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Shek
09-17-2006, 12:33 AM
Moderator's Note

Nine threads in July 2015 easily id'd as linked to now retired USMC General Mattis have been merged here and the threar re-titled 'The General Mattis collection: a mixture'. Prompted by the most recent post. Seven more 2-16 threads merged in 29/12/16 (ends).

I just finished reading Thomas Rick's Fiasco and was trying to track down LTG Mattis' reading list. Anybody out there have it? Thanks.

Shek

marct
09-19-2006, 02:29 PM
I just finished reading Thomas Rick's Fiasco and was trying to track down LTG Mattis' reading list. Anybody out there have it? Thanks.

Shek

I'd love to see it as well. If you get it, could you post it?

Thanks,

Marc

selil
09-19-2006, 02:55 PM
The only thing's I've found were a story about it...

http://defense.iwpnewsstand.com/insider_books.asp

marct
09-19-2006, 03:16 PM
Thanks, Selil, that's a really good list.

Marc

Shek
09-20-2006, 12:58 PM
The only thing's I've found were a story about it...

http://defense.iwpnewsstand.com/insider_books.asp

Selil,
Thanks. This was the only thing that I had run across as well. Thomas Rick's book Fiasco speaks of 73 books and articles IIRC, so my quest is not the Holy Grail, but the complete list.

Cheers.

Shek

SWJED
12-22-2006, 10:51 AM
22 December LA Times - Marine Commander is Seen as Tough but Fair (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mattis22dec22,1,2262985.story?coll=la-headlines-world) by Tony Perry.


...As a combatant, Mattis, nicknamed "Mad Dog" by his troops, prefers speed and a relentless attack style. His straightforward and often salty rhetoric is tailor-made for infantry troops.

But such rhetoric belies a man who is deeply read in history and military tactics and who, after the fall of Baghdad, pushed for the military to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the Iraqi populace...

Because of his combat experience and expertise in counterinsurgency, Mattis is rumored to be a possible candidate for a high-level command in Iraq under new Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

In a recent trip to Marine outposts in the expansive Al Anbar province, Mattis talked to Marines about training the Iraqi army and winning support from civilians. But he also mentioned the insurgent threat in the province.

"This is not sectarian violence," he told them. "This is Al Qaeda in Iraq. We expect you to kill them."

Much more at the link...

SWJED
12-22-2006, 03:26 PM
... LtGen James Mattis (CG I MEF) replaces GEN John Abizaid in March at CENTCOM.

slapout9
12-22-2006, 03:35 PM
Do you think he will try to implement a CAP style or Distributed Operations type Strategy?

SWJED
12-22-2006, 03:51 PM
Do you think he will try to implement a CAP style or Distributed Operations type Strategy?

General Mattis will attempt to identify the desired end-state (hopefully he will have some help here from the National Command Authority) and based on his in-depth knowledge of COIN issue mission type orders / commander's intent to his subordinate commander in Iraq. Whether that entails CAP or DO or anything else remains to be seen as the situation in Iraq is quite dynamic and what may have worked in one province at one particular point in time may or may not be applicable now. That said, he will hopefully be able to instill unity of command amongst all the entities that are now players in Iraq.

Merv Benson
12-22-2006, 05:14 PM
In this post (http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2006/12/petraeus-and-mattis-may-take-command.html) the speculation is that Gen. Petraeus would replace Abizaid and Gen. Mattis would replace Gen. Casey, Gen Casey is also apparently in the running for Abizaid's Centcom slot.

SWJED
12-22-2006, 05:19 PM
In this post (http://prairiepundit.blogspot.com/2006/12/petraeus-and-mattis-may-take-command.html) the speculation is that Gen. Petraeus would replace Abizaid and Gen. Mattis would replace Gen. Casey, Gen Casey is also apparently in the running for Abizaid's Centcom slot.

CENTCOM has traditionally been commanded by sequentially alternating between the Marine Corps and Army. We have had two Army CENTCOM commanders in a row. The crystal ball says there will not be a third in a row - moreover - the NCA is looking to shake things up - at least give that perception. Mattis will be the next CENTCOM commander... That said - Petraeus would be a great choice. I believe he and Mattis are our two "COIN stars".

jcustis
12-22-2006, 08:03 PM
That would be tough for I MEF. He just took over there, and it could definitely use his leadership.

SWJED
09-09-2007, 01:49 PM
On the Small Wars Journal Blog - LtGen Jim Mattis to US Joint Forces Command (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/09/ltgen-jim-mattis-to-us-joint-f/).


A rumor we have been hearing since May was reported on yesterday in the North County Times – Lieutenant General James Mattis (USMC) has been nominated for his fourth star and slated to take over US Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia...

pcmfr
09-09-2007, 05:57 PM
If we're lucky, his first official order will be to disestablish that useless command.

Ken White
09-09-2007, 06:37 PM
OTOH, maybe it's a valid organization and some service peculiar subordinate (nominal, of course...) commands are unnecessary...

SWJED
11-11-2007, 01:02 PM
Mattis Takes the Helm at JFCOM (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/11/mattis-takes-the-helm-at-jfcom/) - SWJ Blog - video of and article on the change of command...

Rob Thornton
11-11-2007, 01:18 PM
what you make of it. If'n I were a betting man I'd wager that JFCOM (and the rest of us) will be well served with him leading it.
Best, Rob

Old Eagle
11-11-2007, 06:47 PM
This assignment will be very telling in many ways -- for General Mattis' future, for the future of IW and for the futures of the Services. In this battle of man vs beauracracy, there is a lot of hope riding on Mattis, but the smart money is probably on the bureaucracy. Hope I'm wrong.

SWJED
11-11-2007, 08:37 PM
This assignment will be very telling in many ways -- for General Mattis' future, for the future of IW and for the futures of the Services. In this battle of man vs beauracracy, there is a lot of hope riding on Mattis, but the smart money is probably on the bureaucracy. Hope I'm wrong.

Ingrained bureaucracy – read GS (especially 15’s and FOGO equivalents) plus the extraordinary numbers of embedded contract workers now prevalent in many major commands - has a habit of ignoring active duty commanders – with an attitude of “waiting it out” until the next change of command. Their stonewalling is both unconscionable and criminal in my most humble opinion.

JFCOM is one of the worst offenders - I wish General Mattis the best and hope he can make a difference... It is sorely needed to say the least.

