end of things for us, as well as contributing to broader effort - he also fills the shoes of the 2 x USAF AD slots we have here at JCISFA. While we have Army, Marines and a USN LtCDR, our USAF slots are currently unfilled. When they come in, I'm sure they will contribute to the effort - the USAF has an important role to play, and we will all benefit by their attendance & participation.
Best, Rob

[Cliff]

I don't know what AFROTC is doing.

I am doing the AF's Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) by correspondence right now, and I think a lot of SWJ folks would be surprised by the amount of focus on Small Wars in the courses.

I'm on the 5th of 7 classes. The first was on leadership... std mil leadership stuff.

The National Security class focused extensively on the interagency... 2/7 lessons were mainly dealing with the interagency process, mostly using OIF and OEF Phase IV as the examples. State's Coord for Reconstruction and Stabilization was discussed extensively. Weak and Failing States and Terrorism was another lesson, for a total of 3/7 in the National Security lesson on topics similar to what I've read here. The other lessons are the basics of how the NSC, PDDs, etc work, and then a WMD lesson.

The Strategy and War (SW) class, you would think, would focus mostly on the F-22s kicking down the door for B-2s to take on the IADS and HV tgts... but no, it mostly focused on small wars.

The strategy lesson of the SW class was standard... what is strategy, examples, etc. The War lesson focused on how a war is really won after the "Shock and Awe" is done, and the vanquished need to be made a functional country again.

The American way of war lesson was the closest to what I would have expected, but included some articles about the effectiveness of the traditional American way of waging war.

The other ways of war lesson included an article by SWJ's own Steve Metz, as well as one by Col Nagl.

Even the Transformation and OIF lessons in the SW class focused on Phase IV ops... other than a Cebrowski article, the other readings dealt with Stabilization/reconstruction or 4GW...

The Expeditionary Airpower class was mostly history of airpower and foundations, but had some pretty good stuff on Vietnam, and the treatment of OIF and OEF had some frank discussions, as well as articles like "EBO in Small Wars" and "The Phase IV Fight".

3/7 lessons in the NS class on Small Wars-type stuff.
5/7 lessons in the SW class.
Some good stuff in the Airpower class.

So far I have read very little about Shock and Awe, or big air campaigns... in fact, almost none. All this in the AF's premier PME course, the one that is supposed to take Majors from tacticians and take them into the realm of operational art and strategy...

Now, I know that I will once again be seen as defending the AF. Which I am, because I am part of it. :) But I have to tell you that the AF in general is very focused on the fights in OEF and OIF in particular, and pretty focused on Small Wars in general (almost too much at times if you ask me). Is it in the way folks on this forum would like? Maybe not - I think we tend to look more at what our capabilities are using high intensity systems to support the low-end fight.

That said, a couple facts:

The AF has about 6000+ folks deployed with the Army on "In Lieu of Taskings".

Under Total Aircrew Management Initiative (TAMI 21), 180 young fighter pilots are being sent to Predator and to U-28s and PC12s to support the GWOT. The single squadron of U-28s is being augmented by an unspecified number of PC-12s, according to Air Force Magazine.

Predator CAPs are being boosted from 12 to 21 according to DefenseNews.

I am sure not everything is as it could be if we had a lot more money to spend. But as I've said before, if you don't have enough F-22s and F-35s to stop those who by 4th gen fighters and double digit SAMs, then you're not going to have to worry about the small wars for long, because pretty soon someone will decide to go for a big one.

I think the USAF is caught in the position of having to org, train, and equip for a high end war as well as low end, while in two low end fights. That combined with a lot of old airplanes means that you have to balance risks. I think with the Army neccessarily having to focus more on the low end, it makes sense for the USAF and USN to support that effort while hedging on the high end - reduces the risk of us getting caught flat footed in the near term.

Anyway, it has been instructive to go through some of these classes after having been involved in the discussions here. I look forward to learning more - my next class is the Joint Forces one so I am sure I will be asking some questions.

V/R,

Cliff

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

for the USAF to try to stay relevant as the wind is now blowing in the COIN direction.

But to rip a page from Vietnam: "This is a political war and it calls for discrimination in killing. The best weapon for killing would be a knife, but I'm afraid we can't do it that way. The worst is an airplane. The next worst is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle — you know who you're killing."

Vann mayhave been over-zealous in many areas but he did have a sense for what tactical level COIN operated on.

[Cliff]

for the USAF to stay relevant. All we have to do is wait for Iran to finally get their SA-20s. :)

http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/statement29.html

V/R,

Cliff

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

China and that pesky Russian Bear! :D

All the more reason to buy more toys.

Then again, the Post seems to have found another Duryun incident brewing in the Air Force. Once again they have a bit of a conflict of interest issue at hand.

[Entropy]

I find a lot of the AF criticisms rather curious. On one hand, it's criticized for not doing enough to support the ground force and on the other hand, those areas where the AF is assisting the ground force are dismissed and motives are impugned as mere attempts to stay "relevant." As a result, it's hard to see how the AF can avoid criticism one way or another no matter what it does.

[Ken White]

insulting, it is a serious, non-snarky comment appropos of yours -- I have seen that for many years (believe it or not, the USAF existed before I put on a war suit, not long, mind you but it was there...) and I am convinced it has a lot to do with attitude. A whole lot...

[Entropy]

Ken,

I don't disagree about the AF's attitude - in fact I think the service does itself a lot of harm not so much by its actions or policies, but the "attitude" it uses to further those policies. To personalize the service, I would say it is overly sensistive and insecure in the way in conducts itself.

I think I can acknowledge that and still suggest that there are many out there who, for whatever reason, will criticize the service no matter what it does. The AF is frankly acting dumb when it's own rhetoric and actions provide those critics with ample ammunition - ammunition that, in my experience, makes cogent discussion of AF support to COIN or, indeed, any AF-related topic, difficult.

The AF has a role to play in our current wars as well as future conflicts, so I'm all for discussions on how well the service is doing, what it could do better and what roles it should play, if any.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

in that the Air Force oft times comes off with a nose in the air sense of superiority to us earth bound hoi polloi.

I worked for the AF for about seven years at two nearly diametrically opposite levels. The AF does many things in a superior fashion, transportation and airfield support being two of them. They are also the preeminent air superiority force. Oh, and you can’t beat the perks (ok had to throw at least one snarky dig).

But I feel what irks some is, as Ken says, their attitude, particularly when it comes to their role enterprise wide. While our Soldiers and Marines slug it out day to day in the dust and mud of far off battlefields the AF lobbies for more F-22s and the NGB while at the same time not taking a truly serious look at finding the offsets for these systems from within their own TOA. Then it seems that when it is ultimately decided that funding will go elsewhere the Air Force often acts the petulant child.

While I have no problem with any service expending as much of its budget as they so desire on creature comforts for their people, there is a point (gee, just like in real life) where you have to stop driving the Bugatti Veyron and drinking Cristal and get the Toyota Tercel and drink Asti.

[120mm]

Ken,

I don't disagree about the AF's attitude - in fact I think the service does itself a lot of harm not so much by its actions or policies, but the "attitude" it uses to further those policies. To personalize the service, I would say it is overly sensistive and insecure in the way in conducts itself.

I think I can acknowledge that and still suggest that there are many out there who, for whatever reason, will criticize the service no matter what it does. The AF is frankly acting dumb when it's own rhetoric and actions provide those critics with ample ammunition - ammunition that, in my experience, makes cogent discussion of AF support to COIN or, indeed, any AF-related topic, difficult.

The AF has a role to play in our current wars as well as future conflicts, so I'm all for discussions on how well the service is doing, what it could do better and what roles it should play, if any.

We've hashed and rehashed the ways the USAF could become relevant, especially in the realm of airlift, portable medical support facilities and perhaps a better (for COIN), more responsive air to mud airframe than the current stable holds.

The current AF moves remind me of a "####bird", who spends the 30 days prior to his OER, "apple-polishing" for the boss, in order to make up for not doing his own job all along. To say that because the rest of us can see through the USAF's b.s. and critize their misdirected efforts, isn't the same as saying "that there are many out there who, for whatever reason, will criticize the service no matter what it does."

So the question remains: "How come the Air Force isn't hounding Congress to fund their COIN CAS aircraft, exportable air-transportable hospital packages and additional funds for cargo airframes?" The answer, I believe, is that no matter how many airmen they put on perimeter or convoy security, is that the USAF doesn't give a stroke and a crap about the current fight.

And don't get me wrong: We need either the F-22, or a much larger Air Force flying less capable planes, for the possibility of a larger, more conventional conflict.

[Cliff]

The current AF moves remind me of a "####bird", who spends the 30 days prior to his OER, "apple-polishing" for the boss, in order to make up for not doing his own job all along. To say that because the rest of us can see through the USAF's b.s. and critize their misdirected efforts, isn't the same as saying "that there are many out there who, for whatever reason, will criticize the service no matter what it does."


I obviously disagree with this on a fundamental level, but I don't really think it matters what evidence is cited - some folks will just feel the way they feel.

Using the logic above, you could also apply your comment on the "not doing your job all along" to the Army's COIN doctrine at the start of OIF phase IV, and the correction made more recently.



So the question remains: "How come the Air Force isn't hounding Congress to fund their COIN CAS aircraft, exportable air-transportable hospital packages and additional funds for cargo airframes?" The answer, I believe, is that no matter how many airmen they put on perimeter or convoy security, is that the USAF doesn't give a stroke and a crap about the current fight.


The AF has a stated requirement for more C-17s, just like it does for more F-22s. Unfortunately the civilian bosses get to decide what the services ask Congress for.

As for the USAF caring, I'm sorry you feel that way. I know the folks who I work with are well aware and all do care- almost every unit has someone deployed to the AOR. One of my two NCOs got mortared twice yesterday at Balad.




And don't get me wrong: We need either the F-22, or a much larger Air Force flying less capable planes, for the possibility of a larger, more conventional conflict.

I'm not trying to say the AF and Army are committed at the same level - but as you just said, the AF is having to hedge against a lot of potential nastiness in the not so distant future. Would you rather the AF buy a COIN aircraft in great numbers and let China or Iran be able to use SA-20s to prevent us from deterring them, or do the COIN role with Predator, Reaper, A-10, F-16s, and B-1s? Until the budgets are increased it unfortunately is close to a zero sum game. Again, it's kind of like asking why the Army is asking for FCS and not a purpose built COIN system of systems. The entire military is forced to balance future high end threats against the current coin fight.

I'm not looking to start a big arguement here. Just pointing out that you can make similar arguements about any service.

V/R,

Cliff

[Cliff]

While our Soldiers and Marines slug it out day to day in the dust and mud of far off battlefields the AF lobbies for more F-22s and the NGB while at the same time not taking a truly serious look at finding the offsets for these systems from within their own TOA. Then it seems that when it is ultimately decided that funding will go elsewhere the Air Force often acts the petulant child.

While I have no problem with any service expending as much of its budget as they so desire on creature comforts for their people, there is a point (gee, just like in real life) where you have to stop driving the Bugatti Veyron and drinking Cristal and get the Toyota Tercel and drink Asti.

The AF cut personnel to 316,000 folks in an effort to get more money. Personnelists/orderly rooms were elminated and replaced by centralized offices, the internet, and a call center. Finance, contracting, and legal are all going the same way. (See Air Force Magazine for details.)

What systems would you propose cutting (other than all the legacy aircraft the AF wants to retire but Congress won't let them) to pay for buying even minimum numbers of F-35s and F-22s?

[Entropy]

So the question remains: "How come the Air Force isn't hounding Congress to fund their COIN CAS aircraft, exportable air-transportable hospital packages and additional funds for cargo airframes?" The answer, I believe, is that no matter how many airmen they put on perimeter or convoy security, is that the USAF doesn't give a stroke and a crap about the current fight.


First of all, I'm going proceed on the assumption that comments like "apple-polishing" are not referring to the vast majority of rank-and-file USAF personnel. Secondly, different services and, indeed, different people have divergent perspectives on these issues. It's one thing to argue that the USAF's efforts are misdirected - it's quite another to impugn motives. From my perspective claims that essentially boil down to "the USAF doesn't give a ####" are more about perception than reality as are, I believe, claims that "relevance" is the only motivation the USAF seems to possess. I'm frankly always reticent to join into these discussions because too frequently such perceptions are regarded as both foundational and self-evident truths and therefore tend to result in an unconstructive discussion. Regardless, I might suggest that impugning motives, especially in a broad-brush fashion, is counterproductive to the stated intent of changing the USAF's position on one's issues of concern and it only serves to reinforce the service's attitude you do not like.


So the question remains: "How come the Air Force isn't hounding Congress to fund their COIN CAS aircraft, exportable air-transportable hospital packages and additional funds for cargo airframes?" The answer, I believe, is that no matter how many airmen they put on perimeter or convoy security, is that the USAF doesn't give a stroke and a crap about the current fight.

I'll take these one-at-a-time:

1. From my perspective the AF's position is that the A-10 along with UAV's will best fill the COIN CAS role. The A-10's are currently in a SLEP program to upgrade them to the C model - you can google the details if you wish - and extend the airframe's life out to around 2030. Army thinking on UAV's actually seems pretty close to the Air Force. The Army's version of the predator/warrior is slated to do armed reconnaissance/target acquisition and serve as a C3 platform for BFT, radios, etc. for the ground force. The Air Force version is going to be more focused on ISR and as a long-endurance precision strike platform. Together I think they will be a nice compliment.

