PDA

View Full Version : Afghanistan's Drug Problem



SWJED
09-17-2006, 10:57 AM
17 September Wall Street Journal commentary - Afghanistan's Catch-22 (http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008956) by Dana White.


... "In my 33 years in the military, I have never seen tougher terrain than here," says the general, who adds that the "vast majority of the country" is now secure. "There are about five or six provinces that have significant security challenges and they are primarily in rural areas." Translation: Kabul and major cities are calm, but in the southern and eastern provinces, where the government hasn't established its authority, violence prevails.

In some regions, peace admittedly won't come easily, if at all. Take the border with Pakistan, which is roughly twice as long as California--and twice as mountainous. Gen. Eikenberry says the area can't physically be secured, no matter how many boots are planted on the ground. True, Pakistan has committed nearly 80,000 troops to the effort, but the general--while lauding the cooperation between the Pakistani and Afghan forces, which are old foes--avoids questions about why Taliban insurgents are still finding safe haven in Pakistan.

Other areas, however, could be secured, and haven't been--particularly the southern provinces. In recent months, Taliban fighters seized on the transfer of control from U.S. to NATO forces and engaged in pitched battles. NATO's top commander said earlier this month that he needs 15% more troops to effectively roll back the Taliban threat. They may not get there before the Afghan winter sets in and the Taliban retreats into well-fortified caves.

"The insurgents are better equipped and better trained than they were a year ago," Gen. Eikenberry says. "People often fail to understand the full complexity of the violence here. There are several causes for violence in these provinces, including land disputes, tribal feuds and property titles. Taliban fighters often capitalize on these existing divisions to garner support in local communities."

Gen. Eikenberry understands the root of the problem. And it's a big one. In 2005, Afghanistan earned $2.7 billion in opium exports, or 52% of its GDP--plenty of cash to support an insurgency. That fighting has, in turn, basically halted all of the infrastructure build-out that was meant to provide Afghan farmers and other rural residents alternatives to growing poppy.

"In traveling around the country, the top concern of Afghans is unemployment, education and irrigation," Gen. Eikenberry confirms. But to address these issues--and here's the catch-22--violence in rural Afghanistan must first be quelled. If it isn't, the infrastructure that will facilitate trade cannot be built...

slapout9
09-17-2006, 01:27 PM
The General hit the nail on the head about the drug problem. Families,tribes have been doing this ages. Until you can find a way to replace this source of income so they can take care of their families nothing will get done. Simple crop replacement will not work unless it provides the same level of income that the Afghan's are used to. It is true that this should be a Afghan police problem, however I doubt they can handle it.

The other problem is that culture thing again. They really don't think they are doing anything wrong, and I suspect the US intervention is viewed as a form harassment more than anything else. If possible the US should stay away from this and let the Afghan's handle it.

Bill Moore
09-17-2006, 04:44 PM
I guess the first question is are the drugs actually funding the insurgency? The Taleban eliminated the drug trade when they ruled, and the routing of the Taleban gave the clans the freedom they needed to convert back to their old ways. They may pay protection money to some insurgent elements where the coalition isn't effective, but do they willingly fund a significant portion of the insurgency?

If we go after the drugs, won't that be perceived as an attack on their culture and their means of wealth production? In that case wouldn't that encourage them to form a temporarily alliance with the Taleban or other insurgent or criminal organizations to resist the coalition?

If we don't go after the drugs (just let it happen), then what happens? What is the worst case scenario? I'll go out on a limb here thinking out load. Wouldn't we have more influence over a criminal clan that has real economic interests, than a bunch of ideological zealots? Maybe the lesser of the evils is the drug clans in the short term is drug clans?

If not, can we effectively go after both? 53 percent of their GDP is very, very significant. I imagine the other 47% is foreign aid?

Merv Benson
09-17-2006, 05:05 PM
Bill,

I don't think the Taliban ever really eliminated the drug trade, although they did make it more inconvient for a while. I have seen some reports that they actually found a way to profit from the trade.

If it were true that the enemy did not profit from the drug trade, then it might be cost effective to just buy the drugs and take them off the market or sell them to pharmaceutical companies. My speculation is that people who grow and sell drugs do not have many inhibitions and therefore, they are likely to be dealing with other people without inhibitions including the enemy.

RTK
09-17-2006, 05:15 PM
If it were true that the enemy did not profit from the drug trade, then it might be cost effective to just buy the drugs and take them off the market or sell them to pharmaceutical companies. My speculation is that people who grow and sell drugs do not have many inhibitions and therefore, they are likely to be dealing with other people without inhibitions including the enemy.

We were going to do this and then stiffed the farmers. We told them if they planted wheat instead of poppies, we'd buy it and give them the difference. Then we cut that part out of the budget. In the end, there were a whole bunch of new wheat farmers pissed at Americans for not making good on their promise. So now poppie production is about 60% of the country. Cool little 2nd and 3rd order effect there.

slapout9
09-17-2006, 05:28 PM
Merv, that is exactly what we should be doing. Opium has many legitimate medical purposes and the potential for a win win situation for all is something that should be pursued ASAP. However it probably want happen. Why? Because we spend to much time trying to figure out how to fight instead of figuring out how to win.

Bill, I think your observations are correct not just one but all. Here is why. The results of drug profits that you never hear about is that the money creeps into legitimate business, government, etc. The local hospital has a new wing built by the upstanding citizen who is related to a big wealthy drug dealer. The upstanding citizen gets elected to public office, the hospital gets a new wing to treat children, and the drug dealer grows more powerful, safe in the shadows.

Tom Odom
09-18-2006, 01:05 PM
I have been referring to the drug issue in OEF as the 900 pound gorilla in the room for more thhan a year because no one was addressing it in serious discussions. At least LTG Eikenberry is doing that now.

Tom

Jedburgh
09-23-2006, 04:01 AM
From The Senlis Council (http://www.senliscouncil.net/):

Failed Counter-Narcotics Policies Central to Failure of Afghanistan’s Reconstruction (http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/014_publication/documents/5y_chapter_03)

Misguided and badly formulated drug policy has accelerated and compounded all of Afghanistan’s problems, and has effectively hijacked the international community’s nation-building efforts in the country. Five years ago, the international community prioritised counter-narcotics as one of their top objectives for Afghanistan, yet this priority, almost more than anything else, ignored the realities of the country. Afghanistan is severely debilitated by poverty, and poppy cultivation represents a survival strategy for millions of Afghans. Most of Afghanistan is so mired in poverty that without poppy, families cannot feed their children. This misplaced prioritisation of counter-narcotics focused substantial amounts of aid funds away from development and poverty relief; prompted the formulation of ill conceived drug policies for Afghanistan and misinformed the implementation strategies for these eradication and alternative development policies.

Yet despite all the counter-narcotics and alternative development funds provided by the international community, the opium crisis in Afghanistan is worse than ever, and entrenched in almost all facets of Afghan society. In September 2006 the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime announced record poppy cultivation levels in Afghanistan: 165,000 hectares of poppy were cultivated in the 2005-2006 growing season, with a potential yield of 6,100 metric tons of opium. This is a 59% percent increase from 2005, and demonstrates that five years of flawed counternarcotics priorities have brought no positive change in Afghanistan. They have only served to undermine government legitimacy, stability, security and development, whilst farmers have lost confidence in the current Karzai administration. Ultimately, this loss of confidence has ultimately aided insurgents. Five years ago, the total area of cultivated hectares of poppy was less than half of the current total....

CRS, 25 Jan 06: Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf) (first published in '04, updated annually)

slapout9
09-23-2006, 04:56 AM
I guess Tom Ricks can write another book and call it Fiasco II.

Bill Moore
09-23-2006, 05:34 PM
This particular thread is fascinating and telling in many ways beyond the opium problem.

First, RTK can you shed more light on who approved, then who disapproved the replacement crop program? While I doubt it would have worked, it still indicates that our bureaucracy is unwieldy and in many cases prohibits progress. Most agree that the people are the prize in COIN operations, and we can’t win that prize by refusing to walk or talk. This is a well known problem in Iraq also with Civil Affairs, where numerous promised projects were never delivered. Credibility is critical, and I think we would probably be better off promising “realistic” projects that incrementally improve their quality of life, vice trying to build a Hoover dam.

Thanks for the CRS report Jedburgh, as it clarified the issue of the Taliban allegedly suppressing the opium trade (only a partial truth). President Karsai believes the center of gravity in Afghanistan centers on the drug trade and carrying the fight into the Pakistan border region. Just because it isn’t politically correct, doesn’t mean it isn’t correct. Taking the fight into Pakistan border areas would be easier than targeting the drug trade. How do we shut the opium business and still win the prize? We have only been minimal progress in S. America, and there is no real end in sight. The West won’t tolerate operating in a tunnel with no light at the end, so stay the course doesn’t cut it on the political level. Traditional COIN doctrine doesn’t provide any solutions, so where are we at?

The Hoover dam analogy I mentioned was establishing a stable, democratic country. Stable, democratic countries rely on sound economies, which is a bridge too far in many countries. I still think the reality is that much of the world isn’t ready for democracy, and you can’t impose on them. The neo-con favorite, “The End of History” had flawed assumptions that we are still pursuing at great expense. The Taliban and the communists could take over a country and impose extremely harsh population control measures, force people into reeducation camps, and somewhat effectively implement change and enforce it under an oppressive rule. We obviously can’t take that route when we’re trying to spread democracy. When they lost power the culture amazingly retracted back to its historic norm.

When the people are ready for democracy we should lend a hand, but in the mean time we need to clarify what our national interests are, and one could argue that we need to collectively clarify what the West’s security interests are, then develop a realistic strategy to achieve them. Mitigate versus defeat, military punitive raids and preemptive strikes versus occupation, increased spending on homeland security, and a robust information program that unapologetically puts the enemy on the defensive. Every strategy must be sustainable, over reaction will result in depletion of our will and resources prior to the enemies. This way we’ll resources available to respond to opportunities and apply the ink spot strategy globally.

RTK
09-23-2006, 06:32 PM
First, RTK can you shed more light on who approved, then who disapproved the replacement crop program?

I can say this much; it was agreed upon in early 2002 between US State Department and the military. Much discussion was made over whose budget it would come from. After it was determined it would come from DOD funds, it was later dropped as part of a "trimming of the fat."

Jedburgh
09-23-2006, 08:55 PM
...How do we shut the opium business and still win the prize? We have only been minimal progress in S. America, and there is no real end in sight...

...The results of drug profits that you never hear about is that the money creeps into legitimate business, government, etc. The local hospital has a new wing built by the upstanding citizen who is related to a big wealthy drug dealer. The upstanding citizen gets elected to public office, the hospital gets a new wing to treat children, and the drug dealer grows more powerful, safe in the shadows...
"Shutting down" drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan may be a bridge too far. Bill pointed out our significant lack of progress along that road in South America - and that is in dealing with countries that are far more developed and have more diverse economies than Afghanistan can even dream of at the moment. Crop substitution has proven to be a useful, although limited, tool in the fight to reduce production - but we've already seen that approach pretty much discarded.

Slapout's illustration ties right into Bill's statement. As bad as narco-influence is in portions of South America, it is exponentially worse in Afghanistan. And far more dangerous, in that it is fueling the reemergence of the Taliban and the intensification of the insurgency - and do not think for a moment that Al-Qa'ida elements are not taking a slice of the pie.

This drug trade also contributes to the destabilization of Afghanistan's neighbors, Iran and Pakistan (and reinforces the already strong influences of organized crime in the states of former Soviet Central Asia). Pakistan poses an existential threat, being that it is on the teetering edge of being a failed state, and with the ISI and other government elements having kept their greedy hands in the trade for a very long time. Pakistan offers up a frightening nexus of unstable government, organized crime, terrorism and nuclear proliferation (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=2514&postcount=3).

Are we going to come to a resource point where we eventually have to decide between continuing to conduct ops in either Iraq or Afghanistan? (this is not a rhetorical question) In your opinions, which neighborhood has the greater potential to fill the vacuum/absorb the impact of a coalition pullout, and which is more likely to complete the descent into a failed state and terrorist operational hub?

Someone has to be studying these contingencies.

slapout9
09-24-2006, 03:59 AM
A lot has been posted since I last read this thread and yes, I agree this is good discussion and profitable, many excellent points have been.

My opinion about Afghanistan is the drug problem should go to the bottom the list. Jed posted a second link to a paper about the family structure and the reliance on profits to survive. If we begin to do major drug enforcement ops we will rip this entire social fabric apart. Half the country will be dead or in jail and the other half will be hunting US troops for revenge.

I was going to ask RTK the same question as Bill. RTK thanks for responding. I think our COA should be to use the Nancy Reagan approach. Put up some posters that say "just say to no to drugs" and let the Afghan's deal with it. Jed you are right this would truly be a drug war with a lot of US casualties.

Closer to home my concern is Mexico. Middle eastern males can pose as Mexican males and cross our borders with ease. This is an extremely dangerous situation. We worry about people with nukes, which we should, but what if 250 Iranian Special force troops were roving around the US setting off IEDs. The bearded mini-me in Iran may be telling the truth when he says he doesn't need Nukes to do us in. can you imagine the effect that would have on our country!!! They wouldn't even have to kill anybody, just blow #### up!!!

Finally drug dealing is profitable and PORTABLE. When you have a success in one country it often moves to another. Columbia is a Bright spot, but it is fragile especially with the mother FARCers and Hugo(professional devil smeller) Chavez right next door. We have talked about Afghanistan's neighbors, and this same effect happens from state to state in the US. Like COIN you need to have a world approach and you need to pick your battles and win but not at the expense of loosing the war.

And finally,finally we need to stop this get out the vote routine (democracy) for every country in the world. In the end they will have the government that they want just like the US did. What we should be concerned about is their foreign policy to wards the US. If it is peaceful then trade with them, if not?? Do like Bill said and deal with the threat and leave.

I didn't mean to rant so much but I just finished watching the history channel special about SF and the 82ND in Afghanistan. That place is nothing but one big rock. Dosen't look like there is much else to do but grow dope and watch the goats and shoot at the americans.

SWJED
10-04-2006, 09:06 AM
4 October Los Angeles Times commentary - Get Serious About Afghanistan (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-boot4oct04,0,6201842.column?coll=la-opinion-rightrail) by Max Boot.


... The situation is still not as dire as in Iraq, as anyone who has recently been to both countries can attest. But the trends are ominous.

A large part of the fault lies with Pakistan. After making some efforts to curb Taliban activity, President Pervez Musharraf seems to have thrown in the towel. He has agreed to withdraw troops from Waziristan, turning over a frontier area the size of New Jersey to Taliban supporters. He also released from prison about 2,500 foreign fighters linked to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Since those actions, U.S. officials report that Taliban attacks in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan have tripled.

Pakistan isn't just turning a blind eye to Taliban activity. Its Inter-Services Intelligence agency seems to be increasing the amount of training and logistical support it provides to Islamist militants — and not just in Afghanistan. While Musharraf was promoting his book in the U.S. last week, Indian police announced that they hold Pakistani intelligence responsible for the Mumbai train bombings that killed 186 people in July...

What should the U.S. do? Sending more troops isn't in the cards...

This anemic level of support makes it impossible to address Afghanistan's drug problem, which would require subsidizing farmers to plant alternative crops. It also makes it difficult to build up indigenous security forces to stop the Taliban. Earlier this year, the Pentagon suggested that the goal for the Afghan National Army would be downsized from 70,000 troops to 50,000. (The figure at the moment is under 40,000.) But even 70,000 troops wouldn't be enough to protect a nation of 31 million. The Bush administration should announce that it will dramatically increase assistance with the goal of creating an Afghan army of, say, 150,000 troops. More money and more American advisors also should go to the Afghan police force, which is larger but considerably less capable than the army...

Uboat509
10-04-2006, 05:00 PM
I tend to listen when Max Boot speaks. He seems to understand what he is talking about rather than just being another partisan.

SFC W

SWJED
10-04-2006, 06:26 PM
I tend to listen when Max Boot speaks...

SFC W

Same here.

Jedburgh
05-14-2007, 10:06 PM
The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, 10 May 07:

Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How it Funds Taliban Operations (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373383)

...Opium eradication is a promising counter-terrorism strategy if it can be executed without damaging the livelihood of the average opium farmer. For every leaflet and exhortation from the insurgents justifying opium, the Afghan government should be there to highlight the Taliban’s hypocrisy and advertise the damage done to other Muslims.

Second, development programs that offset farmers’ loss of income also need to provide some benefit to the pool of unemployed workers from which the Taliban recruit. Intervening in the opium economy means re-arranging a number of markets, including those for labor. At least, the underemployed or unemployed should not be left worse off, although, of course, the better outcome is a self-sustaining development trajectory.

Compensation to farmers is probably necessary. Options for delivering compensation are complicated by the tendency of some farmers to receive loans from traders and insurgents in anticipation of opium delivery, creating a debt burden that requires alleviation. A plan to pay at the end of the planting season is likely to be resisted more strongly. However, payment at the start of the season raises the risks of cheating and also the costs of monitoring since some crops may need to be checked twice. The United Kingdom’s payments for not planting in 2002 and 2003 were unsuccessful as farmers (and politicians) pocketed funds and still produced opium....

Ski
05-14-2007, 10:30 PM
We were starting to see the Taliban use drug profits to fund their operations when I was in country.

The opium trade will never be eliminated from Afghanistan, and the cocaine trade will never be eliminated from Colombia. The only chance, and it's a limited chance at that, is to buy the entire crop every year, sell what you can of it to pharmacutecal companies, and burn the rest.

Then you take the funds from selling the stuff and start rebuilding the infrastructure.

tequila
05-16-2007, 01:25 AM
NYTIMES article (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/world/asia/15cnd-drugs.html?hp=&pagewanted=print) covering the Bush Administration's movement to combine counterinsurgency with anti-drug efforts in Afghanistan. I read this with a ugly sinking feeling. We may well be on the way to losing this war as well.

carl
05-16-2007, 04:01 PM
Crop substitution programs, buying the opium crop etc. are all attractive ideas but they do nothing to eliminate the demand by illicit users. No matter what you do that demand will always be there over and above anything you do to try and reduce planting. That continueing demand plus the illegal status of the drug will make for big money (demand + illegal= lots of money) and big money means somebody will try to get it.

Tom likened the opium trade to a 900 pound gorilla in the room. There is an unmentioned club in the room that will beat down the gorilla to maybe 100 pounds, drug legalization. Legalization would remove the variable from the business that makes it so impossibly lucrative right now; lucre that bad guys take the most advantage of.

carl
05-16-2007, 06:07 PM
I made this comment on another Afghan thread but it seems more appropriate here.

Nothing will work unless demand is eliminated. That is impossible. Too many people like the idea of feeling good the easy way and don't see anything wrong with it.

The demand combined with the illegal status of opium means big money; that mostly benefits the bad guys wherever they may be.

So, they thing to be done is remove the illegal part of the equation. That removes the big money from from the hands of the bad guys.

There will be social costs to this course of action. But on balance, I think the benefits outweigh the costs, both here and overseas.

Ski
05-16-2007, 11:05 PM
Carl,

Agreed. Combine legalization with buying the crop and you've helped defeat the problem.

I don't think there are too many politicians willing to legalize opiates however.

tequila
05-16-2007, 11:24 PM
Legalization is airy-fairy fantasy. I can't see the political capital mobilizing for it for another 20 years. It certainly will not happen because of a foreign war --- this is way too wrapped up in domestic politics.

Beyond that, there are quite lucrative markets to feed in Europe, China, Pakistan, Iran, etc. Most Afghan opium makes its way to Europe anyway --- I believe most of our heroin comes by way of Mexico and Colombia.

slapout9
05-16-2007, 11:28 PM
Beyond that, there are quite lucrative markets to feed in Europe, China, Pakistan, Iran, etc. Most Afghan opium makes its way to Europe anyway --- .
A very important and often overlooked point I might add.

carl
05-16-2007, 11:55 PM
Legalization is airy-fairy fantasy.

So is a 6 foot tall Swedish girl named Inga, but I can dream can't I. Just because it probably won't come about doesn't mean it wouldn't make life better.

carl
05-17-2007, 12:04 AM
Beyond that, there are quite lucrative markets to feed in Europe, China, Pakistan, Iran, etc. Most Afghan opium makes its way to Europe anyway --- I believe most of our heroin comes by way of Mexico and Colombia.

The ideal is for worldwide legalization, but that won't happen. The European countries are further along that road than we are. But if we were to do it, it would reduce the money available to the killers and at least it wouldn't be American troops thundering around the counryside upsetting the locals.

As far as Columbia goes, it would save the lives of a lot of Columbian officers who are going to get killed dealing with our problem.

VinceC
05-17-2007, 04:51 AM
For Afghan opium, the demand is predominantly in Russia, the former Soviet Republics, and into Western Europe. Pretty tough to eliminate demand in many of those areas.

I've read, with bittersweet irony, several accounts which said the Taliban in its final year of rule, under intense international pressure, was able nearly to halt opium exports. I suppose this was due to their ability to exercise authoritarian and draconian measures against farmers and traffickers.

Tom Odom
05-17-2007, 11:59 AM
Like Carl I see legalization as a solution--painful to be sure--that will ultimately come in one form or another. Fantasy when it comes to the "war on drugs" comes in programs like crop substitution using potatoes in Afghanistan or coffee in Columbia without addressing the demand (and the rewards for meeting that demand).

I know Slap: you think I am touched on this one. But add up the billions spent in the past couple of decades and then please balance the checkbook with a corresponding improvement that justifies that expenditure.

Tom

slapout9
05-17-2007, 12:11 PM
Tom, just a little touched. Awhile back I said almost the same words to the effect unless crop replacement pays the same it is futile. Me and I think it was Merv Benson talked about selling it (opium) to pharmaceutical companies for legal drug usage. There would be a tremendous benefit to that. But finally I said the Afgan drug war is not our war. How many times is the mission in Afgan going to change. 1st it was get OBL and AQ,then the Taliban, now we are going to start spraying round-up on their major cash crop with nothing to replace it long term. When does that new War czar start? He has some work to do.

Tom Odom
05-17-2007, 12:21 PM
Tom, just a little touched. Awhile back I said almost the same words to the effect unless crop replacement pays the same it is futile. Me and I think it was Merv Benson talked about selling it (opium) to pharmaceutical companies for legal drug usage. There would be a tremendous benefit to that. But finally I said the Afgan drug war is not our war. How many times is the mission in Afgan going to change. 1st it was get OBL and AQ,then the Taliban, now we are going to start spraying round-up on their major cash crop with nothing to replace it long term. When does that new War czar start? He has some work to do.


Agree, mate, he does. But we are 5 years beyond where we should be formulating an answer to a problem we have largely ignored (or merely fervently wished would disappear). In those 5 years our answer has been that drugs in Afghanistan are a European problem; it was an expedient response to a problem that only grew until now when we cannot ignore it. The Taliban certainly did not ignore it as a source of funds. I mentioned potatoes above because I actually heard a brief some 2+ years ago that detailed the Brits' potato substitution effort. The briefer--and the audience around me--did not like it when I raised my hand and offered that "those must be some potatoes." Clearly I was supposed to keep drinking the Kool Aid. The War Czar indeed has his work cut out. First step: kick over the Kool Aid dispenser.

Tom

slapout9
05-17-2007, 12:33 PM
Tom, I should have sent or posted a reminder here but I forgot. Monday or Tuesday night on the National Geographic channel they had a great documentary on the drug war and how it worked very successfully in the early W's with what amounted to very effective "border control" what and idea!!! the only aggressive outside the country operations were extraditing major drug king pins to the US. Also had a lot of interviews with former drug dealers and users about how terrible this stuff is(designed to be addictive) this is not the regular stuff that it used to be!! which is why it should not be legalized in the US. I do believe if you are a user it should be decriminalized if you complete a 2 year in custody treatment program. Lou Dobbs talked about this the other night. If you sell the stuff to make money off other people's misery you need to go to jail!!!

SoiCowboy
05-17-2007, 01:09 PM
The War on some Drugs in general is a waste of time, money and people.

The situation in Afghanistan seems superficially similar to the Peruvians dealing with the Shining Path. Army sweeps into control because the peasants generally want to grow their drugs in peace and the army lets them. Government brings in anti drugs operations and the Shining Path sweep back into power. Rinse and repeat.

carl
05-17-2007, 01:33 PM
For Afghan opium, the demand is predominantly in Russia, the former Soviet Republics, and into Western Europe. Pretty tough to eliminate demand in many of those areas.

Why are we trying so hard, expending lives and money, to control their problem for them? Vladimir for one doesn't seem to appreciate our efforts.

carl
05-17-2007, 01:45 PM
Tom, Also had a lot of interviews with former drug dealers and users about how terrible this stuff is(designed to be addictive) this is not the regular stuff that it used to be!! which is why it should not be legalized in the US. I do believe if you are a user it should be decriminalized if you complete a 2 year in custody treatment program....If you sell the stuff to make money off other people's misery you need to go to jail!!!

The stuff was always addictive. If it is more so now, to be brutal about it, it is only a market response to consumer demand. The old unimproved version was just as effective a tool for a person to ruin their lives as the new improved model.

2 years in custody is a jail term by any other name. If we would jail users, it would have to be a certainty in their minds, that might, or might not work. How do you square "decriminalization" with a 2 year term in the pokey?

I don't feel sorry for the people who chose to ruin their lives via drug (or alchohol) use. They ones I've seen who did were never worth saving. To be brutal again, the people we are trying to save aren't worth all the money we are spending, lives we are losing and misery we are enduring trying to save them.

slapout9
05-17-2007, 02:20 PM
carl,decriminalization means you want have a felony rap sheet following you for the rest of your life if you complete the program. The difference in this program and what you might call regular prison was you were either in a job training program or school program during the day and returned to lock up at night. You had to have demonstrated job skills and life supporting skills before you got out of the program.

One of the biggest myths I saw as a cop was this so called magic demand that is built into Americans. It doesn't work that way. Usually happens when a friend gives you free samples and then you become hooked!! Then your friend will start charging you for it and that leads to the long downward spiral.

carl
05-17-2007, 04:47 PM
Right now, simple possesion is effectively decriminalized. If I remember correctly, a felony charge was associated with some indication of intent to sell. Job skills training for dealers doesn't seem like it would be effective.

I think the "magic demand" is built into human nature, especially the human nature of people with weak characters. It is very human to to want to feel good, right now, easy. Weak characters don't see next month or even tomorrow, they see the next hour or so and they want to feel good for that hour. For some it leads to a downward spriral; for others, the rich ones, it doesn't.

The demand is inately human and those who succumb to it are losers in any event so why are we running so hard to get nowhere?

If we were to heavily and immediately penalize simple use, that, I think would be very effective. You get caught with a rock, you go to jail the next day for 3 months guaranteed. Get caught with a joint, 1 month starting now, no exceptions. That sort of thing would get the attention of the user because there would be a very real possibility that his next hour will get fouled up.

A program like that would address the core issue, demand. But our society has not demonstrated a willingness to be that decisive. So since we aren't going to do anything about demand let's do something about the other part of the equation I mentioned, illegality.

slapout9
05-17-2007, 05:00 PM
Right now, simple possession is effectively decriminalized. If I remember correctly, a felony charge was associated with some indication of intent to sell. Job skills training for dealers doesn't seem like it would be effective.

part one:Not in all parts of the country, depends on the "type" of drug (which DEA schedule is the drug on) and "quantity" of drug in order to determine if it is felony possession or not. Possession with intent to sell or distribute is called Trafficking in my part of the Country.

Part two:job skills would probably not have any effect on drug dealers which is why I said they should go to jail.

goesh
05-17-2007, 06:41 PM
Since illegal drug money runs heavily to the top of the pyramid, ideas of legalization won't work since the powers that be will manipulate the counter-political agendas to prevent legalization. For instance, if street drugs can be decriminalized, then prescription drugs should be availble as well to the exclusion of the medical middle men. Drugs are drugs. If it's ok to smoke opium, it then should be ok to take antibiotics at one's sole discretion too.

slapout9
05-17-2007, 06:48 PM
goesh, believe it or not it wasn't to long ago you could do that (in the south) as far as antibiotics were concerned if it was purchased as a veterinary drug. Used be able to by it at the feed store.
Triple agree about drug money running heavy at the top of the pyramid no make that quadruple agree.

carl
05-17-2007, 08:20 PM
For instance, if street drugs can be decriminalized, then prescription drugs should be availble as well to the exclusion of the medical middle men. Drugs are drugs. If it's ok to smoke opium, it then should be ok to take antibiotics at one's sole discretion too.

No fair unslinging the "fallacy of the false alternative". It muddies the waters.

As far as your contention that drugs won't be legalized because the criminals won't let it happen; their political power is but a fraction of that of governments eager for tax money and legitimate companies eager for new market. I don't expect legalization to happen soon, if ever, but not for that reason.

carl
05-17-2007, 08:33 PM
Anyway, to get back to the point of this thread, Afghanistans's drug problem.

From the Afghan villagers point of view, the problem is a lot of foreigners don't want him to grow something that is providing for his family better than anything else. If somehow the foreigners didn't care anymore about what he grew, Afghanistan's drug problem would consist of Afghans who abuse drugs. The Afghans could handle that one without our help.

tequila
05-17-2007, 09:54 PM
Two excellent articles from IWPR about this very issue in Helmand Province, one of the most violent in Afghanistan:

Harvest in Helmand (http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=334828&apc_state=henparr)


It could only happen in Helmand. On April 8, about 60 landowners staged a protest in front of the governor’s compound in Lashkar Gah, the capital of this southern Afghan province.

