Afghanistan's Drug Problem

[SWJED]

17 September Wall Street Journal commentary - Afghanistan's Catch-22 (http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008956) by Dana White.

... "In my 33 years in the military, I have never seen tougher terrain than here," says the general, who adds that the "vast majority of the country" is now secure. "There are about five or six provinces that have significant security challenges and they are primarily in rural areas." Translation: Kabul and major cities are calm, but in the southern and eastern provinces, where the government hasn't established its authority, violence prevails.

In some regions, peace admittedly won't come easily, if at all. Take the border with Pakistan, which is roughly twice as long as California--and twice as mountainous. Gen. Eikenberry says the area can't physically be secured, no matter how many boots are planted on the ground. True, Pakistan has committed nearly 80,000 troops to the effort, but the general--while lauding the cooperation between the Pakistani and Afghan forces, which are old foes--avoids questions about why Taliban insurgents are still finding safe haven in Pakistan.

Other areas, however, could be secured, and haven't been--particularly the southern provinces. In recent months, Taliban fighters seized on the transfer of control from U.S. to NATO forces and engaged in pitched battles. NATO's top commander said earlier this month that he needs 15% more troops to effectively roll back the Taliban threat. They may not get there before the Afghan winter sets in and the Taliban retreats into well-fortified caves.

"The insurgents are better equipped and better trained than they were a year ago," Gen. Eikenberry says. "People often fail to understand the full complexity of the violence here. There are several causes for violence in these provinces, including land disputes, tribal feuds and property titles. Taliban fighters often capitalize on these existing divisions to garner support in local communities."

Gen. Eikenberry understands the root of the problem. And it's a big one. In 2005, Afghanistan earned $2.7 billion in opium exports, or 52% of its GDP--plenty of cash to support an insurgency. That fighting has, in turn, basically halted all of the infrastructure build-out that was meant to provide Afghan farmers and other rural residents alternatives to growing poppy.

"In traveling around the country, the top concern of Afghans is unemployment, education and irrigation," Gen. Eikenberry confirms. But to address these issues--and here's the catch-22--violence in rural Afghanistan must first be quelled. If it isn't, the infrastructure that will facilitate trade cannot be built...

[slapout9]

The General hit the nail on the head about the drug problem. Families,tribes have been doing this ages. Until you can find a way to replace this source of income so they can take care of their families nothing will get done. Simple crop replacement will not work unless it provides the same level of income that the Afghan's are used to. It is true that this should be a Afghan police problem, however I doubt they can handle it.

The other problem is that culture thing again. They really don't think they are doing anything wrong, and I suspect the US intervention is viewed as a form harassment more than anything else. If possible the US should stay away from this and let the Afghan's handle it.

[Bill Moore]

I guess the first question is are the drugs actually funding the insurgency? The Taleban eliminated the drug trade when they ruled, and the routing of the Taleban gave the clans the freedom they needed to convert back to their old ways. They may pay protection money to some insurgent elements where the coalition isn't effective, but do they willingly fund a significant portion of the insurgency?

If we go after the drugs, won't that be perceived as an attack on their culture and their means of wealth production? In that case wouldn't that encourage them to form a temporarily alliance with the Taleban or other insurgent or criminal organizations to resist the coalition?

If we don't go after the drugs (just let it happen), then what happens? What is the worst case scenario? I'll go out on a limb here thinking out load. Wouldn't we have more influence over a criminal clan that has real economic interests, than a bunch of ideological zealots? Maybe the lesser of the evils is the drug clans in the short term is drug clans?

If not, can we effectively go after both? 53 percent of their GDP is very, very significant. I imagine the other 47% is foreign aid?

[Merv Benson]

Bill,

I don't think the Taliban ever really eliminated the drug trade, although they did make it more inconvient for a while. I have seen some reports that they actually found a way to profit from the trade.

If it were true that the enemy did not profit from the drug trade, then it might be cost effective to just buy the drugs and take them off the market or sell them to pharmaceutical companies. My speculation is that people who grow and sell drugs do not have many inhibitions and therefore, they are likely to be dealing with other people without inhibitions including the enemy.

[RTK]

If it were true that the enemy did not profit from the drug trade, then it might be cost effective to just buy the drugs and take them off the market or sell them to pharmaceutical companies. My speculation is that people who grow and sell drugs do not have many inhibitions and therefore, they are likely to be dealing with other people without inhibitions including the enemy.

We were going to do this and then stiffed the farmers. We told them if they planted wheat instead of poppies, we'd buy it and give them the difference. Then we cut that part out of the budget. In the end, there were a whole bunch of new wheat farmers pissed at Americans for not making good on their promise. So now poppie production is about 60% of the country. Cool little 2nd and 3rd order effect there.

[slapout9]

Merv, that is exactly what we should be doing. Opium has many legitimate medical purposes and the potential for a win win situation for all is something that should be pursued ASAP. However it probably want happen. Why? Because we spend to much time trying to figure out how to fight instead of figuring out how to win.

Bill, I think your observations are correct not just one but all. Here is why. The results of drug profits that you never hear about is that the money creeps into legitimate business, government, etc. The local hospital has a new wing built by the upstanding citizen who is related to a big wealthy drug dealer. The upstanding citizen gets elected to public office, the hospital gets a new wing to treat children, and the drug dealer grows more powerful, safe in the shadows.

[Tom Odom]

I have been referring to the drug issue in OEF as the 900 pound gorilla in the room for more thhan a year because no one was addressing it in serious discussions. At least LTG Eikenberry is doing that now.

Tom

[Jedburgh]

From The Senlis Council (http://www.senliscouncil.net/):

Failed Counter-Narcotics Policies Central to Failure of Afghanistan’s Reconstruction (http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/014_publication/documents/5y_chapter_03)
Misguided and badly formulated drug policy has accelerated and compounded all of Afghanistan’s problems, and has effectively hijacked the international community’s nation-building efforts in the country. Five years ago, the international community prioritised counter-narcotics as one of their top objectives for Afghanistan, yet this priority, almost more than anything else, ignored the realities of the country. Afghanistan is severely debilitated by poverty, and poppy cultivation represents a survival strategy for millions of Afghans. Most of Afghanistan is so mired in poverty that without poppy, families cannot feed their children. This misplaced prioritisation of counter-narcotics focused substantial amounts of aid funds away from development and poverty relief; prompted the formulation of ill conceived drug policies for Afghanistan and misinformed the implementation strategies for these eradication and alternative development policies.

Yet despite all the counter-narcotics and alternative development funds provided by the international community, the opium crisis in Afghanistan is worse than ever, and entrenched in almost all facets of Afghan society. In September 2006 the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime announced record poppy cultivation levels in Afghanistan: 165,000 hectares of poppy were cultivated in the 2005-2006 growing season, with a potential yield of 6,100 metric tons of opium. This is a 59% percent increase from 2005, and demonstrates that five years of flawed counternarcotics priorities have brought no positive change in Afghanistan. They have only served to undermine government legitimacy, stability, security and development, whilst farmers have lost confidence in the current Karzai administration. Ultimately, this loss of confidence has ultimately aided insurgents. Five years ago, the total area of cultivated hectares of poppy was less than half of the current total....

CRS, 25 Jan 06: Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf) (first published in '04, updated annually)

[slapout9]

I guess Tom Ricks can write another book and call it Fiasco II.

[Bill Moore]

This particular thread is fascinating and telling in many ways beyond the opium problem.

First, RTK can you shed more light on who approved, then who disapproved the replacement crop program? While I doubt it would have worked, it still indicates that our bureaucracy is unwieldy and in many cases prohibits progress. Most agree that the people are the prize in COIN operations, and we can’t win that prize by refusing to walk or talk. This is a well known problem in Iraq also with Civil Affairs, where numerous promised projects were never delivered. Credibility is critical, and I think we would probably be better off promising “realistic” projects that incrementally improve their quality of life, vice trying to build a Hoover dam.

Thanks for the CRS report Jedburgh, as it clarified the issue of the Taliban allegedly suppressing the opium trade (only a partial truth). President Karsai believes the center of gravity in Afghanistan centers on the drug trade and carrying the fight into the Pakistan border region. Just because it isn’t politically correct, doesn’t mean it isn’t correct. Taking the fight into Pakistan border areas would be easier than targeting the drug trade. How do we shut the opium business and still win the prize? We have only been minimal progress in S. America, and there is no real end in sight. The West won’t tolerate operating in a tunnel with no light at the end, so stay the course doesn’t cut it on the political level. Traditional COIN doctrine doesn’t provide any solutions, so where are we at?

The Hoover dam analogy I mentioned was establishing a stable, democratic country. Stable, democratic countries rely on sound economies, which is a bridge too far in many countries. I still think the reality is that much of the world isn’t ready for democracy, and you can’t impose on them. The neo-con favorite, “The End of History” had flawed assumptions that we are still pursuing at great expense. The Taliban and the communists could take over a country and impose extremely harsh population control measures, force people into reeducation camps, and somewhat effectively implement change and enforce it under an oppressive rule. We obviously can’t take that route when we’re trying to spread democracy. When they lost power the culture amazingly retracted back to its historic norm.

When the people are ready for democracy we should lend a hand, but in the mean time we need to clarify what our national interests are, and one could argue that we need to collectively clarify what the West’s security interests are, then develop a realistic strategy to achieve them. Mitigate versus defeat, military punitive raids and preemptive strikes versus occupation, increased spending on homeland security, and a robust information program that unapologetically puts the enemy on the defensive. Every strategy must be sustainable, over reaction will result in depletion of our will and resources prior to the enemies. This way we’ll resources available to respond to opportunities and apply the ink spot strategy globally.

[RTK]

First, RTK can you shed more light on who approved, then who disapproved the replacement crop program?

I can say this much; it was agreed upon in early 2002 between US State Department and the military. Much discussion was made over whose budget it would come from. After it was determined it would come from DOD funds, it was later dropped as part of a "trimming of the fat."

[Jedburgh]

...How do we shut the opium business and still win the prize? We have only been minimal progress in S. America, and there is no real end in sight...
...The results of drug profits that you never hear about is that the money creeps into legitimate business, government, etc. The local hospital has a new wing built by the upstanding citizen who is related to a big wealthy drug dealer. The upstanding citizen gets elected to public office, the hospital gets a new wing to treat children, and the drug dealer grows more powerful, safe in the shadows...
"Shutting down" drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan may be a bridge too far. Bill pointed out our significant lack of progress along that road in South America - and that is in dealing with countries that are far more developed and have more diverse economies than Afghanistan can even dream of at the moment. Crop substitution has proven to be a useful, although limited, tool in the fight to reduce production - but we've already seen that approach pretty much discarded.

Slapout's illustration ties right into Bill's statement. As bad as narco-influence is in portions of South America, it is exponentially worse in Afghanistan. And far more dangerous, in that it is fueling the reemergence of the Taliban and the intensification of the insurgency - and do not think for a moment that Al-Qa'ida elements are not taking a slice of the pie.

This drug trade also contributes to the destabilization of Afghanistan's neighbors, Iran and Pakistan (and reinforces the already strong influences of organized crime in the states of former Soviet Central Asia). Pakistan poses an existential threat, being that it is on the teetering edge of being a failed state, and with the ISI and other government elements having kept their greedy hands in the trade for a very long time. Pakistan offers up a frightening nexus of unstable government, organized crime, terrorism and nuclear proliferation (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=2514&postcount=3).

