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Ken White
01-23-2011, 05:31 PM
As I understand it, the term Battlespace Owner means that a Commander has been given effective total command -- with some exceptions -- over everything and everyone who enters, crosses or operates in a specified geographical area.

The control is total except for some SOF elements / missions and occasional other exceptions, a Battlespace Owner thus can dictate how units in his area not directly subordinate to him can or cannot operate.

I appreciate the need for delegation of authority, for accountability and for unity of command, however, it has been my observation that the thought processes of well trained Armor, Mech Infantry, Cavalry, Light Infantry and Artillery commanders vary slightly to considerably with respect to TTPs and thus perhaps a potential for friction (Clausewitzian style...) occurs when a dictatorial Light Infantry Commander has local FA elements operating in both the fire support and infantry modes...

What effect this approach has on the so-called 'human terrain' aspects of FID and COIN support is not known by me but I can see a potential for excessive focus on geography and control to the detriment of concentration on the Mission -- or as the British used to more correctly call it, the Aim.

Without getting into the details, specifics about current ops or anything that remotely violates OpSec but with an eye toward US doctrine for conflicts in general, I have two questions:

Is that understanding essentially correct?

Is the concept wise and / or combat effective?

IntelTrooper
01-23-2011, 08:21 PM
1. Yes.
2. No.

jcustis
01-23-2011, 08:33 PM
Ken, your observations about the process are correct, although I've never seen a battlepace owner playbook that describes the term and codifies the rules. Some BOs can be very effective within that construct, so staff and personality influences still have a significant impact,

My boss has owned two Regt/BDE-sized AOs in Iraq and Afg. He didn't care who got the credit, SOF, or GPF, but he preferred that the homegrown security forces were in on the kill as well. We had our challenges, but were not otherwise restricted.

As for your comments about Branch influence, even among like-pedigree commanders, their notions of command can differ significantly, along with their ability to execute FID and COIN. The provisional guys don't suffer too much from these matters when it comes to being employed, unless the respective staff cannot communicate their capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses to the HHQ staff.

82redleg
01-23-2011, 09:09 PM
As I understand it, the term Battlespace Owner means that a Commander has been given effective total command -- with some exceptions -- over everything and everyone who enters, crosses or operates in a specified geographical area.

The control is total except for some SOF elements / missions and occasional other exceptions, a Battlespace Owner thus can dictate how units in his area not directly subordinate to him can or cannot operate.


I don't think this is completely accurate, and I also thought that whoever owned an AO has always been responsible for it.

Some examples:

1- If you are assigned an AO, you should know who is moving in that AO? So units transiting that AO should check in with your TOC (operations center of whatever type) when the enter and leave. This helps prevent fratricide, aids in battle tracking, and assists the moving unit in case it needs QRF, etc.

2- If you are responsible for the reconstruction of an AO, you should have a hand in ALL projects in that AO, right? I've seen logistics units attempting to implement CA projects along their routes- to me, this is totally backa$$wards- and the responsibility of the unit in charge of the AO.

I guess that I am of the opinion that the more control we give to the guy that is in the AO day-in/day-out, and responsible for what happens there, the better. Letting transient units, of whatever type (logistics, SOF, whatever) operate without coordinating with the guy in charge seems like a bad thing to me.

sullygoarmy
01-23-2011, 10:50 PM
Add in the fact that, at least in Baghdad, technically the Iraqi Security Forces are the battlespace owners and you get an even more difficult situation.

That being said, our Brigade, which was responsible for all of Baghdad Province, was the U.S. battlespace owner if you will. As 82redleg mentioned, we maintained situational awareness of all units/convoys/PRTs/Transition Teams/State Department moving in, out and through our area. If any incidents happened from an IED strike to a vehicle breaking down in a convoy (civilian or military), one of our organic battalions would have to respond. We fought daily with getting outside units to report in as they transited our battlespace to ensure we had visibility in case of an incident so we could rapidly respond with assets to assist.

We did not have operational control over units transiting our battlespace nor would any other battlespace owner without prior coordination.

I've personally seen a major shift in how outside units (i.e. SOF) operated in our battlespace. A few years ago, a box would go up over an area without warning, SOF would do their thing, then leave the mess behind for the battlespace owner to deal with. What I saw this tour was a lot more coordination between SOF and the battlespace owners. We knew where every SOF mission was going prior to launch so we could be prepared to assist with QRF assets and coordinate with the ISF battlespace owners as well. Definitely a plus from how things were a few years back.

Bob's World
01-23-2011, 11:18 PM
Ken,

This was my daily drama as the Chief of the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOPLE, a NATO term adopted mid tour, began as a SOCOORD) in RC-South.

Personally, I think we need to evolve from traditional concepts rooted in Physical Battle Space, and adopt more effective constructs that take into account "functional battle space" as well.

As to "SOF," as you well know, that is a broad term. In Afghanistan there are what we called "the three tribes" all operating under distinct and independent chains of command, outside the control of the BSO, that are "SOF." In descending order of degree of BSO influence over, there are the NATO SOF operating under NATO authorities; There are US and certain coalition SOF that operate under OEF authorities; and then there are the JSOC crowd.

Probably more a conversation to have over a couple of beers than over the web, but I'll add more tomorrow, or field any specific questions.

In general though the BSO is left holding the bag and is always left responsible for whatever the SOF guys break (and benefits from what they do well, which is much more and less recognized). Ironically, the SF guys are arguably more frustrated by the efforts of the JSOC guys than the conventional forces are.

One incremental step to smooth this out would be to put all SOF under one set of authorities. That means compromise though. I would, however, open the door to a cleaner C2 lash up.

As to putting SOF under the BSO, it always sounds good, but it also always ends up in some tragic application of SOF to solve problems that are merely difficult and dangerous, rather than SOF-unique in the skills and capabilities required.

jmm99
01-24-2011, 12:37 AM
from BW
....[1] there are the NATO SOF operating under NATO authorities; [2] There are US and certain coalition SOF that operate under OEF authorities; and [3] then there are the JSOC crowd ....

Each of these operates under a different charter, policies and end goals (to the extent these can be identified) at the policy-strategy interface. They also include some very different folks - "just stayoff our concrete".

Open-ended question (soft ball): how would a unified SOF command obviate the "problems" of three different commands (each following different policy objectives - where, in any probable case, military operational considerations will be subordinated to political and diplomatic concerns) ?

Regards

Mike

PS: Query whether use of a legal metaphor ("ownership") is appropriate - "ownership" means different things to different legal systems.

E.g., from my Japanese apartment-sharing genius (http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20011103a1.html) in the 60s: Your common law concept of "ownership" is quite different from ours. Your "ownership" rice bowl has to be completely filled with incidents of ownership - even if you have to invent some to fill the empty spaces. We fill our "ownership" rice bowl with the incidents of ownership as we develop and need them - so, our rice bowl may be partially empty (to you).

