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IntelTrooper
01-26-2011, 04:53 PM
Via Eric Trager at The Atlantic:

Scenes From Egypt's Would-Be Revolution (http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/01/scenes-from-egypts-would-be-revolution/70191/#)


CAIRO, Egypt -- It is too soon to know whether the stunning demonstrations that have rocked Egypt today, with tens of thousands of protesters descending on cities throughout the country and overtaking Cairo's central square in an effort to reproduce Tunisia's recent uprising, will succeed in forcing change. But a telling comment came just after cannons, shooting gas-infused water, dispersed crowds along one major Cairo thoroughfare, when a man turned to me and said, "We want a revolution. We don't want Hosni Mubarak."

That man was a police captain.

omarali50
01-26-2011, 06:19 PM
I just posted the following comments on facebook while discussing this with an Indian friend...I think they are relevant. The US, with its worldcop ambitions and its Israeli mandate cannot easily sit aside, but, for whatever its worth:

I think that the ruling elite will survive, but may have to sacrifice the crook Mubarak and send him to retirement in Jeddah if things get out of hand. Then they will ban alcohol on Fridays or do some other bull#### like that to keep the mullahs happy and meanwhile they will ask America for more money in order to keep the poor people in check. This method of selling nuisance value has been perfected in Pakistan and if they need advice, I can provide it at 500 dollars an hour via skype…
Fundamentalists are a threat to Egypt because if they hijack the “revolution” it will be crude, violent and unproductive and will eventually lead to either anarchy or an Islamist dictatorship that will barely feed its own population and will someday be replaced by another revolution.
Israel is the obvious direct affectee outside of Egypt. It is a waste of time to worry about fundamentalists in Egypt if you are an Indian. In fact, the fundamentalists may have to buy stuff from india and China as Europe and the USA will close down a lot of connections. And India may benefit from a few thousand talented Egyptian refugees finding their way to India. What is India’s worry from such a “revolution”?

jmm99
01-27-2011, 02:07 AM
a brief thanks for again giving us your take on things Islamic and Islamist - and we get you advice and comments without coughing up 10K nickels per hour. :D

Cheers

Mike

omarali50
01-27-2011, 05:51 PM
Since you encouraged me, I have another comment on this article:
http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2011/01/26/adam-shatz/mubarak-your-plane-is-waiting/

I am not sure why Obama has to deliver the people of Egypt out of slavery. I would not imagine that as a traditional function of American diplomacy.

If things get out of hand, then there is the issue of what organized force is in a position to control the situation. Obviously there is no such thing (even in Somalia) as pure anarchy. Whoever has some organized force tends to take control. In an organized modern state, that function is performed by the state. If Egypt is lucky, then their current corrupt ruling elite will have enough sense and staying power to reform themselves enought to satisfy the people’s aspiration for participation in society, fairness, democracy, etc, while maintaining basic law and order.
But given the long history of corrupt elite rule in these countries and its inevitable decay at the core, it may be that they will either impose basic order by force WITHOUT reforming too much, or they will fall apart completely. IF things fall apart, then it all depends on who or what can organize a takeover of the remains. In 1917 in Russia, that was the Bolsheviks. In Egypt in 2012 that may be the Islamists.
And yes, in that case, things may go from bad to worse. My guess is that the Islamists, at least initially, will be less corrupt than the current regime, and they will permit many marginalized but talented people to rise, but given their retrogressive philosophical framework, they will not be able to make much progress and will lose a lot of the technocratic elite to migration. Unlike Iran, they dont have much oil, they dont have that strong and deep a cultural tradition, they dont have a very educated clergy, they have Israel next door and they are infected with just enough grandiose Arab grandstanding: they will not do well as an Islamic republic…

davidbfpo
01-28-2011, 10:35 AM
I have watched a little newsreel and spent more time looking at the photos on FP Blog:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/25/day_of_rage

Where it is remarkable that many of those protesting are not young, indeed juveniles are absent as are women. The vast majority are men in their twenties and one Oriental male - a Chinese student / tourist?

Bob's World
01-28-2011, 10:50 AM
The U.S. has no duty to "deliver" any populace "out of slavery."

But the U.S. has no choice but to deal with the consequences of perceptions that we act to sustain such populaces in "slavery" to begin with.

"Slavery" is a harsh word, designed to evoke emotional responses. This in no time or place for such emotion. This is a time for calm, thoughtful, principled leadership.

I for one am far more comfortable with an America that stands up for popular sovereignty, self-determination, equity, justice and liberty; than I am with an America that ignores inconvenient truths or that rationalizes the priority of upholding "the rule of law" when that law is nearly universally recognized as unjust.

We stand at a crossroad. We have an opportunity to be the country we see ourselves as, or to remain the country that others grow increasingly to see us as. I vote for the former.

AdamG
01-28-2011, 06:37 PM
and one oriental male - a chinese "student / tourist" operative?

ftfy.

Nevermind - the kid looks like an oriental 'Where's Waldo?'
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/25/day_of_rage?page=0,31

IntelTrooper
01-28-2011, 06:57 PM
We stand at a crossroad. We have an opportunity to be the country we see ourselves as, or to remain the country that others grow increasingly to see us as. I vote for the former.

Sir,

How do you propose the US go about that in this situation? It seems to me that any overtures on the part of the US towards a new government would be too little, too late.

tequila
01-28-2011, 09:31 PM
Anyone else think that Joe Biden's comment that Mubarak is not a dictator (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-june11/biden_01-27.html)might come back to bite us in the ass?

Firn
01-28-2011, 10:34 PM
Anyone else think that Joe Biden's comment that Mubarak is not a dictator (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-june11/biden_01-27.html)might come back to bite us in the ass?

Frankly all seems uncertain now. That little piece of the Ben Wedeman tweet (http://twitter.com/bencnn) captured my eye:


Teenager showed me teargas canister "Made in USA."Saw the same thing in Tunisia. Time to reconsider U.S. exports?

...

IntelTrooper
01-28-2011, 10:42 PM
What's to reconsider? We exported those intentionally.

Bob's World
01-28-2011, 10:57 PM
Watching Fox news. Huckabaee is all "this is bad for Israel"; Then the CEO of Heinz "this is bad for business." Prior to them a former CIA expert on AQ "This will empower the Islamists."

The answer one gets depends on the equities of who one asks.

Myself, I am simply a student of Insurgency, history and the law and a retired SF officer and former prosecutor. Take any answer I provide in that context. We all have our biases.

For me personally, this is long overdue and generally good. We should probably start a SWC pool for which state erupts next. It could be Yemen, Algeria, or Libya. Or even Jordan or Saudi Arabia. The people are drawing courage from each other (this is the reality of globalization, and this is what did indeed led to the fall of the Berlin Wall two decades ago).

My assessment is that the President is being a bit too cautious, but he is sending his agents out to test the waters in the right general direction.

The Fear Mongers are starting to line up though, and we could blink. I hope we go with our national principles and support the people. If we don't support them AQ and the Islamist community will.

Fuchs
01-28-2011, 11:07 PM
That was all predictable, few people are still concerned with the full picture. You don't get paid for that. You get paid for looking at a specific direction only.


I hope we go with our national principles and support the people.

Looks like the government isn't on a common line yet. Clinton sounds kinda pro-civility and at least doesn't back Mubarak openly. Biden meanwhile refused to call Mubarak an autocrat/dictator. Obama mentioned only Tunisia and was silent about Egypt and Algeria afaik.

----------

Concerning the thread title: "Scenes from Egypt's Would-Be Revolution"

There might be some really ugly scenes pretty soon if the Egyptian army comes into play with MBTs, for these are mostly U.S. models. It's not going to look well if M1 Abrams are being used against demonstrators.

Looking forward to the future diplomatic cable leak that shows how U.S. diplomats attempt frenzily to convince Mubarak to send only T-62s and T-55s, if any MBTs...

davidbfpo
01-28-2011, 11:13 PM
Some puzzling BBC-TV footage this evening, oddly starting with a short clip of Army M113 going at speed through city streets - in Cairo. Then a much longer report on events in Cairo, what was clear that the numbers protesting are large and now the slums have joined in:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12307698

A short comment on the security forces:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12312337

The report from Suez indicates a loss of control for sometime, with a central police station looted - for weapons - and set alight.

From a different angle is a commentary by the counter-radical UK-based "think tank', the Quilliam Foundation, entitled ‘Egypt and the eclipse of the Muslim Brotherhood’:http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/egyptjan.pdf

Pete
01-28-2011, 11:44 PM
Why all this concern about U.S.-made stuff -- tear gas canisters, tanks, APCs -- being shown on TV? The public relations aspect is fairly trivial in the grand scheme of things. Some years ago the same thing happened with the WP rounds used by Israel.

Fuchs
01-28-2011, 11:56 PM
Why all this concern about U.S.-made stuff -- tear gas canisters, tanks, APCs -- being shown on TV? The public relations aspect is fairly trivial in the grand scheme of things. Some years ago the same thing happened with the WP rounds used by Israel.

Tom Clancy didn't popularize WP rounds. He idealized the M1 Abrams, and the tank has certainly the highest recognition rate world-wide.

Did you never wonder why the baddies in Hollywood movies almost never use AR-15s? Such a "public relations aspect" could be an eye-opener.

Besides; my forum post here was fairly trivial in the grand scheme of things - why did you respond to it?

Bob's World
01-29-2011, 12:46 AM
President Obama breaks his silence. Best speech I have ever heard him make.

As to the Egyptian Army, coming from one who served proudly with the Egyptian Army during the Gulf War: This is the wild card. Egyptian soldiers are about 180 out from western soldiers. An Egyptian soldier will do exactly what he is told and not think to question his superior. He will continue to execute a task until told to stop. He will not worry about why he is doing it, he is told to do it and that is all that matters. He has no concept of "commander's intent." He does what he is told, no more and no less.

However. Unless they have changed, they are draftees and serve two year enlistments. They have no NCO corps. Often a rifle platoon has more college educated privates than the Company has college educated officers. The officer corp are lifers, but the men are civilians in uniform

Assessment: If push comes to shove the Army will follow orders. If shove comes to something more dramatic, I suspect the soldiers will join the civilians and leave the officers to their own devices.

Dayuhan
01-29-2011, 04:11 AM
Watching Fox news. Huckabaee is all "this is bad for Israel"; Then the CEO of Heinz "this is bad for business." Prior to them a former CIA expert on AQ "This will empower the Islamists."

All of them wrong, I'd have to say. No reason to think a new regime in Egypt would have any interest in going to war with Israel; they'll have a whole lot to do on the home front... and in any event it's Israel who should be looking after Israel's interests, not us. I don't at all see how political change is bad for business... in an ossified situation like this removing the dead wood is likely to be good for business in the long run.

The Islamists stand to lose more than anyone, I think. They didn't initiate this, and they aren't driving it. It reminds me in that sense of the Philippines, where a Communist movement that had opposed a dictator for decades failed to anticipate or exploit the events that eventually removed him, and were left behind in the process. I suspect that the Islamists may end up missing Mubarak more than we do, just as the Communists in the Philippines found themselves largely irrelevant without Marcos.


I hope we go with our national principles and support the people. If we don't support them AQ and the Islamist community will.

That would depend on what "support the people" means. I certainly don't think we should support Mubarak. There may be a point where we can have some impact by withdrawing support, but that impact will be purely psychological: he doesn't rely on our support to that great an extent. We could offer asylum if he stands down, and threaten to withdraw that offer if he holds on, but that's largely a moot point; I doubt he'd be looking at asylum in the US anyway. We're not going to get directly involved (inshallah) and there's a limit to what statements can do.

Overreacting on any side would be an error, IMO. In large part we'll be watching, waiting, and working with whatever emerges. Trying to control or direct what emerges would, I suspect, backfire badly.

TheCurmudgeon
01-29-2011, 04:27 AM
President Obama breaks his silence. Best speech I have ever heard him make.

As to the Egyptian Army, coming from one who served proudly with the Egyptian Army during the Gulf War: This is the wild card. Egyptian soldiers are about 180 out from western soldiers. An Egyptian soldier will do exactly what he is told and not think to question his superior. He will continue to execute a task until told to stop. He will not worry about why he is doing it, he is told to do it and that is all that matters. He has no concept of "commander's intent." He does what he is told, no more and no less.

However. Unless they have changed, they are draftees and serve two year enlistments. They have no NCO corps. Often a rifle platoon has more college educated privates than the Company has college educated officers. The officer corp are lifers, but the men are civilians in uniform

Assessment: If push comes to shove the Army will follow orders. If shove comes to something more dramatic, I suspect the soldiers will join the civilians and leave the officers to their own devices.

I think you are dead on. The Army will ultimately decide what happens to the remaining existing government.

The question in my mind is what will replace it - a more democratic institution, a hard-line Islamic government. or a civil war between the two.

Ken White
01-29-2011, 05:49 AM
LINK. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289686/Egypt-protests-Americas-secret-backing-for-rebel-leaders-behind-uprising.html)

If the article at the link is correct. Shades of Kermit Roosevelt... :D

As my Mother said, be careful what you wish for -- you may get it. We'll see how this works out for us -- and them...

outletclock
01-29-2011, 06:44 AM
I'm guessing "Terence Lee" (I am not Terence Lee) is not the name you were expecting on a post on Egypt's current situation. However, for those of you with access - alas, I'm guessing, not many - it might be interesting to check out the following articles:

The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule
Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia
http://cps.sagepub.com/content/42/5/640.abstract

and

Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance
Explaining the Role of the Military in 1989 China and 1998 Indonesia
http://afs.sagepub.com/content/32/1/80.abstract

Obviously these deal with "Asian" (are the quotations relevant or necessary?) cases, but perhaps the insights might be applicable to the Egypt. And while the articles themselves might be inaccessible or, at least, expensive, the abstracts might be worth the quick read.

Regards
OC

outletclock
01-29-2011, 06:50 AM
It just hit me: I can probably post the abstracts of the two articles without running afoul of any copyright issues (apologies in advance if I am wrong).

The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule
Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia
Terence Lee
National University of Singapore
http://cps.sagepub.com/content/42/5/640.abstract

Studies of transitions from authoritarian rule have shown that militaries play decisive roles in authoritarian breakdowns. The military possesses coercive resources that can suppress any challenge to authoritarian rule. This article explains why and under what conditions militaries in authoritarian regimes, when faced with popular demonstrations, will support the path of political liberalization. The study argues that armed forces are likely to back transitions from authoritarianism when there is intense conflict within the military; and arising from these contestations, marginalized officers (losers) either enter into a pact with the domestic opposition or have foreign support to act against the regime. The losers' decision to turn against authoritarianism is a move to eliminate the regime and their rivals within the armed forces. The author illustrates this argument in the February 1986 Philippines People Power revolution and May 1998 collapse of Indonesia's President Suharto's regime.

Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance
Explaining the Role of the Military in 1989 China and 1998 Indonesia
Terence Lee
University of Washington
http://afs.sagepub.com/content/32/1/80.abstract

Why are certain militaries in authoritarian regimes more effective in carrying out the task of regime maintenance than others? This is the central question of this article, which explains the Chinese and Indonesian militaries’differing responses to government orders to suppress the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989 and the protests prior to the downfall of Indonesian President Suharto in 1998. The article argues that the varying level of effectiveness in dealing with protestors is attributable to how governments employ institutional controls or “stick” mechanisms and the effect these controls have on military organizational cohesion. Specifically, the article notes that the efficacy of a regime's institutional controls does not just center on having mechanisms to monitor, prevent, and punish malfeasance within the military. Instead, militaries are likely to be successful in suppressing demonstrations if authoritarian leaders do not implement policies that undermine the organizational integrity of the armed forces.

Regards
OC

Bob's World
01-29-2011, 10:15 AM
LINK. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289686/Egypt-protests-Americas-secret-backing-for-rebel-leaders-behind-uprising.html)

If the article at the link is correct. Shades of Kermit Roosevelt... :D

As my Mother said, be careful what you wish for -- you may get it. We'll see how this works out for us -- and them...

Legal, trusted, and certain means of influencing government are far superior to illegal means. But when Illegal means are the only option, they are far superior to oppression and despotism. But this could go bad in a 100 different ways to be sure.

The only thing worse than acting out illegally in the pursuit of liberty is to do nothing.

Bigger picture: It is the power of these suppressed populaces and the role of the West in promoting, enabling and protecting these governments that has fueled the rise of Islamist organizations. This is what AQ has fed upon. If the US plays this smart, and empowers self-determination (which may mean that many of these leaders stay in power, open talks with their populaces, and implement reasonable reforms). If the US. plays this smart we have the opportunity to change perceptions about our role and intent in the Middle East in ways that can be far more effective in turning the tide of Islamist terrorism than any amount of security force capacity building or CT activities can.

AQ has been waging UW to stir up these populaces, but the populaces are responsive to their message due to the political (and economic) conditions that they live within. The US really needs to abandon COIN (to colonial and rooted in sustaining the status quo) and CT (only mows the tall grass, but does not address the roots) or even development (giving a man a fish when what he really wants is respect and liberty) with a more holistic "counter-UW" campaign that blends all of these things and more in a much better balanced and refocused mix that is aimed at root causes.

I remain optimistic in what is happening; but ever concerned that smart people with bad info will make bad decisions; or that the mob will be directed in ways that are ultimately counter productive.

Of note, Jordan is picking up steam as well. A map of where foreign fighters who traveled to Iraq to fight with AQ is as clear of a crystal ball as any as to where this thing is most likely to spread to next. Diplomats are hopefully meeting with all those governments to urge them to preemptively begin the reform process.

Bob's World
01-29-2011, 10:50 AM
From Joe Felter's study on where Foreign Fighters come from back in 2005
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf
(There is a bar graph that provides a great visual in the document)


Country of Origin
Saudi Arabia was by far the most common nationality of the fighters’ in this sample; 41% (244) of the 595 records that included the fighter’s nationality indicated they were of Saudi Arabian origin.7
Libya was the next most common country of origin, with 18.8% (112) of the fighters listing their nationality stating they hailed from Libya. Syria, Yemen,
7 After recording and comparing the information contained in the translated records, the CTC determined that 34 records were likely duplicates of the same individual. These records were deleted from the sample studied.
and Algeria were the next most common origin countries with 8.2% (49), 8.1% (48), and 7.2% (43), respectively. Moroccans accounted for 6.1% (36) of the records and Jordanians 1.9% (11).8

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-12-05-iraq-fighters_N.htm

In a Dec 2010 article it points out that foreign fighters are once again flowing into Iraq. I would argue that the fastest way to stem that flow is change our approach with the government of the countries these men come from.


But a Mideast counterterrorism official said an estimated 250 foreign fighters entered Iraq in October alone. He said they came through the Syrian city of Homs, a hub for Syrian Muslim fundamentalists that is run mostly by Tunisians and Algerians. Other fighters have come from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Yemen.

Dayuhan
01-29-2011, 12:46 PM
This is what AQ has fed upon. If the US plays this smart, and empowers self-determination (which may mean that many of these leaders stay in power, open talks with their populaces, and implement reasonable reforms). If the US. plays this smart we have the opportunity to change perceptions about our role and intent in the Middle East in ways that can be far more effective in turning the tide of Islamist terrorism than any amount of security force capacity building or CT activities can....

...Diplomats are hopefully meeting with all those governments to urge them to preemptively begin the reform process.


I still don't see how we're supposed to "empower self-determination", in any specific terms. Western diplomats urging reform will have about as much impact as an online petition. These rulers don't give a damn what Western diplomats say; they never have. They've heard the refrain so many times they could sing it in their sleep. It has no impact at all.

The link between domestic conditions, perceived US responsibility for those conditions, and AQ's recruitment remains speculative. AQ was able to recruit fighters quite successfully for jihad against the Soviet Union, which had nothing at all to do with domestic conditions in the countries where recruitment was taking place. "Expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" is a compelling narrative (at least to young men addled by religion and testosterone), and would likely be so even in a democracy. Certainly AQ's efforts to promote jihad against Arab governments have met with no notable success: they're really only able to sell the story when they are fighting foreign invaders.

tequila
01-29-2011, 07:48 PM
I still don't see how we're supposed to "empower self-determination", in any specific terms. Western diplomats urging reform will have about as much impact as an online petition. These rulers don't give a damn what Western diplomats say; they never have. They've heard the refrain so many times they could sing it in their sleep. It has no impact at all.


I disagree if these urgings were actually tied to incentives or punishments. The stick of withdrawing $1.2 bn in annual U.S. military aid could prove an effective incentive for an army divided on whether or not to open fire on peaceful demonstrators, for instance.

Rex Brynen
01-29-2011, 09:04 PM
I still don't see how we're supposed to "empower self-determination", in any specific terms. Western diplomats urging reform will have about as much impact as an online petition. These rulers don't give a damn what Western diplomats say; they never have. They've heard the refrain so many times they could sing it in their sleep. It has no impact at all.

Absolutely right. Populations are looking for signals of the degree of backing that authoritarians have--polite complaints in private have zero effect.

davidbfpo
01-29-2011, 09:13 PM
Abu M's recommendations on who is a true, real expert on Egypt:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/01/egypt-people-who-might-actually-know-what-theyre-talking-about.html

A profile of the new Deputy President:
The AFP has a lengthy profile of Omar Suleiman, who you can see here during his swearing-in ceremony, which I'll reprint in full.

Link and the entry is at 1757 hrs: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8288167/Egypt-protests-live.html

On the relationship between US and Egyptian military:
The officer corps of Egypt’s powerful military has been educated at defense colleges in the United States for 30 years. The Egyptian armed forces have about 1,000 American M1A1 Abrams tanks, which the United States allows to be built on Egyptian soil. Egypt permits the American military to stage major operations from its bases, and has always guaranteed the Americans passage through the Suez Canal.

The relationship between the Egyptian and American militaries is, in fact, so close that it was no surprise on Friday to find two dozen senior Egyptian military officials at the Pentagon, halfway through an annual week of meetings, lunches and dinners with their American counterparts.

(Later)American military officials said on Friday that they had had no formal discussions with their Egyptian counterparts at the Pentagon about how to handle the uprising. No guidance was given, said Gen. James E. Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In other words, we didn’t say anything to them about how they should handle it, and they didn’t tell us about how they were going to handle it.

From:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/world/middleeast/30military.html?_r=2&hp

slapout9
01-30-2011, 12:13 AM
Different perspective on the various revolutions going on.

http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/index.html

91bravojoe
01-30-2011, 12:21 AM
http://28.media.tumblr.com/tumblr_lfsdffT9Ez1qedj2ho1_500.jpg

Our close personal friend.

Bob's World
01-30-2011, 01:13 PM
$1.5B in aid last year is a powerful carrot. We have sticks too. The US employs carrots and sticks around the globe to promote national interests on a regular basis. To "empower self-determination" has never been an issue of lack of means, nor for want of proven ways. It is a matter of priorities as to what type of behavior (ours) we understand to be most important to serving our national interests.

No one said to send a petition. We tried that with King George, and he sent us his Army and Navy instead. This needs to not be done in public accusations and veiled threats over the airways either. This is the work for private rooms with small audiences, between senior leaders. When the affected people see their government making reasonable accomodations of their reasonable concerns following such meetings they will be able to deduce that we have taken a more neutral position.

There is a big difference between putting hard presser on an ally to do something he'd prefer not to do, and dictating exactly how they do things (mandating western-style womens rights, western-style democracy, etc). Few things are black and white.

What I find interesting on this forum is that when someone suggests "Black is not working and we need to change." the typical counter is "But White would not work either." Agreed. The answer lies between the two, and is likely closer to black than white in most cases, as simple changes of nuance and perception can have a tremendous impact.

Also, the US has no duty to "fix" Egypt, Tunisia, or any of the many other similarly situated allies we have in that theater. We do, however, have a duty to address the perception that we promote the security and sustainment of these regimes against the express will of their populaces.

Wargames Mark
01-30-2011, 04:57 PM
ElBaradei = Bazargan (http://goo.gl/0IiuT)= Kerensky (http://goo.gl/6Qb60)

Very, very bad news:

Suez Canal
Hamas
Al Qaida (This is the home of the Qutbists (http://goo.gl/g4Lbu), even of al-Zawahiri)

AdamG
01-30-2011, 05:32 PM
Art imitates life. Life imitates art.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7DbFYsi9iSg


Reports say the army has been ordered to shoot when it sees fit. Military helicopters and jet fighters fly over major locations as the numbers of protesters multiply there.

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/162767.html


CAIRO – In the wake of sustained protests and riots calling for the ouster of Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak, police are vanishing from the streets of Cairo and other major cities across Egypt. In that vacuum armed gangs of men have attacked at least four jails and freed hundreds of radical Muslim militants as well as thousands of other inmates.

http://www.thecypresstimes.com/article/News/National_News/HUNDREDS_OF_MUSLIM_MILITANTS_FREED_BY_ARMED_GANGS_ IN_EGYPT/39572

Ken White
01-30-2011, 05:44 PM
What I find interesting on this forum is that when someone suggests "Black is not working and we need to change." the typical counter is "But White would not work either." Agreed. The answer lies between the two, and is likely closer to black than white in most cases, as simple changes of nuance and perception can have a tremendous impact.I've noticed that when people on this Board present gray arguments as opposed to "Black is not working" the discussion tends to seek what shade of gray is best instead of descending into a a black methodology versus white methodology argument...

For example, this "The answer lies between the two, and is likely closer to black than white in most cases." colors your comment -- pun intended. ;)

Some would've said "The answer lies between the two and the issue is to determine just where..." :wry:

omarali50
01-30-2011, 06:15 PM
The US should vigorously and publicly support the notion of democracy and human rights. That is not to say that the US should somehow intervene to bring democracy to X or Y. Every case is different and in MOST cases the US would do well to do nothing rather than doing something stupid (those seem to be the only choices allowed by the state dept and pentagon in many cases).
Every case being different, the case in Egypt right now is that the US should publicly press for democratic reform and should work behind the scenes to have the army kick out Mubarak and install a functional interim regime and open up the media and phones and so on. That would be best for the US in every way. To work to "stabilize" Mubarak would be the height of folly...
US policy makers have spent so many decades propping up dictators and being afraid of democracy, they do not seem to be able to let things go a little...if they do, they may be pleasantly surprised at the outcome in many cases...and they will not do worse than they are doing right now in almost every case.

Ken White
01-30-2011, 10:31 PM
The US should vigorously and publicly support the notion of democracy and human rights...Agreed.
US policy makers have spent so many decades propping up dictators and being afraid of democracy, they do not seem to be able to let things go a little...if they do, they may be pleasantly surprised at the outcome in many cases...and they will not do worse than they are doing right now in almost every case.Agree with that as well. However, after 45 years of US government service if there's one thing I know it's that very, very few who work for that entity want to take a chance on being even a little bit wrong, much less way wrong... :( :mad:

That said, hopefully most will realize the truth of what you write: "...and they will not do worse than they are doing right now in almost every case." :wry:

Bob's World
01-30-2011, 11:40 PM
The US is getting in Egypt a bit of a dose of our own medicine in terms of "US created conflicts of interest."

We've created a tremendous conflict of interest for Pakistan that is tearing at the fabric of the government's ability to keep a handle on things as they seek to balance their interest in maintaining positive relations with the US against their interest in being able to exert control over Afghanistan through their Pashtun agents. The US flipping on that issue from our position during to Soviet occupation to our position for our own occupation is creating that conflict.

Now we find ourselves caught in our own web in Egypt where we have overlooked (beyond calling the government out in the odd speech) the poor governance of the Mubarak regime because we valued having an important Arab ally and stability for Israel more highly. Now we face a populace that questions how the U.S could support such a regime. This is what happens when one acts in a manner that is out of synch with their professed values. It will be very positive for US influence once we have finished sorting through these inconsistencies, and will have a tremendous disempowering effect on AQ as well. But we have a long ways to go on that little mission, as the list of such governments is fairly long...

jmm99
01-31-2011, 12:14 AM
... notion of democracy and human rights ....

in Pakistan vs Egypt vs USA ?

Are they the same ? Or, different ? If different, what are the differences ?

Cheers

Mike

carl
01-31-2011, 02:34 AM
We've created a tremendous conflict of interest for Pakistan that is tearing at the fabric of the government's ability to keep a handle on things as they seek to balance their interest in maintaining positive relations with the US against their interest in being able to exert control over Afghanistan through their Pashtun agents.

Is the Pak Army/ISI's desire to exert control over Aghanistan one we should honor any more than India's desire that they don't?