Are we going to come to a resource point where we eventually have to decide between continuing to conduct ops in either Iraq or Afghanistan? (this is not a rhetorical question) In your opinions, which neighborhood has the greater potential to fill the vacuum/absorb the impact of a coalition pullout, and which is more likely to complete the descent into a failed state and terrorist operational hub?

Someone has to be studying these contingencies.

[slapout9]

A lot has been posted since I last read this thread and yes, I agree this is good discussion and profitable, many excellent points have been.

My opinion about Afghanistan is the drug problem should go to the bottom the list. Jed posted a second link to a paper about the family structure and the reliance on profits to survive. If we begin to do major drug enforcement ops we will rip this entire social fabric apart. Half the country will be dead or in jail and the other half will be hunting US troops for revenge.

I was going to ask RTK the same question as Bill. RTK thanks for responding. I think our COA should be to use the Nancy Reagan approach. Put up some posters that say "just say to no to drugs" and let the Afghan's deal with it. Jed you are right this would truly be a drug war with a lot of US casualties.

Closer to home my concern is Mexico. Middle eastern males can pose as Mexican males and cross our borders with ease. This is an extremely dangerous situation. We worry about people with nukes, which we should, but what if 250 Iranian Special force troops were roving around the US setting off IEDs. The bearded mini-me in Iran may be telling the truth when he says he doesn't need Nukes to do us in. can you imagine the effect that would have on our country!!! They wouldn't even have to kill anybody, just blow shit up!!!

Finally drug dealing is profitable and PORTABLE. When you have a success in one country it often moves to another. Columbia is a Bright spot, but it is fragile especially with the mother FARCers and Hugo(professional devil smeller) Chavez right next door. We have talked about Afghanistan's neighbors, and this same effect happens from state to state in the US. Like COIN you need to have a world approach and you need to pick your battles and win but not at the expense of loosing the war.

And finally,finally we need to stop this get out the vote routine (democracy) for every country in the world. In the end they will have the government that they want just like the US did. What we should be concerned about is their foreign policy to wards the US. If it is peaceful then trade with them, if not?? Do like Bill said and deal with the threat and leave.

I didn't mean to rant so much but I just finished watching the history channel special about SF and the 82ND in Afghanistan. That place is nothing but one big rock. Dosen't look like there is much else to do but grow dope and watch the goats and shoot at the americans.

[SWJED]

4 October Los Angeles Times commentary - Get Serious About Afghanistan (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-boot4oct04,0,6201842.column?coll=la-opinion-rightrail) by Max Boot.

... The situation is still not as dire as in Iraq, as anyone who has recently been to both countries can attest. But the trends are ominous.

A large part of the fault lies with Pakistan. After making some efforts to curb Taliban activity, President Pervez Musharraf seems to have thrown in the towel. He has agreed to withdraw troops from Waziristan, turning over a frontier area the size of New Jersey to Taliban supporters. He also released from prison about 2,500 foreign fighters linked to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Since those actions, U.S. officials report that Taliban attacks in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan have tripled.

Pakistan isn't just turning a blind eye to Taliban activity. Its Inter-Services Intelligence agency seems to be increasing the amount of training and logistical support it provides to Islamist militants — and not just in Afghanistan. While Musharraf was promoting his book in the U.S. last week, Indian police announced that they hold Pakistani intelligence responsible for the Mumbai train bombings that killed 186 people in July...

What should the U.S. do? Sending more troops isn't in the cards...

This anemic level of support makes it impossible to address Afghanistan's drug problem, which would require subsidizing farmers to plant alternative crops. It also makes it difficult to build up indigenous security forces to stop the Taliban. Earlier this year, the Pentagon suggested that the goal for the Afghan National Army would be downsized from 70,000 troops to 50,000. (The figure at the moment is under 40,000.) But even 70,000 troops wouldn't be enough to protect a nation of 31 million. The Bush administration should announce that it will dramatically increase assistance with the goal of creating an Afghan army of, say, 150,000 troops. More money and more American advisors also should go to the Afghan police force, which is larger but considerably less capable than the army...

[Uboat509]

I tend to listen when Max Boot speaks. He seems to understand what he is talking about rather than just being another partisan.

SFC W

[SWJED]

I tend to listen when Max Boot speaks...

SFC W

Same here.

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 10 May 07:

Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How it Funds Taliban Operations (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373383)
...Opium eradication is a promising counter-terrorism strategy if it can be executed without damaging the livelihood of the average opium farmer. For every leaflet and exhortation from the insurgents justifying opium, the Afghan government should be there to highlight the Taliban’s hypocrisy and advertise the damage done to other Muslims.

Second, development programs that offset farmers’ loss of income also need to provide some benefit to the pool of unemployed workers from which the Taliban recruit. Intervening in the opium economy means re-arranging a number of markets, including those for labor. At least, the underemployed or unemployed should not be left worse off, although, of course, the better outcome is a self-sustaining development trajectory.

Compensation to farmers is probably necessary. Options for delivering compensation are complicated by the tendency of some farmers to receive loans from traders and insurgents in anticipation of opium delivery, creating a debt burden that requires alleviation. A plan to pay at the end of the planting season is likely to be resisted more strongly. However, payment at the start of the season raises the risks of cheating and also the costs of monitoring since some crops may need to be checked twice. The United Kingdom’s payments for not planting in 2002 and 2003 were unsuccessful as farmers (and politicians) pocketed funds and still produced opium....

[Ski]

We were starting to see the Taliban use drug profits to fund their operations when I was in country.

The opium trade will never be eliminated from Afghanistan, and the cocaine trade will never be eliminated from Colombia. The only chance, and it's a limited chance at that, is to buy the entire crop every year, sell what you can of it to pharmacutecal companies, and burn the rest.

Then you take the funds from selling the stuff and start rebuilding the infrastructure.

[tequila]

NYTIMES article (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/world/asia/15cnd-drugs.html?hp=&pagewanted=print) covering the Bush Administration's movement to combine counterinsurgency with anti-drug efforts in Afghanistan. I read this with a ugly sinking feeling. We may well be on the way to losing this war as well.

[carl]

Crop substitution programs, buying the opium crop etc. are all attractive ideas but they do nothing to eliminate the demand by illicit users. No matter what you do that demand will always be there over and above anything you do to try and reduce planting. That continueing demand plus the illegal status of the drug will make for big money (demand + illegal= lots of money) and big money means somebody will try to get it.

Tom likened the opium trade to a 900 pound gorilla in the room. There is an unmentioned club in the room that will beat down the gorilla to maybe 100 pounds, drug legalization. Legalization would remove the variable from the business that makes it so impossibly lucrative right now; lucre that bad guys take the most advantage of.

[carl]

I made this comment on another Afghan thread but it seems more appropriate here.

Nothing will work unless demand is eliminated. That is impossible. Too many people like the idea of feeling good the easy way and don't see anything wrong with it.

The demand combined with the illegal status of opium means big money; that mostly benefits the bad guys wherever they may be.

So, they thing to be done is remove the illegal part of the equation. That removes the big money from from the hands of the bad guys.

There will be social costs to this course of action. But on balance, I think the benefits outweigh the costs, both here and overseas.

[Ski]

Carl,

Agreed. Combine legalization with buying the crop and you've helped defeat the problem.

I don't think there are too many politicians willing to legalize opiates however.

[tequila]

Legalization is airy-fairy fantasy. I can't see the political capital mobilizing for it for another 20 years. It certainly will not happen because of a foreign war --- this is way too wrapped up in domestic politics.

Beyond that, there are quite lucrative markets to feed in Europe, China, Pakistan, Iran, etc. Most Afghan opium makes its way to Europe anyway --- I believe most of our heroin comes by way of Mexico and Colombia.

[slapout9]

Beyond that, there are quite lucrative markets to feed in Europe, China, Pakistan, Iran, etc. Most Afghan opium makes its way to Europe anyway --- .
A very important and often overlooked point I might add.

[carl]

Legalization is airy-fairy fantasy.

So is a 6 foot tall Swedish girl named Inga, but I can dream can't I. Just because it probably won't come about doesn't mean it wouldn't make life better.

[carl]

Beyond that, there are quite lucrative markets to feed in Europe, China, Pakistan, Iran, etc. Most Afghan opium makes its way to Europe anyway --- I believe most of our heroin comes by way of Mexico and Colombia.

The ideal is for worldwide legalization, but that won't happen. The European countries are further along that road than we are. But if we were to do it, it would reduce the money available to the killers and at least it wouldn't be American troops thundering around the counryside upsetting the locals.

As far as Columbia goes, it would save the lives of a lot of Columbian officers who are going to get killed dealing with our problem.

[VinceC]

For Afghan opium, the demand is predominantly in Russia, the former Soviet Republics, and into Western Europe. Pretty tough to eliminate demand in many of those areas.

I've read, with bittersweet irony, several accounts which said the Taliban in its final year of rule, under intense international pressure, was able nearly to halt opium exports. I suppose this was due to their ability to exercise authoritarian and draconian measures against farmers and traffickers.

[Tom Odom]

Like Carl I see legalization as a solution--painful to be sure--that will ultimately come in one form or another. Fantasy when it comes to the "war on drugs" comes in programs like crop substitution using potatoes in Afghanistan or coffee in Columbia without addressing the demand (and the rewards for meeting that demand).

I know Slap: you think I am touched on this one. But add up the billions spent in the past couple of decades and then please balance the checkbook with a corresponding improvement that justifies that expenditure.

Tom

[slapout9]

Tom, just a little touched. Awhile back I said almost the same words to the effect unless crop replacement pays the same it is futile. Me and I think it was Merv Benson talked about selling it (opium) to pharmaceutical companies for legal drug usage. There would be a tremendous benefit to that. But finally I said the Afgan drug war is not our war. How many times is the mission in Afgan going to change. 1st it was get OBL and AQ,then the Taliban, now we are going to start spraying round-up on their major cash crop with nothing to replace it long term. When does that new War czar start? He has some work to do.

[Tom Odom]

Tom, just a little touched. Awhile back I said almost the same words to the effect unless crop replacement pays the same it is futile. Me and I think it was Merv Benson talked about selling it (opium) to pharmaceutical companies for legal drug usage. There would be a tremendous benefit to that. But finally I said the Afgan drug war is not our war. How many times is the mission in Afgan going to change. 1st it was get OBL and AQ,then the Taliban, now we are going to start spraying round-up on their major cash crop with nothing to replace it long term. When does that new War czar start? He has some work to do.


Agree, mate, he does. But we are 5 years beyond where we should be formulating an answer to a problem we have largely ignored (or merely fervently wished would disappear). In those 5 years our answer has been that drugs in Afghanistan are a European problem; it was an expedient response to a problem that only grew until now when we cannot ignore it. The Taliban certainly did not ignore it as a source of funds. I mentioned potatoes above because I actually heard a brief some 2+ years ago that detailed the Brits' potato substitution effort. The briefer--and the audience around me--did not like it when I raised my hand and offered that "those must be some potatoes." Clearly I was supposed to keep drinking the Kool Aid. The War Czar indeed has his work cut out. First step: kick over the Kool Aid dispenser.