Rob Thornton
11-11-2007, 08:47 PM
why we are interested in JFCOM as an organization (http://www.jfcom.mil/index.htm)

What I hope JFCOM can do is become the joint engine of leader agility and adaptation that looks far enough forward in sufficient breadth to help us get it more right than wrong.

A tall order in itself. JFCOM has in the past been billed as an engine of Joint "Transformation" - a term that was ambiguous enough and which appeared to emphasize everything but the people who make up the military. It has been perceived as being techno-centric, deservedly or not - and its embracing of EBO in Joint Doctrine generated some well articulated fights by the opposition (part of this probably has to do with how the services perceive the value of EBO in terms of strengths and limitations)

A large challenge will be overcoming entrenched mindsets (both within and on the outside) to achieve a balance that entices the services and commands out of our kung-fu stances. Fostering a Joint culture of innovation required to identify and understand ourselves and our adversaries (current and future) operating across the broad spectrum of war vs. being perceived as a gear which grinds out flavors of the month is no small task. The collective "we" must come to grips with the limitations of DOTMPF to fix our shortfalls. Wherever we adjust these aspects to answer hard, but specific questions, we paint ourselves into corners.

These are the science pieces, whereas Leadership is the art piece. We don't like to rely wholeheartedly on that one because it seems to leave too much to chance - not everybody is going to be as good as the next guy or gal - so we seek to even the odds with the science. We can't even agree on where "born" ends and "made" begins in the quest for leaders - its too vague and too suspicious - and hits too close to home for many to ponder.

You can give the same tools under like conditions to different leaders in complex organizations operating in complex environments and the odds are at least equal that they will not reach the same outcome - even if their experience set up to the time appears to be the same. One may succeed and the other may fail simply because one has the right innate mixture of courage, character and intellect (be they born to, or developed) equal to the task at hand. That is hard for us to swallow.

This is why putting the right person in the right command matters so much. JFCOM can be about helping us get over ourselves by providing a framework for common discussion that helps us take what we have vs. what we wished we had and jointly solving the strategic, operational or tactical problem set (be it the one now or the one on the horizon). Its success in doing so will depend as much on the folks outside JFCOM as those inside.

Best Regards, Rob

nichols
11-12-2007, 05:05 AM
He is heavy duty into simulations. His thinking is that sims are a better investment then $400k SGLI. He has been pushing us since his time at MCCDC.

selil
11-12-2007, 05:26 AM
Ingrained bureaucracy – read GS (especially 15’s and FOGO equivalents) plus the extraordinary numbers of embedded contract workers now prevalent in many major commands - has a habit of ignoring active duty commanders – with an attitude of “waiting it out” until the next change of command. Their stonewalling is both unconscionable and criminal in my most humble opinion.

JFCOM is one of the worst offenders - I wish General Mattis the best and hope he can make a difference... It is sorely needed to say the least.

That is why I wish active duty commanders were given something kind of reverse of the Taft Hartley Act (forcing people to work) and could fire anybody much like Regan fired the "un-fireable" air traffic controllers on strike in 1981.

Ken White
11-12-2007, 05:43 AM
Ingrained bureaucracy – read GS (especially 15’s and FOGO equivalents) plus the extraordinary numbers of embedded contract workers now prevalent in many major commands - has a habit of ignoring active duty commanders – with an attitude of “waiting it out” until the next change of command. Their stonewalling is both unconscionable and criminal in my most humble opinion.

JFCOM is one of the worst offenders - I wish General Mattis the best and hope he can make a difference... It is sorely needed to say the least.

As a former one of the former silly villian types, You are regrettably correct. However, there is a solution. One such who opposes that practice simply need find one kindred soul of like grade (and my experience is that there are always a couple of good ones to battle the four to ten less concerned types in every big hindquarters) and join together to flank, circumvent and befuddle the recalcitrant. :eek:

That's not hard to do because those "wait 'em out" types are mostly Turtles, not willing to stick their necks out for anything. Easy to shortstop 'em, baffle 'em, go around them and get things done. :rolleyes:

Lacking that, it takes only a Chief of Staff with testicular fortitude -- he can make their lives miserable with little effort -- all he has to do is divert the Bonus money. They'll quickly leave unless they're dedicated and good guys. :D

Ken White
11-12-2007, 05:47 AM
That is why I wish active duty commanders were given something kind of reverse of the Taft Hartley Act (forcing people to work) and could fire anybody much like Regan fired the "un-fireable" air traffic controllers on strike in 1981.

AFGE has more votes in Congress... :mad:

Had an employee illegally absent for over 76 days in one year. Took three letters, another 18 months (with more absences) and two hearings to get that person fired. :confused:

selil
11-12-2007, 05:55 AM
Does that mean if I take a job as an SES y'all won't like me anymore :(

Hacksaw
11-12-2007, 05:10 PM
Let me begin by saying I'm a "dirty" contractor, and I needed a couple of weeks before I could come to grips with the title.

My last four years on active duty (recently retired) were spent in two different HQs that were heavily populated with civilian employees (GS and contractor), and I have a few relevant observations...

1. The vast majority of individuals in both groups come to work wanting to do a good job. They are ready to implement guidance, but in many cases are undersupervised by "greens suits" because they are either uncomfortable giving orders to civilians or they don't understand the civilian's role as direct support to the organizational mission.

2. As a rule, contract employees are more responsive because they have far less job security and the customer is always right. Note: This can be both good and bad (sometimes a young major could benefit from listening carefully to a retired LTC).

3. HQs usually prefer the contractor route because its much easier to hire and fire a contractor than it is to get an authorized TDA position. However, this well will dry up when supplementals go away.

4. When a GS is acting like a "toad in the road" its often because they are convinced it is the "right" thing to do. Note: Not condoning, just making the point that its not always because they hate change.

5. The world of the largely civilian work force is here to stay. No way to turn this ship around in the midst of current committments. It is better to stop the customary complaining (I was guilty once as well) about the lazy GS and dirty contractor, and go about the business of leading the non-uniform work force.

Old Eagle
11-12-2007, 08:44 PM
That said, I wouldn't try to draw too many distinctions among various flavors in the workforce.

My concern with the general's assignment to JFCOM is still that the bureaucracy (regardless of its make up) may be too tough for even this old bird to crack.

Stevely
11-13-2007, 06:29 AM
Ingrained bureaucracy – read GS (especially 15’s and FOGO equivalents) plus the extraordinary numbers of embedded contract workers now prevalent in many major commands - has a habit of ignoring active duty commanders – with an attitude of “waiting it out” until the next change of command. Their stonewalling is both unconscionable and criminal in my most humble opinion.