Ken White
01-31-2011, 02:57 AM
Is the Pak Army/ISI's desire to exert control over Aghanistan one we should honor any more than India's desire that they don't?When I was wandering about the Region years ago, the Afghans liked the US and Americans. A good part of that was, they said, due to the fact that only they and we had beaten the British, not once but twice (actually in all four cases, the British decided the hassle wasn't worth the effort but no sense being pedantic...).

They were nearly neutral on Indians, mentioning only their status as kuffar. They did not like Russians or the British at all -- and they hated the Pakistanis due to their excessive desire for control of Afghanistan and the Pakistani attempts to divide the Pathan (as they were then). There were also some flatlander comments... :D

Of course, that was forty years ago and it's probably changed a bit -- but I bet not much... :wry:

CrowBat
01-31-2011, 08:25 AM
I still don't see how we're supposed to "empower self-determination", in any specific terms. Western diplomats urging reform will have about as much impact as an online petition. These rulers don't give a damn what Western diplomats say; they never have.I'll respectfully disagree here.

Most of US-allied despots, and then particularly those clinching to power like Mubarak, are "hanging" on every signal they get from Washington. The Shah of Iran back in 1979 is a classic example. As long as there is no clear "you have to go" message from the White House, Mubarak is definitely not going to leave (except he's carried away by somebody else).

And vice-versa: the public in such countries is carefully monitoring the behaviour of leading US politicians, particularly the President. I witnessed several occassions where this went as far as that everyday Arabs monitored how often the US Pres appeared in the public, carefully following even their mimic and gestures. A clear signal of the kind, "people of Egypt, you are right to protest against Mubarak" would likely prompt additional thousands to the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and elsewhere.


Certainly AQ's efforts to promote jihad against Arab governments have met with no notable success: they're really only able to sell the story when they are fighting foreign invaders....IMHO, this is an image created by the fact that there are plenty of developments in the Arab world we do not get to hear about. For example, in Algeria the FIS was relatively successful in mobilizing at least a part of the population, back in the 1990s. Nowadays they've been pushed out into the expanses of Sahara and bases in Mali and elsewhere, sure. But, Algerian security services and military are still regularly undertaking large-scale operations against them (usually including heli-borne commandos, often supported by fighter-bombers), "far down in the south"...

Similarly, we know next to nothing about developments in large parts of Egypt outside the urban areas, i.e. outside major cities, in recent years. Some places in southern Egypt are effectivelly under the control of various extremists since decades and no security services trust themselves to go there (foreigners are strongly advised NOT to go that way). There are countless stories about the Egyptian Air Force having flown a number of massive operations in which entire villages have been obliterated. It's just so that even the specialized media hardly ever gets to hear about this (or even if, this was never reported).

Note that despite this situation, both - the militaries in Algeria and Egypt - continue to refuse adapting the emphasis of their doctrine from conventional warfare to that of COIN warfare and anti-terror operations.


Is the Pak Army/ISI's desire to exert control over Aghanistan one we should honor any more than India's desire that they don't?IMHO, the answer is definitely negative.

An undisputed matter of fact is that the ISI is the major source of world-wide terrorism - and that already since 50 years, and so also until this very day (only a few days ago, the US Army issued another report about the continuous activity of ISI's instructors in relation to training Taliban inside Afghanistan, as well as in Pakistan).

If nothing else, I do not recall to have ever heard that any of the idiots from 9/11, any of the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, or any of the FIS/AQM in Algeria have been trained by the Indian Army, somewhere in Punjab... ;)

Bob's World
01-31-2011, 12:18 PM
Is the Pak Army/ISI's desire to exert control over Afghanistan one we should honor any more than India's desire that they don't?

Personally I am a consistent (and fairly lonely) voice that the U.S. needs to take into greater account the impact on Pak-Indian deterrence of the actions (both policy and physical) that we take in the name of the War on Terrorism.

"Loose Nukes" are not all that likely based upon what I understand, but certainly the likelihood of deliberately exchanged nukes is higher now than it was 10 years ago.

I would never say that Pakistan has a right to an unstable Afghanistan ( be that worked through their Army or intel service with Pashtun agents, or however else). I only state that Pakistan believes that they have a vital national interest in it being so.

If the U.S. is any example, a nation will go to any lengths, and get into situations that make outside observers scratch their heads in wonder, in the pursuit on vital national interests. And I doubt any will argue that Pakistan faces far more of an "existential threat" against India than the U.S. does from AQ taking sanctuary in the FATA.

My only point was the observation that our demands on Pakistan to support our efforts against AQ and the Taliban creates a very dangerous conflict of interest for the government, that erodes the stability of the nation. On one hand they need a solid relationship with the US, so they agree to do what we ask (sort of, and thus our frustration at the seeming lack of competence from what is a very competent security force); while at the same time seeking to continue their covert operation to secure instability in Afghanistan.

Now the US finds ourselves in a similar conflict of interest of our own making. On one hand we stand for "universal rights" and democracy; but on the other hand we support the Mubarak government as a critical Arab ally that sits on the key terrain of both Israel's flank and the Suez canal. Such relationships are rationalized based upon vital national interests, yet when they create conflicts of interest they are damaging as well.

We have an opportunity to begin cleaning the effects of a post WWII policy/strategy/engagement program in the Middle East that has about reached the breaking point. We do not want to wake up on the wrong side of history there, and if we continue to cling to an unsustainable past that is the most likely result. We have a tremendous opportunity here, but it is a delicate game of showing greater support to the people, greater alignment of our actions and policies with our stated principles as a nation; but condemning of the actions of "allied" governments who have been enabled in their slides toward despotism by their relationships with the US. If we just yank the rug on these clowns we could create a massive violent chaos in the Middle East that is good for no one.

We must empower a controlled change. We focus on the empower aspect, and allowing the current governments to establish processes with their people to hear their grievances and give them their due consideration as they seek reasonable evolutions of government. This is tricky stuff. Far easier to just send in TLAMs, but the potential return is far greater and holds the key to reducing acts of terrorism emanating from the Middle East.

So far what I have heard from our President and our Sec State; coupled with what I have seen in terms of physical responses are in synch with how I see this. I don't know what the back room actions are, but I can only hope they are in synch as well. In synch or not, agree or not, I think we can all share in the hope that they work. Inshah Allah.

omarali50
01-31-2011, 04:15 PM
Democracy in Pakistan vs Egypt vs USA ?

Are they the same ? Or, different ? If different, what are the differences ?

Cheers

Mike

They are obviously all different. But I think we can step back a little bit from textbook notions of democracy to another line: In every country where modern education and economics has made forays, the population wants some say in what goes on and economics demands some rationality in governance. The elite always have more influence than the poor, but even within the elite, there are notions of rule of law, political space, personal space, opportunity to move forward and so on. And the poor must have the means for bare survival and at least a vague notion that they can move forward on merit if they are really really good. Historical contingencies and other local factors make every case different and culture DOES matter, but its still possible to make some generalizations. One is that bull#### like the Mubarak dynasty is not going to last. Another is that extreme forms of Islamism are not going to make most people happy even if war with outsiders is not an issue. Another is that if you hook the elite on selling their role as "bulwark against Islamism", you will face accelerating demands for more money, you will foster terrible corruption and you will strengthen support for those very Islamists. In fact, it is an indication of the Islamists profoundly outdated and unproductive philosophical framework that they cannot take more advantage of this wonderful opportunity presented to them courtesy of the US taxpayer.
US policymakers who act as if the US has to determine what happens everywhere and simultaneously believe that there is very little the US can do to change things for the better, are wrong on both counts. In the Middle East, they are laboring under the very real burden that they really do want something (Israeli occupation) that almost everyone in that part of the world does not support, so their "democratic" options are limited. But even where the US does not necessarily have such a burden to carry (Pakistan, for example), hamhanded interference, reliance on outdated or irrelevant models (like the "modernizing army", "the whisky-drinking-moderate-Muslim", the Latin American model of using the army against undesirables at the cost of democracy, and so on) are not exactly working.
but, no matter, change is coming. With, without or in spite of US participation. And Israel should really make a fair peace from a position of strength while they have that chance. Its going to become so costly to support that occupation, even Uncle Sam may one day be unable to afford to carry that millstone around his neck...

Surferbeetle
01-31-2011, 05:13 PM
Crowbat,

Pokeman (http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_do_you_get_crowbat_on_pokemon_sapphire), urban dictionary definition (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=crowbat), or something else? :wry:


Most of US-allied despots, and then particularly those clinching to power like Mubarak, are "hanging" on every signal they get from Washington. The Shah of Iran back in 1979 is a classic example. As long as there is no clear "you have to go" message from the White House, Mubarak is definitely not going to leave (except he's carried away by somebody else).

I would instead argue that US, European, and Asian political 'signals' are but some of the many variables populating the daily calculus equation run by a variety of political leaders as they test the winds to see what is possible today. Internal politcal/social/economic alliances, financial interests, patronage networks, the security forces, etc. all serve to both provide and constrain political options and must be balanced against external inputs and demands. For context the 2011 Pocket World in Figures from the Economist reports Egypt's GDP as $162 Billion in USD, with it's top four export destinations being Italy, USA, Spain, and India (in that order). The US financial support figure reported in the press (http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0412/p07s01-wome.html) is ~$2.5 Billion USD or less than 2% of Egypt's GDP. The World Bank's Middle East and North Africa website provides some further economic insights (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,menuPK:247606~pagePK:146732~piPK:146828~theSite PK:256299,00.html) into the many variables juggled by political leaders in this region of the world.


... the public in such countries is carefully monitoring the behaviour of leading US politicians, particularly the President. I witnessed several occassions where this went as far as that everyday Arabs monitored how often the US Pres appeared in the public, carefully following even their mimic and gestures. A clear signal of the kind, "people of Egypt, you are right to protest against Mubarak" would likely prompt additional thousands to the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and elsewhere.

States and institutions often have more impact than individuals. The lessons learned from Turkey's EU accessions efforts, the Iraq OIF/OND experience, the Shia experience in Iraq during the first Gulf War, the interaction with the French in Algeria during the 1950's-60's, and Europe's (Germany, Russia, England, France, and others) interactions with the Ottoman's as the empire crumbled during the early 1900's are also included in these analysis'.


...IMHO, this is an image created by the fact that there are plenty of developments in the Arab world we do not get to hear about.

The sentiment regarding the paucity of 'good' information is and has always been true. A full awareness of the 'truth' will never be achieved...instead it's always approximations thereof....:wry:

Pete
01-31-2011, 07:52 PM
It wasn't so long ago that many commentators were saying that previous American leaders of the Realpolitik school would never have countenanced the idea of invading of Iraq for the purpose of establishing a democracy there. There are dangers whenever U.S. policy errs to much on exporting our ideals on one hand or purely upon considerations of power politics on the other. I'm not sure there are any "perfect" solutions, as though we could somehow thread the needle and make everyone everywhere agree with what we're doing.

Surferbeetle
02-01-2011, 12:18 AM
It wasn't so long ago that many commentators were saying that previous American leaders of the Realpolitik school would never have countenanced the idea of invading of Iraq for the purpose of establishing a democracy there. There are dangers whenever U.S. policy errs to much on exporting our ideals on one hand or purely upon considerations of power politics on the other. I'm not sure there are any "perfect" solutions, as though we could somehow thread the needle and make everyone everywhere agree with what we're doing.

...Realpolitik (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realpolitik). Some of my benchmarks include Niccolò Machiavelli's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niccol%C3%B2_Machiavelli) work the Prince, Alexis de Tocqueville's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexis_de_Tocqueville) study on American Democracy, Walt Whitman Rostow's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walt_Whitman_Rostow) model - Take off Model or Development Model (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rostovian_take-off_model), John Mearsheimer's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Mearsheimer) book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Stephen Walt's (http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/) blog over at Foreign Policy, The Nixon Center's website (http://www.nixoncenter.org/), and of course Dr. Kissinger's amazingly verbose (it's something like 900 pages long yet it's interesting - and I hope to re-read it this year) book Diplomacy (http://www.amazon.com/Diplomacy-Touchstone-book-Henry-Kissinger/dp/0671510991).

As to the Monday morning quarterbacking phenomenon, the Army has co-opted that human trait with the AAR (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/After_action_review)...I still remember my very first one, held on a bitterly cold night somewhere high up in the Rockies....good times :rolleyes: :wry: ....nonetheless they are worthwhile, it's at the heart of the SWJ business model, and of course our friend Socrates kicked things of with his Socratic Method (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socratic_method) of teaching...:)

CrowBat
02-01-2011, 05:19 AM
Crowbat,

Pokeman (http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_do_you_get_crowbat_on_pokemon_sapphire), urban dictionary definition (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=crowbat), or something else? :wry:Insignia of No.31 Squadron UARAF as of 1959-1967. ;)


I would instead argue that US, European, and Asian political 'signals' are but some of the many variables populating the daily calculus equation run by a variety of political leaders as they test the winds to see what is possible today. Internal politcal/social/economic alliances, financial interests, patronage networks, the security forces, etc. all serve to both provide and constrain political options and must be balanced against external inputs and demands. For context the 2011 Pocket World in Figures from the Economist reports Egypt's GDP as $162 Billion in USD...
I'm really sorry, but creatures like Mubarak do not think that way. Sure, they do think about _their own_ alliances, financial interests, patronage (in sense of what they already control and what they do not control - yet), but surely not about GDP, per-capita income or similar topics.

External inputs are very important for them, then if there is somebody who can cause any sort of trouble, this somebody's actions have to be prevented or stopped, in one way or the other (if by no other, then a threat that should the dictator fall there will be an Islamic Republic...).

Similarly when it comes to external inputs, they have to seriously consider the possibility that the military might turn against them if they prove incapable of ascertaining the same funding like when getting the US aid (the reason is that the military is usually the best organized and functioning institution in such a country, and armed - which translates into being capable of bringing them down).

In summary, Mubarak can't care less about "everyday" Egyptians: he's not responsible to them (otherwise he wouldn't be a dictator).


States and institutions often have more impact than individuals.Very likely a valid point - except when it comes to those Egyptians I happen to know more closely. For most of them, Obama (or any other US president) = US. For them, they way he behaves, what he says, the "signals" he's "emitting", is the way the US is acting or going to act.


The sentiment regarding the paucity of 'good' information is and has always been true. A full awareness of the 'truth' will never be achieved...instead it's always approximations thereof....:wry:Sure. Still, this is not making certain "standard" assessments/conclusions any more true. In this case, it was my point that the usual ("schoolar"?) standpoint that the al-Qaida's efforts to promote Jihad against Arab governments met no notable success, is based on non-availability of sufficient information.

To add a third example: the lack of news about internal dissent, often even unrest in Saudi Arabia means not that there is none, and even less so it's a land of milk and honey there. It rather means that the state is doing very well at suppressing any kind of independent reporting about what's really going on.

Surferbeetle
02-01-2011, 10:14 AM
Insignia of No.31 Squadron UARAF as of 1959-1967. ;)

Thanks for sharing, it's a distinctive avatar. :) United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) Air Force MiG 19’s and MiG 21’s? I have a friend, with some interesting stories, who was on the other side during June 5th ‘67.


I'm really sorry, but creatures like Mubarak do not think that way. Sure, they do think about _their own_ alliances, financial interests, patronage (in sense of what they already control and what they do not control - yet), but surely not about GDP, per-capita income or similar topics.

So...to follow along with Mr Gideon Rachman's, of the FT, train of thought (31 Jan 2011 - Democracy is Back - How Awkward) are General Mubarak (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosni_Mubarak) and General Suharto (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suharto) vergleichbar? Each has had thirty or so years in power as president, preceded by significant distinguished military service to their respective nations. Both nations experienced stability and significant economic returns during their respective presidents rule. General Suharto was able to resign, facilitate a peaceful transition of power, and has not been too vigorously pursued in his retirement.

Currently President Mubarak has authorized his new Vice President Mr. Omar Suleiman to negotiate directly with the opposition (although Osama al-Ghazali Harb, head of the Democratic Front party is currently playing hard to get), perhaps prompted by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei's efforts to negotiate directly with the Egyptian Army.

Perhaps that core of sense of service to one's nation fostered by military service should not be totally discounted?


Sure. Still, this is not making certain "standard" assessments/conclusions any more true. In this case, it was my point that the usual ("schoolar"?) standpoint that the al-Qaida's efforts to promote Jihad against Arab governments met no notable success, is based on non-availability of sufficient information.

Definitions of who comprises al-Qaida (AQ) vary, and there are significant gaps between desire, capability, and motivations of those who populate AQ as well as other organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Do you think that Saad al-Katatny is strong enough to represent interests of the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood and does his organization truly represent the will of the majority of the Egyptian people…or that of the Egyptian Army?


To add a third example: the lack of news about internal dissent, often even unrest in Saudi Arabia means not that there is none, and even less so it's a land of milk and honey there. It rather means that the state is doing very well at suppressing any kind of independent reporting about what's really going on.

I appreciate your provision of examples...;)

It is very interesting to think about what effects the events in Tunisia and Egypt are having upon the youth of Saudi Arabia as well as those in power in that nation. Some of the recent fluctuations in the price of oil of late appear to be an attempt to price in this uncertainty.

slapout9
02-01-2011, 05:57 PM
according to the linked article below. Article by former CIA officer(27 year veteran) Robert Grenier, he was also the former head of the Counter-Terror Unit.


http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/02/guest-post-former-director-of-the-cia%e2%80%99s-counter-terrorism-center-american-policy-in-the-middle-east-is-failing-because-the-u-s-doesnt-believe-in-democracy.html

omarali50
02-01-2011, 06:17 PM
My latest post on this issue: http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/02/01/egypt-the-downside/

carl
02-01-2011, 07:02 PM
I would never say that Pakistan has a right to an unstable Afghanistan ( be that worked through their Army or intel service with Pashtun agents, or however else). I only state that Pakistan believes that they have a vital national interest in it being so.

If the U.S. is any example, a nation will go to any lengths, and get into situations that make outside observers scratch their heads in wonder, in the pursuit on vital national interests. And I doubt any will argue that Pakistan faces far more of an "existential threat" against India than the U.S. does from AQ taking sanctuary in the FATA.

My only point was the observation that our demands on Pakistan to support our efforts against AQ and the Taliban creates a very dangerous conflict of interest for the government, that erodes the stability of the nation. On one hand they need a solid relationship with the US, so they agree to do what we ask (sort of, and thus our frustration at the seeming lack of competence from what is a very competent security force); while at the same time seeking to continue their covert operation to secure instability in Afghanistan.

If Pak Army/ISI does not have a valid right to exert control over Afghanistan, but only has a belief that it must because of a belief that it is in Pakistan's national interest, isn't it foolish of us to act in deference to that belief? Wouldn't it be wiser to do our best to disabuse them of that belief and not act in any way to further it? They are on a road to destruction because of it so we might be doing them an unappreciated good by frustrating their accomplishment of that goal.

Bob's World
02-01-2011, 07:16 PM
Pakistan believes it to be a vital national interest. Every nation gets to pick their own positions on such things.

It is typically when the U.S. presumes to impose our vital national interests onto or over the vital interests of others that we tend to get into conflicted positions such as we are now with Pakistan.

This is not about the ISI or the Army, they are agents of this vital national interest, not the determiners of it. Similarly this is not about "rights." There are many who would argue the U.S. had no right to assist the Northern Alliance in their victory or to invade Iraq. But the U.S. relied upon our belief we had a vital national interest at stake, and that no one could stop us from enforcing it. I suspect Pakistan feels much the same way in regard to Afghanistan.

This is a game that every nation gets to play. Increasingly, non-state actors as well.

Cliff
02-01-2011, 07:26 PM
according to the linked article below. Article by former CIA officer(27 year veteran) Robert Grenier, he was also the former head of the Counter-Terror Unit.


http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/02/guest-post-former-director-of-the-cia%e2%80%99s-counter-terrorism-center-american-policy-in-the-middle-east-is-failing-because-the-u-s-doesnt-believe-in-democracy.html

Slap-

I have a little problem with this article - it claims that the US doesn't believe in democracy, but then goes on to criticize Pres Bush's attempts to use Iraq to bring democracy to the region.

So which is it - does the US fear democracy or support it?

Folks like this who criticize everything the government does aren't helpful.

V/R,

Cliff

davidbfpo
02-01-2011, 07:37 PM
I am sure that the Israeli reaction has appeared in the US media, although I have missed it here in the UK. So courtesy of Real Clear Politics an article 'Washington Looks Clueless on Egypt;, by Caroline Glick, of the Jerusalem Post, which scathing of US actions to date:http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/02/01/clueless_in_washington_108731.html

Indicated by these unlinked portions:
..the character of the protesters is not liberal...According to a Pew opinion survey of Egyptians from June 2010, 59 percent said they back Islamists....it is clear that the Islam they support is the al Qaida Salafist version.

Rightly the author points to elections elsewhere in the Arab World, citing the Palestinian vote in 2006 and Egypt in 2005, where when given that chance the voters voted for parties who stand for a very different agenda. Her argument falls by failing to explain how tyranny can end without some form of democracy appearing.

carl
02-01-2011, 07:49 PM
We've created a tremendous conflict of interest for Pakistan that is tearing at the fabric of the government's ability to keep a handle on things as they seek to balance their interest in maintaining positive relations with the US against their interest in being able to exert control over Afghanistan through their Pashtun agents.


Pakistan believes it to be a vital national interest. Every nation gets to pick their own positions on such things.


This is not about the ISI or the Army, they are agents of this vital national interest, not the determiners of it.


I would never say that Pakistan has a right to an unstable Afghanistan

Bob's World:

All of these things listed above you have said, and they bring to my mind two questions. First, do you believe the Pak Army/ISI is correct in it's view that it must exert control over Afghanistan, is that actually a vital national interest of Pakistan? Second, I restate my original question, is the Pak Army/ISI's desire to exert control over Afghanistan one we should honor any more than India's desire that they don't?

davidbfpo
02-01-2011, 07:49 PM
I noted the clear change of policy by the Army and found a link to the actual statement:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12332488

The main points are:
Your Armed Forces acknowledges the legitimacy of the people's demands and is adamant on carrying out its responsibilities in protecting the country and its citizens as ever.

We stress the following:

1. Peaceful freedom of expression is guaranteed for everyone.

2. [No-one] shall carry out an action that could endanger the country's safety and security or vandalise public and private property.

3. It is not acceptable that some outlaws have terrorised citizens. The Armed Forces will not allow it. It will not allow the safety and security of the country to be tampered with.

4. [To citizens] Keep safe the assets and capabilities of your great people. Resist any vandalism against public or private property.

5. The Armed Forces is aware of the legitimate demands of the honourable citizens.

6. The Armed Forces' presence on the Egyptian streets is for your own sake, safety and security. Your Armed Forces have not and will not resort to the use of force against this great people.

Tonight's news reports that the machine guns on the armour deployed have been removed and one clip showed soldiers without AKs.

davidbfpo
02-01-2011, 08:34 PM
From Abu M's Londonistani, who has lived in Cairo, a long article on the context for events of late and one funny tale about tuna:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/01/mubarak-and-me.html

Which ends with these paragraphs:
Some of the US and UK coverage of the anti-Mubarak demonstrations happening now suggests that extremists are waiting to take over. Considering Mubarak's manipulation of feelings towards the United States and suppression of moderate Islamists and secularists, it's a surprise that the demonstrators are not all extremist Jihadis.

However, the legacy of Mubarak's rule means that there are few leaders with any of the contacts, stature and relationships that would allow government to function if Mubarak's regime was removed root and branch. Few people outside the ruling circle even have any idea of what the country's real financial situation is. Those who demand that the peace treaty with Israel be cancelled have no idea what part it plays in keeping their country solvent.

There is hope. The Egyptians who turned up to prevent the looting of the Cairo Museum, the popular committees, the Muslim-Christian cooperation show glimmers of hope that Egyptians - despite the best efforts of three decades of Mubarak - have retained the civic values that will be vital for their future.

Bob's World
02-01-2011, 09:42 PM
Bob's World:

All of these things listed above you have said, and they bring to my mind two questions. First, do you believe the Pak Army/ISI is correct in it's view that it must exert control over Afghanistan, is that actually a vital national interest of Pakistan? Second, I restate my original question, is the Pak Army/ISI's desire to exert control over Afghanistan one we should honor any more than India's desire that they don't?

I believe that Pakistan's position is reasonable, as is their position in regards to the Durrand line. Most military professionals doing a basic assessment of the terrain and the threat would probably come to the same conclusion. If Pakistan is reduced down to just the Indus river valley a quick push by India could foreseeably take their entire country. They would cease to exist as a nation. A fearful, nuclear armed state with its back up against the Hindu Kush and a rival nuclear state to their front is NOT a healthy situation for anyone. I think there are workable solutions, but before the US can get to sitting down and discussing workable solutions we to first be willing to recognize their reasonable perspective in regards to what their national interests are and how highly they prioritize them.

Second, to rephrase your question a bit: Is sustaining a set of conditions that supported a workable situation of deterrence between India and Pakistan one that I think is more important than disrupting that balance to grant India a clear advantage? I have to go with sustaining the status quo. Like our own Cold War with the Soviets, it was sometimes a bit dicey, but it worked. I can't imagine if some external power would have come along and ceded Canada into the Warsaw Pact, allowing the Russians to positions military forces all along our northern border, that we would have said "oh, ok."

We probably would have seen such a situation as threatening our national survival and we would have broken out our complete bag of dirty tricks to do whatever it took to put things back as they were before. Perhaps not a perfect example, but I want to try to convey how big of an issue i believe this to be for Pakistan. We just do not understand all of the dynamics of the relationship between India and Pakistan to go in and make major alterations like we have.

Pakistan is in a tough situation, and India is just one of their concerns. They also have the Pashtuns and the Baluchs to balance. One more mess Great Britain cobbled together as they executed their passage of lines at the end of WWII and said "Here you go Yanks, good luck!"

davidbfpo
02-01-2011, 10:32 PM
Bob's World just stated:
One more mess Great Britain cobbled together as they executed their passage of lines at the end of WWII and said "Here you go Yanks, good luck!"

Yes the British exited South Asia in 1947, ending that imperial era, although we stayed in a few other places till later (more in a moment). At no stage did we conduct a handover to the USA and wish you luck IMHO.

The UK did stay around South Asia, notably through the Cold War, remember CENTO? Effectively the UK relied on diplomacy, although we offered a nuclear umbrella to India after the Indo-China conflict (1961 IIRC) and after 1967 our East of Suez role dwindled. The USA for mainly Cold War reasons got involved in Pakistan, with a dribble of aid into Afghanistan.

IMHO the USA between 1947-1980 paid very little attention to South Asia, you had your own distractions elsewhere in South-East Asia and only returned when the USSR intervened in Afghanistan.

davidbfpo
02-01-2011, 10:35 PM
A number of the latest threads (including my own last:wry:) have strayed from the focus on Egypt and moved a long distance to the east.

Can we please stay on the unfolding situation in Egypt and the Arab World?

Surferbeetle
02-01-2011, 10:38 PM
I noted the clear change of policy by the Army and found a link to the actual statement:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12332488

Back at ya from Lebanon's Al Manar TV (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Manar) (our acquaintances at Hezbollah)...link to story (http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=171886&language=en).


Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued a “sincere warning and piece of advice” for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak telling him, “we are all passing, and we will be judged by what we left behind.”

More from the LA Times regarding Recep Tayyip Erdogan: TURKEY: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan joins call for Egypt's Mubarak to make big changes (http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/02/turkey-recep-tayyip-erdogan-egypt-hosni-mubarak.html)


Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sided with the Egyptian protesters against their president in a televised speech on Tuesday in which he rebuked Hosni Mubarak and urged him to take a bold step before more blood is spilled.

Wikipedia backgrounder regarding Recep Tayyip Erdogan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recep_Tayyip_Erdo%C4%9Fan)

slapout9
02-02-2011, 12:10 AM
Slap-

I have a little problem with this article - it claims that the US doesn't believe in democracy, but then goes on to criticize Pres Bush's attempts to use Iraq to bring democracy to the region.

So which is it - does the US fear democracy or support it?

Folks like this who criticize everything the government does aren't helpful.

V/R,

Cliff

I have a few problems with it myself, which is why I put it up here to get the other side of the story. As you point out there does appear to be a contradiction in his basic thesis on using democracy to achieve some sort of stable End but at the same time criticizing it.