Now many have suggested a turboprop, like the Texan or Tucano is needed and I'm assuming this is what you mean in your question above. In my view, the only role these aircraft can perform that an A-10/UAV combination cannot is superior MK1 eyeball recon as opposed to utilizing sensors. From the limited conversations I've had with guys on the ground side of things, it seems to me that most prefer the live data-link and video capability. Additionally, many, including me, feel a turboprop aircraft is too vulnerable - it won't have the armored protection and system redundancy of the A-10 and Apache and it operates in the sweet spot for both manpads and SA/lt AAA. Finally, weapons employment is arguably worse from these aircraft since precision air-dropped ordnance is best delivered from medium altitude. Low-altitude options like guns, rockets and some guided missiles can be done by A-10's and helo's. I do think they'd be a good aircraft for indigenous forces we're supporting but, imo, they don't provide enough additional capability to justify adding another airframe to the inventory.

2. Aeromedical evac is not my thing, but the AF did develop EMEDs in the late 1990's which are, I believe, used today. Beyond that, I'm not sure what the problem is - if you could expand on that point a bit more it would be helpful.

3. The Air Force would like to buy more cargo aircraft and has been quietly fighting for a few years now to buy more C-17's beyond what the DoD wants based on the latest joint mobility capabilities study. Additionally, it's trying to decide if it's better to upgrade the C-5 or retire the C-5 and buy more C-17's to replace that capability which is a tough decision actually. As for the C-130, the service is reluctant to buy a bunch more of these aircraft right now because new requirements imposed by FCS means a new airlifter will have to be built to carry those vehicles. FCS seems to be falling apart, however, so maybe that will change.

[Steve Blair]

I find a lot of the AF criticisms rather curious. On one hand, it's criticized for not doing enough to support the ground force and on the other hand, those areas where the AF is assisting the ground force are dismissed and motives are impugned as mere attempts to stay "relevant." As a result, it's hard to see how the AF can avoid criticism one way or another no matter what it does.

A great deal of this has to do with how the AF tends to present itself to the public and other services. You mentioned the A-10...they may be upgrading it now but some folks have a hard time forgetting that they didn't want the aircraft in the first place and have tried at least twice to get rid of it. The F-16 (another AF workhorse) was also decidedly unpopular with a fair chunk of the AF higher command when it came online. There's also the issue of their initial unwillingness in the 1980s to support CH-53 programs, which was a contributing factor to the formation of SOCOM.

I don't think anyone is saying that the AF doesn't do good things. But it's important that the AF (like any other branch) stop from time to time and try to see itself as others see them. They may also need to come to grips with the fact that this is not the 1950s (when they got about half of the total defense budget...more in some years) and they can't always fight the war they want to fight (and this is also something the Army needs to deal with...but that's a different thread).

I don't expect to change any minds here...but just pointing out that there are some long-term indicators and reasons that the AF's corporate motives may at times seem a little odd or out of sync with what's going on.

[Ken White]

many more years than I care to recall, I think you've really summarized the problem very well:


A great deal of this has to do with how the AF tends to present itself to the public and other services...

I don't think anyone is saying that the AF doesn't do good things. But it's important that the AF (like any other branch) stop from time to time and try to see itself as others see them...Attitude...

One can be arrogant and dismissive (see me for an example ;) ) but one has to be prepared to take the flak for doing so. To come on strong is fine; to whine about being called for it invites derision...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

where to begin? First off I do not agree 100% with all of 120’s observations, but he makes a pretty good point when it comes to other’s perceptions of the Air Force.


What systems would you propose cutting (other than all the legacy aircraft the AF wants to retire but Congress won't let them) to pay for buying even minimum numbers of F-35s and F-22s?

What is the "minimum" number of F-35s and F-22s? And why both?

I admit that Congressional meddling does hurt the USAF's attempts to divest itself of platforms and programs (as well as the other services). It would take a SecAF and a CSAF with HUGE cajones (and no future employment prospects) to tell Congress too bad, so sad we're getting rid of the B-52s. :eek:

However, if I were the CSAF these are a few things I would do:

Kill NASCAR. Kill Jumbotron. Kill ABL (its a money pit). Stop the Thunderbirds F-16 swap. Stop BAS payments to deployed Airmen. All unmarried E-4 and below live in the dorms, with few exceptions, and also three to a room at that (saves BOS and O&M). No TDY's posing as "deployments" and deployments are minimum 6 months (saves O&M). Eliminate some officer billets and give more authority and responsibility to NCOs (they're cheaper). Eliminate AFSCs by requiring more "multitasking" of personnel (some of this is being done). Scrub acquisition costs with a wire brush (especially Space and AFSOC). Cancel all base maintenance contracts (Airmen can cut grass and paint stuff). Squeeze TDY "perks" to a minimum (if you're TDY or "deployed" to a site and billeted within walking distance of your work site, why do you need a rental car? When you deploy to support Cobra Gold at U-Tapao why do you need to stay in hotels in Pattaya Beach, 40 miles away?).

I could jump onto the DPD Warehouse and find more but those are just for starters. Now some will say “those are mostly small dollar amounts.” True, but start cutting the small stuff and it adds up over the FYDP.

Bump me up to SecDef (which is a truly scary thought, I'd have to wear suits all the time) and I would take a long hard look at all of OSD's programs (excluding the services) and scrub them really hard to eliminate waste and duplication of effort. Plus there'd be greater scrutiny on the COCOMs, which would get less of a free pass to dip into the service POMs for their support. Rather than give that cash back, I would pass those savings to the Services to help fund those programs that do need it.

However, change like that hurts when you’ve become used to certain perks, but it can be done. An AF GO once noted that given the fiscal restraints over the next several years the USAF can either be the best in the world at putting lead on target or be the world’s best base support service, but not both. To be the former while giving up the latter requires a big change in culture.

Granted you could also focus more scrutiny on the other three service’s programs and probably find significant savings. But the Marines seem to pretty much make do with what they get, the Army seems careful in what it pushes hard for (although IMHO I think JIEDDO was a bit pricey for the result), and these days it seems like the Navy just tries to stay under everyone’s radar.

[wm]

Pentagon chief: Getting aircraft to Iraq, Afghanistan 'like pulling teeth'

Article is here (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24238978)

[Van]

I think we're underestimating the degree of internal conflict in the Air Force. The message from the top is "Everything begins and ends with F-22". When was the last time you saw an AF graphic that didn't have an F-22 in it? When you get down to the Majors and Captains, you'll actually hear advocates for real jointness, as opposed to Douhet/H.G. Wells/Billy Mitchell's Air Power for COIN (but at heart, the old school folks' loyalty lies with the fighter community that emerged during Viet Nam).

As an institution, the Air Force does not value what they provide for the greatest value-added in COIN; comm, airlift, and ISR (I'm not denigrating the firepower, but for COIN, firepower in the sky is secondary to comm, airlift, and ISR from above). If we can get a generation of AF generals who don't kowtow irrationally to their own divinity as zipper-suited sungods, the problem will resolve itself. But as it stands, their fantasy of gun kills in dogfights is as rational as the really old school Navy vision of capitol ships duking it out. Dogfighting and battleships trying to cross the T might be relevant someday, but not in the near future given current geopolitics and technology.

Don't get me wrong, we'd have a lot more trouble with the current conflict without the capabilities the Air Force brings to the fight, I just wish their COLs and BGs would see that.

Oh, and Umar- for cost cutting, why do general officers in the air force maintain their flight status? Just the flight hours so they can fly is hundreds of thousands of dollars a month, it keeps them from doing the things Generals really should be doing, and it keeps the Lieutenants and Captains out of the airframes they should be current on. Put 'em in Cessnas from the Aeroclubs and Civil Air Patrol if they want flight hours.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

I think I hurt myself laughing at that.

I really do not know why rated GOs keep their flight pay (although it is at a reduced rate). Hell, rated pilots still draw flight pay even when they're not in flying billets. Ask a chairborne USAF guy wearing a bag when the last time he clocked any stick time.

On another note (caution snarky remark coming): Why do Air Force officers in the space AFSC wear flight suits? What exactly is it they fly in? Do we still have manned ICBMs? :D

Good time for a movie quote, paraphrased: "No, I like all you Air Force boys. Every time we've gotta go someplace and fight, you fellas always give us a ride."

There is a huge chasm between the Air Force culture and the Marines, and I speak not of yogurt. ;)

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

"These new realities and missions should be reflected in our training and doctrine. The Air Force will be increasingly called upon to conduct civil-military or humanitarian operations with interagency and nongovernmental organizations and partners and deal directly with local populations."

"All this may require rethinking long-standing service assumptions and priorities about which missions require certified pilots and which do not."

Who knows, perhaps our next air-to-air combat ace will be a senior airman (the horror!). :D

[Entropy]

I've noted all the "attitude" criticisms here and will again say that I have no fundamental disagreement. No one is saying (at least I'm not) the USAF should not be criticized - I have many criticisms myself - but my point is that such criticisms should at least have some substance and evidence behind them and be delivered professionally. The generalizations I most often read, many of which are extremely vitriolic, typically lack substance and do nothing to further the debate, much less change anyone's mind.

Additionally, part of the problem with criticisms of the USAF is that it's often not clear, to me at least, what critics actually want the USAF to do with regard to COIN. Like the other services, the AF was not prepared for, nor did it foresee the kind of environment we're in today. A bigger issue, ISTM, is it's not clear what big Army and the DoD want out of the AF in regards to COIN besides more ISR, which has already been identified.

Van has touched on something of real substance and impact when he/she mentions internal conflict within the AF and the generational gap in attitudes which, imo, mirror those in the Army. The AF in decades ahead is probably in for a lot of cultural turbulence .


The message from the top is "Everything begins and ends with F-22". When was the last time you saw an AF graphic that didn't have an F-22 in it?
As for everything "beginning and ending" with the F-22, that's true to a certain extent, but from an AF perspective, it's justified. The US military requires air supremacy in order to operate and achieving that is the Air Force's primary mission and the F-22's primary mission. For the Air Force it is a foundational capability like armor is for the Army or the destroyer for the Navy. So the AF takes that role very seriously which is the biggest reason why it wants the F-22. Everyone is justifiably unhappy about the cost, especially the AF, since costs have impacted the number of aircraft it can buy. Personally, I think the entire DoD procurement process is fundamentally flawed, but that discussion is probably best left to another thread.

"Zipper-suited Sun Gods" actually is heard all the time within the Air Force. Here's another for you. Since rated aviators fill the vast majority of leadership positions, aviator's wings on the uniform are often called "Air Force Universal Management Badges" in the private company of non-aviators.

Umar,

Some of your suggestions sound reasonable, others not so much, but what do any of them have to do with the AF and COIN - or the wars we're in currently? At most they seem like tertiary solutions only designed to save a bit of money.


On another note (caution snarky remark coming): Why do Air Force officers in the space AFSC wear flight suits? What exactly is it they fly in? Do we still have manned ICBMs?

The whole flight-suit is a source of tension within the AF, especially with Space officers and especially since most are issued those suits and don't have to spend their own money (unlike officers who wear BDU's, for example). The original reason, of course, was that those who worked in missile silo's needed the fire protection (particularly in the old days), but the missile force has been reduced to handful of personnel so now it's all about "tradition."

And while such service quirks are interesting to discuss in their own right (and having spent several years in the US Navy before the Air Force, I can say that every service has them), how are they relevant to the Air Force's role in COIN?

[Ron Humphrey]

Entropy,

I think I can empathize with what your saying, but doesn't most of what we're seeing come back to the old material girl principle. What have you done for me lately?

The capability to keep the skies clear forever and ever against all enemies foriegn and domestic is the mission dejour for AF as a whole (at least in my limited perspective). But what about the sudden introduction of anything (use your imagination) which would cause manned flights to be untenable. What then?

Just trying to take a stab at the meat of it.

[Entropy]

BTW, good on Secdef Gates for challenging tradition.

Oh, and the issue of officers as pilots for UAV's was looked at by a few in the 1990's. Here's one paper (https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay1999/saas/tobin.pdf). I would support reexamining it and I hope the some enterprising NCO's or junior officers take it on.

The UAV pilot problems in the Air Force are not due to a shortage of pilots, but they way UAV's are currently operated in the force. UAV's are not yet their own co-equal weapons platform. So, for example, a pilot can't be a full-time UAV pilot under the current system. UAV slots are temporary assignments lasting 3-4 years, so there is no permanent cadre of pilots to build upon. The bottleneck is really training since with no permanent pilots training resources are sucked-up on replacements. Adding to the problem is the extreme demand for UAV's which has in some cases taken instructors away from training new pilots which negatively impacts the ability to increase the number of qualified pilots.

What the service needs to do, IMO, is create a permanent cadre of UAV pilots and make it a co-equal platform where pilots can spend a majority of their careers.

[Entropy]

Entropy,

The capability to keep the skies clear forever and ever against all enemies foriegn and domestic is the mission dejour for AF as a whole (at least in my limited perspective). But what about the sudden introduction of anything (use your imagination) which would cause manned flights to be untenable. What then?

Just trying to take a stab at the meat of it.