I suspect different things to different people may also be something of a problem here.

max161
01-24-2011, 01:30 AM
That is my snarky answer on a quick break from the ball game tonight. If the host nation does not own its battlespace then their is a military occupation by a foreign force. Think about that from the host nation's perspective and how that usually provides legitimacy in the eyes of the insurgents and the population who does not like foreign intervention, regardless of the foreign force's good intentions.

But on a serious note, until we learn to operate in support of the host nation's internal defense and development programs that are focused on their security forces defeating the security threats and bringing good governance and development to ungoverned or under-governed spaces we are not going to get these types of operations right. Even if we have to "own" battlespace in terms of our own organizations we should not forget that 8 times out of 10 we are going to be operating in a sovereign nation (the 2 out of 10 being Iraq and Afghanistan when we took their sovereignty from them and they were incapable of acting as a sovereign nation)

But to get into the discussion between regular and special operations forces let me offer this perspective. When regular forces organize geographically obviously gaps or seams are created. This is especially true when there are tribal boundaries that are different from the political boundaries that are different from the practical and logical and efficient military boundaries organized along geographic lines to make military operations as effective and efficient as possible.

If there is good coordination and cooperation among regular and special operations forces and if all are in tune with the Joint Force commander's mission and intent, special operations forces with a wider focus that may be less geographic and more politically and tribal focused can be of great value in reducing gaps and seams if there is good and effective information sharing. Everyone has their horror stories about lack of coordination and cooperation and there will always be friction, challenges and of course personalities, but if everyone is on the same page with the Joint Force commander (and if the Reagan principle is in effect - along the lines of "it is amazing what can be accomplished when no one worries about who gets the credit") the coordination and cooperation between regular and special operations forces can achieve effective results. There are a great many vignettes that can be told about that to match all the horror stories.

If you put special operations forces under the regular forces C2 then you are going to have all forces limited to the same geographic areas and everyone will have the same gaps and seams. Furthermore the Joint Force Commander's campaign plan gives the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander missions with different focus and tasks and purposes than the ground forces. Yes it is hard when there are forces operating in close proximity with regular and special operations forces all conducting complex operations, but great synergy can be achieved if regular and special operations forces understand the different focus of each as directed by the Joint Force Commander and learn to coordinate cooperate, and collaborate and follow the Reagan principle. But when personalities dominate rather than mission focus, we may as well just accept that there will be more friction than necessary and operations will be much less effective (and maybe ineffective) than they should be.

Just my 2 cents. Back to the half time show and then the game.

Ken White
01-24-2011, 02:48 AM
Intel Trooper cuts to the gist concisely, thanks for the confirmation (1) and shared opinion (2).

jcustis Thanks, Jon. I suspected as much -- the qualities of the Commander in this technique, as in most others, make a tremendous difference. Curiously, we know that but do not really select for it...

82redlegI'm sure it isn't completely accurate, that's why I asked the question -- to get some accuracy. What in your opinion should be changed?

You are correct as far as I know in you statement that whoever owned an AO has been responsible for it. However, this owner thing has three aspects. First and basically -- should there be such a thing as an AO in this kind of war? Don't reject it automatically, please give it some thought. If you say there should be, fine, then consider whether an AO and a 'Battlespace' are the same thing and if they are, consider which term is most appropriate, flexible and accurate .

Second, as jmm says below, 'ownership' means different things to different people. I do not question allocation of responsibility for 'battle space' or a Zone, Sector, AO, TAOR or whatever we'll decide to call it next year. I do question the terminology in total and very particularly the 'ownership' aspect-- as the old Gen-Gen said, 'words are important.' Our doctrinal Command processes and procedures have been worked out over a long time. They work. Ad Hocery is often necessary in combat but it can also get out of control. Not to mention that we are not occupation troops. Afghanistan IS a sovereign nation... :wry:

Thirdly and the most important reason for my question, I understand the need to prevent fratricide, aid in battle tracking, and assist the moving units in case they need QRF, etc. This:
I guess that I am of the opinion that the more control we give to the guy that is in the AO day-in/day-out, and responsible for what happens there, the better. Letting transient units, of whatever type (logistics, SOF, whatever) operate without coordinating with the guy in charge seems like a bad thing to me.I also agree with. That doesn't address two things; coordination or being under control or de facto command? I totally agree with the former but have heard that some insist on the latter -- which I emphatically do not agree with.

Plus the "exceptions" I mentioned of which I understand SOF/SF is just on example -- who determines those that are valid and those that are not? The important reason -- is the 'ownership' of space militarily sound and should the concept be incorporated in changes to our C2 doctrine. If the answer to that is 'no,' then we shouldn't be using it today.

A point on the reconstruction and / or aid and support in an AO. Should the unit preparing to battle in a battle space even be involved in that other than peripherally? I understand that's the way it's being done -- I have operated in that mode but I also have operated in very different approaches that allowed units to concentrate on the military aspects while others handled aid and such. I fully understand where we are with all that now; again, my question is for the future -- should it be that way?

sullygoarmyI can identify with the many frustrations of having another Nation being the real 'battlespace owner.'

I think that your lack of OpCon over transiting units is important and is correct. Things can happen locally that you could not control while the man on the ground could. We really don't do as well at trusting each other as we should...

That really gets to the crux of my tertiary concern -- is it possible for the Battle Space Owner (hereafter BSO) to take the term to heart and attempt to exercise control where he or she should not? Before anyone says "what's this she bit?" there could an MI Bde tabbed to be the BSO. Unlikely and illogical but could happen. I can see the potential for both conflict and unknowing directions to transiting or other units.

I appreciate your SOF specific comments. My sensing was and is that what you describes as the change is taking place everywhere -- and that' better for everyone. The last thing we need is distrust between each other...

Bob's World:
Personally, I think we need to evolve from traditional concepts rooted in Physical Battle Space, and adopt more effective constructs that take into account "functional battle space" as well.Totally agree and that is a big part of my concern and an unstated reason for the question; that and the potential to focus excessively on geography and 'control' (to avoid unpleasant surprises from own side and echelons above reality) as opposed to focusing on the reason one is there.
In general though the BSO is left holding the bag and is always left responsible for whatever the SOF guys break (and benefits from what they do well, which is much more and less recognized). Ironically, the SF guys are arguably more frustrated by the efforts of the JSOC guys than the conventional forces are.I can see and believe all that (especially that last item :D ). That was part of my concern -- the development of ill will and enhanced parochialism and again, the words are important. An Area of Operations is one thing and Command responsibility is essentially understood and well delineated (as are OpCom and OpCon -- and when they are not appropriate...). However, 'ownership' implies something else and that can be misunderstood.
One incremental step to smooth this out would be to put all SOF under one set of authorities. That means compromise though. I would, however, open the door to a cleaner C2 lash up.I agree and as you know there are ways to do that cleanly and easily -- but that's for the over that beer discussion. ;)
As to putting SOF under the BSO, it always sounds good, but it also always ends up in some tragic application of SOF to solve problems that are merely difficult and dangerous, rather than SOF-unique in the skills and capabilities required.Also agree and that should not be done. No need for it if the parameters and command lines are clean...

jmm99 Thanks Mike, that is a valuable contribution and you apparently sensed what I was after. My answer to your question would be that such a Command line would be ideal. However, I'd have to caveat that by jabbering about personalities and parochialism. :(

max161Bingo!!!