CrowBat
02-02-2011, 06:55 AM
Thanks for sharing, it's a distinctive avatar. :) United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) Air Force MiG 19’s and MiG 21’s? I have a friend, with some interesting stories, who was on the other side during June 5th ‘67.No.31 flew MiG-17PFs (radar-equipped, "night/all-weather interceptor" variant) originally acquired by Syria before that country joined the UAR, in 1958-1961 period.

Re. "friends": I've got quite a few on both sides of 1967; that makes the research about related topics far more easier. ;)

Re. Mubarak and Suharto: except for both rulling for 30+ years, I do not really see much similarity. Suharto was instrumental for establishment of the Indonesian military and personally involved in fighting the Dutch, when he distinguished in action, in the late 1940s. He pursued a successful, and quite well-documented military career right up to 1965 or so.

For comparisson, practically nothing is known about the details of Mubarak's military career, and I think there are a few good reasons for this. For much of his early career, Mubarak served as instructor at the Air Force Academy in Bilbeis. While I know that many other instructors flew combat sorties during the 1956 War (on Spitfire F.Mk.22s), for example, I never heard Mubarak did the same. In the early 1960, at the time any other professional Egyptian officer (see Riyadh, al-Ezz etc.) was purged out of the military by FM Amer and FM Fawzy, Mubarak rose in rank and was appointed the commander of the Academy (in my eyes, this makes him one of typical Egyptian "political" military officers, like Naguib, Nasser, Amer, Fawzy, Sadat etc.). While many Russians recall Riyadh's stint at Frunze very well, nothing comparable can be said about Mubarak...

By early 1967, Mubarak was back in Egypt and in command of an Air Group ("Wing/Brigade") operating Tu-16s. True enough, he personally led a number of daring, low-level attacks against the Yemeni Royalists in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, possibly even the fake raid against the Royal Palace in Riyadh (only flash cartriges were used), but very few details about these are known. Quite estranging given how much is meanwhile known about a number of other Egyptian Tu-16 and Il-28 pilots from the same period... Similarly, the most "distinguished" action by Mubarak during the June 1967 War was to lead a section of six Tu-16s that, by pure accident, took off five minutes before the first Israeli strike on 5 June 1967. Instead of doing something meaningful with his planes, at least fly them to the safety of Yemen or Sudan, he diverted them to an airfield well within the range of Israeli fighter bombers - and then made a call on an open line in order to ask the High Command what shall he do. Unsurprisingly, the Israelis intercepted that call and 30 minutes later smoked all six of his Tu-16s on the ground... Once again, not a single combat sortie flown by him during that war is known, as compared with missions flown by other Egyptian bomber pilots.

During the Attrition War he served in various staff positions until being appointed the C-in-C EAF. He was certainly never as popular as other air force commanders, particularly el-Hinnawy or al-Ezz, and I am yet to find out if he ever did anything "special". Many of sources available so far indicate something entirely different, but due to the situation in Egypt until now it was impossible to find out any specific details (that alone makes Mubarak's role appearing quite "suspect"). Thus, for the time being it's definitely sure that most of Mubarak's job consisted of completing various projects launched by his predecessors in that position.

Mubarak remained in charge of the EAF during the 1973 War, when the air force was first held back (much to disagreement of most of its officers) and then rushed to the battle when it was much too late. Afterwards, he definitely sided with Ismail and the rest of the "missile superiority" clique and became crucial in Egyptians generally being taught that the crossing of Suez on 6 October was the only significant action of that war... The only other act of his during the 1970s that was of any durable importance was to let one of leading fighter-bomber commanders write an official history of the Egyptian Air Force in 1967 War for internal purposes (important, since the original work to this topic, written back in 1968, was subsequently destroyed on order from Fawzy).

It was really quite surprising when he was appointed the President, following Sadat's assassination, in October 1981, and I really do not see him ever emphasising the core value of "serving the nation" in his entire life. While Suharto's "New Order" promoted stability and economic development, and significantly improved the standard of living of much of the Indonesian population, Mubarak excelled in nepotism and corruption, made the military largely dependent on US aid and did not seriously care about the state of the Egyptian economy before 2005. Except in making himself, his family, and his closest supporters obscenely rich, allienating vast majority of the Egyptian population, or keeping himself in power, he failed in almost anything else he ever did (that is, he successfuly presented his regime as a "bastion against Islamic extremism in Egypt"...).

The act of appointing Soleiman as VP should be seen as a (much belated) attempt to tame the protests and buy time, nothing else. Perhaps Mubaraks didn't get all of their money and gold out of the country (yet), or have to discuss their future exile in Saudi Arabia with the King...


Definitions of who comprises al-Qaida (AQ) vary, and there are significant gaps between desire, capability, and motivations of those who populate AQ as well as other organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.I plead guilty for not providing a better definition. I'll excuse this with explanation that I took it for "granted" that it's clear who am I talking about, given that several of closest associates of OBL (including his leading theoretician) and four of 9/11 idiots were all Egyptians.


Do you think that Saad al-Katatny is strong enough to represent interests of the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood and does his organization truly represent the will of the majority of the Egyptian people…or that of the Egyptian Army?I do not think that anybody can reasonably say whether the MBs represent the "will of the majority" in Egypt. I hope there are going to be "trully free" elections there, and that such assessments are going to be dispelled.

What I know is that the current protest was largely organized by as many secularists as Islamists and simple "onlookers" from the impoverished suburbs. Actually, one of most prominent "organisers" during the first few days of protests were such organisations of the Egyptian "ultras" like al-Ahly or al-Zamalek: football fan clubs similar to those in Europe. And, their representatives stressed that they are determined to remain non-political.

That aside, even the MB supporters that I know in person are sure that the Brotherhood is 100% incapable of improving the condition of the economy (if for no other reason, then because much of the crucial Egyptian businesses are run by the Copts) - which is the critical drive behind the protest.

However, right now, I do not see this as important. The fact hardly anybody of "talkingheads" in the West (with exception of few that attempt pouring oil to the fire of specific fears) is mentioning in these days is, that nobody on the streets of Egyptian cities is currently talking about the USA or Israel, there are no flag-burnings, and nothing religious. And that Copts protest as much as Moslems do. I therefore see the situation as an uprising of the Egyptian people that want to get rid of Mubarak's regime and a complete change of the entire political system. I.e. a struggle motivated by domestic situation and aiming at finding solutions for problems very specific to Egypt.

Well...this post grew quite long (hope, nobody is going to mind that), and I'll stop here.

Fuchs
02-02-2011, 02:45 PM
Interesting AJE interview (http://pulsemedia.org/2011/01/27/shihab-rattansi-lays-bare-us-hypocrisy-on-egypt/)

Bob's World
02-02-2011, 07:51 PM
Former Amb Dan Gillerman from Israel to the UN on Fox. Very pro Israel as one would expect him to be. That is his job, to be an advocate. Harshly critical (in a very polite way) of President Obama's stance, and what he describes as an abandonment of Mubarak, who has been a staunch ally for 30 years, etc.

I will say the same thing regarding Mubarak as I have said regarding Karzai:

It is not the US who has abandoned Mubarak, it is Mubarak who has abandoned the US through his reliance on US support to treat his own people with growing impunity.

In contract law there is a principle of "first material breach," and while the US is certainly in breach of its contract with the Mubarak government, I would argue that Mubarak has been in material breach for decades. He remained true to the aspects he knew the US cared most about (stability with Israel, access through the Suez, etc), but has with equal consistency and growing impunity violated is duties to his own populace. If he was standing on his own two feet, such breach is between him and his people, but as he executed such breachs under a cloak of US support and tacit approval, he has made us complicit in his actions.

This is true for so many of our relationships across this region. There are solutions to this problem far short of demanding leaders to step down, or coming on in support of protesters, but those steps require these governments to act affirmatively to address these wrongs and rapidly seek to allow new voices to be heard and reasonable adjustments of government put in place.

Israel is important, but we have allowed our efforts to support them take us down a path to where we are today. We should continue to support Israel, but not at the expense of our own credibility, not at the expense of our own principles, and not in a manner that continues to fuel the flames of terrorism against the US as these sullied relationships with Arab strongmen have these past couple of decades.

91bravojoe
02-03-2011, 01:20 AM
http://l.yimg.com/a/p/us/news/editorial/1/c2/1c2a43228266b7fcb967d55a86d2bbb5.jpeg

Today's lesson: don't fvck with Anderson Cooper.

91bravojoe
02-03-2011, 01:27 AM
Somehow it got into here that the US invaded and occupied Iraq to promote democracy.

Ludicrous. Eight years in, and we get only faux elections. Baath party can't participate. Not is democracy.

Iraq was invaded in 2003 to get little Bush re-elected in 2004. Catch up after allowing 9/11 to happen.

omarali50
02-03-2011, 02:00 AM
It is interesting that some American commentators are using the “clashes” trope. If you hear anyone say “clashes between pro and anti-Mubarak forces” that can only mean one of two things:
1. The commentator is a total ass and actually has no idea what is going on. Which is a good way to identify the total asses working in the media.
OR
2. The commentator believes he or she is doing a service to American/Israeli interests by projecting the thug crackdown as “clashes”. Secondarily, this also means he or she is a bit of an ass because the US does not have enough of a media monopoly in the world and this sort of reporting/disinformation will only confuse the more clueless faction of the American people without influencing events in any way…

omarali50
02-03-2011, 02:03 AM
btw, Admiral Mike Mullen (who runs his own foreign policy, from Pakistan to Egypt) has talked to the Egyptian army chief and expressed
confidence in the army’s ability to maintain order. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62665
Obama should take some initiative to rein in the Pentagon. Everytime they open their mouth about such things, they are making it worse...

carl
02-03-2011, 03:34 AM
Did anyone notice the Egyptian camel rider in post #66 appears to be wearing blue jeans? The world is mystifying and wonderful place.

CrowBat
02-03-2011, 04:40 AM
A very good summary of Mubarak's reactions over the last 8-9 days:

Mubarak’s Basij

by Prof Juan Cole (http://www.juancole.com/2011/02/mubaraks-basij.html)


On Wednesday, the Mubarak regime showed its fangs, mounting a massive and violent repressive attack on the peaceful crowds in Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo. People worrying about Egypt becoming like Iran (scroll down) should worry about Egypt already being way too much like Iran as it is. That is, Hillary Clinton and others expressed anxiety in public about increasing militarization of the Iranian regime and use of military and paramilitaries to repress popular protests. But Egypt is far more militarized and now is using exactly the same tactics.

The outlines of Hosni Mubarak’s efforts to maintain regime stability and continuity have now become clear. In response to the mass demonstrations of the past week, he has done the following:

1. Late last week, he first tried to use the uniformed police and secret police to repress the crowds, killing perhaps 200-300 and wounding hundreds.

2. This effort failed to quell the protests, and the police were then withdrawn altogether, leaving the country defenseless before gangs of burglars and other criminal elements (some of which may have been composed of secret police or paid informers). The public dealt with this threat of lawlessness by organizing self-defense neighborhood patrols, and continued to refuse to stop demonstrating.

3. Mubarak appointed military intelligence ogre Omar Suleiman vice president. Suleiman had orchestrated the destruction of the Muslim radical movement of the 1990s, but he clearly was being groomed now as a possible successor to Mubarak and his crowd-control expertise would now be used not against al-Qaeda affiliates but against Egyptian civil society.

4. Mubarak mobilized the army to keep a semblance of order, but failed to convince the regular army officers to intervene against the protesters, with army chief of staff Sami Anan announcing late Monday that he would not order the troops to use force against the demonstrators.

5. When the protests continued Tuesday, Mubarak came on television and announced that he would not run for yet another term and would step down in September. His refusal to step down immediately and his other maneuvers indicated his determination, and probably that of a significant section of the officer corps, to maintain the military dictatorship in Egypt, but to attempt to placate the public with an offer to switch out one dictator for a new one (Omar Suleiman, likely).

6. When this pledge of transition to a new military dictator did not, predictably enough, placate the public either, Mubarak on Wednesday sent several thousand secret police and paid enforcers in civilian clothing into Tahrir Square to attack the protesters with stones, knouts, and molotov cocktails, in hopes of transforming a sympathetic peaceful crowd into a menacing violent mob. This strategy is similar to the one used in summer of 2009 by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to raise the cost of protesting in the streets of Tehran, when they sent in basij (volunteer pro-regime militias). Used consistently and brutally, this show of force can raise the cost of urban protesting and gradually thin out the crowds.

Note that this step number 6 required that the army agree to remain neutral and not to actively protect the crowds. The secret police goons were allowed through army checkpoints with their staves, and some even rode through on horses and camels. Aljazeera English’s correspondent suggests that the military was willing to allow the protests to the point where Mubarak would agree to stand down, but the army wants the crowd to accept that concession and go home now.

Surferbeetle
02-03-2011, 04:54 AM
From the 2 Feb 2011 NY Times: Europe Leaders Call for Faster Transition in Egypt (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/world/middleeast/03react.html?src=twrhp)


Prime Minister David Cameron condemned the violence in Egypt on Wednesday in the strongest language yet used by the leader of a major Western country, and issued a veiled warning to President Mubarak to halt the involvement of Egyptian security forces in the turmoil.


A spokesman for President Nicolas Sarkozy told reporters that Mr. Sarkozy “reiterates his wish to see a concrete transition process start without delay, in response to a desire for change and renewal so strongly expressed by the population. He calls on all Egyptian authorities to do everything to ensure that this crucial process takes place without violence.”


Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said in Berlin that Mr. Mubarak’s promise not to seek another term “frees the way for a political new beginning.” “People want democratic change and they want it now,” he said. “It must be a change toward democracy. Not a change that begins someday, but one which begins now.”


The foreign minister, Carl Bildt, who was in Brussels Wednesday for conferences with other European diplomats, said that Sweden welcomed Mr. Mubarak’s decision to cede power. “The Mubarak era in Egyptian politics is over,” Mr. Bildt said. “I now hope that real transition to a democratic, pluralistic, and stable Egypt can begin.”


The president of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, expressed a similar view at a news conference in Ankara. “It’s very important that this transition period is short — Egypt’s stability, peace and strength matters to us,” Mr. Gul said. “The more the demands of people in Egypt are taken into account and implemented, the better.”

From the 31 Jan Hindu Times: World leaders call on Egypt to implement reforms (http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article1142092.ece)


China’s Foreign Ministry said Beijing hopes normalcy and stability will be restored in Egypt soon. The Japanese and Indian foreign ministries issued similar statements.

“We hope that the government of Egypt will listen to the voices of many citizens, promote reforms in a way that gains support of a wide range of people and realize its stability and progress,” Japan’s government said.


From the 2 Feb 2011 NYT: Mubarak’s Allies and Foes Clash in Egypt (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/world/middleeast/03egypt.html?_r=1&hp)


Many protesters argued that Mr. Mubarak was provoking a confrontation in order to prompt a military crackdown.

It is also possible that the military was satisfied with his decision to step down, perhaps fearful of the more radical shift to democratic elections that protesters are calling for.


The deployment of plainclothes forces paid by Mr. Mubarak’s ruling party — men known here as baltageya — has been a hallmark of the Mubarak government, and there were many signs that the violence was carefully choreographed.

The Mubarak supporters emerged from buses. They carried the same flags and the same printed signs, and they all escalated their actions, from shouting to violence, at exactly the same moment: 2:15 p.m. The protesters showed journalists police and ruling party identification cards that they said had been taken from Mubarak supporters who had been caught infiltrating Tahrir Square, also known as Liberation Square, and detained in a holding pen.

Surferbeetle
02-03-2011, 05:19 AM
A very good summary of Mubarak's reactions over the last 8-9 days:

Looks like we were posting at the same time...appreciate your roll-ups ;)

So... to date the visible score on the world stage is words vs. deeds. When I think about the ladder of escalation (Herman Kahn (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herman_Kahn)) I consider the seen and the unseen...:wry:

Step two (Political, Economic, and Diplomatic gestures)

Surferbeetle
02-03-2011, 06:01 AM
...it would make for an interesting international case study. :wry:

United Nations Convention against Corruption (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Convention_against_Corruption)


The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is the first legally binding international anti-corruption instrument.[1] In its 8 Chapters and 71 Articles, the UNCAC obliges its States Parties to implement a wide and detailed range of anti-corruption measures affecting their laws, institutions and practices. These measures aim to promote the prevention, criminalization and law enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, technical assistance and information exchange, and mechanisms for implementation.

Investment Banking (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Investment_banking) backgrounder from Wikipedia

Retail Banking (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Retail_bank) backgrounder from Wikipedia

From Bloomberg Businessweek: Offshore Banks Must Adapt or Die in WikiLeaks Era (http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-01-24/offshore-banks-must-adapt-or-die-in-wikileaks-era-matthew-lynn.html)


Jan. 25 (Bloomberg) -- You might think this is a great time for the offshore-banking industry. There is a lot of spare cash sloshing around the world. The mega-rich are still piling up money. Taxes are likely to go up as every developed country tries to cope with huge deficits, creating even more incentive to shift money to some island hideaway.

But it’s not so easy anymore.

davidbfpo
02-03-2011, 09:49 AM
Amidst all the reporting - with more journalists arriving in Egypt - was a BBC Radio Four snippet:
0812: The retired general talking to the BBC's Jon Leyne had been speaking in turn to tank crews in Tahrir Square. The general said he believed the military would move very soon against Mr Mubarak - possibly as soon as tomorrow. Our correspondent says it seems the army is willing now to put its lot very firmly on the side of the protesters.

0807: The BBC's Jon Leyne has been told by a retired Egyptian general that the army is losing patience. He was told that if there's more firing from pro-government groups the army is now willing to open fire on them.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12307698

There is another BBC TV report on the secret police detaining them, after being stopped near the presidential palace - with the Army's connivance; more interesting for the two interviews at the start:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12351996

Bob's World
02-03-2011, 10:08 AM
It will be fascinating to read years from now which country's agents were working the crowd to stir up the activities that began yesterday. Such tactics are foreign manipulation 101. It could have been Mubarak, but I would take a hard look at other countries that reasonably believe that sustaining the status quo is preferable to some unknown future. They have 2-3 neighbors that fall in that category.

In a region famous for intrigue and struggles for power; in a region of small states and armor-friendly terrain where a tactical error can result in a strategic disaster; power is up for grabs, and intrigue is in play. How this ends for the US will depend upon how well we can "play away from the ball." Currently the ball is in Egypt, but that is only a small portion of this game. Meanwhile, the US media is like a bunch of 5-year olds chasing the ball, so that is all most Americans see. Al Jeezera is painting a broader picture.

M-A Lagrange
02-03-2011, 11:53 AM
What happened in Egypt and before in Tunisia is here to remind us what is the difference between a "revolte" and a "revolution".
In Egypt, the situation is clearly not the one of a "revolution". Populations are not tired enough of their leaders and power still benefit from support inside army and population.

We should not confuse both. :D

CrowBat
02-03-2011, 03:20 PM
It will be fascinating to read years from now which country's agents were working the crowd to stir up the activities that began yesterday. Such tactics are foreign manipulation 101. It could have been Mubarak, but I would take a hard look at other countries that reasonably believe that sustaining the status quo is preferable to some unknown future. They have 2-3 neighbors that fall in that category.I doubt this, then it would take a big deal of capability to assemble that force of 2,000 of Mubarak's "Basiji" and send them to Cairo.

But, if one prefers to believe that variant, the most likely candidate No.1 is nobody less but the "only democracy in the Middle East" itself:
Israel urges world to curb criticism of Egypt's Mubarak (http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-urges-world-to-curb-criticism-of-egypt-s-mubarak-1.340238) - as published by Haretz, just three days back.

If this comedy lasts for any longer, and particularly if the Egyptian population is to suffer even more, we'll all be paying bills for the failures of our governments for decades longer...

Stan
02-03-2011, 04:52 PM
Gimme Shelter (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/02/gimme_shelter)

Why is Hosni Mubarak clinging to power?


So why is Mubarak trying to squeeze a few more months out of his three-decade career in office and avowing his intentions to stay in Egypt rather than packing for the Riviera? It may be because exile isn't what it used to be; over the last 30 years, things have gotten increasingly difficult for dictators in flight. Successor regimes launch criminal probes; major efforts are mounted to identify assets that may have been stripped or looted by the autocrat, or more commonly, members of his immediate family. I witnessed this process myself, twice being asked by newly installed governments in Central Eurasia to advise them on asset recovery measures focusing on the deposed former leader and his family.

J Wolfsberger
02-03-2011, 07:30 PM
In what must rank as one of the most clueless assessments of events in Egypt, I got this in this morning's email:


...

The presence of so much U.S. military hardware in Egypt is a good thing. Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. military assistance and has been since the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement in 1979. The provision of U.S. assistance and military hardware broke the stranglehold of the Soviet Union over the Egyptian military, thereby helping to cement that peace treaty. The fact that the Egyptian Army and Air Force is U.S. equipped gives Washington enormous leverage over those institutions as we and they try and figure a way forward in the current crisis.

... Because it controls the flow of spare parts and the technology to upgrade U.S. systems, Washington can also influence local politics. This is part of what is going on between Washington and Cairo right now. ...

(Source: Lexington Institute, Author: Daniel Goure, Ph.D.)

Right. Because what all parties to the turmoil in Egypt are concerned about today is being able to buy spares in five years. :mad:

Bob's World
02-03-2011, 07:48 PM
This is the air force model of Theater Security Cooperation. Just as the Navy does port calls (nothing builds US influence and rapport like letting loose a few thousand drunken sailors on some port community), the AF does foreign military sales. I don't see it helping much in the near term, but the long-term investment of such complex systems does lead to a stability of who the the government is going to work with. The question is, will we be able to swallow our pride and work with them if they are more closely aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood than with the current regime? I hope so.

We had a similar deal in place with Iran, and when the Iranians ran us off I suspect we did not work too hard to leverage the need to maintain their "made in the USA" equipment as a rationale to establish and maintain relations with the new government. We should have. It would have saved a lot of the silliness between the west and Iran that has gone down since. But with both Israel and Saudi Arabia seeing Iran as enemy #1, there is a lot of pressure on the US to hold them in that light as well. That is too bad, as Iran is arguably the most pro-US Muslim populace and is a true nation that will endure into the foreseeable future.

tequila
02-03-2011, 07:55 PM
Just out of interest, have you ever read anything by the Lexington Institute that ever pointed out any of the downsides of our vastly expansive mil-industrial complex?

The need for spare parts certainly worked wonders in Iran after 1979 ... :D

I think the Mubarak regime is showing quite an interesting counterinsurgent strategy in a very fast-moving situation. Deniable violence against the demonstrators, while offering concessions, negotiations, and placid words in the press. The obvious objective is to thin the crowds in the streets to relieve immediate pressure on the regime. Long term, perhaps they hope to stay in by demonstrating staying power, making cosmetic concessions, buying off or imprisoning opponents, and clamping down to ensure no more mass demos. Operations against the foreign press are to get inflammatory pictures off the TVs in Egypt and around the world, and hope that everyone forgets in a week or so.

In this case, the leaderless nature of the Egyptian demonstrators works for them. The movement cannot really be beheaded. At this point we will see just how much staying power an 83-year-old dictator really has, and how farsighted the Egyptian Army high command is.

J Wolfsberger
02-03-2011, 09:31 PM
Just out of interest, have you ever read anything by the Lexington Institute that ever pointed out any of the downsides of our vastly expansive mil-industrial complex?


The Lexington Institute isn't one that I've ever paid much attention to. At this level of thinking, that will continue.

Surferbeetle
02-03-2011, 10:35 PM
From the 1 Feb 2011 edition of Bloomberg: Kissinger Says Mubarak Exit a `Question of Months,' Urges Muted U.S. Reply (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-01/kissinger-says-mubarak-exit-a-question-of-months-urges-muted-u-s-reply.html)


Henry Kissinger, a former U.S. secretary of state and presidential adviser, said Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is certain to resign within “months at most” as the Arab world’s most populous country braces for “a period of great uncertainty.”

Kissinger said on Bloomberg Television's "In the Loop with Betty Liu" that the U.S. should say little publicly about Egypt during this transition. The U.S. does not want to be perceived as trying to impose a government on the Egyptian people, he said.


Mohamed ElBaradei, a leader of the Egyptian opposition and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, is likely only a transitional figure because he lacks a political base, Kissinger said.

“I think almost certainly he will be a temporary figure,” he said. “In order to govern, you have to represent some sort of forces, and I don’t know what forces ElBaradei represents.”

Omar Suleiman, a former Army general and Mubarak’s newly appointed vice president, is “highly intelligent and quite sophisticated,” Kissinger said. While stopping short of calling Suleiman a friend of the United States, Kissinger said he “has been very cooperative.”

Pete
02-03-2011, 10:40 PM
We had a similar deal in place with Iran, and when the Iranians ran us off I suspect we did not work too hard to leverage the need to maintain their "made in the USA" equipment as a rationale to establish and maintain relations with the new government. We should have.
Would the Iranians have given us our hostages back sooner had we continued to give them spare parts?

Old Eagle
02-03-2011, 11:27 PM
The GCCs do Theater Security Cooperation, ergo the term Theater. All Services do Foreign Military Sales, along with other Security Assistance and Security Cooperation programs. Programs are coordinated by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the GCCs.

Cole
02-04-2011, 12:47 AM
The question is, will we be able to swallow our pride and work with them if they are more closely aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood than with the current regime? I hope so.
So we should have worked with democratically-elected Hitler and today should embrace democratically-selected Hezbollah in Lebanon? And of course if President Carter had told the Shah that he needed to resign now, that would have made all the difference...

Instead, seem to recall it was the promised threats of a new Presidential candidate who was unprepared to deal with Iran diplomatically that finally got our hostages released after 444 days of diplomacy.


I suspect we did not work too hard to leverage the need to maintain their "made in the USA" equipment as a rationale to establish and maintain relations with the new government. We should have. It would have saved a lot of the silliness between the west and Iran that has gone down since.So if we imposed no sanctions today, Iran's government would cease funding Hezbollah and developing nuclear weapons?


That is too bad, as Iran is arguably the most pro-US Muslim populace and is a true nation that will endure into the foreseeable future.
And Iran is a perfect example of a nation whose people may appear secular and appear to like the U.S. but whose government is just the opposite. The NEW government is the problem no matter how much we try to placate the citizenry by appearing to be on their side during their ill-considered revolution.

Sanctions and focused aid in support of allies aligned with our interests has arguably saved us considerably more than the money we gave/give Egypt and Israel each year. Which is more dangerous...appearing to abandon allies which drives Israel and Saudi Arabia to work together to attack Iran, or telling a 30-year ally that we understand his stated need for a smooth transition, and our past relationship will remain intact until you retire in September.

tequila
02-04-2011, 01:12 AM
Instead, seem to recall it was the promised threats of a new Presidential candidate who was unprepared to deal with Iran diplomatically that finally got our hostages released after 444 days of diplomacy.

Umm ... didn't that same Presidential candidate also negotiate with that same Iranian regime when additional hostages were taken in Lebanon during his own term? Indeed, weren't weapons sent to that regime in violation of U.S. law in exchange for hostage releases?


Sanctions and focused aid in support of allies aligned with our interests has arguably saved us considerably more than the money we gave/give Egypt and Israel each year. Which is more dangerous...appearing to abandon allies which drives Israel and Saudi Arabia to work together to attack Iran, or telling a 30-year ally that we understand his stated need for a smooth transition, and our past relationship will remain intact until you retire in September.

Having a little trouble understanding what you are trying to say here. How does focused aid in support of allies save us money, exactly? Also, your second sentence is a bit confusing. Are you saying abandoning the "allies" will drive Israel and Saudi Arabia together to attack Iran? Or that abandoning them will separate this partnership?

omarali50
02-04-2011, 01:13 AM
Bob, I just wanted to say that I agree with every word you wrote about Iran.

Cole
02-04-2011, 01:38 AM
Having a little trouble understanding what you are trying to say here. How does focused aid in support of allies save us money, exactly? Also, your second sentence is a bit confusing. Are you saying abandoning the "allies" will drive Israel and Saudi Arabia together to attack Iran? Or that abandoning them will separate this partnership?The war in Afghanistan is costing us $100 billion a year these days. The $4.7 billion in foreign aid we gave Israel and Egypt last year is considerably cheaper. How much did the last round of bail outs and stimulus cost the U.S.? Would you allow that $150 a barrel oil due to this short-sighted people's revolution spreading to Saudi Arabia or an attack on Iran would cause a repeat recession far more costly than foreign aid?

http://www.vaughns-1-pagers.com/politics/us-foreign-aid.htm

Yes, I'm saying that our government's appearance to abandon a long time ally will not go unnoticed. Abandoning an ally who has kept peace for 30 years and has enhanced the economy of one of the few Arab nations without much oil revenue constrasts with our assurances to Israel to "trust us," when we ask you to give Iran sanctions (and STUXNET) a chance. The Saudi Arabia reference in that context is a wink on Israeli use of their airspace. Think we could stay out of that war after the Straits of Hormuz get blocked?

tequila
02-04-2011, 02:08 AM
The war in Afghanistan is costing us $100 billion a year these days. The $4.7 billion in foreign aid we gave Israel and Egypt last year is considerably cheaper. How much did the last round of bail outs and stimulus cost the U.S.? Would you allow that $150 a barrel oil due to this short-sighted people's revolution spreading to Saudi Arabia or an attack on Iran would cause a repeat recession far more costly than foreign aid?