That certainly could be a possibility at some point, but one could say the same thing about manned tanks, for example. I know there's a lot of focus on unmanned aircraft for the future, but I think a lot of people are missing some significant vulnerabilities they introduce. Specifically, control of the aircraft has to come via some signal which could be hacked or jammed. An attack on the satellite network or the comm network could disable the entire force. Unmanned aircraft offer a lot of possibility, but until there is pretty solid assurance that the supporting C3 network cannot be interdicted I think a man-in-the-loop will remain a requirement. However, given that airframes are lasting longer and longer, I would not be surprised if the follow-on to the F-22 is unmanned 30-40 years from now, or perhaps platforms will go away completely in lieu of long-range autonomous weapons. Or maybe we'll get Iron Man! (http://ironmanmovie.marvel.com/) :D Now that would be cool, but imagine the service fight over who would get to develop it!

[Old Eagle]

A lot of chatter among the air guys about the efficacy of a prop airplane. In truth, props are bad, it would be much better to mod F-15s to run at a coupla hundred bucks per operational hour instead of whatever it costs now. The mods should also allow maintenance by largely illiterate populations with materials readily at hand.

As far as "BPC" goes, don't worry about it. Some enterprising company will step up to fill the void. Blackwater is already active in the air world; wouldn't take much to develop a core of contractors to advise HN air forces (or Army Air Corps in countries who keep the relationship in order.)

That way, OUR air force could fly air superiority missions against ...um..

[wm]

. . .it quite often helps to look at the past. I am currently reading Lee Kennett's The First Air War 1914-1918. I heartily recommend it to those who are trying to figure out where the attitude and culture of the worlds' air forces come from. We have not heard from our non-American readership about the other air forces of the world, but I suspect their reports would not be that different. Kennett has some interesting discussion that I find explains much of it quite handily. But, I suspect there is more to this as well.

While working in a strategic intelligence unit that was a tenant in USAREUR, my troops and I were treated by the folks from 7th Army units with an attitude similar to that expressed here by ground forces types about the air arm. On an almost daily basis we were subjected to comments like "get a haircut" and "try sleeping in a tent for a change." My troops would be jerked awake at 0500 (after working a second shift and getting back at about 0100) by Jodies about them "sleeping in," yelled by the neighboring FA Bn's batteries as they ran by in their PT formations. I suspect some part of it was envy/sour grapes on the part of the FA and Armor guys that we affectionately referred to as "treads." And, within our joint organization, interestingly enough, the Army INSCOM folks made similar snide comments about the Air Force and Navy personnel worked along side us. My point here is that some of the attitude expressed by members of the junior service may be a defense mechanism while some is simply an expression of group rivalry.

[Ron Humphrey]

That certainly could be a possibility at some point, but one could say the same thing about manned tanks, for example. I know there's a lot of focus on unmanned aircraft for the future, but I think a lot of people are missing some significant vulnerabilities they introduce. Specifically, control of the aircraft has to come via some signal which could be hacked or jammed. An attack on the satellite network or the comm network could disable the entire force. Unmanned aircraft offer a lot of possibility, but until there is pretty solid assurance that the supporting C3 network cannot be interdicted I think a man-in-the-loop will remain a requirement. However, given that airframes are lasting longer and longer, I would not be surprised if the follow-on to the F-22 is unmanned 30-40 years from now, or perhaps platforms will go away completely in lieu of long-range autonomous weapons. Or maybe we'll get Iron Man! (http://ironmanmovie.marvel.com/) :D Now that would be cool, but imagine the service fight over who would get to develop it!

However consider that an armor guy would probably be one of the first to try his hand at driving them by remote considering what happens if one actually gets hit by something which can hurt it.

Also consider that from their perspective if it stops moving then you get out and you "are " infantry. For a grunt whats the comparison to that scenario for the pilot?

Not trying to play devil's advocate so much as simply trying to get perspective on it.

[Ron Humphrey]

. My point here is that some of the attitude expressed by members of the junior service may be a defense mechanism {while some is simply an expression of group rivalry}.

Not too sure this part is such a bad thing since a little competition helps keep the rust off:D

[Entropy]

However consider that an armor guy would probably be one of the first to try his hand at driving them by remote considering what happens if one actually gets hit by something which can hurt it.

Also consider that from their perspective if it stops moving then you get out and you "are " infantry. For a grunt whats the comparison to that scenario for the pilot?

Not trying to play devil's advocate so much as simply trying to get perspective on it.

No, you're right. Both the Air Force and Navy are limited by their environments and depend on their machines not only to fight, but for basic human survival. But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?

Additionally, I hinted above that big changes are coming in the Air Force and the service could be fundamentally different in 50 years - perhaps unrecognizable. I think the current leadership, despite their old-school mentality, may sense it as well which may explain why the AF has such a woody for "space" and "cyberspace." On the latter, I suspect the AF's effort here will prove them either be fools or visionaries. In either event, it will be interesting to see what happens!

[120mm]

First of all, I'm going proceed on the assumption that comments like "apple-polishing" are not referring to the vast majority of rank-and-file USAF personnel.

No, I'm talking about the USAF assigning airmen to missions like tower and convoy security. While I appreciate airmen doing this, their actual contribution in this role is micro-inconsequential and so far out of the Air Force's "lane" that it is obviously a transparent ploy to make the USAF look like they "are in the fight". What would happen if the USAF actually embraced missions that contributed to the current, actual fight, in addition to the theoretical future fight.



I'll take these one-at-a-time:

1. From my perspective the AF's position is that the A-10 along with UAV's will best fill the COIN CAS role. The A-10's are currently in a SLEP program to upgrade them to the C model - you can google the details if you wish - and extend the airframe's life out to around 2030. Army thinking on UAV's actually seems pretty close to the Air Force. The Army's version of the predator/warrior is slated to do armed reconnaissance/target acquisition and serve as a C3 platform for BFT, radios, etc. for the ground force. The Air Force version is going to be more focused on ISR and as a long-endurance precision strike platform. Together I think they will be a nice compliment.


With all due respect, this is complete and utter bull####. If it were up to the Air Force, there would be NO A-10 and NO UAS. It has taken acts of congress to get them to retain the A-10, and only the Army's adoption of UAS has kept the Air Force in this game, out of self-defense.

The current attempts to "get control" of UAS from the Army is indicative of traditional USAF MO. "State it is 'your lane', get control of the systems and then kill them." We have USAF officers and retirees acting as contractors who are pushing airstrikes like a dealer pushing meth on a playground around here, but I have never seen USAF types attempt to push recon or observation platforms on Army types. A more constructive strategy, by the Air Force, would be to "flood the skies" with their own airframes, and force the Army to prove they really need UAS.

The USAF effectively killed CAS in the past by using the same tactics as they are currently using against UAS: Wrest control from the Army, and then quit doing the mission. Then, when the stuff hits the fan "it's too hard".


2. Aeromedical evac is not my thing, but the AF did develop EMEDs in the late 1990's which are, I believe, used today. Beyond that, I'm not sure what the problem is - if you could expand on that point a bit more it would be helpful.

I'm not talking about Aeromedical evac, I'm talking about airtransportable hospitals, which can be exported to support both combat troops and HA missions. As the USAF doesn't push PR on this mission like the Army does, I'm left to assume they don't view it as a priority. Personally, I think the PR story of a dedicated HA/medical branch of the USAF would be awesome IO for them.


3. The Air Force would like to buy more cargo aircraft and has been quietly fighting for a few years now to buy more C-17's beyond what the DoD wants based on the latest joint mobility capabilities study. Additionally, it's trying to decide if it's better to upgrade the C-5 or retire the C-5 and buy more C-17's to replace that capability which is a tough decision actually. As for the C-130, the service is reluctant to buy a bunch more of these aircraft right now because new requirements imposed by FCS means a new airlifter will have to be built to carry those vehicles. FCS seems to be falling apart, however, so maybe that will change.

Quietly, indeed. I would submit that their priorities are reversed. I would be quietly funding the F-22, and screaming and hollering about cargo aircraft like there is no tomorrow.

While my manner is abrupt, do not mistake my dislike of the way the USAF has done business for their entire freaking history (John Gotti could learn something from them) and the way the institutional USAF is screwing the pooch right now, with a fundamental dislike of the USAF. In fact, my passion comes from my basic love of the USAF, and what they COULD be. Nothing ticks me off more than wasted talent and opportunities.

[120mm]

No, you're right. Both the Air Force and Navy are limited by their environments and depend on their machines not only to fight, but for basic human survival. But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?

Ummm, some of the best fighters I've ever met were armor types. They tend to have extremely good awareness of how to apply sightlines and fires, as well as bringing a different paradigm to the infantry combat framework.

[120mm]

As for the USAF caring, I'm sorry you feel that way. I know the folks who I work with are well aware and all do care- almost every unit has someone deployed to the AOR. One of my two NCOs got mortared twice yesterday at Balad.

You make my point about the USAF "not caring". The USAF has put those NCOs into a position to get mortared not because their core mission required it, but because they are trying to make a "statement" by putting personnel in harms way.

There is not a single place on Anaconda where an USAF personnel should legitimately be, doing a valid USAF mission where mortars should be an issue. I calculated the sightlines myself, back in 2003, when we occupied it. (Rockets, on the other hand, can range the airfield, but not accurately)

While we're at it, the USAF fought tooth and nail not to even be IN Balad. They wanted to occupy BIAP, and intentionally bombed Balad SE runways(which was abandoned pre-war) in order to deter the Army from occupying it. I saw the freaking target lists, both before, and after we attempted to coordinate with the Air Force to form Balad SE as the Corps air hub.

[Cliff]

What is the "minimum" number of F-35s and F-22s? And why both?

Why do you need enough armor/troops to be able to fight on the Korean peninsula and in another conflict at the same time?

Why do you need both Bradleys and M-1s? Or both MRAPs and Strykers?

The F-22 and F-35 are different airplanes, with different capabilities. You need the F-22 because it has capabilities that the F-35 doesn't have. And not just for shooting down Flankers. It is not an either-or option - the F-35 is not viable without the F-22, just like the F-16 was not viable without the F-15 to provide air superiority.

You need a minimum number of them so that you can support the National Military Strategy and cover more than one conflict at the same time while still doing your everyday homeland defense missions.

Put another way, which AOR would you prefer your Army and USMC folks be open to air attack in?



Eliminate some officer billets and give more authority and responsibility to NCOs (they're cheaper). Eliminate AFSCs by requiring more "multitasking" of personnel (some of this is being done).


These are all already in the works. In many cases it isn't working out - there's only so many jobs you can have folks do. For example, they have combined all the life support folks into one AFSC. Problem is that now you don't have the folks with the specalized knowledge... there's only so far you can go in being a jack of all trades before you become a master of none.



Scrub acquisition costs with a wire brush (especially Space and AFSOC).


Agree with this!



Cancel all base maintenance contracts (Airmen can cut grass and paint stuff).


Contractors are cheaper than airmen in many cases - when you include the medical benefits and the retirement, it's much cheaper to have a contractor do it. Better to save your money for the jobs only military folks can do - or at least that's the rationale.



Granted you could also focus more scrutiny on the other three service’s programs and probably find significant savings. But the Marines seem to pretty much make do with what they get, the Army seems careful in what it pushes hard for (although IMHO I think JIEDDO was a bit pricey for the result), and these days it seems like the Navy just tries to stay under everyone’s radar.

The Marines and Navy are a fundamental part of the F-35... so if you're arguing the AF doesn't need the F-35, why do the USMC and USN need it? And by the way, if the F-35 is so horrible for CAS, why is the USMC fighting so hard to get them?

Again, I am not trying to start arguements, but at some point you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.

What level of risk are you willing to accept in this area? What AOR should the risk be accepted in? Or will you attempt to use another system to achieve the same effects as the F-22? If so what system?

[Cliff]

You make my point about the USAF "not caring". The USAF has put those NCOs into a position to get mortared not because their core mission required it, but because they are trying to make a "statement" by putting personnel in harms way.

My NCO is in the desert based on orders from SECDEF - the AF had no input. He is not "making a statement".

You would rather not have AF folks there helping? The result would be increased deployments for your Army troops - I guess that is "caring" for your people?

I understand you dislike the Air Force, but that doesn't make everyone in it evil and uncaring.

[Entropy]

No, I'm talking about the USAF assigning airmen to missions like tower and convoy security. While I appreciate airmen doing this, their actual contribution in this role is micro-inconsequential and so far out of the Air Force's "lane" that it is obviously a transparent ploy to make the USAF look like they "are in the fight". What would happen if the USAF actually embraced missions that contributed to the current, actual fight, in addition to the theoretical future fight.

Airmen got assigned to convoy duty and other "in lieu of" positions because the USAF was told to pony up manpower for that purpose - not, as you allege - as some kind of transparent AF ploy. The Navy is shouldered with similar requirements. The CSAF and other senior AF leaders have testified before Congress and others they oppose airmen operating out of their core competencies, yet the ILO requirements were increased again this year.

You last question begs another which is what missions exactly could the AF be doing to contribute to the "current, actual fight" that it is not already doing?


With all due respect, this is complete and utter bull####. If it were up to the Air Force, there would be NO A-10 and NO UAS. It has taken acts of congress to get them to retain the A-10, and only the Army's adoption of UAS has kept the Air Force in this game, out of self-defense.