They were demanding that the local authorities step in to resolve a dispute that was threatening to disrupt the all-important gathering of the opium crop. The hired labourers, who work as sharecroppers, had united to force landowners to give them half of the yield, when the owners insisted that one-fifth was a more reasonable share.

The farm owners wanted the provincial government to mediate.

It might look like democracy in action, except that the Afghan government is supposed to be engaged in a high-profile campaign to eradicate the plant ...


Operation Achilles Heel? (http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=334968&apc_state=henparr)


As international forces in Afghanistan’s Helmand region engage in their biggest offensive yet to drive the Taleban out of the north of the troubled province, everyone agrees the insurgents have not put up much of a fight.

However, IWPR has been told by local residents that the relative calm has little to do with a successful security operation. Instead, they say, the Taleban have staged a tactical withdrawal to prevent the opium harvest being harmed by fighting.

Operation Achilles, which began on March 6, was billed as “the largest multinational combined operation launched to date”, and will eventually involve 4,500 troops from the International Security Force, ISAF, and up to 1,000 Afghan National Security Forces, ANSF.

An ISAF press release issued on April 16 suggested that the tough tactics were working, “Helmand province showing signs of [economic] growth due to increasing security.”

The reason for the improvement, ISAF said, was Operation Achilles.

Helmand residents were left either chuckling or shaking their heads at the suggestion. From their vantage point at ground zero in the conflict, the new phase of relative calm will be temporary.

“There are no big problems in Helmand right now because everyone is busy with the poppy harvest,” said Abdul Halek, from Nawzad district. “The elders have asked the Taleban to leave until the harvest is in, so that NATO does not come and bomb the fields or the harvesters. But I don’t know what will happen afterwards ...”

goesh
05-18-2007, 04:06 PM
What is the fair market value to an Afghan farmer for an acre of his poppy crop? What would it cost to buy the crop at fair market value from the farmer and torch it on the spot/on the vine as they say? Why would the farmer care whether or not addicts get their dope? Why would he care if the middle men don't get to step on the product to pay off their patrons in the upper levels of the food chain? How many hectares are there anyway? To cut out the middle men and their nefarious economic contributions to narco-terrorism and corrupt politicians would leave the middle men no choice but to coerece the farmers back into growing the stuff. The logical choice would be to impliment payment for non production, sort of like the old Soil Bank program in the US years ago. That way the taliban and dealers would essentially have to coerce people into working when they are being paid not to work. Who then would the farmers align themselves with? What's the cost of dealing with the crimes associated with addiction, treatment and prevention and narco terrorism? How much LE budget allocation is sucked up by heroin/opium problems alone? I certainly don't pretend this is going to solve the world's opiate addiction problem but it certainly would help would take a huge hunk out of the taliban's coffers.

slapout9
05-18-2007, 04:17 PM
goesh, you hit upon the problem with your plan when you talk about coercion of the farmers or the more likely option (IMHO) that they would just kill the farmers and install their own sharecroppers.

goesh
05-18-2007, 05:33 PM
Yup, it's a farmer's market all right - the Talimen/buyers would have to give them a higher premium for their crop, say a 10% increase over last year's price and they'd be out with the hoes and donkeys seeding and planting away as usual, then along comes the other side and ups their ante to beat the competition's price. Soon every poppy farmer would have a new 4DW Toyota and lots of other nice things. But on a small scale with a target group in one of the more secure areas, it would be worth a shot simply to see what shakes loose. Such a project would flush out into daylight all kinds of people in the drug food chain offering all kinds of reasons why such a project should not be tried/implemented. It would do that much if nothing else. There is quite a divers crowd between the farmer's market in the field and the addict on the street. I think I saw somewhere in this thread that the Afghan opium trade was valued at 2.6 billion - so what are the farmers getting - 10 million? What would be the buy-out cost at ground level for a target group of farmers? 200K maximum? I don't have a clue

tequila
05-28-2007, 04:06 PM
U.S. under fire over Afghan poppy plan (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ac35906e-0aeb-11dc-8412-000b5df10621.html). - Financial Times, 25 May07.



The US is proceeding with plans for a big crop-spraying programme to destroy opium poppies in Afghanistan, in spite of resistance from the government of President Hamid Karzai and objections from some senior US military officers who fear it will fuel the Taliban insurgency.
A US delegation will soon leave for Kabul to persuade Mr Karzai that glycophate, a herbicide that is widely applied by US farmers, is safe to use and that trial ground-spraying should begin for the first time since the US ousted the Taliban regime in 2001.


But controversy over the proposed spraying is causing rifts within the Nato alliance. Some governments, including Germany, want nothing to do with the eradication programme and are threatening to reconsider their posture in Afghanistan, diplomats say. Afghan security forces trained by Dyncorp, a private US defence contractor, are to carry out the spraying ...

Ski
05-28-2007, 06:53 PM
Has spraying in any of the South American narcotic producing countries worked at all?

tequila
06-05-2007, 08:54 AM
Everyone's a Winner at Helmand's Drug Bazaars (http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=336012&apc_state=henh)- IWPR, 1 June.


... Sayed Gul is new to the retail trade. Until now, he has been a poppy farmer. But lured by the hope of large profits, he decided to sell his own crop this year.

“I got 36 kilos of poppy paste from my land this season, so I decided to go into business,” he told IWPR.

It is a difficult market – Helmand’s farmers have grown so much poppy that prices are down, so buyers like “Hajji Sahib” must be courted assiduously.

Afghanistan is by far the world’s largest producer of opium poppy. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC, the country produced over 90 per cent of the world’s heroin in 2006, with Helmand alone accounting for close to 45 per cent of that figure.

Like most of the other merchants at the Chan Jir bazaar, Sayed Gul is paying the police to leave him alone while he sells his highly illegal wares. The monthly fee for protection hovers around 6,000 Pakistani rupees, or approximately 100 US dollars.

...

Farmers also pay informal “taxes” to police and local officials from the beginning of the process all the way up to the harvest.

“The government makes a lot of money at harvest time,” said Shah Mahmud, 40, a landowner in Nadali. “We paid about 1,500 afghani per jerib to the police not to destroy our poppy during the eradication campaign. Now we’re paying the government to allow us to sell the product without interference - we are giving them 220 grams of poppy paste per jerib.”

...

The arrangements are quite open and operate semi-officially, according to Hajji Aligul, 55, a tribal leader in Nadali.

“I attended a shura [council] where we negotiated with the government,” he told IWPR. “We agreed that we would give 220 grams of poppy paste per jerib. The police commander told us, of course, that if we did not reach agreement, they would take the paste by force.”

...

The Taleban are another major player in the drugs game. While evidence is sketchy, many observers assume that the insurgency is being funded by international drug profits. It is undisputed that the Taleban are receiving funds locally from farmers, shopkeepers, and traffickers.

“Local people collect money for the Taleban,” said Shah Mahmud 40, a landowner in Nadali. “The Taleban contact tribal leaders and say, ‘don’t forget us, we need money too’. Most people give voluntarily.”

Others pay out of fear, say some residents.

But cooperation has been so close that farmers say the Taleban scaled down their “spring offensive” this year so as not to interfere with bringing in the crop.

“It is not beneficial to have fighting during the harvest,” said Shah Mahmud. “The Taleban and the government both receive money from poppy – they lose out if the crop is destroyed by bombing or fighting.”

In several places, villagers have requested that the Taleban leave the area until after the harvest.

“We told the Taleban, ‘This year the government was very good to us and did not destroy our poppy,” said one tribal leader who did not want to give his name. “We said, ‘Stop your fighting during harvest time, otherwise we will turn against you, take up arms against you and kick you out of the area.’”

Najmuddin, 25, a landowner in Zarghon village in Nadali, agreed.

“The Taleban treat us very kindly and we will support them forever,” he told IWPR. “They left so that people could get their harvest in. The government has also treated us kindly, and helped us set up markets where we can sell our poppy ...”

goesh
06-26-2007, 01:49 PM
- that's what the MSN article is reporting. Opium production is up that much from 2005:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19431056/

"U.N.: Opium production soaring in Afghanistan
Nation’s record poppy harvest has boosted global supply to new record high
..
In 2006, Afghanistan accounted for 92 percent of global illicit opium production, up from 70 percent in 2000 and 52 percent a decade earlier. The higher yields in Afghanistan have brought global opium production to a new record high of 6,610 metric tons in 2006, a 43 percent increase over 2005."

that's beau-coup smoke - no wonder the taliban keeps coming across the border in force.

Jedburgh
07-17-2007, 03:30 PM
ISN, 17 Jul 07: Addicted in Afghanistan (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17868)

...Experts warn that high levels of unemployment in Afghanistan, war trauma and wide-scale bereavement are fuelling the population's appetite for the drug.

"Thirty years of war and social disintegration," Dr Suleman says, "have left ordinary Afghans extremely vulnerable to anxiety, chronic depression and post-traumatic stress disorders. And in such a scenario, the easy and cheap availability of opium, heroin and other drugs is creating a rapid dependency on these harmful pharmaceuticals."

For treatment of women, a team of female doctors and counselors from the Nejat Centre visit their homes. The trend of opium uses so entrenched, Nadira Yusuf told ISN Security Watch, a female counselor at the clinic, that women use opium as "medicine" to silence a wailing child, or even alleviate medical conditions such as tuberculosis, asthma or the common cold....

tequila
08-26-2007, 03:48 PM
Taliban Raise Poppy Production to a Record Again (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26heroin.html) - NYTIMES, 25 Aug.


Afghanistan produced record levels of opium in 2007 for the second straight year, led by a staggering 45 percent increase in the Taliban (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=nyt-org) stronghold of Helmand Province, according to a new United Nations (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/u/united_nations/index.html?inline=nyt-org) survey to be released Monday.

The report is likely to touch off renewed debate about the United States’ $600 million counternarcotics program in Afghanistan, which has been hampered by security challenges and endemic corruption within the Afghan government.

“I think it is safe to say that we should be looking for a new strategy,” said William B. Wood, the American ambassador to Afghanistan, commenting on the report’s overall findings. “And I think that we are finding one.”

Mr. Wood said the current American programs for eradication, interdiction and alternative livelihoods should be intensified, but he added that ground spraying poppy crops with herbicide remained “a possibility.” Afghan and British officials have opposed spraying, saying it would drive farmers into the arms of the Taliban.

While the report found that opium production dropped in northern Afghanistan, Western officials familiar with the assessment said, cultivation rose in the south, where Taliban insurgents urge farmers to grow poppies......

Jedburgh
08-28-2007, 01:23 PM
UNODC, 27 Aug 07: Afghanistan: 2007 Annual Opium Poppy Survey (http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf)

In 2007, Afghanistan cultivated 193,000 hectares of opium poppies, an increase of 17% over last year. The amount of Afghan land used for opium is now larger than the corresponding total for coca cultivation in Latin America (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia combined).

Favourable weather conditions produced opium yields (42.5 kg per hectare) higher than last year (37.0 kg/ha). As a result, in 2007 Afghanistan produced an extraordinary 8,200 tons of opium (34% more than in 2006), becoming practically the exclusive supplier of the world’s deadliest drug (93% of the global opiates market). Leaving aside 19th century China, that had a population at that time 15 times larger than today’s Afghanistan, no other country in the world has ever produced narcotics on such a deadly scale.....

Tom Odom
08-28-2007, 04:39 PM
Follow up to Jed and Tequila:


Second Record Level for Afghan Opium Crop (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/28/world/asia/28afghan.html)KABUL, Afghanistan, Aug. 27 — Opium cultivation in Afghanistan grew by 17 percent in 2007, reaching record levels for the second straight year, according to a United Nations report released Monday.

Despite a $600 million American counternarcotics effort and an increase in the number of poppy-free provinces to 13 from 6, the report found that the amount of land in Afghanistan used for opium production is now larger than amount of land used for coca cultivation in all of Latin America.

Afghanistan now accounts for 93 percent of the world’s opium, up from 92 percent last year, the report said.

Antonio Maria Costa, the executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes Policy, which issued the report, called the new figures terrifying. “Afghanistan today is cultivating megacrops of opium,” he said at a news conference. “Leaving aside China in the 19th century, no other country has produced so much narcotics in the past 100 years.”

Dennis
08-28-2007, 05:30 PM
Two issues I'll present:

1) Recognizing the larger monetary return of growing poppy as opposed to another crop, would we necessarily have the desired effect if the money flow to the Taliban is through their protection of farmers and the transport routes? Won't the Taliban continue to get their piece of the pie of another crop?

2) Can we influence the farmers without addressing the land owners and the corruption within the Afghan government?

tequila
08-28-2007, 05:54 PM
U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/90671.pdf)- Aug 07. The official public release. There is a classified release which deals with problems of official corruption that are too sensitive for open discussion.

tequila
09-07-2007, 10:49 AM
How Afghan anticorruption chief once sold heroin in Las Vegas (http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,2157248,00.html)- GUARDIAN, 28 Aug. Passed on via Afghanistica.


Fighting sleaze is no easy task in a country like Afghanistan, as anti-corruption tsar Izzatullah Wasifi can testify. The economy is awash with opium money, and bribery and backhanders are rife, as confirmed by yesterday's alarming UN report.


Then again, Mr Wasifi is unusually well acquainted with the perilous lure of easy drug money.

Twenty years ago US police arrested a young Afghan emigrant at his hotel room in Caesars Palace, Las Vegas. The Afghan, who introduced himself as Mr E, tried to sell a bag of heroin to an undercover detective. At his trial, prosecutors said it was worth $2m.

The man spent three years and eight months in a Nevada state prison before being released on parole. His wife, who had stood lookout in the hotel corridor, received a probationary sentence.

Now Mr E - or Mr Wasifi - is the director general of the Afghan government's main anti-corruption agency.

He plays down the 1988 drug bust as a little youthful fun gone wrong. "It was my honeymoon. I was a youngster and youngsters do stuff," he said with a shrug during an interview at his modest Kabul office. "Stuff like gambling, drugs" - he rubbed a finger against his nose and sniffed - "and girls. I was a Las Vegas boy ..."


The rest of the article has good details on the massive corruption ongoing in Kabul which is undermining the war effort.

Culpeper
09-08-2007, 04:58 AM
Isn't marijuana the largest revenue producing cash crop in Alabama, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia? In fact, it is the #4 cash crop in the United States. Only corn, soybean, and hay being more profitable to the American farmer. This is one area in a country such as Afghanistan where we have and will never have any amount of measured control to change an outcome.

sgmgrumpy
10-03-2007, 10:24 AM
Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy Updated September 14, 2007 (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf)


In addition to describing the structure of the Afghan narcotics trade, this report provides current statistical information, profiles the narcotics trade’s participants, explores narco-terrorist linkages, and reviews U.S. and international policy responses since late 2001. The report also considers current policy debates regarding the counternarcotics roles of the U.S. military, poppy eradication, alternative livelihoods, and funding issues for Congress. The report will be updated to reflect major developments. For more information on Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

tequila
10-08-2007, 03:52 PM
U.S. renews bid to destroy opium poppies in Afghanistan (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/world/asia/08spray.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print)- NYTIMES, 8 Oct. Ground spraying raises its head again. Can someone explain to me a good case for spraying? Because the negatives for COIN and population legitimacy seem screamingly obvious.


After the biggest opium harvest in Afghanistan’s history, American officials have renewed efforts to persuade the government here to begin spraying herbicide on opium poppies, and they have found some supporters within President Hamid Karzai (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/hamid_karzai/index.html?inline=nyt-per)’s administration, officials of both countries said.

Since early this year, Mr. Karzai has repeatedly declared his opposition to spraying the poppy fields, whether by crop-dusting airplanes or by eradication teams on the ground.

But Afghan officials said the Karzai administration is now re-evaluating that stance. Some proponents within the government are pushing a trial program of ground spraying that could begin before the harvest next spring.

The issue has created sharp divisions within the Afghan government, among its Western allies and even American officials of different agencies. The matter is fraught with political danger for Mr. Karzai, whose hold on power is weak ...

carl
10-09-2007, 06:14 AM
I don't think ground spraying would mean much. The Afghans could slow things down enough so that it would have only a marginal effect. But the article seems to suggest the ultimate goal is aerial spraying. Aerial spraying would not be a good thing.

Spraying is great for American politicians and functionaries. They can stand in front of a TV camera and courageously state they are DOING something about the drug problem. Pictures of airplanes spraying fields make great backdrops for this kind of photo op.

tequila
10-16-2007, 03:46 PM
Helmand drug profits fund alms for the poor (http://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=339897&apc_state=henh)- IWPR, 16 Oct. Unsurprising.


Drug traffickers in the war-torn Helmand province have been winning public support by distributing some of their ill-gotten gains to the poor during the fasting month of Ramadan.

Many people interviewed by IWPR said the traffickers had given out food and clothing to some of Helmand’s neediest families during the holy month and the Eid al-Fitr festival which marks its end.

“May God bless them [the traffickers],”said Faizullah, a resident of the Washir district, which has been under Taleban control for over six months. “People have been very happy during Ramadan. The traffickers have helped us in many ways, like giving out clothes for Eid, distributing food and other things.”

The growing Taleban insurgency in Helmand has proved a boon to the drugs trade, since government eradicators cannot get into many areas to monitor or destroy the opium poppy crop. The chaos has kept out aid agencies and prevented any meaningful development from taking place, something that has caused resentment and anger among local people.

In return for protection, drug traffickers are believed to be providing money and weapons to the Taleban.

One smuggler in Washir, who did not want to be named, said he had distributed goods worth 200,000 Pakistani rupees, or 3,300 US dollars, in the last four weeks. The rupee is in common use in this southern province, often edging out the national currency, the afghani.

“I distributed [charity] to the poor in the shape of food and clothing during the holy month of Ramadan,” said the smuggler. “We are Muslims and we are obliged to give alms. I gave most of it to the poor, and a small amount to the Taleban who are fighting for Islam ...”

jonSlack
10-18-2007, 11:40 AM
New Scientist - Grass-munching bugs could charge rural phones (http://technology.newscientist.com/article/dn12731)


To tackle the problem, a team of students from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, US, has designed a microbial fuel cell (MFC) that runs on plant waste. Their prototype won the $5,000 first prize in a contest called MADMEC, which was sponsored by Dow Chemical to encourage new uses of materials that allow alternative or non-traditional sources of energy.

...

MFCs use electrons released by feeding bacteria on sugars, starches, and other organic material, to produce electricity.

Wildcat
10-30-2007, 06:53 PM
Opium Funding Up To 40 Percent of Afghan Unrest: U.S. General (http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3119850&C=america)


Army Gen. Dan McNeill, head of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), added he had been told by an international expert that this figure was likely low and could reach up to 60 percent.

”It is my best subjective estimate that the insurgency enjoys fiscal resources from the cultivation of poppy probably to the level of 20 to 40 percent of its total fiscal resources,” the general told journalists.

The cultivation of opium — 93 percent of which comes from Afghanistan, according to the United Nations — is undermining everything the government and its international allies were trying to do, he said.

Despite internationally-backed efforts to cut the drugs trade, Afghanistan’s opium production grew by 34 percent this year, according to a U.N. survey.

Michael Yon has more on this.

The Perfect Evil: Coming to Roost (http://michaelyon-online.com/wp/the-perfect-evil-coming-to-roost.htm)


I have characterized Afghanistan as little more than a hunting lodge for our special operations forces. Since the Afghan campaign has been largely a special forces war from the beginning, we have been able to transition with great secrecy from near victory, to abysmal performance, to what has now become a sustainable human-hunting resort. Our special operations forces are out there hunting Taliban and al Qaeda, outside of public view—although it appears that “the public” is hardly clamoring for news from Afghanistan—while the country devolves into the consummate narco-state.

goesh
10-31-2007, 05:04 PM
I don't know how extensive the eradicate and pay 'em program was - I sense it was mostly experimental. Therapy and treatment isn't working too well at home for the end users, drug money runs to the top and the Geneva Conventions and the Constitution won't allow the slaying of drug smugglers. Drugs get the money, money gets the guns, guns get the power and we can't even make them an offer they can't refuse like Vito Corleone did.

marct
12-06-2007, 01:25 PM
From CBC.ca


Think-tank suggests Afghans grow ingredient in anti-malarial drugs
Last Updated: Wednesday, December 5, 2007 | 12:21 PM ET
CBC News

A security and development policy group wants to add another option to its Poppy for Medicine Proposal, a initiative announced earlier in 2007 intended to encourage Afghan farmers to use their fields to grow drugs other than opium.

More... (http://www.cbc.ca/story/health/national/2007/12/05/afghan-farmers.html)

More on the Poppy For Medicine proposals here (http://poppyformedicine.net/).

Rank amateur
01-24-2008, 05:33 PM
A key step in a successful COIN effort is forcing the population to choose sides.

Economically, they have no choice but to go with the side that buys their opium. I heard one of the CNN generals say that we should buy opium from the population and use it to make morphine. I think that is about the only thing that might solve the problem.

davidbfpo
01-24-2008, 10:08 PM
One of the factors that undermines Western involvement in Afghanistan, well at least those who in the frontline, are the occassional pictures of troops amdst fields of opium poppies and the public knowledge the heroin is heading home. Even with opponents of the UK's role this causes bewilderment.

Hence the byline a "War on Drugs" in one place, e.g Caribbean and "Protect the Poppy" in Afghanistan.

Good knows what the impact is on those serving there.

Personally I've long believed we should each year buy the crop and then mix it in bitumen for road construction. When I was in NWFP years ago the UN drug adviser I met reported 3k tones p.a. were being produced in Afghanistan; the only time production dropped was when the Taliban imposed a ban.

davidbfpo

oakfox
02-06-2008, 02:50 PM
Interesting idea.. buying all the poppy? How would you consider convincing an Afghan that you would stay long enough to keep buying the opium longer than drug barons?

"Fortunate" for us that the average Afghan cannot read western newspapers otherwise he would realize that the West is unwilling to make a long term commitment (see reports regarding the Canadian parliament).

(Although I completely understand the Canadian position).

Rex Brynen
02-06-2008, 03:02 PM
Interesting idea.. buying all the poppy? How would you consider convincing an Afghan that you would stay long enough to keep buying the opium longer than drug barons?

I shudder to think of the leakage, fraud and corruption that would result if you had millions of dollars having to paid out to rural farmers, and tons of poppy to be collected and destroyed. I suspect much of the former would end up in the wrong pockets, and much of the latter would enter the market anyway (or be repeatedly resold).

Rank amateur
02-06-2008, 07:55 PM
Not to mention that if you start buying up supply while other demand stays the same - and the demand from heroin addicts isn't going to decrease - you push up the price, which means that the Taliban will be paying "their" farmers even more than the farmer makes now.

Nonetheless, I do not see how you can create an "inkspot" in certain parts of the country without agreeing to buy their most lucrative cash crop. (Opium makes up a huge percentage of the GDP. You can't replace that with a series of $300 microloans.) And we do need some opium. Lots of patients get a morphine drip at the hospital.

Stan
02-06-2008, 10:14 PM
Interesting idea.. buying all the poppy? How would you consider convincing an Afghan that you would stay long enough to keep buying the opium longer than drug barons?

"Fortunate" for us that the average Afghan cannot read western newspapers otherwise he would realize that the West is unwilling to make a long term commitment (see reports regarding the Canadian parliament).

(Although I completely understand the Canadian position).

Hmmm, why do you conclude the farmers wouldn't sell their cash crop to the first person that rolled in with cash, regardless of how long the 'client' was around for ? I think the language issue is long gone, and these folks communicate sufficiently enough to conduct daily transactions.

I agree with Rex. Air on the side of caution...Such a mission is not a soldier's, nor should it be considering the already full plate they have. I really like Rank amateur's recent post -- buy out the competition and pump the price up well out of the reach of criminals, and, make the client's life living hell (but save a smiggin for those on the drip canisters).

Ya know Oakfox, I've asked you several times to introduce yourself on the Dumped German Ordnance Thread. It's hard to take you seriously with no background to support your claims and opinions with :mad:

marct
02-07-2008, 03:36 PM
Hi RA,


Not to mention that if you start buying up supply while other demand stays the same - and the demand from heroin addicts isn't going to decrease - you push up the price, which means that the Taliban will be paying "their" farmers even more than the farmer makes now.... You can't replace that with a series of $300 microloans.) And we do need some opium. Lots of patients get a morphine drip at the hospital.

I'm just wondering if anyone else is getting a desire to pick up a package of Head On ("APPLIED DIRECTLY TO THE FOREHEAD!!!!! - Gods I hate that commercial!)? I wish Tom OC would comment on this since he knows more about criminology than I do, but there appears to be a direct correlation between demand, making something illegal and price. Thinking back to the Volstead Act and the 18th Amendment to the US Constitution I really have to wonder who, outside of organized crime,benefited? Come on folks, back to some basic economics - if you want to reduce the price on a product then destroy the monopoly that runs it; in this case, it is a monopoly supported by various governments and given to various and sundry "drug lords". Legalize them and watch the bottom fall out of the market.

Marc

Rank amateur
02-10-2008, 10:40 PM
Hi Marc:

Never going to happen, but I do think we need an economist or two on the council. COIN and nation building distorts markets and I think that the results are relatively predictable. It'd be nice to know the results in advance, instead of waiting to see what happens.

Jedburgh
02-29-2008, 01:19 PM
The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor, 26 Feb 08:

Russia, Afghanistan and the Drug Trade (http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372833)

Alarmed by the rise of opium cultivation in Afghanistan, Russia’s Federal Drug Enforcement Service has opened a permanent office in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Federal Drug Enforcement Service Director Alexei Milovanov said of the move, “Russia advances cooperation and interaction with Afghanistan in the war on drug production and proliferation…As for the office in Kabul, our representative there will be in charge of efficient interaction between Russian and Afghani structures dealing with trafficking. With an emphasis, needless to say, on what channels lead to Russia. All of that will be carried out in close cooperation with our Central Asian colleagues.”

Milovanov also suggested that Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan establish border checkpoints and customs offices and make a joint effort to draw up an international agreement to track and confiscate drug trafficking profits.....

Eden
02-29-2008, 05:53 PM
A few things to remember when thinking about poppies in Afghanistan. My last tour ended in early '07, but I think I'm still fairly current.

1. With a very few exceptions, the insurgents are not using the drug lords for support - they are working for them. It's the second job they have to support their fight against infidels and the tribe pissing in the river upstream. They provide security, intelligence, and muscle. In return, the drug lords allow a few crumbs to fall in their plates. It is not narco-terrorism on the Columbia model.

2. The drug lords - who are often also into weapons and human trafficking - have no great problem with NATO, so long as interference in their trade is limited to a few photo ops. Any concerted effort to do more will trigger violence on a scale far greater than that seen recently, and across the country. Just ask the Iranians what happened when they seriously attempted to interfere with trafficking across their borders.

3. Buying up the supply is a simple solution, but probably not an effective one. First, see paragraph 2. The drug lords won't stand idly by. Second, as has been pointed out, even if it is successful, it will merely push production outward. Do we want to solve the problem in Afghanistan by destabilizing one of the other 'stans, at least one of which has nuclear weapons?

Not to sound negative, but the tone of some posts is that there are easy solutions out there being ignored. There aren't, only long, hard, costly solutions.

Jedburgh
03-21-2008, 12:26 PM
Chatham House's The World Today, Apr 08: Afghanistan - Drugs: Hard Habit to Break (http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/download/-/id/1614)

....Those who benefit from the opium trade have a vested interest in seeing the continuation of the insurgency in the south. Perpetual conflict there will derail progress in other parts of the country. At their meeting in Bucharest, leaders may fixate on the ‘the military burden’ but the first step to stability lies in addressing Afghanistan’s corrosive opium dependence. The only certainty is that it will be a long and hard road, with no quick fixes.

davidbfpo
03-21-2008, 12:51 PM
Excellent short article and perhaps a few here in the UK government will read it. I still think buying the opium closer to the producer is an option, before conversion to heroin. The merchants and local officials will still make money.
Oh yes, then we burn the damm stuff or mix it with tarmac for new roads.

davidbfpo

Paul Smyth
03-21-2008, 02:39 PM
When I've asked people involved in the Afghan endeavour the following question I have not received a compelling reply:

Which is the greatest threat to the long-term security of the Afghan government/nation:

a. the insurgency in the south of the country, or
b. illicit narcotics?

I suggest this question is important as the international CN and COIN efforts overlap and can conflict. If the answer is 'a', then the CN campaign should sit within a broader COIN strategy; if the answer is 'b', then the COIN campaign should accord with a larger CN strategy. Which one sets the context for the other?

Eden
03-21-2008, 03:32 PM
Clearly COIN is currently taking precedence, but the reason why that is is complicated.

At ISAF headquarters, the long-term threat of narcotics was (and still is, I assume - I left there last year) clearly recognized. However, the increased violence and decreased Afghan support for NATO pursuant to a serious CN effort had to be avoided. Why? Because the coalition in Afghanistan was barely being held together. Several major contributors were very leery about allowing 'their' region to become more violent. They feared that NATO involvement in CN would lead to their troops becoming targets. Many had caveats specifically exempting them from CN. Therefore, any CN effort had to be Afghan-led and executed, and the Afghans were both unable and unwilling to mount anything more than photo-op missions.