I will note a few things. First off, our aid has not exactly prevented instability in Egypt. Secondly, Saudi Arabia is not Egypt. Observers of Egypt already knew that Egypt was primed to blow --- if not quite in the dramatic way it has done so, but the disastrous attempt to implant Gamal on the throne alienated Mubarak's base and lent energy to the opposition. Tunisia was the spark on a quite dry field. The KSA, OTOH, has no such legitimacy crisis.


Yes, I'm saying that our government's appearance to abandon a long time ally will not go unnoticed. Abandoning an ally who has kept peace for 30 years and has enhanced the economy of one of the few Arab nations without much oil revenue constrasts with our assurances to Israel to "trust us," when we ask you to give Iran sanctions (and STUXNET) a chance. The Saudi Arabia reference in that context is a wink on Israeli use of their airspace. Think we could stay out of that war after the Straits of Hormuz get blocked?


Sorry, but circumstances change. Our "30-year ally" made his own bed. I was completely unaware that we were married to Hosni Mubarak or any other country or leader. The interests of the United States come first, not Mubarak's or Israel's. From a pure realpolitik standpoint, Mubarak has proven that his regime is no longer a guarantor of regional stability if it ever was (see: Ayman al-Zawahiri). The agreement between the Egyptian people and the regime has broken down - the only thing that can preserve him is brute force, and what kind of "stability" is that?

Also, if an Israeli attack on Iran was truly the imminent and drastically costly threat that you describe, it is quite easy for the U.S. to deter it in a number of ways.

Cole
02-04-2011, 02:57 AM
I will note a few things. First off, our aid has not exactly prevented instability in Egypt. Secondly, Saudi Arabia is not Egypt. Observers of Egypt already knew that Egypt was primed to blow --- if not quite in the dramatic way it has done so, but the disastrous attempt to implant Gamal on the throne alienated Mubarak's base and lent energy to the opposition. Tunisia was the spark on a quite dry field. The KSA, OTOH, has no such legitimacy crisis.You mention perceived intent to get his son elected. Is that the horrible human-rights violation that led to this crisis? What else is he responsible for on par with the likes of Ahmadinejad and Kim Jung Il? Or was it the youthful, utopian, inexperienced views of unemployed internet users fueled by 24/7 news coverage that led to this mess. Do you really believe the replacement government will do better for the Egyptian people's lives?


Sorry, but circumstances change. Our "30-year ally" made his own bed. I was completely unaware that we were married to Hosni Mubarak or any other country or leader. The interests of the United States come first, not Mubarak's or Israel's. From a pure realpolitik standpoint, Mubarak has proven that his regime is no longer a guarantor of regional stability if it ever was (see: Ayman al-Zawahiri). The agreement between the Egyptian people and the regime has broken down - the only thing that can preserve him is brute force, and what kind of "stability" is that?

Also, if an Israeli attack on Iran was truly the imminent and drastically costly threat that you describe, it is quite easy for the U.S. to deter it in a number of ways. Have circumstances really changed? I have no special Middle East insight other than an unworthy-by-today's-standards Sinai year-long tour during the Intifada. I had a female relative who went to Egypt in that timeframe and was never seen again. Speed boats were assaulting Tel Aviv's coast. Folks were blowing themselves up all over Israel before they built the walls. Rockets land all over Israel. Yet overall, Egypt has been remarkably stable in contrast, and the economy actually appeared pretty healthy. There was no war with Israel despite extensive Palestinian unrest then and trouble to the north during Israeli occupation of Lebanon.

Mubarak had already announced he would not run again. He may hand over power now to his vice president. Why did Obama feel the need to overreach his authority and tell him to leave now? He must have known how Mubarak would react to such external pressure. The other reasonable autocratic ruler in Jordan is also in peril. And you think we can pressure Israel not to act in its own defense?

Surferbeetle
02-04-2011, 03:57 AM
From the 2 Feb 2011 NYT: Frank Wisner, the Diplomat Sent to Prod Mubarak (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/world/middleeast/03wisner.html?_r=1&ref=world)


This week, Mr. Wisner, whose stints around the globe have included four ambassadorships, one of them to Egypt, was briefly President Obama’s man in Cairo, charged with prodding an old friend, President Hosni Mubarak, to make his exit.


An imposing presence with a resonant voice whose last posting was as ambassador to India, Mr. Wisner has spent the years since his retirement in 1997 operating at the nexus of diplomacy and business. For more than a decade, he was vice chairman of the insurance giant A.I.G.; he left in 2009, just as the company was getting bailed out by American taxpayers, and joined the lobbying firm Patton Boggs.

Wikipedia backgrounder on Patton Boggs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patton_Boggs)

Wikipedia backgrounder on AIG (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aig)

Cliff
02-04-2011, 05:40 AM
This is the air force model of Theater Security Cooperation. Just as the Navy does port calls (nothing builds US influence and rapport like letting loose a few thousand drunken sailors on some port community), the AF does foreign military sales.

Thanks for the cheap shot on the USAF. As already pointed out, FMS cases are not Theater Security Cooperation. And they normally are driven by political (read OSD) policy, not service prerogatives. In this case, the decision that providing the Egyptian AF with the same F-16s the Israelis got was a decent way of influencing them as well as keeping a peaceful strategic balance...

Also, you could easily say the same thing about the Army and the M-1s that rolled into Tahrir Square...


I don't see it helping much in the near term, but the long-term investment of such complex systems does lead to a stability of who the the government is going to work with.

As I pointed out before, the big advantage is that you have a relationship. When you pick up the phone to call the generals in Cairo, you are talking to someone that knows and understands the US. Relationships matter, hardware is merely the key to unlock the door. Also, note that the hardware is what allowed Egypt to feel secure and be at peace with Israel since the 70's- would a war between them have made you feel better?


The question is, will we be able to swallow our pride and work with them if they are more closely aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood than with the current regime? I hope so.

We will undoubtedly have to work with them... but that doesn't mean we have to support the Muslim Brotherhood, even if they have renounced violence...


We had a similar deal in place with Iran, and when the Iranians ran us off I suspect we did not work too hard to leverage the need to maintain their "made in the USA" equipment as a rationale to establish and maintain relations with the new government. We should have. It would have saved a lot of the silliness between the west and Iran that has gone down since. But with both Israel and Saudi Arabia seeing Iran as enemy #1, there is a lot of pressure on the US to hold them in that light as well. That is too bad, as Iran is arguably the most pro-US Muslim populace and is a true nation that will endure into the foreseeable future.

Iran was arguably different in that the military there WAS seen as being an instrument of the Shah. The military in Egypt (thus far) is far more respected and has yet to align itself against the protesters. We'll see what happens if the crowds march on the Presidential Palace tomorrow on "Departure Friday"... but I would still argue that the relationships we have with the Egyptian brass allow us to pressure them to show restraint and protect the people. Which is probably a good thing.

I also fail to see how the Iranian populace was pro-US in the 80s... any poll numbers to back that up? I agree with you on engagement though... even at the height of the Cold War we at least tried to talk to the Soviets and maintain a mil-to-mil relationship...

V/R,

Cliff

CrowBat
02-04-2011, 05:49 AM
This is the air force model of Theater Security Cooperation. Just as the Navy does port calls (nothing builds US influence and rapport like letting loose a few thousand drunken sailors on some port community), the AF does foreign military sales. I don't see it helping much in the near term, but the long-term investment of such complex systems does lead to a stability of who the the government is going to work with.I am sorry, but this conclusion is confusing me a little bit.

If we gauge by the example of Iran...within the period 1971-1978, that country purchased (note: contrary to the Egyptians, the Iranians paid for every single screw - and they usually paid two or three times its actual worth) not only enough of best aircraft, weapons and spares the USA could provide, but in such amounts that they proved able to run their air force through a pitched war well into the late 1980s without any particular problems. On the top of this, the Iranians purchased also an entire infra-structure capable of manufacturing (not only maintaining) aircraft and weapons for them. Mind that the huge state-owned companies like Iranian Aircraft Industries, Iranian Aircraft Manufacturing Industries, Iranian Helicopter Overhaul Industries, Iranian Electronic Industries etc. were all launched in the 1970s, in cooperation with companies like Northrop, McDonnell, Bell Textron, Hughes etc.. Over 150,000 Iranians found jobs in this sector alone, back then (today it's more than 200,000). As was nicelly illustrated in 1978 and 1979, this did not bring any kind of stability to Iran.

In the last 30 years, Egypt was primarily receiving aid in form of not the best aircraft (F-16 is really not the best the USA can offer), armour (M1 Abrams MBTs), warships (Perry-class frigates) and similar. Large parts of the Egyptian defence sector - otherwise existing already since the early 1950s - were retooled to become capable of at least assembling some of these (M1s), and manufacturing spares for them. As we are witnessing in these days, this did not bring any kind of stability to that country either.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, the situation is actually "worse", then they bought plenty of downgraded US armament (see F-15S) and then more of it than they can maintain, yet still not enough to fight a war (see their involvement in the "anti-Houthi" campaign in Yemen, last two years, when the run out of ammo within only a few days) and without any kind of infrastructure that would enable them to maintain all that equipment without foreign help. I might now state something that plenty of people prefer not even to think about, but let's be sincere and frank: the country is meanwhile one of largest exporters of international terrorism (right behind another "most important non-NATO ally", Pakistan), and if we do not get to hear about internal unrest there then almost exclusively because the King and his corrupt clique wouldn't let anybody report about that.


We had a similar deal in place with Iran, and when the Iranians ran us off I suspect we did not work too hard to leverage the need to maintain their "made in the USA" equipment as a rationale to establish and maintain relations with the new government. We should have. It would have saved a lot of the silliness between the west and Iran that has gone down since.I'm really sorry, but there was no such leverage at all. The new Iranian gov was not the least interested in running the huge military machinery left behind by the Shah. Immediately after climbing to power and long before the US Embassy in Tehran was occuppied, the gov in Tehran first killed orders worth some US$10 billion, then cancelled all the ongoing projects and then began demobilizing the army. The manpower of their air force was slashed from more than 100,000 to less than 50,000 within less than a year, and - because the new Iranian government was shocked by the costs of operating such types like F-14 Tomcats and F-4 Phantoms - flying hours of their pilots from more than 300 annually, to less than 20. As next, they opened negotiations with the Pentagon for selling much of the equipment back to the USA. One of best-known such negotiations was the one about Iran returning the 77 F-14s (out of 80 originally purchased) back, Grumman overhauling these and re-selling them to the UK, Canada or even the US Air Force (not the USN). This process ended only when Iraq invaded Iran, in September 1980: without that invasion, Iran wouldn't have had a military to speak about as of 1982 or so.

So, sorry, but there was no such leverage for the USA to talk about: the Iranians did not (originally) intend to maintain a military that would require US spare parts and thus there would've been no point in the USA talking with them about relevant issues. That aside, as described above, even when they had to re-mobilize that military in the face of the Iraqi invasion, they still had so many spares at hand, they could fight for years without any major problems. Indeed, once the Iraqis attacked, their air force went from "doing nothing since months" to "fighting a full-scale war" in a matter of two hours. The problem was rather that in the chaos that reigned the country since the revolution, they literaly lost the keys to some of their immense underground depots... that in the priod 1978-1980 they did their best to get rid of more than half of their highly-qualified technical personnel (less so the pilots)... and that by September 1980 they began feeling shortages of kerosene because they simply did not purchase any for months...

But, that's an entirely different story...


But with both Israel and Saudi Arabia seeing Iran as enemy #1, there is a lot of pressure on the US to hold them in that light as well. That is too bad, as Iran is arguably the most pro-US Muslim populace...A certain part of the Iranian population is, no doubt. The trouble is that nobody can precisely say how big is that part compared to the entire population.


The war in Afghanistan is costing us $100 billion a year these days. The $4.7 billion in foreign aid we gave Israel and Egypt last year is considerably cheaper. How much did the last round of bail outs and stimulus cost the U.S.? Would you allow that $150 a barrel oil due to this short-sighted people's revolution spreading to Saudi Arabia or an attack on Iran would cause a repeat recession far more costly than foreign aid?I think you're forgetting the following equatation:

- The war in Afghanistan costs 100 Billion a year now, because the USA failed to invest perhaps a few hundred of millions in Afghanistan, and instead left the country to the mercy of the ISI, back in the early 1990s.

True enough, the US never really "run" the Mujjs in Afghanistan: it was the ISI that did - with help of US and Saudi money. But then, perhaps the USA could've said ISI at least in 1992, that it's an American issue how they spend their taxpayer's money, and not that of the Pakistani military intelligence...

- Furthermore, paying Israel and Egypt not only 4.7 billion annually now, but actually much more (then, this amount accounts only for officially provided military aid, not for all the other sorts of aid, like large-scale deliveries of grain, various US-granted loans etc.) is equal to curing the effects of a desease, but not curing the desease itself.

"So, Egypt got a cancer in form of the Brotherhood? No problem: provide arms to Mubarak so he can better kick their backsides. And never mind if it's granted he can't do that forever: my term lasts only four years - eight, if I convince the Congress Mubarak needs another 40 F-16s from Lockmart to counter the Brotherhood..."

Cole
02-04-2011, 06:54 AM
I think you're forgetting the following equatation:

- The war in Afghanistan costs 100 Billion a year now, because the USA failed to invest perhaps a few hundred of millions in Afghanistan, and instead left the country to the mercy of the ISI, back in the early 1990s.

True enough, the US never really "run" the Mujjs in Afghanistan: it was the ISI that did - with help of US and Saudi money. But then, perhaps the USA could've said ISI at least in 1992, that it's an American issue how they spend their taxpayer's money, and not that of the Pakistani military intelligence...

- Furthermore, paying Israel and Egypt not only 4.7 billion annually now, but actually much more (then, this amount accounts only for officially provided military aid, not for all the other sorts of aid, like large-scale deliveries of grain, various US-granted loans etc.) is equal to curing the effects of a desease, but not curing the desease itself.

"So, Egypt got a cancer in form of the Brotherhood? No problem: provide arms to Mubarak so he can better kick their backsides. And never mind if it's granted he can't do that forever: my term lasts only four years - eight, if I convince the Congress Mubarak needs another 40 F-16s from Lockmart to counter the Brotherhood..."If Wikipedia is correct, 12.8 million tourists visited Egypt in 2008 spending $11 billion and employing 12% of the workforce. When I saw the horses/camels running through the crowd, it was not difficult to imagine them as irritated workers losing tourism revenue rather than paid thugs. I'm sure there are plenty of those courtesy of the Interior Ministry, but an objective observer would probably admit that many more are unhappy with the economic disruption this is causing and the starvation it risks.

Spent an hour watching C-SPAN with Egyptian experts who met today talking at The Frontline Club in London (Mod added podcast link:http://frontlineclub.com/events/2011/02/first-wednesday-10.html ). Highly recommend it if you can catch a rerun. Several admitted there is no clear leader ready to take power in either Tunisia or Egypt. A student getting his masters in London said none of the organizers of the protests were remotely qualified to govern. The interesting thing to me was several Iranian men in the audience who compared the protesters to teen-agers talking back to their parents.

Another point of interest was a reporter saying that the Muslim Brotherhood has not hurt Turkey. A second Turkish economist agreed while others were less sure that has been a positive Turkish influence on what was once an extremely secular country. At 25-30%, it is pretty easy to see some coalition including the Muslim Brotherhood eventually ending up in power...along with communists, socialists, and all those other fun groups.

Finally, while I have been as addicted as most to watching the chaos on TV, I had to chuckle when Pierce whatever-his-name-is asked an Israeli observer about attacks on the press. He answered honestly that the American press was guilty of "professional narcissism." Anderson Cooper is going for the record of showing himself getting beat up over and over from "an undisclosed location," while I noted Christiane Ammanpour being snooty on camera.

While the press needs to be there, there is little doubt that they are accessories to some of the violence. Plus, one tires of hearing networks claim to be objective as they repeatedly interview Fouad Ajami from Johns Hopkins who can't say enough bad about Mubarak in flowery language.

Bob's World
02-04-2011, 11:39 AM
Hmm. Subtle inter-service jab at my AF and Navy brothers went off course a bit...

I'll try to regroup my point a bit: The upfront costs of buying influence and subtly thwarting popular will in favor of stability with a semi-cooperative government is indeed cheaper than what an Iraq or an Afghanistan costs; there are subtle costs that are being ignored because we have misplaced the causation for what is going on in the world.

Are we in Iraq and Afghanistan and spending Billions there, and spending billions on increased counter-terror security initiatives across our society; and spending billions re-framing the military from one well trained, postured and equipped to deter and defeat major threats to our nation because of Islamist ideology?

Or has Islamist ideology taken root across these populaces due to 65 years of increasing US manipulation of political processes and the resultant impunity in which these governments (All on the Freedom House list of least free states) have come to treat their own people with while secure in the support of the US?

Making matters worse is this information and transportation technology that allows the oppressed in Yemen to connect with those in Jordan, with those in Egypt, with those in Algeria, with those in Libya, etc, etc, etc.

A critical part of the quid pro quo from these governments was that they would control their populaces. With today's information age, they can't. There is a tremendous synergy and it is no longer possible to "separate the insurgent from the populace."

The same thing happened on a slower scale when Great Britain connected the world with a great network of telegraph cables and steam powered fleets. Events in South Africa affected India, events in India affected Malaya, etc. Co-options of local systems of legitimacy that result in local national governments that grow emboldened in their foreign protections and come to act with increasing impunity can survive in isolation through strong military action. They cannot survive once connected and exposed.

So, while a billion here and a billion there may have been a economical model of securing national interests over the past 65 years, it is a model that is unsustainable. It is a model that is now requiring us to drop a $100 Billion in various places where we are acting out to try to keep the wheels on. Do we now intervene in Egypt and drop a $100B/year there as well?

The irony is, that we are not being attacked by the populaces of our enemies, we are being attacked by the populaces of our billion dollar a year friends. Then, in response, we ignore those populaces and those governments and instead go to Afghanistan and Iraq and attack them. We are chasing symptoms of the problem and pointedly avoiding the root causes.

The root causes are that we have allowed our foreign policy to get out of line with our national ethos and principles. We have backed shady characters, and they have grown more shady as they became emboldened by our backing. Now that house of cards is coming down. To act out to continue to prop up these governments is a suicide move for US power and influence. We've run out of fingers to jam into this dike.

We need a new approach that is more tuned to the growing power of connected populaces. We need a new approach that is more in line with our national ethos. This is where I came into the SWC to begin with. I wrote a paper and published it here on the SWJ.

Populace-Centric Engagement – A Positive Change of Strategic Perspective for Winning the Long War. Small Wars Journal
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/10/populacecentric-engagement/

Then, a couple weeks later some guy named Slap sends me an email and says that people are arguing about my paper and that I should weigh in. I had no idea what he was talking about, but followed the link he sent me to here:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6226&highlight=win

Don't blame me, blame Slap...

CrowBat
02-04-2011, 12:18 PM
If Wikipedia is correct, 12.8 million tourists visited Egypt in 2008 spending $11 billion and employing 12% of the workforce. When I saw the horses/camels running through the crowd, it was not difficult to imagine them as irritated workers losing tourism revenue rather than paid thugs. I'm sure there are plenty of those courtesy of the Interior Ministry, but an objective observer would probably admit that many more are unhappy with the economic disruption this is causing and the starvation it risks.I had a talk with several Egyptians on the telephone today. A friend of mine, who grew up in Egypt, called his family and friends too. The outcome was quite similar: shop-owners, middle-aged people are scared to death and want the protests to end, and the protesters to go home. "It's bad for business".

From what I hear from a member of a bedu family now working in the tourist industry in the Sinai, many from that sector think exactly the same. What is going on in Egypt since eight days practically caused a collapse of tourism, and is thus surely to have grave economic consequences.

Furthermore, I know from own experience that the Ministry of Interior's Central Security Forces (CSF) have plenty of informers in the tourist industry, so it might not surprise if some of them go protesting, then get caught by the anti-Mubarak protesters only to have police or CSF IDs with them. However....

The problem is that there are only a very few such people compared to the numbers of those that do not own shops, or can only dream about working in the tourism industry.

Even more so, believing in anything like "spontaneous pro-Mubarak demos"...borders on believing in miracles - or simply denying reality. Ordinary, "everyday" people don't have printed placards, or stocks of flags, sticks, rocks, and even less so lenghty convoys of buses ready to take them to Cairo - where most of them then did not know their way around (!) - and even less so are they ready to voluntarily charge a crowd on horseback or riding a camel; ordinary people staging "spontaneous" demonstrations do not challenge their opponents for a violent confrontation, grab one or two and then beat them, shot them and then drop their bodies in some alley...they do not loot and then burn down one of largest shopping mals (happened 3 days back in Alexandria), and I also do not know of ordinary people who shot at the others with a sniper rifle from the roof of the nearby building. If this is not enough, ordinary people involved in protest of whatever kind also do not launch decisive attacks on offices of two major human-rights associations, beat and then take away around a dozen of people in "some civilian bus", escorted by the Central Security Forces car...- and this while explaining to the crowd around them that these are Iranian-paid, Hezbollah agents.

Nobody does that unless he's paid and ordered to do it and promised to be backed up and protected later.

And at that point this all turns into a SOP for a dictator clinging to power - against all odds, and regardless the cost.

Bob's World
02-04-2011, 12:39 PM
The American Revolution was horribly disruptive on the economy and stability of the society for at least a generation. The majority of the populace had little interest in revolution going in, and perhaps even those who were enthusiastic had "buyers remorse" once it was over.

Egypt and her people have a long, hard road in front of them. The easy path is to simply submit to despotism. To accept one's role in life as assigned to them by birth and the government. Populaces will typically submit to this unless something jolts them to action.

Sometimes it is a period of major economic hardship that turns the bad into the intolerable, and the people act out. This is why so many believe that economics are the key to such revolts. My take is that bad economics without a corresponding high-level conditions of insurgency due to perceptions of poor governance is spark without fuel.

Sometimes it is an internal or external leader who emerges, armed with some ideology tailored to speak to the target populace that provides the spark.

Sometimes, as in the Middle East today, you have a vast "fuel supply" of despotism, with economic and ideological sparks flying, all connected through real-time communications. A spark in Tunisia ignites a conflagration in Egypt. Far too many of those fuel supplies link directly back to the US. Breaking those linkages, and applying influence to help keep these inevitable events from getting out of control is a prudent course for the US. Insanely difficult, but prudent.

slapout9
02-04-2011, 01:43 PM
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6226&highlight=win

Don't blame me, blame Slap...


Yea,it's all my fault:D

Bob's World
02-04-2011, 02:37 PM
Yea,it's all my fault:D

Taking responsibility is the first step toward getting healthy...:)

jmm99
02-04-2011, 05:14 PM
Well, the How to Win thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6226&highlight=win) was a bit of nostalgia - deja vu all over again. ;)

I chimed in with post #34 A Failure to Communicate Here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=59757&postcount=34)?, shortly before Bob came on board, which started:


I've had difficulties with COL Jones' articles, which mix legal and military language and concepts in something of a pot-purri. That accords with his background.


E.g., Juris Doctorate from Willamette University (1995); Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College (2006); also a Deputy District Attorney in Portland, Oregon (2001).

Without doubt, his is a brave attempt to create a needed interface between communities that use different terms (for the same or similar things), all derived from different cultures.

And soon, I responded directly in posts ## 48 & 49, Hi, Bob's World - Governance & Ideology (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=59906&postcount=48) & Formal & Informal Governance (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=59927&postcount=49):


Ending up with Ideology, you and I would have some differences as to what is the "American Ideology" - even in (or perhaps because of) the stripped-down version you present. However, there is little point to two lawyers yammering on about Con Law and the Foundations of our Republic.

To me, there is a more basic issue which goes to the heart of the question - should we be marketing "American Ideology" at all (assuming arguendo that we could agree on what that is); and, if so, to what extent and to what purpose ?

If our focus is on the population of a foreign land, it seems more logical to me to learn the ideologies which are native to that land - and market the indigenous ideology that is most likely to aid us in reaching our endgoal (assuming that we know what that is). E.g., in a given country, communism might be the best answer, simply because the other ideologies are not going to be helpful (even if some of them are closer to "American Ideology").

Note that I have no objection to presenting the "American Ideology" (assuming arguendo as above) to explain where we are coming from - to inform others. Perhaps that is what you are saying; but you seemed to be propounding a broader agitprop agenda than that.

At least both of us have had some consistency in our respective positions.

I'd say both Slap & you should be "blamed" for making the last several years more interesting. :)

Regards

Mike

Bob's World
02-04-2011, 07:24 PM
There are a few aspects of ideology that trigger a "cringe" factor in me:

1. When the US does not act consistently with the principles we hold out to the world in our three principle founding documents (Dec of Ind, Const, & Bill of Rights).

2. When the US publicly calls out foreign leaders for not standing for the same current values that the US gives those principles (A value being a principle with a judgment applied to it) in cultures that are in a very different place in their background and development than we are; and where leaders to not respond well to public condemnations of their character and abilities.

3. When "experts" blame insurgency and acts of terrorism as being "caused" by ideology or leaders who employ ideological operations.

All three of those factors weave directly into the events going on across the Middle East currently. The US has formed relationships that have gotten us at cross purposes with our own ideological principles; Our leaders go to these countries (or deliver from the comfort of the oval office) stump speeches that serve to embarrass these leaders and cause them to entrench even more, while at the same time making the US look ineffective at causing true change; and lastly exposed now is the firm bedrock of discontent across these nations that AQ, the Muslim Brotherhood and others have been building their influence upon. Take away that bedrock, and their ideological houses of cards will tumble.

Bob

tequila
02-04-2011, 10:08 PM
Nice graph from Bloomberg News, via the IMF. Though it certainly doesn't explain Tunisia:

Ken White
02-04-2011, 10:10 PM
From Bob's World.

With my standard quibble on the ideological aspect -- you discount that too readily. It is not pervasive, does not drive drive the bus. However it is an enabler; a fuel source. I note you're getting more cagey on that aspect, simply stating it is not generally causative. Generally, I agree... :wry:

I do particularly agree with your second item. I cringe whenever the press secretary of the day appears, whoever he or she is appears during these sorts of flaps. I firmly believe Senators should keep their noses out of foreign policy and most Representatives should be seen and seldom heard. :rolleyes:

Some compare current events to 1979. Not a good match. 1986 is a better correlation. ;)

jmm99
02-04-2011, 10:52 PM
1. High level - ideology & policy

2. Middle level - opportunism (advancement of self and included others)

3. Low level - basic interests (primarily different forms of personal and group security, and insecurity).

Unique to specific population group - general principles often lead down blind alleys.

Less and less people are involved as you climb the ladder. He who aspires to the highest level must kinow the lower levels well.

Nothing new - with respect to the political struggle and less conventional aspects of the military struggle, Mao (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/index.htm), Giap and the other PAVN folks (http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/EdMoise/commlead.html#giap) all point in this direction. So also, Jack McCuen (from 1966 (http://www.hailerpublishing.com/artofcwar.html)) and Tim Lomperis (from 1996 (http://www.amazon.com/Peoples-War-Rule-Insurgency-Intervention/dp/0807822736)) - the next key reference (a joint effort by Ken and JMM) will appear in 2026 (;)).