JFCOM is one of the worst offenders - I wish General Mattis the best and hope he can make a difference... It is sorely needed to say the least.

This can be the case. However, on the GS side (actually note that in most of the DOD, and soon all of it, "GS" is finished, having been done away with in NSPS - we converted earlier this year), the personnel system has changed greatly, so that the days of the un-fire-able civil servant are past (though there was always some amount of myth to that, a determined commander could can a civil servant, many found it easier to just move them on. Of course this happens on active duty, too). It is now much easier to get rid of troublesome civil servants, though of course same protocol follows just as if you want to chapter a bad soldier: document, document, document.

But speaking from inside the belly of the purple beast, it is not that simple, uniformed military on a 2 or 3 year tour vs. civil servants waiting them out. For every JFCOM Sir Humphrey, there is an active duty officer armed with dubious ideas and a willingness to waste the taxpayer's dollar, all to get his star. This place often feels to me like a bunch of little feudal fiefdoms, squabbling over agendas and resources. I've seen one O6 build a shadow organization to another O6's directorate, and so try to steal his rival's portfolio and resources.

Just wanted to point out that there are more mischief makers here than just the guys with ties. When you get right down to it, money and ambition - they ruin everything. There is a lot of both here and that fuels the craziness.

I have not much experienced the stonewalling you described, except in one case. And in that case, the two-star flag who got waited out, gave in my opinion all the opportunity for his underlings to do so; there was an impression from my lowly POV at least that he was just marking time and waiting for his next post. He had a very "hands off" leadership style... His successor was of a different sort entirely, and he has since taken a very active interest in his organization and has even asked to extend his tour one year to make sure that his changes will stick.

I am very excited that Gen. Mattis is our commander - there are many of us who are hoping for great things from him. A man like him is a breath of fresh air from the series of gizmo-centric commanders we've had prior to him. Let's all pray for him that he makes a difference.

PS - Rob, nice suggestion, will have more to say about whither JFCOM, when it's not such a late hour.

goesh
11-13-2007, 03:14 PM
I for one don't have any qualms about my tax dollars being spent by a "warrior monk" - has bin laden and his followers acclerated us this much or is this all just in the course of natural evolution? Does war really put a bump in the curve or do we just keep grinding along? "Warrior monk" got me to thinking about Ia Drang and the implementation of air mobile tactics and in about 2.5 decades we had the high tech stuff of the Gulf War, man riding the missle in cyber space. Maybe it boils down simply to great men just happening along and stepping up to the plate devoid of collective evolution and the lessons of history.

Stevely
11-16-2007, 05:27 AM
Rob,

Taking you up on your offer of a discussion, this is a subject near and dear to my heart (and not to mention my paycheck). Safely pseudonymous, here I go.

I think you made a very well articulated case as to why JFCOM is important and what sort of personal leadership challenges, what kind of leader it would take, to be a good and effective commander at JFCOM. I don’t have much to add to that, but I would like to share my personal observations about the problems we have internally, the challenges we face and some specific things the new commander needs to fix if he is going to be successful.

JFCOM was created to fill a real need in the Armed Forces. If JFCOM was done away with tomorrow, it would have to be re-invented, and would be re-invented de facto by the services and the COCOM's, only on a piecemeal and disjointed manner. So while there are of course those who wish to do away with that "worthless" command, they are mistaken and would simply find something like a new JFCOM eventually arising to fill the void left by the old one.

It's a saying around here that the military is trained and equipped by the services, but we fight wars joint. The war we are in now, and certainly the wars we will face in the years to come, require effective and thorough cooperation and interoperability between forces fielded by the services (and indeed beyond, all instruments of national power), in other words, we require "Jointness." The regional COCOM's are not the right organizations to inculcate, foster and train this jointness; they are too focused on the 50 meter targets of their daily missions. Therefore we need a command that can foster "jointness" - develop and promulgate Joint doctrine, develop and field Joint interoperable equipment, particularly command and control systems (or at least strongly influence their development in the right direction by the services), and train the force to fight joint.

But JFCOM has not always been up to its high calling, for many reasons, some its own fault and others the fault of wider circumstances in DOD and the government as a whole about which it can do little.

A lot of good ideas and concepts are born out of JFCOM, often after careful consideration and analysis of lessons learned by the troops in the field, that are useful even needful for the armed forces at large, but fail on the external ambitions and parochialism of the services and sometimes the COCOMs. There is not much the Commander JFCOM can do about this, but be a good advocate and sell the right thing to do to his four star peers.

A lot of good ideas and concepts are born out of JFCOM but fail on the internal ambitions and Byzantine organizational culture. Also, bad ideas and concepts are also sometimes born out of this, and are promoted and foisted upon the services and COCOMs. Sometimes. These things, Commander JFCOM can do a lot to fix, and here are the things he needs to tackle, as I see them.

Our incoming Commander needs to fix:

* Internal communications - horizontal (cross directorate) and vertical (from the directorates up to the commander) communications are usually very poor in JFCOM. The right hand does not know what the left hand is doing, or the heads of the hydra never bother to talk to each other. This has the effect of isolating the JFCOM directorates from each other, and prevents the command from working effectively as a whole. It also keeps the commander in the dark about what is going on inside his own command (this is often the case inside directorates, too). If General Mattis doesn't know what is going on inside JFCOM and what JFCOM is doing to and with the rest of DOD, he can't lead JFCOM to live up to its mission.

* Internal ambitions and agendas of directorates and components - often work towards own ends at cross purposes to other JFCOM components and directorates, and even the command's own priorities and goals as set by the commander. The new commander must bring the independent operators to heel and get them working in unison with the rest of the command. Initiatives should not be pursued and funded that aren't vetted at the DCDR and CDR level, and fall in lockstep with the commander's vision.

* Institutional culture suffers from fuzzy thought and dubious ideas due to fascination with buzz words (buzz paragraphs in this place) and uncritical acceptance of the latest trendy concepts to pass through the door. Solving the problem listed right above this one will help a lot, because a lot of otherwise stupid BS gets latched on to as it seen as a vehicle to acquire funding and resources. But more than that, there is no disciplined way to think about the future and apply that to JFCOM's activities. There is no overarching vision that informs the way the command's directorates do business, across the board. This leaves everyone free to experiment, and there is no rigorous intellectual process to consider and vett ideas, no "sanity check" to separate the wise concepts from the hare-brained schemes.