I asked the Thread question for the two reasons I stated initially and for the reason you state far better than I. It was one of three unstated goals in asking the question -- the Nation whose territory it is "owns the Battle Space" -- US Forces can have an AO assigned within that and the C2 process for that are well established. The term BSO has bad connotations and implies a condition that cannot -- cetainly should not -- exist. The ANA can use the term, we should not.

A second unstated reason: To ask why on earth would we substitute dicey civilian ideas like ownership for proven doctrinal concepts and TTP? (I will not here ask about the either the Mayor or the BBQ coordinator on Afghan located FOBs...)

The third and most important of all was to suggest that yet again that it appears we are adapting unwisely and in administrative mode to a particular war and we will thus build bad habits that will not translate well to a new and different war...

Rifleman
01-24-2011, 04:02 AM
A few years ago, a box would go up over an area without warning, SOF would do their thing, then leave the mess behind for the battlespace owner to deal with.


I take it by "SOF" you don't mean Army Special Forces and by "their thing" you mean a direct action and it's aftermath?



What I saw this tour was a lot more coordination between SOF and the battlespace owners. We knew where every SOF mission was going prior to launch so we could be prepared to assist with QRF assets and coordinate with the ISF battlespace owners as well.


Again, I take it you mean DA. I would have thought the battle space owner would already know about SF doing FID/UW (or whatever it's called now) or SR type stuff in his area.

Cliff
01-24-2011, 05:28 AM
As I understand it, the term Battlespace Owner means that a Commander has been given effective total command -- with some exceptions -- over everything and everyone who enters, crosses or operates in a specified geographical area.

The control is total except for some SOF elements / missions and occasional other exceptions, a Battlespace Owner thus can dictate how units in his area not directly subordinate to him can or cannot operate.

I appreciate the need for delegation of authority, for accountability and for unity of command, however, it has been my observation that the thought processes of well trained Armor, Mech Infantry, Cavalry, Light Infantry and Artillery commanders vary slightly to considerably with respect to TTPs and thus perhaps a potential for friction (Clausewitzian style...) occurs when a dictatorial Light Infantry Commander has local FA elements operating in both the fire support and infantry modes...

As the token air guy, I feel compelled to mention that the CFLCC battlespace technically only extends vertically to the coordination altitude- above that, the CFACC "owns" the battlespace.

This means the "BSO" probably should coordinate any indirect fire larger than small mortars with the CFACC thru the ALO/BCD. Still doesn't avoid incidents like this (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6Zj2wdX0tc), but at least my bros in the jets can hopefully not get involved... :D

In practice the use of kill boxes helps this coordination quite a bit, especially when "purple" kill boxes are used.

Ownership is immaterial, but coordination (and procedures to get it done right!) are critical for all the reasons you mentioned- frat, etc.

V/R,

Cliff

jcustis
01-24-2011, 07:02 AM
sullygoarmy highlights that although we have a process, the reality is often widely different.

I had similar experiences when I was in N. Iraq last deploy.

William F. Owen
01-24-2011, 09:56 AM
In the real world no one should ever say "Battle Space." It's utterly meaningless. OK, people use the term, but it would seem to signify more ignorance than insight. Terms I use are:

Operational Area . - that defined area of terrain and air space in which an operation will take place. The definition is also time limited.

Area of Responsibility . - that defined area where a unit or sub-unit has responsibility for activity and/or security.

As concerns "owners" is not "ownership" often contested?

Bob's World
01-24-2011, 12:50 PM
(Rifleman when I mean US Army SF I say SF; I use SOF when I mean the entire array of joint and mulitnational forces.)

Concur with Dave completely about the host nation. I will only add that that is absolutely NOT how ISAF thinks about this, and it is a huge problem. There is that dang "control" word again. We are addicted to control in these operations, and it is the very fact that we seek to control outcomes that make the problems as large as they are. (That classic principle from Lawrence that everyone can quote, but no one wants to apply to their own slice of the equation regarding any HN solution, regardless of how poor being superior to any foreign solution, regardless of how good).

I was the point man for a couple months leading up to Marjah to take beatings from the RC leadership and staff for the insistence of SF on facilitating much larger Afghan units to function more effectively under their own C2 and structures; rather than disempowering their leadership and merging Afghan soldiers into Coalition units in a 1-1 ratio. (On my mental OER support form it states "Did not say 'are you F'n kidding me?' to any generals; and 'did not punch out the snarky USMC Lt Col who lectured me on how the SF model was outdated and that now partnering is defined as the 1-1 technique being employed by the Marines in Helmand.')


I am sure the rationale is along the lines of "we can't put the HN in the lead in their own country now because there is too much that needs to be done so that we can withdraw and leave them in charge on their own then."

(Warning, self-induced rant to follow. Chalk this up to PTSD: God. Colonial intervention counter guerrilla operations cloaked as "COIN" makes my head hurt. We would never pull this crap if it was at home. We would not even attempt to pull this crap if we were supporting a "first world" nation. We only pull this crap when we go some place we assess as inferior. We are arrogant a-holes, and our doctrine is a codification of that arrogance derived from the arrogant lessons of the European colonial experience. Trying to sugar coat that with "pop-centric" tactics is like putting sugar sprinkles on a bowl of dog####.)

SJPONeill
01-24-2011, 06:48 PM
Personally, I think we need to evolve from traditional concepts rooted in Physical Battle Space, and adopt more effective constructs that take into account "functional battle space" as well.

Good point as 'battlespace' always conjures up thoughts of good old-fashioned force-on-force state-versus-state MCO e.g. DESERT STORM, OIF Part 1, the Fulda Gap, etc...

My understanding is that, doctrinally, after fiddling with 'missionspace' the incoming terminology is now 'operating environment' in an attempt to better clutch up those other features, often less-tangible, of the COE...i.e those in the PMESCII-PT ASCOPE areas which were not the focus of operational training for those of use who went to school pre-21C...

So far as the C2 question in concerned...I think that it all comes down to the training and development of the commanders concerned - if you have those that operate strictly by the letter of the law (or doctrine) then, yes, that friction or worse is going to occur. Regardless of the doctrine, the guiding principle should always be 'apply with judgement' and all our systems do do their utmost to ensure that judgement is good...

With this caveat, I'm quite comfortable with Ken's definition's at the top of the thread...