Regards

Mike

Bob's World
02-04-2011, 11:00 PM
February 1986 when 2LT Jones reported for duty with the 8th Infantry Division in West Germany? :confused:

omarali50
02-04-2011, 11:05 PM
I agree with those who say that cultures are different, but I am very enthusiastic about the current revolution nonetheless. I think that there are indeed chasms between the values of this or that set of people, but they are still people and tend to converge (sometimes in surprising ways) when similar inputs and constraints come into play. Egypt, for all the Islamic pretensions of 80% of its population, is actually not living life using some peculiarly Islamic economics, or Islamic politics or Islamic sociology (not to speak of nonsense like “Islamic science” and “Islamic technology”).
Their Islamic history and its good and bad elements have a role in all these things, but still, a man’s got to eat. With many detours and disasters along the way, they will still converge towards some similar notions of individual autonomy, personal property, democratic governance, rule of law…the whole shebang. They will enjoy even more of the same philosophers, the same novelists, the same poets, the same musicians, the same artists…I know some deep seated Marxism is leaking through my brain right now, but I think we are heading for one world, just more slowly and tortuously than most one-worlders realize (one world does not mean totally homogenous on all scales, just one interconnected whole with many similar features endlessly repeated…fractally weird, so to speak)..
I dont deny that vast gulfs still exist. Just that there IS convergence and an increasing interdependence and intermixing..one step at a time.
The future is already here, its just not evenly distributed (William Gibson)

To the extent that the US has any influence, it has done what it has done in Egypt because of Israel, period. Everything else pales into insignificance. If there were no Israeli occupation and no Israeli lobby pushing the US to support/bribe people on its behalf, I cannot see how or why the US would spend 3 billion a year on bribes to Mubarak.
And I think what the US does or does not do is not necessarily decisive. So the US should take a chill pill in most cases. Stop worrying. The world will go on more or less the same. Even Israel will probably survive without the herculean exertions the US does on its behalf. It will just have to adjust its aims a little and treat some people with a little more respect.
Oil? What will they do with all that oil? drink it? I have never figured out why the US has to spend billions to ensure access to oil that everyone else can apparently just buy in the market. Again, if its doing so as part of some planetary level law-enforcement function (worldcop), then the planet should be taxed for it and the planet should get to have a say in how the cop does his job. No taxation without representation. Otherwise, it seems to me that the cost of maintaining order exceeds the benefits the american taxpayer derives from any such exercise.

Pete
02-04-2011, 11:57 PM
Some compare current events to 1979. Not a good match. 1986 is a better correlation. ;)
What similar things happened during 1986 (http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005268.html)? Does it have anything to do with Kurt Waldheim's military service?

slapout9
02-05-2011, 12:15 AM
Since it is all my fault:D here is what I think is happening. In fact President Obama spoke briefly on this in his State of the Union Address when he said "Somebody changed the rules on you in the middle of the game":eek: That was a rather Cryptic but very accurate and telling statement.

Link to the 5 part series narrated by Orson Welles based on the book by Alvin Toffler.......Future Shock!


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Ghzomm15yE

Ken White
02-05-2011, 12:15 AM
February 1986 when 2LT Jones reported for duty with the 8th Infantry Division in West Germany? :confused:However, that was not quite what I had in mind. That would be this: LINK (http://articles.philly.com/1986-02-05/news/26086827_1_salvador-laurel-marcos-people-kbl).

There will be those who say no comparison. True to an extent, each nation and each situation will differ. However there's more commonality with that event and today than with the Iranian fiasco. The most noticeable difference is then there was early warning that was heeded (I know you don't like the Intel folks but they get a lot right... :wry:) and that was followed by 'distancing,' in turn followed by prompt decisive action at the peak of protests instead of dithering.

We dither a lot nowadays... :o.

jmm99
02-05-2011, 01:02 AM
I can't argue with this:


from O
Oil? What will they do with all that oil? drink it? I have never figured out why the US has to spend billions to ensure access to oil that everyone else can apparently just buy in the market. Again, if its doing so as part of some planetary level law-enforcement function (worldcop), then the planet should be taxed for it and the planet should get to have a say in how the cop does his job. No taxation without representation. Otherwise, it seems to me that the cost of maintaining order exceeds the benefits the american taxpayer derives from any such exercise.

since I would be arguing against myself.

Cheers

Mike

Cliff
02-05-2011, 01:30 AM
Nice graph from Bloomberg News, via the IMF. Though it certainly doesn't explain Tunisia:

Tequila-

Great find! I think that Egypt (much more than Tunisia) is driven by economics almost as much as politics.

V/R,

Cliff

Cole
02-05-2011, 02:33 AM
Tequila-

Great find! I think that Egypt (much more than Tunisia) is driven by economics almost as much as politics.

V/R,

Cliff
I was puzzled by those graphs because they contrasted with other things I thought I heard. Was curious so while not an economist, went searching for understandable explanations and contrasting viewpoints. Got this Gallup poll.

http://www.gallup.com/poll/145883/Egyptians-Tunisians-Wellbeing-Plummets-Despite-GDP-Gains.aspx

The graphs show GDP climbing rather dramatically in the last few years, yet the "thriving" rating declined. The turning point appears to be around 2008...when the worldwide recession was at its worst. Do folks vacation in Egypt during a recession? Compare the thriving ratings a few years earlier at 29 which was more comparable to other Arab countries...those with oil. People still must buy oil in a recession.

So my theory is that rising oil prices helped other Arab economies while declining travel hurt Egypt more than the others due to its lack of oil and extensive reliance on tourism. In addition, Egypt grew from around 52 million folks in 1990 to 85 million today...that would tend to put a damper on your economy and ability to feed folks and get them jobs.

Admit that it was surprising to learn from one network that the Mubarak family may be worth $40 billion plus due to fingers in many government contracts. That's kind of alarming in a nation with a $500 billion GDP.

Cole
02-05-2011, 02:53 AM
The problem is that there are only a very few such people compared to the numbers of those that do not own shops, or can only dream about working in the tourism industry.

Even more so, believing in anything like "spontaneous pro-Mubarak demos"...borders on believing in miracles - or simply denying reality. Ordinary, "everyday" people don't have printed placards, or stocks of flags, sticks, rocks, and even less so lenghty convoys of buses ready to take them to Cairo - where most of them then did not know their way around (!) - and even less so are they ready to voluntarily charge a crowd on horseback or riding a camel; As you probably know, tourists ride horses/camels at nearby Giza where the Pyramids are. I did. My wife has a horse. I don't ride it because anytime I tried, I went plop...plus it hurts other areas. An untrained thug would not ride like that.



ordinary people staging "spontaneous" demonstrations do not challenge their opponents for a violent confrontation, grab one or two and then beat them, shot them and then drop their bodies in some alley...they do not loot and then burn down one of largest shopping mals (happened 3 days back in Alexandria), and I also do not know of ordinary people who shot at the others with a sniper rifle from the roof of the nearby building.Yeah, saw some pretty big boys being treated for injuries. When folks are concerned about losing their jobs as interior ministry and other police, that does not automatically mean that Mubarak's orders are behind it.



If this is not enough, ordinary people involved in protest of whatever kind also do not launch decisive attacks on offices of two major human-rights associations, beat and then take away around a dozen of people in "some civilian bus", escorted by the Central Security Forces car...- and this while explaining to the crowd around them that these are Iranian-paid, Hezbollah agents.Allegations. Can you prove there were not Hezbollah agents or Muslim brotherhood instigators? I read that many folks with closely cropped beards (supposedly characteristic of that group) were up front throwing rocks.


Nobody does that unless he's paid and ordered to do it and promised to be backed up and protected later. Not sure $20 bucks is much motivation to get beat up...unless your job is at risk and you are broke because the banks are closed, and you feel like kicking troublemaker booty anyway. Just can't picture guys paying tens of thousands of thugs and nobody saw it.


And at that point this all turns into a SOP for a dictator clinging to power - against all odds, and regardless the cost.Or a series of overzealous officials screwed up trying to please the boss (or hang onto their job) and now find themselves under house arrest.

Dayuhan
02-05-2011, 03:00 AM
However, that was not quite what I had in mind. That would be this: LINK (http://articles.philly.com/1986-02-05/news/26086827_1_salvador-laurel-marcos-people-kbl).

There will be those who say no comparison. True to an extent, each nation and each situation will differ. However there's more commonality with that event and today than with the Iranian fiasco. The most noticeable difference is then there was early warning that was heeded (I know you don't like the Intel folks but they get a lot right... :wry:) and that was followed by 'distancing,' in turn followed by prompt decisive action at the peak of protests instead of dithering.

There are a fair number of common factors. One that gets insufficient attention is that both leaders were aging and rapidly losing their grip, and that in both cases the plans for succession were shaky and involved family members widely seen as inadequate. We tend to focus on the reasons for growing discontent within a populace, without realizing that these events are often driven less by discontent rising to a tipping point than by the leader's control declining to a tipping point. Peaceful rebellions succeed so often because they don't usually happen until it's clear that the leader no longer has control. Of course in the Philippines the leader's incapacity was evident far before the tipping point was reached, allowing more preparation.

At the risk of diverting the thread, though... the US role in resolving the events in Manila in '86 is substantially overstated. There was a great deal of dithering, and the US action was not decisive, nor was it at the peak of protest: by the time the US acted the matter had already been resolved on the streets. This is not entirely a criticism of the US - it's not always a bad idea to see who's going to win before committing to a side - but it would be inaccurate to refer to the US action as "decisive". It did avoid a very unpleasant end for both the rebellion and the Marcos family, but it did not affect the outcome one way or the other.

Having been right in the middle of that particular affair from beginning to end, I'm often struck by the extent to which the official records (there are a number of varying ones about, mainly arranged to serve the interests of their sponsors) get it wrong, despite the heavy media coverage. Not that I ever fully trusted the official record of anything, but it did place the deficiencies in stark relief.

Ken White
02-05-2011, 04:14 AM
...without realizing that these events are often driven less by discontent rising to a tipping point than by the leader's control declining to a tipping point.True -- and Bob's World will agree wholeheartedly... ;)
Of course in the Philippines the leader's incapacity was evident far before the tipping point was reached, allowing more preparation.Also true and a contributor to the rather rapid DC decision to provide air transport at no cost. Therein lay the decisiveness of which I spake; albeit not clearly...:o
the US role in resolving the events in Manila in '86 is substantially overstated.Not to my knowledge, really and I did not mean to imply that it was significant or game changing though I did through careless wording. Can't even claim laziness there, just sloppily careless.
There was a great deal of dithering, and the US action was not decisive, nor was it at the peak of protest: by the time the US acted the matter had already been resolved on the streets.All true however, the amount of dithering for about two years culminated in a rapid two days of meetings in the basement of the WH. That's what I meant by 'decisive' -- unusually rapid decision by the US to aid and abet what had indeed already been decided when the HKPP refused to fire on the protesters IIRC.
This is not entirely a criticism of the US - it's not always a bad idea to see who's going to win before committing to a side - but it would be inaccurate to refer to the US action as "decisive". It did avoid a very unpleasant end for both the rebellion and the Marcos family, but it did not affect the outcome one way or the other.Again true -- but still a 'decisive' action by the then Administration who were noted ditherers. Witness Lebanon.

I have long ( going on 31 years...) contended that Carter's abysmal handling of the Tehran Embassy seizure, Reagan's foolish foray into Lebanon and the mishandling of that whole episode, Bush 41s failure to topple Saddam in 91 and Clinton's tail wagging (that's a celebrity buzz - pop culture reference not a veiled innuendo) led to the attacks in the US in 2001 (and others worldwide before that time). So I'm not a Reagan fan. However, while he didn't topple Marcos, he did take surprisingly and unusually (for the US outside a war) decisive action when many were urging him to not take the action he did -- that was my poorly stated point.
Not that I ever fully trusted the official record of anything...That's always a wise course... :wry:

tequila
02-05-2011, 04:16 AM
A very interesting analysis that I originally read on AJE's website:

Why Mubarak is out (http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/516/why-mubarak-is-out) - Paul Amar

Quite a lengthy article but well worth the read for its analysis of the various social groups in competition both on the pro-Mubarak wing and the protesters in the square. Gets a bit idealistic towards the end, but the social analysis is quite interesting.

Dayuhan
02-05-2011, 05:31 AM
I have long ( going on 31 years...) contended that Carter's abysmal handling of the Tehran Embassy seizure, Reagan's foolish foray into Lebanon and the mishandling of that whole episode, Bush 41s failure to topple Saddam in 91 and Clinton's tail wagging (that's a celebrity buzz - pop culture reference not a veiled innuendo) led to the attacks in the US in 2001 (and others worldwide before that time). So I'm not a Reagan fan. However, while he didn't topple Marcos, he did take surprisingly and unusually (for the US outside a war) decisive action when many were urging him to not take the action he did -- that was my poorly stated point.That's always a wise course... :wry:

Going way OT... I'm not convinced that anything the US did was a decisive factor leading to the attacks in 2001. I suspect that the ultimate push coming to shove there was AQ's need for a foreign intervention in Muslim land to justify - and indeed to continue - its own existence.

My impression was that Reagan was pretty much the last holdout on the Marcos issue. Of course I watched it from this side rather than that, so there may be things I didn't see. I do know, though, that from the time of the disastrous (for Marcos) snap election and the blatantly obvious cheat, both State and CIA were desperately urging Washington to back away from Marcos, and I know for sure that the embassy people here were absolutely livid (not for the first or last time) over some of the pro-Marcos comments coming out of Washington. Seemed from here that by the time Reagan came 'round almost everyone else had already figured out that it was done.

One of the big differences between Manila '86 and Egypt '11, IMO, is that Manila '86 was triggered by local events, while events in Tunisia seem to have provided the spark for Cairo. Manila was the culmination of a chain of local events that allowed foreign observers to be better prepared and local players to be a bit better organized than they might have been in a more spontaneous outburst. The response to a failed election left a rival candidate and political apparatus in the picture, however tenuously, and created a possibility for rapid transition that is less evident in Egypt. In that sense, the Cairo spark may have been slightly premature.

It's often forgotten, of course, that the showdown in Manila was sparked not by Cory Aquino's supporters but by an opportunistic attempt at a military coup, which had it succeeded would not have led to a democratic transition.


That's what I meant by 'decisive' -- unusually rapid decision by the US to aid and abet what had indeed already been decided when the HKPP refused to fire on the protesters IIRC.

Again straying OT, but it's not entirely off (at least in my imagination) to look at key balance points in analogous situations...

It's often said that the tipping point in Manila was the refusal of the Philippine Marine contingent to fire on protesters at the EDSA/Ortigas junction on the afternoon of day 2. That was a dicey moment, and if they'd put a hundred PSG thugs in front of the Marines it would have been very different: there weren't more than 20 or 30 of us on the spot when it came right down to it... but it wasn't the tipping point, in my view. (And if anyone wonders, the story that "the nuns stopped the tanks" is a load of bollocks. There was not a nun in sight.)

I've also heard it said that the defection of most of the air force's helicopter assets early the next morning was the critical point, but again I disagree. It was a huge relief to those on the street who saw their arrival on the scene as a pretty major "this is gonna suck" moment, but it wasn't the tipping point.

The key, to me: a few hours after the helicopters landed in the opposition camp it was broadcast over radio and TV that Marcos had left the country. Often forgotten fact: up to that point, the crowds on the street weren't really all that big. Once the news of departure came out, within an hour the crowd multiplied exponentially. Pretty much all of Manila hit the street. The funny thing was... it wasn't true. I don't think it was an accident, either: it was inspired disinformation. By the time everyone realized that it wasn't true there were a million or so people on the street, and they just stayed. It was too obvious by that time that there was no way back for Marcos. That to me was the tipping point. Most of that crowd would never have committed if they thought Marcos was still there... but once they were out the outcome was just too obvious for anyone not to see it. There might be a lesson there somewhere about the utility of the barefaced lie at just the right moment.

I still wonder whose idea that was; never been able to find out.

jmm99
02-05-2011, 06:22 AM
Although the author won't bet on a specific outcome, here are the three scenarios posited in Three Possible Scenarios for Egypt (http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/three_possible_scenarios_for_egypt), February 3, 2011 · By Islam Qasem (Institute for Policy Studies - which has a "progressive" slant (http://www.ips-dc.org/about/history)):


Hosni Mubarak is on his way out, but when and how remain open questions.
....
Scenario one: Mubarak and his lieutenants will try to ride out the unrest. They hope to wear out the crowds using the carrot-and-stick approach. They will promise to address political reforms, improve employment conditions, and allow freedom of speech. At the same time, they will display a show of power with the military scattered throughout the country and fighter jets sweeping low over the crowds. Come September, an election will be held in which Suleiman will do whatever it takes to get to the top. Suleiman and the rest of the military establishment believe that time is on their side as they take every necessary step to avoid a second uprising. Mubarak will step down as a great president who has served his country in an honorable way for 30 years. Meanwhile, the promises made of political reforms are unlikely to be kept. In sum, the status quo will be restored under the leadership of Suleiman.

Scenario two: Mubarak steps down, but the regime does not. If the crowds remain on the streets, Mubarak will be forced to leave office to give the regime a chance of survival. The average Egyptian abhors Mubarak more than anything else. He has come to exemplify all of Egypt’s current failings. By dumping Mubarak, the military regime will not only attempt to avoid clashes with the people but also to win their support. At this moment, the most important thing for the military regime is to keep the reins of power in its own hands. Under this scenario, there will be no radical changes in Egypt’s domestic or foreign policy. Egypt will remain on the same path as in the first scenario.

Scenario three: Mubarak and the regime step down. What the people demand is a complete transformation of the political landscape: the resignation of the military regime that has dominated Egypt’s politics since the Free Officers’ revolution in 1952. A successful regime change in Egypt will have a domino effect throughout the entire region, ushering in a radically different Middle East. At home, the Egyptian society will have to endure a hard period of transition, during which lessons will have to be learned in political compromise, pragmatism, and consensus. At the same time, Islamists of all strips and colors will be emboldened. On the foreign policy front, no other country will feel the pain more than Israel. After all, Egypt and Israel fought four wars. Although a peace treaty was signed between the two countries, Egyptian society has never really legitimized it, and the late president Anwar Sadat paid for it with his own life. The second loser will be the United States. After decades of supporting Mubarak and pursuing narrow-minded policies in the region, U.S. popularity is at rock-bottom.

Logically, the third scenario should have variants; but I'm too ignorant of Egyptian political groups to suggest specifics. The Muslim Brotherhood gathered about 20% of the vote when it was allowed to present candidates; but that leaves a large slice for others.

Anyone with reasonable knowledge of Egyptian political groups ?

Regards

Mike

CrowBat
02-05-2011, 06:32 AM
Allegations. Can you prove there were not Hezbollah agents or Muslim brotherhood instigators?Actually yes. It took me a while, but I even found an online report of the same event on the website of The Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2011/feb/03/egypt-protests-live-updates):

Specifically:

8.03pm GMT: Ahdaf Soueif emails from Cairo:

A good friend just saw 8 to 12 people being dragged out of No 1 Souq el-Tawfikiyyah St and bundled into a civilian micro-bus while a military police vehicle waited nearby. The people were being beaten and the street had been told they were "Iranian and Hamas agents come to destabilise Egypt" so the street was chanting against them.

No 1 Souq el-Tawfikiyyah St is the home of the offices of The Hisham Mubarak Legal Aid Centre, The Centre for Social and Economic Rights and The 6th April Youth.

The Hisham Mubarak centre is a partner of Oxfam International, which has put out a statement:

The offices of two Egyptian human rights organisations in Cairo supported by Oxfam in Cairo have been attacked today and several staff members arrested by the Military Police.

The offices of Hisham Mubarak Law Center and the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights were raided at 14:30 and eight people were arrested including both directors, Ahmed Seif, director of the Hisham Mubarak Law Center and Khaled Ali, director of the Center for Economic and Social Rights.

They have been taken to an unknown location in Cairo.

Catherine Essoyan, Oxfam Regional Manager for the Middle East and Maghreb:

"We are extremely worried about the fate of these human rights defenders who have been providing critical legal aid and support to their people over the past days of protest. We deplore this assault against Egyptian civil society organisations dedicated to promoting respect for the rule of law. We call for the safe and immediate release of those detained."

********


I read that many folks with closely cropped beards (supposedly characteristic of that group) were up front throwing rocks.Frankly speaking: are there Islamist extremists on the streets of Egypt, participating in the protests? Yes, no doubt, there are.

Do they or other Islamist extremists work behind the scenes, seeking a way to take advantage of this crisis? Yes, no doubt, they do.

This is as indisputable as that the sun is going up in (what we call) the East, and down in the West.

But... how many of them are out there, how influential they really are, what are they able of really doing, what are they eventually going to do, and - first and foremost - are they going to prove capable of taking over entire Egypt once this brawl is over...?

Well, sorry, but the matter of fact is: nobody can say for sure. Means: we don't know.

The reason we don't know is that there is a brutal dictatorship in Egypt, controlling the media and feeding us "news" at its own discretion. Between these news is the idea that the Brotherhood is ah so powerful, that without this dictatorship in place we all - but Israel as first - are in jeopardy of being blown away. And, this stance of that dictatorship is supported by all the possible talkingheads between Tel Aviv and Washington DC.

So, we have a guess, but don't really know whether this is going to happen.

As a "convinced and practicing pluralist", I simply can't find this satisfactory. That's why my standpoint is: when you're in doubt and have no clue what to do, stick to the two most basic rules. The Rule No.1. says: personal freedoms, pluralism and democracy first. And the Rule No.2 says: if in doubt, see rule No.1.


Not sure $20 bucks is much motivation to get beat up...unless your job is at risk and you are broke because the banks are closed, and you feel like kicking troublemaker booty anyway. Just can't picture guys paying tens of thousands of thugs and nobody saw it.Again: there is no trace of evidence for "spontaneous" pro-Mubarak demonstrations.

That aside, well, the Ministry of Interior pays some 390.000 of thugs of the Central Security Force alone (the black-clad Father Mubarak's "Basiji" we've seen in the first days of the unrest), plus another 60.000 of the National Guard (responsible for the protection of the royal palace, between others) - and thus there is plenty of choice. That aside, in a country where average monthly income ranges between US$ 100 and 150, 20 bucks is "plenty of money" (oh, and I do recall several inmates on deathrow in various US prisons, sitting there for murdering people for less than 20 bucks).


Or a series of overzealous officials screwed up trying to please the boss (or hang onto their job) and now find themselves under house arrest.I doubt this. Available indications point at the fact that all that is currently undertaken by Mubarak is nothing else but his regime launching it's efforts to do "yesterday" (to paraphraze Robin Gibbs) what it planned to do in period September-November this year any way.

The current flow of Mubarak's (re)actions actually follows much of what's been anticipated already since years. The only difference is that it became easier to expose his lies. When Mubarak fired the old government and appointed Soleiman as VP, he did not do something that was "new", or "unexpected", and even less so did he do that in reaction to the protests. He did something that has been expected since years. See Egypt's Next Strongman (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/17/egypts_next_strongman) as example.

When, in the interview with Amanpour/ABC, aired yesterday, he stated he's "fed up" with politics and power, he was lying: back in 1981, immediately after climbing to power, Mubarak explained he's going to run for only one term (sorry, no citate here; there was no internet in 1981). So, another lie.

Finally, if this report - Mubarak's Last Gasps (http://www.counterpunch.com/amin02042011.html) - is to be trusted, there are no "overzealous officers", but the Mubarak's clique (including his new Minister of Interior, Gen Waqdy) acts at least in agreement with him, if not on his own orders.

jmm99
02-05-2011, 07:11 AM
Here are three more "trinitarian scenarios" - all suggesting somewhat different outcomes (on which, no one is placing bets).

Washington Post - ANALYSIS, Three possible scenarios for Egypt's future (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/03/AR2011020307156.html), By Glenn Kessler, Friday, February 4, 2011


As the Egyptian political crisis grows more violent and uncertain, analysts have begun to turn to historical parallels for answers. Will an Islamist movement or a new strongman - or both - emerge to seize control, in an eerie repeat of the 1979 Iranian revolution? Or will Egypt's secular tradition and powerful military allow for a messy transition to democracy, as happened in Indonesia in 1998? Or will it be something in between, such as the initial outcome of the Romanian revolution of 1989? ... (more in the article)

Huffington Post - Egypt: Possible Scenarios (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amir-madani/egypt-possible-scenarios_b_817321.html), Amir Madani, Author, Le Letture Persiane, Posted: February 2, 2011:


....
There are three sets of players in the Egyptian scene right now...

The first players are the members of the ruling elite, supported by security forces and an army which, still as this article is written, has Mubarak's face as its symbol. There may be other faces symbolizing power in the future, but these too will be military ones. The military is Egypt's most powerful institution and one embedded deeply in all aspects of life. It will do its best to retain its purpose and power. In order to make sure that his regime stays in power, Mubarak resorted to a coup in which he appointed Omar Suleiman, his right-hand man and the country's intelligence chief, as vice-president.
....
The second player in this scenario are the Egyptian people: millions of men, women, youth, workers, intellectuals, writers, journalists, and ordinary citizens who demand rights and freedom and aware of the dangers of sectarianism. The best-known opposition figure is Dr. ElBaradei, a moderate diplomat who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005 for his working in leading the United Nations' nuclear watchdog. A headline recently read: "El Baradei asks Obama: Take Egypt's Mubarak off life support." Other prominent figures like the jurist Ayman Nour and Osama al-Ghazali Harb have also struggled to build popular followings. But there could emerge other figures from the wider civil society and from the ranks of Kefayah (Enough) as well.
....
The Islamists are the third set of players. Egyptian Islamism (like all social phenomena) is complex and divided. It encompasses a myriad of trends, ranging from enlightened moderates to extremists who exploit the concept of jihad (originally based on catharsis) and promise a land of desolation. The Muslim Brotherhood could be expected to win a large part of the vote in any fair election as it is rooted in Islamic society and has gained a certain popularity for the work of its charities.
....
Here are some possible scenarios for how the situation could play out among these groups.

One scenario that could play out is a clash between the ruling elite (with or without Mubarak) and the elements of civil society. In this scenario, the ruling elite will promise formal security and stability by fighting the fundamentalists, and will continue to receive aid from the US, the support of Israel. It would be shock therapy, a treatment resolution that promises future explosions.

The second scenario is the emergence of a power vacuum that could lead to some form of civil war and a Lebanization of Egypt; a sort of chaos in which armed fundamentalist groups might thrive and the army would need to take over the running of the state, but without the necessary forces to defeat them. This scenario, which is the wishful thinking of the enemies of Egypt, would certainly be prevented by the Egyptians themselves. As Amr Shalakany wrote from in Tahrir Square in Cairo: "This is a sweet, sweet revolution; it is peaceful. Tell everyone we are peaceful." And the government has offered talks with protesters after the army said it will not fire on them.

A third scenario is that the army, as the key institution, indicates to Mubarak that he must resign as he is a cause of instability. In this case, the army takes charge of the country's security. In such a scenario, chaos and violence are avoided, and Mr. Mubarak could leave gradually. This would allow the necessary time to exclude President Mubarak and his closet associates, but also to let the surviving parts of the ruling system exist as warrant to prevent fundamentalist groups from flourishing. This is probably what Washington means by an "orderly transition." In this scenario, Mohamed ElBaradei (or another figure) could emerge as a compromise to oversee the transition and a free and fair election for the presidency and parliament. This could only happen if only the Egyptians decide to follow through along this path. ... (again, more in the article)

BBC News - Egypt unrest: Possible scenarios (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12326297), By Tarik Kafala, BBC News, 31 January 2011:


For Egyptians, and the millions of Arabs watching closely across the Middle East, these are hugely exciting times. But for all the hope for change, there are also enormous dangers. These are three broad scenarios that could result from the events in Egypt.

CUT AND RUN: MUBARAK GIVES UP PRESIDENCY
.... (explanation and analysis)
....
STICK TO HIS GUNS: MILITARY AND POLICE CRUSH PROTESTS
.... (explanation and analysis)
....
TRANSITION: PROMISE TO LEAVE, OPPOSITION JOINS GOVERNMENT
.... (explanation and analysis)
....

Regards

Mike

Fuchs
02-05-2011, 11:31 AM
The current opposition tactic seems to be to
a) keep the protests going, the pressure up
b) do behind-the-scenes homework: building an opposition interim leadership

Meanwhile, Mubarak seems to
a) try to sit this out
b) discredit the opposition movement,
c) discourage it and to
d) mobilize supporters


The answer to the obvious question why the opposition doesn't storm Mubarak's palace seems to be strong and loyal defences there.

The police seems to have proven ineffective.
The intelligence service has already failed in preventing demonstrations and is now likely employed in infiltrating and discrediting them.
The army seems to be neutral, yet still willing to intervene for order and less bloodshed.


I do not recall a revolution that looked similar to this one.

Bob's World
02-05-2011, 11:44 AM
This is surely more complex than any of us will ever know.

With so much at stake, why would Israel or even the Saudis sit on their hands and watch?