IIRC, the AF last considered killing the A-10 before the Gulf War in 1991. How long ago is that? The AF, whatever it's stance was over a decade ago, fully supports the A-10 now and is even looking at placing a squadron under AFSOC that would be dedicated to SOF support.

And your history on the UAV's is simply wrong. Predator and several other UAV's all came out of an organization called DARO in the mid-1990's - an organization that was intended to be the NRO for airborne ISR platforms and would have controlled development and acquisition of these platforms. From the beginning, the Army opposed DARO, refusing even to fully man its alloted billets, and DARO subsequently died. Predator continued to be developed and improved by the Air Force long before OIF. It's hard to argue, therefore, that the "Army's adoption of UAS" was the only thing that kept the AF interested in UAV's. One could, I think, reasonably argue the opposite.


I'm not talking about Aeromedical evac, I'm talking about airtransportable hospitals, which can be exported to support both combat troops and HA missions.

And like I said, the AF developed such a thing in the 1990's called EMEDS and EMEDS personnel are some of the highest optempo in the Air Force. So what's the complaint? Are there not enough of these in theater? Are they being poorly utilitized? What, precisely, is the problem and what, exactly, do you want the AF to do differently?


As the USAF doesn't push PR on this mission like the Army does, I'm left to assume they don't view it as a priority. Personally, I think the PR story of a dedicated HA/medical branch of the USAF would be awesome IO for them.

The AF prioritizes aeromedical evacuation because that's it's primary medical mission. Perhaps the AF should advertise its EMEDS support more often, though I suspect some would cynically view that as simply more evidence of the AF attempting to remain "relevant." The AF has it's own medical people and "branch." (https://www.afms.mil/sg/index.htm)


Quietly, indeed. I would submit that their priorities are reversed. I would be quietly funding the F-22, and screaming and hollering about cargo aircraft like there is no tomorrow.

Well, a few years ago, the AF WAS loud about it, but the DoD told them to shut up and color, so the service has worked quietly since. The USAF wants more airlift and has for quite a while - but as you probably know, the services can only do so much once DoD has made up its mind. More recently, the AF again publicly went against the DoD on the question of F-22's and was, again, told to shut up and color. Guess which incident received all the press coverage? If you want more airlift, find out who's representing the Army at the next joint airlift requirements board and ask them to scream long and loud for more - the AF will appreciate such efforts.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Some of your suggestions sound reasonable, others not so much, but what do any of them have to do with the AF and COIN - or the wars we're in currently? At most they seem like tertiary solutions only designed to save a bit of money.

Just responding to Cliff’s query. ;)

To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost. :eek:

I'm going to offer an oversimplification here: The only way to completely defeat your enemy, particularly in COIN, is to occupy his land with your people (and by “your” people I mean they can be our troops or indigenous personnel on our side of the COIN). You do not have to kill them necessarily, but you do have to be physically present on the ground. That is the essence of the infantryman.

Everything else the military does is done to support him.

COIN is conflict with both a knife and a handshake, and while having air “power” is nice, it’s not always necessary, air transportation is much more important. It is difficult to win hearts and minds and show people you care from 30,000 feet. Although today you certainly can kill them more accurately from up there.

Having total control of the air certainly makes the infantry’s job easier. But typically in COIN the opposition has no aircraft of note, so it’s a moot point.

Having space superiority certainly makes the infantry’s intel support better. But typically in COIN the opposition has no space capability of note.

So were does the USAF fit in the COIN picture? First must come that essential realization they are a "support" service first and foremost (and yes I believe Douhet, Doolittle, Arnold, and LeMay will roll in their graves). Then seriously asking the Army and Marines what the USAF can do for them to best assist them in the fight. I suspect the answers would be more airlift, UAVs, and ISR capability.

Perfect their CAS capability. If this means more A-10’s, so be it. Get more UAS assets into service. If it means having operators who are not rated, so be it.

Put the F-22/F-35/Tanker issues on the back burner and move to the front things that COIN actually needs, but that means looking at COIN from the practitioner’s POV and not from the Air Forces’.

“there's only so far you can go in being a jack of all trades before you become a master of none.” That’s the Marines motto! Although it’s more along the lines of being a jack of all trades yet a master of few. You do what you must to get the job done. Sometimes the USAF does suffer from over specialization.

“..you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.” That depends on where we operate. Air Superiority in not a prerequisite for us to operate, it is something very, very nice to have. When was the last time US ground forces were subjected to sustained air attack? Not that it couldn’t happen in the future.

“I am not trying to start arguments.” But this is a great place for argumentation, in the polite sense, as long as we can agreeably agree to disagree while avoiding being disagreeable. :D

“What level of risk are you willing to accept in this area? What AOR should the risk be accepted in? Or will you attempt to use another system to achieve the same effects as the F-22? If so what system?”

I guess I could counter with what relevancy does the F-22/F-35 have in COIN? Who is it we are looking to use the F-22 against? China? Iran? Russia? Lichtenstein? If so, when and where?

I do not get to see what our National leadership is really thinking but I do know that at this moment in time we are in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and not in China and Russia. Our primary focus should be on how we defeat an implacable enemy in those two arenas, an enemy I might note without a single aircraft, before we seek to pick a fight somewhere else.

[Ken White]

...To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost. :eek:Yes and no. In the air, they are primary; for land warfare they are indeed support and I suggest that dichotomy is a part of their character and thus gives rise to the attitudinal problem.
I'm going to offer an oversimplification here: The only way to completely defeat your enemy, particularly in COIN, is to occupy his land with your people (and by “your” people I mean they can be our troops or indigenous personnel on our side of the COIN). You do not have to kill them necessarily, but you do have to be physically present on the ground. That is the essence of the infantryman...Everything else the military does is done to support him...Having total control of the air certainly makes the infantry’s job easier. But typically in COIN the opposition has no aircraft of note, so it’s a moot point.True and that is the here and now -- but there's a reason that is true...
“...you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.” That depends on where we operate. Air Superiority in not a prerequisite for us to operate, it is something very, very nice to have. When was the last time US ground forces were subjected to sustained air attack? Not that it couldn’t happen in the future.Having been subjected to enemy air attack, friendly air superiority is indeed nice to have. Very, very nice. I 'm personally a fan of us having all the air superiority we can get. Your points on COIN are correct -- but neither you nor I can guarantee that COIN will be the role we'll always be in or even that our very next war will be a COIN fight. It's important to recall that we are and have been in several COIN fights in recent years in large measure simply because the Air Force, the Navy and the Marines can all mount a successful air dominance battle. I for one would greatly prefer to keep it that way.
I guess I could counter with what relevancy does the F-22/F-35 have in COIN? Who is it we are looking to use the F-22 against? China? Iran? Russia? Lichtenstein? If so, when and where?Fair question. Do you know the answer?
I do not get to see what our National leadership is really thinking but I do know that at this moment in time we are in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and not in China and Russia. Our primary focus should be on how we defeat an implacable enemy in those two arenas, an enemy I might note without a single aircraft, before we seek to pick a fight somewhere else.Wise words. Hopefully our national leadership will heed them. Who's prepared to guarantee that others will play by our rules...

The F22 is necessary; so is the F35 (even more so IMO -- and it will be an F16 on steroids in the COIN fights). More C17s, 130s and re-engining the C5Bs would be nice. Nice and necessary are different. Not to mention that as Cliff and Entropy pointed out, there's a body od folks in the AF who are on board with you on that score (notably AFSOC). DoD and the mil contractors can be faulted for gold plating equipment, excessively long development cycles and poor procurement practices but I'd note that is a DoD wide (EFV, MV22, Commanche, LCS, Virginia class anyone???) problem and is far from Air Force specific. The USAF can be faulted for misplaced priorities off and on over the years and for having an attitude problem but to be fair, they've done a lot more good than harm.

[Ron Humphrey]

Air Superiority is very important. OK

What other assets besides just the airplanes themselves help maintain air superiority?

Are there perhaps some being left out of this discussion which might have a lot to say about more cooperative and/or integrated ways of fulfilling the requirement?

And if so would this not allow for more measured approach to specialized order but more in the realm of whats truly necessary vs what might just be more comfortable?

[Ken White]

...And if so would this not allow for more measured approach to specialized order but more in the realm of whats truly necessary vs what might just be more comfortable?predict what the next war and, given todays development times, the one after that will be like, I think...

[Ron Humphrey]

predict what the next war and, given todays development times, the one after that will be like, I think...

I was merely thinking about ADA, High flying drop it and let it run big boys, helicopter, etc:wry:

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

at Agincourt count as "Having been subjected to enemy air attack."?

:D


Fair question. Do you know the answer?

Well, I'm pretty sure it's not Lichtenstein. I do not argue from the aspect that the F-22 is unnecessary, but the USAF has already been given the "hand in the face" by the SecDef on how many to buy. But still they whine about peer competitors. How about a nice "Aye aye, Sir" coupled with a snappy about face and press on. I would hope the 10 pound brains across the Potomac figured out how much risk to take by cutting production levels.

But I do keep asking them to allow me in on those NSC briefs... or just let me be in charge for awhile. ;)

I agree, its ultimately predicated on whether you can accurately predict the level of the next few wars. Still, our military history shows more COIN/LIC level conflicts with the "big battalion" wars being the exception rather than the rule. So my Vegas bookie says bet on lower intensity for the short term but keep an eye on the trifecta of Beijing Moscow Tehran.


Who's prepared to guarantee that others will play by our rules...

No one, besides, most of the "rules" imposed upon us are our own, stemming from a sincere desire to do what's right.

Perhaps we should stop assuming there are rules, but then we would be stooping to the base levels of those we fight.

It's a conundrum at best and all part and parcel of a Democracy with morals fighting a war using volunteers. :cool:

[Ken White]

at Agincourt count as "Having been subjected to enemy air attack."?:Yes they did... ;)
Well, I'm pretty sure it's not Lichtenstein. I do not argue from the aspect that the F-22 is unnecessary, but the USAF has already been given the "hand in the face" by the SecDef on how many to buy. But still they whine about peer competitors. How about a nice "Aye aye, Sir" coupled with a snappy about face and press on. I would hope the 10 pound brains across the Potomac figured out how much risk to take by cutting production levels.While I totally agree with you on a philosophical level, that is, unfortunately, not the way our Congress chooses to work -- or to allow DoD to work. Reality is always a pain in the tail. I also suggest the five sided funny farm does not have a great track record in ascertaining (or accepting) risk -- or probabilities. The neat thing about being a dumb grunt is I don't have to worry about peer competitors in the air; I can be pretty cavalier and dismissive about it. However, some folks do get paid to worry about that. They may not do it our way but that doesn't necessarily mean they're wrong.
But I do keep asking them to allow me in on those NSC briefs... or just let me be in charge for awhile. ;)Me too, so far with little success :(
I agree, its ultimately predicated on whether you can accurately predict the level of the next few wars. Still, our military history shows more COIN/LIC level conflicts with the "big battalion" wars being the exception rather than the rule. So my Vegas bookie says bet on lower intensity for the short term but keep an eye on the trifecta of Beijing Moscow Tehran.Yep. Though I'm not worried about Tehran. The EU or a monolithic South America, OTOH...

Not to mention that I don't bet, I seem to end up donating, so I don't got no bookie; said bookies may end up winning more than they lose but when they get it wrong, it's usually way wrong, with them, it's only money; with us, somebody's gonna be dead...
No one, besides, most of the "rules" imposed upon us are our own, stemming from a sincere desire to do what's right.Generally if not universally true but the other guy does have a say and he doesn't have to tell us in advance what he'll say or when or where he'll say it...
Perhaps we should stop assuming there are rules, but then we would be stooping to the base levels of those we fight.We can be and have been pretty base ourselves. I can recall some incidents in Korea with the 1 MarDiv that are better left unmentioned. May have to be that way again, never can tell. In any event, I used 'rules' as shorthand; I simply meant the other guy is not constrained to do what we would like him to do. Assymetric is not just a COIN fight, it's doing the unexpected...
It's a conundrum at best and all part and parcel of a Democracy with morals fighting a war using volunteers. :cool:To get the thread back on track, I don't think it's a conundrum at all, in this case it's simply a case of making prudent and sensible investments and that is always extremely difficult because as the man said, "It's hard to make predictions, especially about the future."

[selil]

I have some concerns about the f22, f35, etc... class of air craft. These all seem like fast moving, anti-aircraft, aircraft. Where are the Warthogs? In COIN the fighting is in close and pin-point accuracy versus saturation effect means bombers aren't as effective. Fast moving jets can't be nearly as effective unless they are using laser guided munitions which takes at least one or two individuals out of the ground fight to designate a target that may be highly mobile. I'm not sure if these are issues or not, but the choices of platform seem to be driving farther from CAS and COIN.

[Ken White]

I have some concerns about the f22, f35, etc... class of air craft. These all seem like fast moving, anti-aircraft, aircraft. Where are the Warthogs? In COIN the fighting is in close and pin-point accuracy versus saturation effect means bombers aren't as effective. Fast moving jets can't be nearly as effective unless they are using laser guided munitions which takes at least one or two individuals out of the ground fight to designate a target that may be highly mobile. I'm not sure if these are issues or not, but the choices of platform seem to be driving farther from CAS and COIN.Both the F15 and F16 as well as the F22 and F35 can do their own laser designating from on high -- as can the bombers nowadays as more and more of them are equipped with Sniper or other pods.