In my opinion, we need an overarching, strategic vision to guide the efforts of each of our directorates, particularly the big ones - J7, J8, J9. A commander who is both a strong leader and a strong intellectual like General Mattis seems to be just what we need.

Of course, we are manned by the services, and the doctrine and systems we develop must be accepted by them, so good luck with the overarching strategic visions. Never said the commander's job was going to be easy.

* Reduce internal bureaucracy, it is impossible for JFCOM to promote 'agility' if it is itself clumsy. My personal experiences with the JFCOM staff process were traumatic, it was long and painful to get major projects through all the staff wickets before we could get them released to the COCOM customer. And the processes we have imposed on our customers to get help from us (and here I am writing about my particular competency, JNTC), sometimes turn what should be easy and effective fixes into drawn out, inconclusive efforts that satisfy no one.

Everything, including our bureaucracy and how it is constituted and how it operates, should be as simple as is absolutely possible (except where it might put me out of work ;) ). If General Mattis fixes all of the other things, but the JFCOM internal bureaucracy remains a hopeless mess, his best intentions will be stymied.

General Mattis has a big job ahead of him, but it is an important one. DOD needs JFCOM, and needs it to function right. If he can be a success, in ways his past several predecessors weren't IMO, he can leave a much more significant and lasting mark on the DOD than if he had become a regional COCOM commander, or even CMC. I am guardedly hopeful, he is an outstanding personality and intellect, and has real character, unlike so many featureless and generic GO/FO's we have today - if anyone can succeed at this task, it must be him. Let's wish him the best of luck and pray for his success.

J Wolfsberger
05-20-2010, 08:57 PM
He makes some good points about over reliance on technology.

Mattis: Military should rely less on technology (http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2010/05/military_mattis_technology_051310w/)

William F. Owen
05-21-2010, 06:30 AM
He makes some good points about over reliance on technology.

Mattis: Military should rely less on technology (http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2010/05/military_mattis_technology_051310w/)

OK but.....

I like General Mattis. He's on my tick list, but I'm not sure about this. "Turn the radios off" is a tad simplistic, and so-called "mission command" is not enabled just by switching off radios. - also there are very many differing types of "mission command."

Sure, use the radios less. Practice pro-longed radio silence, but that did not mean switching them off - and as the entire command system of the US Army is essentially digital, I'm more than curious to know how this gets put into practice.

Chris jM
05-21-2010, 08:18 AM
There were a number of interesting replies when this was posted on the SWJ blog here: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/mattis-military-should-rely-le/


"Turn the radios off" is a tad simplistic, and so-called "mission command" is not enabled just by switching off radios. - also there are very many differing types of "mission command."

But simple works! I don't think that Gen Mattis expects a radio switch to go to 'off' and de-centralised mission command to suddenly be turned on. However, taking away some of the props that support micro-management and enable massive reach-down can be a great thing in training. If people are suddenly forced to employ verbal orders, use their own initiative in-keeping with their commander's intent and trust their subordinates once in a while it can only be of benefit, even when technology is allowed again.

William F. Owen
05-21-2010, 02:08 PM
There were a number of interesting replies when this was posted on the SWJ blog here: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/mattis-military-should-rely-le/

WHY Oh WHY... cannot we have the Blog discussion here!! No wonder this board goes a bit quiet. Why is the blog comment different form the Forum!! We are missing a trick!! IMO - possible IMHO.... but unlikely.... :eek:


But simple works! I don't think that Gen Mattis expects a radio switch to go to 'off' and de-centralised mission command to suddenly be turned on.
Wallah!! Mate, I am as simple as it gets. I am the Mr Simple of simple things. It's my schtick. Clausewitz the Hedgehog!!! I may well be an opinoated arrogant little twat, but I am very simple opinionated.... you get it! :D

If people are suddenly forced to employ verbal orders, use their own initiative in-keeping with their commander's intent and trust their subordinates once in a while it can only be of benefit, even when technology is allowed again.
Yes, its about leaders leading regardless. Ensuring leaders lead, under all likely conditions is leadership. Back in the day I've seen Section Commanders making sketch maps, because there were not enough maps. If I was king, I would be teaching platoons to use whistles. PRR is gradually eroding hand signals. All good. - IF that was what Matis is talking about, then all for it.

Steve Blair
05-21-2010, 02:15 PM
OK but.....

I like General Mattis. He's on my tick list, but I'm not sure about this. "Turn the radios off" is a tad simplistic, and so-called "mission command" is not enabled just by switching off radios. - also there are very many differing types of "mission command."

Sure, use the radios less. Practice pro-longed radio silence, but that did not mean switching them off - and as the entire command system of the US Army is essentially digital, I'm more than curious to know how this gets put into practice.

Maybe Mattis wants to make the entire chain think...to teach superiors to occasionally trust their subordinates, or at least allow them to learn on their own. So yes, Wilf, sometimes it DOES mean switching them off. As Chris points out, it's good for learning and testing.

Hacksaw
05-21-2010, 02:23 PM
I don't know if it was good leadership... but I turned off the BN CMD net in the field more often than I should admit... Not sure I need to call in hourly slant reports when I'm supposed to be in the middle of Battery TNG :D

Only got caught once, and when the BN CDR came and found me observing some outstanding PLT TNG lanes designed, organized and led by my junior leaders... I was forgiven my sin... maybe that's why he made 3-star:rolleyes:

slapout9
05-21-2010, 03:42 PM
OK but.....

I like General Mattis. He's on my tick list, but I'm not sure about this. "Turn the radios off" is a tad simplistic, and so-called "mission command" is not enabled just by switching off radios. - also there are very many differing types of "mission command."

Sure, use the radios less. Practice pro-longed radio silence, but that did not mean switching them off - and as the entire command system of the US Army is essentially digital, I'm more than curious to know how this gets put into practice.

Wilf, you may not like this and I could be wrong but I think he means to use the Prime Tenets of Maneuver Warfare. The Mission....The Main Effort....Surfaces and Gaps. Per the OODA loop. Turn the radio off.... Observe(visually see) Surfaces and Gaps. Orient on the Main effort. Decide how you can support the Mission (commanders Intent) then Act on your decision. Adjust as necessary based upon what you see ....not the chatter over the radio. Just my interpretation anyway.