Tom

[slapout9]

Tom, I should have sent or posted a reminder here but I forgot. Monday or Tuesday night on the National Geographic channel they had a great documentary on the drug war and how it worked very successfully in the early W's with what amounted to very effective "border control" what and idea!!! the only aggressive outside the country operations were extraditing major drug king pins to the US. Also had a lot of interviews with former drug dealers and users about how terrible this stuff is(designed to be addictive) this is not the regular stuff that it used to be!! which is why it should not be legalized in the US. I do believe if you are a user it should be decriminalized if you complete a 2 year in custody treatment program. Lou Dobbs talked about this the other night. If you sell the stuff to make money off other people's misery you need to go to jail!!!

[SoiCowboy]

The War on some Drugs in general is a waste of time, money and people.

The situation in Afghanistan seems superficially similar to the Peruvians dealing with the Shining Path. Army sweeps into control because the peasants generally want to grow their drugs in peace and the army lets them. Government brings in anti drugs operations and the Shining Path sweep back into power. Rinse and repeat.

[carl]

For Afghan opium, the demand is predominantly in Russia, the former Soviet Republics, and into Western Europe. Pretty tough to eliminate demand in many of those areas.

Why are we trying so hard, expending lives and money, to control their problem for them? Vladimir for one doesn't seem to appreciate our efforts.

[carl]

Tom, Also had a lot of interviews with former drug dealers and users about how terrible this stuff is(designed to be addictive) this is not the regular stuff that it used to be!! which is why it should not be legalized in the US. I do believe if you are a user it should be decriminalized if you complete a 2 year in custody treatment program....If you sell the stuff to make money off other people's misery you need to go to jail!!!

The stuff was always addictive. If it is more so now, to be brutal about it, it is only a market response to consumer demand. The old unimproved version was just as effective a tool for a person to ruin their lives as the new improved model.

2 years in custody is a jail term by any other name. If we would jail users, it would have to be a certainty in their minds, that might, or might not work. How do you square "decriminalization" with a 2 year term in the pokey?

I don't feel sorry for the people who chose to ruin their lives via drug (or alchohol) use. They ones I've seen who did were never worth saving. To be brutal again, the people we are trying to save aren't worth all the money we are spending, lives we are losing and misery we are enduring trying to save them.

[slapout9]

carl,decriminalization means you want have a felony rap sheet following you for the rest of your life if you complete the program. The difference in this program and what you might call regular prison was you were either in a job training program or school program during the day and returned to lock up at night. You had to have demonstrated job skills and life supporting skills before you got out of the program.

One of the biggest myths I saw as a cop was this so called magic demand that is built into Americans. It doesn't work that way. Usually happens when a friend gives you free samples and then you become hooked!! Then your friend will start charging you for it and that leads to the long downward spiral.

[carl]

Right now, simple possesion is effectively decriminalized. If I remember correctly, a felony charge was associated with some indication of intent to sell. Job skills training for dealers doesn't seem like it would be effective.

I think the "magic demand" is built into human nature, especially the human nature of people with weak characters. It is very human to to want to feel good, right now, easy. Weak characters don't see next month or even tomorrow, they see the next hour or so and they want to feel good for that hour. For some it leads to a downward spriral; for others, the rich ones, it doesn't.

The demand is inately human and those who succumb to it are losers in any event so why are we running so hard to get nowhere?

If we were to heavily and immediately penalize simple use, that, I think would be very effective. You get caught with a rock, you go to jail the next day for 3 months guaranteed. Get caught with a joint, 1 month starting now, no exceptions. That sort of thing would get the attention of the user because there would be a very real possibility that his next hour will get fouled up.

A program like that would address the core issue, demand. But our society has not demonstrated a willingness to be that decisive. So since we aren't going to do anything about demand let's do something about the other part of the equation I mentioned, illegality.

[slapout9]

Right now, simple possession is effectively decriminalized. If I remember correctly, a felony charge was associated with some indication of intent to sell. Job skills training for dealers doesn't seem like it would be effective.

part one:Not in all parts of the country, depends on the "type" of drug (which DEA schedule is the drug on) and "quantity" of drug in order to determine if it is felony possession or not. Possession with intent to sell or distribute is called Trafficking in my part of the Country.

Part two:job skills would probably not have any effect on drug dealers which is why I said they should go to jail.

[goesh]

Since illegal drug money runs heavily to the top of the pyramid, ideas of legalization won't work since the powers that be will manipulate the counter-political agendas to prevent legalization. For instance, if street drugs can be decriminalized, then prescription drugs should be availble as well to the exclusion of the medical middle men. Drugs are drugs. If it's ok to smoke opium, it then should be ok to take antibiotics at one's sole discretion too.

[slapout9]

goesh, believe it or not it wasn't to long ago you could do that (in the south) as far as antibiotics were concerned if it was purchased as a veterinary drug. Used be able to by it at the feed store.
Triple agree about drug money running heavy at the top of the pyramid no make that quadruple agree.

[carl]

For instance, if street drugs can be decriminalized, then prescription drugs should be availble as well to the exclusion of the medical middle men. Drugs are drugs. If it's ok to smoke opium, it then should be ok to take antibiotics at one's sole discretion too.

No fair unslinging the "fallacy of the false alternative". It muddies the waters.

As far as your contention that drugs won't be legalized because the criminals won't let it happen; their political power is but a fraction of that of governments eager for tax money and legitimate companies eager for new market. I don't expect legalization to happen soon, if ever, but not for that reason.

[carl]

Anyway, to get back to the point of this thread, Afghanistans's drug problem.

From the Afghan villagers point of view, the problem is a lot of foreigners don't want him to grow something that is providing for his family better than anything else. If somehow the foreigners didn't care anymore about what he grew, Afghanistan's drug problem would consist of Afghans who abuse drugs. The Afghans could handle that one without our help.

[tequila]

Two excellent articles from IWPR about this very issue in Helmand Province, one of the most violent in Afghanistan:

Harvest in Helmand (http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=334828&apc_state=henparr)

It could only happen in Helmand. On April 8, about 60 landowners staged a protest in front of the governor’s compound in Lashkar Gah, the capital of this southern Afghan province.

They were demanding that the local authorities step in to resolve a dispute that was threatening to disrupt the all-important gathering of the opium crop. The hired labourers, who work as sharecroppers, had united to force landowners to give them half of the yield, when the owners insisted that one-fifth was a more reasonable share.

The farm owners wanted the provincial government to mediate.

It might look like democracy in action, except that the Afghan government is supposed to be engaged in a high-profile campaign to eradicate the plant ...


Operation Achilles Heel? (http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=334968&apc_state=henparr)

As international forces in Afghanistan’s Helmand region engage in their biggest offensive yet to drive the Taleban out of the north of the troubled province, everyone agrees the insurgents have not put up much of a fight.

However, IWPR has been told by local residents that the relative calm has little to do with a successful security operation. Instead, they say, the Taleban have staged a tactical withdrawal to prevent the opium harvest being harmed by fighting.

Operation Achilles, which began on March 6, was billed as “the largest multinational combined operation launched to date”, and will eventually involve 4,500 troops from the International Security Force, ISAF, and up to 1,000 Afghan National Security Forces, ANSF.

An ISAF press release issued on April 16 suggested that the tough tactics were working, “Helmand province showing signs of [economic] growth due to increasing security.”

The reason for the improvement, ISAF said, was Operation Achilles.

Helmand residents were left either chuckling or shaking their heads at the suggestion. From their vantage point at ground zero in the conflict, the new phase of relative calm will be temporary.

“There are no big problems in Helmand right now because everyone is busy with the poppy harvest,” said Abdul Halek, from Nawzad district. “The elders have asked the Taleban to leave until the harvest is in, so that NATO does not come and bomb the fields or the harvesters. But I don’t know what will happen afterwards ...”

[goesh]

What is the fair market value to an Afghan farmer for an acre of his poppy crop? What would it cost to buy the crop at fair market value from the farmer and torch it on the spot/on the vine as they say? Why would the farmer care whether or not addicts get their dope? Why would he care if the middle men don't get to step on the product to pay off their patrons in the upper levels of the food chain? How many hectares are there anyway? To cut out the middle men and their nefarious economic contributions to narco-terrorism and corrupt politicians would leave the middle men no choice but to coerece the farmers back into growing the stuff. The logical choice would be to impliment payment for non production, sort of like the old Soil Bank program in the US years ago. That way the taliban and dealers would essentially have to coerce people into working when they are being paid not to work. Who then would the farmers align themselves with? What's the cost of dealing with the crimes associated with addiction, treatment and prevention and narco terrorism? How much LE budget allocation is sucked up by heroin/opium problems alone? I certainly don't pretend this is going to solve the world's opiate addiction problem but it certainly would help would take a huge hunk out of the taliban's coffers.

[slapout9]

goesh, you hit upon the problem with your plan when you talk about coercion of the farmers or the more likely option (IMHO) that they would just kill the farmers and install their own sharecroppers.

[goesh]

Yup, it's a farmer's market all right - the Talimen/buyers would have to give them a higher premium for their crop, say a 10% increase over last year's price and they'd be out with the hoes and donkeys seeding and planting away as usual, then along comes the other side and ups their ante to beat the competition's price. Soon every poppy farmer would have a new 4DW Toyota and lots of other nice things. But on a small scale with a target group in one of the more secure areas, it would be worth a shot simply to see what shakes loose. Such a project would flush out into daylight all kinds of people in the drug food chain offering all kinds of reasons why such a project should not be tried/implemented. It would do that much if nothing else. There is quite a divers crowd between the farmer's market in the field and the addict on the street. I think I saw somewhere in this thread that the Afghan opium trade was valued at 2.6 billion - so what are the farmers getting - 10 million? What would be the buy-out cost at ground level for a target group of farmers? 200K maximum? I don't have a clue

[tequila]

U.S. under fire over Afghan poppy plan (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ac35906e-0aeb-11dc-8412-000b5df10621.html). - Financial Times, 25 May07.


The US is proceeding with plans for a big crop-spraying programme to destroy opium poppies in Afghanistan, in spite of resistance from the government of President Hamid Karzai and objections from some senior US military officers who fear it will fuel the Taliban insurgency.
A US delegation will soon leave for Kabul to persuade Mr Karzai that glycophate, a herbicide that is widely applied by US farmers, is safe to use and that trial ground-spraying should begin for the first time since the US ousted the Taliban regime in 2001.


But controversy over the proposed spraying is causing rifts within the Nato alliance. Some governments, including Germany, want nothing to do with the eradication programme and are threatening to reconsider their posture in Afghanistan, diplomats say. Afghan security forces trained by Dyncorp, a private US defence contractor, are to carry out the spraying ...

[Ski]

Has spraying in any of the South American narcotic producing countries worked at all?

[tequila]

Everyone's a Winner at Helmand's Drug Bazaars (http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=336012&apc_state=henh)- IWPR, 1 June.

... Sayed Gul is new to the retail trade. Until now, he has been a poppy farmer. But lured by the hope of large profits, he decided to sell his own crop this year.

“I got 36 kilos of poppy paste from my land this season, so I decided to go into business,” he told IWPR.