On the other hand, for political reasons and domestic consumption, no one could say that they were going to ignore narcotic trafficking. So you would have statements to the effect that it simply couldn't be tackled until the security situation improved (only partially true in some areas), and the trumpeting of a few 'replacement livelihood' programs that were desperately underfunded and of dubious effectiveness.

The truth is that NATO is unwilling to tackle CN and that some nations are more interested in being seen to participate than they are in actually improving conditions in Afghanistan. The more dedicated NATO members recognize they can only ask so much of their less willing partners if they are to sustain any sort of effort at all. It is not, I believe, the first time that politicians and generals have preferred short-term benefits to long-term gains. These are truths that are unspeakable, of course, which is why you have been unable to get a satisfactory answer to your question.

slapout9
03-22-2008, 04:36 PM
A few things to remember when thinking about poppies in Afghanistan. My last tour ended in early '07, but I think I'm still fairly current.

1. With a very few exceptions, the insurgents are not using the drug lords for support - they are working for them. It's the second job they have to support their fight against infidels and the tribe pissing in the river upstream. They provide security, intelligence, and muscle. In return, the drug lords allow a few crumbs to fall in their plates. It is not narco-terrorism on the Columbia model.

2. The drug lords - who are often also into weapons and human trafficking - have no great problem with NATO, so long as interference in their trade is limited to a few photo ops. Any concerted effort to do more will trigger violence on a scale far greater than that seen recently, and across the country. Just ask the Iranians what happened when they seriously attempted to interfere with trafficking across their borders.

3. Buying up the supply is a simple solution, but probably not an effective one. First, see paragraph 2. The drug lords won't stand idly by. Second, as has been pointed out, even if it is successful, it will merely push production outward. Do we want to solve the problem in Afghanistan by destabilizing one of the other 'stans, at least one of which has nuclear weapons?

Not to sound negative, but the tone of some posts is that there are easy solutions out there being ignored. There aren't, only long, hard, costly solutions.


Eden I think your post was excellant very good analysis... from my armchair as davidbfpo says.
I have been out of the loop on Intel for quite a few years now but here is some real wisdom here. However I agree with davidbfpo about buying the crop (which is not a new startegy) in this case it is worth the shot.

Billy Ruffian
03-23-2008, 06:42 AM
Interesting idea.. buying all the poppy? How would you consider convincing an Afghan that you would stay long enough to keep buying the opium longer than drug barons?

"Fortunate" for us that the average Afghan cannot read western newspapers otherwise he would realize that the West is unwilling to make a long term commitment (see reports regarding the Canadian parliament).

(Although I completely understand the Canadian position).

We're even more divided than you might think on this issue. I would argue that Canadians, myself included, are a very compassionate people (as all soft socialists are) who want to see the job get done... well... one half only will fulfill that just so long as no one's feelings get hurt. The other half, I would again argue, wants to get 'Cowboy' on the Taleban/Narco-Lord individuals.

We're a very divided people on this issue.

We've all spoken alot about just buying up the crop from the farmers, but has anyone in the ISAF, NATO or UN hierarchy actually seriously tried to implement this? If we were able to deliver pain-killer medicine to Afghans with a label that said 'Proudly grown in Afghanistan', wouldn't that help us out a little?

Paul Smyth
03-25-2008, 12:43 PM
This issue keeps running, primarily championed by the Senlis Council. On the surface it seems logical but I suspect the argument receives far more prominence that it deserves. Why? because:

- there may be a debate about whether there is a global shortage of opiates.

- a key tenet of the proposal to legitimately farm poppy is that the Afghans would self-regulate its production. Thus, farmers would only grow their allotted amount of poppy. This system would not be effective in a corrupt environment.

- little thought is given to the reaction of drug barons and the insurgents who currently profit from the illicit opium market.

- even if a self-regulating system could be implemented, the cultivated opium would not be produced for the illicit heroin market. Continued demand would fuel the requirement for illicit farming.

- if legalizing opium would suddenly remove the profit incentive, why is there a multi-million (£/$/Euro) market in illicit tobacco products?

- the continued cultivation of poppy will do little to ease the chronic effects of opiate production on the populations in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Too often we ignore the damaging and corrosive effects of opium in the Region.

- the eventual solution is to remove poppy as a crop of choice. Paying farmers to grow it does not promote that outcome. :(

Ron Humphrey
03-25-2008, 12:55 PM
.

- little thought is given to the reaction of drug barons and the insurgents who currently profit from the illicit opium market.(

Actually one thing about war is that if one manages to get the criminals to side with the enemy then there is a greater percentage of them dealt with through attrition vs court systems


.
- the continued cultivation of poppy will do little to ease the chronic effects of opiate production on the populations in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Too often we ignore the damaging and corrosive effects of opium in the Region. :(

This may be but can we find an example historically where quitting cold turkey actually worked out in the long run with this sort of thing?


.
- the eventual solution is to remove poppy as a crop of choice. Paying farmers to grow it does not promote that outcome. :(

Although it's no guarantee sometimes the only way to get a different product on the market is through hostile takeover of the product line. Not sure what the best way to do this is but on one of these threads I tried to lay out an idea. I'll try to find it.

Got It-

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4816

selil
03-25-2008, 02:32 PM
- if legalizing opium would suddenly remove the profit incentive, why is there a multi-million (£/$/Euro) market in illicit tobacco products?


Exactly!!!

It's NOT a multi BILLION Euro market in illicit tobacco because it ain't illegal.

Paul Smyth
03-25-2008, 03:03 PM
And it is a major problem. E.g. a quote from British American Tobacco (http://www.bat.com/group/sites/uk__3mnfen.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO6TNKVW?opendocument&SKN=3&TMP=1):

Illicit trade is not just the work of small operators. Organised crime is increasingly dominant. The rewards can be high. A single 40 foot long container (8.5 million cigarettes) smuggled into the UK and sold at half the recommended retail price could net the criminals around US$2 million in profit.

and (http://www.ash.org.uk/ash_20gyvtb9.htm):
It has been estimated that illicit trade accounted for 10.7 percent of global cigarette sales in 2006, or about 600 billion cigarettes. This analysis found that the illicit tobacco trade deprives governments of $US 40-50 billion in tax revenue each year, greater than the GDPs of two-thirds of the world's countries.
Source: All Africa, 13 February 2008
Link: http://tinyurl.com/2gqwpm

There is also a global nmarket for counterfeit pharmacuticals. If Afghan Opium was suddenly legalized, it would presumably open up a new opportunity for illicit activity.

P

jonSlack
05-14-2008, 10:12 PM
Newsweek - The Opium Brides of Afghanistan (http://www.newsweek.com/id/129577)


Khalida's father says she's 9—or maybe 10. As much as Sayed Shah loves his 10 children, the functionally illiterate Afghan farmer can't keep track of all their birth dates. Khalida huddles at his side, trying to hide beneath her chador and headscarf. They both know the family can't keep her much longer. Khalida's father has spent much of his life raising opium, as men like him have been doing for decades in the stony hillsides of eastern Afghanistan and on the dusty southern plains. It's the only reliable cash crop most of those farmers ever had. Even so, Shah and his family barely got by: traffickers may prosper, but poor farmers like him only subsist. Now he's losing far more than money. "I never imagined I'd have to pay for growing opium by giving up my daughter," says Shah.

The family's heartbreak began when Shah borrowed $2,000 from a local trafficker, promising to repay the loan with 24 kilos of opium at harvest time. Late last spring, just before harvest, a government crop-eradication team appeared at the family's little plot of land in Laghman province and destroyed Shah's entire two and a half acres of poppies. Unable to meet his debt, Shah fled with his family to Jalalabad, the capital of neighboring Nangarhar province. The trafficker found them anyway and demanded his opium. So Shah took his case before a tribal council in Laghman and begged for leniency. Instead, the elders unanimously ruled that Shah would have to reimburse the trafficker by giving Khalida to him in marriage. Now the family can only wait for the 45-year-old drugrunner to come back for his prize. Khalida wanted to be a teacher someday, but that has become impossible. "It's my fate," the child says.

Afghans disparagingly call them "loan brides"—daughters given in marriage by fathers who have no other way out of debt. The practice began with the dowry a bridegroom's family traditionally pays to the bride's father in tribal Pashtun society. These days the amount ranges from $3,000 or so in poorer places like Laghman and Nangarhar to $8,000 or more in Helmand, Afghanistan's No. 1 opium-growing province. For a desperate farmer, that bride price can be salvation—but at a cruel cost. Among the Pashtun, debt marriage puts a lasting stain on the honor of the bride and her family. It brings shame on the country, too. President Hamid Karzai recently told the nation: "I call on the people [not to] give their daughters for money; they shouldn't give them to old men, and they shouldn't give them in forced marriages."

Ron Humphrey
05-14-2008, 11:55 PM
Newsweek - The Opium Brides of Afghanistan (http://www.newsweek.com/id/129577)

This seems like the perfect job for a Negotiator. You know wait for him to show up to claim the girl and make "him an offer he can't refuse"

It is sad that this happens but it's been going on for a long time there and many other places.

The only way it ever changes is by finding other options for those involved and sometimes thats culturally limited.

negotiator6
05-20-2008, 07:09 PM
Mid-May of 2003 on a three day trip to the Pakistan-Afgh border, we passed through valley after valley of poppy fields. Beautiful as the manicured fields were fed by the melting ice of snow packs as high as 11,500 feet. And we were at nearly 10,000 feet. The valleys are such that low flying aircraft would have just one pass. On the hilltops are 12.7mm (50 cal size) weapons.

These fields that reap so much damage to society are worked by share croppers, but owned by those who live in Hong Kong, London, Lahore....and perhaps a few in Kabul.

How to resolve this problem...this serious problem is yet to be determined. But, see the faces of the people, they are as addicted to growing poppy as the addicts who use the end product.

Try to make that trip today...no way. (Gardez, Paki border-northern Khwost Province...down through Jaji to Khwost in the southern portion, then the Kwost-Gardez "hiway" back to FOB Gardez...then the following day to Ghazni..(my back still hurts from that trip...)

Ken White
05-20-2008, 11:47 PM
the bod -- if not now, soon; LINK (http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Article.308.aspx).

davidbfpo
06-11-2008, 09:17 PM
Here is a different angle: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...14&ft=1&f=1001

Summary - An excellent illustration of how providing alternative livelihoods for Afghan poppy-growing farmers is stymied not just by the Taliban, but by government corruption and weak institutions: a group of foreign and local businessmen – including noted Afghan expert Barnett Rubin – have been frustrated in their efforts to launch a small-scale perfume industry in eastern Afghanistan.

Additional comments by Mr Rubin: http://icga.blogspot.com/2008/01/err...ium-poppy.html

davidbfpo

(Moved here - the correct thread!)

Surferbeetle
06-12-2008, 03:55 PM
From yesterday's BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7449532.stm)


Afghan police working with British special forces have uncovered a drugs stash of 237 tonnes of hashish.

Afghan and British officials say they believe it to be the world's biggest seizure of drugs in terms of weight.


Afghan and British officials said the hashish had a value of more than $400m (£203m).

Tom Odom
06-27-2008, 01:24 PM
You can download the full report here:

UN 2008 World Drug Report (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/pdf/world_drug_report.pdf?sid=ST2008062601924&pos=list)


Here is the relevant chart on Afghanistan. There is but a single negative production figure, that of farm price for dry opium suggesting that higher production has driven down price.

Rex Brynen
07-24-2008, 03:37 AM
Is Afghanistan a Narco-State? (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/magazine/27AFGHAN-t.html?pagewanted=1&hp)

By THOMAS SCHWEICH
New York Times Magazine
Published: July 27, 2008


On March 1, 2006, I met Hamid Karzai for the first time. It was a clear, crisp day in Kabul. The Afghan president joined President and Mrs. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Ambassador Ronald Neumann to dedicate the new United States Embassy. He thanked the American people for all they had done for Afghanistan. I was a senior counternarcotics official recently arrived in a country that supplied 90 percent of the world’s heroin. I took to heart Karzai’s strong statements against the Afghan drug trade. That was my first mistake.

Over the next two years I would discover how deeply the Afghan government was involved in protecting the opium trade — by shielding it from American-designed policies. While it is true that Karzai’s Taliban enemies finance themselves from the drug trade, so do many of his supporters. At the same time, some of our NATO allies have resisted the anti-opium offensive, as has our own Defense Department, which tends to see counternarcotics as other people’s business to be settled once the war-fighting is over. The trouble is that the fighting is unlikely to end as long as the Taliban can finance themselves through drugs — and as long as the Kabul government is dependent on opium to sustain its own hold on power.

Ken White
07-24-2008, 04:26 AM
Reads like he's getting one.

He says in summation:
"1. Inform President Karzai that he must stop protecting drug lords and narco-farmers or he will lose U.S. support. Karzai should issue a new decree of zero tolerance for poppy cultivation during the coming growing season. He should order farmers to plant wheat, and guarantee today’s high wheat prices. Karzai must simultaneously authorize aggressive force-protected manual and aerial eradication of poppies in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces for those farmers who do not plant legal crops.

2. Order the Pentagon to support this strategy. Position allied and Afghan troops in places that create security pockets so that Afghan counternarcotics police can arrest powerful drug lords. Enable force-protected eradication with the Afghan-set goal of eradicating 50,000 hectares as the benchmark.

3. Increase the number of D.E.A. agents in Kabul and assist the Afghan attorney general in prosecuting key traffickers and corrupt government officials from all ethnic groups, including southern Pashtuns.

4. Get new development projects quickly to the provinces that become poppy-free or stay poppy free. The north should see significant rewards for its successful anticultivation efforts. Do not, however, provide cash to farmers for eradication.

5. Ask the allies either to help in this effort or stand down and let us do the job.

There are other initiatives that could help as well: better engagement of Afghanistan’s neighbors, more drug-treatment centers in Afghanistan, stopping the flow into Afghanistan of precursor chemicals needed to make heroin and increased demand-reduction programs. But if we — the Afghans and the U.S. — do just the five items listed above, we will bring the rule of law to a lawless country; and we will cut off a key source of financing to the Taliban."to which I suggest:

1. That's not laughable but it is sad. Extremely unlikely to happen for several reasons and if it does, the blowback will be horrendous. Welcome to South Asia...

2. That can be done. Well, could be done. But. Since the Pentagon, that bastion of evil, is aware of what that will mean to their troops, they'll resist it. If a politician gives the order, it might happen -- and said politician would not be the one who took the flak over the sudden increase in casualties, the folks in the Five Sided bit of Arlington County know that, ergo...

3. That has some merit as long as realistic expectations are maintained.

4. Ditto the comment above.

5. Unlikely to happen, if asked, most will steer clear of any 'help' for the same reasons they have avoided helping in the past. Put too much pressure on them -- and, well, many would be happy to leave Afghanistan anyway...

The other suggestions are also good and achievable but any dream of bringing the rule of law to Afghanistan in less than a generation or two is I believe regrettably deluded. I know we're American and we like to fix things and do it quickly; but some things and some places just won't play along.

Darksaga
07-24-2008, 08:04 AM
There has been some research based on a Purdue University study that examined hemp growth for industrial purposes. Some groups have been looking at that as a way to curb the opium and marijuana production by building an industrial infrastructure around hemp grown for that purpose.

Eden
07-24-2008, 12:08 PM
Any concerted anti-poppy campaign would significantly increase the level of violence in the country, particularly in the northern and western parts of the country that the uninformed believe are 'success' stories. They are quiescent at best, largely due to the ineffectiveness of government and Afghan forces in those regions.

Also to be considered is the fact that poppy is especially suited to the current conditions in Afghanistan. Until the irrigation system is rebuilt, along with an infrastructure that allows for transportation, storage, and refrigeration, the choice of crops will remain sharply circumscribed for the average farmer.

Tom Odom
07-24-2008, 12:48 PM
There has been some research based on a Purdue University study that examined hemp growth for industrial purposes. Some groups have been looking at that as a way to curb the opium and marijuana production by building an industrial infrastructure around hemp grown for that purpose.

OK and what is the market for hemp? Kenya once was the hemp production point for the British Empire but as the use of hemp ropes and lines died at sea so did the production of hemp.

The Brits have tried potatoes in Afganistan as a crop replacement and other staples have been tested. The bottom line is they--like coffee for Juan Valdez in Colombia--do not come close to paying as well.

What Eden said is worth repeating:

Clearly COIN is currently taking precedence, but the reason why that is is complicated.

At ISAF headquarters, the long-term threat of narcotics was (and still is, I assume - I left there last year) clearly recognized. However, the increased violence and decreased Afghan support for NATO pursuant to a serious CN effort had to be avoided. Why? Because the coalition in Afghanistan was barely being held together. Several major contributors were very leery about allowing 'their' region to become more violent. They feared that NATO involvement in CN would lead to their troops becoming targets. Many had caveats specifically exempting them from CN. Therefore, any CN effort had to be Afghan-led and executed, and the Afghans were both unable and unwilling to mount anything more than photo-op missions.

On the other hand, for political reasons and domestic consumption, no one could say that they were going to ignore narcotic trafficking. So you would have statements to the effect that it simply couldn't be tackled until the security situation improved (only partially true in some areas), and the trumpeting of a few 'replacement livelihood' programs that were desperately underfunded and of dubious effectiveness.

The truth is that NATO is unwilling to tackle CN and that some nations are more interested in being seen to participate than they are in actually improving conditions in Afghanistan. The more dedicated NATO members recognize they can only ask so much of their less willing partners if they are to sustain any sort of effort at all. It is not, I believe, the first time that politicians and generals have preferred short-term benefits to long-term gains. These are truths that are unspeakable, of course, which is why you have been unable to get a satisfactory answer to your question.


As Ken says, welcome to South Asia.

Rex Brynen
07-24-2008, 03:57 PM
As Ken says, welcome to South Asia.

Yes, I agree too. I was quite dumbfounded that anyone with even a faint understanding of either the politics or geostrategic stakes thought this was remotely possible:


Inform President Karzai that he must stop protecting drug lords and narco-farmers or he will lose U.S. support.


Get tougher? Maybe. Probably. Withdraw all US support? :eek:

Ken White
07-24-2008, 04:23 PM
law enforcement type, he's obviously smart and aggressive. And he's an American. I think that latter fact gets in the way of the former attributes. We like to get things done, believe that wrongs must be righted and are generally pretty up-front in our dealings. Not popular attitudes in much of the world and we always have difficulty accepting that fact. Egos again... :wry:

I also think his experience with Colombia probably clouded the issue. Afghans are NOT Colombians :eek:

Darksaga
07-25-2008, 04:15 AM
OK and what is the market for hemp? Kenya once was the hemp production point for the British Empire but as the use of hemp ropes and lines died at sea so did the production of hemp.

The Brits have tried potatoes in Afganistan as a crop replacement and other staples have been tested. The bottom line is they--like coffee for Juan Valdez in Colombia--do not come close to paying as well.



Here is the link to the Purdue report.

http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/ncnu02/v5-284.html

Tom Odom
07-25-2008, 12:04 PM
Here is the link to the Purdue report.

http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/ncnu02/v5-284.html

Good report and interesting. Seems to me though that the proposed industry assumes a benign security environment, a functioning commercial structure, and an accepted, practiced, and functional government to support such an endeavor. None of those assumptions apply to Afghanistan and are not likely to in the next decade.

Tom

Entropy
08-04-2008, 01:48 PM
Interesting report here (http://monocle.com/sections/affairs/Web-Articles/Narcotecture-in-Afghanistan/) showing how Afghanistan's nouveau-rich are stylin'

bismark17
08-04-2008, 04:40 PM
Fitting example of how we will never be able to compete with the other side in the "war" on drugs as we currently wage it.

bourbon
11-27-2008, 06:04 PM
U.N. Reports That Taliban Is Stockpiling Opium (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/28/world/middleeast/28opium.html), By KIRK KRAEUTLER. The New York Times, November 27, 2008.

UNITED NATIONS — Afghanistan has produced so much opium in recent years that the Taliban are cutting back poppy cultivation and stockpiling raw opium in an effort to support prices and preserve a major source of financing for the insurgency, Antonio Maria Costa, the head of the United Nations drug office, says.

Mr. Costa made his remarks to reporters last week as his office prepared to release its latest survey of Afghanistan’s opium crop. Issued Thursday, it showed that poppy cultivation had retreated in much of the country and was now overwhelmingly concentrated in the 7 of 34 provinces where the insurgency remains strong, most of those in the south.

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008 (http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, November 2008. (187 Page PDF)

120mm
05-16-2009, 06:34 AM
That, because of it's helicopter-centric slant, kind of glosses over a bunch, but it describes what "yours truly" has been up to since January.

http://www.verticalmag.com/control/news/templates/?a=10797&z=11

Change From Above
Thursday, May 14, 2009 - Graham Lavery, Vertical 911


In this story that appears in the current issue of Vertical 911, Graham Lavery reports on the U.S. Department of State Air Wing's counternarcotics mission in Afghanistan.


Part of a three-ship formation as it makes its way
across the Red Desert. This flight includes gunship
support and SAR capability, safety precautions
that the Air Wing takes whenever possible.
Graham Lavery Photo.
From a side seat in the “penalty box” of a United States Department of State (DoS) Huey, cruising 1,000 feet over Afghanistan's infamous Helmand Valley, it's easy to see how this southern province produces up to half the world's total supply of opium poppies. With huge areas of the country being rocky and barren, most Afghan farmers must cultivate every square inch of arable land through an ingenious system of terracing, levies and dykes. But, the broad, flat Helmand Valley was the focus of intensive American engineering efforts in the mid-20th century, and part of the legacy from that is a network of irrigation canals which allows agriculture to flourish here.

During the poppy season (which runs, roughly, from January through June), Helmand is vividly green. Even in the off-season, the scene from overhead is inviting, exotic — and deceptively peaceful. The reality on the ground, of course, is dramatically different.

More at the link...

davidbfpo
05-24-2009, 12:24 PM
Thanks. A different viewpoint and informative - even if officially sanctioned. The role of Helmand Province in producing so much heroin is something the UK government would prefer not to publicise here.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
06-09-2009, 11:07 AM
I am sure other threads have carried views on Afghan drug production since the last update, anyway this seems a good place to add this: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/5477990/British-troops-seize-65-million-of-Taliban-drugs.htm

Aside from the amounts seized, the operation involved the entire UK Helmand mobile force, an infantry battallion (Royal Scots, ex-Black Watch), plus a 100 ANA and all landed by helicopter. No details on whose helicopters used, I suspect UK and US.

Following procedure I suspect the drugs will be handed over to the Afghan government, hopefully burnt quickly before leakage.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
06-20-2009, 10:07 PM
The SWJ blog article: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/06/poppy-is-not-the-most-profitab/#c003212 appeared June 14th and was missed being in Chicago.

Recalled this alternative view, which advocates melons: http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-magazine/business/3665983/one-day-the-kharbouza-will-be-mightier-than-the-kalashnikov.thtml

Makes an interesting contrast! Later author's background not readily found.

davidbfpo

AnalyticType
06-21-2009, 01:05 AM
One which I will add to!

September to November 2007 I was on a team of four students (capstone course for my undergrad program) in which we were tasked with assessing poppy eradication methods which had been successful in a few areas, to determine their utility for the rest of Afghanistan. We were to examine what Governor Atta had done in the Balkh province (which was "officially" poppy-free at that point) and see if his methods were duplicatable. This assessment was for a gentleman in the General Counsel's office at the Pentagon.

By the way, before anyone gets concerned, this was an OSINT project and it was not classified once we presented our findings, so I can share it.

It was apparent quickly that there is no "cookie-cutter" solution. Too many complexities are involved, between ethnicities, geography/geology, weather patterns, tribal structures, not to mention a couple thousand years of history... So I retooled our Terms of Reference to encompass any and all solutions which can be interlinked, thereby multiplying the benefit of any one program.

On this team of students, we had two 21-year olds who had good research and analytical skills, but not much of a "global" outlook. The third member of the team was a 24-year old Marine Scout Sniper with two tours in Afghanistan...definitely an asset! And then there was me...over 40 and a type-A personality! We didn't officially have a team leader, but I filled the role...

Having been owned by horses for 30 years, I'm pretty conversant in agricultural matters, so I took that sector. The Marine was the obvious choice for Security. And I delegated the other two to Industry and Mineral/Petroleum Exploitation.

So having laid out the basic scenario, I thought I'd share with y'all our Executive Summary...


Executive Summary:
What viable poppy elimination and replacement programs are likely to succeed in Afghanistan?
Any successful opium poppy replacement program will likely include several integrated programs in the areas of agriculture, mineral and fuel deposit exploitation, the construction of infrastructure, and industrial manufacturing. It is highly likely that an interconnected set of programs will benefit both the local and national economies. The potential for success of any coordinated program is in direct proportion to the level of interdiction, border security, and prosecution of drug lords and corrupt officials. It is highly unlikely that eradication, the physical destruction of poppy crops, is sufficient for successful elimination of opium and sustainable replacement. One single replacement program, industry or crop is highly unlikely capable of replacing poppy, for the complexities of the situation, geography and culture require a multifaceted and interconnected solution.

AnalyticType
06-21-2009, 11:32 PM
Well, I was going to upload the full report for those who would be interested in reading it, but it's too large (even as a pdf, and zipped.) So, should you be curious, let me know and I'll email it to you.

Victoria

davidbfpo
06-29-2009, 07:44 AM
Following a G8 Afghanistan meeting, with Richard Holbrooke announcing an end to US policy on crop destruction: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-drugs28-2009jun28,0,7732272.story (one of many). A UK press report shows that the Afghan government and the UK do not agree: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5674309/Britain-to-continue-poppy-eradication-in-Afghanistan-despite-US-reversal.html

Nothing like joined up thinking and working as an alliance!

davidbfpo

AnalyticType
06-29-2009, 06:09 PM
While it's true that lack of synchronized effort among the coalition nations tends to slow down forward progress, the U.S. decision is best.

Here's why:

The situation of the average Afghani farmer that grows poppy can be likened to that of the Depression Era coalminer... he owes his soul "to the company store." When it's time to plant poppies, most of the farmers have no money, and no food. They borrow money against the poppy crop from the local drug lord, so that they can feed themselves and their families.

When eradication teams come along and obliterate the crop, by dragging the fields with weighted sections of chainlink fence behind ATVs, or flailing it, or chemically killing it, the farmer is put in an untenable position which he cannot fix - that of not having a crop to pay his debt with, nor money to do so. Additionally, he watches the balance of the money he would have received at harvest (with which to sustain his family for the balance of the year) 'die on the vine' as well. It's a downward spiral that can only be slowed by growing more poppy. It's also far too late in the season, at the typical time that the eradication teams do their thing, for the farmers to recoup their losses in another fashion.

The often offered alternative that people in the US like to discuss, that of buying the crop and selling it to pharmeceutical companies for legitimate use, is not a realistic option simply because that market is already fully supplied. There is no demand to be filled, in the legal market, for Afghani opium.

Yes, the trafficking/processing/transportation elements must be dealt with, most often by lethal means. The corrupt provincial government officials, from the Governor down, must be jailed or otherwise removed, as Governor Atta did in the Balkh province. Truth be known, he also offered to replace the lost poppy crops with cannabis...:rolleyes: But when he announced that Balkh was "poppy-free," he spoke the truth... Also, being in the Northern Plateau, where poppy was a very small percentage of the agricultural efforts, there wasn't much poppy production to deal with in the first place.

The bottom line with the southern poppy-growing regions is economics. An Afghani farmer who does not grow poppies will make approximately 300 USD per year. A farmer next door who grows poppies on a couple hectares (ha) of land will make 3,000 USD per year. When you look at it in real numbers, of course it makes sense that they're growing poppies! But you (meaning governments) cannot pay the farmers not to grow poppies. Unlike (in welfare states) the tendency of those with their hands out for money to be ruled by the law of inertia, Afghanis are fairly industrious people.

I spoke with former Minister of the Interior Ali Jalali in 2007 about this very issue. He said flat out that if farmers are paid not to grow poppy, they will tend to take the money and grow poppies rather than leaving the fields fallow. But Jalali was very specific; he said that this is pure economics. There is no longstanding tradition of opium use in the Afghani (et al) culture. The solution lies in replacing the poppy cultivation with either another high-value crop or jobs that will earn them at least as much as the poppy crop would. They need to be busy and productive.

So when I was researching alternative crops, I used 3,000 USD/2 ha as a benchmark to find economically advantageous alternatives. I also had a team member research non-agricultural industries which were likely to pay as well, while utilizing the agricultural products of the alternative crops. I found some very interesting and viable crop options.

The one at the top of the list: saffron. As the world's most costly spice (retail avg 300USD/oz), the economic benefit of cultivating saffron crocuses is clear. Granted, three stigma (the female part of the flower) per flower are the sole source of the spice, and it takes approximately 75,000 flowers to produce one pound of saffron threads. However, saffron crocuses are indigenous to the Iran/Afghanistan/Pakistan/Northern India swath, meaning that this is not a crop which would require specialized cultivation/fertilization. As with opium poppies, the key to economic benefit is the export value. Furthermore, being a late summer to fall crop, food crops can be cultivated on the same ground earlier in the spring and summer, effectively producing for the farmer both income and sustenance on the same piece of ground.

Another crop with high value is flax, which is already grown all over Afghanistan. However, it is only grown as an oil seed crop (linseed oil). One crop can produce two products if flax is also utilized for an indigenous textile industry.