Steve Blair
05-21-2010, 03:45 PM
Wilf, you may not like this and I could be wrong but I think he means to use the Prime Tenets of Maneuver Warfare. The Mission....The Main Effort....Surfaces and Gaps. Per the OODA loop. Turn the radio off.... Observe(visually see) Surfaces and Gaps. Orient on the Main effort. Decide how you can support the Mission (commanders Intent) then Act on your decision. Adjust as necessary based upon what you see ....not the chatter over the radio. Just my interpretation anyway.

Slap, have you considered going to a Warden recovery clinic?;):D

I think you're at least partway right, although I'd slim it down to seeing what the commanders at all levels can do when they don't have someone looking over their collective shoulders. At the very least it would be a start toward weeding out the sitters from the doers, and might even allow something like (gasp) actual learning, training, and safe (as in non-combat) tactical mistakes to be made and learned from.

William F. Owen
05-21-2010, 04:09 PM
Wilf, you may not like this and I could be wrong but I think he means to use the Prime Tenets of Maneuver Warfare.
Well you're right about not liking it!! :rolleyes:

So called "Mission Command" is not a tennet of so called MW. Foch writes very clearly about the "ability to understand your commander" in 1911. Moltke even earlier, but I am less familiar with his work.
I strongly believe in:

a.) "doing your utmost to fulfil your commanders intent."
b.) especially when the situation changes significantly from the one he issues the orders to cover.

..... but you cannot do a Formation crossing of the Suez Canal, using "mission command" and with no radios. It is very context specific.

Surfaces and Gaps? OK, as long as you know that the gaps are the entrances to ambushes, - especially if you've run into North Korean, Chinese, Japanese, or Soviet Fortified region, or prepared defensive position. ... but I digress. :wry:

Fuchs
05-21-2010, 06:10 PM
Guderian crossed the Meuse at Sedan using the normal German leadership methods.
He had trained the troops very well for that particular action before the campaign, though.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
05-21-2010, 07:04 PM
It is as much about the commander clearly explaining his intent and plan as it is for the subordinate to carry it out with minimal further direction. But as it is said even the best plan rarely survives contact.

I agree that “turning off the radios” is a bit much plus our over reliance on technology is not so much radios as it is those things that replace solid field craft, like GPS. While GPS is a great thing the art of map reading and navigation using the compass are falling by the wayside. That is an over-reliance on technology. Comms are comms and short of wig wag and heliograph there's not much else you can do to replicate them.

Ken White
05-21-2010, 07:30 PM
wearing a war suit...:D

I really do post date the Smoke Signals and even the Telegraph and Heliograph. ;)

...Barely...

However, I'm old enough that radio was the primary comm means and we did back then turn 'em off for training and for real when our emissions might have been a problem.

There was no replicate to it, the idea was not to find alternatives or substitutes, it was to do the job without using them at all. Hard as it is to believe with all the modern gee whiz stuff, GPS, BFT, etc. (those are just aids -- and that's all they are, aids, they are not imperatives) and amazing as it may seem that units were trusted to the extent that they were released from view and 'positive control' to perform actual combat missions in a fairly active war or two, it was done. You can really do that... :wry:

One would be remiss to not understand that even if non use of comm and the other aids was not intentional it did, does and can happen due to both technological and logistic problems -- and even more frequently as a result enemy or combat action. Combat is hard on equipment...

The problem is that we are not using our aids as aids-- they are too often being used as substitutes for a lack of training. They have ceased being a cane and have become a Walker (or even a Wheelchair in some cases...) That's what Mattis is warning against...

slapout9
05-21-2010, 07:39 PM
Slap, have you considered going to a Warden recovery clinic?;):D


They wouldn't take me....said it was a pre-existing condition:D

Entropy
05-22-2010, 04:08 AM
One can never know when technology will fail you - only that it is sure to fail at some point.

For a time I was in charge of training the new intel people that came to the unit directly from Intel schoolhouse. At first I had them prepare a brief on some topic and in the middle of delivering their brief I would turn off the computer running their powerpoint slides. I had them finish the briefing and, unfortunately, they usually didn't do too well. Next I would have them develop a briefing on a topic without the use of the SIPRnet or JWICs for research which got them acquainted with the pub library.

Technology can be a monkey on your back if you let it.

J Wolfsberger
05-22-2010, 03:32 PM
One can never know when technology will fail you - only that it is sure to fail at some point.
...

Technology can be a monkey on your back if you let it.

I may have read more into Gen. Mattis quoted comments than was actually present in his speech, but this is my take away from his comments. I remember the level of resources an erstwhile adversary invested in Radio Electronic Combat (REC). If the force is reliant on all the high tech networking and commo, what happens when a dedicated opponent takes them away? Are our leaders fully prepared to effectively prosecute their mission when that happens?

I may also be mistaken (observer bias), but I assumed his term "mission command" meant Auftragstaktik. Which, as Wilf points out, "...is not enabled just by switching off radios."

Ken White
05-23-2010, 12:40 AM
..."mission command"...Which, as Wilf points out, "...is not enabled just by switching off radios."It is not. It is enabled by decent training. However, given even marginal training, a Commander with enough testicular fortitude to turn off the radios forces his subordinate commanders to perform -- whether they want to or not.

You'd be surprised (or maybe not...) by the number of folks who take an entirely too great amount of comfort in being told what to do by a Staff or a Commander miles away instead of making decisions on their own. That forcing effort is beneficial as it pushes the marginal types to become better. Or be pushed off the cart...

Fuchs
05-23-2010, 10:35 AM
Mission command can also be enforced the other way - by subordinates turning off their radios and acting on the last "commander's intent" they liked. This has been done up to Army HQ level, and very often at division and regiment level.

This part of Auftragstaktik - to violate orders when one thinks it's better like that is at the root of the whole system and pretty much ignored in U.S. writings. It was also a critical component of the birth of Blitzkrieg, and the greatest mistake of the Fall Gelb campaign in France 1940 happened when generals obeyed an order even though they knew it was wrong..

Auftragstaktik has its roots in the 18th century, and I can recount an interesting anecdote (albeit not accurately; merely out of the memory):

A major had followed his orders during the seven Years War and done something very stupid because the orders were outdated. A prince arrives and questions the man why he had done something that stupid. The major answered that this had been his order.
The prince replied "His majesty made you a major because he believed you would know when NOT to follow orders!"