When I read about Operation Ajax in 1953 Iran the thing that amazed me most was how such a Keystone Cops operation could actually work to topple a government. The key was that the British had been there a long time and had a well developed UW network in place, which they then convinced the US to lead the operation and loaned us their network. (They still work us like that far more than most Americans would like to admit, btw). The US employed that British network to incite the riots that supported the events that put the Shah into power. Just as insurgents leverage the populace in insurgency, so to do state and non-state actors in unconventional warfare.

Does Israel or Saudi Arabia or Great Britain or the US, etc, etc, etc have such networks in place in Egypt?? I don't know. I do know they have a confluence of long term access and national interests, so I recognize that it is likely such networks exist. Are any of these nations either employing their own network to shape events, or loaning their network to others to employ?? Again, we may never know.

Bottom line is that these things are complicated, and where interests are high, external forces will always come and work to shape things to their own advantage. Enemies become friends, and friends become enemies, it is all about shared and conflicting interests and leveraging what one can to gain an advantage. Egypt has to deal with all of this in addition to their own factions at work.

Things are rarely what they appear to be. There are those with anti-Iran agendas that are pointing fingers at Iran. There are those from the "ideology/terrorism" community who point fingers at the Muslim Brotherhood. There are those who are pro-Israel who rail about the implications to Israeli security.

The voice getting lost is that for transitioning as peacefully as possible to a more stable Egypt under a government of their own determination, with a legitimacy recognized by their own populace, and that participates rationally within the global community.

Cole
02-05-2011, 12:25 PM
This is surely more complex than any of us will ever know.

With so much at stake, why would Israel or even the Saudis sit on their hands and watch? Or Iran, or Hezbollah, or China/Russia, or Hamas.

Word of Omar Suleiman's (new V.P.) attempted assassination several days ago may cast some light on timing of the pro-government crackdown. The sabotage of a natural gas pipeline leading from Egypt to Israel is another example.


The voice getting lost is that for transitioning as peacefully as possible to a more stable Egypt under a government of their own determination, with a legitimacy recognized by their own populace, and that participates rationally within the global community.

It's easy to claim we own the high ground and to bad mouth perceived despots for exploiting unseemly advantages in their own world. Then you look at appointment of former GE CEOs to the government who have supported one political side, and then see new initiatives for light bulbs, look at unions getting health care exemptions, and attempts to legitimize illegal immigration to gain votes...we start to not look a lot different than Mubarak and his cronies.

Where we DO stand out is the example of the U.S. military in the past twenty years in showing reasonable use of force. Would Egypt's Army have shown this kind of restraint in earlier days? Doubtful.

So when folks say we should use a heavier hand in places like Afghanistan, just think of the example that would set to other militaries of the world. We should thank our lucky stars that pop-centric COIN in Afghanistan, democratization of Iraq, and suppression of genocide in the Balkans is leading by example in ways far more constructive than talking the talk on how democracy makes all the difference.

Bob's World
02-05-2011, 01:39 PM
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1357781


For the US, the story of 1953 Iran is an important one to understand when looking at Egypt today.

slapout9
02-05-2011, 01:51 PM
Link to world trends and predictions for 2011. This was posted before the situation in Egypt, take a close look at trends 1,4,and 9. I am not that familiar with Gerald Celente but looks like he is off to a pretty good start.



http://www.lewrockwell.com/celente/celente59.1.html

Ken White
02-05-2011, 04:35 PM
Going way OT... I'm not convinced that anything the US did was a decisive factor leading to the attacks in 2001.Not sure it's OT. 'Decisiveness' is an issue in this thread. The US government is, by design, not decisive. That lack of decisiveness arguably led to halfhearted measures -- easier to attain or perform -- in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME. That lack of decisive action led to knowledge (not a perception but true knowledge) that the US could not and would not respond well and thus could be slowly nibbled at and the resultant irrtiation and attrition would cause overstretch at a minimum and self flagellating destruction at best.
I suspect that the ultimate push coming to shove there was AQ's need for a foreign intervention in Muslim land to justify - and indeed to continue - its own existence.If by ultimate push you mean the aircraft flights, perhaps. However one should recall that the provocations started internationally with the attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972, accelerated over the next few years and first involved the US with the seizure of the Embassy in Tehran -- Osama was a 22 year old playboy at the time. Subsequent attacks and provocation were from the Muslim Brotherhood, a precursor to Hezbollah and various other, non AQ elements.

It's a great deal bigger than AQ who are nothing much to lose sleep over. Hezbollah is more worrying and the broader outlook even more so.
My impression was that Reagan was pretty much the last holdout on the Marcos issue... Seemed from here that by the time Reagan came 'round almost everyone else had already figured out that it was done.That is my impression also. Thus my comment that the decision was surprising and unusual.
It's often said that the tipping point in Manila was the refusal of the Philippine Marine contingent to fire on protesters at the EDSA/Ortigas junction on the afternoon of day 2. That was a dicey moment, and if they'd put a hundred PSG thugs in front of the Marines it would have been very different: there weren't more than 20 or 30 of us on the spot when it came right down to it... but it wasn't the tipping point, in my view. (And if anyone wonders, the story that "the nuns stopped the tanks" is a load of bollocks. There was not a nun in sight.)I bow to the guy who was on the ground...;)
I still wonder whose idea that was; never been able to find out.He or she may not even realize that idea was a spark. Or they may have known precisely what it would do. Some thing can remain unknown unknowns... :D

Meanwhile, in Egypt today:

The apparent indecisiveness in Washington is a feature not a bug. It has penalties, always has -- but the benefits make those shortfalls bearable IMO. Decisive action akin to Truman and Korea, Reagan and an airplane or either Bush and Iraq are the exception rather than the rule. I personally would not opt to change that for a more decisive form of government. We muddle along but get more right than wrong...

Likely will do so in North Africa -- and the ME; it'll just take a while.

Fuchs
02-05-2011, 06:15 PM
... in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME. That lack of decisive action led to knowledge (not a perception but true knowledge) that the US could not and would not respond well and thus could be slowly nibbled at and the resultant irrtiation and attrition would cause overstretch at a minimum and self flagellating destruction at best.

Ah, the old hawk song, where only shouts and fists supposedly work well on certain people. It's apparently a matter of attitude whether people believe this song or not.



I don't get your "30 years", though.

I can easily identify 33 years of provocations of Arabs by the U.S. (taking the first delivery of F-4 Phantom II in 1968 as marking).

30 years of provocations of the U.S. from the region seems otherwise a bit stretched, for I don't recall an earlier significant incident than 1979 embassy crisis. That was Iran (Persians, not Arabs!), though.
2001 - 30 = 1971. What exactly did Arabs do to the U.S. around that time?


Why exactly do you believe that the U.S. was not strong enough in its responses? I recall it bombed Libya in the 1980's quite strongly.


In short: I don't call this 'They are the aggressors and we powerful and patient people didn't push them back, but appeased them.' view.

CrowBat
02-05-2011, 06:18 PM
This is surely more complex than any of us will ever know.

With so much at stake, why would Israel or even the Saudis sit on their hands and watch?Why not the USA themselves?

For example, see the following cable released by WikiLeaks to The Telegraph and published on 28 January 2011: Egypt protests: America's secret backing for rebel leaders behind uprising (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289686/Egypt-protests-Americas-secret-backing-for-rebel-leaders-behind-uprising.html)

Here's the text of the cable: Link (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289698/Egypt-protests-secret-US-document-discloses-support-for-protesters.html)

Did something like "Operation Ajax II" back-fire this time?


I can easily identify 33 years of provocations of Arabs by the U.S. (taking the first delivery of F-4 Phantom II in 1968 as marking).I would start with saving al-Sauds from starvation with help of a shipload of silver Dollars, back in 1942...

Pete
02-05-2011, 06:54 PM
The slang word "boondocks" meaning jungle or out in the country comes from a Philippine Tagalog dialect word for mountain. It apparently entered the American vocabulary when we were civilizing with Krag rifles.

Bob's World
02-05-2011, 07:35 PM
Why not the USA themselves?

For example, see the following cable released by WikiLeaks to The Telegraph and published on 28 January 2011: Egypt protests: America's secret backing for rebel leaders behind uprising (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289686/Egypt-protests-Americas-secret-backing-for-rebel-leaders-behind-uprising.html)

Here's the text of the cable: Link (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289698/Egypt-protests-secret-US-document-discloses-support-for-protesters.html)

Did something like "Operation Ajax II" back-fire this time?

I would start with saving al-Sauds from starvation with help of a shipload of silver Dollars, back in 1942...

Always possible. Would explain some of the finger pointing at Iran coming from the line up of SMEs enlisted by the media.

Ken White
02-05-2011, 09:08 PM
Ah, the old hawk song, where only shouts and fists supposedly work well on certain people. It's apparently a matter of attitude whether people believe this song or not.Speaking of attitude...:rolleyes:

One could suggest that the songs you believe are at least equally flawed -- if not more so... ;)

But I digress. Lemme give you a hawkish comment. If you allow people to bulldoze you or shout you down, then they will. You, Fuchs, personally typify the antithesis of that because you do not allow that to occur. Nor should you. Nor should a nation tolerate continued -- note that word, continued -- provocations from a single source. Not a single party, a single source which may involve multiple parties. The Middle East was and is such a source and it does provide multiple parties with various grudges and strategies -- it is not monolithic.

We did tolerate such provocations from a single source, partly trying to be nice and partly assuming that as the provenance of theses acts varied there were different actors, multiple sources, involved. Wrong deduction, same crowd, different players.
I don't get your "30 years", though.Not surprising, it's hard to see through bias blinders. :D
I can easily identify 33 years of provocations of Arabs by the U.S. (taking the first delivery of F-4 Phantom II in 1968 as marking).You weren't paying attention -- you weren't even born, in fact. Crowbat is closer but even he's about eight years late (Google ArAmCo and look around). Franklin D. Roosevelt started diddling around in the ME in 1942, met Ibn Saud in the Great Bitter Lake in 1945...
30 years of provocations of the U.S. from the region seems otherwise a bit stretched, for I don't recall an earlier significant incident than 1979 embassy crisis. That was Iran (Persians, not Arabs!), though.Allow me to repeat what I wrote:

"in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME."

Note the ME, for Middle East, which includes Iran. The Iraniha , some of them at any rate, were upset with us for moving in to their country, uninvited and supporting the old Shah in 1943. The fact that the main intent was to force the then present USSR to back off and leave Iran often gets lost in all the ill informed left wing rhetorical flourishes. That long predates Bob's World's Operation Ajax in 1953 which placed that Shah's son on the throne. Regardless of motivation -- and erroneous assumptions, the Persians led the ME -- again, as they had for centuries. They broke the ice, so to speak in attacking the Great Satan -a and getting away with it. The Arabs then piled on -- ME way of warfare...:wry:

If you doubt that, you should spend some time there and get out on the street and talk to people. Not Academics, the elites -- the people.
2001 - 30 = 1971. What exactly did Arabs do to the U.S. around that time?Just plotted. As a result of the Munich attack, Nixon directed a study (LINK) (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3596) which got rolling (at the Deputy level, really) and produced a report which was remarkably prescient. So we've been interested since the early 70s (LINK) (http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr-08-02/thirtyyears.html), over 30 years -- and so was the opposition...
Why exactly do you believe that the U.S. was not strong enough in its responses? I recall it bombed Libya in the 1980's quite strongly.Not at all strongly; better than nothing perhaps -- maybe not. Sometimes minor efforts like that do more harm than good and make one look rather ineffectual. All of our ME responses were like that, ineffectual -- until Iraq (and that wasn't as good as it should have been because DoD and the US Armed Forces did not do a good job)

The US is always more concerned with domestic politics than it is with the broader world. Nixon's effort produce some good results which were ignored. Carter totally mishandled the hostage crisis by actually sending the Ayatollah Ruhollah K. a letter saying he would not use force. Khomeini had been about to direct the Students (note that world, ponder Taliban and look at Tunisia and Egypt today...) at the Embassy to release the hostages but upon receipt of Carter's letter, told then to continue the march. Reagan Failed utterly in first sending troops to Lebanon in 1983, second in allowing State to tie their hands and thirdly in doing little to nothing about the Embassy and troop billet bombings and latterly by withdrawing -- that merely encouraged everyone to believe the US had no staying power. In his defense, he learned from that and thus the Libyan attack in 1986, though it was really not much of an effort. Follow him with Bush 41 failing to topple Saddam -- some moderately good reasons not to but in the ME a very different message was received. Then Somalia and Clinton's feeble effort, all of which failed to impress anyone.
In short: I don't call this 'They are the aggressors and we powerful and patient people didn't push them back, but appeased them.' view.We can differ on that.

All of which is off thread. So if you want to continue this, let's do it by PM.

Fuchs
02-05-2011, 09:23 PM
I took your "ME" as "Arabs" because it makes no sense to discuss 9/11 and Iran together.

The Munich assassinations were about Arabs and Israel, not about the U.S. - this cannot seriously be counted as ME-born provocation against the U.S..

You still did not explain which Arab/ME actions of around '71 pointed the beginning of provocations against the U.S..
This is central to your earlier idea that the U.S. did not respond appropriately to provocations for three decades. No provocations = no lacking response.

Even worse, the whole idea that the U.S. was too soft/dovish towards ME powers/extremists/whatever seems to be clearly unhistorical to me.

------

About Egypt: Foreign agents may play a great role, but considering the possibility that a dictator might use rumours about this for his political survival, I'm for skipping unproven theories and for not adding rumours to the mix.

Most if not all intelligence services are apparently (see 20th century history) rather ineffective at inciting popular revolts anyway. They have much "better" track records with sponsoring extremists or military coups.

Ken White
02-05-2011, 10:35 PM
I took your "ME" as "Arabs" because it makes no sense to discuss 9/11 and Iran together.If one does not realize the linkage and pervasive influence of the Persian Empires (plural) throughout the area on mores and attitudes, I can understand that. OTOH, if one is aware of that, the linkage is obvious. As I said, the Persians have been out in front of the Arabs for centuries...:wry:

They had as much if not more influence on the ME and eastern North Africa than did Islam and far more than did the Ottomans.
The Munich assassinations were about Arabs and Israel, not about the U.S. - this cannot seriously be counted as ME-born provocation against the U.S.In order; Of course they were, True - I didn't say it was.

However, it was the first big transnational terrorist attack against the West and emanating from the ME. It was a harbinger of things to come and it was extremely important because the west got a wakeup call and except for the formation of GSG 9, mostly ignored it...

That is true of the US, Nixon wisely said let's take a look, we did, saw what was going to happen -- and did nothing. Mostly because of domestic politics (It seems de rigueur in the US for a new Administration to disavow ANYTHING the previous Admin did...). We sat on our hands and let a problem develop when we could have taken diplomatic and economic steps to forestall or defuse the problem. Contrary to what you seem to believe, every comment that inadequate action was taken does not entail attack or a military response -- those are usually, IMO, ill advised. However, I do believe that if they are necessary, as they occasionally are, they should be effective. I'd even go a step further and say that if such measures are employed, necessary or not, they should be effective and not just futile swats. Those can result in doing more harm than good (witness most of the past 30 years...[from today]).
You still did not explain which Arab/ME actions of around '71 pointed the beginning of provocations against the U.S.Sorry, thought it would be obvious. Apparently not. This is 2011, just barely. Thirty years ago would make it 1981 and Reagan would have been recently inaugurated and the Hostages released. I should have been more precise and instead of saying 30 years (meaning a not stated 'from today' and as a rough or approximate figure) should have written "since 4 November 1979..."
This is central to your earlier idea that the U.S. did not respond appropriately to provocations for three decades. No provocations = no lacking response.Try recomputing with that 1979 start date, see if that works, don't forget to count the Embassy bombings (all of them), attacks on the World Trade Center (all of them), the Barracks bombings (all of them), the aircraft hijackings and bombings (all of them) and I think you'll come up with a fair total over the first 22 of that 30 plus years. Not quite one major attack a year but not far off, either. ;)

Throw in the ship attacks plus Viet Nam and Somalia -- which you may not deem important in this context but of which many in the ME and Asia are well aware and often cite, not least including Bin Laden and Zawahiri, the Egyptian and Abu Yahya al-Libi -- the Libyan AQ strategist. ;).

As an aside, you seem to accord the 2001 attacks far more importance than I do. While extracting a higher body count and having great symbolic effect, it was just another attack IMO, just one more (or three or four more, depending upon how one counts) atop all the others over the [from 2001] previous 22 years (and that's a figure I've used often on this board...).
Even worse, the whole idea that the U.S. was too soft/dovish towards ME powers/extremists/whatever seems to be clearly unhistorical to me.If one paid attention -- and few outside the US had or have any reason to do so -- one might come to a different conclusion. I did, do and have...
Most if not all intelligence services are apparently (see 20th century history) rather ineffective at inciting popular revolts anyway. They have much "better" track records with sponsoring extremists or military coups.True. So we can agree on that. ;)

Also on Egypt -- that first comment of mine above -- "linkage and pervasive influence of the Persian Empires (plural) throughout the area on mores and attitudes" -- applies to Egypt as well...

Fuchs
02-05-2011, 11:40 PM
Come on, if you argue with the Persian empire, I can argue with the Roman Empire, Alexander's successor states (Greek), the Byzantine (effectively Greek again) Empire and - this blows a 2,300 y.o. empire to pieces - the Ottoman Empire, which controlled the region for centuries well into the 20th century (Turks).

You overstate the influence of Persians/Iran in the Arab world badly.
They're a different crowd and the actions of some people in Tehran in '79 had as much to do with later AQ-style terrorism as did the attack on the Embassy in Saigon.


Moreover, you're moving goalposts. You CANNOT have meant 1979 with your 30 years statement without having written nonsense.


(...)That lack of decisiveness arguably led to halfhearted measures -- easier to attain or perform -- in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME;(...)

You were clearly writing about 30 years with only halfhearted measures. This could impossibly include the last nine years. It would at most have been 22 years (79-01) of half-hearted measures, not 30.

Furthermore, the bombardment of Libya in 1986 with 60 dead cannot seriously be considered half-hearted. A full war would have been disproportionate and unnecessary.


I still don't buy this revisionist view that the U.S. was overly passive and Arabs/ME/Muslims/whatever were the provoking party.
At most, the history of the post-WW2 relationship between the U.S. and the Arab world could be called troublesome and full of minor offenses/skirmishing from both sides (with the biggest offenses being the invasion of Iraq, decades of support for Israel and 9/11 - in this order).

jmm99
02-05-2011, 11:46 PM
Foreign Affairs Coverage of the Crisis in Egypt and the Middle East (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/collections/foreign-affairs-coverage-of-the-crisis-in-egypt-and-the-middle-e) - Summary: A collection of continuing Foreign Affairs coverage of the crisis in Egypt and the Middle East (most recent posted this week):


The Muslim Brotherhood After Mubarak: What the Brotherhood Is and How it Will Shape the Future (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67348/carrie-rosefsky-wickham/the-muslim-brotherhood-after-mubarak)
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham
February 3, 2011
Portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as eager and able to seize power and impose its version of sharia on an unwilling citizenry is a caricature that exaggerates certain features of the Brotherhood and underestimates the extent to which the group has changed over time.

The U.S.-Egyptian Breakup: Washington's Options in Cairo (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67347/steven-a-cook/the-us-egyptian-breakup)
Steven A. Cook
February 2, 2011
With the political era of Hosni Mubarak coming to an end, is the strategic relationship between Cairo and Washington similarly finished? The Obama administration must scale back its ambitions to affect change in Cairo.

Israel's Neighborhood Watch: Egypt's Upheaval Means that Palestine Must Wait (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67344/yossi-klein-halevi/israels-neighborhood-watch)
Yossi Klein Halevi
February 1, 2011
With Hezbollah calling the shots in Lebanon and Islamists poised to gain power in Egypt, Israel sees itself as almost completely encircled by Iranian allies or proxies. Where does this leave the future of a sovereign Palestine state?

Letter From Cairo: The People's Military in Egypt? (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-cairo)
Eric Trager
January 30, 2011
As protests continue in Egypt, both sides -- the protesters in the streets and the Mubarak regime -- are wondering exactly which side the Egyptian military is supporting. Does the army hold the key to the country's political endgame?

The Psychology of Food Riots: When Do Price Spikes Lead to Unrest? (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67338/evan-fraser-and-andrew-rimas/the-psychology-of-food-riots)
Evan Fraser and Andrew Rimas
January 30, 2011
The connection among rising prices, hunger, and violent civic unrest seems intuitively logical. But there was more to Tunisia's food protests than the logic of the pocketbook. The psychological element -- a sense of injustice that arises between seeing food prices rise and pouring a Molotov cocktail -- is more important.

Letter From Beirut: Crime and Punishment in the Levant: Lebanon’s False Choice Between Stability and Justice (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-beirut-crime-and-punishment-in-the-levant)
Michael Young
January 26, 2011
In bringing down its government last week, did Lebanon just witness a coup d’etat or did it narrowly dodge civil war? Either way, Damascus, Tehran, and Washington are all watching.

Morning in Tunisia: The Frustrations of the Arab World Boil Over (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67321/michele-penner-angrist/morning-in-tunisia)
Michele Penner Angrist
January 16, 2011
Last week's mass protests in Tunisia were less a symptom of economic malaise than of a society fed up with its broken dictatorship. Should the other autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa be afraid?

Is El Baradei Egypt's Hero? Mohamed El Baradei and the Chance for Reform (broken link)
Steven A. Cook
March 26, 2010
The return of Mohamed El Baradei to Egypt has raised questions about the country's political system and the rule of President Hosni Mubarak. Is reform possible, and if so, is El Baradei the man to lead it?

Back to the Bazaar (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57621/martin-indyk/back-to-the-bazaar)
Martin Indyk
January/February 2002
The United States has an opportunity to set new terms for its alliances in the Middle East. The bargain struck with Egypt and Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War seemed successful for a decade, but now the United States is facing the consequences: Washington backed Cairo's and Riyadh's authoritarian regimes, and they begat al Qaeda. The Bush administration should heed the lesson.

Cheers

Mike

Pete
02-05-2011, 11:49 PM
The Iranian Embassy hostage siege in London in May 1980 happened shortly after the seizure of U.S. embassy personnel in Tehran in 1979.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/london/content/images/2006/07/17/iranian_embassy_siege_240x320.jpg

Ken White
02-06-2011, 12:58 AM
Come on, if you argue with the Persian empire, I can argue with the Roman Empire, Alexander's successor states (Greek), the Byzantine (effectively Greek again) Empire and - this blows a 2,300 y.o. empire to pieces - the Ottoman Empire, which controlled the region for centuries well into the 20th century (Turks).All those had an effect, I just think the Persians had more and a more enduring effect. The length of time since the Persian Empires -- there was more than the one shown on that map -- made the total effect more pervasive; they were around far longer than any of the others you cite. (LINK) (http://www.crystalinks.com/persia.html).
You overstate the influence of Persians/Iran in the Arab world badly.
My having lived there and seen Ta'arof at work in most of the ME nations and Afghanistan says you're far from correct. ;)
Moreover, you're moving goalposts. You CANNOT have meant 1979 with your 30 years statement without having written nonsense.I beg your pardon?

Go back and read the thread. Note these:

My Post 105: "Some compare current events to 1979. Not a good match. 1986 is a better correlation."

My Post 117: "I have long ( going on 31 years...) contended that Carter's abysmal handling of the Tehran Embassy seizure, Reagan's foolish foray into Lebanon and the mishandling of that whole episode, Bush 41s failure to topple Saddam in 91 and Clinton's tail wagging (that's a celebrity buzz - pop culture reference not a veiled innuendo) led to the attacks in the US in 2001 (and others worldwide before that time)..."

My Post 128: "That lack of decisiveness arguably led to halfhearted measures -- easier to attain or perform -- in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME."

That last is the one to which you responded.
You were clearly writing about 30 years with only halfhearted measures. This could impossibly include the last nine years. It would at most have been 22 years (79-01) of half-hearted measures, not 30.That is correct and is pretty much what I wrote in My Post 135 just above. So what are we arguing about? More correctly, what are you arguing about? :D

As for the last nine years, whether there have been provocations or attempted attacks from the ME or not is not fully known, certainly there have been no big or very successful such. That's really academic -- it's the thought that counts...
Furthermore, the bombardment of Libya in 1986 with 60 dead cannot seriously be considered half-hearted.You may not consider it half hearted, I certainly do. I've been in units that lost more people killed in less time. :rolleyes:
A full war would have been disproportionate and unnecessary.Agreed, IMO the bombing operation was not necessary but Reagan didn't ask me... :(
I still don't buy this revisionist view that the U.S. was overly passive and Arabs/ME/Muslims/whatever were the provoking party.Not a problem, I'm not selling.

You can call it revisionist but its a view I've held for almost all that 30 years, certainly for the last 27 years, since the second Beirut Embassy bombing. As I said, I've been paying attention, you had no need to do so.
At most, the history of the post-WW2 relationship between the U.S. and the Arab world could be called troublesome and full of minor offenses/skirmishing from both sides...I agree and nothing I've said implies otherwise.
... (with the biggest offenses being the invasion of Iraq, decades of support for Israel and 9/11 - in this order).I do not agree with either of those but I can understand that you and many in the world would think that. Both IMO have a basis in fact but both are biased -- as is my view, just in a different direction. Iraq was an over reaction to rectify the false impression given by 22 years of placatory response, premature departure, inaction and halfway measures. It worked fairly well even though the execution was flawed.

The real truth is probably somewhere between your view and mine. In any event, this is way off the thread to which I once again suggest we return and take this off thread discussion into PMs if you have more to say. I really do not. We should be able to differ without boring others...

Dayuhan
02-06-2011, 03:02 AM
Foreign Affairs Coverage of the Crisis in Egypt and the Middle East (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/collections/foreign-affairs-coverage-of-the-crisis-in-egypt-and-the-middle-e) - Summary: A collection of continuing Foreign Affairs coverage of the crisis in Egypt and the Middle East (most recent posted this week):

Interesting reading. The contrast between the piece on the Muslim Brotherhood and the rather hysterical "Israel's neighborhood Watch" piece is particularly interesting. Overall the chorus of panic and recrimination emanating from Israel is getting pretty deafening, example here...

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/31/us-egypt-israel-usa-idUSTRE70U53720110131


Israel shocked by Obama's "betrayal" of Mubarak

If Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak is toppled, Israel will lose one of its very few friends in a hostile neighborhood and President Barack Obama will bear a large share of the blame, Israeli pundits said on Monday.

Political commentators expressed shock at how the United States as well as its major European allies appeared to be ready to dump a staunch strategic ally of three decades, simply to conform to the current ideology of political correctness...

...To win popular Arab opinion, Obama was risking America's status as a superpower and reliable ally.

"Throughout Asia, Africa and South America, leaders are now looking at what is going on between Washington and Cairo. Everyone grasps the message: "America's word is worthless ... America has lost it."

One has to wonder what exactly they want the US to do to preserve the hollow shell of Mubarak's rule. There seems to be a general reluctance to admit that Mubarak is probably going down no matter what the US does. Rats may leave sinking ships, but who in his right mind stays on a sinking ship?

Seems to me an excellent opportunity for the US to demonstrate that we do not necessarily hold our interests to be identical to those of Israel.



For the US, the story of 1953 Iran is an important one to understand when looking at Egypt today.

It may be even more important to understand that story when looking at Egypt tomorrow, or in the near future, as a new Egyptian government emerges. There will doubtless be all manner of panic over presumed Islamist influence, and all manner of calls for the CIA to do the dirty and bring back a tidy reliable dictatorship. This temptation will, I think, be best avoided.

The message the US needs to deliver, IMO, lies not in what we do to resolve Egypt's current crisis but in how we deal with what emerges after. Time for us to show, not say, that we are able and willing to deal with a government that puts Egypt's interests ahead of ours. Certainly there will be friction, but the way we choose to manage that friction will speak volumes, and have a lasting impact.

Dayuhan
02-06-2011, 03:38 AM
The slang word "boondocks" meaning jungle or out in the country comes from a Philippine Tagalog dialect word for mountain. It apparently entered the American vocabulary when we were civilizing with Krag rifles.

Yes, "boondocks" comes from the Tagalog (it's a language, not a dialect) bundok, meaning mountain or highlands.

A portion and a half of greasy adobo to whoever knows the other Tagalog word adopted into English during the "civilize 'em with a Krag" days... (there's only one other that I know of, and if someone has a third I'm seriously impressed).