Ken White
01-24-2011, 07:29 PM
(Rifleman when I mean US Army SF I say SF; I use SOF when I mean the entire array of joint and mulitnational forces.)Me too. Though I'm contemplating adding CRAF and WTFMF. Those would be 'CIFs Running Amok Forces' and 'Wrong Time For [this] Mission Forces' (another expansion of the abbreviation may be alternatively used). They seem to be amalgams and over present... :D
There is that dang "control" word again. We are addicted to control in these operations, and it is the very fact that we seek to control outcomes that make the problems as large as they are.Yes! :mad:
Colonial intervention counter guerrilla operations cloaked as "COIN" makes my head hurt. We would never pull this crap if it was at home. We would not even attempt to pull this crap if we were supporting a "first world" nation. We only pull this crap when we go some place we assess as inferior. We are arrogant a-holes, and our doctrine is a codification of that arrogance derived from the arrogant lessons of the European colonial experience. Trying to sugar coat that with "pop-centric" tactics is like putting sugar sprinkles on a bowl of dog####.)Yes! :mad:

Fuchs
01-24-2011, 07:52 PM
(Warning, self-induced rant to follow. Chalk this up to PTSD: God. Colonial intervention counter guerrilla operations cloaked as "COIN" makes my head hurt. We would never pull this crap if it was at home. We would not even attempt to pull this crap if we were supporting a "first world" nation. We only pull this crap when we go some place we assess as inferior.

I'm not so sure about that. The counter-insurgency influence of the U.S. in Greece (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_Civil_War) wasn't exactly diplomatic either.

Bob's World
01-24-2011, 08:33 PM
Greece fell in a unique time and place. Still establishing the lines for post WWII spheres of influence; and still in the realist "contain expansion of Sovietness" era of the Cold War. It was a few years later after the fall of Nationalist China that we began to morph to what I see as a much more Idealist "contain communism" era the dominated the Cold War proper; and shapes how we look at Islamism today. Still trying to contain ideologies, when the real energy fueling most of the conflicts were people seeking a liberty not controlled by some Colonial power or their appointed successor.

People are still seeking such liberty today. Tunisia is a current testament to that fact. Everyone is asking "where are the Islamists?" Meanwhile the people are talking in terms of "Liberty" "Democracy" "Justice" and "Self-Determination." Appears that the intel guys and ideologues are wrong again. No big surprise there.

So, back to my original point. We need to trade in the relentless pursuit of control for the relentless pursuit of influence. Once we make that paradigm shift, the rest will begin to fall in place. Oh, and that influence must be with populaces and non-state actors as well as with official governments. We're going to need a new playbook.

Infanteer
01-25-2011, 12:30 AM
So, back to my original point. We need to trade in the relentless pursuit of control for the relentless pursuit of influence. Once we make that paradigm shift, the rest will begin to fall in place. Oh, and that influence must be with populaces and non-state actors as well as with official governments. We're going to need a new playbook.

I feel like I'm reading something by Joseph S. Nye....:)

Ken White
01-25-2011, 01:20 AM
You noticed... :wry:

Cole
01-25-2011, 01:46 AM
OPSEC guys, Ken White said it was OK to post it and I answer to that higher authority. :wry:

"Assigning areas of operations to subordinate commanders maximizes decentralized execution by empowering those commanders to exercise initiative. Mission command gives commanders the authority to create any effects necessary to accomplish the mission (consistent with the rules of engagement) within their areas of operations. However, commanders cannot create effects outside their areas of operations without permission from the commander assigned the area of operations in which those effects will occur.
Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates. Assignment of an area of operations includes authority to perform the following:
.. Terrain management.
.. Intelligence collection.
.. Civil affairs activities.
.. Air and ground movement control.
.. Clearance of fires.
.. Security."

Believe "battlespace" has been ruled a non-term in Army doctrine although the Marines still use it.

My questions are many. Does a BCT or battalion's boundaries constitute its area of operations (AO)? If so, what of the larger area of influence for indirect fires? And if area of interest is even farther out, this quote seems to imply you are busting boundaries beyond your "intelligence collection" AO. BTW, Wilf believe AOR only applies to combatant command and other upper echelon units although you frequently see it used at lower level.

Does it come down to a battalion having noncontiguous AO boundaries within a larger BCT AO so that the organic artillery battalion can shoot targets inside the battalion's area of influence but actually in the brigade AO? Likewise, does the Fires Brigade shoot targets in division unassigned areas that are the BCT's area of influence? Confused yet? There's more.

I've been told in the past that units are allowed to employ direct fires across a boundary anytime if positive ID is established but not indirect fires without permission? Yet this quote seems to imply no "effects" outside your AO/boundaries??

Finally, what happens if a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is located instead a battalion's AO? Can a Brigade Support Battalion have an AO?

Cliff, I made the same comment to Ken in a PM about coordinating altitude being the cut-off for ground commander's air control. I only recently learned about blue (ground up) and purple (lower and higher altitude) kill boxes. Is anyone out there using the term Joint Fires Area in the real Army/Joint world? Is the Air Force allowing Kill Boxes to be split up to allow airspace users to share the same area by restricting themselves to just one Keypad within a Kill Box? Did that UH-60 in your video bust a Position Area for Artillery big time...or is that artillery unit never going to get resupplied by air again?;)

SJPONeill
01-25-2011, 02:32 AM
I think that we are in danger here of applying an over-specific brush to what is 'only' doctrine and which should not attempt to prescribe specific situations...the examples being quotes of 'but what if? are the sorts of issues that should be resolved on a case-by-case basis using existing command and control processes...I find it hard to believe that brigade staffs are so dumb or doctrinally-driven that they can not and do not recognise and mitigate such situations - noting, of course, that is such mitigations, not every departs happy (i.e. got what they wanted) and so the staff responsible are tagged as biased, slanted, ticket-punching, unresponsive, out-of-the-loop, etc etc...

Cliff
01-25-2011, 03:46 AM
Cliff, I made the same comment to Ken in a PM about coordinating altitude being the cut-off for ground commander's air control. I only recently learned about blue (ground up) and purple (lower and higher altitude) kill boxes. Is anyone out there using the term Joint Fires Area in the real Army/Joint world? Is the Air Force allowing Kill Boxes to be split up to allow airspace users to share the same area by restricting themselves to just one Keypad within a Kill Box? Did that UH-60 in your video bust a Position Area for Artillery big time...or is that artillery unit never going to get resupplied by air again?;)

Cole-

The ALSA website (https://wwwmil.alsa.mil/) has links to FM 3-09.34 Kill Box Tactics and Multiservice Procedures... distribution is restricted, so you will need a CAC card to look at it.

Kill Boxes can in theory be opened and closed by keypad, but that is not as likely due to the smaller size of the keypads. I'll have to ask my sources to see what is happening right now in the field... Kill boxes are a pretty flexible means of doing FSCMs, and they work well for a fluid fight like Afghanistan because you can open and close them with less work since everyone (in theory!) already knows where they are- unlike a ROZ.