Ken White
05-23-2010, 02:40 PM
...to violate orders when one thinks it's better like that is at the root of the whole system and pretty much ignored in U.S. writings.but I can assure you it is or at least was emphatically not ignored in practice by a great many US commanders and leaders. :D

That's why the current push for mandatory interconnectivity, BFT, PLRS and all that (not to mention UAVs which offer a way to be the 'Commander in the Sky' without hovering overhead in a Helicopter). Guys who as Captains ignored their Lieutenant Colonels or as LTCs ignored their Generals by "turning off their radios" are now Generals and want to make sure that no one does the same thing to them...:eek: :wry:

The sad thing is that they really ought to be encouraging initiative instead of inadvertently destroying it. :mad:

Cole
05-23-2010, 07:16 PM
Not sure I understand the tech aversion by so many here.

Take UAS for example. In OIF 1, there was virtually no V Corps UAS support because Predators were concentrating on trying to find “strategic” SCUD targets. Would having more Army direct support tactical UAS have reduced brigade and below commander initiative or enhanced it? If you no longer had to rely on movement-to-contact or intelligence tasked by some distant operations center and fed to you from the U.S., but instead had access to your own assets and combat information, wouldn’t that help?

If you had the UAS video in your combat vehicle or on a dismounted patrol, accessible to the JTAC and F/A-18, company commander, and providing information to the FS officer in the battalion CP, the Shadow GCS being influenced by the brigade CP, and visible to Apaches supporting you, doesn’t that help?

If the enemy attempts to jam the local UAS digital line-of-sight signal, he is emitting and can be targeted. If instead, he takes out the satellite controlling the "theater-capable" UAS, the temporary loss of information may not be so temporary. And do you prefer to rely on a Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) analyzing UAS video and communicating with you from California, or would analysts operating inside your battalion/brigade CP DCGS-Army be more immune to loss of signal to provide more timely analysis based on the tactical commander’s CCIR?

Would we prefer combat information to come exclusively at the speed and range of the mounted or dismounted Soldier/Marine, whose ground perspective may be limited and events may change minutes after the patrol passes by? Can you see or influence the Taliban shooting at you from 700 meters away? Can you watch that mosque 24/7 with a secure dismounted 2-man OP? Do you trust the lead vehicle keeping an eye out for ground disturbances more than the UAS operator using coherent change detection? Is it possible that just because you don’t understand a technology's value, it still might help you?

When the enemy starts launching long range missiles, rockets, and mortars against your unit (or allies), aren’t you glad we have counter-mortar radars, C-RAM, and Patriot/THAAD/SM3/Aegis…not to mention HESCO and stealth aircraft and satellites with sensors that may detect missile launch? When you cross that minefield or unknown ground near the attack objective, aren’t you glad that tank has a line charge on it? Will that line charge be as effective if every commander mounts his mounted assault based on personal preferences without the benefit of that line charge breech, pre-planned fires, and support-by-fire that one commander may be providing another at specific times and phase lines?

As for commander’s intent, isn’t it fair to say that tactical and strategic actions must mirror that of the national command authority and joint force commander?

In 2003, our probability for success to go all the way to Baghdad was good since we had planned the logistics to support heavy force refuel efforts and had BFT to track unit locations, provide digital comms and graphics, and prevent fratricide.

In contrast, a continued Desert Storm attack well beyond what was logistically supportable and that could have increased fratricide risk and attacks by bypassed threats was not in the cards, despite what a squadron commander may have wanted. And the commander’s intent of the POTUS and General Schwarzkopf were not to go that far. Should those orders have been disregarded?

Just my personal view.

Ken White
05-23-2010, 08:33 PM
Not sure I understand the tech aversion by so many here.No one is being tech averse so far I can see. Several of us caution that you cannot totally -- remember that word, totally -- rely on it and you should be prepared to implement alternatives, that just seems prudent. That inability to totally rely on it is only partly due to technological flaws or failures, it has much more to do with potential enemy disruptive action or own side human error. No one suggested not using anything...

I will, though, point out that every thing you cite has been used in a relatively benign environment. One cannot always rely on that relatively low degree of combat action and friction. I said I'd say the same things I said on the front page. Here are some:

"Mattis didn't say don't use technology, he pointed out that it is rarely failsafe for a variety of reasons and he adds that if you lose a techno-capability, you'd better have a fallback."

"No one I've seen here including Mattis is suggesting doing away with any technology, the issue is to not become over reliant on technology and to attempt to let it substitute for poor or missing training."

"The issue is not less technology, no one said that; the issue is a better balance between technology and training and a suggestion that total reliance on technology can be dangerous. Any thinking peer opponent of the US is going to seek ways to degrade or render useless our technological edge. We would be foolish IMO to not prepare properly for such unknowns."

Could you please point out where I or anyone else in this thread has really been "tech averse" or suggested NOT using any of the systems you cited?

Fuchs
05-23-2010, 08:49 PM
A thorough training should begin with little technology and then make things ever easier with technology as performance expectations rise during training.

An example: GPS
A map and a suitable compass should suffice, and soldiers should know the polar star (or whatever the people on the southern hemisphere use).
GPS-dependent soldiers are often an embarrassment when they're being tasked to navigate without GPS.


I'm also in favour of having plenty motorcycles in an army for traffic control, courier and rear scouting (such as finding a good spot for a depot or hospital).

Cole
05-23-2010, 09:38 PM
Could you please point out where I or anyone else in this thread has really been "tech averse" or suggested NOT using any of the systems you cited?

Your comment about UAS was what caught my eye. There is nothing wrong with having good situational awareness at a higher echelon CP via UAS full motion video access. It allows that commander/staff to get the quick reaction force and other support moving while avoiding questions about danger close or collateral damage.

I understand doctrine about radio silence to avoid being targeted. But that must be weighed, IMHO, against the unlikelihood that it will occur at all due to weak threat opponents, or because his EW emissions or artillery would result in a near instant more capable friendly response. Don't we remote antennas for a reason? Is a communicating moving target likely to be struck...although admittedly a stationary CP in Baghdad was hit in OIF 1.

A similar quandary exists in air combat training. How many pilots are lost annually in training versus actual air combat? Couldn't simulators perform more of that training? Threat opponents don't get anywhere near our flight hours or simulation training. Look at Russian airpower problems over Georgia. Read DefenseTech to see how confident Chinese leadership is regarding homegrown reverse-engineered old tech jets. Yet we always seem to consider the threat to be a 10 feet tall boogeyman on land, sea, and in the air.