Cole
02-06-2011, 04:29 AM
Yes, "boondocks" comes from the Tagalog (it's a language, not a dialect) bundok, meaning mountain or highlands.

A portion and a half of greasy adobo to whoever knows the other Tagalog word adopted into English during the "civilize 'em with a Krag" days... (there's only one other that I know of, and if someone has a third I'm seriously impressed).My bet is bolo. Google was my friend.

Also liked the more modern slang terms CIA (certified Imelda admirer) and "forgets" for old person. I resemble that latter term...but at least at nearly 56 I can still chest press and fly 255 a dozen times and elliptical for half an hour at resistance level 13.

I know, you're not impressed. You just go out and climb a boondocks:rolleyes:

My 47 year old bro did that recently climbing Mt Whitney (14.505') with his wife!

Cole
02-06-2011, 04:42 AM
One has to wonder what exactly they want the US to do to preserve the hollow shell of Mubarak's rule. There seems to be a general reluctance to admit that Mubarak is probably going down no matter what the US does. Rats may leave sinking ships, but who in his right mind stays on a sinking ship?


Seems to me an excellent opportunity for the US to demonstrate that we do not necessarily hold our interests to be identical to those of Israel.Ever hear the old joke about two men coming upon a Grizzly bear and the one says, "Run," and takes off to which the other says "you can't outrun a bear." The first replies, "That maybe true but I only gotta out run you." In this case Iran is the bear. Wouldn't you prefer both the U.S. and Israel to have a better hunting rifle and Israel to be the first target of the bear?:(

Second analogy: If your ship is sinking in water that will cause hypothermia and death in 10 minutes and a rescue ship (election) is 15 minutes away and you have nothing resembling a life raft now, do you jump now?

And you certainly don't need someone from the rescue ship telling you over the radio to jump now...or your young sailors who have no clue what hypothermia (or running a country) involves.

Dayuhan
02-06-2011, 05:45 AM
Ever hear the old joke about two men coming upon a Grizzly bear and the one says, "Run," and takes off to which the other says "you can't outrun a bear." The first replies, "That maybe true but I only gotta out run you." In this case Iran is the bear. Wouldn't you prefer both the U.S. and Israel to have a better hunting rifle and Israel to be the first target of the bear?:(

Second analogy: If your ship is sinking in water that will cause hypothermia and death in 10 minutes and a rescue ship (election) is 15 minutes away and you have nothing resembling a life raft now, do you jump now?

And you certainly don't need someone from the rescue ship telling you over the radio to jump now...or your young sailors who have no clue what hypothermia (or running a country) involves.

I don't see a bear on the horizon, and our ship isn't sinking. Mubarak's is, but it doesn't have to be ours, in fact it had better not be ours, because it's already below the surface and I don't see it coming back up. Our wise rats need to hop off his ship and back onto ours, where they belong. The elections may be coming and they may be a rescue, but the choice of waiting or not ain't ours to make. Let the crowd toss Mubarak, let a caretaker handle the intervening time, the rescue arrives anyway. Last thing we want to do is be seen trying to keep him in power.

First necessary realization: Mubarak is done. The US couldn't resurrect him if we tried, and trying would just be hitching ourselves to a fallen star. There's no debate over whether to try to keep Mubarak in power; we cannot reanimate a corpse. The only reasonable debate is over whether and to what extent we can or should try to influence the transition.

Second necessary realization: a post-Mubarak Egypt does not have to be an Islamist nightmare or an Iranian clone. Of course the Israelis, and a few others, will wave that threat at us in an effort to persuade us to try to shape the new Egypt to their liking, but that would be an effort well worth resisting. I think the Islamists will miss Mubarak more than we do, and that we'll discover that the notion of Mubarak as the last bulwark against Egyptian Islamic radicalism is as completely invalid as the notion of Marcos as the last bulwark against Philippine Communism was.

Mubarak is history, and history is a one way street. We need to deal with it and deal with what comes after. It will be complicated, but it always is. He wasn't ever gonna last forever.

And on the aside...


My bet is bolo. Google was my friend.

Never really though "bolo" got adopted into English. The word is "cooties", from the Tagalog "kuto", for head lice.


Also liked the more modern slang terms CIA (certified Imelda admirer) and "forgets" for old person.

Did anyone ever admire Imelda, other than Fabian Ver? A joke from the old days...

The Marcos family were in their jet flying back from the US. They flew over a barangay, and little Irene looked down and saw the poor people, and ran to her father and said" "Tatay, I want to make a thousand Filipinos happy, can I have 100,000 pesos?". So Ferdinand pulled 100,000 out of his pocket, the plane flew over the barangay, they threw the money out and everyone was happy.

Then they flew over a poblacion, and little Imee looked down and saw the poor people, and ran to her father and said" "Tatay, I want to make ten thousand Filipinos happy, can I have a million pesos?". So Ferdinand pulled a million out of his suitcase, the plane flew over the poblacion, they threw the money out and everyone was happy.

Then they came to Manila, and little Bongbong looked down and saw the poor people, and ran to his father and said" "Tatay, I want to make 15 million Filipinos happy, can I have a billion pesos?"

Ferdinand thought about that for a moment and replied...

"Just fetch your mother."


I'm sure there are some great Mubarak jokes flying around Cairo right now; somebody should collect them.

And yeah, I mostly just run around the bundoks. We use what we've got, and I'm in the middle of them...

CrowBat
02-06-2011, 07:19 AM
Crowbat is closer but even he's about eight years late (Google ArAmCo and look around). Franklin D. Roosevelt started diddling around in the ME in 1942, met Ibn Saud in the Great Bitter Lake in 1945...Allow me to repeat what I wrote:Aramco's original involvement in exploring oil in Saudi Arabia was "business" (and not particularly successful at first); nothing special as such. It turned a "provocation" when the US upheld al-Sauds on the throne and practically turned the country into a military protectorate, in the 1940s and 1950s.

So, I must admit, I'm as confused at this analogy as Fuchs appears to be.


"in response to 30 years of provocations from the ME; not from Muslims -- though most were that -- from the ME."

Note the ME, for Middle East, which includes Iran. The Iraniha , some of them at any rate, were upset with us for moving in to their country, uninvited and supporting the old Shah in 1943.They couldn't get more upset over what the USA were doing in 1943 than they already were over what the British and the Soviets did in 1941. Then, note that the Shah's son - Reza Pahlavi II - was placed on the throne instead of his father by the British, and already in 1941-1942: what the Americans did in 1953 was "just" to return the same Shah Reza Pahlavi II to the power - and this with help of the same clergy that later stole the revolution of 1978. As such, that was also no "ME provocation", but an US intervention and a provocation. The "payback" bill was delivered in 1978-1979...


Regardless of motivation -- and erroneous assumptions, the Persians led the ME -- again, as they had for centuries. They broke the ice, so to speak in attacking the Great Satan -a and getting away with it. The Arabs then piled on -- ME way of warfare...:wry:I'm sorry, but you're really mixing two entirely different things here. If the "Persians" lead the way, then certainly not with their example of "attacking the Great Satan". Then, their biggest "attack" on the USA before 1979 was the Shah's drive to increas oil prices, in the early 1970s.

Quite on the contrary. What created the modern-day antagonism against the USA was a) Johson admin's decision to abandon the policy of neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict, after the 1967 War, and b) the Israeli victory during that War. This brought the al-Sauds and Wahhabists to the idea that a religiously motivated fighter can win wars, and from that moment onwards they began promoting and financing Islamist extremism all around the world. It's easy to follow this development on the basis of activity of various resistance/terrorist groups, (Palestinian as well as others): originally, they had nothing to do with religion at all (on the contrary, many were centrists or even leftists), nor were active against the USA. This began to change after the 1967 War.

And now watch the US reaction to this development: Al-Sauds became the "best friends", and their financing of the development of a major terrorist base in Pakistan was supported as well - with argumentation of the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Zia ul-Haq, who was instrumental in turning Pakistan into the Islamist quagmire as we know it today (with extensive Saudi financing), became Reagan's favourite and Pakistan was left to make its own nuke...


As a result of the Munich attack, Nixon directed...I'm sorry to interrupt here, but Nixon did not wait for the Munich attack: Kissinger began his tenure with ignoring Sadat's peace-proposal from 1970. That aside, the US intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict was already going on since at least 1969 (see deliveries of F-4s, which started in 1969 and prompted the Soviet intervention in Egypt, in 1970). It was continued through 1970 (see Kissinger's development of the politics of "ignoring" the Israeli nuclear weapons, and his ignoring of Sadat's peace proposal) and later on, all well ahead of Munich.

One could draw similar parallels - once more related to Egypt - to Reagan's reaction to Sadat's assassination, in October 1981. That was the moment Egypt (plus Sudan at the time) was granted US$1 billion + in military aid for the first time, and the USA launched a host of military and intelligence operations against Libya (does "Early Call" ring any bells here?), which eventually lead to knocking out of that country, in the 1990s. Simultaneously, through all of this time, absolutely nothing has been undertaken to decrease the spread of Wahhabism by the Saudis.


The US is always more concerned with domestic politics than it is with the broader world. Nixon's effort produce some good results which were ignored. Carter totally mishandled the hostage crisis by actually sending the Ayatollah Ruhollah K. a letter saying he would not use force. Khomeini had been about to direct the Students (note that world, ponder Taliban and look at Tunisia and Egypt today...) at the Embassy to release the hostages but upon receipt of Carter's letter, told then to continue the march.Sorry, but this sounds very much like a misinterpretation to me. Khomeini was surprised by the take-over himself, at first, though he certainly did not wait for any letters from Carter before, only two days later, sending his own thugs to take over from the students. So, he did not escalate the situation because of Carter's (undisputable) "weakness", but for his own reasons.


Reagan Failed utterly in first sending troops to Lebanon in 1983, second in allowing State to tie their hands and thirdly in doing little to nothing about the Embassy and troop billet bombings and latterly by withdrawing -- that merely encouraged everyone to believe the US had no staying power.I never heard any Arab or Islamist complaining about this. I do recall, though, bitter complaints about the defeat of the "Arab issue" by the Israelis in Lebanon, and the Libyan deafeat (at the hand of a CIA-supported "liberation movement") in Tchad, in 1982. That's why I still find this analogy....well, without foundation.


All of which is off thread. So if you want to continue this, let's do it by PM.Some of this is crucial for this thread. Particularly Reagan's "installation" of Mubarak and opening of the US military aid program for Egypt: without these two actions, who knows what would Egypt look alike nowadays...?

CrowBat
02-06-2011, 08:10 AM
Continuing my attempt to understand Ken's flow of thoughts....


Try recomputing with that 1979 start date, see if that works, don't forget to count the Embassy bombings (all of them), attacks on the World Trade Center (all of them), the Barracks bombings (all of them), the aircraft hijackings and bombings (all of them) and I think you'll come up with a fair total over the first 22 of that 30 plus years. Not quite one major attack a year but not far off, either.

Throw in the ship attacks plus Viet Nam and Somalia -- which you may not deem important in this context but of which many in the ME and Asia are well aware and often cite, not least including Bin Laden and Zawahiri, the Egyptian and Abu Yahya al-Libi -- the Libyan AQ strategist.

<snip>

....its a view I've held for almost all that 30 years, certainly for the last 27 years, since the second Beirut Embassy bombing. As I said, I've been paying attention, you had no need to do so.I think I understand your standpoint now, but have a strong feeling you're throwing quite a lot of unrelated events on the same pile, while ignoring the US involvement in many of them. At least you blame wrong people for attacks on the USA. I also don't agree with the premise of the US - generally - acting "lamely", or being provoked.

If you like, consider me a "Devil's advocate". I don't mind, since it happens often and I got used to that. My point is: as much as I can understand your standpoint, so I can understand the standpoint of those you say "provoke" the USA.

For example: the Iranians see themselves as provoked by the USA, time and again, and again, and again. Op Ajax in 1953 and installation of the Shah was just the start, some of them "insist" on it, others don't even care about these events, but some much newer ones. See; Israeli invasion of Lebanon which (as they see it) and the resulting oppression of the Shi'a in the south of that country - couldn't have been undertaken without US support; assassination of their charge d'affairs in Lebanon by (what they see as) an US ally (Lebanese Christians), and which was a signal for the onset of an "undeclared war" against the IRI; US support for Iraq that brutally invaded them and actually enabled Khomeini to firmly entrench himself in power in Tehran - but also led to the development of the IRGC as the major military, political and economic power in the IRI -; wholehearted support of Wahhabism on at least two sides of the IRI (in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) since the 1980s (I'll not involved various "Stans" to this consideration now); US treachery after Iranians supported them so much in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, and then in Iraq, in 2003; clandestine US operations to steer troubles between ethnic minorities etc. As you can see, their list appears even longer than the one you could offer as argumentation that the Persians are "provoking" the Great Satan...

Now, you are relating various terrorist attacks against the USA with the IRI, and see these are a result of "soft" actions of various US admins. But, why don't you "connect the dots"? Who are the crucial theoreticians of the AQ, and who were not only the 19 idiots from 9/11, but also those who bombed embassies in places like Nairobi? Who are the MBs the Israelis are so in panic about? Persians - or Egyptians and Saudis?

In what way are - for example - Islamists from Egypt that turned so extreme they are not accepted even by their own "brothers" (from the Brotherhood), related to the Persians?

Sorry, not the least.

Furthermore, if you continue connecting these dots...and to bring us back to the actual topic of this thread: don't you find it at least "curious" that the people that run the AQ and became involved in actions against the US, emerged after Mubarak came to power, and since the USA began delivering extensive military aid to Egypt? Prior to that the MBs did not care the least about Washington. If you study them more closely, you find out that their motivation has nothing to do with the Iranian Shi'a, but with the Saudi Wahhabists. They turned against the USA after the US troops "violated the holy soil" of Saudi Arabia, in 1990. They were trained by the ISI in Pakistan in projects financed 50:50 by the USA and the Saudis, and ignored by the US while spreading their ideas from Marocco and Nigeria, via India to the Philippines.

You also mentioned Somalia: as of 1981-1983, Somalia was a recipient of the US military aid, as a counter to the "reactionary and pro-Soviet government" in another former US ally - Ethiopia: I strongly doubt anybody in the DC ever came to the idea to study how comes Mengistu "turned" Marxist-Leninist (literaly) over the night. At the same, the US at least ignored provision of military aid provided by various Arab regimes to the Islamists in Eritrea...only to, 20 years later, find itself having to support Ethiopia against Islamists in Eritrea and in Somalia... Now, do you think Ethiopia or Somalia ever "provoked" the USA, or any US admin to have been "soft" to them too?

Dayuhan
02-06-2011, 09:47 AM
Shortly after writing this:


a post-Mubarak Egypt does not have to be an Islamist nightmare or an Iranian clone. Of course the Israelis, and a few others, will wave that threat at us in an effort to persuade us to try to shape the new Egypt to their liking, but that would be an effort well worth resisting.


I browse around and note Sarah Palin saying this:


...information needs to be gathered and understood as to who it will be that fills now the void in the government. Is it going to be the Muslim Brotherhood? We should not stand for that...

Somebody really ought to remind her, and perhaps a few other people, that the US does not have veto power over who rules Egypt.

slapout9
02-06-2011, 01:46 PM
Keyfaya is Arab for enough! this is a link to the RAND corporation study on the usage of social media and youth groups to cause regime change. Still reading the paper but there are some very strong parallels as to what is happening in Egypt......coincendence?????:eek:


http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG778.pdf

Bob's World
02-06-2011, 02:21 PM
Americans will always have more in common with Persians than with Arabs, thus the irony of where we find ourselves today where Iran is cast in the role of "enemy" and so many Arab governments are cast in the role of "friend."

As CrowBat points out, we are attacked by the populaces of our allies, not the populaces of our enemies. That alone is metric enough to point out how out of balance the current state of governmental relations have grown to become over the years. Arab and Persian populaces both yearn for greater liberty and self-determination; greater infusion of democratic principles into the governments they design for themselves; and greater respect from the West than they have been shown over the past couple hundred years. But Persians don't attack us becuase they don't blame us for their current government. That issue is resolved. This, however is an unresolved issue in many Arab states where the people do blame the US for the state of their governance, and do attack us. None of these states have the wherewithal to attack us, even if they formed an alliance and called it a "Caliphate." Weak states are not threats to strong states. Populaces of weak states, however, can launch us into 10 years of GWOT tail-chasing. The game has indeed changed, but we liked to old rules better so ignored that little fact.

Egypt is important. Culturally and physically, it sits at the fulcrum point between Mediterranean Arabs and Arabian Peninsula Arabs; between West and East. It is an ancient culture and a true nation; as is Iran. As Anwar Sadat once said the others are largely "tribes with flags." There was a certain balance in place, but it was an artificial one, with far too many fingers on either side of the scale.

Because Egypt is so important there are a wide range of stake holders who are working a wide range of angles to push for status quo or change as they see best suits their respective cause. Some speak directly to advocate their cause, most take indirect approaches. They leak "intel" to someone who they know can and will leap to get in front of a camera and scoop the story; or they play on the biases of people like Ms. Palin to get her to stir up her base (as is Glenn Beck, Rush, etc). Similarly there are agents on the ground working agendas as well.

The irony is that the people are the ones who started this, the people are the ones who hold the true power to decide this, but it is the people who are the last consideration of most who are working hardest to steer events one way or another. As the world continues to evolve, it will be in finding balance points that the people buy into that will be the most powerful and enduring.

Amb. Bolton has said one thing that I agree with, and that is that the US needs to stop sending powerful and mixed message out into the airwaves, and needs to exercise a cogent plan of diplomacy behind the scenes and across the region. There is great opportunity here, but great risk as well.

Ken White
02-06-2011, 06:12 PM
Aramco's original involvement in exploring oil in Saudi Arabia was "business" (and not particularly successful at first); nothing special as such. It turned a "provocation" when the US upheld al-Sauds on the throne and practically turned the country into a military protectorate, in the 1940s and 1950s.

So, I must admit, I'm as confused at this analogy as Fuchs appears to be.So let me add to the confusion. :D

ArAmCo was the nose of the Camel. No more, no less. A Camel that had FDR's full knowledge and support. Quite full. Devious old dude, he. Wanted to see British and French Colonies disappear the better for American companies to sell in those 'former' colonies and spheres of influence...

Re: The British and Soviets in Iran. True. Both those folks are soundly detested, the US is merely mildly disliked by most Iraniha. That is obviously a generalization but I believe it to be fairly accurate as such.

On Reza and Reza II the perception in Iran was, some years ago, that the US had lobbied for the old man and then been persuaded by the British to support the son and that the US did so. The 1953 coup was as you note supported by the same Clergy that did indeed steal the 1978 Revolution.

The Shah drove to increase oil prices in the 1969-71 period in an effort to convince the US to support his demand for more and better weapons which were being denied him by the then US Administration (my pet strory being the denial of sale of a dozen O-2s which the IIAF got around by ordering them from Reims Aviation...). It worked. The tale of how the Phantoms came to be sold is a cautionary tale in itself and I do not know all the details but do know US domestic politics were heavily involved and Kissinger just pushed the opportunity...

On the Johnson decision to increase support for Israel, you are of course correct and there is no question the results were much as you say and as the common knowledge hold. I did not address the US errors and shortfalls, errors and just plain stupid actions that in many cases led, quite understandably and correctly IMO, to the hostility toward us because, while germane to that hostility, I presumed they were all common knowledge and should be understood. They are of course important in context and in fairness but not important to my point of a pattern of US flawed responses. There have been many errors on both sides of this equation and they are not going to be easily forgiven. The good news is that the US attention span is so short, we'll get over it. For the ME, that is not likely to be the case -- and for the US, that should but may not be a cautionary.

Nixon waited for the Munich attack to get interested in international terrorism as a weapon. That was the point. The political maneuverings you cite were indeed provocative to the ME -- again, I did not mention US provocations that caused the, uh, rather intense dislike and resultant action that emanated from the ME. My point was that 30 years (from 2010-11 :D) of the not mentioned US provocations led to 30 years of ME provocations in an effort at retaliation (deserved, perhaps) and that the US failure to properly respond to those puts us pretty much where we are today. Let me emphasize that my idea of proper response was not and is not all military.

I think this:
Sorry, but this sounds very much like a misinterpretation to me. Khomeini was surprised by the take-over himself, at first, though he certainly did not wait for any letters from Carter before, only two days later, sending his own thugs to take over from the students. So, he did not escalate the situation because of Carter's (undisputable) "weakness", but for his own reasons.is not correct. Khomeini was indeed surprised (as to an extent were the Students themselves...) but he had very early notice from Brzezinski that no force would be used. Exactly what happened and his thinking, neither of us could know.

This is a valid complaint:
...but have a strong feeling you're throwing quite a lot of unrelated events on the same pile, while ignoring the US involvement in many of them. At least you blame wrong people for attacks on the USA. I also don't agree with the premise of the US - generally - acting "lamely", or being provoked.to a great extent, particularly in that the posts you've read on this thread do not address US stupidity in many areas (though I have mentioned them in other threads). They were omitted for brevity (heh...) not to deny or obfuscate.

The events are in fact unconnected -- but they are also a pattern. That pattern gets ignored by too many and can -- will -- lead to more US errors...

For example:
In what way are - for example - Islamists from Egypt that turned so extreme they are not accepted even by their own "brothers" (from the Brotherhood), related to the Persians?

Sorry, not the least.

Furthermore, if you continue connecting these dots...and to bring us back to the actual topic of this thread: don't you find it at least "curious" that the people that run the AQ and became involved in actions against the US, emerged after Mubarak came to power, and since the USA began delivering extensive military aid to Egypt? Prior to that the MBs did not care the least about Washington. If you study them more closely, you find out that their motivation has nothing to do with the Iranian Shi'a, but with the Saudi Wahhabists. They turned against the USA after the US troops "violated the holy soil" of Saudi Arabia, in 1990. They were trained by the ISI in Pakistan in projects financed 50:50 by the USA and the Saudis, and ignored by the US while spreading their ideas from Marocco and Nigeria, via India to the Philippines.I think you made my point...

A series of unrelated but flawed policies and perceptions on both sides; the ME as an entity and its multi varied polity and the US, equally multi varied; has put us where we are today. The US as the nominally more rich and seemingly powerful has an obligation IMO to be much smarter about what it does and how it does it -- but that does not remove the actions of varied actors from the ME over a period of years in a pattern that have led to yet more stupid actions.

The issue of this sub thread to me is that flawed US reactions to events trigger more events and thus the self replicating pattern becomes embedded. That cycle need to be broken.
You also mentioned Somalia: as of 1981-1983, Somalia was a recipient of the US military aid, as a counter... Now, do you think Ethiopia or Somalia ever "provoked" the USA, or any US admin to have been "soft" to them too?Not at all. What many in the world fail to realize is that the US government reinvents itself at 2, 4, 6 and /or 8 year intervals due to our political process. That is no excuse for blundering in policy and international relations but it is the reason for a good bit of it. Those elected on the cycles mentioned do not react to the international community -- they react to US domestic politics, period. Perhaps they should be more internationally aware (certainly many of us think so) and they are getting better due to enhanced communication (if only our news media were better -- but that's another thread) but US domestic politics drive much of our 'diplomacy.'

All the things you cite with respect to the horn of Africa are true -- but the point I was making was that Bush 41's effort to send US Troops to Somalis was flawed because we just sent targets (as did Regan in 1983...). That was exacerbated by Clinton's stupid directive to "get Aideed" and that in turn was not helped by the badly flawed tactics of JSOC and the Rangers; the upshot was that Clinton ordered a withdrawal and that withdrawal was seen by the would be desert raiders of much of the ME as a weakness. It was a weakness but it got misconstrued...

This sub thread is about misconstrueing :wry:

That said, Bob's World has some good points with which I agree also.

CrowBat
02-06-2011, 07:23 PM
....I browse around and note Sarah Palin saying this:
Somebody really ought to remind her, and perhaps a few other people, that the US does not have veto power over who rules Egypt.
Down to the bottom, brutal reality is that "Sarah Palin" has more to say about the future Egyptian president, than 79.999.996 Egyptians.

Bob,
Ken,
thanks for understanding my points (and that inspite of my usual Sunday-morning-sloppy-typing ;)).

One plea from me, if you don't mind: don't get my "prose" as an accusation or putting the blame on the US for "everything". I very well understand the machinery of the US politics, at home and abroad. The same with many of the countries we're talking about. So, that was a simple counting of historical facts, thinking about what you write, and trying to make you think about what I write. My experience is that I always "only" learn from such exchanges.

Few (this time relevant, I hope) observations for the time being:


Egypt is important. Culturally and physically, it sits at the fulcrum point between Mediterranean Arabs and Arabian Peninsula Arabs; between West and East. It is an ancient culture and a true nation; as is Iran...If one can trust recent reports from Cairo and Zagreb (Croatia), Egypt might become even more important, since the Croatian company INA might have found two huge gas fields somewhere between Marsa Matruh and el-Alamein (yes, "that" el-Alamein). Some three weeks ago the (meanwhile former) Egyptian energy minister went as far as to state that Egypt might become one of major gas producers world-wide. For what it's worth: Minister: Egypt can be one of main gas producers (http://english.ahram.org.eg/~/NewsContent/3/12/4467/Business/Economy/Minister-Egypt-can-be-one-of-main-gas-producers.aspx).


What many in the world fail to realize is that the US government reinvents itself at 2, 4, 6 and /or 8 year intervals due to our political process. That is no excuse...Trust me, it's even less of an "excuse" considering the fact that in regards of ME, all the administrations since Nixon - without any exceptions - are sticking to the policy developed and introduced by Kissinger: Israel is dictating the US foreign policy in the Middle East, irrespectivelly - often regardless - of the price the USA pay for that.

That's the essence - also that of what's currently going on in Egypt. Stay tunned, the "Super Bowl match" between the teams of "Egyptian Opposition" led by coaches Obama and Clinton on one side, vs. "Mubarak", led by coaches Netanyahu and AIPAC on the other, is going to be continued "right after this"....

Ken White
02-06-2011, 08:39 PM
That's the essence - also that of what's currently going on in Egypt. Stay tunned, the "Super Bowl match" between the teams of "Egyptian Opposition" led by coaches Obama and Clinton on one side, vs. "Mubarak", led by coaches Netanyahu and AIPAC on the other, is going to be continued "right after this"....Yet one can hope we'll get a bit smarter.

Or, more to the point, hope that one team is not playing US football with a poor defensive line while the other is aiming for the FIFA World Cup and has an erratic midfield winger or two... :wry:

Surferbeetle
02-06-2011, 10:06 PM
...crank up the Bambino Nel Tempo (http://www.lyricstime.com/eros-ramazzotti-bambino-nel-tempo-ingl-s-lyrics.html) song, and pass the Martini and Rossi :wry:

From Al Jazeera on 4 Feb 2011: Berlusconi: Mubarak is a wise man (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2011/02/201124194950335734.html)


"I hope that in Egypt there can be a transition toward a more democratic system without a break from president [Hosni] Mubarak, who in the West, above all in the United States, is considered the wisest of men and a precise reference point," he said.

"I hope there can be continuity in government," he told reporters on Friday.

From UPI on 28 July 2010: Italy's Eni expands role in Egypt (http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/07/28/Italys-Eni-expands-role-in-Egypt/UPI-44311280321822/)


CAIRO, July 28 (UPI) -- Italian energy company Eni announced Wednesday that it secured new deals in the Egyptian natural gas sector as it starts oil production in the Western Desert.

Eni announced that it started oil production in the Arcadia field in the Western Desert of Egypt just 45 days after it made its initial discovery.

The Italian energy company said it plans to drill four more wells in the area during the next year. The well is part of a plan to exploit deeper reserves locked in Egypt's Western desert and refocus oil strategies in the country.

Speaking of Rossi, he's finally coming back to Ducati's Moto GP Squad (http://www.motogp.com/en/news/2011/Rossi+speaks+at+Wrooom+2011)!!!!

Dayuhan
02-07-2011, 12:55 AM
Down to the bottom, brutal reality is that "Sarah Palin" has more to say about the future Egyptian president, than 79.999.996 Egyptians...

That's the essence - also that of what's currently going on in Egypt. Stay tunned, the "Super Bowl match" between the teams of "Egyptian Opposition" led by coaches Obama and Clinton on one side, vs. "Mubarak", led by coaches Netanyahu and AIPAC on the other, is going to be continued "right after this"....

I think you're substantially overstating the extent of US influence... and if the Israelis had influence of their own to use inside Egypt, they wouldn't be shrieking frantically and fruitlessly for the US to do their bidding. Times change.