As for the video, I have heard (anecdotally) that the artillery folks hadn't coordinated their fires, but I don't know all the details. That is a case of Army vs. Army coordination, so I can only speculate... :p

My only other comment is that it seems like the "ownership" issue gets pretty emotional... like I said before (and I'm agreeing with the majority here I think), having a system of coordination seems to be more important than who owns what.

I'll post again if I can get some current data from bros at the CAOC.

V/R,

Cliff

IntelTrooper
01-25-2011, 04:17 AM
I find it hard to believe that brigade staffs are so dumb or doctrinally-driven that they can not and do not recognise and mitigate such situations - noting, of course, that is such mitigations, not every departs happy (i.e. got what they wanted) and so the staff responsible are tagged as biased, slanted, ticket-punching, unresponsive, out-of-the-loop, etc etc...

There are some brigade staffs that have deployed and have been pretty unanimously determined to be biased, ticket-punching, unresponsive, and out-of-the-loop. That's certainly not universal but when talking about "ownership," it can seriously impede progress and when it goes on for a year or more, that's a lot of damage to all the progress that had been and could have been made.

I recall one particularly absurd case where the brigade commander was so adamant at enforcing his "no night ops" rule that he wouldn't let another government agency with all of their own assets and support snatch a guy at 3 AM. They were told they had to wait until dawn to go after him, of course rendering the whole mission moot.

This kind of stuff goes on all the time, unfortunately.

Ken White
01-25-2011, 04:24 AM
OPSEC guys, Ken White said it was OK to post it and I answer to that higher authority. :wry:Partly so I could laugh at this:
"Assigning areas of operations to subordinate commanders maximizes decentralized execution by empowering those commanders to exercise initiative. Mission command gives commanders the authority to create any effects necessary to accomplish the mission (consistent with the rules of engagement) within their areas of operations. However, commanders cannot create effects outside their areas of operations without permission from the commander assigned the area of operations in which those effects will occur.I think that says "you're in charge except when you're not..."

Still, I get the intent and that's not too bad. Here's the part that does bother me:
Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates...That 'control' word and that statement are, perhaps, part of the problem I see that led to my first post.

I'm not at all sure ANY Commander can truthfully 'control' "all parts of their area not assigned to subordinates" and I suspect many US Commanders do not fully trust some of their subordinates and that this all leads to OVER control -- or attempts to do so. Certainly some recent contacts from the 'Stan have said that is a problem -- and not just in one area. That's a bad and dangerously worded paragraph that merits review -- as IMO does that BSO bit...

As to your questions, not an OpSec violation in them to my mind though others may not agree and thus not answer. So I'll give you the pre-2001 answers. ;)

A BCT or battalion's boundaries do constitute its area of operations (AO) but it is important to recall that boundaries as a control measure differ from the use of a unit AO. They used to be called a Tactical Area of Operations (TAOR) and were the lower echelon equivalent of the AO used for echelons above reality. The paragraph following your quote, Para 5-79 and illustration 5-2 give a clearer picture than does 5-78. I think that also answers your Fires question asked later.

The larger area of influence for indirect fires relies on coordination, pure and simple. An area of interest is even farther out does imply one is busting boundaries beyond ones "intelligence collection" AO but again the key is coordination -- and as always, METT-TC...

Units have to be allowed to employ direct fires across a boundary anytime if positive ID is established. As for indirect fires without permission, the quote seems to imply no "effects" outside the AO but I suspect that's sloppy writing and that somewhere in that oversized tome, it's clarified.

At least, I hope it is... :D

I think SJPONeill is correct -- most Commanders will work it out and not get too hung up over the doctrine. My concern is simply that one must be careful with doctrine to limit the damage caused by those few Commanders who cannot (or, more often, just will not) work it out. :wry:

I also think Cliff is spot on with the comment that "the 'ownership' issue gets pretty emotional... like I said before (and I'm agreeing with the majority here I think), having a system of coordination seems to be more important than who owns what." That emotional aspect exists and luckily will only adversely affect a few. The importance of using known and standard names and processes is that system he wants. He's totally correct and about 80 to 90% of all folks know and will do that.

Those existing processes are unfortunately necessary and quite critical to limit the damage that other 10 to 20% can do. We aren't talking hurt feelings and bruised egos here -- people get killed unnecessarily due to such screwups and its easy to miss that point in peacetime or in low intensity conflicts. Such errors are far too costly in a mid or high intensity fight. Hopefully no one will have to endure one or more of those.

But don't bet the farm you or people you train will not have to do so...

jcustis
01-25-2011, 04:43 AM
In the real world no one should ever say "Battle Space." It's utterly meaningless. OK, people use the term, but it would seem to signify more ignorance than insight. Terms I use are:

Operational Area . - that defined area of terrain and air space in which an operation will take place. The definition is also time limited.

Area of Responsibility . - that defined area where a unit or sub-unit has responsibility for activity and/or security.

As concerns "owners" is not "ownership" often contested?

Wilf, there are no issues with employing those terms. They are doctrinal and have clear definitions. I don't think that battlespace owner has the same rigidity in terms of a doctrinal construct, but people have come to understand that when it is used, it generally means the terrain within a prescribed boundary that is controlled by X element.

BSO is a snazzier term, as Area of Responsibility Owner just doesn't roll off the tongues as well.

Yeah, the HN should be considered the BSO, but at the end of the day, not a whole lot of stock should be put into the term itself. We know what the objective understanding should be, even if the common understanding or threshold leaves a lot to be desired. Even when using doctrinal terms, there are nuances to them that differ between Marine and Army usage, despite joint definitions existing in black and white.

William F. Owen
01-25-2011, 05:21 AM
We need to trade in the relentless pursuit of control for the relentless pursuit of influence. Once we make that paradigm shift, the rest will begin to fall in place. Oh, and that influence must be with populaces and non-state actors as well as with official governments. We're going to need a new playbook.

What worked in wars 3,000 years ago, works today. War is politics. Break will, gain control, and support follows. Influence comes from the application of force, to force compliance. Influence is control, and it is should be articulated as control.

Focus on killing and all else follows. Kill the people opposed to your policy. if that doesn't work the policy, not the killing, was wrong. Leave the population alone. Focus effort of breaking the will of enemy armed force, be they regular or irregular.

There is no confusion as to what works and how to do it.

William F. Owen
01-25-2011, 05:29 AM
Yeah, the HN should be considered the BSO, but at the end of the day, not a whole lot of stock should be put into the term itself. We know what the objective understanding should be, even if the common understanding or threshold leaves a lot to be desired. Even when using doctrinal terms, there are nuances to them that differ between Marine and Army usage, despite joint definitions existing in black and white.

Not a lot of stock, an understatement?

So the host nation is the Battle Space Owner? So during the invasion of Iraq, Iraq was the Battle Space Owner? When did the Iraqi Government become the BSO, and where was that?