It is a difficult market – Helmand’s farmers have grown so much poppy that prices are down, so buyers like “Hajji Sahib” must be courted assiduously.

Afghanistan is by far the world’s largest producer of opium poppy. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC, the country produced over 90 per cent of the world’s heroin in 2006, with Helmand alone accounting for close to 45 per cent of that figure.

Like most of the other merchants at the Chan Jir bazaar, Sayed Gul is paying the police to leave him alone while he sells his highly illegal wares. The monthly fee for protection hovers around 6,000 Pakistani rupees, or approximately 100 US dollars.

...

Farmers also pay informal “taxes” to police and local officials from the beginning of the process all the way up to the harvest.

“The government makes a lot of money at harvest time,” said Shah Mahmud, 40, a landowner in Nadali. “We paid about 1,500 afghani per jerib to the police not to destroy our poppy during the eradication campaign. Now we’re paying the government to allow us to sell the product without interference - we are giving them 220 grams of poppy paste per jerib.”

...

The arrangements are quite open and operate semi-officially, according to Hajji Aligul, 55, a tribal leader in Nadali.

“I attended a shura [council] where we negotiated with the government,” he told IWPR. “We agreed that we would give 220 grams of poppy paste per jerib. The police commander told us, of course, that if we did not reach agreement, they would take the paste by force.”

...

The Taleban are another major player in the drugs game. While evidence is sketchy, many observers assume that the insurgency is being funded by international drug profits. It is undisputed that the Taleban are receiving funds locally from farmers, shopkeepers, and traffickers.

“Local people collect money for the Taleban,” said Shah Mahmud 40, a landowner in Nadali. “The Taleban contact tribal leaders and say, ‘don’t forget us, we need money too’. Most people give voluntarily.”

Others pay out of fear, say some residents.

But cooperation has been so close that farmers say the Taleban scaled down their “spring offensive” this year so as not to interfere with bringing in the crop.

“It is not beneficial to have fighting during the harvest,” said Shah Mahmud. “The Taleban and the government both receive money from poppy – they lose out if the crop is destroyed by bombing or fighting.”

In several places, villagers have requested that the Taleban leave the area until after the harvest.

“We told the Taleban, ‘This year the government was very good to us and did not destroy our poppy,” said one tribal leader who did not want to give his name. “We said, ‘Stop your fighting during harvest time, otherwise we will turn against you, take up arms against you and kick you out of the area.’”

Najmuddin, 25, a landowner in Zarghon village in Nadali, agreed.

“The Taleban treat us very kindly and we will support them forever,” he told IWPR. “They left so that people could get their harvest in. The government has also treated us kindly, and helped us set up markets where we can sell our poppy ...”

[goesh]

- that's what the MSN article is reporting. Opium production is up that much from 2005:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19431056/

"U.N.: Opium production soaring in Afghanistan
Nation’s record poppy harvest has boosted global supply to new record high
..
In 2006, Afghanistan accounted for 92 percent of global illicit opium production, up from 70 percent in 2000 and 52 percent a decade earlier. The higher yields in Afghanistan have brought global opium production to a new record high of 6,610 metric tons in 2006, a 43 percent increase over 2005."

that's beau-coup smoke - no wonder the taliban keeps coming across the border in force.

[Jedburgh]

ISN, 17 Jul 07: Addicted in Afghanistan (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17868)
...Experts warn that high levels of unemployment in Afghanistan, war trauma and wide-scale bereavement are fuelling the population's appetite for the drug.

"Thirty years of war and social disintegration," Dr Suleman says, "have left ordinary Afghans extremely vulnerable to anxiety, chronic depression and post-traumatic stress disorders. And in such a scenario, the easy and cheap availability of opium, heroin and other drugs is creating a rapid dependency on these harmful pharmaceuticals."

For treatment of women, a team of female doctors and counselors from the Nejat Centre visit their homes. The trend of opium uses so entrenched, Nadira Yusuf told ISN Security Watch, a female counselor at the clinic, that women use opium as "medicine" to silence a wailing child, or even alleviate medical conditions such as tuberculosis, asthma or the common cold....

[tequila]

Taliban Raise Poppy Production to a Record Again (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26heroin.html) - NYTIMES, 25 Aug.

Afghanistan produced record levels of opium in 2007 for the second straight year, led by a staggering 45 percent increase in the Taliban (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org) stronghold of Helmand Province, according to a new United Nations (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/u/united_nations/index.html?inline=nyt-org) survey to be released Monday.

The report is likely to touch off renewed debate about the United States’ $600 million counternarcotics program in Afghanistan, which has been hampered by security challenges and endemic corruption within the Afghan government.

“I think it is safe to say that we should be looking for a new strategy,” said William B. Wood, the American ambassador to Afghanistan, commenting on the report’s overall findings. “And I think that we are finding one.”

Mr. Wood said the current American programs for eradication, interdiction and alternative livelihoods should be intensified, but he added that ground spraying poppy crops with herbicide remained “a possibility.” Afghan and British officials have opposed spraying, saying it would drive farmers into the arms of the Taliban.

While the report found that opium production dropped in northern Afghanistan, Western officials familiar with the assessment said, cultivation rose in the south, where Taliban insurgents urge farmers to grow poppies......

[Jedburgh]

UNODC, 27 Aug 07: Afghanistan: 2007 Annual Opium Poppy Survey (http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf)
In 2007, Afghanistan cultivated 193,000 hectares of opium poppies, an increase of 17% over last year. The amount of Afghan land used for opium is now larger than the corresponding total for coca cultivation in Latin America (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia combined).

Favourable weather conditions produced opium yields (42.5 kg per hectare) higher than last year (37.0 kg/ha). As a result, in 2007 Afghanistan produced an extraordinary 8,200 tons of opium (34% more than in 2006), becoming practically the exclusive supplier of the world’s deadliest drug (93% of the global opiates market). Leaving aside 19th century China, that had a population at that time 15 times larger than today’s Afghanistan, no other country in the world has ever produced narcotics on such a deadly scale.....

[Tom Odom]

Follow up to Jed and Tequila:

Second Record Level for Afghan Opium Crop (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/28/world/asia/28afghan.html)KABUL, Afghanistan, Aug. 27 — Opium cultivation in Afghanistan grew by 17 percent in 2007, reaching record levels for the second straight year, according to a United Nations report released Monday.

Despite a $600 million American counternarcotics effort and an increase in the number of poppy-free provinces to 13 from 6, the report found that the amount of land in Afghanistan used for opium production is now larger than amount of land used for coca cultivation in all of Latin America.

Afghanistan now accounts for 93 percent of the world’s opium, up from 92 percent last year, the report said.

Antonio Maria Costa, the executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes Policy, which issued the report, called the new figures terrifying. “Afghanistan today is cultivating megacrops of opium,” he said at a news conference. “Leaving aside China in the 19th century, no other country has produced so much narcotics in the past 100 years.”

[Dennis]

Two issues I'll present:

1) Recognizing the larger monetary return of growing poppy as opposed to another crop, would we necessarily have the desired effect if the money flow to the Taliban is through their protection of farmers and the transport routes? Won't the Taliban continue to get their piece of the pie of another crop?

2) Can we influence the farmers without addressing the land owners and the corruption within the Afghan government?

[tequila]

U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/90671.pdf)- Aug 07. The official public release. There is a classified release which deals with problems of official corruption that are too sensitive for open discussion.

[tequila]

How Afghan anticorruption chief once sold heroin in Las Vegas (http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,2157248,00.html)- GUARDIAN, 28 Aug. Passed on via Afghanistica.

Fighting sleaze is no easy task in a country like Afghanistan, as anti-corruption tsar Izzatullah Wasifi can testify. The economy is awash with opium money, and bribery and backhanders are rife, as confirmed by yesterday's alarming UN report.


Then again, Mr Wasifi is unusually well acquainted with the perilous lure of easy drug money.

Twenty years ago US police arrested a young Afghan emigrant at his hotel room in Caesars Palace, Las Vegas. The Afghan, who introduced himself as Mr E, tried to sell a bag of heroin to an undercover detective. At his trial, prosecutors said it was worth $2m.

The man spent three years and eight months in a Nevada state prison before being released on parole. His wife, who had stood lookout in the hotel corridor, received a probationary sentence.

Now Mr E - or Mr Wasifi - is the director general of the Afghan government's main anti-corruption agency.

He plays down the 1988 drug bust as a little youthful fun gone wrong. "It was my honeymoon. I was a youngster and youngsters do stuff," he said with a shrug during an interview at his modest Kabul office. "Stuff like gambling, drugs" - he rubbed a finger against his nose and sniffed - "and girls. I was a Las Vegas boy ..."


The rest of the article has good details on the massive corruption ongoing in Kabul which is undermining the war effort.

[Culpeper]

Isn't marijuana the largest revenue producing cash crop in Alabama, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia? In fact, it is the #4 cash crop in the United States. Only corn, soybean, and hay being more profitable to the American farmer. This is one area in a country such as Afghanistan where we have and will never have any amount of measured control to change an outcome.

[sgmgrumpy]

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy Updated September 14, 2007 (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf)

In addition to describing the structure of the Afghan narcotics trade, this report provides current statistical information, profiles the narcotics trade’s participants, explores narco-terrorist linkages, and reviews U.S. and international policy responses since late 2001. The report also considers current policy debates regarding the counternarcotics roles of the U.S. military, poppy eradication, alternative livelihoods, and funding issues for Congress. The report will be updated to reflect major developments. For more information on Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

[tequila]

U.S. renews bid to destroy opium poppies in Afghanistan (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/world/asia/08spray.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print)- NYTIMES, 8 Oct. Ground spraying raises its head again. Can someone explain to me a good case for spraying? Because the negatives for COIN and population legitimacy seem screamingly obvious.

After the biggest opium harvest in Afghanistan’s history, American officials have renewed efforts to persuade the government here to begin spraying herbicide on opium poppies, and they have found some supporters within President Hamid Karzai (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/hamid_karzai/index.html?inline=nyt-per)’s administration, officials of both countries said.

Since early this year, Mr. Karzai has repeatedly declared his opposition to spraying the poppy fields, whether by crop-dusting airplanes or by eradication teams on the ground.

But Afghan officials said the Karzai administration is now re-evaluating that stance. Some proponents within the government are pushing a trial program of ground spraying that could begin before the harvest next spring.

The issue has created sharp divisions within the Afghan government, among its Western allies and even American officials of different agencies. The matter is fraught with political danger for Mr. Karzai, whose hold on power is weak ...

[carl]

I don't think ground spraying would mean much. The Afghans could slow things down enough so that it would have only a marginal effect. But the article seems to suggest the ultimate goal is aerial spraying. Aerial spraying would not be a good thing.

Spraying is great for American politicians and functionaries. They can stand in front of a TV camera and courageously state they are DOING something about the drug problem. Pictures of airplanes spraying fields make great backdrops for this kind of photo op.

[tequila]

Helmand drug profits fund alms for the poor (http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=339897&apc_state=henh)- IWPR, 16 Oct. Unsurprising.

Drug traffickers in the war-torn Helmand province have been winning public support by distributing some of their ill-gotten gains to the poor during the fasting month of Ramadan.