Other high value export crops include pomegranates, grapes (exported as raisins and juice), nuts, and the 'animal husbandry piece de resistance'... cashmere. Though only 11% of Afghanistan's landmass is arable ground the total pasture grazing land available, exclusive of arable farmland, is approximately 45% or 291,375 km sq. But what of the market for cashmere?

Afghanistan is the third largest producer of this high value, renewable commodity, behind China and Mongolia. The importance of the cashmere industry to the Mongolian economy is clear: it provides income and employment for over a third of the population and raw cashmere and cashmere products are Mongolia’s third largest export. A vibrant cashmere industry has the potential to contribute to the growth of the economy, of the manufacturing sector, of employment at both the herder and the manufacturing levels, and of exports. It is important here to note that in Mongolia the herding sector and processing sectors are in deep trouble. In 2005, the herding sector surpassed the total herd size that can be sustained by Mongolia’s pasturelands, and overgrazing began to cause desertification. Many firms in the processing sector ceased to operate or downsized their operations over the past 10 years, yet processors still operate on average at less than 50% capacity.

This is to Afghanistan’s advantage. Despite being ranked third in cashmere production, Afghanistan’s share of the cashmere market is approximately 5%. As horticultural crop productivity increases, and irrigation systems are renovated, Afghanistan’s capability to sustain larger numbers of goats will increase. There is a growing market to be tapped by Afghan farmers who produce cashmere as Mongolian production continues to drop.

Contrary to the media-provided impression of agricultural sterility, Afghanistan is fully capable of sustaining regionally specialized agriculture. Afghanis have for millenia made effective use of their limited water resources for growing a wide variety of food crops. These include tree crops such as pomegranates, figs, mulberries, walnuts, pistachios, almonds and apricots; field crops such as cotton, peanuts, kidney beans, chickpeas, melons, herbs and grapes; and cereal grains such as wheat, barley, millet, rice and maize.

The key to success with any of these crops is the repair and revitalization of the surface irrigation and kareze systems which were demolished by the Soviets, and of which approximately 65% remain in disuse.

The more energy, money, and time that we pour into fixing the agricultural infrastructure (particularly the water supply systems) concurrently with interdiction efforts, the more quickly and easily we can wean the Afghani agricultural sector (85% of the whole) off of opium poppies and on to sustainable and economically feasible crops.

davidbfpo
07-13-2009, 10:22 AM
I think legal cultivation of the opium poppy has cropped up before, most recently that it was grown in Australia and Turkey. This article refers to cultivation in the UK and asks why not legally cultivate in Afghanistan: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/borisjohnson/5814860/Its-poppycock-to-grow-crops-here-but-destroy-them-in-Afghanistan.html

(The author is the Mayor of London and a Conservative).

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
07-13-2009, 10:23 AM
Just in case it is lost, this SWJ item needs to be retained: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/carrots-and-sticks-when-is-pop/

davidbfpo

goesh
07-13-2009, 01:12 PM
- just the odd comment and opinion but I rather doubt farmer Joe simply pays back any money borrowed to plant and harvest his crop, he is probably paying a protection fee as well and steep interest. Drugs and extortion cross all cultural barriers, pretty much a universal thing. I wouldn't advocate buying the opium, rather paying fair market value for it then destroying it on the spot via non chemical means. No doubt this has been hashed over and ruled out for various reasons and I haven't researched it. It just seems darn odd that a Bn Commander for instance can go forth and do all kinds of things in the name of the mission and change peoples lives forever, drastic things. Yet the same Commander can't go driving up to Farmer Joe's place, hop out with some cash in his hand, tell him in affect ' here is the high end value for your crop, we are going to destroy it now' and unleash a Hummer with chain link fence behind it on the crop, sit back and see what develops down the line with farmer Joe and some of his fellow growers. I don't think much would change really - Joe would still end up paying extortion money to the taliban and drug lords to be used against us but who is he going to like more in the process? Bottom line, farmer Joe does half the work for the same end results because of Uncle Sam.

jcustis
07-19-2009, 02:11 AM
(Copied to here from the Afghan agriculture thread) I'm about to drop an AAR in the Afghanistan PTP thread, but I just attended a lecture by Gretchen Peters (author of Seeds of Terror, and she made the point that opium cultivated in Afghanistan would have to go through a shift in collection and production methods in order to come close to the hygienic methods required for medicinal purposes. She also added that unless the whole shebang was subsidized, medicinal opium would not likely garner prices higher than the farmer would get for growing wheat.

I found those points very interesting.

jcustis
07-20-2009, 12:50 AM
I had the chance to sit in on a lecture on 7/11/09, sponsored by the 1st Marine Division as part of a lecture series which will eventually include David Kilcullen and Greg Mortensen of Three Cups of Tea renown. The lecturer was Gretchen Peters, the author of Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Participants were provided with a copy of the book and I am reading it slowly, but I made several notes that i offer up here as an after action review of sorts. I'll likely post a book review later, because I think she has some important things ton say, though they cut against the grain in terms of our current strategy.

My notes are in no particular order, and some are actually just notes to self:

-Ms. Peters began the lecture with several images of Afghan militants, and stated that most of the West views the Taliban as a bedraggled, bearded fighter toting a Kalashnikov, and sworn to protect Islam. She prefers the image of the mafioso, however, since the Taliban, from her research, are profiting from the drug trade despite other claims that they are anti-drug. They are less an ideologue, and more a basic thug. Although they are thugs, they are better equipped, better organized, and more capable than they were in late 2001 when the US first went in to Afghanistan. The reason is the profits made from the explosion of opium production.
-Methods of interrogation oriented on eliminating criminal elements, would in fact be better than the techniques we might use otherwise, because crime and corruption is at the heart of the insurgency while opium production skyrockets.
-In reported cases, the Taliban and peripheral drug kingpins have purchased, up front, a poppy crop's opium output. This results in occasions where farmers (who do not make significant profits from growing poppy) end up in debt to the trafficker and Taliban when we swoop in an d eradicate crops.
-We (read as coalition) need to be careful of how we are viewed when we cast our lot in with the ANA and ANP. [as in Iraq] the ANP are not as respected as the ANA, and are seen as the more corrupt of the two. Morale of the story: think about the IO aspect of your alliance with security forces, before you descend on a village with them in tow.
-Distribution, smuggling, extortion, and contract protection are making more money than the revenue created at the lower-level from growth of poppy and the initial production of opium from the poppy resin. We should be expending energy at disrupting these middle to upper-level activities, and interdict the trade after it leaves the farm.
-With the improvement of distribution networks, we need to conduct an analysis of drug trafficking ratlines first. Will a new road help us in our interactions with the local populace, or help the Taliban?
-In order to make our impact worthwhile, we might need to focus on corruption that is rampant within the civil servants and local official the strapped government, s. The reason for this is that too many people rely on instability in order to keep the illicit activities going, and their actions are more dangerous (although still corruption on the surface) than the policeman who pockets a few bucks while running a checkpoint. Ms. Peters was talking about instances where entire police forces are absent from certain roads that eventually see drug convoys pass through on the way to Pakistan or points west.
-The coalition would do itself a favor to take pictures of the drug kingpins homes in Quetta and other border areas who are living lavishly on the backs of poor farmers, and then use them as part of the IO campaign in poppy-rich areas.
-Proposals to legalize the Afghan opium production don't survive the rigor of the hygienic requirements needed in medicinal opiate production. Even if it did, the process would have to be subsidized in order to make the profit margin better than what can be gained from growing wheat, or we need to subsidize agricultural alternatives. Her point to that is "why not?" Why not totally reshape our counter-drug policy to put money into into alternative agriculture while focusing on interdiction at the same time.
-By and large, the problem in Afghanistan is more easily compared to Colombia, and therefore we should look at the COIN efforts conducted against the FARC to glean TTPs and operational-level policy.
-We can remove the terrorists through force, or maybe even hearts and minds, but unless we remove the narco-state, we still lose.

Ms. Peters utilized HN research assistants, paid with United States Institute of Peace grant money, to conduct primary source research in the study she conducted, which led to the book. She made several statements that we need to do a better job of killing the bad guys who need to be killed, so I don't take her assessments as tinfoil conspiracy theory that seeks to undercut any administration's effort. The simple fact that she advocates interdiction along the flow of opium, and not destruction at the source (since that is a problem too large to defeat), causes me to rethink my understanding of the problem, because I am going to be dealing with this at the farmer and local governance level during my next deploy. And since Helmand Province is the scene of the greatest poppy growth, I can expect to be dealing with a slice of the populace tied to the drug trade.

davidbfpo
07-20-2009, 07:59 AM
Jon,

Thanks for that and to help education via SWJ, here is the author's website: http://gretchenpeters.org/ ; on a quick skim her blogsite has some useful pointers on relations with Afghans and a critical review of her book: http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/07/09/seeds-of-terror-how-heroin-is-bankrolling-the-taliban-and-al-qaeda-by-gretchen-peters/ I note she responds at length to this on her blogsite: http://blog.gretchenpeters.org/

I will place a pointer to the book on the 'open' SWJ.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
07-20-2009, 08:03 AM
Economy of effort: here is the author's website: http://gretchenpeters.org/ ; on a quick skim her blogsite has some useful pointers on relations with Afghans and a critical review of her book: http://www.registan.net/index.php/20...etchen-peters/ I note she responds at length to this on her blogsite: http://blog.gretchenpeters.org/

davidbfpo

Red Rat
07-20-2009, 12:42 PM
Jon, Dave,

Thanks for the AAR and the links.

I think that the focus is changing in theatre from the cultivation to refining and distribution networks. The advice I had in-theatre (from a senior UK counter-narcotics official) was not to bother with poppy eradication but to look for the processing labs and chemicals. The latter were described to me as instantly recognisable as they did to your oral/nasal passages what scraping your nails on a blackboard does to your ears :eek:

Poppy eradication is a quick way to rile the locals at all levels. We had an incident where a benign district went red after poppy eradication. It transpired that the farmers had mortgaged themselves to the hilt to get the land and the seed for what was for them the most lucrative crop. When we started to eradicate the poppy they fought tooth and nail when all the known matrices (viable alternative crops, no prolonged history of poppy cultivation etc) said they should not. It transpired that the collateral on the mortgages was their children (mostly daughters), several of whom it was reliably reported ended up in bondage.

We are looking at the possibility of having some units mentoring the ANP. Problem is that we do not have enough MP to do this. How much police training does one need to mentor the ANP? Presumably basic forensics and an idiots guide to the Afghan legal system?

Red Rat
08-04-2009, 05:27 PM
Just finished reading Gretchen Peters' book. What struck me was the similarities to N. Ireland.

We used to say that the difference between the Nationalist (Catholic, PIRA) and the Loyalist (Protestant, UVF, RHC) was that in the former 70% of the take from organised crime went to 'the cause' and 30% to their pockets; with the latter it was the reverse. When I first deployed there in 1994 the police's big worry was that the terrorists would metamorphisise Mafia like to an organised criminal fraternity - something which appears to have happened... although possibly not on the scale envisaged.

One of our most successful organisations in dealing with the Troubles came late and was a joint police/intelligence/customs/revenue organisation which targeted the money.

Violence will continue as long as people have a large stake in ensuring that it continues. While the majority of people in Afghanistan may want to live in peace, so long as the people in power (at all levels) have a strong vested interest in maintaining the status quo, then the 'quo is unlikely to be changed. I saw the same in Somalia. the powerful clan chiefs in Somalia had ne real interest in a strong government and the rule of law because they gained their power and profit from Somalia being in a state of lawlessness (lost white goods for central africa seemed to go through Somalia at one point!) The carrot and stick approach needs to be along the lines of:


Violence will be met with violence
Violence and criminality will not be profitable for you, your family or your associates.
The IGoA will provide profitable legal alternatives.


Problem is when the whole system is corrupt where do you start? Top down or bottom up? Patronage is also part of the culture - where does patronage stop and criminality start? Retiring warlords with their ill-gotten gains just encourages others to emulate; criminality must be seen as risky and unprofitable in the long run.

As a matter of interest how has Columbia coped?

MattC86
08-04-2009, 10:39 PM
Not certain how much stock y'all put into his increasingly pessimistic (and often bitter) critiques, but I thought Foust's review of the book had some relevancy:



It’s probably best to skip the first 130 pages of this book. That’s how long it takes Ms. Peters, who claims to be passionately involved in telling this story, to even begin to discuss the ways in which opium-based corruption has distorted the Afghan government in far more pernicious ways than merely fueling an insurgency. There, on page 134, Ms. Peters says that “almost everyone” she interviewed for this book agreed that “crooked members of Hamid Karzai’s administration are earning even more” from the drug trade than the Taliban.

Considering the finality of the book’s central thesis—drugs are funding the Afghan and global insurgency—it is a stunning admission. Why limit the discussion to just the Taliban and al Qaeda if there is almost universal consensus that the drug problem is much worse in the official government? This consensus carries into other discussions that fatally undermine Ms. Peters’ thesis: she notes the drugs trade is not why the insurgency is so strong in the FATA, for example (she notes, but doesn’t explain, why it is so significant that the Pakistani Taliban brag about imposing law and order by catching and executing bandits that rob locals).

Probably more relevant to higher level policy towards GOA than operational and tactical level issues, but more at Registan.net (http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/07/09/seeds-of-terror-how-heroin-is-bankrolling-the-taliban-and-al-qaeda-by-gretchen-peters/)

Matt

Red Rat
08-05-2009, 04:41 AM
I think Foust is missing the point somewhat - the book is about the Taleban and narcotics of which corruption of the local governance is an aspect, not the other way round.

Narcotics production and traffiking needs ungoverned space in which to operate at any great capacity, it often achieves this by corruption of local governance structures. Where all sides of the conflict (traffikers governance, local economy/producers) have more to gain from the status quo then there is no incentive to improve governance.

That said it is not a single issue problem. Like most insurgencies there is a complex knot of issues involved and different strings will be pulled by different actors at deifferent levels. This feeds directly into the operational and tactical levels as without understanding the picture you cannot develop an appropriate solution. Ahmed Rashid in his book 'Descent into Chaos' states that it is impossible to untangle the web of tribal interests, politics and narcotics in dealing with the region.

I have to say I am not sure what the solution is either! :eek:

Jedburgh
08-13-2009, 12:46 PM
US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 Aug 09:

Afghanistan's Narco War: Breaking the Link Between Drug Traffickers and Insurgents (http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/USGOV_AfghanistansNarcoWar_BreakingLink_DrugTraffi ckersInsurgents.pdf)

The attempt to cut off the drug money represents a central pillar of counter-insurgency strategy—deny financing to the enemy. This shift is an overdue move that recognizes the central role played by drug traffickers and drug money in the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. While it is too early to judge whether this will be a watershed, it is not too early to raise questions about whether the goals of the counter-narcotics strategy can be achieved. Is it possible to slow the flow of drug money to the insurgency, particularly in a country where most transactions are conducted in cash and hidden behind an ancient and secretive money transfer system? Does the U.S. Government have the capacity and the will to provide the hundreds more civilians required to carry out the second step in the counter-narcotics program and transform a poppy-dominated economy into one where legitimate agriculture can thrive? Can our NATO allies be counted on to step up their contributions on the military and civilian sides at a time when support for the war is waning in most European countries and Canada?

Seahorse
08-13-2009, 08:07 PM
I agree that we need to re-shape the counter drug strategies currently in place and I have a bold proposal that I wish to air and maybe get some constructive feedback in order to shape it more fully. Bear with me as I outline my argument and touch on some of the salient discussion points brought up previously in this trhead.

First of all, the eradication strategy is completely wrong for several reasons. It has not been managed or implemented in any way so as to actually effect any positive change in poppy cultivation. If anything, it has exacerbated the security situation and encouraged the opium trade and anti-government militias. The recent announcement that these practices would stop is welcome news, however the replacement strategy is actually one that focusses on the drug-counterinsurgency nexus (as some have described it). I am not optimistic that this strategy will prove any more effective since it fails to address the underlying problems that stoke the opium cultivation.

The annual reports from the UNODC portray a fairly accurate description of the poppy growth, cultivation and processing and in particular demonstrate the lack of effectiveness of previous strategies when one considers the explosive growth and spread of poppy cultivation across Afghanistan. According to their reports, insurgent related profits from the opium industry represent only 17 to 20% of the trade (still huge when one considers the figure of $4B). Most of the poppy trade is related to its street price, its hardiness and viability in the agricultural landscape of southern Afghanistan, and the lack of other alternatives (crops, markets etc.). Some 9 million Afghans are involved in some way in the poppy trade.

In many instances alternative crop suggestions are based on the market prices and how they relate to the farmer, however one extremely important element is overlooked in this analsysis - labour requirements. Poppy framing is very high in labour demands and therefore employs up to five times as many workers per acre than say wheat. This means that in replacing poppy for wheat, you are effectively cutting off employment for 80% of the labourers. These people need work and incomes to support themselves and their families and many turn to powerbrokers and insurgents as their only options. Therefore alternative strategies must accommodate the whole of the poppy industry.

What are some alternatives:

1) Conduct widespread eradication: this strategy has failed for the past several years and has resulted in poppy trade growth, heroin processing, and cartel like development.

2) purchase the crop and eradicate: drives street price up, creates unemployed fighting age males, encourages poppy cultivation for following years and spurns new cultivation.

3) legalise the crop for medicinal purposes: again drives up prices, encourages corruption, creates dual poppy economy and as discussed there would be significant investments required to produce medicinal grade opiates.

4) Implement a poppy license program with a 10 year reduction strategy. this strategy relates to poppy growth and not opiate production, distribution or sales, which supports the current Government policies on counter-narcotics. This last strategy is that which I propose and will briefly outline.

Essentially, we need to admit that eradication is not working despite the costs and effort, which therefore leads to the fact that poppy cultivation has become a dependent resource for s significant portion of the population.

I propose that we acknowledge poppy cultivation and implement a ten year reduction strategy that offers poppy cultivation licenses to farmers, with some direct and enforced limits on a yearly basis. Current poppy farmers and powerbrokers would be co-opted into this scheme and convinced that they have a ten year window during which to become legitimate farmers and wean themselves off of the poppy trade. Limits would decline each year and farmers would be provided support and incentives to transition into other crops during that period.

The government would adopt a 100% eradication effort in non-licensed poppy production tied to the current poppy trade brokers. This form of eradication is enforceable and potentially corrupt free since only licensed areas are permitted. (As an aside, I also endorse an interim policy of eradicating 80-90% of any crops found in violation in order to leave sufficient crops for the affected farmer to potentially recover any loans or debts associated with the poppy fields destroyed.)

Monies generated from the sale of the licenses would be: funnelled into local alternative livelihoods, used to provide agricultural loans and support interdiction and other anti-drug strategies. Licenses would be renewable but a ten year reduction strategy supported by increasing fees and fines would be enforced. The initial allocation of licenses could be set at 2007 poppy cultivation levels which would mean at least a 30% reduction over current poppy production in the first year.

This strategy combined with the Government counter-narcotics efforts could lead to an effective, enforceable, measureable and supportable counter-narcotic strategy for Afghanistan.

I would appreciate any feeedback you may have.

jcustis
08-17-2009, 02:09 AM
For the sake of further training, let's say that the decision to eradicate a poppy field (or better yet, the yield of opium) before it has begun the process of movement to an area where further refinement and trans-shipment occurs. It is still in the immediate vicinity of the farm where it was grown, and has not been paid for (is that ever the case?).

As the business of eradication begins, what engagement strategies can I, the guy sent in to send a message to local leaders, employ? The classic answer might be some sort of aid drop done at the point of destruction, with follow-up engagement aimed at keeping the local growers and their leaders off balance, but that is an Iraq model I am thinking of.

What issues are inherent with this scenario? Honor? Family shame? Promise-making and deal-breaking? I know that there has to be a better incentive to break the cycle, but until that comes 'round, what else can I do?

davidbfpo
08-17-2009, 09:52 AM
Jon,

Recently I read an account of the UK working with the ANA and they cited an incident where an ANA search found 100k heroin in a village and the elders shook their hands on leaving.

On that basis I'd suggest the ANA participate, in your example they hand out the re-supply of essentials.

What are the alternatives you can offer? Wheat is often cited and of course melons!

davidbfpo

Jedburgh
02-21-2010, 02:51 AM
UNODC, 10 Feb 10: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010: Winter Rapid Assessment (http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2010_Final.pdf)

After a major drop in opium cultivation (one third) over the past two years, UNODC projects a stable crop in Afghanistan in 2010.

The majority of the 20 Afghan provinces that were poppy-free in 2009 will remain so this year. Yet, three provinces (Baghlan, Faryab and Sari Pul, all in the north) risk showing the beginning of a trend reversal, with a minimal increase in cultivation in the districts with higher insecurity. Five other provinces (Kunar, Nangarhar, Kabul, Laghman and Badakhshan), not poppy-free so far, are also expected to have negligible amounts of poppies.

All considered, with appropriate local community-inspired measures – such as shura-driven campaigns, governor-led eradication, and development assistance – up to 25 Afghan provinces could become poppy-free in 2010. Further progress in the reduction of drug cultivation (hectares) in Afghanistan is within reach.

Against the recent trend of ever higher productivity in the country-side, agricultural conditions in Afghanistan are expected to deteriorate in 2010, because of bad weather. Lower opium yields should also reduce the volume (tons) of opium produced, continuing the decline that has characterized the past three years......

JMA
05-08-2010, 02:37 PM
We were starting to see the Taliban use drug profits to fund their operations when I was in country.

The opium trade will never be eliminated from Afghanistan, and the cocaine trade will never be eliminated from Colombia. The only chance, and it's a limited chance at that, is to buy the entire crop every year, sell what you can of it to pharmacutecal companies, and burn the rest.

Then you take the funds from selling the stuff and start rebuilding the infrastructure.

That is not the only option.

Schmedlap
05-08-2010, 04:08 PM
For those with access to the docs, here are three that I stumbled upon over the past few weeks (though, I haven't gotten around to reading them thoroughly and I'm not sure when I will)...

Jeffrey Clemens, Opium in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Success of Source Country Drug Control Policies (http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~clemens/Opium.pdf), 51 J. of L. & Econ. 407.

Alyssa Greenspan, Are We Fighting the Right War?, 16 Cardozo J. of Int'l and Comparative Law 493.

Elizabeth Peterson, Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Link Between Illicit Opium Production and Security in Afghanistan (http://law.wustl.edu/Journal/25/Peterson.pdf), 25 Washington U. J. of L. and Policy 215.

Don't sharpshoot me on my citations.

davidbfpo
05-10-2010, 01:20 AM
An IWPR report by an Afghan reporter:
Landowner Hajji Fateh Khan lives in one of the most violent districts in Afghanistan, but this spring he says is a happy man as deep-pocketed buyers eye the imminent opium yield from his poppy plantations.

“The year before last, four kilogrammes of opium was sold for 200 US dollars, but now that weight fetches up to 1,000 dollars,” the farmer from Nad Ali in southern Helmand province said.

“Who does not like more money, and this is the only crop which earns lots of it?” he added with a laugh. Khan has further cause to celebrate his illegal harvest. It was produced not on his own 40-hectare spread of arable farmland, but rather on a 12-ha patch he started cultivating in the outlying, government-owned desert. And so far, no one has tried to destroy it.

Link:http://www.currentintelligence.net/features/2010/4/28/helmand-poppy-growth-surges.html

On a quick read every local party gains and of course there is the official GIRoA and UK 'lead' on eradication.

JMA
06-29-2010, 08:12 PM
As one of the previous posters said, you really, really ought to check with your DEA rep, or the CPEF folks in Helmand. You should have reps from both of them in Lashkar Gah, unless things have changed a lot. You mentioned that 'this would usually fall into the RFI category....', I guess I'm wondering if you submitted it as an RFI through your O&I channels?

Also, I definitely agree - interdiction is a much better CN strategy than eradication. I'd think you'd agree, if you're down in Registan/Rh*no area - far easier to interdict than try to manually eradicate. The farmers in Helmand sell their crops a season in advance - if we eradicate their crop, the narcos almost always get money's worth. Sometimes that means taking a child across into Pakistan and selling it into the human sex slave trade. Nasty business. Interdiction allows them to get paid, absolves them of responsibility for what happens next when you and the MAGTF hit the shipment, and gives them time to gradually transition to other crops.

Any thoughts for the western kids who get hooked on this stuff?

Rex Brynen
06-29-2010, 09:13 PM
Any thoughts for the western kids who get hooked on this stuff?

Not just Western kids--it is a major problem in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, and especially in Iran (http://www.cfr.org/publication/11457/afghanistans_role_in_irans_drug_problem.html).

Indeed, by some estimates the Iranian security services have lost more casualties to clashes with Afghan drug smuggling networks than ISAF has lost to the Taliban.

Rex Brynen
06-30-2010, 05:01 PM
And, on the broader topic:


Counternarcotics in Afghanistan
July 6, 2010, 10:00am-11:30am

Location:
U.S. Institute of Peace
2nd floor
1200 17th Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20036

The United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan view counternarcotics initiatives as vital to counterinsurgency efforts by cutting off revenue to insurgents. A new Center for International Cooperation (CIC) report entitled "Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan" challenges this assumption. Instead, the authors argue:

Current counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan is financially benefiting - rather than hurting - insurgents;
Rural development efforts should be focused on assisting rural populations - aid should not be conditioned on desistance from poppy-growing; and
Counter-narcotics policy should be refocused to discriminate against illegal armed groups and corrupt officials in enforcement.
The report utilizes microeconomic analysis of the likely consequences of various counternarcotics strategies on both drug-market outcomes and the security and governance situation in Afghanistan. It examines the division of drug trafficking revenues among insurgents, "warlords", and corrupt government officials; the likely impact of drug enforcement policies on different points of the distribution chain; and the effect of these policies on drug consumption, dependency, and harm to drug users.

This event will feature the following speakers:

Jonathan Caulkins, Presenter
Co-author, "Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan."

Mark Kleiman, Presenter
Co-author, "Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan."

Jonathan Kulick, Presenter
Co-author, "Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan."

Philip B. Heymann, Discussant
Ames Professor of Law at Harvard and former Deputy Attorney General

William Taylor, Moderator
Vice President of Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace

Inquiries

Please contact Ashley Pandya at 202-429-3849 or apandya@usip.org with any general questions about this event.

Media

Journalists should contact Lauren Sucher at lsucher@usip.org or Allison Sturma at asturma@usip.org.

JMA
07-01-2010, 09:57 AM
Not just Western kids--it is a major problem in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, and especially in Iran (http://www.cfr.org/publication/11457/afghanistans_role_in_irans_drug_problem.html).

Indeed, by some estimates the Iranian security services have lost more casualties to clashes with Afghan drug smuggling networks than ISAF has lost to the Taliban.

So we are going to turn this whole issue into another talk shop. Talk, talk, talk and no action. (Re the conference mentioned in you other post)

If there are no poppies grown then there is no opium, then there is no heroin, there is no corruption...etc etc

The one unknown cog in the corruption wheel is the one close to US policy making on this issue. Take than one out and the poppies will go and with them the opium/heroin problem.

Imagine this. we have reached to the point where even soldiers are starting to agree that growing and harvesting poppies should be allowed. You go figure.

tequila
07-01-2010, 01:41 PM
If there are no poppies grown then there is no opium, then there is no heroin, there is no corruption...etc etc

Seriously, no supply then no demand?

I think you have it the wrong way round.


The one unknown cog in the corruption wheel is the one close to US policy making on this issue. Take than one out and the poppies will go and with them the opium/heroin problem.

Corruption at any level does not create drug consumption, which is the root of the problem.

JMA
07-01-2010, 02:05 PM
Seriously, no supply then no demand?

I think you have it the wrong way round.

Not at all. It is easier to locate a poppy field in Afghanistan where you have 100,000 troops and some of the most advanced surveillance kit the world has ever seen than it is to keep the finished product away from the kids in the USA.

Let them grow it elsewhere. It is criminal to allow it to be grown and harvested under the noses of the US troops in Afghanistan.


Corruption at any level does not create drug consumption, which is the root of the problem.

If the SF went after the drug barons as carefully and aggressively as they go after the AQ leadership in Afghanistan the problem would be over in a year.

... but first you have to take out the insiders on the US side that allow it all keep happening.

tequila
07-01-2010, 02:11 PM
... but first you have to take out the insiders on the US side that allow it all keep happening.

Not sure what you are implying when you say "one unknown cog in the corruption wheel is the one close to US policy making".

Are you saying that U.S. government officials are taking drug money to allow Afghan farmers to grow poppy?

Rex Brynen
07-01-2010, 02:37 PM
If there are no poppies grown then there is no opium, then there is no heroin, there is no corruption...etc etc

The question is whether eradication can be undertaken without increasing rural alienation to the point that it substantially strengthens, rather than weakens, the Taliban.

The general view is that widespread eradication would require massive numbers of troops, be only partially effective, and benefit the Taliban (in terms of rural alienation and increased recruitment) more than in hurt them (in terms of finance). Perhaps that view is wrong, but it is by no means a simple issue--even if we wished it was.

Iran has implemented a draconian anti-opium policy for more than a decade, including mass public hangings of drug smugglers (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5il-zhbvKBqb2ITPTeZBfdDbfpppA). It hasn't stopped smuggling or distribution in the country--there's just too much money to be made.