Whose ever doctrine this is, it's moronic. "Ownership??" The way we can get around stupid ideas is to stop using them.

I can guess I can add "Battle Space" to my list of "military terms used by 8-year-olds."

jcustis
01-25-2011, 06:10 AM
Wilf, it's just a term, and it's battlespace as a single word, not two. Think slang.

No one is saying Iraq was the BSO during the invasion...looking a little closely at the comments above, we are talking about the FID/COIN environment, not conventional conflict.

William F. Owen
01-25-2011, 07:18 AM
Wilf, it's just a term, and it's battlespace as a single word, not two. Think slang.

Ahhhh.... Sorry. I thought is was a book-learning term for all that there bank-bank stuff them soldiers boys do of somewhere some when.

Guess reading and all that, don't help you none here. :D


No one is saying Iraq was the BSO during the invasion...looking a little closely at the comments above, we are talking about the FID/COIN environment, not conventional conflict.
So the slang term "Battlespace" only applies to FID/COIN. OK, so when did the current Iraqi government take possession of it's "Battlespace."

82redleg
01-25-2011, 11:45 AM
that 'control' word and that statement are, perhaps, part of the problem I see that led to my first post.

I'm not at all sure ANY Commander can truthfully 'control' "all parts of their area not assigned to subordinates" and I suspect many US Commanders do not fully trust some of their subordinates and that this all leads to OVER control -- or attempts to do so. Certainly some recent contacts from the 'Stan have said that is a problem -- and not just in one area. That's a bad and dangerously worded paragraph that merits review -- as IMO does that BSO bit...

As I read that paragraph (and I fully admit to reading the snippet posted here and not going back to the manual), I understand it to mean that, if a commander is assigned an AO, and decides not to further assign responsibilities for portions of that AO to a subordinate, he/she retains responsibility for all the coordination required in controlling that AO (clearing fires, tracking movement, etc).

Bob's World
01-25-2011, 12:53 PM
What worked in wars 3,000 years ago, works today. War is politics. Break will, gain control, and support follows. Influence comes from the application of force, to force compliance. Influence is control, and it is should be articulated as control.

Focus on killing and all else follows. Kill the people opposed to your policy. if that doesn't work the policy, not the killing, was wrong. Leave the population alone. Focus effort of breaking the will of enemy armed force, be they regular or irregular.

There is no confusion as to what works and how to do it.

"Give unto Caesar that which is Caesar's" Wise words. I would take the liberty to derive from that "Give unto Mars that which is Mar's."

What I just posted on the thread regarding globalization applies, and I won't repeat here. My case is yes, war is war; but NO insurgency is not war; and foreign intervention is not COIN. History is littered with the ruins of empires who never grasped this fine point.

I say it's time to break the trend. So, when at war, wage war. Crush your enemies and the will of his populace to even consider attempting such a thing ever again (or at least for a generation or two). But when faced with illegal challenges at home by one's own populace tread lightly in re-establishing security and focus on understanding and addressing the true causes (most of which will track right back to the government itself) of the uprising. When going overseas to assist a friendly government faced with such challenges give them this friendly advice as well. Tell them you will not assist them in the suppression of their own people, but rather that you are willing to help them in a neutral manner to mediate the differences between the people and their government. If that is not enough for that government, or if that government then seeks to screw you over by turning to your enemies for such support in suppressing the populace the answer is easy: Switch to UW and support the people against the government. At the end of the day, our national interests are in the resources and support of the land and the people. Governments come and go.

Bob's World
01-25-2011, 12:59 PM
(oh yeah, and now I have a homework assignment from Infanteer and Ken to go find out who the heck Joseph S. Nye is, and read some of his stuff.)

max161
01-25-2011, 01:15 PM
See his original Foreign Policy article: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65163/joseph-s-nye-jr/get-smart

This is where Secretary Clinton derives the concept of Smart Power she talks about.

See also the CSIS Smart Power initiative: http://csis.org/program/smart-power-initiative

sullygoarmy
01-25-2011, 01:26 PM
Not a lot of stock, an understatement?

So the host nation is the Battle Space Owner? So during the invasion of Iraq, Iraq was the Battle Space Owner? When did the Iraqi Government become the BSO, and where was that?



William,
At this point in history, the Iraqi Security Forces own the battlespace, Area of Operations, Operational Environment or whatever term we want to use. They are the lead partner and were the junior partner. Other than some very rare force protection missions, we always requested permission from the Iraqi General in charge of an area we wanted to operate in and always had ISF with us. With only one Brigade in all of Baghdad province we must rely on the ISF to conduct security operations...U.S. forces cannot anymore. The drawdown truly was a forcing function to get the ISF out on their own and keep using U.S. enablers to support them.

Obviously not the same situation in Afghanistan. But when we look at Security Force Assistance, we want the host nation in the lead. Fortunately, we are at that point in Iraq.

Love the discussions!

Bob's World
01-25-2011, 01:45 PM
See his original Foreign Policy article: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65163/joseph-s-nye-jr/get-smart

This is where Secretary Clinton derives the concept of Smart Power she talks about.

See also the CSIS Smart Power initiative: http://csis.org/program/smart-power-initiative

Thanks Dave, actually I am less ignorant on this than I thought. QDDR, the products coming out of PNSR ( http://www.pnsr.org/index.asp ) have a great deal of good within them, but I find them to be disconnected from the realities of what it takes to operationalize them, and also the realities of our own liability in the causation of many of the problems that challenge us the most.

So, my take adds a larger dose of taking responsibility for our own contributory roles and also a more realist approach toward operationalizing what are admittedly fairly "idealistic" recommendations.

So, I find that "neoliberalism" misses the mark as far to the left of the target as "neoconservatism" misses to the right. I will have to develop my own brand, but it would probably best be described as "NeoAmericanism".

A philosophy that returns to our founding principles as a nation, that recognizes our responsibility in contributing to current instability (as well as much that is good) in the world, and that recognizes the difference between war and peace, and wages both with relentless pursuit of influence whenever, and wherever necessary. Recognizing also that there are few greater applications of power than wise restraint in a manner that allows others to sort out their own differences without always defaulting to "might makes right." Employing a greater might to allow "right" to evolve semi-peacefully as determined by the populaces that it affects the most.

Making this up as I go. Perhaps its time for a NeoAmerican Party that gives rational Americans who feel abandoned by both the Democratic and the Republican parties a place where they can work together to make America, and a world touched by American influence, a better place.

Infanteer
01-25-2011, 01:59 PM
(oh yeah, and now I have a homework assignment from Infanteer and Ken to go find out who the heck Joseph S. Nye is, and read some of his stuff.)

Much of what you say resonates to his writings on soft power and its difference from hard power.

sullygoarmy
01-25-2011, 03:41 PM
(oh yeah, and now I have a homework assignment from Infanteer and Ken to go find out who the heck Joseph S. Nye is, and read some of his stuff.)