The issue on the F22 and F35 is, again, can you guarantee that we'll only need aircraft to support COIN operations in the admittedly excessive length of time it now takes to develop and field an aircraft system?

Plus the F35 will bring some real strengths to any type of war, COIN or air dominance...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

a philosophical level. :)

Granted Congress does mess with the procurement process a wee bit too much but the F-22 is not one of those systems that they are pushing the Air Force to acquire, just the opposite.

If Congress would allow the USAF to divest themselves of those legacy systems they are trying to rid themselves of then mayhaps they could make a better case for more F-35s. B-52's have been relegated to systems carriers, and slow ones at that.

I believe that here “prudent and sensible investments” is often an oxymoron. :p

[Ken White]

a philosophical level. :)

Granted Congress does mess with the procurement process a wee bit too much but the F-22 is not one of those systems that they are pushing the Air Force to acquire, just the opposite.Didn't say it was -- but the way Congress works the appropriations process is what drives the train on procurement, the F22 is just one example of how that charade works. The EFV is another. The process is the reality I referred to.
If Congress would allow the USAF to divest themselves of those legacy systems they are trying to rid themselves of then mayhaps they could make a better case for more F-35s. B-52's have been relegated to systems carriers, and slow ones at that.Conversely, if the USAF would not skew its purchases (Build the golf course, then the club -- then ask for more money to build an airstrip) then Congress wouldn't have to do that. It would also help if Lockheed Martin had been too dumb to get subcontractors in virtually every Congressional district but they weren't. Unfortunately, the AF and all the services do play with system as do the contractors and as does Congress. Plenty of egg here for everyone's face...
I believe that here “prudent and sensible investments” is often an oxymoron. :pAs it is everywhere -- because one mans "prudent and sensible" is another's "maybe..." and yet another's "waste and inefficiency." Always easy for us kibitizers to find errors and point 'em out; less easy to make those decisions when one has the responsibility if things go wrong.

[Cavguy]

But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?



<sigh> :rolleyes:

OIF has shown that the tankers (and artillerymen, and engineers) can convert into quite adequate infantry if need be. The cost is that they degrade their primary MOS sills. At a basic level, tactics are tactics. Infantry platoon maneuver isn't conceptually that much different than armor or cav maneuver. Leadership is leadership. Tactics for the environment can be quickly learned.

Even more so, their leaders are often exceptional COIN fighters. As has been repeatedly noted, Armor officers have sheparded the most significant successes in Iraq, and developed tactics and operational art that became models for the rest of the country.

Peruse some of the Armor/Mech in COIN threads for your answer. Look for anything on Tal Afar, Ramadi, Kerbala, or Najaf. Google the branches of H.R. McMaster, Sean MacFarland, John Nagl, and Peter Monsoor.

[Rank amateur]

Having been subjected to enemy air attack,

I was waiting for someone to say that. (Should've known I could count on Ken.) I don't think we should be doing a Rumsfeld on the AF. "Can you maintain air superiority with fewer planes, even fewer, even fewer." It was a disaster in OIF, it'll be even worse if we lose air superiority because we spread too few planes too thin.

The Navy wants a new sub. Out of any service, they are the ones who should cut back.

[Entropy]

Just responding to Cliff’s query. ;)

To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost. :eek:


I feel pretty safe in saying that pretty much everyone in the AF knows that we are the supporting service. When you think about it, the AF is the most joint service because so much of what the AF does is not for AF needs. Airlift is one, CAS is another, ISR is a third, Aeromedical evac another and one could consider tanking for Navy and Marine aircraft a fifth. Even missions like BAI are ground-component support since the goal is to attrit enemy ground forces to reduce their threat to ours. How many functions does the Army or Navy have that support the AF mission? I would say Patriot, but it's shot down more allied aircraft than enemy, so I'm not so sure about that one. ;)

You can even consider one of the AF's newer TV commercials (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=36jVTmq81qA) or even it's own internal propaganda...er...press (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kSpOYZR0klA). Could you imagine an Army recruiting ad talking about what wonderful support they provide the AF or Navy? :wry:


I'm going to offer an oversimplification here: The only way to completely defeat your enemy, particularly in COIN, is to occupy his land with your people (and by “your” people I mean they can be our troops or indigenous personnel on our side of the COIN). You do not have to kill them necessarily, but you do have to be physically present on the ground. That is the essence of the infantryman.

Everything else the military does is done to support him.

The vast majority of the time that is correct.


So were does the USAF fit in the COIN picture? First must come that essential realization they are a "support" service first and foremost (and yes I believe Douhet, Doolittle, Arnold, and LeMay will roll in their graves).

First of all, see above. Secondly, all those guys rolled over in their graves many times back in 1992 when SAC was disestablished. I don't think a lot of people realize what a big deal that was - SAC was the big Kahuna in the AF and the AF got rid of it right after the cold war ended and completely reorganized. I think it shows the AF is perfectly capable of changing with the times and instituting big changes in response to a new strategic environment.


Then seriously asking the Army and Marines what the USAF can do for them to best assist them in the fight. I suspect the answers would be more airlift, UAVs, and ISR capability.

I think perhaps you assume the AF hasn't done this, and regardless, the Army is perfectly capable of making its support requirements clear without the AF having to prod. I think your suspicion as to what is needed is correct - now if we can only get DoD to sign off on more airlift and solve the UAV issues.


Perfect their CAS capability.

I don't hear many complaints about CAS anymore. It seems the system and support is working pretty good, though there is always room for improvement.


Put the F-22/F-35/Tanker issues on the back burner and move to the front things that COIN actually needs, but that means looking at COIN from the practitioner’s POV and not from the Air Forces’.

Why? The AF can walk and chew gum and work on these and ground support at the same time. Besides, without tankers, there won't be much CAS or ISR or even airlift. There's a very good reason that tankers are the AF's #1 procurement priority. Also, the Army is not neglecting it's conventional capabilities either considering the money it's requested in the latest budget for things like Patriot and MLRS.

[Entropy]

<sigh> :rolleyes:


Thanks for setting me straight. I made some dated erroneous assumptions based on the tales a couple of old school armor guys I know. My apologies on that.

[Ron Humphrey]

I was waiting for someone to say that. (Should've known I could count on Ken.) I don't think we should be doing a Rumsfeld on the AF. "Can you maintain air superiority with fewer planes, even fewer, even fewer." It was a disaster in OIF, it'll be even worse if we lose air superiority because we spread too few planes too thin.

The Navy wants a new sub. Out of any service, they are the ones who should cut back.

I don't recall off hand the latest achievement of any peer competitors recently in airpower(at least not that we would be flying against that we know of),
but I seem to remember several instances of new subs showing up from somewhere:eek:

[Rob Thornton]

Man - seems like we retake this hill every so often:D.

Re-reading Secretary Gate's speech at Maxwell (and worth comparing to his speech at USMA, and Secretary Geren's speech at the Marshall Awards), I don't think he was worried too much about the procurement end and hardware - he was targeting grey matter.

I don't discount the $$$s - but I point out that the materiel piece is the end product. If we let the product define and constrain us, the enemy gets the advantage at some point. I think most of the hardware pieces I've seen in action are mostly suitable to us and our range of requirements - the piece that is sometimes lacking is our ability to get past our constrained thinking. On the ground - its people that make it work, that innovate, adapt, cooperate, empathize and understand the operational environment - breaking free from service cultures and prejudices. I've got many an Army 19D, Logistician and MI bubba, many an airman (who flew ISR, EW, and CAS missions), many a seaman (the naval EWOs & logisticians) to thank. All of these guys broke the mold - they discarded the mantra "that's not my job" and adopted "support the mission".

If we get the "grey matter" piece right - the rest will follow.

Best, Rob

[Rank amateur]

I don't recall off hand the latest achievement of any peer competitors recently in airpower(at least not that we would be flying against that we know of),
but I seem to remember several instances of new subs showing up from somewhere:eek:

Iran is rumored to be buying almost 300 of these. (http://youtube.com/watch?v=X9scN7pwjFg&feature=related)

They can afford good training too. I have wondered if the variable thrust gives these planes the ability to outmaneuver one of our missiles. (I'm sure a AF guy can tell me.) If so, it seems to me that they could cause a lot of damage. Especially since the Iranians have a tradition of martyrdom.

I think that if all our fighters were in the Middle East, China might be tempted to grab Taiwan. Kim Jung Il might start feeling a little adventurous too. Do we want to take the chance or do we want to be prepared?

On the other hand, I am more than willing to take a chance that we can destroy any enemy subs we might possible need to sink without another sub.

[Entropy]

I don't recall off hand the latest achievement of any peer competitors recently in airpower(at least not that we would be flying against that we know of),
but I seem to remember several instances of new subs showing up from somewhere:eek:

There are a few factors at play. Potential hostile world airforces are not, from a technical standpoint, as threatening as some F-22 advocates might have you believe, though some of the new Russian designs they're pushing for export are pretty sweet and they do outclass the F-15, but not by much when things like training, tactics and C3 are taken into account. The thing is that the F-22 will be the main fighter for perhaps the next 40-50 years, like the F-15 before it, and threat aircraft will undoubtedly increase in capability over that time.

Additionally, the F-22 was originally intended solely as a fighter, but will now have important strike missions and is actually intended to replace the F-117. Air Defense is really where the serious threats are these days and the F-22 will be what is sometimes called a "double-digit SAM killer" - meaning SA-10 and newer systems with capabilities on par with Patriot. I can go into some detail on the SAM threat as it relates to the F-22 if there anyone is interested - that is one of my geeky knowledge areas.

Finally, a lot of what's driving the boat are airframe limitations. The F-15's are wearing out and the first lot numbers have already been retired. There are three options in that case - SLEP and upgrade existing aircraft, buy new F-15's, buy F-22's. Were this 1998 and not 2008, I would probably recommend the second option - buy more F-15's. The first option has been studied and deemed too expensive - such upgrades almost equal the price tag on a new F-15. The second option doesn't make sense at this point. The F-15 production line is still open, though only producing a handful of aircraft. Those aircraft are the F-15K model that South Korea is buying and it's actually a really nice plane. The thing is, they cost about $110 million a copy. For around 30-60 million dollars more you can get F-22's, which are superior in every way and can also perform the SEAD and high-threat strike missions the F-15 cannot. Knowing what I know now with the expense and development time of the F-22, I think canceling it back in the 1990's in favor of more advanced F-15's might have been a better choice, and then shelve the F-22 for 10 or 15 years until the F-15 is really old in the tooth. At this point though, the F-22 is done. Over 1/2 of the planned 187 plane buy have been delivered and funding for the remaining has already been programmed or promised for by Congress. There are only three years of production left - The 187th plane will come off the line in 2011 at which point Congress and the next administration will have to decide whether to buy more, close the the line, or pay to keep the line on standby for future acquisitions.

We're at that point now with the C-17, actually. The line was supposed to shut down a couple years ago, but Congress and foreign orders have kept it open for now. Closing production is a serious decision because doing so costs close to half-a billion dollars by itself and if more airframes are needed in the future, it's neither easy nor cheap to re-start production.

Anyway, now I'm rambling - sorry, I get carried away! :o

[Ron Humphrey]

Iran is rumored to be buying almost 300 of these. (http://youtube.com/watch?v=X9scN7pwjFg&feature=related)

They can afford good training too. I have wondered if the variable thrust gives these planes the ability to outmaneuver one of our missiles. (I'm sure a AF guy can tell me.) If so, it seems to me that they could cause a lot of damage. Especially since the Iranians have a tradition of martyrdom.

I think that if all our fighters were in the Middle East, China might be tempted to grab Taiwan. Kim Jung Il might start feeling a little adventurous too. Do we want to take the chance or do we want to be prepared?

On the other hand, I am more than willing to take a chance that we can destroy any enemy subs we might possible need to sink without another sub.

I'll choose to concede to your reasoning. After all being Army background I'm kinda used to being told told to do more with less so accepting things isn't to hard.
perhaps this is part of the perception disconnect with us on why the AF seems to be whining vs laying out the facts. We're just kinda used to makin do so we expect others to be that way as well:confused:

[Entropy]

I'll choose to concede to your reasoning. After all being Army background I'm kinda used to being told told to do more with less so accepting things isn't to hard.
perhaps this is part of the perception disconnect with us on why the AF seems to be whining vs laying out the facts. We're just kinda used to makin do so we expect others to be that way as well:confused:

No need to concede to anything - assumptions should be challenged and if it turns out in the end you were wrong or simply misinformed, then it's a learning experience and if you're right, then you've changed someone's faulty assumptions. It's all good! :D

[Rank amateur]

I can go into some detail on the SAM threat as it relates to the F-22 if there anyone is interested - that is one of my geeky knowledge areas.


Yes please.




I'm kinda used to being told told to do more with less. We're just kinda used to makin do so

I think that's always been the case for infantry: probably always will be.

[120mm]

My NCO is in the desert based on orders from SECDEF - the AF had no input. He is not "making a statement".

You would rather not have AF folks there helping? The result would be increased deployments for your Army troops - I guess that is "caring" for your people?

The AF "help" is insubstantial, relative to numbers. It IS a PR move. And every time an AF supporter brings it up, I am reminded of that subordinate who suddenly starts bringing me coffee the week before his OER/NCOER.