Ken White
07-01-2010, 02:51 PM
If the SF went after the drug barons as carefully and aggressively as they go after the AQ leadership in Afghanistan the problem would be over in a year.Do you know that they or others are not doing that?

Then there's this:
... but first you have to take out the insiders on the US side that allow it all keep happening.I'm with Tequila, can you expand on that a bit?

Steve Blair
07-01-2010, 03:53 PM
Not sure what you are implying when you say "one unknown cog in the corruption wheel is the one close to US policy making".

Are you saying that U.S. government officials are taking drug money to allow Afghan farmers to grow poppy?

This sounds like a rehash of the CIA's reputed involvement with the drug trade in SEA.

JMA
07-01-2010, 08:36 PM
I said: "If the SF went after the drug barons as carefully and aggressively as they go after the AQ leadership in Afghanistan the problem would be over in a year."


Do you know that they or others are not doing that?

Because if they were the drug hierarchy would have been long gone by now...

JMA
07-01-2010, 08:45 PM
The question is whether eradication can be undertaken without increasing rural alienation to the point that it substantially strengthens, rather than weakens, the Taliban.

The general view is that widespread eradication would require massive numbers of troops, be only partially effective, and benefit the Taliban (in terms of rural alienation and increased recruitment) more than in hurt them (in terms of finance). Perhaps that view is wrong, but it is by no means a simple issue--even if we wished it was.

Iran has implemented a draconian anti-opium policy for more than a decade, including mass public hangings of drug smugglers (http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5il-zhbvKBqb2ITPTeZBfdDbfpppA). It hasn't stopped smuggling or distribution in the country--there's just too much money to be made.

So am I to accept that in order to be in with a chance of "winning the hearts and minds" of the Afghan people they have to be allowed to continue to produce heroin?

By the time it gets into a form that can be smuggled its too late. The best time to get at this stuff is when its still in the field.

There is some really strange logic being used to justify poppy farming being allowed to continue. Wonder who is behind it?

JMA
07-01-2010, 08:49 PM
Not sure what you are implying when you say "one unknown cog in the corruption wheel is the one close to US policy making".

Are you saying that U.S. government officials are taking drug money to allow Afghan farmers to grow poppy?

No.

My gut feel is that it is the Afghan government putting pressure on the US to allow this to continue and they have agreed.

Rex Brynen
07-01-2010, 08:51 PM
Wonder who is behind it?

Do you have any suggestions for us?

JMA
07-01-2010, 09:05 PM
Do you have any suggestions for us?

as i said in another post... some people in the Afghan government.

tequila
07-01-2010, 11:16 PM
I can see your point on that one ...

http://i.telegraph.co.uk/telegraph/multimedia/archive/01460/Ahmed-Wali-Karzai_1460591c.jpg

Ken White
07-02-2010, 01:10 AM
Because if they were the drug hierarchy would have been long gone by now...Spells assume. I believe your assumption is incorrect. Without going into a lot of detail -- much of which is available on Google but I'm not going to collect it for you -- there are people (DEA and others, not SOF; it is considered by us for several US domestic reasons a police / law enforcement function and not a military effort). They have had success but just as in any other endeavor where a lot of money is to be made, you remove one lab, one smuggler, one area Boss -- and another of each pops up. Progress is being made but it is slow. It is not as well funded, well staffed or as visible as the military effort and is poorly reported. All that mostly, again, due to US domestic political considerations. :rolleyes:

Those considerations involve the 'heart and minds' foolishness and a desire to get along with everyone. As I said before, the US is a center right nation but the current administration is center left (and would like to be further left but can't quite get there). The attitude of 'being nice' is kinda dumb, I know but there you go... :mad:

Rex Brynen
07-02-2010, 02:07 AM
Those considerations involve the 'heart and minds' foolishness and a desire to get along with everyone.

I don't have a strong view on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, in part because I think it is damn complicated (and much more complicated than most of the discussion here). I will say, however, that evidence across many cases, countries, and time periods suggests that targeting a primary income crop of rural farmers tends to push them from passive to active support for rural insurgencies.

As I mentioned before, the Iranians have deployed massive numbers of police, paramilitaries, and military personnel to counter-smuggling/narcotics, have a death penalty for drug smuggling, execute drug lords when they catch them, and have very few ROE restrictions--and still, after several thousand security force casualties, still have a growing drug problem entering the country via Afghanistan. This is a difficult nut to crack, and even more so actually inside Afghanistan and alongside a major insurgency.

tequila
07-02-2010, 03:10 AM
And seriously, do you actually believe that our tolerance for opium growing comes from the Administration's Leftist desire to get along with everyone? Do you think our relationship with Ahmed Wali Karzai began after November 2008?

Ken White
07-02-2010, 04:54 AM
Rex, I agree with you and had no intention of making light of the problem. It is very difficult and just eradicating the crop as some suggest would, IMO, be an invitation to huge problems.

Tequila, you asked
And seriously, do you actually believe that our tolerance for opium growing comes from the Administration's Leftist desire to get along with everyone? Do you think our relationship with Ahmed Wali Karzai began after November 2008?In reverse order, no, I recall when it began. Yes, I do believe that this Administrations tends to make some poor foreign policy decisions. I did not say they had a tolerance for opium growing. I said "...All that mostly, again, due to US domestic political considerations." Note that does not ascribe fault, just generic domestic politics. I continued [notes added]: "Those considerations involve the 'heart and minds' foolishness [1] and a desire to get along with everyone [2]. As I said before, the US is a center right nation but the current administration is center left (and would like to be further left but can't quite get there). The attitude of 'being nice' is kinda dumb, I know but there you go[3]..."

[1] That is a derisory comment about anyone from the left, center or right, in uniform and not who believes the hearts and minds mantra. I believe that to be a misunderstood, misused and flawed approach to FID / COIN or what have you.

[2] That is another comment aimed broadly at many Americans, all spectra, in service and not -- and including some close personal friends -- who do not realize that there are a lot of really mean people out there, many of them do not think like most of us 'enlightened westerners' and they really think we should be 'friendly' to everyone and that we have allies and friends. Sorry, but I belong to the school that echoes Sir Henry Temple, Lord Palmerston. :cool:

[3]Here's the mea culpa -- I did say and do believe this Administration is out of sync with most of the country and I believe that minor disconnect literally causes them to 'try too hard' in foreign affairs and that their proclivity is to take soft approaches partly from an ideological perspective and partly from a typical (all new administrations do it) effort to do most everything in a very different way than the Admin who preceded them, partly because they got sandbagged into a bad trip by Bush 43 and crew and partly because of other reasons we can only guess at... :eek: :wry:

After all that the short answer to your question is: (1) Yes but that's not the only reason and they have allies in other parties and places here and around the world who support them in that rather naive attitude. (2) Nope, the relationship with that Karzai dates, according to some, from 2001. No question that Neumann recommended he be assigned somewhere, anywhere as an Ambassaodr -- that would've been the previous Admin. A while in any event...

War makes stranger bedfellows than politics. ;)

William F. Owen
07-02-2010, 05:26 AM
I don't have a strong view on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, in part because I think it is damn complicated (and much more complicated than most of the discussion here). I will say, however, that evidence across many cases, countries, and time periods suggests that targeting a primary income crop of rural farmers tends to push them from passive to active support for rural insurgencies.

Well I do have a view..... wow, who saw that coming?? :eek:

I agree that you do not want to harm the farmers and their crops - because it does not set forth the policy. Growing poppies is not a crime, BUT- you can target and destroy the process which turns poppies into narcotics, - which is a crime , and that is relatively easy to do.

JMA
07-02-2010, 07:15 AM
Well I do have a view..... wow, who saw that coming?? :eek:

I agree that you do not want to harm the farmers and their crops - because it does not set forth the policy. Growing poppies is not a crime, BUT- you can target and destroy the process which turns poppies into narcotics, - which is a crime , and that is relatively easy to do.

With respect William that is exactly why westerners get into a tangle with such matters.

The Afghan farmer is not just growing poppies. He goes out intot he field and scratches them so that he can harvest, not poppies, but the juice that starts the whole process. We will understand quite clearly when he is told that to continue is going to get his "head chopped off" (because that's what the TB do).

The mistake we have made is to treat this people as "civilians" instead of part of the opium/heroin cycle. They are now untouchable even if they bring out a weapon from time to time and take shots at ISAF or lay the odd IED and they carry on growing their poppies. Have you any idea how little respect they must have for the US and other forces in the area?

William F. Owen
07-02-2010, 09:22 AM
With respect William that is exactly why westerners get into a tangle with such matters.
Don't assume all "westerners" think like westerners, but I can see your basic point.

The mistake we have made is to treat this people as "civilians" instead of part of the opium/heroin cycle. They are now untouchable even if they bring out a weapon from time to time and take shots at ISAF or lay the odd IED and they carry on growing their poppies. Have you any idea how little respect they must have for the US and other forces in the area?
This misses the point. If the little chap picks up a gun and points it at you, you drop him. See him digging in an IED? It ends right then. He has no immunity, when it comes to taking armed action against you.
I'm not overly concerned about his respect. I just want him to fear using weapons against me.

What I do not want to get sucked into is an utterly pointless eradication effort, that consumes vast amounts of resources and will suck more people into the fight, it does not further my policy. Far better to kill the folks paying the farmers - and that also sets forth my policy.
My policy is against armed resistance, not agriculture.
Focus on destroying the enemy.

JMA
07-02-2010, 10:01 AM
Don't assume all "westerners" think like westerners, but I can see your basic point.

And you get to the point where you can't counter the barbarism of the methods of intimidation used by the TB.

I took a black (RAR) company on an Op once. On evening the CSM and I sat having drink and he asked me whether we needed control of the area we were operating in. I naturally said of course. He said then it could be done if I took the officers (white) back to "town" and just resupplied him and the company with their ammo and rations needs every week and he would deliver a totally peaceful area for as long as was needed. I remember mumbling something about it not being possible and we left it at that.

This is where this hearts and minds things falls on its ass. It is not a question of you makes them happier, you gives them more things its a question of as the man Charles "Chuck" Colson said "If you've got them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow." Most Westerners just don't understand this.


This misses the point. If the little chap picks up a gun and points it at you, you drop him. See him digging in an IED? It ends right then. He has no immunity, when it comes to taking armed action against you.
I'm not overly concerned about his respect. I just want him to fear using weapons against me.

OK now we are talking about the "you" here as being a soldier right? I agree with you thats what soldiers do.


What I do not want to get sucked into is an utterly pointless eradication effort, that consumes vast amounts of resources and will suck more people into the fight, it does not further my policy. Far better to kill the folks paying the farmers - and that also sets forth my policy.
My policy is against armed resistance, not agriculture.
Focus on destroying the enemy.

I agree that soldiers should not get involved in the eradication effort. But it must be done. Figure out how, chemical spraying, something mechanical etc etc. Civil power stuff, police, dept of agriculture, militias etc etc

There is a difference in roles and we should see that difference and not misuse fine soldiers to act as a song and dance clown act handing out sweets and soccer balls.

William F. Owen
07-02-2010, 10:45 AM
I agree that soldiers should not get involved in the eradication effort. But it must be done. Figure out how, chemical spraying, something mechanical etc etc. Civil power stuff, police, dept of agriculture, militias etc etc
...so once the armed opposition is defeated and the Government can again assert its control over the population, you can then start to plough up the poppy fields, having made growing poppies for opium production "illegal."

There is a difference in roles and we should see that difference and not misuse fine soldiers to act as a song and dance clown act handing out sweets and soccer balls.
And strangely, I agree with you.
.....but if the kids can show me where the local bad guys are burying IEDs, I can hand out the odd chocolate bar or football in return..... maybe.

JMA
07-02-2010, 11:23 AM
...so once the armed opposition is defeated and the Government can again assert its control over the population, you can then start to plough up the poppy fields, having made growing poppies for opium production "illegal."

In terms of military support to the civil power (Karzai is there for better or worse) the military can provide some protection for the people spraying the fields, ploughing (US sp = plowing) the stuff in or whatever.

So with a good bit of concurrent activity while the military are taking out anyone who fires a weapon or plants an IED the civilian elements are getting rid of the poppies. I like it.

JMA
07-02-2010, 11:24 AM
Rex, I agree with you and had no intention of making light of the problem. It is very difficult and just eradicating the crop as some suggest would, IMO, be an invitation to huge problems.

And these huge problems would be?

Entropy
07-02-2010, 01:41 PM
And these huge problems would be?

To begin with, you're talking about 50% of Afghanistan's GDP and the primary source of income for very many regular Afghans. People have to eat and feed their families - if you destroy their means to do that, what do you think they'll do? You can't kill half a nation's economy and expect positive effects from that - even assuming it were possible to do so.

Secondly, the scale of poppy cultivation is vast. Diverting resources to really try to destroy all the crops would negatively impact every other effort in Afghanistan because the resources required would be so large. We don't have the resources to do everything we might like to do in Afghanistan, so we must make priorities.

Third, it's a counterproductive COA, as are most which try to impose our own values on other people. We're not in Afghanistan to fight a drug war and that goal is not worth spilling our soldier's blood for, especially since I don't think there's been a single case where crop eradication was successful.

davidbfpo
07-02-2010, 03:08 PM
I have moved x25 post from the RFI thread Destroying Tar Opium to this existing thread, as this is a far better place for them and may the posts continue. The RFI thread is: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=10732

Ken White
07-04-2010, 02:48 AM
And these huge problems would be?in post 148 above. Recall my comment on US domestic concerns. Add those two together.

About 1/3 of the US is saying as you do, eradicate! Another third are just terribly concerned that the poor Farmers, their families and income should take precedence over those Western Kids who are of concern to you -- they think their kids would never have a drug problem (I know -- but they don't realize the little monster already does or is dealing in too many cases... :rolleyes:). The remaining third are leaners in both directions but basically undecided.

Thus, in the US, there is no consensus on what should be done so our typically American solution is to do little. Always been our way -- until someone goes too far or a consensus is reached.

I suspect most of NATO has the same splits but with a Parliamentary system, the government has much more decision authority than they do in a constitutional republic with a purposely designed dysfunctional governmental and electoral system.

We putter around until its almost too late, thus Churchill's statement: "You can always trust the Americans will do the right thing -- after they have tried every conceivable alternative." :wry:

JMA
07-04-2010, 07:29 AM
To begin with, you're talking about 50% of Afghanistan's GDP and the primary source of income for very many regular Afghans. People have to eat and feed their families - if you destroy their means to do that, what do you think they'll do? You can't kill half a nation's economy and expect positive effects from that - even assuming it were possible to do so.

Secondly, the scale of poppy cultivation is vast. Diverting resources to really try to destroy all the crops would negatively impact every other effort in Afghanistan because the resources required would be so large. We don't have the resources to do everything we might like to do in Afghanistan, so we must make priorities.

Third, it's a counterproductive COA, as are most which try to impose our own values on other people. We're not in Afghanistan to fight a drug war and that goal is not worth spilling our soldier's blood for, especially since I don't think there's been a single case where crop eradication was successful.

Does the same rationale apply to Mexico? ... (I await your response)

I never thought I would see the day when the US (and NATO) would support a narco economy openly aggressively and without shame. My of my how times have changed.

JMA
07-04-2010, 07:39 AM
in post 148 above. Recall my comment on US domestic concerns. Add those two together.

About 1/3 of the US is saying as you do, eradicate! Another third are just terribly concerned that the poor Farmers, their families and income should take precedence over those Western Kids who are of concern to you -- they think their kids would never have a drug problem (I know -- but they don't realize the little monster already does or is dealing in too many cases... :rolleyes:). The remaining third are leaners in both directions but basically undecided.

Thus, in the US, there is no consensus on what should be done so our typically American solution is to do little. Always been our way -- until someone goes too far or a consensus is reached.

I suspect most of NATO has the same splits but with a Parliamentary system, the government has much more decision authority than they do in a constitutional republic with a purposely designed dysfunctional governmental and electoral system.

We putter around until its almost too late, thus Churchill's statement: "You can always trust the Americans will do the right thing -- after they have tried every conceivable alternative." :wry:

Ken as I responded to Entropy above does this way of thinking apply to whats happening in Mexico right now?

The problem after eradication starts would be in Afghanistan for the Afghans the middlemen and the international dealer network. But since when has the US developed a concern for the welfare of those in the drug production cycle?

So I am growing dope in a hothouse in my basement and it accounts for 100% of my earnings the police will just leave me be? Poor guy they would say, can't take away his livelihood.

The US being a great litigation society I can't wait to follow the first law suit where parents sue the US government (and maybe the military) for providing support for the production of the stuff that killed their son. Sure to be a good one.

JMA
07-04-2010, 07:42 AM
Third, it's a counterproductive COA, as are most which try to impose our own values on other people. We're not in Afghanistan to fight a drug war and that goal is not worth spilling our soldier's blood for, especially since I don't think there's been a single case where crop eradication was successful.

Good, I'm glad you brought this up.

Maybe you can help me here by answering these two questions:

* What was the original aim of US military involvement in Afghanistan?

* What is the current aim of US military involvement in Afghanistan?

Many thanks

Ken White
07-04-2010, 03:21 PM
and films lead many in the world to believe... :eek:


Ken as I responded to Entropy above does this way of thinking apply to whats happening in Mexico right now?Yes.

But since when has the US developed a concern for the welfare of those in the drug production cycle?Along the line of those 'thirds' I cited above, it's always been present. Search here and on Google for 'War on Drugs' or 'Legalizing drugs'...
So I am growing dope in a hothouse in my basement and it accounts for 100% of my earnings the police will just leave me be? Poor guy they would say, can't take away his livelihood.Depends on the jurisdiction. This is a big country. Some areas are tolerant, others less so. The Cops do what the law says IF their Bosses push them to do it. In some places, the citizens (with varying views) are the 'Bosses,' in others not so much.
The US being a great litigation society I can't wait to follow the first law suit where parents sue the US government (and maybe the military) for providing support for the production of the stuff that killed their son. Sure to be a good one.Probably will. There'll probably be several. So? :D

The neat thing about the very large, very diverse 300 million plus person nation that is the US is that there are some people who agree with you and believe your approach is best. There are others who probably would think you're an idiot. Still others fall in between those poles. Many, like me, who believe that you don't understand all you think you know know about your stated positions on many things -- particularly the US and how it operates (which is erratically... :D) and that the answers to most things aren't nearly as simple as you make them -- or as some also wish they were.

Pity they aren't...;)

Entropy
07-04-2010, 07:09 PM
Does the same rationale apply to Mexico? ... (I await your response)

Yep, same rationale. I don't think the US has any business sending soldiers into Mexico to do crop eradication.


I never thought I would see the day when the US (and NATO) would support a narco economy openly aggressively and without shame. My of my how times have changed.

Except that's not what anyone is arguing. No one in this thread is suggesting that opium production is not a problem. What has been suggested is that it's a secondary problem and, furthermore, that going after the middle-men and "big fish" (when possible) is a better strategy than attempting to eradicate the crop in the fields for all the reasons cited upthread.

I would go further and argue that supply-side drug interdiction is ineffective - at least that's the US experience with 30 years of the "drug war." Can you point to any example where an eradication strategy has been successful?

So, if you want to convince me that eradication is the best policy, then you need to at least demonstrate that it's a feasible, achievable COA and have a plan to mitigate all the negative consequences.

JMA
07-04-2010, 08:31 PM
Yep, same rationale. I don't think the US has any business sending soldiers into Mexico to do crop eradication.

Except that's not what anyone is arguing. No one in this thread is suggesting that opium production is not a problem. What has been suggested is that it's a secondary problem and, furthermore, that going after the middle-men and "big fish" (when possible) is a better strategy than attempting to eradicate the crop in the fields for all the reasons cited upthread.

I would go further and argue that supply-side drug interdiction is ineffective - at least that's the US experience with 30 years of the "drug war." Can you point to any example where an eradication strategy has been successful?

So, if you want to convince me that eradication is the best policy, then you need to at least demonstrate that it's a feasible, achievable COA and have a plan to mitigate all the negative consequences.

Good, lets look at how on this basis the problem in Mexico should be handled.

(Note: I am only half joking here)

My reference for stats etc is Wikipedia.

OK, so lets cut out the middle man. 90% of cocaine entering the US transits Mexico. So why not allow the Colombians direct access through Florida? No more Mexican middle man.

Now that the US is active with the protection of poppy growers in Afghanistan why not let them export direct to the US (one would think there was plenty of space on US military planes to bring in the stuff for them. Again you cut out the Mexican middleman.

Ok so what to do about cannabis? Legalise it. After all its much less of a problem than the heavy stuff. The government can even plant it on state and national land so as to force the price down through availability. Out go the Mexicans.

So that leaves us with methamphetamine. Ok, you got to take the Mexicans out of the equation. They run the labs on both sides of the border. So why not licence the drug companies to produce the stuff to ensure quality control and put a health warning on the label.

That's the Mexicans done for. Drug problem... no change but will be able to get some tax revenue now. Probably billions. Build a few rehab clinics, make a few education videos...

JMA
07-04-2010, 08:46 PM
The neat thing about the very large, very diverse 300 million plus person nation that is the US is that there are some people who agree with you and believe your approach is best. There are others who probably would think you're an idiot. Still others fall in between those poles. Many, like me, who believe that you don't understand all you think you know know about your stated positions on many things -- particularly the US and how it operates (which is erratically... :D) and that the answers to most things aren't nearly as simple as you make them -- or as some also wish they were.

Pity they aren't...;)

Of course I don't understand the US, never been there.

All I am relaying is a view of how the US is seen by a good few billion people who don't live in the US. Surely by now you realise that no matter what the truth is it is the perception that matters in the end.

May I differ from you on one thing?

The answers are indeed obvious. It is the solutions which are often very difficult to implement.

Ken White
07-04-2010, 10:30 PM
Of course I don't understand the US, never been there.

All I am relaying is a view of how the US is seen by a good few billion people who don't live in the US. Surely by now you realise that no matter what the truth is it is the perception that matters in the end. All of it -- except that in many cases, their sometimes accurate and sometimes not perception and vision of 'truth' creates all sorts of problems for us. All our fault for not doing a better job of getting out a more accurate picture but we've always been terribly poor at that; unlikely to change in the near future. Not a 'woe is us' sort of thing, just reality and not a major problem IMO.

Older American are used to it, the younger ones nowadays often seem to get their shorts in a wad over it for no great reason. In the eyes of some, the bad thing is that we know of the mispercpetions, could correct them but just don't care to bother. :wry:
May I differ from you on one thing...The answers are indeed obvious. It is the solutions which are often very difficult to implement.Sometimes. Some times the answers that seem obvious and would be good for some or even many will not work for others.

Occasionally, as in this case, the solution is or could be easily implemented but the answer is to the wrong question. ;)

JMA
07-26-2010, 01:57 PM
(Edited out for this thread; originally appeared on Children in War thread).

I'm trying to figure out the reason why Afghanistan was allowed to develop into a narc state. So I look at Mexico and then LA (and others). The simple deduction is that if its OK so close to home then who cares about Afghanistan, right?

Then again maybe not ;)

davidbfpo
07-26-2010, 03:52 PM
JMA asked:
I'm trying to figure out the reason why Afghanistan was allowed to develop into a narc state.

We have talked around the subject of Afghanistan and narcotics, IIRC on several threads, but not
why Afghanistan was allowed to develop into a narc state..

I am not an expert on the issue, so from the comfort of a faraway "armchair" here goes.

Afghanistan has always grown narcotics, I suspect heroin production is a relatively new phenomenon (will look for clues another time) and for a very long time neither external powers (neighbours mainly), let alone those with internal power have sought to hamper production. It is not an area that lends itself naturally to heroin poppy cultivation, I recall back in the 1970's the focus was on 'The Golden Triangle', but it shares a lack of good governance.

Roll-on the Soviet invasion and the campaign against them. Growing heroin then became a resistance enabler, nay an Islamic duty (dispite the Koran's stricures on narcotics) and quickly became a veritable money machine. Read Gretchen Peter's book 'Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda' for far more detail and opinion (and a thread on the book: ).

Note that in Helmand Province the "breadbasket" for poppy cultivation the original 'Cold War' era of US-sponsored irrigation and development I doubt ever considered poppies as a crop. I am sure there are reliable sources that show other crops were grown there into the Soviet era.

Post-9/11 and the West's intervention for a host of reasons, mainly political, no-one wanted to consider narcotics - again refer to Gretchen Peter's book. This part we have covered in previous threads as to why so little action was taken. 120mm in particular was "boots on the ground". The main thread being: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1234

IMHO we decided to fight other enemies and not upset too many Afghans, from the poor farmer who sells his children when disaster strikes (eradication visitations), who may take up arms too (if paid enough or hates us) to the narco-barons and otehrs entrenched in Afghan government and more. It is one of the weaknesses - to the public - of the UK's involvement in Afghanistan that we have flunked this issue, why are we fighting and doing very little to stop heroin production? Note we share a mutual concern with heroin supply with Iran, which has millions of addicts.:confused:

Hope that helps and if others far more expert chime in hurrah.:D

huskerguy7
07-26-2010, 05:59 PM
JMA asked:

We have talked around the subject of Afghanistan and narcotics, IIRC on several threads, but not

I am not an expert on the issue, so from the comfort of a faraway "armchair" here goes.

Afghanistan has always grown narcotics, I suspect heroin production is a relatively new phenomenon (will look for clues another time) and for a very long time neither external powers (neighbours mainly), let alone those with internal power have sought to hamper production. It is not an area that lends itself naturally to heroin poppy cultivation, I recall back in the 1970's the focus was on 'The Golden Triangle', but it shares a lack of good governance.

Roll-on the Soviet invasion and the campaign against them. Growing heroin then became a resistance enabler, nay an Islamic duty (dispite the Koran's stricures on narcotics) and quickly became a veritable money machine. Read Gretchen Peter's book 'Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda' for far more detail and opinion (and a thread on the book: ).

Note that in Helmand Province the "breadbasket" for poppy cultivation the original 'Cold War' era of US-sponsored irrigation and development I doubt ever considered poppies as a crop. I am sure there are reliable sources that show other crops were grown there into the Soviet era.

Post-9/11 and the West's intervention for a host of reasons, mainly political, no-one wanted to consider narcotics - again refer to Gretchen Peter's book. This part we have covered in previous threads as to why so little action was taken. 120mm in particular was "boots on the ground". The main thread being: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1234

IMHO we decided to fight other enemies and not upset too many Afghans, from the poor farmer who sells his children when disaster strikes (eradication visitations), who may take up arms too (if paid enough or hates us) to the narco-barons and otehrs entrenched in Afghan government and more. It is one of the weaknesses - to the public - of the UK's involvement in Afghanistan that we have flunked this issue, why are we fighting and doing very little to stop heroin production? Note we share a mutual concern with heroin supply with Iran, which has millions of addicts.:confused:

Hope that helps and if others far more expert chime in hurrah.:D

I'm no expert, but I've had the chance to talk with my neighbor who is more familiar with the situation (he's an adviser for a reconstruction project).

Surprisingly, pomegranates have been very popular in Afghanistan. They were grown throughout the early 20th century and there was substantial demand (especially in Pakistan and India). Pomegranates not only have nutritional value, but they can be used to produce different medicines and cures; essentially, it was a successful crop. However, during the Soviet occupation, much of the land was destroyed. The different mines, explosions, battles, crashes, debris, and "war junk" caused a substantial amount of the land to be difficult to grow pomegranates. As a result, farmers turned to poppies which are easier to grow (plus, getting ahold of the seed in that region isn't difficult). The next thing you know, poppies are being grown and heroin is being produced (prior to the OEF, the Taliban claimed to have clamped down on heroin production because it violates Sharia law, but this was relaxed when they were overthrown).

His project's goal is to revive the pomegranate crop in Afghanistan. They've been able to set up distribution centers for the seeds, but they've discovered another problem. Since some of their funding comes from USAID, there is a "Hello from the US" sticker on the bags. Obviously, when the Taliban see the farmers with these stickers, violence erupts. Their current goal is to remove all signs of international involvement, but that is difficult.

This kind of got off track, but I think it shows partially why Afghanistan became a narco state. Their were not many agricultural options available.

JMA
08-01-2010, 09:27 AM
This kind of got off track, but I think it shows partially why Afghanistan became a narco state. Their were not many agricultural options available.

As an explanation that may work but as an excuse it does not.

Poor neighbourhoods it is often said resort to drugs to survive or make a living. Well that is at the expense of other people and therefore unacceptable.

The fact that the US and the European countries involved in Afghanistan have reached the point where there is tacit acceptance of poppy cultivation even though it kills probably more of their kids than the war does and partially funds the Taliban war against their forces in the country absolutely boggles the mind.

Eradication of the poppy crop is probably the only good reason for ISAF to remain in Afghanistan.

davidbfpo
01-16-2011, 08:49 PM
Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den to finding a report by URD, the French government's development agency, on Afghan's drug problem:http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/Strategies_to_counter_opiate_in_Afghanistan.pdf

The blogsite comments:
They conclude that "Though slow, practices are changing and there is growing recognition that there is no one replacement crop, nor any one “alternative” form of development, but that only holistic socio-economic and political development will make it possible to reduce dependence on opium poppy cultivation in a sustainable manner.

davidbfpo
07-23-2011, 03:23 PM
On the CIMIC website there is open access to 'Afghanistan Provincial Indicators' and an array of data, including Opium: Area under cultivation (in Hectares). More resources are available on CIMIC after registration:https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/cimicwebWelcome.aspx


For Helmand Province and Kandahar:

2003 015,371 03,005
2005 026,500 12,989
2007 102,770 16,615
2009 No data 19,811
2010 No data 25,835

Helmand:https://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Helmand.aspx

Kandahar:https://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Kandahar.aspx

Clearly something is wrong here, I just - vainly I fear - hope that US$ millions have not been spent on drug control projects.