Link to Joseph Nye's book, Soft Power (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1586483064/ref=kinw_rke_tl_1). A good, quick read.

William F. Owen
01-25-2011, 04:00 PM
"Give unto Caesar that which is Caesar's"
From the Christian book?

My case is yes, war is war; but NO insurgency is not war; and foreign intervention is not COIN. History is littered with the ruins of empires who never grasped this fine point.
Insurgency is really baby-talk for a rebellion. Rebellions is when folks seek to alter the political power being exercised over them. How is that not war?

Empires, nations and ideas are sustained by wiping out the the rebels. Rebellion is War. Faced with a rebellion, you break the armed factions will to fight and force them conduct peaceful negotiations for their political objectives, under terms you dictate.

Bob's World
01-25-2011, 04:35 PM
Yes, yes, I am quite aware of the recipe for sustaining illegitimate and despotic rule over ones own populace or the populace of others. Nothing new or insightful there.

What I speak to is how to actually address the root causes. Suppression of those who dare to challenge you is easy enough. Resolving such situations is another matter entirely, and it cannot be resolved through the principles of war or through the conduct of warfare.

Ken White
01-25-2011, 04:53 PM
As I read that paragraph (and I fully admit to reading the snippet posted here and not going back to the manual), I understand it to mean that, if a commander is assigned an AO, and decides not to further assign responsibilities for portions of that AO to a subordinate, he/she retains responsibility for all the coordination required in controlling that AO (clearing fires, tracking movement, etc).However, my belief -- and fear -- is that some (that 10-20%...) will latch onto the words "Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates..." and overdo it. Some will take it to mean they must literally control the entire area by occupation. Others will be excessive in their exercise of control authority by insisting on excessive coordination or adherence to their restrictions and tactical direction. I have it on good authority that is occurring and that some are being quite rigorous in their exercise of 'control' (that wording makes me a master of political correctness... ;) ).

'Control' the verb is overly loved by too many in the US Army -- it leads to micromangement, reluctance or even refusal to delegate and / or to trust subordinates and increases the societal tendency toward risk aversion. I do not question the necessity for use of the word but know that overuse of the word and the concept can lead to the inadvertant stifling of initiative and innovation. I'm firmly convinced that its employment in doctrine should minimal and quite specific.

I fully realize that no doctrinal pub can account for all possibilities for misuse but I do strongly believe two things in this regard:

- The proliferation of terms, be they shorthand, slang or whatever should be avoided as such terms have a way of making their way into publications, largely written by Snowbirds, Blackbirds and civilian writers who hear but do not always understand the context. This proven tendency can create confusion and can among other things provide the unwary latitude for unwise directives and measures.

- The current trend toward ever more wordy manuals can also lead to such confusion as the critical points often become physically separated and lose impact.

I know there's little hope in educating the 10% -- my concern is to keep it at that level or lower if possible instead of allowing, even encouraging, it to hit the 20% level. :wry:

I'm also concerned that while adaptation to the current fight is certainly necessary, such adaptation excessively pursued can lead to blinders for other fights in other times and places against far different opponents. I saw many bad habits acquired by the US Army (and Marines) in Viet Nam. Some -- too many -- of those one war peculiar and undesirable traits are still around. My hope is that the potential for even worse habits from the current wars not get embedded to our future detriment.

Fuchs
01-25-2011, 07:10 PM
I say "let them fail". That's what the economy does.
There are gazillions of business owners past the age of 50 who have a business model that would allow for 50 employees but they cannot go beyond 5-10 because they have the urge to micromanage.

They'll never sustain a growth beyond their ability to micromanage, that's the punishment of the markets.

Armies should keep handicapped leaders small as well. let them fail, send them back to last position where they didn't fail. A Col who cannot resist the urge to micromanage should be turned into a section leader.

That's way easier than to develop work-around everywhere in order to mitigate their failures.

Ken White
01-25-2011, 08:06 PM
Even prosper -- after all, the flawed run may be a tax write-off, the items may be sold at a discount, perhaps there can be some recycling and the management team can be sent back to the drawing board and will likely produce a better production method or process.

In war, flawed processes will almost certainly mean unnecessary deaths. So while there is merit to letting leaders fail and recycling them, it's got to be tempered with full knowledge of the costs and a sense of time and place. A better solution would be improved selection of leaders and to not presume that everyone can do the job if not well, at least acceptably. They cannot.

Bob's World
01-25-2011, 09:02 PM
Of course, worth considering is that the Afghans may well be amused to hear that some Coalition Commander considers some area to be his "battlespace," much as many a nation is likely "amused" to hear that their entire nation and its territorial waters lie within some GCC's "Area of Responsibility" as well. Point being, we may well take our overly grandiose proclamations of control more seriously than do those who actually have control/responsibility for those spaces.

In a place like Afghanistan one can layer dozens of such stakeholders, foreign and domestic, on any particular area; few really coordinating with the others, and many quite likely not even aware of who all the claimants are or how to coordinate with them if they were so inclined to do so to begin with.

Which brings us back to the largest problem with battlespace being that coalition commanders believe they all have such space and are in control over the same.

Such space is critical in operations where someone must be able to account for the presence of friendly forces and clear fires. If Afghanistan such fires are virtually always observed. One need no "own" battlespace to clear such fires. In fact most battlespace has been abandoned to SOF, with the conventional forces focused on a fraction of their entire AOR, leaving SOF commanders to take calls from roving helicopters requesting permission to engage some target or another that they swear is "the enemy." Too often it is not, and once again SOF has produced a CIVCAS while the helicopter boys return to base with all the Teflon that not being a BSO provides in such incidents. So a change that makes the air guys "clear" their own fires and take responsibility for what they break would be a nice change.

I have no bright scheme for clearing this mess up, but I do recognize it is far messier and more complex than it need be.

SJPONeill
01-25-2011, 11:29 PM
I have no bright scheme for clearing this mess up, but I do recognize it is far messier and more complex than it need be.

As above it may be as 'simple' as "
...A better solution would be improved selection of leaders and to not presume that everyone can do the job if not well, at least acceptably..."

I don't agree with Fuchs on recyling...natural selection in this profession should be as harsh as the consequences of getting it wrong...and I'm sure (based on past practice) that most of those 'out-cycled' will survive very nicely in the outside world, worse case in some dodgy thinktank...

Rifleman
01-26-2011, 04:41 AM
While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.

The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.

The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.

Just wanted to make that observation.

William F. Owen
01-26-2011, 06:29 AM
Yes, yes, I am quite aware of the recipe for sustaining illegitimate and despotic rule over ones own populace or the populace of others. Nothing new or insightful there.
...but you cannot say what is despotic or illegitimate. The US President tells you what is legitimate and what is not. He is a politician and his statements are very relative, changeable and imprecise.

There is no bench-mark for legitimacy. You just have a political opinion as to what is legitimate.