Many people interviewed by IWPR said the traffickers had given out food and clothing to some of Helmand’s neediest families during the holy month and the Eid al-Fitr festival which marks its end.

“May God bless them [the traffickers],”said Faizullah, a resident of the Washir district, which has been under Taleban control for over six months. “People have been very happy during Ramadan. The traffickers have helped us in many ways, like giving out clothes for Eid, distributing food and other things.”

The growing Taleban insurgency in Helmand has proved a boon to the drugs trade, since government eradicators cannot get into many areas to monitor or destroy the opium poppy crop. The chaos has kept out aid agencies and prevented any meaningful development from taking place, something that has caused resentment and anger among local people.

In return for protection, drug traffickers are believed to be providing money and weapons to the Taleban.

One smuggler in Washir, who did not want to be named, said he had distributed goods worth 200,000 Pakistani rupees, or 3,300 US dollars, in the last four weeks. The rupee is in common use in this southern province, often edging out the national currency, the afghani.

“I distributed [charity] to the poor in the shape of food and clothing during the holy month of Ramadan,” said the smuggler. “We are Muslims and we are obliged to give alms. I gave most of it to the poor, and a small amount to the Taleban who are fighting for Islam ...”

[jonSlack]

New Scientist - Grass-munching bugs could charge rural phones (http://technology.newscientist.com/article/dn12731)

To tackle the problem, a team of students from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, US, has designed a microbial fuel cell (MFC) that runs on plant waste. Their prototype won the $5,000 first prize in a contest called MADMEC, which was sponsored by Dow Chemical to encourage new uses of materials that allow alternative or non-traditional sources of energy.

...

MFCs use electrons released by feeding bacteria on sugars, starches, and other organic material, to produce electricity.

[Wildcat]

Opium Funding Up To 40 Percent of Afghan Unrest: U.S. General (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3119850&C=america)

Army Gen. Dan McNeill, head of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), added he had been told by an international expert that this figure was likely low and could reach up to 60 percent.

”It is my best subjective estimate that the insurgency enjoys fiscal resources from the cultivation of poppy probably to the level of 20 to 40 percent of its total fiscal resources,” the general told journalists.

The cultivation of opium — 93 percent of which comes from Afghanistan, according to the United Nations — is undermining everything the government and its international allies were trying to do, he said.

Despite internationally-backed efforts to cut the drugs trade, Afghanistan’s opium production grew by 34 percent this year, according to a U.N. survey.

Michael Yon has more on this.

The Perfect Evil: Coming to Roost (http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/the-perfect-evil-coming-to-roost.htm)

I have characterized Afghanistan as little more than a hunting lodge for our special operations forces. Since the Afghan campaign has been largely a special forces war from the beginning, we have been able to transition with great secrecy from near victory, to abysmal performance, to what has now become a sustainable human-hunting resort. Our special operations forces are out there hunting Taliban and al Qaeda, outside of public view—although it appears that “the public” is hardly clamoring for news from Afghanistan—while the country devolves into the consummate narco-state.

[goesh]

I don't know how extensive the eradicate and pay 'em program was - I sense it was mostly experimental. Therapy and treatment isn't working too well at home for the end users, drug money runs to the top and the Geneva Conventions and the Constitution won't allow the slaying of drug smugglers. Drugs get the money, money gets the guns, guns get the power and we can't even make them an offer they can't refuse like Vito Corleone did.

[marct]

From CBC.ca

Think-tank suggests Afghans grow ingredient in anti-malarial drugs
Last Updated: Wednesday, December 5, 2007 | 12:21 PM ET
CBC News

A security and development policy group wants to add another option to its Poppy for Medicine Proposal, a initiative announced earlier in 2007 intended to encourage Afghan farmers to use their fields to grow drugs other than opium.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/story/health/national/2007/12/05/afghan-farmers.html)

More on the Poppy For Medicine proposals here (http://poppyformedicine.net/).

[Rank amateur]

A key step in a successful COIN effort is forcing the population to choose sides.

Economically, they have no choice but to go with the side that buys their opium. I heard one of the CNN generals say that we should buy opium from the population and use it to make morphine. I think that is about the only thing that might solve the problem.

[davidbfpo]

One of the factors that undermines Western involvement in Afghanistan, well at least those who in the frontline, are the occassional pictures of troops amdst fields of opium poppies and the public knowledge the heroin is heading home. Even with opponents of the UK's role this causes bewilderment.

Hence the byline a "War on Drugs" in one place, e.g Caribbean and "Protect the Poppy" in Afghanistan.

Good knows what the impact is on those serving there.

Personally I've long believed we should each year buy the crop and then mix it in bitumen for road construction. When I was in NWFP years ago the UN drug adviser I met reported 3k tones p.a. were being produced in Afghanistan; the only time production dropped was when the Taliban imposed a ban.

davidbfpo

[oakfox]

Interesting idea.. buying all the poppy? How would you consider convincing an Afghan that you would stay long enough to keep buying the opium longer than drug barons?

"Fortunate" for us that the average Afghan cannot read western newspapers otherwise he would realize that the West is unwilling to make a long term commitment (see reports regarding the Canadian parliament).

(Although I completely understand the Canadian position).

[Rex Brynen]

Interesting idea.. buying all the poppy? How would you consider convincing an Afghan that you would stay long enough to keep buying the opium longer than drug barons?

I shudder to think of the leakage, fraud and corruption that would result if you had millions of dollars having to paid out to rural farmers, and tons of poppy to be collected and destroyed. I suspect much of the former would end up in the wrong pockets, and much of the latter would enter the market anyway (or be repeatedly resold).

[Rank amateur]

Not to mention that if you start buying up supply while other demand stays the same - and the demand from heroin addicts isn't going to decrease - you push up the price, which means that the Taliban will be paying "their" farmers even more than the farmer makes now.

Nonetheless, I do not see how you can create an "inkspot" in certain parts of the country without agreeing to buy their most lucrative cash crop. (Opium makes up a huge percentage of the GDP. You can't replace that with a series of $300 microloans.) And we do need some opium. Lots of patients get a morphine drip at the hospital.

[Stan]

Interesting idea.. buying all the poppy? How would you consider convincing an Afghan that you would stay long enough to keep buying the opium longer than drug barons?

"Fortunate" for us that the average Afghan cannot read western newspapers otherwise he would realize that the West is unwilling to make a long term commitment (see reports regarding the Canadian parliament).

(Although I completely understand the Canadian position).

Hmmm, why do you conclude the farmers wouldn't sell their cash crop to the first person that rolled in with cash, regardless of how long the 'client' was around for ? I think the language issue is long gone, and these folks communicate sufficiently enough to conduct daily transactions.

I agree with Rex. Air on the side of caution...Such a mission is not a soldier's, nor should it be considering the already full plate they have. I really like Rank amateur's recent post -- buy out the competition and pump the price up well out of the reach of criminals, and, make the client's life living hell (but save a smiggin for those on the drip canisters).

Ya know Oakfox, I've asked you several times to introduce yourself on the Dumped German Ordnance Thread. It's hard to take you seriously with no background to support your claims and opinions with :mad:

[marct]

Hi RA,

Not to mention that if you start buying up supply while other demand stays the same - and the demand from heroin addicts isn't going to decrease - you push up the price, which means that the Taliban will be paying "their" farmers even more than the farmer makes now.... You can't replace that with a series of $300 microloans.) And we do need some opium. Lots of patients get a morphine drip at the hospital.

I'm just wondering if anyone else is getting a desire to pick up a package of Head On ("APPLIED DIRECTLY TO THE FOREHEAD!!!!! - Gods I hate that commercial!)? I wish Tom OC would comment on this since he knows more about criminology than I do, but there appears to be a direct correlation between demand, making something illegal and price. Thinking back to the Volstead Act and the 18th Amendment to the US Constitution I really have to wonder who, outside of organized crime,benefited? Come on folks, back to some basic economics - if you want to reduce the price on a product then destroy the monopoly that runs it; in this case, it is a monopoly supported by various governments and given to various and sundry "drug lords". Legalize them and watch the bottom fall out of the market.

Marc

[Rank amateur]

Hi Marc:

Never going to happen, but I do think we need an economist or two on the council. COIN and nation building distorts markets and I think that the results are relatively predictable. It'd be nice to know the results in advance, instead of waiting to see what happens.

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor, 26 Feb 08:

Russia, Afghanistan and the Drug Trade (http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372833)
Alarmed by the rise of opium cultivation in Afghanistan, Russia’s Federal Drug Enforcement Service has opened a permanent office in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Federal Drug Enforcement Service Director Alexei Milovanov said of the move, “Russia advances cooperation and interaction with Afghanistan in the war on drug production and proliferation…As for the office in Kabul, our representative there will be in charge of efficient interaction between Russian and Afghani structures dealing with trafficking. With an emphasis, needless to say, on what channels lead to Russia. All of that will be carried out in close cooperation with our Central Asian colleagues.”

Milovanov also suggested that Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan establish border checkpoints and customs offices and make a joint effort to draw up an international agreement to track and confiscate drug trafficking profits.....

[Eden]

A few things to remember when thinking about poppies in Afghanistan. My last tour ended in early '07, but I think I'm still fairly current.

1. With a very few exceptions, the insurgents are not using the drug lords for support - they are working for them. It's the second job they have to support their fight against infidels and the tribe pissing in the river upstream. They provide security, intelligence, and muscle. In return, the drug lords allow a few crumbs to fall in their plates. It is not narco-terrorism on the Columbia model.

2. The drug lords - who are often also into weapons and human trafficking - have no great problem with NATO, so long as interference in their trade is limited to a few photo ops. Any concerted effort to do more will trigger violence on a scale far greater than that seen recently, and across the country. Just ask the Iranians what happened when they seriously attempted to interfere with trafficking across their borders.

3. Buying up the supply is a simple solution, but probably not an effective one. First, see paragraph 2. The drug lords won't stand idly by. Second, as has been pointed out, even if it is successful, it will merely push production outward. Do we want to solve the problem in Afghanistan by destabilizing one of the other 'stans, at least one of which has nuclear weapons?

Not to sound negative, but the tone of some posts is that there are easy solutions out there being ignored. There aren't, only long, hard, costly solutions.

[Jedburgh]

Chatham House's The World Today, Apr 08: Afghanistan - Drugs: Hard Habit to Break (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/download/-/id/1614)
....Those who benefit from the opium trade have a vested interest in seeing the continuation of the insurgency in the south. Perpetual conflict there will derail progress in other parts of the country. At their meeting in Bucharest, leaders may fixate on the ‘the military burden’ but the first step to stability lies in addressing Afghanistan’s corrosive opium dependence. The only certainty is that it will be a long and hard road, with no quick fixes.

[davidbfpo]

Excellent short article and perhaps a few here in the UK government will read it. I still think buying the opium closer to the producer is an option, before conversion to heroin. The merchants and local officials will still make money.
Oh yes, then we burn the damm stuff or mix it with tarmac for new roads.

davidbfpo

[Paul Smyth]

When I've asked people involved in the Afghan endeavour the following question I have not received a compelling reply:

Which is the greatest threat to the long-term security of the Afghan government/nation:

a. the insurgency in the south of the country, or
b. illicit narcotics?