Bill Moore
07-24-2011, 03:20 AM
David,

I thought the UK had the lead on the effort against drugs in Afghanistan? I know the DEA is also involved, but overall in charge of synching the effort, who does that?

The numbers you show are alarming and surprising (while I didn't think we were winning, I didn't know the problem was actually getting a lot bigger).
Unlike terrorism, a good bit of the narcotics trade is facilitated by lack of viable economic alternatives for the farmers. I recall a few years back the USG made a deal with some of the Afghan opium farmers to provide seeds, fertilizer, etc. for a replacement crop, and then at the 11th hour the State Department pulled funding from the program, so once again it appears we can be our own worst enemies.

jcustis
07-24-2011, 06:35 AM
Unlike terrorism, a good bit of the narcotics trade is facilitated by lack of viable economic alternatives for the farmers. I recall a few years back the USG made a deal with some of the Afghan opium farmers to provide seeds, fertilizer, etc. for a replacement crop, and then at the 11th hour the State Department pulled funding from the program, so once again it appears we can be our own worst enemies.

Unless there are teeth to force compliance and planting of the free/subsidized seeds, the farmers have little incentive to actually plant the replacement crop, so the lack of funding might have saved us from wasting the money all together.

The governor of Helmand had a counter-narcotics campaign during my unit's deploy (in advance of the winter wheat season) that consisted of four pillars or treatment of addiction, education about the deleterious effects of growing narcotics, a replacement crop program (consisting of wheat seed and some vegetable seeds, and eradication (this was billed as a precision effort to eradicate select fields in order to send a deliberate message).

In the district my unit had responsibility for, the program of bringing in seed and fertilizer to distribute at a slashed price, barely made it off the ground due to terrible logistics. Farmers queued up for it when it did arrive, following some semblance of an organized distribution that was led by the DG's tashkiel, but in the end, we had to stand back and merely observe. We had no ability to verify who the seed and fertilizer outputs were going to, relative to need, and whether the recipients were even the right target population of farmers who might otherwise grow poppy that season. It was clear though that low-grade corruption was certainly in play when the police chief found a few extra rupees in his pocket from men who were allowed to slide into the line despite their names not being on the register.

The bare fact remains that these programs don't have the necessary enforcement components, and if a farmer is going to get more $$$ per hectare by growing opium, and can grow it easier than the water-intensive wheat or corn, there is no reason he would grow it as a cash crop outside of a smaller plot that allows him to feed his family. He stands to gain more by buying it at the subsidized price, haul it out and sell it at a higher price, and pocket the cash, all the while as he prepares for the upcoming opium season.

The larger plots of land that saw wheat and corn grown were clearly owned by wealthy landowners who could diversify, but they still had a variety of hectares planted with marijuana and poppy, often further back from the natural lines of drift.

Until the coalition and GIRoA are willing to make some painful decisions, and assume the risk that some farmers are going to be put out and pissed when their crops are destroyed, whether in the plot or after the harvest, the opium cycle will continue. Disrupting the cycle after the harvest has begun, and the distribution network is active, is terribly difficult when you have a troops-to-task ratio that isn't in you favor.

So therein lies our Catch-22. You can burn it in the field and eyes get wide because conventional wisdom has it that you will grow insurgents as quickly as the poppy bulbs burn. You can alternately attempt to capture the drugs after they are refined into opium tar or hashish and formed into the 10 kilo bricks. Despite the limited road network, trying to interdict that traffic is terribly difficult, especially when you consider that possessing 10 kilos of heroin was not considered by GIRoA to be an offense worthy of detention, adjudication by trial, sentencing, and imprisonment. The theme was that growing and possessing drugs was bad, but we could never pin the district governor down on what precisely the law prescribed and what GIRoA was actually going to do about it. We had a few big hauls when we caught the traffickers in the expanses of the southern desert, but I think we were barely scratching the surface.

I'll admit that our district and my unit's situation (the southernmost coalition unit in Helmand), compounded by the lack of police influence beyond the district center and the few traffic control points that the border police manned, may have been unique. I don't know how common our situation was across the other districts or provinces, but I'd for sure be happy to hear from other folks who had a tie in to the drug issue during their deploy.

You know, the most difficult thing to swallow for me and the OIC of our CA team was the fact that the use of wheat as an attempt to replace opium was not based on any scientific process as far as we could tell. The two shared the same growing season, but poppy is a weed and will grow anywhere. Wheat takes a little bit more finesse, and it wasn't even clear that the majority of the soil and water sources could support wheat growth. It was simply shoved down our throats, despite our efforts to try to find a solution that was better tuned to our local situation.

davidbfpo
07-24-2011, 10:00 AM
David,

I thought the UK had the lead on the effort against drugs in Afghanistan? I know the DEA is also involved, but overall in charge of synching the effort, who does that?

The numbers you show are alarming and surprising (while I didn't think we were winning, I didn't know the problem was actually getting a lot bigger).

Bill,

Yes that is my understanding that the UK 'leads' on counter-narcotics and the 'lead' agency on the ground is the Serious & Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which did have a substantial outpost in Helmand two years ago plus. SOCA is a criminal intelligence and law enforcement agency; one that has a very mixed reputation.:wry: SOCA's international partner is the US DEA.


..alarming and surprising..the problem..getting a lot bigger.

Yes, an understatement:(, scandal is mild and a disaster for UK public policy - in Afghanistan and at home.

I do not watch for coverage on counter-narcotics, which IMHO is rarely in the public domain and I doubt if HMG, SOCA and the DEA would appreciate the public, let alone politicians knowing the problem is getting bigger. Later I will see if there are any official, HMG statements on the situation.

davidbfpo
07-24-2011, 10:06 AM
Jon,

Thanks for that insight and your arguments reinforce my view that we should simply buy the initial opiate product on site, then destroy it. This suggestion has appeared on another thread and led to a debate.

The challenge then would be to identify a local replacement crop, perhaps an international competition? Assuming an opium poppy alternative crop in such terrain has not been found before, just that we've all forgotten.

jcustis
07-24-2011, 03:55 PM
The Afghans grow vegetables and some hardy cash crops, along with wheat and corn (which are water-intensive as I mentioned), so things can be grown. The output is variable depending on the access to canal irrigation from the Helmand, which is at a lower state at that time of year due to control policies at the Kajaki Dam and the lack or rainfall. The locals literally dam the Helmand and "push water uphill" in order to get it to their pumps, and the canals are at times silted over something fierce. The local answer is to employ village and migrant labor to clean them, perhaps reinforced with a caterpillar-tracked backhoe. The elders are very adept by now at trying to get the coalition to drop money for a canal cleaning or repair project, when they would likely be doing it regardless.

The poppy harvest experienced a lower haul in the Spring of 2010, and many of the locals spread the rumor that the coalition had done something to spike the poppy. Turns out, if I remember correctly, that the poppy simply experienced either some blight or pest that year.

We were hopeful that the possibility of lower output or even worse blight would drive farmers to move to a replacement crop, but the exact opposite seemed to happen, because the price of opium tar ended up going higher due to the impact the poor harvest had on supply. It was hard to turn away from poppy when the price was climbing and expected to go even higher.

This is all complicated by the fact that in our district, much of the land was owned by men who lived far away, in some cases Lashkar Gah or Goreshk. Finding them would be necessary if you wanted to buy the crop. And what then of paying the locals who live on the land and care for it as it grows, or the migrants who swarm in with their cutting knives to score the bulbs and scrape the resin off? Those are larger eradication policy questions that I never saw a cohesive plan, or even coherent policy paper, for; and I spent a lot of time with my team scouring the secure networks looking for someone's proposal.

Bill Moore
07-24-2011, 04:42 PM
All the Western governments are having serious financial challenges, so the idea of having our governments pay for and then destroy the product year after year doesn't sound too appealing, even if it is more cost effective than the ineffeective drug war. I think it would take quite a bit of political salesmanship to make this option a reality. We have already signed up to spend billions to sustain Afghanistan's security forces for an indefinite period.

We need to start all over again and generate some creative solutions, instead of continuing down the same failed path.

jcustis
07-24-2011, 04:59 PM
The drug scenario in Afghanistan is akin to the rotten apple in the bushel basket of good ones. We need to figure something out, and act on it. I don't think a coherent policy is on anyone's mind, unfortunately, and without it we are just sticking our fingers in the dike.

Seahorse
07-25-2011, 06:46 PM
It is discouraging to note the poppy problem continues to grow worse despite claims by some counter-narcotics organisations of the increases in seizures and eradication. The problem however is growing faster than these 'successes', is involving more and more of the Afghan population and economy, is increasing in its diversity and resilience and most current efforts are only causing greater instability for the regions and country.

I have made small attempts in otehr threads here at SWJ to introduce an alternative to the current failed counter-narcotics strategies in an attempt to deal with the issue holistically. Looking at the problem from a systems perspective can yield strategies that have greater positive effects and far fewer negative secondary and tertiary effects.

For example, too many strategies rely on poppy eradication and related replacement efforts which fail to look broadly and deal with the secondary problems created by the poppy industry as a whole. Supplying wheat: may not work for all farmers, may not be viable to grow and/or market; furthermore, many grow wheat for subsistence and not to market it, some feed the seed to their cattle rather than grow wheat, and generally the associated labour for wheat is up to 80% lower than poppy which means that a vast number of Afghans that benefit from the poppy trade are now displaced and looking for an income (maybe recruits for the insurgency?). Buying the crop: feeds the current system, raises the street price and incentivises more Afghans and the potential for continued corruption. Destroying the crop: feeds corruption, contributes to insecurity, foments resentment from majority of Afghans, has proven to be a failed strategy.

I propose considering setting up an agricultural marketing type board consisting of a licence fee based quoto to grow poppy by the acre (not produce opiates) which would be managed in partnership with the current powerbrokers, landowners and government (police and provincial). A set number and size of licenses would be sold annually, with the fees and number adjusted each year in order to i) reduce the current poppy cultivation by 25% in the first year compared to current levels, ii) reduce the number of licences each year over ten years to nil, iii) continue and expand eradication and alternative livelihood progrmammes, iv) produce government revenues and involvement, and finally v) implement some demand reduction measures in destination countries.

In this proposal; there would be 100% eradication enforced in all non-licenced areas, farmers would have ten years to transition to licit agricultural products (vineyards for grapes and raisins, pomegranates, nut groves, etc.), fees from sales would go into alternatives, precurser opiate production chemicals from external suppliers would be interdicted, education programmes would be funded and corruption would be directly monitored and controlled.

That is the essence of the strategy, which I hope to publish as a longer paper with supporting evidence and conclusions. It is entirely feasible to adopt such a proposal province by province as a test case as well, however a whole country effort is more appropriate given the recent and continuing history.

Regards,

David

davidbfpo
07-25-2011, 07:42 PM
David C,

Thanks for the considered and informed response. Plus being from someone who has had "boots on the ground" and not from my distant "armchair".

Now if we, the UK, are in Helmand Province in ten years time I will be amazed.

jcustis
07-26-2011, 05:23 AM
I propose considering setting up an agricultural marketing type board consisting of a licence fee based quoto to grow poppy by the acre (not produce opiates) which would be managed in partnership with the current powerbrokers, landowners and government (police and provincial). A set number and size of licenses would be sold annually, with the fees and number adjusted each year in order to i) reduce the current poppy cultivation by 25% in the first year compared to current levels, ii) reduce the number of licences each year over ten years to nil, iii) continue and expand eradication and alternative livelihood progrmammes, iv) produce government revenues and involvement, and finally v) implement some demand reduction measures in destination countries.

This will never be tenable, until we get a handle on the matter of corruption and nepotism across all things currently that involve GIRoA, ANSF, development, etc. I mean widespread, sweeping changes that aren't likely without a lot of time, energy, partnered commitment, and honesty.

As davidbfpo shrugs, we don't have that sort of time.

Maybe we should study what the Taliban did more closely, when they went at opium for a bit, for lessons learned. :D

Bill Moore
07-26-2011, 06:47 AM
Maybe we should study what the Taliban did more closely, when they went at opium for a bit, for lessons learned.

Actually that isn't a bad idea. I doubt that we could replicate their behavior and success, but it would still be interesting to explore:

+ how they reduced the trade
+ what the impact was on the farmers and others
+ how the farmers and others adapted
+ "why" the farmers went back to growing opium after the Taliban were forced out of power

If we could answer these factually (not based on assumptions) then it would probably yield some interesting insights in our never ending pursuit of a better way.

JMA
07-26-2011, 04:46 PM
Actually that isn't a bad idea. I doubt that we could replicate their behavior and success, but it would still be interesting to explore:

+ how they reduced the trade
+ what the impact was on the farmers and others
+ how the farmers and others adapted
+ "why" the farmers went back to growing opium after the Taliban were forced out of power

If we could answer these factually (not based on assumptions) then it would probably yield some interesting insights in our never ending pursuit of a better way.

A few facts:

* Around 90% of the opiates that make it onto the world market originate from Afghanistan.

* The US government/NATO/ISAF are doing very little to reduce this flow.

* The Taliban stopped all poppy cultivation in Helmand in 2001 (without any crop replacement programs or cost or any armed uprising against them)

* The Taliban ban with the resultant loss of revenue all but bankrupted the country.

* (oh yes the the killer fact) That a portion of the revenues generated by the Afghan drug trade (which has tacit acceptance of the US government and ISAF) are used by the Taliban to fund the war against ISAF with significant resultant cost in terms of death and mutilation.

All this and despite the solution being blindingly obvious the US/ISAF just bungle on and advance deeper into the swamp. Very sad situation.

jmm99
07-27-2011, 05:44 PM
One can no longer speak of purely "terrorist" or purely transnational criminal groups, as exemplified by the following:

DOJ News Release (http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/2011/nyc072611p.html) (July 26, 2011):


Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Arrests in DEA Narco-Terrorism Undercover Operations

One DEA Operation Results in Arrests of Defendants for Agreeing to Acquire $9.5 Million Worth of Surface-to-Air Missiles and Other Weapons for Hizballah

Separate DEA Operation Culminates in Arrest of Heroin and Weapons Trafficker from Kandahar, Afghanistan for Taliban-Related Narco-Terrorism Conspiracy

Note the well-traveled defendants and where they were arrested:


Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Michele M. Leonhart, the Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), announced the unsealing of two indictments resulting from two DEA narco-terrorism undercover operations: first, an indictment against Siavosh Henareh, Bachar Wehbe, and Cetin Aksu for conspiring to provide various forms of support to Hizballah; second, an indictment against Taza Gul Alizai ("Gul") for narco-terrorism conspiracy, narco-terrorism, and heroin importation related to his supplying of 15 kilograms of heroin and six AK-47 assault rifles to a DEA confidential source whom Gul believed represented the Taliban. Henareh and aksu were arrested yesterday in Bucharest, Romania, where they were detained pending extradition to the United States. Wehbe and Gul were arrested yesterday in the Republic of the Maldives, and arrived in the Southern District of New York earlier today.

Of much greater general interest is the recent Executive Order--Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/25/executive-order-blocking-property-transnational-criminal-organizations) (July 25, 2011):


By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, find that the activities of significant transnational criminal organizations, such as those listed in the Annex to this order, have reached such scope and gravity that they threaten the stability of international political and economic systems. Such organizations are becoming increasingly sophisticated and dangerous to the United States; they are increasingly entrenched in the operations of foreign governments and the international financial system, thereby weakening democratic institutions, degrading the rule of law, and undermining economic markets. These organizations facilitate and aggravate violent civil conflicts and increasingly facilitate the activities of other dangerous persons. I therefore determine that significant transnational criminal organizations constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
....
Entities

1. THE BROTHERS’ CIRCLE (f.k.a. FAMILY OF ELEVEN; f.k.a. THE TWENTY)
2. CAMORRA
3. YAKUZA (a.k.a. BORYOKUDAN; a.k.a. GOKUDO)
4. LOS ZETAS

Note that the legal authority cited is Title 50 and not Title 10.

Regards

Mike

davidbfpo
10-12-2011, 09:37 PM
Hat tip to Circling The Lion's Den, which has id'd a UN report:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2011/10/massive-increase-in-afghan-opium.html

A few choice sentences from Nick's review:
A total of 131,000 hectares was under cultivation, compared to 125,000 ha last year. However, that obscures the fact that the amount of opium produced will rise by 61 per cent this year compared to last, to a total of 5,800 metric tonnes.

As I watch Helmand Province:
There have been some counter-narcotic successes, with a reduction in opium cultivation in central Helmand province, mainly due to the successful introduction of counter narcotics programmes by the central government. But in the north and south of the province production increased.

The final sentence reminds us of the impact on Afghans, have a look!

JMA
10-13-2011, 12:16 PM
Hat tip to Circling The Lion's Den, which has id'd a UN report:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2011/10/massive-increase-in-afghan-opium.html

A few choice sentences from Nick's review:

As I watch Helmand Province:

The final sentence reminds us of the impact on Afghans, have a look!

David, there is no serious counter-narcotic programme in Afghanistan... I mean nobody... and I mean nobody could be that incompetent.

What was not mentioned beyond the dollar terms the Taliban's cut will be is what they are likely to do with it and an estimation of how many killed and maimed ISAF soldiers that with translate into.

taabistan
10-21-2011, 05:04 AM
Somewhat old, but relevant:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VbltuJERN2U

120mm
04-05-2012, 02:25 AM
...So I would not spend a cent on agriculture in Afghanistan... in fact the next trick should be to destroy their irrigation system if they use continue to use them to cultivate poppies. Just give them the Gypsy's warning on that... and if they don't listen... then let the Engineers have a little fun with demolitions.

And that worked SO WELL for the Soviets when they tried it.

Equating poppy-cultivation to insurgency in Afghanistan is only one of the major mistakes we've made in that country.

But if you want to set the whole country afire, have fun.

120mm
04-05-2012, 02:29 AM
What if it's the government that ignores the rule of law, refuses to negotiate, and resorts to violence? It happens, and it's a good reason to be very careful about choosing what governments we want to support and deciding what insurgents need to be countered.

Or what if we, the US, crammed a completely unworkable and illegitimate over-centralized government down the throats of Afghanistan as a whole?

The kind of government that rewards bad behavior and has zero responsiveness to localities that are not dominated by Pashtuns. You know, the same Pashtuns that are the Taliban, by and large. (I know, I know, there are IMU out there, but I digress.)

JMA
04-05-2012, 10:27 AM
And that worked SO WELL for the Soviets when they tried it.

Tried what? Are we talking about the same thing?


Equating poppy-cultivation to insurgency in Afghanistan is only one of the major mistakes we've made in that country.

If you connect the dots (and read) you will see that the Taliban are partially funded by the Afghan drug trade. How dumb can the US continue to be to allow the source of that funding to flourish right under their noses? The situation is so outrageous that one needs to demand to know who in the US political/civilian/military structures have been bought off by the druglords.


But if you want to set the whole country afire, have fun.

So what are you saying? The US's current best 'friends' the druglords are more dangerous than the Taliban? A war requires warriors. A war against the Taliban requires warriors. A war against the drug lords requires warriors. If you ain't got the warriors who are up for the fight better to stay at home and play tin-soldiers.

Try this... if there are no poppies grown there will be no opium which means there will be no heroin... no funding for the Taliban (from that source), no druglords, no heroin deaths, no heroin addictions. Not that difficult to understand is it?

tequila
04-05-2012, 03:11 PM
JMA - So let me see if I understand.

Basically your solution to the insurgency/opium problem, assuming they are the same thing, is to threaten the Afghan farming population with the destruction of their farmland if they do not comply with our directives?

Allow me to point out two things.

1) Population clearance as COIN tactic has been tried in Afghanistan before. The Soviets pursued this strategy in both the south and the east post-1984 - it generated over five million Afghan refugees and killed tens of thousands, if not more. This did not work for them because the Soviets, just like the U.S. now, could not control the Pakistani or Iranian borders. These refugees came back across the border and continued the insurgency unabated.

2) Assuming your program was adapted successfully, would opium production not simply move to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and destabilize those polities? When supply fell in Colombia during the Uribe war against the FARC, it increased correspondingly in Bolivia and Peru. It is currently behind a resurgence in Peru of the Shining Path.

JMA
04-05-2012, 06:00 PM
JMA - So let me see if I understand.

Obviously you don't


Basically your solution to the insurgency/opium problem, assuming they are the same thing, is to threaten the Afghan farming population with the destruction of their farmland if they do not comply with our directives?

Let me help you here... the 'opium problem' is a significant source of funding for the Taliban. Without poppies there would be no druglords. 90% of the world's heroin production comes from Afghanistan and it kills tens of thousands each year.

So it is no only insane, but criminally insane, to allow poppy cultivation to flourish. (Remembering Vietnam I wonder if each and every US aircraft out of Afghanistan is given the once over on arrival in the States. Its just a question of how far up the line it goes.)


Allow me to point out two things.

1) Population clearance as COIN tactic has been tried in Afghanistan before. The Soviets pursued this strategy in both the south and the east post-1984 - it generated over five million Afghan refugees and killed tens of thousands, if not more. This did not work for them because the Soviets, just like the U.S. now, could not control the Pakistani or Iranian borders. These refugees came back across the border and continued the insurgency unabated.

As I stated, tens of thousands are being killed by heroin produced under the 'protection' of the US military in Afghanistan. This is criminal.

The Soviet invasion created the environment where poppy cultivation flourished. The flow of opium derivatives ever since has been outwards.

Now I would have thought that a nice coulurful field of poppies would be relatively easy to deal with rather than packets of the derivatives.

Now it appears that the Soviets did attempt to destroy agriculture so as so draw people into the cities where could be better controlled or force them out of the country where they became other peoples problem.

But despite common sense the US has chosen to cosy up to a corrupt/criminal/illegitimate regime and every low down druglord in town. Its criminal behaviour plain and simple.


2) Assuming your program was adapted successfully, would opium production not simply move to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and destabilize those polities? When supply fell in Colombia during the Uribe war against the FARC, it increased correspondingly in Bolivia and Peru. It is currently behind a resurgence in Peru of the Shining Path.

So the logic is just let it flourish where it is currently being grown? Poppies are grown in the open. Personally I don't care about any loss of earnings those who currently grow poppies incur (just as most people would not care if some hillbilly family were bust over their marijuana field or moonshine still).

One day someone will study how the US sleepwalked into bed with the scum of Afghanistan.

tequila
04-05-2012, 06:36 PM
Obviously you don't

I don't see anywhere in your post where you have a different solution other than the destruction of Afghan farmland where poppies are grown - just moral arguments about how poppies must be destroyed.


Now it appears that the Soviets did attempt to destroy agriculture so as so draw people into the cities where could be better controlled or force them out of the country where they became other peoples problem.

Yes, we both agree with that. But those people did not really become an Iranian or a Pakistani problem. The Iranians and Pakistanis ensured that they remained a major Soviet/Afghan government problem. How would your plan differ from the Soviet one, and why would it have different results?


So the logic is just let it flourish where it is currently being grown? Poppies are grown in the open. Personally I don't care about any loss of earnings those who currently grow poppies incur (just as most people would not care if some hillbilly family were bust over their marijuana field or moonshine still).

The logic is this: the people involved in poppy production are not just a few hillbillies, isolated from society - it is a large percentage of the population of southern Afghanistan. Destroying their agricultural land would represent a major effort and would likely encounter severe opposition from both the Afghan government and the Taliban, not to mention the people themselves.

Assuming that we are successful in destroying all this land and wrecking the southern Afghan opium economy, we will have accomplished what?

- We will likely have killed a lot of Afghans and convinced many others that our presence is actively harmful.

- We will have disrupted some Taliban funding and opium planting for at least a year or so.

- Opium planting will displace elsewhere, most likely Central Asia or Pakistan, but previous episodes in drug eradication (including the Taliban's own ban on opium in 2001) have shown that the opium supplies to the drug markets of Europe and America will not be interrupted significantly.

I doubt any of these factors will either (1) defeat the insurgency or (2) impact the world supply of illegal opium.

So why should we do it, if it will have little to potentially negative effect?

JMA
04-05-2012, 07:06 PM
I don't see anywhere in your post where you have a different solution other than the destruction of Afghan farmland where poppies are grown - just moral arguments about how poppies must be destroyed.

Sorry friend but you need to up the intellectual level of your argument.

Destroying a crop is not the equivalent of destroying the farmland itself. Taking out a key piece of the irrigation system does not mean that the whole irrigation system gets to be destroyed... just placed beyond use (if necessary) until they play ball.

Yes I know that in the US of today everything, and that means everything, is negotiable but that does not negate from the simple truth that the US forces in Afghanistan are nothing more than proxies for druglords and corrupt politicians. If that is as low as the US military has sunk to then thats how it is ... but let no one talk of honour and the honourable profession of arms while that is going on.

tequila
04-05-2012, 07:34 PM
Sorry friend but you need to up the intellectual level of your argument.

Destroying a crop is not the equivalent of destroying the farmland itself. Taking out a key piece of the irrigation system does not mean that the whole irrigation system gets to be destroyed... just placed beyond use (if necessary) until they play ball.


So, rather than permanently despoiling the land, we will simply remove part of the irrigation system, destroy planted opium, and ensure that no one repairs said irrigation system or replants the opium.

I am not sure how doing so changes any of what I said before, except that this solution will be more costly in terms of manpower requirements and technical expertise.

Can you address how doing so will at least assist in defeating the insurgency or significantly degrading opium supply to the point where the benefits involved would outweigh the costs?

JMA
04-06-2012, 07:02 AM
So, rather than permanently despoiling the land, we will simply remove part of the irrigation system, destroy planted opium, and ensure that no one repairs said irrigation system or replants the opium.

I am not sure how doing so changes any of what I said before, except that this solution will be more costly in terms of manpower requirements and technical expertise.

Can you address how doing so will at least assist in defeating the insurgency or significantly degrading opium supply to the point where the benefits involved would outweigh the costs?

I believe you understand exactly what I mean.

Look it is really simple... in a war it helps to know who your enemy is.

It just so happens that your friendly Afghan poppy growers are killing more US kids (90% of 2,000 annual heroin deaths in the US) than Taliban bombs and bullets. That this simple fact has been missed is rather ... strange, I'm sure you will agree. That the US diplomatic/military contingents in-country continue to use the troops on the ground to protect the source of supply is strange to the point of bizarre. (Worth investigation I suggest)

So where are the Taliban getting their money from?

* From (US allies) in the Gulf

* From taking a cut from the opium trade

* From taking a cut from the billions of US tax-payers $ supposedly to be used for aid and development.

Read here and weep!

Funding the Enemy: How U.S. Taxpayers Bankroll the Taliban (http://www.amazon.com/Funding-Enemy-Taxpayers-Bankroll-Taliban/dp/1616146036)

Dayuhan
04-06-2012, 10:17 AM
your friendly Afghan poppy growers are killing more US kids (90% of 2,000 annual heroin deaths in the US) than Taliban bombs and bullets.

Guess we ought to be serving warrants on the major distillers for those 75k deaths caused annually by alcohol.

Poppy growing is an issue and a problem, but to blame the growers for the deaths at the other end of the supply chain seems to overlook a whole lot of involvement by people who are at least as culpable, or more so. Blowing that out of proportion is not a way to arrive at effective policy.

JMA
04-06-2012, 11:12 AM
Guess we ought to be serving warrants on the major distillers for those 75k deaths caused annually by alcohol.

Poppy growing is an issue and a problem, but to blame the growers for the deaths at the other end of the supply chain seems to overlook a whole lot of involvement by people who are at least as culpable, or more so. Blowing that out of proportion is not a way to arrive at effective policy.

Oh boy...

... forget it

marct
04-06-2012, 03:13 PM
Guess we ought to be serving warrants on the major distillers for those 75k deaths caused annually by alcohol.

Poppy growing is an issue and a problem, but to blame the growers for the deaths at the other end of the supply chain seems to overlook a whole lot of involvement by people who are at least as culpable, or more so. Blowing that out of proportion is not a way to arrive at effective policy.


Oh boy...

... forget it

Why forget it? You are making a claim that is, basically, indefensible unless you are willing to extend it to other "causes" of death in the US. Would you make the same claim against the use of force in securing oil fields even though there are 40,000+ deaths per year due to car accidents in the US?

Let's go back to another component of your argument that you made earlier:


My position is that it is not with the restrictions placed on the US and Brit armies in Afghanistan. Rules of engagement and (horrifyingly) increasingly attitudes of officers (some displayed around here) which are more suited to work with the Peacecorps than with an army at war.

Then inexplicably the US have appeared to forgotten the simple lesson they learned in Vietnam - where a segment of their Viet Cong enemy were 'farmers by day, soldiers by night'. (If they have not forgotten then they have no #*!# idea how to deal with that)

This comes back to the need - IMHO - to use proxies who can fight by the same lack of rules as the Taliban. Use of such tactics or methods would not be possible for use by US or Brit forces. (Nor would - most likely - the US Congress allow such proxies to kill in the name of the US).