What I speak to is how to actually address the root causes. Suppression of those who dare to challenge you is easy enough.
...but you are no qualified to address them or know what the root causes are. You just want your version of power in place, which would be pro-US and thus in the eyes of many could in no way be legitimate.

Resolving such situations is another matter entirely, and it cannot be resolved through the principles of war or through the conduct of warfare.
History does not support that statement.

Cole
01-26-2011, 01:41 PM
While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.
AOR would be more like the entire large city jurisdiction the Police Chief is responsible for, while a precinct would be more like an operational area, and series of beats are the individual areas of operation (AO).


The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.This raises the point that the commander of the area of operation has responsibilities listed in FM 3-0 for that area. That does not mean they "own" that space anymore than the police or precinct chief owns the space they operate in.


The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.It also is analogous to how a police officer treats citizens and how (I would presume) a Soldier/Marine practicing COIN should treat foreign citizens...with respect. If police officers play rambo and treat citizens with disrespect, my bet is they don't last long on the job. It should be the same way for Soldiers and commanders in an AO with respect to average citizens. Police don't assume that everyone is a criminal. Troops can't treat every Pashtun like they are Taliban...IMHO the whole disconnect of those who advocate enemy-centric COIN.

Enemy-centric COIN implies an assumption that you can take greater liberties with the population as a whole and screw the collateral damage as long as you ferret out and kill the bad guys. Would a cop take that attitude?

Rifleman
01-26-2011, 02:00 PM
Police don't assume that everyone is a criminal.


Police don't, or shouldn't, automatically treat everyone as a criminal.

But I'm convinced the following quote is the way to go:

"Conduct every traffic stop extending the olive branch of peace; while having a tactical plan to kill everyone inside the vehicle." - Gordon Graham

Bob's World
01-26-2011, 03:58 PM
Bob: "Resolving such situations is another matter entirely, and it cannot be resolved through the principles of war or through the conduct of warfare."

WILF: "History does not support that statement."

Actually I argue the opposite is true, but toss a couple examples out there and lets take a look at them. My only condition is that we look at least 20 years beyond any military "victory" and see how the subsequent peace turned out. Mere suppression of a particular insurgent group or ideology for some narrow window of time does not count.

Ken White
01-26-2011, 04:00 PM
"21. Be polite. Be professional. But, have a plan to kill everyone you meet."

Always, of course, accompanied by Nrs 19 and 20:

"19. Decide to be aggressive ENOUGH, quickly ENOUGH.
20. The faster you finish the fight, the less shot you will get" :D

jmm99
01-26-2011, 05:49 PM
As a segué into this, I've been slogging at the early development of Operational Law since its "conception" in the 1980s-1990s (legal doctrines material to military operations in war and in "other than war"). As part of that, I've been looking at ROE development; e.g., Rules of Engagement (ROE) Handbook for Judge Advocates (http://www.difesa.it/NR/rdonlyres/15563AC1-B128-41EB-A6C0-FB2C701CE649/0/roehandbook.pdf) (CLAMO 2000); and, from the international humanitarian law viewpoint, Rules of Engagement Handbook (https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/International-Law/San-Remo-ROE-Handbook.aspx) (Sanremo 2009).

Needless to say, after burying my head in those august publications, Ken's post was a breath of fresh air - and the entire "Marine Rules of Combat" are an oxygen tent. So, here are all of them for perusal by "battlespace owners, occupiers and possessors" (and those who might represent them in consequent courts-martial proceedings):


Rules of Combat (http://www.strategypage.com/humor/articles/military_humor_rules_of_combat.asp)

USMC

1. Bring a weapon. Preferably, bring at least two. Bring all of your friends who have weapons. Bring their friends who have weapons.

2. Anything worth shooting is worth shooting twice. Ammo is cheap. Life is expensive.

3. Only hits count. Close doesn't count. The only thing worse than a miss is a slow miss.

4. If your shooting stance is good, you're probably not moving fast enough, nor using cover correctly.

5. Move away from your attacker. Distance is your friend. (Lateral and diagonal movement are preferred.)

6. If you can choose what to bring to a gunfight, bring a big weaponand a friend with a big weapon.

7. In ten years nobody will remember the details of caliber, stance, or tactics. They will only remember who lived and who didn't.

8. If you are not shooting, you should be communicating, reloading, and running.

9. Accuracy is relative: most combat shooting is more dependent on "pucker factor" than the inherent accuracy of the weapon.

10. Use a weapon that works EVERY TIME. "All skill is in vain when an Angel pisses in the flintlock of your musket."

11. Someday someone may kill you with your own weapon, but they should have to beat you to death with it because it is empty.

12. In combat, there are no rules, always cheat; always win. The only unfair fight is the one you lose.

13. Have a plan.

14. Have a back-up plan, because the first one won't work.

15. Use cover or concealment as much as possible. The visible target should be in FRONT of YOUR weapon.

16. Flank your adversary when possible. Protect yours.

17. Don't drop your guard.

18. Always tactical load and threat scan 360 degrees.

19. Watch their hands. Hands kill. (In God we trust. Everyone else, keep your hands where I can see them).

20. Decide to be aggressive ENOUGH, quickly ENOUGH.

21. The faster you finish the fight, the less shot you will get.

22. Be courteous to everyone, friendly to no one.

23. Be polite. Be professional. But have a plan to kill everyone you meet.

24. Your number one Option for Personal Security is a lifelong commitment to avoidance, deterrence, and de-escalation.

25. Do not attend a gunfight with a handgun, the caliber of which does not start with a ".4."

Army

1. See USMC Rules for combat

2. Add 60 to 90 days

3. Hope the Marines already destroyed all meaningful resistance

Navy

1. Spend three weeks getting somewhere

2. Adopt an aggressive offshore posture

3. Send in the Marines

4. Drink Coffee

5. Bring back the Marines

Air Force

1. Kiss the spouse good-bye

2. Drive to the flight line

3. Fly to target area, drop bombs, fly back.

4. Pop in at the club for a couple with the guys

5. Go home, BBQ some burgers and drink some more beer

My own summary of the Golden Twenty-Five: Carry a Big Hunting License, but don't kill everything in the forest.

Regards

Mike

SJPONeill
01-26-2011, 08:33 PM
While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.

Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.

The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.

The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.

Just wanted to make that observation.

And a good observation it is...while we have CIMS (C for Coordinated) down here instead of NIMS, I expect that they are essentially similar...one of the key lessons we found (the hard way, of course) when dealing with rotating ICs was the essential need for regular liaison and training between all the various agencies involved at both the area/regional command level and at the boots on the ground work-face level...once some egos got put in their box, it worked well, to the extent that, when the lahar kicked off in 2007, it was almost ho-hum-whatever as ALL the agencies involved were so used to working together...

The difference though is that most of the relationships that develop for incident management are long-term as most of the agencies involved don't rotate people in and out on a 2-3 year basis...the military always seemed to be ones playing catch-up in terms of continuity because of this...