I suggest this question is important as the international CN and COIN efforts overlap and can conflict. If the answer is 'a', then the CN campaign should sit within a broader COIN strategy; if the answer is 'b', then the COIN campaign should accord with a larger CN strategy. Which one sets the context for the other?

[Eden]

Clearly COIN is currently taking precedence, but the reason why that is is complicated.

At ISAF headquarters, the long-term threat of narcotics was (and still is, I assume - I left there last year) clearly recognized. However, the increased violence and decreased Afghan support for NATO pursuant to a serious CN effort had to be avoided. Why? Because the coalition in Afghanistan was barely being held together. Several major contributors were very leery about allowing 'their' region to become more violent. They feared that NATO involvement in CN would lead to their troops becoming targets. Many had caveats specifically exempting them from CN. Therefore, any CN effort had to be Afghan-led and executed, and the Afghans were both unable and unwilling to mount anything more than photo-op missions.

On the other hand, for political reasons and domestic consumption, no one could say that they were going to ignore narcotic trafficking. So you would have statements to the effect that it simply couldn't be tackled until the security situation improved (only partially true in some areas), and the trumpeting of a few 'replacement livelihood' programs that were desperately underfunded and of dubious effectiveness.

The truth is that NATO is unwilling to tackle CN and that some nations are more interested in being seen to participate than they are in actually improving conditions in Afghanistan. The more dedicated NATO members recognize they can only ask so much of their less willing partners if they are to sustain any sort of effort at all. It is not, I believe, the first time that politicians and generals have preferred short-term benefits to long-term gains. These are truths that are unspeakable, of course, which is why you have been unable to get a satisfactory answer to your question.

[slapout9]

A few things to remember when thinking about poppies in Afghanistan. My last tour ended in early '07, but I think I'm still fairly current.

1. With a very few exceptions, the insurgents are not using the drug lords for support - they are working for them. It's the second job they have to support their fight against infidels and the tribe pissing in the river upstream. They provide security, intelligence, and muscle. In return, the drug lords allow a few crumbs to fall in their plates. It is not narco-terrorism on the Columbia model.

2. The drug lords - who are often also into weapons and human trafficking - have no great problem with NATO, so long as interference in their trade is limited to a few photo ops. Any concerted effort to do more will trigger violence on a scale far greater than that seen recently, and across the country. Just ask the Iranians what happened when they seriously attempted to interfere with trafficking across their borders.

3. Buying up the supply is a simple solution, but probably not an effective one. First, see paragraph 2. The drug lords won't stand idly by. Second, as has been pointed out, even if it is successful, it will merely push production outward. Do we want to solve the problem in Afghanistan by destabilizing one of the other 'stans, at least one of which has nuclear weapons?

Not to sound negative, but the tone of some posts is that there are easy solutions out there being ignored. There aren't, only long, hard, costly solutions.


Eden I think your post was excellant very good analysis... from my armchair as davidbfpo says.
I have been out of the loop on Intel for quite a few years now but here is some real wisdom here. However I agree with davidbfpo about buying the crop (which is not a new startegy) in this case it is worth the shot.

[Billy Ruffian]

Interesting idea.. buying all the poppy? How would you consider convincing an Afghan that you would stay long enough to keep buying the opium longer than drug barons?

"Fortunate" for us that the average Afghan cannot read western newspapers otherwise he would realize that the West is unwilling to make a long term commitment (see reports regarding the Canadian parliament).

(Although I completely understand the Canadian position).

We're even more divided than you might think on this issue. I would argue that Canadians, myself included, are a very compassionate people (as all soft socialists are) who want to see the job get done... well... one half only will fulfill that just so long as no one's feelings get hurt. The other half, I would again argue, wants to get 'Cowboy' on the Taleban/Narco-Lord individuals.

We're a very divided people on this issue.

We've all spoken alot about just buying up the crop from the farmers, but has anyone in the ISAF, NATO or UN hierarchy actually seriously tried to implement this? If we were able to deliver pain-killer medicine to Afghans with a label that said 'Proudly grown in Afghanistan', wouldn't that help us out a little?

[Paul Smyth]

This issue keeps running, primarily championed by the Senlis Council. On the surface it seems logical but I suspect the argument receives far more prominence that it deserves. Why? because:

- there may be a debate about whether there is a global shortage of opiates.

- a key tenet of the proposal to legitimately farm poppy is that the Afghans would self-regulate its production. Thus, farmers would only grow their allotted amount of poppy. This system would not be effective in a corrupt environment.

- little thought is given to the reaction of drug barons and the insurgents who currently profit from the illicit opium market.

- even if a self-regulating system could be implemented, the cultivated opium would not be produced for the illicit heroin market. Continued demand would fuel the requirement for illicit farming.

- if legalizing opium would suddenly remove the profit incentive, why is there a multi-million (£/$/Euro) market in illicit tobacco products?

- the continued cultivation of poppy will do little to ease the chronic effects of opiate production on the populations in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Too often we ignore the damaging and corrosive effects of opium in the Region.

- the eventual solution is to remove poppy as a crop of choice. Paying farmers to grow it does not promote that outcome. :(

[Ron Humphrey]

.

- little thought is given to the reaction of drug barons and the insurgents who currently profit from the illicit opium market.(

Actually one thing about war is that if one manages to get the criminals to side with the enemy then there is a greater percentage of them dealt with through attrition vs court systems

.
- the continued cultivation of poppy will do little to ease the chronic effects of opiate production on the populations in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Too often we ignore the damaging and corrosive effects of opium in the Region. :(

This may be but can we find an example historically where quitting cold turkey actually worked out in the long run with this sort of thing?

.
- the eventual solution is to remove poppy as a crop of choice. Paying farmers to grow it does not promote that outcome. :(

Although it's no guarantee sometimes the only way to get a different product on the market is through hostile takeover of the product line. Not sure what the best way to do this is but on one of these threads I tried to lay out an idea. I'll try to find it.

Got It-

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4816

[selil]

- if legalizing opium would suddenly remove the profit incentive, why is there a multi-million (£/$/Euro) market in illicit tobacco products?


Exactly!!!

It's NOT a multi BILLION Euro market in illicit tobacco because it ain't illegal.

[Paul Smyth]

And it is a major problem. E.g. a quote from British American Tobacco (http://www.bat.com/group/sites/uk__3mnfen.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO6TNKVW?opendocument&SKN=3&TMP=1):

Illicit trade is not just the work of small operators. Organised crime is increasingly dominant. The rewards can be high. A single 40 foot long container (8.5 million cigarettes) smuggled into the UK and sold at half the recommended retail price could net the criminals around US$2 million in profit.

and (http://www.ash.org.uk/ash_20gyvtb9.htm):
It has been estimated that illicit trade accounted for 10.7 percent of global cigarette sales in 2006, or about 600 billion cigarettes. This analysis found that the illicit tobacco trade deprives governments of $US 40-50 billion in tax revenue each year, greater than the GDPs of two-thirds of the world's countries.
Source: All Africa, 13 February 2008
Link: http://tinyurl.com/2gqwpm

There is also a global nmarket for counterfeit pharmacuticals. If Afghan Opium was suddenly legalized, it would presumably open up a new opportunity for illicit activity.

P

[jonSlack]

Newsweek - The Opium Brides of Afghanistan (http://www.newsweek.com/id/129577)

Khalida's father says she's 9—or maybe 10. As much as Sayed Shah loves his 10 children, the functionally illiterate Afghan farmer can't keep track of all their birth dates. Khalida huddles at his side, trying to hide beneath her chador and headscarf. They both know the family can't keep her much longer. Khalida's father has spent much of his life raising opium, as men like him have been doing for decades in the stony hillsides of eastern Afghanistan and on the dusty southern plains. It's the only reliable cash crop most of those farmers ever had. Even so, Shah and his family barely got by: traffickers may prosper, but poor farmers like him only subsist. Now he's losing far more than money. "I never imagined I'd have to pay for growing opium by giving up my daughter," says Shah.

The family's heartbreak began when Shah borrowed $2,000 from a local trafficker, promising to repay the loan with 24 kilos of opium at harvest time. Late last spring, just before harvest, a government crop-eradication team appeared at the family's little plot of land in Laghman province and destroyed Shah's entire two and a half acres of poppies. Unable to meet his debt, Shah fled with his family to Jalalabad, the capital of neighboring Nangarhar province. The trafficker found them anyway and demanded his opium. So Shah took his case before a tribal council in Laghman and begged for leniency. Instead, the elders unanimously ruled that Shah would have to reimburse the trafficker by giving Khalida to him in marriage. Now the family can only wait for the 45-year-old drugrunner to come back for his prize. Khalida wanted to be a teacher someday, but that has become impossible. "It's my fate," the child says.

Afghans disparagingly call them "loan brides"—daughters given in marriage by fathers who have no other way out of debt. The practice began with the dowry a bridegroom's family traditionally pays to the bride's father in tribal Pashtun society. These days the amount ranges from $3,000 or so in poorer places like Laghman and Nangarhar to $8,000 or more in Helmand, Afghanistan's No. 1 opium-growing province. For a desperate farmer, that bride price can be salvation—but at a cruel cost. Among the Pashtun, debt marriage puts a lasting stain on the honor of the bride and her family. It brings shame on the country, too. President Hamid Karzai recently told the nation: "I call on the people [not to] give their daughters for money; they shouldn't give them to old men, and they shouldn't give them in forced marriages."

[Ron Humphrey]

Newsweek - The Opium Brides of Afghanistan (http://www.newsweek.com/id/129577)

This seems like the perfect job for a Negotiator. You know wait for him to show up to claim the girl and make "him an offer he can't refuse"

It is sad that this happens but it's been going on for a long time there and many other places.

The only way it ever changes is by finding other options for those involved and sometimes thats culturally limited.

[negotiator6]

Mid-May of 2003 on a three day trip to the Pakistan-Afgh border, we passed through valley after valley of poppy fields. Beautiful as the manicured fields were fed by the melting ice of snow packs as high as 11,500 feet. And we were at nearly 10,000 feet. The valleys are such that low flying aircraft would have just one pass. On the hilltops are 12.7mm (50 cal size) weapons.

These fields that reap so much damage to society are worked by share croppers, but owned by those who live in Hong Kong, London, Lahore....and perhaps a few in Kabul.

How to resolve this problem...this serious problem is yet to be determined. But, see the faces of the people, they are as addicted to growing poppy as the addicts who use the end product.

Try to make that trip today...no way. (Gardez, Paki border-northern Khwost Province...down through Jaji to Khwost in the southern portion, then the Kwost-Gardez "hiway" back to FOB Gardez...then the following day to Ghazni..(my back still hurts from that trip...)

[Ken White]

the bod -- if not now, soon; LINK (http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Article.308.aspx).

[davidbfpo]

Here is a different angle: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...14&ft=1&f=1001

Summary - An excellent illustration of how providing alternative livelihoods for Afghan poppy-growing farmers is stymied not just by the Taliban, but by government corruption and weak institutions: a group of foreign and local businessmen – including noted Afghan expert Barnett Rubin – have been frustrated in their efforts to launch a small-scale perfume industry in eastern Afghanistan.

Additional comments by Mr Rubin: http://icga.blogspot.com/2008/01/err...ium-poppy.html

davidbfpo

(Moved here - the correct thread!)