First off, the socio-technical context of Afghanistan is quite different from that of Vietnam. I truly doubt that the "lessons" have been forgotten. Instead, I would argue that the "solutions" have been rendered impossible - and don't forget that the US lost Vietnam. Even if we draw on the lessons of Malasia, which could be argued as a limited "win", those solutions are still impossible in the current socio-technical regime.

Two points here:

Force levels
International law


ISAF does not, and is unlikely ever to have, sufficient force levels to actually monitor down to the village level. That was why this silliness with VSO was created. Second, international law precludes using overt proxies to commit actions that are chargable as war crimes. Look at the Canadian experience with handing over detainees to the Afghan government and where that left the CF.

Cheers,

Marc

JMA
04-06-2012, 05:09 PM
Why forget it? You are making a claim that is, basically, indefensible unless you are willing to extend it to other "causes" of death in the US. Would you make the same claim against the use of force in securing oil fields even though there are 40,000+ deaths per year due to car accidents in the US?

No, that's no better than a high school level argument. So I need to be careful because I don't know how old you are.

For those with a greater grasp of the situation it would be clear that while the incidence of road traffic accident deaths/alcohol related deaths/deaths from smoking are (or should be) a major cause for concern back in the US the US and Brit politicians and their military general staff have the ability and the means to take action to significantly reduce the 90% of the heroin production in the world coming out of Afghanistan. Not to do so is criminal negligence.

The simple question must be asked why the US government (under both Bush and Obama) have chosen to cosy up to an obviously corrupt and democratically illegitimate regime ... together with scum of the earth druglords and warlords who infest the country.

I appreciate there is no simple answer to this question so the standard response is either silence or the cute (but somewhat childish) stuff I am dealing with now.


First off, the socio-technical context of Afghanistan is quite different from that of Vietnam. I truly doubt that the "lessons" have been forgotten. Instead, I would argue that the "solutions" have been rendered impossible - and don't forget that the US lost Vietnam. Even if we draw on the lessons of Malasia, which could be argued as a limited "win", those solutions are still impossible in the current socio-technical regime.

Two points here:

Force levels
International law


ISAF does not, and is unlikely ever to have, sufficient force levels to actually monitor down to the village level. That was why this silliness with VSO was created. Second, international law precludes using overt proxies to commit actions that are chargable as war crimes. Look at the Canadian experience with handing over detainees to the Afghan government and where that left the CF.

Cheers,

Marc

You see this is what happens when civilians make the leap of arrogance in deluding themselves that they understand all about wars and how best to approach specific problems.

First off, I repeat, the error was made to turn the rout of the Taliban into a nation building exercise. George Bush has a lot to answer for in this regard.

Now while troops are there they should at least attempt to the job they are there for (if they know what it is, that is). It is not a simple case of troop numbers it is more how the troops are used. (Hint: go read up how the Romans managed to 'control' an empire with relatively few troops)

If the problem with the Taliban was that they harboured AQ and then refused to hand OBL and others over to the US (thus providing a much needed pretext - and target - for the the US to strike out post 9/11) then on the positive side were their attempts to curb poppy production in Afghanistan.

Yes one understands that if the US were to go after the druglords and poppy production (in addition to the Taliban) it would mean that they would be at war with just about everyone in Afghanistan with their only (temporary) friends being those with pockets full from the indiscriminate and poorly controlled distribution of US aid money.

The balance of your comment is quite silly.

First I challenge you or anyone to establish how much currently serving officers and NCOs actually understand about the 'lessons' from Vietnam or other insurgencies. Just as if you did the same with Brits about the 'lessons' out of Malaysia and Kenya I suggest it will be sure to be an eye opener.

My alternative was that they (given the self imposed RoE) they have no idea how to deal with the Taliban.

You need to define how you see 'win' in this circumstance. Of course you seem to believe you have already considered that all the solutions have been rendered impossible. Now if you had qualified that with the words: "politically and legally acceptable to the US and European countries" you may be onto something. This is an important point.

Those of us who have actually fought a counterinsurgency war quickly come to realise that our inability to descend to the levels of depraved barbarity against the civilian population that the insurgents invariably do means effectively our best hope is for a negotiated settlement.

This applies to those who had some human restraint and in the absence of laws some conscience.

This does not of course apply to the likes of Robert Mugabe and his North Korean trained 5th Brigade who through butchering civilians in quantities of tens of thousands effectively poisoned the water (the people) in which the Ndebele 'dissidents' (the fish) moved (swam). That solution worked - and I did say (go read what I wrote) using proxies would be problematic in any circumstances but obviously impossible if a 'gukurahundi' solution was considered.

Then move onto Sri Lanka. After years of pussy-footing around with the Tamil Tigers finally figured it out (with a little help from the Chinese).

Now look at Syria.

So yes there is international law for those who bother with it. The Russians, Chinese and those nations under their tutelage don't give a damn.

In fact the Taliban have become so adept at exploiting the weaknesses in ISAF military capacity that they taken themselves out of the iron-age to giant killer status as they give ISAF the run around.

The problem is that the more clueless 'academics' start to voice uninformed opinion on matters of warfare the greater the chances are that the politicians may just listen to them with further catastrophic consequences.

More people should read Edward Luttwak as a balance to the current nonsense been peddled around.

davidbfpo
04-06-2012, 07:08 PM
Post 183 onwards to here have been relocated here from a long running thread on Human Terrain Teams (HTT), some may appear out of context so have a peek at their former place:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4093&page=41

marct
04-06-2012, 07:16 PM
No, that's no better than a high school level argument. So I need to be careful because I don't know how old you are.

Try logic instead of ad hominen attacks.


For those with a greater grasp of the situation it would be clear that while the incidence of road traffic accident deaths/alcohol related deaths/deaths from smoking are (or should be) a major cause for concern back in the US the US and Brit politicians and their military general staff have the ability and the means to take action to significantly reduce the 90% of the heroin production in the world coming out of Afghanistan. Not to do so is criminal negligence.

No, it is not "criminal negligence" as you state. It may be irresponsible, but it is not criminal, and it just highlights why your claim is ridiculous. Would you argue that since US and Brit politicians have the ability and means to reduce deaths by car accident, and they do, that they are criminally negligent in not doing so? If you would, then I have to wonder what criminal code you are referring to.


You see this is what happens when civilians make the leap of arrogance in deluding themselves that they understand all about wars and how best to approach specific problems.

First off, I repeat, the error was made to turn the rout of the Taliban into a nation building exercise. George Bush has a lot to answer for in this regard.

Well, I never said that it wasn't an error :cool:.


Now while troops are there they should at least attempt to the job they are there for (if they know what it is, that is). It is not a simple case of troop numbers it is more how the troops are used. (Hint: go read up how the Romans managed to 'control' an empire with relatively few troops)

I am quite familiar with how the Romans managed their empire both militarily and politically. I am also well aware that it is not a simple matter of numbers; although there are minimum numbers necessary to do what you suggested, and those numbers where not available in Afghanistan.


If the problem with the Taliban was that they harboured AQ and then refused to hand OBL and others over to the US (thus providing a much needed pretext - and target - for the the US to strike out post 9/11) then on the positive side were their attempts to curb poppy production in Afghanistan.

Yes one understands that if the US were to go after the druglords and poppy production (in addition to the Taliban) it would mean that they would be at war with just about everyone in Afghanistan with their only (temporary) friends being those with pockets full from the indiscriminate and poorly controlled distribution of US aid money.

The balance of your comment is quite silly.

I will certainly grant you that the US rationale for being in Afghanistan has changed over the years. Also, since the US has adopted the somewhat irrational goal of stating that their strategic rationale is to deny facilities to AQ etc. as their current rationale, there are some quite serious problems, many of which are exacerbated by US domestic politics.

And why do you say that the balance of my comment is silly? Is it because you know what you know and facts have nothing to do with it?


First I challenge you or anyone to establish how much currently serving officers and NCOs actually understand about the 'lessons' from Vietnam or other insurgencies. Just as if you did the same with Brits about the 'lessons' out of Malaysia and Kenya I suggest it will be sure to be an eye opener.

My alternative was that they (given the self imposed RoE) they have no idea how to deal with the Taliban.

Try reading something about logic and look up the Rule of the Excluded Third. I have probably read more AARs, from the Brits, Americans and Canadians than most people, and it is quite obvious that the actual amount of lessons learned from Vietnam, etc., is fairly low. That said, that same apparent ignorance needs to be put into a domestic political context where 'strategies" are often defined and imposed by politicians who have no concept of military operations and don't care about anything beyond the next election. Who do you think imposes the RoE's on the troops?


You need to define how you see 'win' in this circumstance. Of course you seem to believe you have already considered that all the solutions have been rendered impossible. Now if you had qualified that with the words: "politically and legally acceptable to the US and European countries" you may be onto something. This is an important point.

That was implied, but I probably should have spelled it out.


Those of us who have actually fought a counterinsurgency war quickly come to realise that our inability to descend to the levels of depraved barbarity against the civilian population that the insurgents invariably do means effectively our best hope is for a negotiated settlement.

This applies to those who had some human restraint and in the absence of laws some conscience.

Again, go study some basic logic and ask yourself what effect such actions would have on the general population once they were demobbed.


This does not of course apply to the likes of Robert Mugabe and his North Korean trained 5th Brigade who through butchering civilians in quantities of tens of thousands effectively poisoned the water (the people) in which the Ndebele 'dissidents' (the fish) moved (swam). That solution worked - and I did say (go read what I wrote) using proxies would be problematic in any circumstances but obviously impossible if a 'gukurahundi' solution was considered.

Mugabe is a psychotic and, in this instance, a red herring.


Then move onto Sri Lanka. After years of pussy-footing around with the Tamil Tigers finally figured it out (with a little help from the Chinese).

Now look at Syria.

The Tamil Tigers are an interesting example but, I have to wonder, how appropriate to a discussion of Afghanistan. Are we likely to the the ANA pushing the Taliban into a pocket and annihilating them? Probably not, and ISAF forces are not likely to do so either since a) they are not the government and b) they can't get access to FATA. The Tigers, you'll note, didn't have a safe haven, while the Taliban do.

As far as Syria is concerned, it appears to be turning into a multi-sided proxy fight. There are potential analogs with Afghanistan, but I would be very careful about them.


So yes there is international law for those who bother with it. The Russians, Chinese and those nations under their tutelage don't give a damn.

So what? The US and the Brits do. Deal with what is rather than what you might wish to be.


In fact the Taliban have become so adept at exploiting the weaknesses in ISAF military capacity that they taken themselves out of the iron-age to giant killer status as they give ISAF the run around.

Sigh. Of course, the Soviets were nothing but Bronze Age barbarians. I have many problems with how ISAF has handled their campaign, but the ability to exploit Western weaknesses has been know for a long time, so I wouldn't give the Taliban more than their due.


The problem is that the more clueless 'academics' start to voice uninformed opinion on matters of warfare the greater the chances are that the politicians may just listen to them with further catastrophic consequences.

Politicians listen only to themselves and their political advisers. Their choice to "adopt" the views of academics or military people people is undertaken solely on whether or not those people's ideas match the politicians preconceptions. Any competent student of practical politics knows this.


More people should read Edward Luttwak as a balance to the current nonsense been peddled around.

And anyone who knows Byzantine history will agree that his "thoughts" on that are singularly uninformed.

JMA
04-07-2012, 06:26 AM
Try logic instead of ad hominen attacks.

The rate of car accident deaths in the US have nothing to do with the cycle from poppy cultivation in Afghanistan to heroin death in the US and the opportunities for at source eradication.

I noticed that you deleted the following from my post, I presume to avoid having to attempt an answer. One more time then:


The simple question must be asked why the US government (under both Bush and Obama) have chosen to cosy up to an obviously corrupt and democratically illegitimate regime ... together with scum of the earth druglords and warlords who infest the country.

You want to try and answer this? If you don't I'll understand.


No, it is not "criminal negligence" as you state. It may be irresponsible, but it is not criminal, and it just highlights why your claim is ridiculous.

LOL.. According to Edward Girardet the book Killing the Cranes, the Bush administration paid 43 million dollar 'eradication' reward payment to the Taliban in 2001 when production was reduced to minimal quantities. Then he lets poppy production blossom after he has run the Taliban out of town.

So call it interesting/unusual/strange/bizarre/crazy/suspicious/irresponsible/negligent/criminally-negligent/or whatever. Lets settle for 'criminally negligent incompetence' shall we?


Would you argue that since US and Brit politicians have the ability and means to reduce deaths by car accident, and they do, that they are criminally negligent in not doing so? If you would, then I have to wonder what criminal code you are referring to.

I asked you nicely to drop the school boy level argument. Your linkage here is ridiculous (your word).

Criminal as an adjective.


Well, I never said that it wasn't an error

Cute answer but did you ever voice an opinion on that somewhere, anywhere?


I am quite familiar with how the Romans managed their empire both militarily and politically.

I guess I'll have to take your word for it.

Well then you may wish to explain how you failed to connect the dots?


I am also well aware that it is not a simple matter of numbers; although there are minimum numbers necessary to do what you suggested, and those numbers where not available in Afghanistan.

How would you calculate the numbers required for any of the possible 'solutions' that have been muted?

I did not suggest anything other than it is more about how the troops are used than the mere numbers deployed in theatre.

You don't really know much about this stuff do you?


I will certainly grant you that the US rationale for being in Afghanistan has changed over the years. Also, since the US has adopted the somewhat irrational goal of stating that their strategic rationale is to deny facilities to AQ etc. as their current rationale, there are some quite serious problems, many of which are exacerbated by US domestic politics.

The politicians (and their advisors from academia) haven't got a clue. It is to the eternal discredit of primarily the US Joint Chiefs (and also the Brit general staff) that the facts and the implications of the political decisions were not brought home forcefully to their political masters.


And why do you say that the balance of my comment is silly? Is it because you know what you know and facts have nothing to do with it?

I was being polite. You clearly know nothing about force level calculations and you apply 'law' as it applies to conduct of war but ignore 'law' as it applies to drug production/trafficking/etc. Selective and silly.


Try reading something about logic and look up the Rule of the Excluded Third.

Boy, you are so clever.


I have probably read more AARs, from the Brits, Americans and Canadians than most people,

Again I'll have to take your word for it... but tell me, as reading is one thing and comprehension is quite another, what did you actually glean from all that reading?


... and it is quite obvious that the actual amount of lessons learned from Vietnam, etc., is fairly low.

That's what I said... and that is at general staff level and it gets a whole worse when it comes down to those actually deployed on ops in Afghanistan.


That said, that same apparent ignorance needs to be put into a domestic political context where 'strategies" are often defined and imposed by politicians who have no concept of military operations and don't care about anything beyond the next election. Who do you think imposes the RoE's on the troops?

Neither do the academic advisors to the politicians know diddly... that is why it is up to the Joint Chiefs to 'explain' what can and can't be done by the military and when to deploy the Peace Corps instead. (It has become clear that when needed the Joint Chiefs do not have the moral courage to stand up for the men of the military and place their careers and pensions ahead of the good of the military - the US system sucks).


That was implied, but I probably should have spelled it out.

Again I'll have to take your word for it won't I.


Again, go study some basic logic and ask yourself what effect such actions would have on the general population once they were demobbed.

Ok... obviously you didn't understand. So one more time then, I said:


Those of us who have actually fought a counterinsurgency war quickly come to realise that our inability to descend to the levels of depraved barbarity against the civilian population that the insurgents invariably do means effectively our best hope is for a negotiated settlement.

This applies to those who had some human restraint and in the absence of laws some conscience.

Now let me help you here (as one who has actually been at the sharp end).

Using the examples I listed it is actually quite simple to defeat an insurgency if a state is prepared to adopt the methods of (most) insurgents and use methods against the population which out-terrorise the insurgents.

Could ISAF use such methods to 'win the hearts and minds' of the population? Of course not. How do you think the Taliban reduced poppy cultivation by 2001? Kind words and crop replacement programs? No, the gave the population the gypsies warning and the population knew to take it seriously. What threat could ISAF make that would be taken seriously?

[split into two due to length of posting restrictions]

JMA
04-07-2012, 06:34 AM
Continued as part two:


Mugabe is a psychotic and, in this instance, a red herring.

OK, so you don't know about Gukurahundi. Mugabe ended an insurgency by making the population turn against the insurgents out of a justifiable fear for their own lives. Relevant, in that it was a repeat from successful COIN methods of successful empires of the past. But then you say you know all about Roman history yet seem to have missed this simple fact?


The Tamil Tigers are an interesting example but, I have to wonder, how appropriate to a discussion of Afghanistan.

I guess like I'm wondering how car accident rates in the US are appropriate to drug production originating in Afghanistan? (Sorry, couldn't resist that but in so doing lowered myself to your high school debating level.)


Are we likely to the the ANA pushing the Taliban into a pocket and annihilating them? Probably not, and ISAF forces are not likely to do so either since a) they are not the government and b) they can't get access to FATA. The Tigers, you'll note, didn't have a safe haven, while the Taliban do.

You are either trying to be cute or you quite frankly don't have a clue.

You missed the key 'change' at policy level when "Rajapaksa promised his troops that the war would end only with the LTTE’s elimination and Prabhakaran’s capture or death." So the nation aim changed from peace talks to military victory. Now having said that you should be able to follow the dots from there. Oh yes, and the self righteous West is still wailing and gnashing its teeth over the war crimes and human rights abuses but as far as Sri Lanka is concerned the the 26 odd year war is over and they are safe in the lovingly protective arms of China.

So what is the ISAF aim in Afghanistan (the current one that is)? Are they wanting to win (still waiting for your definition of 'win') or are have they admitted defeat and trying to slide out with the minimum of fuss?


As far as Syria is concerned, it appears to be turning into a multi-sided proxy fight. There are potential analogs with Afghanistan, but I would be very careful about them.

You miss the point again (I mean its three strikes and you are out).

But I'll continue for this post. Hint: what did daddy do in 1982? Has that aqnd the support of Russia and China got anything to do with the current approach? Is he handing out soccer balls and pencils or is he intent to crush the insurgency?


So what? The US and the Brits do. Deal with what is rather than what you might wish to be.

So what? You ask 'so what?'

What that means is that the US and the Brits should not get into conflicts they can't win.

I quote Colin Powell from his autobiography ‘My American Journey’, “Many of my generation of Vietnam-era officers vowed that when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand.”

Get the idea?


Sigh.

LOL... you poor long suffering dear.


Of course, the Soviets were nothing but Bronze Age barbarians. I have many problems with how ISAF has handled their campaign, but the ability to exploit Western weaknesses has been know for a long time, so I wouldn't give the Taliban more than their due.

You need to give them their due that they have the initiative, they are well funded from local sources (including the US tax-payer) and their use IEDs (and ISAFs inability to effectively counter them) is in reality a war winner.


Politicians listen only to themselves and their political advisers. Their choice to "adopt" the views of academics or military people people is undertaken solely on whether or not those people's ideas match the politicians preconceptions. Any competent student of practical politics knows this.

Obviously. They surround themselves with their coterie and disregard the rest. I say again it is up to the Joint Chiefs to show moral courage and stand up to the politicians when necessary - even at the cost of their careers.


And anyone who knows Byzantine history will agree that his "thoughts" on that are singularly uninformed.

...and you be one of them... lol.

PS: wonderful logical fallacy that, got a name for it?

Dayuhan
04-07-2012, 07:28 AM
The simple question must be asked why the US government (under both Bush and Obama) have chosen to cosy up to an obviously corrupt and democratically illegitimate regime ... together with scum of the earth druglords and warlords who infest the country.

What options have they got? The US doesn't have the capacity to create a non-corrupt democratically legitimate regime in Afghanistan. Short of letting the Taliban have the place or the non-option of taking over and running it as a colony, what else would you have them do?

Personally, I don't think the US should ever have gotten involved in prolonged occupation, installing governments, or attempts at "nation-building", but it's a little late for that.


The rate of car accident deaths in the US have nothing to do with the cycle from poppy cultivation in Afghanistan to heroin death in the US and the opportunities for at source eradication.

The key word here is "cycle". The question is what point of that cycle is the most efficient and economical target for intervention. Given the cost of military intervention in Afghanistan, I'd suggest that we'd be better off attacking the cycle where it's actually under our control, and we can do it with our own government, rather than having to either work though a completely dysfunctional government elsewhere.

US drug policy has for years been based on the utterly boneheaded notion that supply creates demand, that the people who buy drugs are innocent victims who need to be helped and the people who sell them are the evil ones who must be punished. That policy has left demand unchecked and has constrained supply just enough to make the business incredibly profitable. Of course as long as the demand and the profit are there, somebody somewhere will produce the stuff. The basic force driving the business is not supply, but demand. Trying to blame Mexican cartels (we're already being told we have to "do COIN" in Mexico) or Afghan growers for a problem that starts within our own borders is utterly counterproductive: until the US gets serious about addressing demand, any "solution" will be stopgap at best.

JMA
04-08-2012, 10:06 AM
What options have they got? The US doesn't have the capacity to create a non-corrupt democratically legitimate regime in Afghanistan. Short of letting the Taliban have the place or the non-option of taking over and running it as a colony, what else would you have them do?

Personally, I don't think the US should ever have gotten involved in prolonged occupation, installing governments, or attempts at "nation-building", but it's a little late for that.

Second point first. Yes we appear to agree that the switch to nation building was a major error in judgement.

IMHO there were two Afghan related incidents along the timeline which would have/should have prompted a US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan.

* when it was realized that the Karzai regime irredeemably corrupt.

* when the second? election was obviously rigged.

It was time to withdraw recognition of the Karzai regime (as they should do for all non-democratic countries) and downgrade their diplomatic contact (there is a term for this I am in too much of a hurry to look up)

In concert with that a strategic withdrawal (or a better word; extraction) of troops would take place. The Karzai regime was never worth the lives and limbs of US or any ISAF servicemen.


The key word here is "cycle". The question is what point of that cycle is the most efficient and economical target for intervention. Given the cost of military intervention in Afghanistan, I'd suggest that we'd be better off attacking the cycle where it's actually under our control, and we can do it with our own government, rather than having to either work though a completely dysfunctional government elsewhere.

And obviously one such point (but obviously not the only one) is where you have 100,000 troops and the crop in the field. That's a no brainer.

That said one understands soldiers have to prioritize their tasks and focus one one enemy at a time. As per Mark Moyer in his paper ‘The Third Way of COIN: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin’ on 3/5 Marines approach in Sangin in 2010:


The Marines decided that they had too many enemies already to engage in large-scale counternarcotics activities. Much of the population depended on the opium industry for its livelihood, and could be expected to cling to insurgency more strongly if that livelihood were at stake. Counternarcotics could wait until the government had enough personnel and adequate security to undertake robust counternarcotics measures.

Sadly the situation in Sangin has never reached that of 'adequate security' for 'robust counternarcotics measures' to be undertaken (even if the will was there).


US drug policy has for years been based on the utterly boneheaded notion that supply creates demand, that the people who buy drugs are innocent victims who need to be helped and the people who sell them are the evil ones who must be punished. That policy has left demand unchecked and has constrained supply just enough to make the business incredibly profitable. Of course as long as the demand and the profit are there, somebody somewhere will produce the stuff. The basic force driving the business is not supply, but demand. Trying to blame Mexican cartels (we're already being told we have to "do COIN" in Mexico) or Afghan growers for a problem that starts within our own borders is utterly counterproductive: until the US gets serious about addressing demand, any "solution" will be stopgap at best.

Sounds good but you miss the obvious link between availability and use. Anyway as drugs in the states is a trillion dollar industry you don't really believe that corruption in that regard has not reached the highest levels of politics/government/law enforcement do you?

JMA
04-08-2012, 07:59 PM
Afghans, US sign deal on night raids (http://m.apnews.mobi/ap/db_36972/contentdetail.htm?contentguid=zS7P4IBI)

Night raids are the only thing that's really working militarily.

Since when are night operations classed as 'special operations' or 'unconventional'? Has it got to that level?

Is Gen Allen off his rocker?

... in fact after the the Bales shootings when Karzai demanded that ISAF forces pull back to the large bases they should have done so.

Dayuhan
04-08-2012, 11:44 PM
Second point first. Yes we appear to agree that the switch to nation building was a major error in judgement.

IMHO there were two Afghan related incidents along the timeline which would have/should have prompted a US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan.

* when it was realized that the Karzai regime irredeemably corrupt.

* when the second? election was obviously rigged.

I'd have said even earlier. I think it was predictable, even inevitable, that any government the US installed in Afghanistan was going to fall short of expectations and face widespread opposition. It was predictable, even inevitable, that once US attention turned from "clear" to "hold" - to occupying and protecting territory and preserving a regime - attacks aimed at weakening that hold would begin. Once that starts, the occupier is backed into a position where leaving becomes a defeat, where the people doing the attacking can claim credibly to have driven the occupier out. Once you back into that position, you make a place where you lose by not winning and the enemy wins by not losing, which is not a good place to be, especially when home front political will is lacking, as would inevitably be the case in a country where the US has so few real interests and so little to gain.

To me the time to leave was before those attacks ever began, before we made that transition to "hold". We didn't need "clear, hold, build", we needed "clear and walk away". Leave while you're still on top, still scary, when nobody can claim to have driven you out, while the mojo is still intact and the message "don't make us come back" carries real weight.

All that, of course, is just my opinion and water long under the bridge, though there might be a lesson for the future somewhere in there.


And obviously one such point (but obviously not the only one) is where you have 100,000 troops and the crop in the field. That's a no brainer.

So you destroy the crop... then what? The users are still there, they want the stuff really badly, and they are willing to pat for it. Reduce supply, and the price goes through the roof. That makes production even more attractive, and makes producers all along the supply chain even more willing to take risks. So you have to do it all over again next year,and the year after, ad infinitum, and while you're doing it people in every other potential poppy-growing area on earth fire up to get a piece of the profit.

If we've learned anything from decades of trying to suppress coca production in Latin America, it's that as long as the demand is there and the profits are large, somebody will find a way to meet the demand.

Trying to control the drug problem by focusing only on supply looks to me like wading deeper and deeper into the swamp, and heaping more and more endless responsibilities on the people in the field.


Sounds good but you miss the obvious link between availability and use. Anyway as drugs in the states is a trillion dollar industry you don't really believe that corruption in that regard has not reached the highest levels of politics/government/law enforcement do you?

This of course is true: fifty years or more of idiotic policy leaves a legacy that is not going to be unraveled quickly or easily. Shouldn't it be easier, though, to unravel our own corruption and our own counterproductive laws and habits than those of Afghanistan, or any number of others? Trying to control our drug problem in Afghanistan, Columbia, Mexico etc has a superficial appeal, in that the most visible impacts, including the worst of the violence, are imposed on people in other places. Ultimately, though, we end up relying on governments that don't share our interests, concerns, or priorities, or else trying to undertake governance functions in other countries on our own, which is the last thing we want to do. At least if we face our own problem on our own soil, we have our own laws to work with, and any resistance is ours to manage. Of course there will be costs and troubles as well, but that's fair enough: it's our problem after all.

JMA
04-09-2012, 09:12 AM
I'd have said even earlier. I think it was predictable, even inevitable, that any government the US installed in Afghanistan was going to fall short of expectations and face widespread opposition. It was predictable, even inevitable, that once US attention turned from "clear" to "hold" - to occupying and protecting territory and preserving a regime - attacks aimed at weakening that hold would begin. Once that starts, the occupier is backed into a position where leaving becomes a defeat, where the people doing the attacking can claim credibly to have driven the occupier out. Once you back into that position, you make a place where you lose by not winning and the enemy wins by not losing, which is not a good place to be, especially when home front political will is lacking, as would inevitably be the case in a country where the US has so few real interests and so little to gain.

To me the time to leave was before those attacks ever began, before we made that transition to "hold". We didn't need "clear, hold, build", we needed "clear and walk away". Leave while you're still on top, still scary, when nobody can claim to have driven you out, while the mojo is still intact and the message "don't make us come back" carries real weight.

All that, of course, is just my opinion and water long under the bridge, though there might be a lesson for the future somewhere in there.

I don't believe you understand the concept of 'clear, hold, build'.

(Take a look at FM 3-24, 5-50 to 5-80)

JMA
04-09-2012, 09:40 AM
So you destroy the crop... then what?

Then you will have achieved an important victory by effectively cutting off the Taliban from a significant source of funding.

Then if those who are wringing their hands over the loss of income the farmers will suffer then they can prevail upon the US government to compensate them for their loss of earnings and start programs to assist them to grow alternative crops. (You know what? The US government would probably be dumb enough to shell out a few billion per year over the next few years for just that purpose - if China will lend them the money)

Of course the warlords/druglords would by now be beside themselves over their loss of future income and are likely to become belligerent... so as this had been anticipated and number of carefully targeted night operations or drone strikes would have been carried out to remove these individuals from the scene.


The users are still there, they want the stuff really badly, and they are willing to pat for it. Reduce supply, and the price goes through the roof. That makes production even more attractive, and makes producers all along the supply chain even more willing to take risks. So you have to do it all over again next year,and the year after, ad infinitum, and while you're doing it people in every other potential poppy-growing area on earth fire up to get a piece of the profit.

If we've learned anything from decades of trying to suppress coca production in Latin America, it's that as long as the demand is there and the profits are large, somebody will find a way to meet the demand.

Trying to control the drug problem by focusing only on supply looks to me like wading deeper and deeper into the swamp, and heaping more and more endless responsibilities on the people in the field.