FCS had embedded simulation as a KPP and many other promising technologies...largely victimized by JTRS not being ready. Isn't the use of technology for training a good idea? Pursuit of promising BCT Modernization tech like Class I UAS should not be eliminated due to imperfect datalinks on someone else's development schedule.

Should testers be committing fratricide by claiming that hearing a UAS at 2 kms and seeing it at 4 kms is unacceptable? Can you see and hear a tank or cavalry scout vehicle at 2-4 kms? Why is one shockpower and exploitable via deception and the other is a no-go? And how much shock does the heavy BCT create when it never arrives before the war is over and then runs out of gas because we decide we need 50 ton infantry fighting vehicles?

Ken White
05-24-2010, 02:44 AM
Your comment about UAS was what caught my eye. There is nothing wrong with having good situational awareness at a higher echelon CP via UAS full motion video access. It allows that commander/staff to get the quick reaction force and other support moving while avoiding questions about danger close or collateral damage.Totally agree and I did not object to that use -- I did make a snide comment about possible misuse by a poor Commander. Poor Commanders can misuse anything, high tech or no tech.
I understand doctrine about radio silence to avoid being targeted. But that must be weighed, IMHO, against the unlikelihood that it will occur at all due to weak threat opponents, or because his EW emissions or artillery would result in a near instant more capable friendly response. Don't we remote antennas for a reason? Is a communicating moving target likely to be struck...although admittedly a stationary CP in Baghdad was hit in OIF 1.I also totally agree with that. The key is that in "must be weighed." I would hope and really expect most units would do that competently.
A similar quandary exists in air combat training. How many pilots are lost annually in training versus actual air combat? Couldn't simulators perform more of that training? Threat opponents don't get anywhere near our flight hours or simulation training. Look at Russian airpower problems over Georgia. Read DefenseTech to see how confident Chinese leadership is regarding homegrown reverse-engineered old tech jets. Yet we always seem to consider the threat to be a 10 feet tall boogeyman on land, sea, and in the air.Uh, yeah. However doesn't that paragraph tend toward less technology? You seem to be arguing with yourself. Or is it just certain Air Force and Naval technology that is objectionable?
FCS had embedded simulation as a KPP and many other promising technologies...largely victimized by JTRS not being ready. Isn't the use of technology for training a good idea? Pursuit of promising BCT Modernization tech like Class I UAS should not be eliminated due to imperfect datalinks on someone else's development schedule.Yes to all that -- and no one here has suggested otherwise. I trust you are not an employee of or are yourself a Contractor who lost out on the FCS cxl... :confused:

Regardless, valid points all -- and, again, no one here is arguing otherwise.
Should testers be committing fratricide by claiming that hearing a UAS at 2 kms and seeing it at 4 kms is unacceptable? Can you see and hear a tank or cavalry scout vehicle at 2-4 kms? Why is one shockpower and exploitable via deception and the other is a no-go? And how much shock does the heavy BCT create when it never arrives before the war is over and then runs out of gas because we decide we need 50 ton infantry fighting vehicles?I frankly do not understand that. I would submit that we have no Cavalry Scout Vehicles, that the vehicles we use for that role travel in packs and are prepared for combat. If an opponent sees one, he knows there will be more nearby and they are looking for trouble.

A recon or surveillance UAS OTOH may be employed hopefully covertly or at least stealthily to not let a targeted enemy know of our interest in a specific area of ground. In short, I think we have a Pomegranates and Kiwi Fruit comparison... :wry:

The 'solutions' to your latter conundrum are many, not least that we should plan better and / or develop a C5 replacement (and those are both quite serious comments).

You're fighting the age old protection versus mobility battle which has never been resolved. It is also unlikely to be resolved because every war is different even though a lot of planning is expended on re-doing the last one. I personally opt for mobility in most cases but acknowledge the need for the protection afforded by 50t IFVs and 80t Tanks on occasion. The US Army is trying to sort out which way it will go. My bet is a compromise that annoys many because that's the only reasonably prudent course.

I may be wrong but I believe that you did not provide an example of me or anyone else in this thread really being "tech averse" or suggesting the US not use any of the systems you cited. Thus I'm still unsure of your point. My apologies for being old and dense... :o

slapout9
05-24-2010, 05:42 AM
I'm also in favour of having plenty motorcycles in an army for traffic control, courier and rear scouting (such as finding a good spot for a depot or hospital).

We did experiments with that in the 70's in the 82nd Airborne. They were used as couriers between units to deliver orders and maps just to practice what we would do if we lost our radio communications due to electronic jamming or lack of battery resupply. Don't know if they ever formally adopted it as a permanent procedure.

J Wolfsberger
05-25-2010, 12:28 PM
Ken covered it so well, that I won't add to it. I will take a step back and add one thing: In the US, we seem to have a peculiar belief that technology can solve any and every problem, and so we can have an "Easy Button" for war if we just spend enough money to build the right gadget. Most of us on this board reject that approach.

(e.g. Embedded training is a nice "gadget" if used as a supplement to field training. It can not replace field training. It should never have been a KPP. But it, like many other "neat" technologies, were loaded into FCS as "must have KPP" rather than "nice, but only if we can afford the burdens after we've taken care of shoot, move, communicate.")

Cliff
07-08-2010, 10:38 PM
It was announced today that Gen Mattis will be taking over CENTCOM.

Fox makes much of his previous gaffe about shooting people being fun:

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/07/08/gates-names-marine-gen-mattis-central-command/

Seems like a logical choice. Interesting part will be how he interfaces with Gen Petraeus. Realistically Gen Petraeus will be working directly for the president, but it will be a unique situation for both generals.

Does this mean EBO might be spared by JFCOM? :p

SWJED
07-08-2010, 11:54 PM
It was announced today that Gen Mattis will be taking over CENTCOM.

Fox makes much of his previous gaffe about shooting people being fun:

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/07/08/gates-names-marine-gen-mattis-central-command/

Seems like a logical choice. Interesting part will be how he interfaces with Gen Petraeus. Realistically Gen Petraeus will be working directly for the president, but it will be a unique situation for both generals.

Does this mean EBO might be spared by JFCOM? :p


EBO, at least as JFCOM defined it in the late '90's and early 2K’s is dead as a doorknob.

slapout9
07-09-2010, 02:41 AM
EBO, at least as JFCOM defined it in the late '90's and early 2K’s is dead as a doorknob.

Will Mattis push Maneuver Warfare as a replacement?

Cliff
07-09-2010, 03:52 AM
Will Mattis push Maneuver Warfare as a replacement?