[Surferbeetle]

From yesterday's BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7449532.stm)

Afghan police working with British special forces have uncovered a drugs stash of 237 tonnes of hashish.

Afghan and British officials say they believe it to be the world's biggest seizure of drugs in terms of weight.

Afghan and British officials said the hashish had a value of more than $400m (£203m).

[Tom Odom]

You can download the full report here:

UN 2008 World Drug Report (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/pdf/world_drug_report.pdf?sid=ST2008062601924&pos=list)


Here is the relevant chart on Afghanistan. There is but a single negative production figure, that of farm price for dry opium suggesting that higher production has driven down price.

[Rex Brynen]

Is Afghanistan a Narco-State? (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/magazine/27AFGHAN-t.html?pagewanted=1&hp)

By THOMAS SCHWEICH
New York Times Magazine
Published: July 27, 2008

On March 1, 2006, I met Hamid Karzai for the first time. It was a clear, crisp day in Kabul. The Afghan president joined President and Mrs. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Ambassador Ronald Neumann to dedicate the new United States Embassy. He thanked the American people for all they had done for Afghanistan. I was a senior counternarcotics official recently arrived in a country that supplied 90 percent of the world’s heroin. I took to heart Karzai’s strong statements against the Afghan drug trade. That was my first mistake.

Over the next two years I would discover how deeply the Afghan government was involved in protecting the opium trade — by shielding it from American-designed policies. While it is true that Karzai’s Taliban enemies finance themselves from the drug trade, so do many of his supporters. At the same time, some of our NATO allies have resisted the anti-opium offensive, as has our own Defense Department, which tends to see counternarcotics as other people’s business to be settled once the war-fighting is over. The trouble is that the fighting is unlikely to end as long as the Taliban can finance themselves through drugs — and as long as the Kabul government is dependent on opium to sustain its own hold on power.

[Ken White]

Reads like he's getting one.

He says in summation:"1. Inform President Karzai that he must stop protecting drug lords and narco-farmers or he will lose U.S. support. Karzai should issue a new decree of zero tolerance for poppy cultivation during the coming growing season. He should order farmers to plant wheat, and guarantee today’s high wheat prices. Karzai must simultaneously authorize aggressive force-protected manual and aerial eradication of poppies in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces for those farmers who do not plant legal crops.

2. Order the Pentagon to support this strategy. Position allied and Afghan troops in places that create security pockets so that Afghan counternarcotics police can arrest powerful drug lords. Enable force-protected eradication with the Afghan-set goal of eradicating 50,000 hectares as the benchmark.

3. Increase the number of D.E.A. agents in Kabul and assist the Afghan attorney general in prosecuting key traffickers and corrupt government officials from all ethnic groups, including southern Pashtuns.

4. Get new development projects quickly to the provinces that become poppy-free or stay poppy free. The north should see significant rewards for its successful anticultivation efforts. Do not, however, provide cash to farmers for eradication.

5. Ask the allies either to help in this effort or stand down and let us do the job.

There are other initiatives that could help as well: better engagement of Afghanistan’s neighbors, more drug-treatment centers in Afghanistan, stopping the flow into Afghanistan of precursor chemicals needed to make heroin and increased demand-reduction programs. But if we — the Afghans and the U.S. — do just the five items listed above, we will bring the rule of law to a lawless country; and we will cut off a key source of financing to the Taliban."to which I suggest:

1. That's not laughable but it is sad. Extremely unlikely to happen for several reasons and if it does, the blowback will be horrendous. Welcome to South Asia...

2. That can be done. Well, could be done. But. Since the Pentagon, that bastion of evil, is aware of what that will mean to their troops, they'll resist it. If a politician gives the order, it might happen -- and said politician would not be the one who took the flak over the sudden increase in casualties, the folks in the Five Sided bit of Arlington County know that, ergo...

3. That has some merit as long as realistic expectations are maintained.

4. Ditto the comment above.

5. Unlikely to happen, if asked, most will steer clear of any 'help' for the same reasons they have avoided helping in the past. Put too much pressure on them -- and, well, many would be happy to leave Afghanistan anyway...

The other suggestions are also good and achievable but any dream of bringing the rule of law to Afghanistan in less than a generation or two is I believe regrettably deluded. I know we're American and we like to fix things and do it quickly; but some things and some places just won't play along.

[Darksaga]

There has been some research based on a Purdue University study that examined hemp growth for industrial purposes. Some groups have been looking at that as a way to curb the opium and marijuana production by building an industrial infrastructure around hemp grown for that purpose.

[Eden]

Any concerted anti-poppy campaign would significantly increase the level of violence in the country, particularly in the northern and western parts of the country that the uninformed believe are 'success' stories. They are quiescent at best, largely due to the ineffectiveness of government and Afghan forces in those regions.

Also to be considered is the fact that poppy is especially suited to the current conditions in Afghanistan. Until the irrigation system is rebuilt, along with an infrastructure that allows for transportation, storage, and refrigeration, the choice of crops will remain sharply circumscribed for the average farmer.

[Tom Odom]

There has been some research based on a Purdue University study that examined hemp growth for industrial purposes. Some groups have been looking at that as a way to curb the opium and marijuana production by building an industrial infrastructure around hemp grown for that purpose.

OK and what is the market for hemp? Kenya once was the hemp production point for the British Empire but as the use of hemp ropes and lines died at sea so did the production of hemp.

The Brits have tried potatoes in Afganistan as a crop replacement and other staples have been tested. The bottom line is they--like coffee for Juan Valdez in Colombia--do not come close to paying as well.

What Eden said is worth repeating:
Clearly COIN is currently taking precedence, but the reason why that is is complicated.

At ISAF headquarters, the long-term threat of narcotics was (and still is, I assume - I left there last year) clearly recognized. However, the increased violence and decreased Afghan support for NATO pursuant to a serious CN effort had to be avoided. Why? Because the coalition in Afghanistan was barely being held together. Several major contributors were very leery about allowing 'their' region to become more violent. They feared that NATO involvement in CN would lead to their troops becoming targets. Many had caveats specifically exempting them from CN. Therefore, any CN effort had to be Afghan-led and executed, and the Afghans were both unable and unwilling to mount anything more than photo-op missions.

On the other hand, for political reasons and domestic consumption, no one could say that they were going to ignore narcotic trafficking. So you would have statements to the effect that it simply couldn't be tackled until the security situation improved (only partially true in some areas), and the trumpeting of a few 'replacement livelihood' programs that were desperately underfunded and of dubious effectiveness.

The truth is that NATO is unwilling to tackle CN and that some nations are more interested in being seen to participate than they are in actually improving conditions in Afghanistan. The more dedicated NATO members recognize they can only ask so much of their less willing partners if they are to sustain any sort of effort at all. It is not, I believe, the first time that politicians and generals have preferred short-term benefits to long-term gains. These are truths that are unspeakable, of course, which is why you have been unable to get a satisfactory answer to your question.


As Ken says, welcome to South Asia.

[Rex Brynen]

As Ken says, welcome to South Asia.

Yes, I agree too. I was quite dumbfounded that anyone with even a faint understanding of either the politics or geostrategic stakes thought this was remotely possible:

Inform President Karzai that he must stop protecting drug lords and narco-farmers or he will lose U.S. support.


Get tougher? Maybe. Probably. Withdraw all US support? :eek:

[Ken White]

law enforcement type, he's obviously smart and aggressive. And he's an American. I think that latter fact gets in the way of the former attributes. We like to get things done, believe that wrongs must be righted and are generally pretty up-front in our dealings. Not popular attitudes in much of the world and we always have difficulty accepting that fact. Egos again... :wry:

I also think his experience with Colombia probably clouded the issue. Afghans are NOT Colombians :eek:

[Darksaga]

OK and what is the market for hemp? Kenya once was the hemp production point for the British Empire but as the use of hemp ropes and lines died at sea so did the production of hemp.

The Brits have tried potatoes in Afganistan as a crop replacement and other staples have been tested. The bottom line is they--like coffee for Juan Valdez in Colombia--do not come close to paying as well.



Here is the link to the Purdue report.

http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/ncnu02/v5-284.html

[Tom Odom]

Here is the link to the Purdue report.

http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/ncnu02/v5-284.html

Good report and interesting. Seems to me though that the proposed industry assumes a benign security environment, a functioning commercial structure, and an accepted, practiced, and functional government to support such an endeavor. None of those assumptions apply to Afghanistan and are not likely to in the next decade.

Tom

[Entropy]

Interesting report here (http://monocle.com/sections/affairs/Web-Articles/Narcotecture-in-Afghanistan/) showing how Afghanistan's nouveau-rich are stylin'

[bismark17]

Fitting example of how we will never be able to compete with the other side in the "war" on drugs as we currently wage it.

[bourbon]

U.N. Reports That Taliban Is Stockpiling Opium (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/28/world/middleeast/28opium.html), By KIRK KRAEUTLER. The New York Times, November 27, 2008.
UNITED NATIONS — Afghanistan has produced so much opium in recent years that the Taliban are cutting back poppy cultivation and stockpiling raw opium in an effort to support prices and preserve a major source of financing for the insurgency, Antonio Maria Costa, the head of the United Nations drug office, says.

Mr. Costa made his remarks to reporters last week as his office prepared to release its latest survey of Afghanistan’s opium crop. Issued Thursday, it showed that poppy cultivation had retreated in much of the country and was now overwhelmingly concentrated in the 7 of 34 provinces where the insurgency remains strong, most of those in the south.

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008 (http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, November 2008. (187 Page PDF)

[davidbfpo]

I am sure other threads have carried views on Afghan drug production since the last update, anyway this seems a good place to add this: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/5477990/British-troops-seize-65-million-of-Taliban-drugs.htm

Aside from the amounts seized, the operation involved the entire UK Helmand mobile force, an infantry battallion (Royal Scots, ex-Black Watch), plus a 100 ANA and all landed by helicopter. No details on whose helicopters used, I suspect UK and US.

Following procedure I suspect the drugs will be handed over to the Afghan government, hopefully burnt quickly before leakage.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

The SWJ blog article: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/06/poppy-is-not-the-most-profitab/#c003212 appeared June 14th and was missed being in Chicago.

Recalled this alternative view, which advocates melons: http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-magazine/business/3665983/one-day-the-kharbouza-will-be-mightier-than-the-kalashnikov.thtml

Makes an interesting contrast! Later author's background not readily found.

davidbfpo

[AnalyticType]

One which I will add to!

September to November 2007 I was on a team of four students (capstone course for my undergrad program) in which we were tasked with assessing poppy eradication methods which had been successful in a few areas, to determine their utility for the rest of Afghanistan. We were to examine what Governor Atta had done in the Balkh province (which was "officially" poppy-free at that point) and see if his methods were duplicatable. This assessment was for a gentleman in the General Counsel's office at the Pentagon.

By the way, before anyone gets concerned, this was an OSINT project and it was not classified once we presented our findings, so I can share it.

It was apparent quickly that there is no "cookie-cutter" solution. Too many complexities are involved, between ethnicities, geography/geology, weather patterns, tribal structures, not to mention a couple thousand years of history... So I retooled our Terms of Reference to encompass any and all solutions which can be interlinked, thereby multiplying the benefit of any one program.