I understand you dislike the Air Force, but that doesn't make everyone in it evil and uncaring.

Not true at all. If I disliked the Air Force, I wouldn't be so passionate about wanting them to do the right thing.

The thing I don't "get" is how incredibly effective they can be in getting what they "want", but the things they don't "want" are suddenly a bridge to far, or "We in the Air Force just do what we're told."

[120mm]

Before we get too involved in who can pee the farthest, this current discussion is indicative of what happens when you have two (or more) self-interested and separate groups competing for limited assets.

I work as a scenario writer at JMRC Hohenfels, and traditionally, the different groups would make their best attempt at a plan, separately, and then come together and hammer out their differences on the first day of an exercize. That was typically pretty bloody, and I doubt our effectiveness using this method.

The last rotation we ran, we made the unprecedented move of collaborating directly, between 3 different contractor groups, the Army, Air Force, and the UK Army from the beginning. Not surprisingly, we had the best rotation I've witnessed.

I think competing services are much more effective/less ineffective in conventional war. I also think that competitiveness between services is not conducive to winning COIN/unconventional warfare.

[Entropy]

The AF "help" is insubstantial, relative to numbers. It IS a PR move. And every time an AF supporter brings it up, I am reminded of that subordinate who suddenly starts bringing me coffee the week before his OER/NCOER.

:confused: I guess I don't quite understand how DoD ordering the USAF and USN to pony up manpower for tasks outside of their doctrinal missions is a "PR move." And if the numbers are "insubstantial" then why do ILO/IA requirements exist in the first place? The AF has about 6.300 people in these positions and the Navy about 8,000. What number is "substantial" and how many additional personnel are required before the reasoning ceases to be a "PR move?"


I think competing services are much more effective/less ineffective in conventional war. I also think that competitiveness between services is not conducive to winning COIN/unconventional warfare.

Partially agreed. I think a limited amount of competitiveness is usually a good thing - for questioning assumptions as much as anything else - but cooperation should be the norm. I'm a big, big fan of jointness and interoperability. Of course, the biggest service fights really boil down to money and the budget and I don't have much good to say about our current procurement process. If the budget rivalries could somehow be eliminated (I can't think of how that might be achieved) that would go along way to improving relations in other areas IMO.

Rank Amateur,

Essentially, the F-22 with it's sensor suit, stealth design, and supercruise capability allows it to penetrate the 100nm+ engagement envelopes of the new SAM systems that are beginning to proliferate and deliver weapons to kill the key nodes in those systems. It will have the ability to DF threats, image those areas with its SAR for target coordinates (for mobile and semi-mobile systems), and then pass those coordinates to a weapon - probably a small-diamter-bomb variant. It can also receive target information via datalink from other F-22's and a variety of other ISR platforms.

Anyway, to sum up based on what everyone's said it looks like there are four primary things to make the Air Force and air forces in general more effective in COIN:

1. Attitude: More AF humility and deference on COIN matters.
2. ISR: More, more, more
3. Airflift: More, more more
4. CAS: Better integration with the ground force and ??? not sure what else.

Thanks everyone for an interesting and lively debate!

[selil]

4. CAS: Better integration with the ground force and ??? not sure what else.


The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...

[Entropy]

The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...

:rolleyes:

Ok, three things. First the vagueness of that bullet was in large part due the general complaints here about CAS with an almost complete lack of specifics. Vague, generalized criticisms about not being "serious" are, to put it charitably, not very helpful.

Secondly, sending 10000 plus aviators (no mention of the Navy?) to "work with grunts" is a solution looking for a problem. It's the JTAC/JFO that needs to understand the various types of fires, capabilities and how to employ them in a particular situation. This was formalized a few years ago (http://sill-www.army.mil/jcid/Joint_Fires_Observer_Course/JFO%20MOA-Signed%2014%20Nov%2005.pdf), in case you hadn't heard.

Finally, the comment on A-10 pilot selection is frankly an insult to the many outstanding Hog pilots out there and furthermore is 100% incorrect. A-10's are part of the same training track as fighters and bombers, which usually get the top 25% of candidates depending on AF needs, pilot desires and other factors. And in that top quartile, it's actually easier to get an F-16 than an A-10 and the B-2 is the most difficult.

[120mm]

:confused: I guess I don't quite understand how DoD ordering the USAF and USN to pony up manpower for tasks outside of their doctrinal missions is a "PR move."

I guess I just don't believe that the DoD made this move on their own, without USAF and USN input, or even suggestion (I don't accept that the USAF is not politically involved in this). I put it down in the "even if it was forced upon those services, it was the natural result of ignoring/neglecting the future of conflict since 1989" category at the very least. In other words, if the USAF was decisively engaged (and was pushing this fact in its IO) in their core competency in the COIN fight, there wouldn't be the reality or perception that they had airmen available to do the mission.

[120mm]

IIRC, the AF last considered killing the A-10 before the Gulf War in 1991. How long ago is that? The AF, whatever it's stance was over a decade ago, fully supports the A-10 now and is even looking at placing a squadron under AFSOC that would be dedicated to SOF support.

While it may not be a current issue, it is instructive of what they Air Force does when it doesn't get what it wants. And it is part of the "legend" that makes the Army reluctant to believe current Air Force promises. Even with the USAF keeping the A-10, there is a definite perception within the Army that the USAF only reluctantly and recently modernized the system.


And your history on the UAV's is simply wrong. Predator and several other UAV's all came out of an organization called DARO in the mid-1990's - an organization that was intended to be the NRO for airborne ISR platforms and would have controlled development and acquisition of these platforms. From the beginning, the Army opposed DARO, refusing even to fully man its alloted billets, and DARO subsequently died. Predator continued to be developed and improved by the Air Force long before OIF. It's hard to argue, therefore, that the "Army's adoption of UAS" was the only thing that kept the AF interested in UAV's. One could, I think, reasonably argue the opposite.

Army was developing UAVs long before DARO. Ya think there may be some reason why the Army didn't want to play nice with the USAF on this? Like they saw DARO as OV-10 pt II??? The Air Force as an institution had been opposed to UAS's since its inception in 1947. In fact, they used some unmanned drones developed from other platforms on an ad hoc basis, but persistently killed them once they could. You argue about yesterday, I look at everything that's come before.

The problem isn't that USAF types aren't bad guys. The problem is that the USAF is an institution, with a long history of pulling out the football just as the Army is ready to kick it.

And the Army is not blameless, here. In fact, you won't finding me defending The Army as an institution.

[selil]

Ok, three things. First the vagueness of that bullet was in large part due the general complaints here about CAS with an almost complete lack of specifics. Vague, generalized criticisms about not being "serious" are, to put it charitably, not very helpful.

So some specific complaints about CAS being done by the USAF.

1. The ground troop mission is not fully understood by the air crews and the CAS mission for air crews is an added mission rather than a primary mission.

2. Most debate around CAS seems to be an organizational issue rather than a tactical or capability issue centered on unity of command. A personal opinion is that the troops on the ground in close proximity to the most lethal weapons on the battlefield should be controlling the release of those weapons.

3. The Marine Corps was specifically left out of the discussion as until recently Marine Aviators and Naval Aviators do operate under a unified command system and rarely (in comparison) have the issues that the Army USAF and Marine USAF have in CAS.

4. There are examples of artillery and now UAVs being used for supporting missions that when employed rarely have the issues of fratricide CAS has involved.

Oh, you don't have to believe me because the Air Force said it all first. (http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=b58S36o0ivsC&oi=fnd&pg=PR13&dq=Close+Air+Support+Army&ots=wymeBvoLeK&sig=-f_TKkg7-gQCDoWY1gLMytdWuns#PPP1,M1)


Secondly, sending 10000 plus aviators (no mention of the Navy?) to "work with grunts" is a solution looking for a problem. It's the JTAC/JFO that needs to understand the various types of fires, capabilities and how to employ them in a particular situation. This was formalized a few years ago (http://sill-www.army.mil/jcid/Joint_Fires_Observer_Course/JFO%20MOA-Signed%2014%20Nov%2005.pdf), in case you hadn't heard.

Relying on absurdity to counter a point is rarely relevant on the discussion. First only those dedicated to CAS should be required to train and understand the infantry position. Except the USAF has few dedicated CAS specialists. Further, deploying a single USAF Major to a battalion for coordination of all elements on the ground has to reach cognitive saturation rapidly.



Finally, the comment on A-10 pilot selection is frankly an insult to the many outstanding Hog pilots out there and furthermore is 100% incorrect. A-10's are part of the same training track as fighters and bombers, which usually get the top 25% of candidates depending on AF needs, pilot desires and other factors. And in that top quartile, it's actually easier to get an F-16 than an A-10 and the B-2 is the most difficult.

The comment though meant to be funny has an element of truth in it as several A10 drivers at Peterson recounted some hilarious tales about the first Gulf war and being pulled out of other air frames to drive the beast to me personally. You obviously know since you stated "pilot desires" that few pilots are interested in driving a relatively slow, high risk, platform when the big cheese is in fast movers countering other fast movers.

I have my personal USAF peeves. Once upon a time a long time ago the former commander of Peterson AFB and I were having lunch. Along came the topic of the state of the Air Force. I told him then that unless he could make a case for separating armor from the Army, submarines from the Navy, I could not see why the USAF should exist as a separate service based simply on a type of weapons platform.

Another not nearly related article starting (http://bingo.clarus.com.au/public/static/AAJ_Winter_2004.pdf#page=28) on Page 28.. Specifically page 30 talking about the failure of precision munitions.

[VMI_Marine]

The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...

I don't think that is a realistic fix. The Marine Corps does not require pilots to perform a FAC tour before flying CAS missions. In fact, (speaking as a non-aviator JTAC) one of the reasons that aviators retain their place as SMEs in the ground combat element is their knowledge of CAS tactics in the air. The ground piece is relatively straight forward, the difficulty comes from things such as airspace management that aviators are much smarter on.

[Cavguy]

"You old guys need to get over that s—t."
- Young Marine to Marine Sergeant Major when asked how he felt about fighting alongside an Army unit in Al Anbar, Iraq.

I feel compelled to defend the USAF some. The USAF is undoubtedly making significant contributions to the conflicts in Iraq/Afghanistan. A soldier in theater can be assured of an armed CAS aircraft overhead to support in less than a half hour (often much less) when he gets into trouble. That makes them the "QRF" for many units.

I was on the receiving end of this support - both on the ground in combat and as a coordinator for a BCT's worth of assets. They never failed to show up and support the ground commander. There was sometimes some friction/difficulty, but no more than any other asset.

While I have signifcant disagreement with the USAF's approach to COIN as articulated by MGen Dunlap, (and for those who say it's only his opinion - name a serving USAF GO who has publically disagreed with him - therefore, he speaks for the USAF by default), many of their lower level guys "get it".

The JFO issue remains a problem to get "enough" to the force to support everyone who needs supporting. There are fixes in the pipeline. It was a major topic of the III Corps CALL collection I just attended.

The UAV issue is a self-inflicted wound IMO, and a failure to anticipate the growing demand for UAV's versus who should fly them. I'm not a pilot, so I won't say whether a pilot is needed to support the strategic UAV's or a highly trained WO/Enl. It does seem they're making efforts to fix.

This also applies to the supported/supporting relationship of the CAOC to the theaters requesting support - there is still some friction there to be addressed so too many cooks don't spoil the ATO and CAS pot.

Finally, the F-22. We must retain air dominance for the future. We lose that, I'm up Sh*t creek. I don't know whether it could be performed at lesser cost by another aircraft, and I doubt we need 380 F-22's versus other airframes. We can't affort to let anyone else control the skies.

I'm tempted with the USA and USMC to pull the biblical admonition - "Pull the stick out of your own eye (though the USAF has a stick too)"

I'm more concerned with the articles and speeches emerging from USAF thinking Airpower and PGM's can win a COIN fight than anything. It just defies reality as practiced the last few years. The IAF thought it could defeat Hizbollah using EBO, when it failed the Israeli army was left holding the (unprepared and untrained) bag. Listening to the USAF, they seem to hold similar views to the IAF in 2006 regarding airpower, EBO, and low intensity wars.

[Hacksaw]

well said padawan

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

that the capabilities that the USAF bring to the fight are the best in the world. However, their senior leadership in the five sided puzzle palace, rather than focus on the fight we're in, tend to advocate for more stuff we don't need at the moment to prosecute the two COIN wars we're eye deep in.


:confused: I guess I don't quite understand how DoD ordering the USAF and USN to pony up manpower for tasks outside of their doctrinal missions is a "PR move."

I don't agree either that it was a PR stunt. I think the USAF and USN made a legitimate and sincere offer to close a personnel gap that needed to be filled in the near term. While the typical Airman and Sailor may not be ready to pull on a set of cammies, grab a weapon, and join the fight tomorrow they at least have been through basic training and thus can be brought up to a certain level of tactical ability much quicker that someone who has just entered either the Army or Marine Corps training pipeline.



1. Attitude: More AF humility and deference on COIN matters.
2. ISR: More, more, more
3. Airflift: More, more more
4. CAS: Better integration with the ground force and ??? not sure what else.