According to the SAMS instructor that talked to my class today, design is being written into the new joint doctrine.

I know the AF is still trying to keep its version of EBO... which is different than what JFCOM used.

Hacksaw
07-09-2010, 01:46 PM
A Petraeus/Mattis lash-up will work just fine... they are of a similar mind on the most important things, and Mattis will leave AFG to Petraeus except where it impacts the rest of the AOR and at that point the will work cooperatively... not sure there was a better selection possible

EBO is DEAD DEAD DEAD...

Cavguy
07-09-2010, 08:16 PM
EBO is DEAD DEAD DEAD...

Long Live SOD/Design/EBAO! :D

SWJ Blog
02-17-2011, 03:13 AM
Did Gen. Mattis pull duty on Christmas so a Marine could be with his family? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/02/did-gen-mattis-pull-duty-on-ch/)

Entry Excerpt:

Did Gen. Mattis pull duty on Christmas so a Marine could be with his family? Jeff Schogol has the answer (http://www.stripes.com/blogs/the-rumor-doctor/the-rumor-doctor-1.104348/did-gen-mattis-pull-duty-on-christmas-so-a-marine-could-be-with-his-family-1.134995) at Stars and Stripes.



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SWJ Blog
07-21-2013, 03:09 AM
General James Mattis (USMC Ret) On Middle East Policy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/general-james-mattis-usmc-ret-on-middle-east-policy)

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davidbfpo
10-30-2013, 12:06 PM
Just a thought, surely General Mattis reading list is known now?

SWJ Blog
09-21-2014, 12:32 PM
Mattis on Iraq: ‘You Just Don’t Take Anything Off the Table Up Front’ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mattis-on-iraq-%E2%80%98you-just-don%E2%80%99t-take-anything-off-the-table-up-front%E2%80%99)

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SWJ Blog
02-27-2015, 12:43 AM
General Mattis: A New American Grand Strategy (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/general-mattis-a-new-american-grand-strategy)

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davidbfpo
06-17-2015, 07:46 PM
Spotted today a HistoryNet interview, via Twitter and added here:http://www.historynet.com/interview-with-general-james-mattis.htm

gute
06-23-2015, 02:59 AM
Had the honor of meeting the man in Kandahar in January 2002. If there are any other members who were present at that time I was the short DEA agent and not the big dumb goofy looking one. Just want to set the record straight.

lindastacy3
10-03-2015, 09:43 AM
Spotted today a HistoryNet interview, via Twitter and added here:http://www.historynet.com/interview-with-general-james-mattis.htm

Thanks for the link to Historynet interview. I liked it.

SWJ Blog
04-18-2016, 07:45 AM
The Case for James N. Mattis for President (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-case-for-james-n-mattis-for-president)

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SWJ Blog
09-16-2016, 06:13 AM
The Mattis Way of War (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-mattis-way-of-war)

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SWJ Blog
11-22-2016, 10:36 AM
LtGen James Mattis' Reading List (2007) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ltgen-james-mattis-reading-list-2007)

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slapout9
11-22-2016, 02:51 PM
Does anybody know the title of the book he gave to President Trump when he met with him this past weekend?

Bill Moore
11-22-2016, 03:23 PM
I didn't hear the title, the grape vine rumor said it was a book on civil-military relations. An appropriate topic.

TheCurmudgeon
11-22-2016, 06:11 PM
Seems to be taking a long time for him to decide. Curious if he has reservations about moving to the Civilian side of the Pentagon.

slapout9
11-22-2016, 06:42 PM
Curmdgy,
The Trump organization is supposed to make a big announcement after Thanks Giving and the Iron Bowl.

TheCurmudgeon
11-22-2016, 07:36 PM
Curmdgy,
The Trump organization is supposed to make a big announcement after Thanks Giving and the Iron Bowl.

I can wait. If he takes the job I will feel a lot better about Trump's Foreign Policy Team. Still want to see who gets State.

TheCurmudgeon
11-22-2016, 08:14 PM
In interview today, Trump said that he was surprised that Mattis was against waterboarding. Wonder if that will affect Trump's thinking on Mattis?

TheCurmudgeon
11-23-2016, 12:00 AM
When it comes to torture, clearly Mattis has a greater understanding of the issue than Trump. But Trump has made his position clear. This may be a deal breaker. Hoping not. Trump needs some dissenting opinions in his cabinet.

JHR
11-23-2016, 01:02 AM
Warriors and Citizens
by General Jim Mattis, Kori Schakevia Books by Hoover Fellows
Tuesday, August 2, 2016


Fifteen prominent experts on civil-military relations analyze data from the largest survey since 1998 of American public attitudes about military issues in order to explore the ways the public is losing connection to its military

(copied from The Hoover Institute website)
Link:http://www.hooverpress.org/Warriors-and-Citizens-P627.aspx

Amazon has a few reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Warriors-Citizens-American-Views-Military/dp/0817919341

SWJ Blog
11-23-2016, 07:15 PM
Short Video: Who is General James Mattis? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/short-video-who-is-general-james-mattis)

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SWJ Blog
11-25-2016, 02:44 PM
I Love Mattis, But I Don't Love Him as SecDef (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/i-love-mattis-but-i-dont-love-him-as-secdef)

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SWJ Blog
11-26-2016, 06:01 AM
Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, (General, USMC, Retired): Can He Be A Civilian Leader? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/secretary-of-defense-james-n-mattis-general-usmc-retired-can-he-be-a-civilian-leader)

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SWJ Blog
12-02-2016, 02:23 PM
Mad Dog, as in ‘Mad Dog’ Mattis: The Colorful History of a Great American Nickname (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mad-dog-as-in-%E2%80%98mad-dog%E2%80%99-mattis-the-colorful-history-of-a-great-american-nickname)

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SWJ Blog
12-06-2016, 09:11 PM
Democrats Uncertain They’ll Take Shot to Block Gen. Mattis From Trump’s Cabinet (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/democrats-uncertain-they%E2%80%99ll-take-shot-to-block-gen-mattis-from-trump%E2%80%99s-cabinet)

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SWJ Blog
12-08-2016, 06:02 PM
'Warrior Monk' Mattis a Strong Voice at Defense (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/warrior-monk-mattis-a-strong-voice-at-defense)

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SWJ Blog
12-22-2016, 12:21 AM
Can Mattis Make Peace Through Technology? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/can-mattis-make-peace-through-technology)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/can-mattis-make-peace-through-technology) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.