On this team of students, we had two 21-year olds who had good research and analytical skills, but not much of a "global" outlook. The third member of the team was a 24-year old Marine Scout Sniper with two tours in Afghanistan...definitely an asset! And then there was me...over 40 and a type-A personality! We didn't officially have a team leader, but I filled the role...

Having been owned by horses for 30 years, I'm pretty conversant in agricultural matters, so I took that sector. The Marine was the obvious choice for Security. And I delegated the other two to Industry and Mineral/Petroleum Exploitation.

So having laid out the basic scenario, I thought I'd share with y'all our Executive Summary...

Executive Summary:
What viable poppy elimination and replacement programs are likely to succeed in Afghanistan?
Any successful opium poppy replacement program will likely include several integrated programs in the areas of agriculture, mineral and fuel deposit exploitation, the construction of infrastructure, and industrial manufacturing. It is highly likely that an interconnected set of programs will benefit both the local and national economies. The potential for success of any coordinated program is in direct proportion to the level of interdiction, border security, and prosecution of drug lords and corrupt officials. It is highly unlikely that eradication, the physical destruction of poppy crops, is sufficient for successful elimination of opium and sustainable replacement. One single replacement program, industry or crop is highly unlikely capable of replacing poppy, for the complexities of the situation, geography and culture require a multifaceted and interconnected solution.

[AnalyticType]

Well, I was going to upload the full report for those who would be interested in reading it, but it's too large (even as a pdf, and zipped.) So, should you be curious, let me know and I'll email it to you.

Victoria

[davidbfpo]

Following a G8 Afghanistan meeting, with Richard Holbrooke announcing an end to US policy on crop destruction: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-drugs28-2009jun28,0,7732272.story (one of many). A UK press report shows that the Afghan government and the UK do not agree: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5674309/Britain-to-continue-poppy-eradication-in-Afghanistan-despite-US-reversal.html

Nothing like joined up thinking and working as an alliance!

davidbfpo

[AnalyticType]

While it's true that lack of synchronized effort among the coalition nations tends to slow down forward progress, the U.S. decision is best.

Here's why:

The situation of the average Afghani farmer that grows poppy can be likened to that of the Depression Era coalminer... he owes his soul "to the company store." When it's time to plant poppies, most of the farmers have no money, and no food. They borrow money against the poppy crop from the local drug lord, so that they can feed themselves and their families.

When eradication teams come along and obliterate the crop, by dragging the fields with weighted sections of chainlink fence behind ATVs, or flailing it, or chemically killing it, the farmer is put in an untenable position which he cannot fix - that of not having a crop to pay his debt with, nor money to do so. Additionally, he watches the balance of the money he would have received at harvest (with which to sustain his family for the balance of the year) 'die on the vine' as well. It's a downward spiral that can only be slowed by growing more poppy. It's also far too late in the season, at the typical time that the eradication teams do their thing, for the farmers to recoup their losses in another fashion.

The often offered alternative that people in the US like to discuss, that of buying the crop and selling it to pharmeceutical companies for legitimate use, is not a realistic option simply because that market is already fully supplied. There is no demand to be filled, in the legal market, for Afghani opium.

Yes, the trafficking/processing/transportation elements must be dealt with, most often by lethal means. The corrupt provincial government officials, from the Governor down, must be jailed or otherwise removed, as Governor Atta did in the Balkh province. Truth be known, he also offered to replace the lost poppy crops with cannabis...:rolleyes: But when he announced that Balkh was "poppy-free," he spoke the truth... Also, being in the Northern Plateau, where poppy was a very small percentage of the agricultural efforts, there wasn't much poppy production to deal with in the first place.

The bottom line with the southern poppy-growing regions is economics. An Afghani farmer who does not grow poppies will make approximately 300 USD per year. A farmer next door who grows poppies on a couple hectares (ha) of land will make 3,000 USD per year. When you look at it in real numbers, of course it makes sense that they're growing poppies! But you (meaning governments) cannot pay the farmers not to grow poppies. Unlike (in welfare states) the tendency of those with their hands out for money to be ruled by the law of inertia, Afghanis are fairly industrious people.

I spoke with former Minister of the Interior Ali Jalali in 2007 about this very issue. He said flat out that if farmers are paid not to grow poppy, they will tend to take the money and grow poppies rather than leaving the fields fallow. But Jalali was very specific; he said that this is pure economics. There is no longstanding tradition of opium use in the Afghani (et al) culture. The solution lies in replacing the poppy cultivation with either another high-value crop or jobs that will earn them at least as much as the poppy crop would. They need to be busy and productive.

So when I was researching alternative crops, I used 3,000 USD/2 ha as a benchmark to find economically advantageous alternatives. I also had a team member research non-agricultural industries which were likely to pay as well, while utilizing the agricultural products of the alternative crops. I found some very interesting and viable crop options.

The one at the top of the list: saffron. As the world's most costly spice (retail avg 300USD/oz), the economic benefit of cultivating saffron crocuses is clear. Granted, three stigma (the female part of the flower) per flower are the sole source of the spice, and it takes approximately 75,000 flowers to produce one pound of saffron threads. However, saffron crocuses are indigenous to the Iran/Afghanistan/Pakistan/Northern India swath, meaning that this is not a crop which would require specialized cultivation/fertilization. As with opium poppies, the key to economic benefit is the export value. Furthermore, being a late summer to fall crop, food crops can be cultivated on the same ground earlier in the spring and summer, effectively producing for the farmer both income and sustenance on the same piece of ground.

Another crop with high value is flax, which is already grown all over Afghanistan. However, it is only grown as an oil seed crop (linseed oil). One crop can produce two products if flax is also utilized for an indigenous textile industry.

Other high value export crops include pomegranates, grapes (exported as raisins and juice), nuts, and the 'animal husbandry piece de resistance'... cashmere. Though only 11% of Afghanistan's landmass is arable ground the total pasture grazing land available, exclusive of arable farmland, is approximately 45% or 291,375 km sq. But what of the market for cashmere?

Afghanistan is the third largest producer of this high value, renewable commodity, behind China and Mongolia. The importance of the cashmere industry to the Mongolian economy is clear: it provides income and employment for over a third of the population and raw cashmere and cashmere products are Mongolia’s third largest export. A vibrant cashmere industry has the potential to contribute to the growth of the economy, of the manufacturing sector, of employment at both the herder and the manufacturing levels, and of exports. It is important here to note that in Mongolia the herding sector and processing sectors are in deep trouble. In 2005, the herding sector surpassed the total herd size that can be sustained by Mongolia’s pasturelands, and overgrazing began to cause desertification. Many firms in the processing sector ceased to operate or downsized their operations over the past 10 years, yet processors still operate on average at less than 50% capacity.

This is to Afghanistan’s advantage. Despite being ranked third in cashmere production, Afghanistan’s share of the cashmere market is approximately 5%. As horticultural crop productivity increases, and irrigation systems are renovated, Afghanistan’s capability to sustain larger numbers of goats will increase. There is a growing market to be tapped by Afghan farmers who produce cashmere as Mongolian production continues to drop.

Contrary to the media-provided impression of agricultural sterility, Afghanistan is fully capable of sustaining regionally specialized agriculture. Afghanis have for millenia made effective use of their limited water resources for growing a wide variety of food crops. These include tree crops such as pomegranates, figs, mulberries, walnuts, pistachios, almonds and apricots; field crops such as cotton, peanuts, kidney beans, chickpeas, melons, herbs and grapes; and cereal grains such as wheat, barley, millet, rice and maize.

The key to success with any of these crops is the repair and revitalization of the surface irrigation and kareze systems which were demolished by the Soviets, and of which approximately 65% remain in disuse.

The more energy, money, and time that we pour into fixing the agricultural infrastructure (particularly the water supply systems) concurrently with interdiction efforts, the more quickly and easily we can wean the Afghani agricultural sector (85% of the whole) off of opium poppies and on to sustainable and economically feasible crops.

[davidbfpo]

I think legal cultivation of the opium poppy has cropped up before, most recently that it was grown in Australia and Turkey. This article refers to cultivation in the UK and asks why not legally cultivate in Afghanistan: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/borisjohnson/5814860/Its-poppycock-to-grow-crops-here-but-destroy-them-in-Afghanistan.html

(The author is the Mayor of London and a Conservative).

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Just in case it is lost, this SWJ item needs to be retained: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/carrots-and-sticks-when-is-pop/

davidbfpo

[goesh]

- just the odd comment and opinion but I rather doubt farmer Joe simply pays back any money borrowed to plant and harvest his crop, he is probably paying a protection fee as well and steep interest. Drugs and extortion cross all cultural barriers, pretty much a universal thing. I wouldn't advocate buying the opium, rather paying fair market value for it then destroying it on the spot via non chemical means. No doubt this has been hashed over and ruled out for various reasons and I haven't researched it. It just seems darn odd that a Bn Commander for instance can go forth and do all kinds of things in the name of the mission and change peoples lives forever, drastic things. Yet the same Commander can't go driving up to Farmer Joe's place, hop out with some cash in his hand, tell him in affect ' here is the high end value for your crop, we are going to destroy it now' and unleash a Hummer with chain link fence behind it on the crop, sit back and see what develops down the line with farmer Joe and some of his fellow growers. I don't think much would change really - Joe would still end up paying extortion money to the taliban and drug lords to be used against us but who is he going to like more in the process? Bottom line, farmer Joe does half the work for the same end results because of Uncle Sam.

[jcustis]

(Copied to here from the Afghan agriculture thread) I'm about to drop an AAR in the Afghanistan PTP thread, but I just attended a lecture by Gretchen Peters (author of Seeds of Terror, and she made the point that opium cultivated in Afghanistan would have to go through a shift in collection and production methods in order to come close to the hygienic methods required for medicinal purposes. She also added that unless the whole shebang was subsidized, medicinal opium would not likely garner prices higher than the farmer would get for growing wheat.

I found those points very interesting.

[davidbfpo]

Economy of effort: here is the author's website: http://gretchenpeters.org/ ; on a quick skim her blogsite has some useful pointers on relations with Afghans and a critical review of her book: http://www.registan.net/index.php/20...etchen-peters/ I note she responds at length to this on her blogsite: http://blog.gretchenpeters.org/

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 Aug 09:

Afghanistan's Narco War: Breaking the Link Between Drug Traffickers and Insurgents (http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/USGOV_AfghanistansNarcoWar_BreakingLink_DrugTraffi ckersInsurgents.pdf)
The attempt to cut off the drug money represents a central pillar of counter-insurgency strategy—deny financing to the enemy. This shift is an overdue move that recognizes the central role played by drug traffickers and drug money in the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. While it is too early to judge whether this will be a watershed, it is not too early to raise questions about whether the goals of the counter-narcotics strategy can be achieved. Is it possible to slow the flow of drug money to the insurgency, particularly in a country where most transactions are conducted in cash and hidden behind an ancient and secretive money transfer system? Does the U.S. Government have the capacity and the will to provide the hundreds more civilians required to carry out the second step in the counter-narcotics program and transform a poppy-dominated economy into one where legitimate agriculture can thrive? Can our NATO allies be counted on to step up their contributions on the military and civilian sides at a time when support for the war is waning in most European countries and Canada?