OK, there will be some knock on effect on the global market. So in conjunction with the international agencies they would, one supposes, develop contingency plans to mitigate against an upsurge of poppy cultivation in other areas.

You continue to miss the simple fact that there is an opportunity here to take out 90% of current world opium production.

There has got to be a reason why this opportunity is not being seized. I will money on it that you won't like the answer when it finally comes out in the wash.


This of course is true: fifty years or more of idiotic policy leaves a legacy that is not going to be unraveled quickly or easily. Shouldn't it be easier, though, to unravel our own corruption and our own counterproductive laws and habits than those of Afghanistan, or any number of others? Trying to control our drug problem in Afghanistan, Columbia, Mexico etc has a superficial appeal, in that the most visible impacts, including the worst of the violence, are imposed on people in other places. Ultimately, though, we end up relying on governments that don't share our interests, concerns, or priorities, or else trying to undertake governance functions in other countries on our own, which is the last thing we want to do. At least if we face our own problem on our own soil, we have our own laws to work with, and any resistance is ours to manage. Of course there will be costs and troubles as well, but that's fair enough: it's our problem after all.

Well one has to start somewhere and it could be making the most of the opportunity to reduce opium production by 90%... and again in concert with this one would expect a number of contingency plans to be worked out to cater for both expected and possible un-expected consequences.

davidbfpo
04-09-2012, 11:31 AM
The UK has for a long time been the 'lead' nation in Afghanistan for counter-narcotics and at times this role has been lauded in official statements.

What is clear from anecdotes from those who served in Helmand - the centre of the opium (heroin) production - destroying large quantities of the paste has not been the operational policy. I have commented upon this is another thread.

More recently comments have been made in Whitehall-Westminster that indicate counter-narcotics did not feature in the UK decision to act in Helmand.

It was alleged that in the early years of involvement the UK government "watered down" reports on the extent of cultivation and state collusion in the drugs trade.

Dayuhan
04-11-2012, 04:59 AM
I don't believe you understand the concept of 'clear, hold, build'.

(Take a look at FM 3-24, 5-50 to 5-80)

The manual actually illustrates what I'm saying quite well. Of course the manual refers to an operation "executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations", but you could argue that the US sees Afghanistan as a whole in exactly that way, and the progression described in the manual is reflected in the overall US strategy.

The manual's section on the "clear" side is short and concise. The basic description is this:


Clear is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area (FM 3-90). The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants.

That's a clear objective and it's an objective suited to achievement by armed force. It's a reasonable mission to assign to an army.

Move on the manual's description of "hold", and suddenly it all goes nebulous. Commanders are told that success depends on "effectively reestablishing a HN government presence at the local level" and "increasing popular support", while at the same time they must control the populace with actions like imposing curfews, limiting travel, setting up pass systems. They are told to "Establish a firm government presence and control over the area and populace" and to "Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus." They are recommended tasks as diverse as picking up traqsh, digging wells, building schools.

In short, they are told to exercise governance functions, all the while relying on a hypothetical "host nation government" that may be unable to undertake any of the functions assigned to it, if it exists at all.

Are those reasonable jobs to hand to an army?

Seems to me that the moment we assigned the army to perform governance duties, we opened the door to a COIN operation that we never needed to be in, and could have avoided by leaving without trying to govern a "nation" that is fundamentally ungovernable, at least in any way that would be remotely compatible with western political expectations.

Dayuhan
04-11-2012, 05:13 AM
Then you will have achieved an important victory by effectively cutting off the Taliban from a significant source of funding.

Temporarily, that is. Even in a best case scenario you won't cut off the whole crop, and they'll plant a lot more carefully next year... and the year after that you'll be drawing down. And of course the Als will be fed infinite amounts of footage showing Americans blowing up irrigation systems, spraying herbicides on crops, and generally throwing Afghan farmers into penury. Those claims will be believed, true or not, and the beneficiary of that belief will be AQ.


Of course the warlords/druglords would by now be beside themselves over their loss of future income and are likely to become belligerent... so as this had been anticipated and number of carefully targeted night operations or drone strikes would have been carried out to remove these individuals from the scene.

So instead of fighting the Taliban we'll be fighting the entire Afghan state - nominal government, actual government, and Taliban - ... at a time when we've barely the resources to fight the Taliban.


OK, there will be some knock on effect on the global market. So in conjunction with the international agencies they would, one supposes, develop contingency plans to mitigate against an upsurge of poppy cultivation in other areas.

Hasn't worked terribly well in the past... the track record of crop eradication programs is not good.


You continue to miss the simple fact that there is an opportunity here to take out 90% of current world opium production.

That's assuming you get all of it, which you won't... and again, the reduction will be temporary. Eradication will get harder every year - they won't stop planting, they'll just hide it more effectively - and full production will resume as soon as we draw down, which is clearly in the cards. You're likely to impose a large new burden and significant additional risk on an already overstretched force to achieve a gain that's temporary at best.


There has got to be a reason why this opportunity is not being seized. I will money on it that you won't like the answer when it finally comes out in the wash.

Those in the field apparently believe that seizing that opportunity would raise a hornet's nest that they don't want to deal with. I don't think either of us is in a position to say that this is not the case, or to anticipate what local reaction would be. Opinions from those who are or recently have been in the field in Afghanistan would be good to hear.

JMA
04-12-2012, 07:54 AM
The manual actually illustrates what I'm saying quite well.

No it doesn't... but I guess you are going to try to apply a little spin to try to convince others with no military background (and yourself) that it does.


Of course the manual refers to an operation "executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations", ...

Yes and it means just that.


... but you could argue that the US sees Afghanistan as a whole in exactly that way, and the progression described in the manual is reflected in the overall US strategy.

Nice try... but no. Why not just admit you got it wrong or just slink away to avoid further embarrassment?


The manual's section on the "clear" side is short and concise. The basic description is this:

Yes I know what it says... after all I drew your attention to that section.


That's a clear objective and it's an objective suited to achievement by armed force. It's a reasonable mission to assign to an army.

Do you know the difference between strategic and tactical? You are over your head here man.


Move on the manual's description of "hold", and suddenly it all goes nebulous. Commanders are told that success depends on "effectively reestablishing a HN government presence at the local level" and "increasing popular support", while at the same time they must control the populace with actions like imposing curfews, limiting travel, setting up pass systems. They are told to "Establish a firm government presence and control over the area and populace" and to "Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus." They are recommended tasks as diverse as picking up traqsh, digging wells, building schools.

In short, they are told to exercise governance functions, all the while relying on a hypothetical "host nation government" that may be unable to undertake any of the functions assigned to it, if it exists at all.

Are those reasonable jobs to hand to an army?

Seems to me that the moment we assigned the army to perform governance duties, we opened the door to a COIN operation that we never needed to be in, and could have avoided by leaving without trying to govern a "nation" that is fundamentally ungovernable, at least in any way that would be remotely compatible with western political expectations.

Again you clearly don't seem to understand the subject.

Perhaps if you want a soundbite then you should take this one - being what the holding force should strive to accomplish:



�� Protect the population from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals.
�� Eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure.
�� Improve essential services where possible.
�� Reinstate HN government presence.


You should really avoid the temptation to sound off on a subject about which you clearly have very little background/experience/knowledge.

JMA
04-13-2012, 11:29 AM
Temporarily, that is. Even in a best case scenario you won't cut off the whole crop, and they'll plant a lot more carefully next year... and the year after that you'll be drawing down. And of course the Als will be fed infinite amounts of footage showing Americans blowing up irrigation systems, spraying herbicides on crops, and generally throwing Afghan farmers into penury. Those claims will be believed, true or not, and the beneficiary of that belief will be AQ.

You may believe that the farmers of Helmand (and other areas) have a right to produce poppies (which as become the chief crop since the Soviet invasion of the 80s). You are entitled to that opinion... but your reasoning is not intelligent. So out with it now what is the real reason you oppose the return to the virtually poppy free status quo of the pre-Soviet invasion period?

Oh yes... and save the AQ scare mongering for a pure USian audience... it does not have the same persuasive effect outside the US. Yes there will be a propaganda campaign started by the druglords and that will have to be countered. I would simply find out what coercion the Taliban used to all but eradicate poppy cultivation in 2001 and suggest to the US's Afghan partners that the same methods be adopted.


So instead of fighting the Taliban we'll be fighting the entire Afghan state - nominal government, actual government, and Taliban - ... at a time when we've barely the resources to fight the Taliban.

That's what I said when I commented on the Marines focus on the Taliban when the entered Helmand in 2010. It of course begs the question why the US insists on remaining in Afghanistan rather than diminishes the need to act against 90% of the worlds opium production.

This quote from Ben Anderson's book 'No Worse Enemy' is apt:


In July (2011), Ghulam Haider Hamidi, mayor of Kandahar, was killed. He and his daughter had returned to Afghanistan from the USA, believing they could help their homeland. A few months later, his daughter left Afghanistan again, saying it was in ‘360 degrees of chaos’ and she had lost all hope: ‘America came to Afghanistan and aligned itself with the very people who destroyed Afghanistan and who continue to destroy Afghanistan: warlords, drug lords, gun lords.’


Hasn't worked terribly well in the past... the track record of crop eradication programs is not good.

US programs you are talking about I believe? Yes it will be important to get another nation to lead on this. The Russians and Iranians are suffering the most from the Afghan opium production so maybe open the door for either/or or both to come in.


That's assuming you get all of it, which you won't... and again, the reduction will be temporary. Eradication will get harder every year - they won't stop planting, they'll just hide it more effectively - and full production will resume as soon as we draw down, which is clearly in the cards. You're likely to impose a large new burden and significant additional risk on an already overstretched force to achieve a gain that's temporary at best.

Again I am interested why you to almost want the opium production in Afghanistan to continue. Kind of like the 'hippie' arguments of the 60s. Are you perhaps pro drug legalisation across the board or just supportive of the Afghan poppy growers?


Those in the field apparently believe that seizing that opportunity would raise a hornet's nest that they don't want to deal with. I don't think either of us is in a position to say that this is not the case, or to anticipate what local reaction would be. Opinions from those who are or recently have been in the field in Afghanistan would be good to hear.

You remind me of Bertrand Russel's quotation and you will (I guess) be hoping that someone will come up with a contribution to support your position. Holding thumbs for you ;)


If a man is offered a fact which goes against his instincts, he will scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, he will refuse to believe it. If, on the other hand, he is offered something which affords a reason for acting in accordance to his instincts, he will accept it even on the slightest evidence. The origin of myths is explained in this way. – Bertrand Russell

It is of course not that there is no effort against opium production. There is... it is just that the Brit efforts there are just as inept as US efforts elsewhere.

'Britain's war against Afghan opium production is failing' (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9088008/Britains-war-against-Afghan-opium-production-is-failing.html)

bourbon
04-13-2012, 05:06 PM
So out with it now what is the real reason you oppose the return to the virtually poppy free status quo of the pre-Soviet invasion period?
The destabilizing effect that the increasing traffic of Afghan heroin into China brings.

tequila
04-13-2012, 07:25 PM
I would simply find out what coercion the Taliban used to all but eradicate poppy cultivation in 2001 and suggest to the US's Afghan partners that the same methods be adopted.

The Taliban did not try to suppress opium production until they were in full control, and appear to have only done so in 2001 as part of their drive to get UN recognition as Afghanistan's legitimate government. Prior to their ban on opium production, they derived enormous revenue from taxing and sale of the crop, and continued to do so after the ban as 2000 had been a bumper crop. Some observers assert that the ban was more to restrict supply and increase profits for opium shippers, avoiding a glut on the market. In 2001, prior to September, they had authorized Afghan farmers to plant opium again (as seen in the record crops after their fall).

As for the methods? That's pretty simple. The Taliban had Pakistan on their side and had established a government that has a monopoly of force over the Afghan countryside.

So ... we should win the war first?

JMA
04-14-2012, 03:15 AM
The destabilizing effect that the increasing traffic of Afghan heroin into China brings.

I would suggest that is a double edged blade given that Afghan opium and derivatives have a significant 'destabilizing' impact on Europe and North American.

JMA
04-14-2012, 04:28 AM
The Taliban did not try to suppress opium production until they were in full control, and appear to have only done so in 2001 as part of their drive to get UN recognition as Afghanistan's legitimate government. Prior to their ban on opium production, they derived enormous revenue from taxing and sale of the crop, and continued to do so after the ban as 2000 had been a bumper crop. Some observers assert that the ban was more to restrict supply and increase profits for opium shippers, avoiding a glut on the market. In 2001, prior to September, they had authorized Afghan farmers to plant opium again (as seen in the record crops after their fall).

This supports the argument that opium production is an important source of funding for the Taliban.

I draw your attention to this source: How Opium Profits the Taliban (http://www.usip.org/files/resources/taliban_opium_1.pdf)

I quote two short extracts from this 2009 paper:


NATO commanders and donor nations have tended to view Afghanistan’s opium trade as a law enforcement issue, often not considering its broader implications for trade, security, and development. The insurgency, meanwhile, is treated as a military matter. This division has stymied efforts to build a comprehensive strategy toward southern Afghanistan, where a more holistic approach could prove more successful.

...

… , this study will demonstrate that insurgent actors in many Afghan villages today behave more like mafiosi than mujahideen. More than 80 percent of those surveyed for this project believe Taliban commanders in the south now fight for profit rather than religion or ideology. And according to recent NATO military intelligence, as few as 5 percent of insurgent commanders now fight for ideological reasons.

This brings us back to 120mm's earlier post and highlights where the problem lies... being if both the generals (and their political masters) and the troops on the ground don't have a clue about what they are dealing with on the ground then quite frankly there is no hope.

So this then links into another thread here: Time to hold the US generals accountable for Afg. and Iraq (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=15322&highlight=Iraq). I believe that regular purges of the general staff is a good thing - short of (in Stalin style) shooting them out of hand as that is a little extreme - where they certainly lose all pensions and benefits and in deserving cases would face criminal charges.

The criminal negligence of how the US and Brit commanders have approached the opium matter in Afghanistan should be dealt with the military justice system where I'm sure charged framed broadly under 'dereliction of duty' could see a number put away for ten years or more. That would be justice seen to be done.

My comments some time ago that a number of seats on aircraft out of Afghanistan should be reserved for those (across the rank structure) who get (or should get relieved) and need to go were met with derision in some quarters but it certainly needs to be not just be considered but implemented without delay for in theatre commanders who haven't got the smarts to simply connect the dots (when it comes to the integration of the Afghan insurgency and opium production).


As for the methods? That's pretty simple. The Taliban had Pakistan on their side and had established a government that has a monopoly of force over the Afghan countryside.

So ... we should win the war first?

No... the Taliban probably said something like... "if we see poppies growing we will get the farmers to first destroy their crop then we will shoot them." Its all about the KISS principle... keep it simple and unambiguous and let the ANA enforce it. Life is cheap in Afghanistan.

Win first? Does this question indicate that you don't see how inextricably interwoven poppy production and the insurgency are?

tequila
04-14-2012, 06:59 AM
No... the Taliban probably said something like... "if we see poppies growing we will get the farmers to first destroy their crop then we will shoot them." Its all about the KISS principle... keep it simple and unambiguous and let the ANA enforce it. Life is cheap in Afghanistan.

Win first? Does this question indicate that you don't see how inextricably interwoven poppy production and the insurgency are?


No. Defeating poppy production is not key to defeating the insurgency in my opinion.

The warlords who the Taliban defeated also profited enormously from opium. Yet the Taliban did not seek to destroy opium (the main source of funds for their enemy - the warlords depended on opium to a far greater extent than the Taliban does) until they were fully in control.

The Taliban are able to profit from opium because they have power in the countryside and over smuggling routes, not the other way around. That power did not come from opium money. It came from ideological commitment, successful organization, backing from the Pakistani military, and most importantly the lack of effective competition from the Afghan government or other Afghan actors.

Dayuhan
04-14-2012, 08:14 AM
Pressed for time at the moment, but re this...


the Taliban probably said something like... "if we see poppies growing we will get the farmers to first destroy their crop then we will shoot them." Its all about the KISS principle... keep it simple and unambiguous and let the ANA enforce it. Life is cheap in Afghanistan.

What makes you think the ANA or the Afghan government have any interest at all in reducing opium production? Aren't they sharing the profits from opium production?

The Taliban were able to eliminate poppy production because they governed the country and there were no limits on the amount or nature of force they were able to apply to do whatever they wanted to do.

The US doesn't want to govern Afghanistan and is not willing to run around shooting people who grow poppies. The Afghan government and army aren't going to shoot people who grow poppies because they get some of the money the poppies bring in. That makes a plan to eradicate poppies by shooting those who grow them a bit fanciful, because neither we nor the Afghan government/army are willing to do the shooting.

JMA
04-14-2012, 12:01 PM
No. Defeating poppy production is not key to defeating the insurgency in my opinion.

You see this is what I find so strange about the attitude towards and understanding of COIN amongst serving age men of today.

When someone says you need to get out there and kill the Taliban the response is that COIN is a 80:20 ratio where direct military action is only 20% of the effort required. Then when someone raises the matter of acting against opium production (which has been proven to a substantial part of the insurgency and significant source of funding for the Taliban) the shutters come down and its treated as a separate and insignificant aspect of the Afghan situation which should be virtually ignored even though it is one of the more important aspects of the 80%.

All very strange.


The warlords who the Taliban defeated also profited enormously from opium. Yet the Taliban did not seek to destroy opium (the main source of funds for their enemy - the warlords depended on opium to a far greater extent than the Taliban does) until they were fully in control.

So what's your point? That you finally agree that the US government and its military is actually protecting the warlord/druglord side of the Afghan drug trade? And you are OK that thousands of US soldiers are being killed/maimed/wounded in the process? Shameful!


The Taliban are able to profit from opium because they have power in the countryside and over smuggling routes, not the other way around. That power did not come from opium money. It came from ideological commitment, successful organization, backing from the Pakistani military, and most importantly the lack of effective competition from the Afghan government or other Afghan actors.

Oh boy, I guess somehow it is lost on you that the poppy crop is in the fields right under the noses of the ISAF and ANA forces. This is unlike stuff grown elsewhere which is partially hidden under jungle canopy it is in the open and and can be easily identified from the air prior to harvest.

Now I accept that the problem is to get an honest buy in from the current Afghan government. This can be used to leverage a quicker withdrawal from Afghanistan in the form of a demand for total compliance from the Karai regime - rather like the ultimatum Bush gave the Taliban over handing over AQ.

JMA
04-14-2012, 12:13 PM
Pressed for time at the moment, but re this...

What makes you think the ANA or the Afghan government have any interest at all in reducing opium production? Aren't they sharing the profits from opium production?

I have said a number of times that the Karzai regime is both democratically illegitimate and criminally corrupt.

As I said stated in my previous post an ultimatum should be issued to the Karzai regime on the basis that they clean up their act (not only in terms of drugs) or ISAF and all aid is out of there. It would be a good way to get out.


The Taliban were able to eliminate poppy production because they governed the country and there were no limits on the amount or nature of force they were able to apply to do whatever they wanted to do.

Good that you understand that.


The US doesn't want to govern Afghanistan and is not willing to run around shooting people who grow poppies. The Afghan government and army aren't going to shoot people who grow poppies because they get some of the money the poppies bring in. That makes a plan to eradicate poppies by shooting those who grow them a bit fanciful, because neither we nor the Afghan government/army are willing to do the shooting.

I would suggest that the US government makes it a condition of their (and NATO) continued support and aid that the ANA clear of areas of poppy cultivation (using their own methods). This would be monitored by satellite. If the Karzai regime fails to keep its side of the bargain then its bye-bye.

Remember KISS and that (as difficult as it may be for a USian) not everything is negotiable.

Dayuhan
04-15-2012, 03:20 AM
I have said a number of times that the Karzai regime is both democratically illegitimate and criminally corrupt.

I've said similar things many times. I'd add that it is also weak, with very limited ability to impose its will on its nominal subordinates.


As I said stated in my previous post an ultimatum should be issued to the Karzai regime on the basis that they clean up their act (not only in terms of drugs) or ISAF and all aid is out of there. It would be a good way to get out...

...I would suggest that the US government makes it a condition of their (and NATO) continued support and aid that the ANA clear of areas of poppy cultivation (using their own methods). This would be monitored by satellite. If the Karzai regime fails to keep its side of the bargain then its bye-bye.

I agree that this would be an excellent way to get out, but I don't think it would have much influence on opium production. Even in the unlikely event that Karzai wanted to stamp out production, I doubt that he has the ability to persuade or compel his nominal subordinates to tear up one of their largest sources of income. I think he'd make some big promises followed by a very thin charade of compliance, and come back with "we tried". Then it would be up to the US to decide whether they want to follow through on the ultimatum or not.


Remember KISS and that (as difficult as it may be for a USian) not everything is negotiable.

We're talking about the US issuing a non-negotiable ultimatum to Karzai, knowing that he probably hasn't the capacity to comply even if he wants to, which he doesn't. That's all well and good if the US willing to back up the ultimatum with action. If they aren't willing to dump the whole thing and walk away, they shouldn't issue the ultimatum. I personally have no problem with dumping the whole thing and walking away, but my opinion means nothing. The worst thing they could do is issue such an ultimatum if they're not willing to back it up.

That process might provide a good excuse for an exit, but again, I don't think it would have much influence on opium production, unless the Taliban take over and suppress it again. They might not suppress it even if they do take over: drug money is as addictive as drugs, and they've been sucking on that teat for a while now. Obviously we don't know what would happen, but I don't think we can assume that because the Taliban suppressed opium production last time around they will do it again if they get back in.

Again, worth noting that even when the Taliban had reduced Afghan production to minimal levels, heroin remained available on American and European streets. As long as demand and profitability are in place, someone will move in and pick up supply. That suggests to me that if we want to deal with the drug issue we should target demand and profitability, not supply, not that my opinion means anything.

bourbon
04-17-2012, 01:29 PM
I would suggest that is a double edged blade given that Afghan opium and derivatives have a significant 'destabilizing' impact on Europe and North American.
No doubt it is a double edged sword; but the nations most directly impacted by the the flow of Afghan opium are Iran, Russia, the Central Asian Republics and China.

It reminds me of a Russian proverb where a farmer is plowing his field and comes upon a lamp with a magic genie in it. The genie says “you may have one wish, but be warned – whatever you wish for will be granted to your neighbor by 2x.”

The farmer looks at the genie, and says “poke out one eye”.


Anyway, my solution is to pump the opium into China.

davidbfpo
05-30-2012, 05:45 PM
A few days ago a KoW post appeared 'Setting the Record Straight on Eradication in Helmand' by Ryan Evans is a devasting critique of what happened recently. A taster:
This is the ultimate irony: In a campaign premised (rightly or wrongly) on the idea of alleviating the grievances of the population and winning its ‘hearts and minds,’ the single most damaging thing being done to Afghans is a Western and UN-funded crop eradication program.

Link:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/05/setting-the-record-straight-on-eradication-in-helmand/

Ryan writes this very puzzling sentence, without a fuller explanation, with my emphasis:
Afghanistan produces an estimated three times the annual global poppy demand for heroin.

Why? Who is buying all the poppies and then producing heroin - which is placed in storage?

Ryan also points to the blogsite of a UK analyst:http://www.davidmansfield.org/all.php and a far wider Chatham House project on Drugs and Organized Crime:http://www.chathamhouse.org/research/security/current-projects/drugs-and-organized-crime

davidbfpo
05-30-2012, 05:49 PM
The post started an exchange and the last person added a stunning comment:
In 02 when we reduced opium cultivation in Nad-i-Ali by 85% in one crop year (just before our funding was cut) it was done with a drainage rehabilitation project that hired some 3000-5000 men to work on their own irrigation system for pay, some $1.75 a day, start support for the cotton gin that had not had any spare parts for some 20 years, back payments for cotton delivered to the gin but not yet paid for, promises for a continuing reconstruction effort (which did not happen) early warnings not to plant poppy and eradication at germination time, in time to replant with wheat. The farmers in at least Nad-i-Ali were into peanuts big time with Pakistani and Iranian markets, starting in early vegetables with crude green houses and several other innovations which did not get support....One of the key reasons for the developing drug based economy has been our ineffectiveness (understatement) in addressing the issue for the past 10 years.

Link:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/05/set...mand/#comments

Within the KoW comments the last one IMHO opens a "pandora's box" of information on the drug control issues in the Helmand Valley, a blog by a USAID analyst who was on the ground 1971-78 and 2003-2012.

Link:http://www.scottshelmandvalleyarchives.org/

I hope that, being selfish for a moment, that this information was available to the UK in 2006, for those assembling the intelligence briefings when the decision was made to intervene and those who once survival was not so dominant could use it as 'human terrain' material.

Just on a quick glance, as there are hundreds of documents, they constitute a "goldmine".

bourbon
05-30-2012, 07:04 PM
Why? Who is buying all the poppies and then producing heroin - which is placed in storage?
The problem for large traffickers is keeping the global price of their heroin product propped up; just like the DeBeers corporation will keep diamonds off of the market to maintain the high price of diamonds, so too do drug cartels (there is a reason why they are called "cartels" after all).

Heroin has a long shelf life; there are caches of heroin all around the world, just to keep the price inflated.

The raw material costs (of opium) are nothing compared to what the final product (heroin) sells for, its peanuts – the ROI is huge.

Lewis341
09-21-2012, 12:44 PM
Whenever surplus possibilities are current, drug dealers will have enticements to bring forth the supply to satisfy purchaser's desires. The finer the excesses are to be rated, the finer, the rewards and the finer the supply of drug selections approach over time.

davidbfpo
09-26-2012, 06:23 PM
Ryan Evans has another paper on wider, related matters in CTC's Sentinel:http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-micro-level-of-civil-war-the-case-of-central-helmand-province

I noted two linked passages, my emphasis added:
Helmand has been the largest poppy-producing province in Afghanistan by a considerable margin. With the eradication program in Helmand wiping out only three percent of the yearly crop, at the cost of alienating struggling farmers whose meager poppy profits barely get them and their families through the year, the utility of this counternarcotics program is questionable at best

Nothing startling I fear:
In Helmand, there is a “Gray Nexus” among the Afghan government, narcotics cartels, the insurgency, and the population based on a common interest in poppy cultivation, processing, and trafficking. The insurgency serves as a protection and transportation racket for the cartels. It also plays a role in surging migrant farmers to help with the harvest in the spring and, in some areas, the insurgents offer farmers protection against eradication efforts. Poppy cultivation and narcotics trafficking represent the most important source of revenue for the Taliban in southern Afghanistan.[40] Government officials profit by allowing and facilitating trafficking. It is not uncommon for government officials in Helmand to be more directly involved in cultivation, processing, trafficking and facilitation. Poppy profits, which are modest for farmers, provide enough cash for a family to meet its costs of living. These profits also serve as a form of insurance for family illnesses, failed crops, drought, and any needed repairs.

davidbfpo
04-03-2013, 09:19 AM
An article from Foreign Affairs, with a rather startling suggestion - copying Iran's way - as Afghanistan's drug addiction problem worsens:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139095/amir-a-afkhami/how-iran-won-the-war-on-drugs?page=show

It opens with:
...the narcotics trade presents one of the gravest threats to the country’s long-term stability and security.... Afghanistan remains the world’s largest supplier of heroin and other illegal opiates.

In NATO countries alone, Afghan narcotics cause more than 10,000 heroin-overdose deaths per year -- making them far deadlier than the munitions that have claimed the lives of approximately 3,200 coalition personnel since the start of the war.

davidbfpo
04-15-2013, 07:18 PM
Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has been increasing for a third year in a row and is heading for a record high, the U.N. said in a report released Monday. The boom in poppy cultivation is at its most pronounced in the Taliban's heartland in the south...

Increased production has been driven by unusually high opium prices, but more cultivation of Afghanistan's premier cash crop is also an indication that Afghans are turning to illicit markets and crops as the real economy shrinks ahead of the expected withdrawal of foreign combat troops at the end of 2014.

Link to Yahoo summary:http://news.yahoo.com/un-afghan-opium-production-increases-081638728.html

Link to UNODC report:http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/ORAS_report_2013_phase12.pdf

davidbfpo
05-09-2013, 12:00 PM
Maybe this reflects a policy taken by default as the decisions were made lower and lower down the command chain. A short article on the US Army's last planned brigade deployment in Kandahar Province:http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/05/afghan-poppies/all/

The last two paragraphs:
The Americans changed their approach to poppies in order to win over the countless Afghans who need poppies to survive.

In that sense it might be too late for America’s hands-off poppy policy to work. As Gackstatter and his 2nd Platoon are learning, the war over Afghan poppies was probably lost years ago. And the U.S., now eying the exit after more than a decade of battle, is the loser.

davidbfpo
11-13-2013, 01:25 PM
A short BBC report, by its experienced reporter, David Loyn; which opens with:
Afghan opium cultivation has reached a record level, with more than 200,000 hectares planted with the poppy for the first time, the United Nations says. The UNODC report said the harvest was 36% up on last year, and if fully realised would outstrip global demand. Most of the rise was in Helmand province, where British troops are preparing to withdraw. One of the main reasons the UK sent troops to Helmand was to cut opium production.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24919056

No real surprises here.

I would strongly disagree with opium production being a 'main reason' for the 2006 UK decision to deploy to Helmand. In one Whitehall discussion, at RUSI, one speaker stated drugs did not even appear as a reason and no-one consulted on that aspect.