I'll chew on these one at a time:

#1: I don't think humility is in order, more like better focus on the Nation's task at hand rather than advocating for future capabilities that have no application to the present situation. All the services have pride in what they do and thus it should be. As to deference to COIN, I'd say it's more along the lines of the USAF has been slow to recognize that the current brouhaha is COIN and accordingly shifted their focus to the fact that COIN takes a long time.

If you hearken back to the last "good war" I do not think that Arnold, Spaatz, Vandenberg, et all were crying "we need the B-36 now, we need a better fighter to deal with ME-262's, we need to be a separate service now,..." They certainly were thinking of those things and as soon as the war was over they shifted gears and pressed hard for all that and more. But while we were in the fight, they stayed focused on the fight. Same should hold true today.

#2: ISR is an important capability within which are UAVs, which should be deployed in greater numbers. Plus, UAV's have slipped slightly out of the ISR lane and are no longer passive sensors, they can bite. :)

#3: There’s the old hack “amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.” While I feel that’s way over simplified our strategic lift is second to none and if the USAF was screaming louder for C-17s they might get more sympathy from ground pounders.

#4: USAF CAS is really good but Marine CAS is better (just as USAF air superiority has the edge over the Marines), so part of staying relevant to the fight is to learn from those who do it for a living. Although with the advent of even better PGMs CAS has changed significantly in that the aircraft carrying the weapon is almost irrelevant (yes, predicated on air supremecy). It’s the coordination between the ground user and the airborne deliverer that is most important.

Oh, CavGuy, BTW, I always looked forward to a tour with the Army, better chow for one, and I usually learned some new stuff. :D

Sometimes while in the Corps I felt there often was an inverse proportion between rank and open mindedness. :wry:

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Man - seems like we retake this hill every so often:D.


Weigley's The American Way of War? :D

[Ken White]

"Before we get too involved in who can pee the farthest" said 120mm. He also said
"I put it down in the "even if it was forced upon those services, it was the natural result of ignoring/neglecting the future of conflict since 1989" category at the very least."causing me to wonder if he was talking about DoD, the Army, the USAF or anyone else other than C. Krulak... :confused:

He also added
"...And the Army is not blameless, here. In fact, you won't finding me defending The Army as an institution."I can agree with that...

Selil said:
"Oh, you don't have to believe me because the Air Force said it all first."I think that's a dated document and the AF has fixed most of that. Last time the kid was in Afghanistan, he had a JTAC with his Platoon frequently and said the CAS was way better than his previous two tours in both theaters. I believe they're flooding the zone with JTACs and that many of the RAND recommendations have been or are being implemented

Umar Al-Mokhtar said:
"...more like better focus on the Nation's task at hand rather than advocating for future capabilities that have no application to the present situation."Sounds good but I'm not sure the Marines are ready to dump the EAV, the Army to dump NLOS or the Navy ready to stop building Submarines. I suspect the respective Bosses realize that there's more going on in the world right now than the two big theaters; that it takes an excessively long time to develop and field new stuff and that there's no certainty in predicting war. We have the luxury to focus on the here and now; they do not.

He also said:
"USAF CAS is really good but Marine CAS is better (just as USAF air superiority has the edge over the Marines), so part of staying relevant to the fight is to learn from those who do it for a living."True, good point. It also makes the point -- correctly -- that CAS is the primary mission of Marine Tac Air while it is a secondary mission for the USAF. AS, IMO, it should be and stay...

I agree with Umar on the C17s but realize that Congress is a part of the problem with that. As is Lockheed Martin.

I tend to agree with Hacksaw.

[ODB]

I've been getting caught up on this one. Notice a lot of AF bashing, just wanted to give them a thanks. They have gotten my brothers and me outta a lot of hairy situations. When your running black on ammo and A/C are stacked overhead to bail you out there is no greater feeling. Gotta love em' for what they do. How they get there I honestly don't care, as long as they are there, which they have been when they were needed most!!!

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

yet as the old adage goes "squeeky wheel gets the grease" and it also may attract more than it's fair share of unwanted attention. ;)

And since the thread specifically targeted Air Power in the New COIN Era and given the recent SecDef speech at Maxwell it was pile on time.

Sandbox can get rough like that. :D

Plus almost everyone had good things to say about what the AF does bring to the fight.

So what about those sneaky Sailors and all this talk about new submarines? :)

[120mm]

The problem with addressing problems is that you paint yourself into the corner as a "critic" pretty quick.

I think the USAF does a pretty good job in their specific mission, and CAS has become a "good thing" in recent years.

The great majority of the perceived problems between the services could be solved by practicing basic fundamental customer service techniques, and that is a two-way street. When I was assigned a FAC team in the early 90s, I made a point of treating them right, and in return, I got everything I wanted from them.

The rest of the issues are basically the natural result of the competitive nature of the services. The Army can't advocate for Air Force solutions, because that would be "blood in the water" come funding time.

In my fantasies, the USAF takes over the great majority of UAS operations because they insinuate themselves into the Army Loop, and push Air Force support hard. Give the Army more than they can use or expect, and I think the USAF may get the control they want and need in the field of UAS. The Army UAS guys I know don't particularly like being in charge of it, and I'm not impressed with the job they do.

Simply demanding that the USAF get control of UAS ops, and saying they'll let us know how they will support us doesn't cut it. It's an example of attracting more flies with honey kind of thing.

I wish I could take some time and actually elaborate on this, but as of yesterday, it's back to "head crushing time" for me at work.

[Sargent]

To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost. :eek:

Agree, but you'd have an easier time fighting a land war in Asia. I'm sure I've mentioned it before, but I recall when I was with a defense contractor a brainstorming session we had, during QDR 01, of ideas to present to the AF on other areas to push. I, not being a member of the "faith," foolishly suggested that we might come up with new ways to use extant systems to support the ground element. If looks could kill.... Needless to say, the idea did not fly.

I would argue the cultural problem comes down to service survival. USAF does not believe it can maintain itself as an independent branch if its mission is to support the other services -- at some point, they could just assume the missions themselves. Therefore, there must be something that makes the service unique and special. And unfortunately, strategic airlift and the like just aren't sexy enough either.



“..you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.” That depends on where we operate. Air Superiority in not a prerequisite for us to operate, it is something very, very nice to have. When was the last time US ground forces were subjected to sustained air attack? Not that it couldn’t happen in the future.

Thank you for pointing out the difference between the need to have and the nice to have. I think that far too many in the defense establishment, government, and public either never learned or have forgotten this rule. Same thing that happened to "no plan survives first contact."

Cheers,
Jill

[stanleywinthrop]

The quality of the box matters little. Success depends upon the man who sits in it.



— Baron Manfred von Richthofen

[Cliff]

I'm not talking about Aeromedical evac, I'm talking about airtransportable hospitals, which can be exported to support both combat troops and HA missions. As the USAF doesn't push PR on this mission like the Army does, I'm left to assume they don't view it as a priority. Personally, I think the PR story of a dedicated HA/medical branch of the USAF would be awesome IO for them.


Sorry, been gone for a while. Not to beat a dead horse, but it seems like the AF has done a pretty good job of taking care of wounded grunts. See below.

-Cliff

From http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Pages/default.aspx :

On The Same Page: Gen Eric Schoomaker, the Army's top doctor, said the Army and Air Force medical communities are working to ensure that the highly successful aeromedical evacuation system now in place in the global war on terror continues without a hitch as the land service's end strength increases over the next few years. Speaking to defense reporters May 27 in Washington, D.C. (see above), Schoomaker said his largest role in the Army's expansion is to make sure facilities and infrastructure are up to par as forces are realigned across the globe from Korea to Europe. These facilities have been vital in supporting aeromedical efforts in the GWOT thus far, he said, noting that more than 50,000 service personnel have been evacuated from theater with a survival rate that hovers around 98 percent. The Army, for its part, also has to make sure that the right equipment, such as the small infusion pumps that travel on Air Force medevac aircraft, is ready and positioned where it needs to be, he said. Schoomaker said he just returned from a visit to Afghanistan. He had high praise for the Air Force-led Craig Joint Theater Hospital at Bagram Air Base.

[Laxman]

There is not a single place on Anaconda where an USAF personnel should legitimately be, doing a valid USAF mission where mortars should be an issue. I calculated the sightlines myself, back in 2003, when we occupied it. (Rockets, on the other hand, can range the airfield, but not accurately)

I know this statement has been refuted. But to make sure everyone is one the same page, a JTAC/ROMAD/ALO - in other words the TACP, vary in rank from Airman to Col. They do an amazing job with what they are given and can provide an intelligent army commander great infuence on the battlefield.

[Laxman]

The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...

I'll tag on a little bit to what Entropy has said.

If the Army (not all, just the majority) was a little smarter in doing business, or understood what CAS actually does for it, then CAS integration would become a lot easier. Prejudice inhibits full integration and the prejudice is propagated within its training plan. Also, please find one RCO/BCO that fully understands what a JFO actually brings to the table. More often than not, a JFO usually ends up a cook or is staring at maps in the 2 shop, not out forward where they should be. The Air Force does not help itself with a lack of leaders that deal directly at the DIV / Corps level and help Army COs make sound decisions. The only service that truly has integration with land and air components is the Marines.

[Ken White]

...please find one RCO/BCO that fully understands what a JFO actually brings to the table. More often than not, a JFO is usually ends up a cook or is staring at maps in the 2 shop, not out forward where they should be.The JFO should be out forward if there were a forward direction and the Bn/Bde was oriented that way. When subordinate units are in dispersed static locations with only sporadic (or even heavy but distributed geographically) contact, where is forward? When units are spread out as in Afghanistan on distributed patrols, which units should the JFO (as opposed to the JTACs. Do we have enough of those yet?) accompany? The JFO is going to be where he and the Cdr agree he can do the most good and have the most flexibility.

Given a war of movement or one of frequent, heavy contact instead of a static low key COIN operation I suspect your complaint would not be a problem.

You might also consider that the Army's lack of smarts about CAS is due to a failure for many years to develop doctrine and to train for it. Both the Army and the AF bear about equal responsibility for that. Consider also that in the current wars, the use of CAS is spotty -- it is not a constant thing for all units in all places, so it is a sometime thing for many in both suits. The important thing is that it's getting better...
The only service that truly has integration with land and air components is the Marines.Well, yeah. Uh, do you really want to go there? :D

[Laxman]

The JFO should be out forward if there were a forward direction and the Bn/Bde was oriented that way. When subordinate units are in dispersed static locations with only sporadic (or even heavy but distributed geographically) contact, where is forward? When units are spread out as in Afghanistan on distributed patrols, which units should the JFO (as opposed to the JTACs. Do we have enough of those yet?) accompany? The JFO is going to be where he and the Cdr agree he can do the most good and have the most flexibility.

Given a war of movement or one of frequent, heavy contact instead of a static low key COIN operation I suspect your complaint would not be a problem.

You might also consider that the Army's lack of smarts about CAS is due to a failure for many years to develop doctrine and to train for it. Both the Army and the AF bear about equal responsibility for that. Consider also that in the current wars, the use of CAS is spotty -- it is not a constant thing for all units in all places, so it is a sometime thing for many in both suits. The important thing is that it's getting better...


Do we have enough JTACs, no. Do we have enough JFOs, no. Is there a conventional "front" or forward to push all the JFOs to, not really. But to keep your JFOs basically locked away on a FOB does you little good either.
Therefore, the requirement to have more JTACs and JFOs will remain. There is a major misunderstanding of what a JFO is capable of by doctrine IAW the JFIRE and JFO MOA. With very little in the way of currency training stateside, and very little actual joint training as well (besides NTC, JRTC) the problem shall remain regarding the lack of knowledge and utilization. Again, the AF does not help enough in pushing for an understanding. The Cdr should place their JFOs where they can be of greatest value, unfortunately this has not been the case in many instances. The doctrine is there, the understanding of the doctrine is not quite there.

The lack of smarts is a problem for both services. The Army generally does not understand air, the AF generally does not understand landbased operational requirements.

I wouldn't call CAS "spotty" necessarily. At least until you have defined the requirement. I'm sure I can find a few soldiers that would not want to be without CAS, which means JTAC/JFO support.

[Entropy]

Some relevant articles from the latest ASPJ (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/win08.htm):

Asymmetric Air Support (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/win08/burg.html)


The land component is acutely aware that under current doctrine, it is apportioned/allocated CAS assets based only on CAS requirements.4 The word close in CAS does not imply a specific distance; rather, it is situational. The requirement for detailed integration due to proximity, fires, or movement is the determining factor, but this is becoming less and less relevant to what the ground component actually needs in order to serve as a stabilizing force. The need for CAS to deliver ordnance in close proximity to friendly forces is becoming a smaller factor in the current environments of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Over the last five years, fighter/bomber aircraft of the coalition air forces have evolved to become more than just strafing/bombing platforms. Granted, their targeting pods were designed to employ precision-guided munitions and reduce collateral damage, but the inherent capabilities of the pods have expanded their role into widely used and effective reconnaissance/surveillance. Unfortunately, the Air Force lacks the intelligence infrastructure to exploit the information garnered from the pods and other sources. The Air Force should have intelligence capability integral to the squadron, as did an RF-4 squadron, if it is going to fully exploit the intelligence gained from full-motion video (FMV) footage.5

In today’s operations, the land component has a great need for reconnaissance platforms; some people have even called it a “limitless hunger.”6 This need far exceeds the assets available to cover requirements, some of which are for armed reconnaissance to enable immediate strikes against the enemy during time-critical operations (e.g., indirect-fire setups and emplacement of improvised explosive devices). These requests may not involve close proximity to friendly forces or require detailed integration since no operations may be occurring at the proposed reconnaissance location. Even so, none of the current fighters in the Air Force’s inventory were designed as FMV reconnaissance platforms. The F-16C+ (Block 30), a reconnaissance-capable aircraft, replaced the RF-4 as the Air Force’s primary armed-reconnaissance platform, but its capabilities lack the real-time feed desired by the land component, which wants the real-time, FMV feed that it gets from aircraft equipped with the Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER). Because the land component can’t fulfill reconnaissance-support requirements from organic assets or from surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, it now uses the JTAR process to request armed reconnaissance from traditional CAS assets. Although referred to as CAS to keep within doctrinal limitations, this is not CAS as the air component community would typically define it. Unfortunately, fighter units assigned to the two theaters of operations must provide CAS to the land component. This is where the friction starts.

Also a good (and related) piece on problems with ISR tasking (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/win08/maceda.html):


I READ WITH GREAT interest Lt Col Michael Downs’s article “Rethinking the Combined Force Air Component Commander’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Approach to Counterinsurgency” (Fall 2008). I agree that the system needs reform but disagree with his proposal to use the close air support request process for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Though faster than the air tasking order cycle, the joint tactical air strike request process used for close air support still does not allow the flexibility in execution required by the ground commander. Given that the Air Force has decided to apply theater ISR assets to tactical priorities, that commander must have the ability to shift those assets when priorities change. The combined air operations center (CAOC) must allow decentralized execution of ISR assets—particularly full-motion-video platforms—by delegating tactical control of platforms apportioned to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) during execution. Doing so would speed the process of dynamic retasking and shorten the time required to respond to the ground commander’s shifting priorities and time-sensitive targets.

[Entropy]

The latest Wright Stuff (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/0323-0324/) from Air University has a couple of interesting and relevant articles:

Airpower in Irregular Warfare: Doctrine and Concepts (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/0323-0324/Articles/ReadParisDec08final.pdf)

This is a presentation given to some members of the French Air Force. I think there is a lot of valuable content here and it's well worth a read, particularly for fans of Clausewitz. There's also a lot of relevance for the discussion taking place in the thread about defining IW.


Given the QDR intent to shift effort toward non-traditional threats without unbalancing the credibility of US forces in major combat operations, the directions are understandable. However, with the current economic meltdown in the news every day, it is not difficult to understand the principal criticism of the 2006 QDR. It lacks fiscal constraint and is patently unexecutable as a strategy. For the flying community, this is not a trivial matter. In a fiscally constrained environment, can you afford to buy different platforms for different missions? You must choose suitable and sustainable aircraft and munitions inventories for two diverse roles. You must also find ways to maintain crew proficiency and platform availability for wholly dissimilar tasks. If you buy just one type of aircraft, a 5th generation
fighter for example, is it capable of performing both missions? If you believe current US Army, Marine Corps and Air Force doctrine, then your answer must be “no.” The Air Force must be prepared to simultaneously conduct irregular and traditional warfare operations.



THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN THE ALGERIAN COUNTER-INSURGENCY – THE PLAN CHALLE (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/0323-0324/Articles/MssrMauduitPresentationtoCESA.htm)

This is an interesting if somewhat disjointed piece not by a French Air Force officer, but a former member of the Algerian insurgency:


The Algerian War had many unusual features. Once the various typical circumstances to that conflict are peeled away, the Algerian insurgency provides valuable lessons, relevant to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in today’s security environment. The Algerian experience might provide some of the initial and very basic elements of a framework that could eventually lead to a generic model for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in the Greater Middle East (defined as ranging from North Africa, through the Arabian Peninsula, to Iran) and the Muslim world at large. In order to do so, it will be necessary to explore the Algerian insurgency in depth by detailing the relevance of the conflict today and then exploring the conduct of operations (both by the FLN and the French) in the field prior to drawing pertinent lessons at the operational level.

and


The Plan Challe was named after Air Force General Maurice Challe, commander-in-chief of French forces in Algeria from 1958 to1960. The Plan Challe was an offensive plan that took the war to the insurgents. The French relegated reserve and conscript units to static defense roles, e.g., protecting roads, quadrillage, etc, in order to free up regular units to conduct mobile “search and destroy” missions in the mountains where guerrilla bands had taken refuge. Employing helicopters, the French inserted special mobile units composed of elite troops such as Foreign Legionnaires, paratroopers, marines, special commandos units, and airmobile regulars. These elite forces never exceeded 20,000 troopers. Operationally, the Plan Challe comprised a series of sweeps against known insurgent spots. Releasing troops from static quadrillage duties, Challe broke down large formations into small units, many of which were mixed Franco-Algerian in make-up, that could move quickly and bring the guerrillas to battle in rough country.

[PhilR]

From Danger Room: How the Afghan Air War Got Stuck in the Sky (http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/12/ff_end_air_war/all/1). This short article offers an account of how the current gudiance on employing airpower is affecting ground operations. As noted in many other forums, the immediate result is that less ordnace is getting dropped and, in certain tactical situations, that's not good.

However, I'm not going to argue the for/against ICO the current theater guidance on utilizing air support. I'll just point out that one issue this article raises is that we conduct our tactical operations with a certain expectation of having that air support available. While in this case, the lack of immediate air support is consciously self-inflicted, there are many reasons on current and future battlefields where we may be denied the air support we have come to expect. In the "level playing field" of ground versus ground forces, how are we doing (and how will we do)?

In a recent Nightwatch report from AFCEA (to big to attach), one of the stats revealed was that since the new rules have been in effect, curtailing our air support operations, our friendly to enemy kill ratio has moved from about 6to1 to 1to1--an even trade during engagements. Now this is based on open sources and is inexact, but probably exposes a trend (of course this isn't a stat to support COIN success necessarily, but does indicate something with regard to tactical engagements).

In looking at MCDP 1 Warfighting and MCDP 1-3 Tactics, the Marine Corps espouses a concept of combined arms to use fire and maneuver to create a dilemma. In fact, we touted that fires weren't necessarily to destroy, but to enable maneuver. However, this requires enough maneuver elements at the point of engagement. My impression is that the small size of units we are employing has degraded our capability to execute our stated doctrine. We are maneuvering to bring destructive fires to bear, not having enough organic maneuver strength to merely use fires for suppression or temporary neutralization. Based on the fact that over the timeframe of the engagement, there was no discussion of other maneuver units reinforcing this squad, that there were none within supporting distance, given relevant terrain and mobility factors. I was also surprised at the stated ineffectiveness of the mortars and artillery fire.

I'm not in any way disparaging our ground unit's performance and capability. However, I think our dispersed operating methods may really depend upon a concept of air support that has changed. I'm sure our commanders on the ground are wrestling with this. It should also cause us to think about our planned future concepts. As I said, I think there are different ways that we could be denied air support.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

[slapout9]

I'm not in any way disparaging our ground unit's performance and capability. However, I think our dispersed operating methods may really depend upon a concept of air support that has changed. I'm sure our commanders on the ground are wrestling with this. It should also cause us to think about our planned future concepts. As I said, I think there are different ways that we could be denied air support.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

You said a mouthful there, The enemy must be drooling at the thought of not having to worry about a lightning bolt from the sky.:mad: The AF has a weaponering problem they need smaller precise munitions and they need to be able to deliver non-lethal weapons like concussion grenades/bombs (the ones from the 1950's) not those silly wimpy flash bangs.

[jmm99]

I appreciate the reference to why the kill ratio has dropped to 1:1:


In a recent Nightwatch report from AFCEA (to big to attach), one of the stats revealed was that since the new rules have been in effect, curtailing our air support operations, our friendly to enemy kill ratio has moved from about 6to1 to 1to1--an even trade during engagements.

I read an article recently which mentioned the drop in kill ratio, but ascribed it to the Taliban getting bigger and better - the author's conclusion was that we should get out while the getting is good. Correlation of the drop in kill ratio with the change in ROE/RUF was, of course, not mentioned in the article.

Limitation of air and artillary support would logically raise cain with our traditional small unit tactics. It seems this study at least provides an inference that the ROE/RUF change caused the drop in kill ratio.

Perhaps, "best practices COIN" and "best political practices" are inconsistent with the basic concepts of a "armed conflict". Certainly, the Laws of War (LOAC) require no such limitations as are in effect. It seems a hell of a note where sound warfighting tactics, legal under the LOAC, are pushed to the side in favor of other considerations.

The result is that our enemies can say "hey, we're winning". In the present case, some of this is "consciously self-inflicted", as you say; some is lack of ground forces. About the best that can be said is that some lessons will be learned about combat situations where US air power is not a factor. Back in those bad old days, the infantry could rely on arty backup. It's been a long time since US air power was not supreme. It's been an even longer time (ever ?) going back to our arty being hobbled.

Regards

Mike

[Firn]

Several considerations, the change in the ROE can cut multiple ways.

a) It might increase popular support, curb the diffuse ressentiment against the foreign troops or more likely at least not inflame it. This is of course a very good thing and might be key. At least the decision makers think (mostly) so.

b) This should greatly enhance the liberty of movement for the enemy in his many forms, enabling him to add overt violence and show of force to his arsenal.

c) This decreases the penalities to support or shelter the enemy. There are less chances that a mistake takes a bloody toll on the (innocent) civilians sheltering or maybe supporting the foe. Kids can transport weapons, people host the foe with even less fear of riprisal.

d) It should also increase the chances of the enemy in direct action. While such a drop in the kill ratio seems to me out of order it is tactically certainly a good thing for the other side.

e) It sends a signal to the world(media) that the coalition tries hard to keep civilian casualities down and does care about the people there.


I wonder if the coalition is able to make up for the loss in bombing power with other, less targeted forms of fire support. In short it might make sense to take the most controversial asset out of the (media, Karzai) firing line and increase the effort delivered by mortars, howitzers, AFV, etc. For example mortars close by are pretty accurate and can fly under the radar of many critics and don't go through so many decision levels. They too should also be handled with care so to avoid to collide too often with the strategic intent.


Firn

[slapout9]

USAF General Deptula responds. Link from SWJ Blog article.

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/12/us-general-blame-taliban-media-for-afghan-civilian-deaths/

[Entropy]

On kill ratios:

I think that has more to do with the Taliban using a lot more IED's while avoiding decisive engagements than restrictive ROE on air support.

[Rex Brynen]

General Faces Unease Among His Own Troops, Too (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/world/asia/23troops.html), New York Times, 22 June 2010.



One Marine infantry lieutenant, during fighting in Marja this year, said he had all but stopped seeking air support while engaged in firefights. He spent too much time on the radio trying to justify its need, he said, and the aircraft never arrived or they arrived too late or the pilots were reluctant to drop their ordnance.

“I’m better off just trying to fight my fight, and maneuver the squads, and not waste the time or focus trying to get air,” he said.

Several infantrymen have also said that the rules are so restrictive that pilots are often not allowed to attack fixed targets — say, a building or tree line from which troops are taking fire — unless they can personally see the insurgents doing the firing.

This has lead to situations many soldiers describe as absurd, including decisions by patrol leaders to have fellow soldiers move briefly out into the open to draw fire once aircraft arrive, so the pilots might be cleared to participate in the fight.

[davidbfpo]

Rex,

Taken from a post elsewhere and shortened (Hat Tip to Tukhachevskii).

Col. Richard Kemp & Chris Hughes, Attack State Red.
The book follows the exploits of the 1st Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment Battle Group (also attached were an Estonian Armoured Infantry Company and a Danish Reconnaissance Company) during their six month tour in Helmand province’s Sangin Valley in spring 2007.

Maj. Mick Aston talking in an Army Air Corps WAH-64...

The JTAC said to Aston, “He repeats what he told us before, he cannot fire until he has positively identified the target”. Fuming, Aston replied, “Well I have PID’d the target. The Viking crews have PID’d the target. 7 Platoon has. How much more PIDing does he need?”. “Sir, he says he needs to PID it himself before he can engage”. “Look I used to be in a helicopter recce squadron. I know how difficult it is to identify people from the air if they are well concealed, even with the kind of kit these fellas up there have nowadays. But we’re firing at the enemy, the Apache pilot can see our tracer. The enemy’s firing back at us, the pilot can see their tracer too. What is the problem?” [...] “What is he bothered about? Is it civvies in the area? There aren’t any. But if there had been, we’d have killed them all by now with our guns”.[...]Aston was raging. He refused to believe the Apaches had to work under such a ridiculous constraint – in this situation.[...] He said, “Let’s get rid of him now. We’ll get something else on to it. Tell the pilot – repeat these words to him exactly from me – fire at the target now or get out”.[...] Aston turned to Corporal Wilsher, his mortar fire controller. “The minute the Apache clears the airspace start engaging with mortars. I want HE up and down that treeline. Can you do that, or will the mortar line commander need to [...] do some PIDing in person?” He turned back to the JTAC. “While he’s doing that, get me some proper close air support”.(p.65)

I know that we've had more current posts on ROE, CAS and criticism on other threads. One hopes the UK position has improved since 2007, to be fair elsewhere in the book the authors report praise for US CAS.