I sometimes wonder who will miss the declining American influence more, the Americans who wielded it or the critics who used it to explain everything that happened in the world. Things will be more complex without a clear bogeyman, and we may have to actually exert ourselves and try to understand the full range of forces at play. Even at the peak of US power there were many other forces involved, and the US was manipulated as often as it manipulated others, often with greater success.

For Egypt, of course, the hard part begins when Mubarak leaves. Transitions out of dictatorship are far from easy, especially if democracy comes into the picture, which it may or may not in this case. Popular expectations will be very high and government capacity is likely to be very low, a stressful combination. We're halfway through chapter one, and it's likely to be quite the saga.

Fuchs
02-07-2011, 01:28 AM
Lots of hyperbolic people in the west will pay much attention to the PRC in the next 2010's and probably to India in the 2020's. They'll get over the changes soon.

Assuming that the domino theory applies to the Arab world, it could become very, very interesting to see how the Europeans behave.
The French have good relations with some Arab countries (thanks to dropping Israel in '67) as far as I know, but they don't exactly have a strategy-capable president these days.

Germany has no bad reputation in the Arab world either, but the German parties won't meet any Arab wishes regarding Israel and Germany has not exactly a track record of leading Europe in extra-European affairs. German political capital and strategy in EU policy have been focused on economic policy mostly.

I don't see Spain, Greece, Portugal or Italy capable of pulling off anything of relevance in regard to coining EU approach towards Arabs in the next few years.

The UK is pretty much an unknown variable for me in regard to Arab-related policies. A certain 'special relationship' may be a hindrance for them.

Finally the classic EU politics joker; highly capable, honourable men with good reputation coming from otherwise quite silent and unimportant European countries, such as Norway, Denmark or Luxembourg.
Norway isn't in the EU, but such a joker could turn out to become relevant nevertheless - and typically so behind the scenes.


My stance is simple; don't piss off the Arab populations and be a good neighbour and trade partner. There's no real security policy problem unless we fuel one.
A revival of the Russian-Arab ties of the 67-73 period would be the greatest possible failure of European security policy (short of actual great war) imaginable.

Pete
02-07-2011, 02:10 AM
Finally the classic EU politics joker; highly capable, honourable men with good reputation coming from otherwise quite silent and unimportant European countries ...
Oh-oh, let's hope nobody from Finland reads that. :eek:

Surferbeetle
02-07-2011, 02:24 AM
Assuming that the domino theory applies to the Arab world, it could become very, very interesting to see how the Europeans behave.
.

The Europeans have been, and are still busy in the Arab world. I know a bit about Iraq, so let's look there...:wry:

Boris Bollion (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Boillon) of France has been working hard in Iraq and is now off to Tunisia. He was covering down on a couple of locations (http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambassade_de_France_en_Irak) while in Iraq


Outre celui de Bagdad, il existe un autre consulat général de France en Irak, basé à Erbil.

The official French website to Iraq (http://www.ambafrance-iq.org/france_irak/)

Dirk Niebel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirk_Niebel) of Germany, and another hard worker, recently had an unexpected ~$2,500 expense (http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article12417898/Dirk-Niebel-von-irakischen-Beamten-festgehalten.html) while in Baghdad.


Entwicklungshilfeminister Dirk Niebel (FDP) ist zwei Stunden am Bagdader Flughafen festgehalten worden. Der Weiterflug wurde mit Geld erkauft.

Murat Ozcelik of Turkey, another hard worker, has been busy in Iraq (http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2011/01/14/iraqs-biggest-power-plant-calik-energy-signs-contract/) as well.


The deal between Turkey’s Calik Enerji and the Iraqi Electricity Ministry is for the construction of the 1,250 megawatt al-Hayrat [Khayrat?] plant in Karbala.
Calik Holding CEO, Ahmet Calik, and Iraq’s Deputy Electricity Minister, Salam Kazzaz, penned the agreement in a ceremony in Baghdad with the participation of Iraqi Deputy Premier for Energy, Hussain al-Shahristani, and Turkey’s Ambassador to Iraq, Murat Ozcelik.

It's a dynamic and interesting place, just like always.

Fuchs
02-07-2011, 04:04 AM
Turkey isn't a European country, so that's a different story. Turks, Persians (Iran), northern Black African countries and Pakistan need to reassess their relations with the Arab region as well, but I focused on Europe and I believe that European countries have very different situations in regard to Arab countries than Turkey.

(and of course I was also trying to get away from the U.S. centricism here. Other countries have relevant relations with the Arab world as well. In fact, some of them are even their neighbours...!)

Surferbeetle
02-07-2011, 04:18 AM
Turkey isn't a European country, so that's a different story. Turks, Persians (Iran), northern Black African countries and Pakistan need to reassess their relations with the Arab region as well, but I focused on Europe and I believe that European countries have very different situations in regard to Arab countries than Turkey.

What??!!! Turkey is not European? Do you mean that you guys have just been stringing them along since 1963 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Turkey_to_the_European_Union)? I am stunned, just stunned!!! Na, so was (http://www.dict.cc/german-english/Na+so+was.html)! :eek: :rolleyes:


Turkey's application to accede to the European Union was made on 14 April 1987. Turkey has been an associate member of the European Union (EU) and its predecessors since 1963.[2] After the ten founding members, Turkey was one of the first countries to become a member of the Council of Europe in 1949, and was also a founding member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961[3] and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1973. The country has also been an associate member of the Western European Union since 1992, and is a part of the "Western Europe" branch of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) at the United Nations. Turkey signed a Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995 and was officially recognised as a candidate for full membership on 12 December 1999, at the Helsinki summit of the European Council. Negotiations were started on 3 October 2005, and the process, should it be in Turkey's favour, is likely to take at least a decade to complete.[4] The membership bid has become a major controversy of the ongoing enlargement of the European Union.[5]

P.S.

Hopefully the Union of the Mediterranean (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_the_Mediterranean) (formerly known as the Mediterranean Union ala Sarkozy) is still supported by at least the EU's Diplomatic Corps (the European External Action Service (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_External_Action_Service)) as vehicle for advocating for Democracy....


The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is a multilateral partnership that encompasses 43 countries from Europe and the Mediterranean Basin: the 27 member states of the European Union and 16 Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans. It was created in July 2008 as a relaunched Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process) in 2008, when a plan to create an autonomous Mediterranean Union was dropped. The Union has the aim of promoting stability and prosperity throughout the Mediterranean region.


The European External Action Service (EEAS or EAS) is a unique European Union (EU) department[2] that was established following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. It was formally launched on 1 December 2010[3] and serves as a foreign ministry and diplomatic corps for the EU, implementing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and other areas of the EU's external representation. The EEAS is under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), a post also created by the Treaty of Lisbon, whom it assists.
The EEAS manages the EU's response to crises, has intelligence capabilities and cooperates with the Commission in areas which it shares competence with. However, although the High Representative and the EEAS can propose and implement policy, it will not make it as that role is left to the Foreign Affairs Council which the High Representative chairs.[2][4]

Pete
02-07-2011, 05:21 AM
What??!!! Turkey is not European?

Traditionally most Europeans have not thought so. The following diplomatic correspondence was written by the British ambassador to the USSR in 1943:

http://www.ntk.net/2000/02/25/moscow.gif

Surferbeetle
02-07-2011, 05:50 AM
Traditionally most Europeans have not thought so.

Pete,

Appreciate it. :)

I am familiar with:


The concept of Deutsches Leid-Kulture. (See the online magazine Perlentaucher (http://www.perlentaucher.de/) for an example)



German Gastarbeiter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gastarbeiter) policies



Gastarbeiter (German pronunciation: [ˈɡastˌʔaɐ̯baɪtɐ] ( listen)) is German for "guest worker" (or "guest workers" – the plural is the same as the singular). It refers to migrant workers who had moved to Germany mainly in the 1960s and 70s, seeking work as part of a formal guest worker programme (Gastarbeiterprogramm)



Frau Dr. Merkel's thoughts (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angela_Merkel#Failure_of_multiculturalism) regarding the ineffectiveness/failure of multikulti (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multikulti) efforts.



In October 2010 Merkel told a meeting of younger members of her conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party at Potsdam that attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany had "utterly failed",[24] stating: "The concept that we are now living side by side and are happy about it does not work"[25] and that "we feel attached to the Christian concept of mankind, that is what defines us. Anyone who doesn't accept that is in the wrong place here."[26] She continued to say that immigrants should integrate and adopt Germany's culture and values. This has added to a growing debate within Germany[27] on the levels of immigration, its effect on Germany and the degree to which Muslim immigrants have integrated into German society.


The controversy surrounding Herr Thilo Sarrazin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thilo_Sarrazin)'s position regarding what it means to be European



Thilo Sarrazin (born 12 February 1945) is a former member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank (until 30 September 2010)[1][2] and a German politician (SPD). Sarrazin previously served as senator of finance for the State of Berlin from January 2002 until April 2009, when he was appointed to his position at Bundesbank. He has been subject to controversy for statements about German immigration policy and for claiming the Jewish people's positive contributions to society are partly due to genetics.[3][4] All this happened in relation to the publication of his book Deutschland schafft sich ab ("Germany Does Away With Itself" or "Germany Abolishes Itself").


Geert Wilders (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geert_Wilders) impact upon political thought in the Netherlands



Jean Marie Pen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Marie_Le_Pen) and his daughter Marine Le Pen (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Le_Pen)'s impact upon political thought in France



Jorg Haider (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%B6rg_Haider)'s impact upon political thought in Austria



David Duke (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Duke)'s impact upon political thought in the US


I also believe that it is important to allow for dialog (to include in the politcal realm) on these issues in order to insure that the topics are not driven underground. European and American leadership, or lack thereof, on these topics directly relates to the effects that an absence of dialog (primarily in the political realm) has had upon the middle east, in particular, Egypt.

P.S.

Herr Gerhard Schroder's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerhard_Schr%C3%B6der) thoughts on the EU and Turkey's place in it, as reported in an October 17th 2005 post on the German Bundesregierung's Website (http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_919412/Content/EN/Artikel/2004__2005/2005/10/2005-10-17-schroeder-turkey-is-part-of-europe-.html), are worthy of consideration:


In a statement made during a visit to Istanbul, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder indicated that the sole objective of accession talks with Turkey is its membership in the European Union, adding that having a strong Turkey in a strong European Union would constitute a significant gain and embody the meaning of the EU motto "United in diversity".

Speaking at an iftar dinner, a traditional meal served at the end of the day during Ramadan to break the fast, Schröder noted that "the initiation of accession talks is a major success for everyone concerned," adding that the objective of the talks, begun on October 3, is the attainment of Turkey's full membership in the European Union, and nothing other than that, evoking a strong round of applause from his audience. He said there is no longer anyone in the European Union who calls this into question and that this will not be done by the new German government either.

Commenting after a meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Schröder said it is his assumption that the new German government will be interested in continuing to develop the excellent and very long-standing relations that exist between Germany and Turkey. He stressed that Germany is Turkey's most important trading partner and the fact that the 2.5 million people of Turkish origin who live in Germany represent a major task with regard to cultural integration, a task both countries want to be involved in. Prime Minister Erdogan thanked Germany and its Chancellor for the many years of strong support provided on the road leading up to accession talks. "Turkey never forgets friends who have supported it in difficult times", Erdogan said.

It is also important to note that Frau Dr. Merkel does not agree with this view (further discussed in a 29 Sept 2009 article in the Telegraph entitled: Angela Merkel win ends Turkey's EU hopes (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/6244276/Angela-Merkel-win-ends-Turkeys-EU-hopes.html))


Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Free Democrats (FDP) are both hostile to the accession of the overwhelmingly Muslim country of 71 million.

The CDU is against the Turks joining for cultural reasons while the FDP leader, and probable new foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle has said the country's economy is too far below European standards to integrate comfortably with other members. With almost three million ethnic Turks living in Germany, many as citizens, Germany also fears there would be a flood of immigrants after Turkish accession.

It's my opinion that the effects of the turmoil in Egypt (keeping in mind that it's only 1638 kilometers from Cairo to Riyadh), have a strong potential to impact how the EU and the US (as well as Asia) conduct business in the ME by impacting our how our political and economic institutions are constructed and how they function...

Steve

CrowBat
02-07-2011, 07:25 AM
I think you're substantially overstating the extent of US influence... and if the Israelis had influence of their own to use inside Egypt, they wouldn't be shrieking frantically and fruitlessly for the US to do their bidding.Well, on one side, it is a matter of fact that even Sarah Pailin has more to say about the future Egyptian president, than something like 80 Million of Egyptians.

On the other side, I nowhere said the Israelis have influence inside Egypt: only that one really can't deny they practically dictate the US foreign policy in the Middle East.


I sometimes wonder who will miss the declining American influence more, the Americans who wielded it or the critics who used it to explain everything that happened in the world. Things will be more complex without a clear bogeyman, and we may have to actually exert ourselves and try to understand the full range of forces at play.One of particularly interesting things about the developments in Egypt is, that if that country really introduces some kind of "democracy", the (agreed: declining) US influence is not going to be as important any more. Which is why it's not surprising that Noah Chomsky concluded It's not radical Islam that worries the US – it's independence (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/feb/04/radical-islam-united-states-independence).


For Egypt, of course, the hard part begins when Mubarak leaves. Transitions out of dictatorship are far from easy, especially if democracy comes into the picture, which it may or may not in this case. Popular expectations will be very high and government capacity is likely to be very low, a stressful combination. We're halfway through chapter one, and it's likely to be quite the saga.We're in full agreement here, except that I'm not as optimistic: IMHO, this saga is still only a step behind the starting line.


A revival of the Russian-Arab ties of the 67-73 period would be the greatest possible failure of European security policy (short of actual great war) imaginable.Let me be bold and conclude that this is next to impossible.

The reason for this is an entire series of incredible (often unbelieveable) failures on the part of Moscow that occurred in recent years. Hope, nobody minds me going into some details, and you're going to find them "relevant" when I explain; if nothing else, most are related to "arms" and "military".

Algeria: in 2006, Putin travelled to Algeria to sign that "huge" deal (reported worth around US$7.5 billion), envisaging a very complex agreement that included the Russians writting off most of the Algerian debt (something like US$4.5 - which the Algerians were not paying back since years), Algerian gas deliveries and "return" of some 60 MiG-21s and MiG-23s, in exchange for newly-built MiG-29SMT-2s, Su-30s and Yak-130s etc. Large parts of this deal collapsed in late 2008. See bellow why.

Syria: the media in Moscow reported it is selling arms to Syria in 1999, in 2000, in 2001 (supposedly, they delivered MiG-29s and Su-27s), in 2006, in 2008, in 2009 (supposedly, Syrians ordered MiG-31s) etc. If you ask the spokesman of Rosoboronexport, he's even now talking about plans to "sell" 40+ Su-30s and 60 Yak-130s to Damascus as if this is already taking place. Actually, through all of these times they did not sell anything at all to Damascus. Not a single bullet.

Where is the problem? Most of former Soviet clients have huge debts for arms delivered back in the 1960s and 1970s, which they refuse to pay. Syrian argument, just for example, is that this armament was of poor quality, that it did not guarantee even technological ballance with the Israel, and that it only caused immense losses. Algerians think similar. Facit, they are not paying.

That's why negotiations between Damascus and Mosow (reports about Syrian debts range between US$15 and 20 billion), and between Algiers and Moscow were stalled for years, and why it took Putin's trip to Algiers to bring at least that contract to a conclusion. However, as soon as RSK MIG finally began delivering "new" MiG-29s to Algeria, back in 2007 (a few months before it was to do the same with Syria), the Algerians found out these are no newly-built planes, as agreed, but overhauled (read: overpainted) aircraft built in the early 1990s. Furthermore, the delivery of Su-30s to Algeria slipped almost two years behind the schedule. The Russians ignored Algerian demands for an explanation until the Algerians almost killed the entire deal: MiG-29s had to be taken back to Russia on Roso's expenses, and the money Algerians transferred as payment for MiG-29s was swiftly transferred from MIG's to Sukhoi's account. Arrogant as they usually are when it comes to "dumb Arabs", the Russians explained the problem in "internal Algerian disputes". The fact is that only an accelerated (though still late) delivery of first Su-30s saved this contact. Still, to make things worse, the Russians then proved unable to deliver ordered Yak-130s; before the Algerians cancelled that contract for the second time, they offered (in spring 2010) a second batch of Su-30s, resulting in a situation where Algeria is about to get 44 aircraft of that type for a price somebody else wouldn't get even 20...

Such "improvisations" did not save MIG RSK's participation in it, though, then - warned by the Algerian experience - the Syrians followed the pattern, checked what the Russians delivered to them, and killed their entire contract (BTW, Syrians were already offended by Russians claiming they ordered MiG-31s, which they did not). The Russians then explained this Syrian decision with "Damascus lacks money": ridiculous in the light of the fact that they had to writte off most of the Syrian debt just in order to get the order for MiG-29s signed. Furthermore, curiously enough, instead of "new" Russian MiGs, Syrians ended purchasing 33 old MiG-23MLDs from Belarus stocks...

(For details about this affair see "Algerian Fighter Deal Threatened", in Combat Aircraft magazine, December 2007; "Syrien lenht MiGs ab", in Fliegerrevue 07/2009 and "Alte MiG-23 kommt zu neuen Ehren", in Fliegerrevue 12/2009)

I have no doubt that the "news" about these affairs spread quite swiftly through various Arab capitals. Surely enough, countries like Sudan and Yemen continue ordering, but they know they are purchasing second-hand equipment. I find it little surprising that vast majority of Russian attempts to cooperate with Arab countries on the plan of gas and oil exploatation, or sell them entire refineries, ended in similar fashion.

BTW, Russian attempts in other Arab countries were not more successful. Moscow offered, at various opportunities during recent years, MiG-29s, helicopters etc. to Egypt Eventually, the Egyptians concluded it's much more convenient to continue getting US arms for free (on the top of that, they bought only a few An-72s from Ukraine).

Finally, the Russian offer, sometimes reported as "contract signed", to sell hundreds of helicopters and other hardware to Saudi Arabia, turned out as an (successful) attempt to press the USA and EU to sell new F-15s, EF-2000s and other stuff, respectivelly...

Dayuhan
02-07-2011, 08:16 AM
Well, on one side, it is a matter of fact that even Sarah Pailin has more to say about the future Egyptian president, than something like 80 Million of Egyptians.

How does one assess such influence at all, let alone declare it "a matter of fact"? I don't see that Sarah Palin has anything at all to say about it. Neither do most Egyptians, at least individually, though when enough of them get together they get to say something. The army is in the picture in a big way. The business elite are in the picture. The Muslim Brotherhood is in the picture. The emerging youth groups are in the picture, as is the urban middle class; both with limited organization but with the potential to make their presence felt. Within all of these groups and many others there are divisions and factions. How they will sort it out and what balance is reached remains to be seen, but any of the above have more to say than Sarah P.


On the other side, I nowhere said the Israelis have influence inside Egypt: only that one really can't deny they practically dictate the US foreign policy in the Middle East.

They don't seem able to persuade or force the US to support Mubarak.


One of particularly interesting things about the developments in Egypt is, that if that country really introduces some kind of "democracy", the (agreed: declining) US influence is not going to be as important any more. Which is why it's not surprising that Noah Chomsky concluded It's not radical Islam that worries the US – it's independence (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/feb/04/radical-islam-united-states-independence).

Noam Chomsky is a joke without a punchline; I've never seen a thing he wrote on matters political that was worth the bytes it took to distribute it. He does preach rather adeptly to a choir that seems to suspend critical thought as they approach his revelations, but if you're not a member of the choir it's generally pretty pointless. On linguistics it may be another matter; I'm told he knows something there. I'm not in a position to judge.

A transition into democracy or some semblance thereof could have all kinds of results, but the most probable is a long and difficult period for Egypt. Cultivating democracy and getting it to function on soil long occupied by a despots is a very tricky thing indeed. The threat of a takeover by the Muslim Brothers is only one scenario, another (and as likely) one is simple paralysis, with a plethora of poorly differentiated parties and candidates unable to achieve a meaningful mandate or take any meaningful action. Likely outcome might be a military coup, with or without US support, likely with support from a populace tired of dysfunction. These scenarios tend to see popular expectation sky high and government capacity dead low, a frustrating combination.

What it will or will not mean to the US remains to be seen; I for one have little interest in ideologically driven prophecy.

I don't see Russian (or Chinese) influence or presence as a threat.

I think most of us knew all along that today's crop of Middle eastern despots wouldn't last forever. How and when the transition would begin nobody knew. How fast it will proceed from nation to nation, nobody knows. What individual course each nation will take remains unknown. It will be sloppy at times and downright ugly at times. I don't personally see these developments as a "threat" in any overall sense. Along the way there will be threats, opportunities, complications and mistakes. There always are. The boat has started rocking, it had to sometime. We'll see where it ends up and manage as we go. There are lots of worse ways it could have started.

On the bright side, Syria and/or Libya could be next in line, not such a bad thing at all... and I'm sure some folks in Iran are watching closely.

Many of us don't fear independence at all, no matter what the Chomskies may pretend, and I'm not convinced that "The US" generically is all that terrified of it either.

Fuchs
02-07-2011, 12:25 PM
@Surferbeetle: "Leitkultur". "Leid" has a very different meaning...

------

I explained the 'Turkey is not European' thing elsewhere in the forum already (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5483&highlight=occident+turkey&page=2).

Fuchs
02-07-2011, 01:07 PM
Meet Mubarak's American fan club (http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2011/02/03/mubarak_american_allies/slideshow.html)
The pundits and politicians who are siding with the brutal dictator over Egypt's people

By Justin Elliott
(salon.com)

Bob's World
02-07-2011, 02:18 PM
It comes down to the question of if it is more important to cling to governments that are known despots, but that will generally support US interests when it suits them even though such relationships empower organizations such as AQ, the Muslim Brotherhood, etc and are arguably the primary causative factor of the increasing terrorist violence against the West;

or

Is it more important to risk the possible rise of governments that may be less supportive of Western interests, but that draw their legitimacy from a governed populace that no longer feels the need for organizations such a AQ or the Muslim Brotherhood (in their current form, anyhow); and that no longer feels that they must act out by conducting acts of terrorism against the West to achieve self-determination and greater civil liberties?

What happened in Iran in '79 is tragic, but it is due far more to our emplacing the Shah and working to keep him in power until the whole thing collapsed, than it is the fault of the Mullahs. They were just the ones organized and avilable to step into the vacuum. One tremendous upside of the ouster of US influence there, however, is that Iranian populaces no longer blame the US for their current government and therefore do not feel compelled to conduct acts of terrorism against the US, and are in fact largely pro-American. The same is not true in these Sunni Arab countries where the US is still perceived as the power that sustains these Despots in ways that enable there growing personal wealth and disdain for their own people.

Powerful Jewish, Arab, and corporate lobbies are at work to sustain the status quo. Also right wing pundits who live to criticize anything President Obama or the Democrats do even when it puts them at odds with their own platforms (Tea Partiers love to wave the Constitution in the face of opponents, as if to proclaim that no one else backs the principles contained there in; and then go on record on the criticality of sustaining in power a handful of governments that are some of the least supportive of those same principles.)

It is inevitable that the current state of governance across the Middle East will change, as the current construct is unsustainable. To attempt to prop up the dominoes would be huge mistake. To call for the dominoes to fall is a huge mistake as well. Success lies in a middle ground that recognizes the end of impunity and embraces greater populace input and evolution of governance across the region.

Cliff
02-07-2011, 03:49 PM
Noam Chomsky is a joke without a punchline; I've never seen a thing he wrote on matters political that was worth the bytes it took to distribute it. He does preach rather adeptly to a choir that seems to suspend critical thought as they approach his revelations, but if you're not a member of the choir it's generally pretty pointless. On linguistics it may be another matter; I'm told he knows something there. I'm not in a position to judge.

A transition into democracy or some semblance thereof could have all kinds of results, but the most probable is a long and difficult period for Egypt. Cultivating democracy and getting it to function on soil long occupied by a despots is a very tricky thing indeed. The threat of a takeover by the Muslim Brothers is only one scenario, another (and as likely) one is simple paralysis, with a plethora of poorly differentiated parties and candidates unable to achieve a meaningful mandate or take any meaningful action. Likely outcome might be a military coup, with or without US support, likely with support from a populace tired of dysfunction. These scenarios tend to see popular expectation sky high and government capacity dead low, a frustrating combination.

I agree with Dayuhan - it is silly to claim that the US wants to retain Mubarak. We have to work with folks we don't like sometimes - and as I've said before it is better to have some sort of relationship. Trying to prevent war in the Middle East by giving Egypt or Saudi arms packages isn't the same thing as supporting dictators. And if we had openly dumped Mubarak immediately it would have a significant impact on all of our alliances - even with democracies, for how can our word be trusted if we change our mind at the first sign of trouble? President Bush in particular tried to make democracy a priority in the region. You can scoff if you like, but the man made it the US policy. We've been warning all of these folks publicly and in private to democratize while they can - not our fault they don't listen. And allowing Iran to dominate the region or Israel and Egypt to go to war would not have helped. Suggesting that it would ignores reality.

The big point is the one on governance. It took the US 11 years from declaring independence to figure out its (somewhat) final form of government. For the first few years of that governance was extremely weak and numerous abuses of different groups occurred, to include a lot of score settling between Tories and the patriots... not all of which was politically motivated. A lot of folks didn't want to be involved.* 74 years later a full-up war occurred due to disagreements over flaws in the basic system of governance. It was only in the last 40 years that the equality we supposedly represent was finally available to all, and still in imperfect form at that. We forget our own struggles at our peril.

The problem in Egypt (or any other country emerging from totalitarianism) is that the very elements of society that would form the basis for governance have been repressed or exiled for years, and have no legitimacy. Building the institutions to provide a democratic government takes time... which is why I agree with Dayuhan that Egypt will be messy and probably experience some serious speed bumps. Anyone who thinks that things will be rosy is ignoring our own history here in the US.

That said, I have to say that I still think that folks basically want to be free. If they are constantly worrying about not dying, then they will be less likely to express this desire. But once their economic situation reaches a point where their basic needs (ie their right to "Life") are not constantly threatened and they can "pursue happiness", they will tend to want to enjoy liberty as well. We should also not confuse ourselves into thinking that this will result in their country becoming our ally. At the same time, one would hope that it will result in their not desiring to go to war with us (or their neighbors) and instead focus on improving their economic position in the world. The international system set up by the Allies after WWII has lifted more people out of poverty than anyone could have predicted, and prevented another great power war. Additionally, more countries than ever experience political change as a result of peaceful means and not violence or civil war. All of these are good things- while the US isn't perfect, can anyone name another system of governance/superpower that would have spent as many lives and as much money as we have to set up such global goods?

V/R,

Cliff


* For a good discussion of this, see Shy, John. “The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War.” In Essays on the American Revolution. Edited by Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, 121–156. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1973.

omarali50
02-07-2011, 08:15 PM
About the US role, I think the US administration includes people who are genuinely unhappy with being openly and totally associated with torturers and murderers. At the same time, their is a huge bureaucracy that has its own momentum regarding “stability” (in this case, its mostly Israel that is the issue, othewise the US has few worries about Egypt..the Suez canal is not a life and death issue for America). I dont think the US has a unified and clear policy in these matters. They can get surprised by events and they can over-react or under-react. They are not God. They are just people, mostly mediocre bureaucrats trying to cover their ass.
Given the power of the Israeli lobby (decreasing now, but still very very powerful) the US is not going to stop interfering in the Middle East (oil is an even bigger issue, but that is focused on the Gulf, SA, Iraq). But eventually the US may be replaced by China in some places, which has fewer problems with open thuggishness and torture. While other places will manage to grow up and run their own governments instead of being ruled by some thugs supported by USA or China. Egypt may be lucky enough to get to that point, but not in a straight line. Its probably going to be a rough ride. Egypt’s economy is not in great shape and population is rather large. Its going to be tough for secular democrats in such a setting. Sure, India has done it, but the historical background is very different..

Pete
02-07-2011, 10:13 PM
Can anyone tell me when the Middle East has not been the source of constant trouble? All my life I've been hearing about its wars and the failure of peace talks to resolve the issues that caused them. On those rare occasions when I go to church I even hear about old imperial and political troubles there 2000 years ago, as recorded in 1662 in the Book of Common Prayer:


Suffered under Pontius Pilate,
Was crucified, dead, and buried:
He descended into hell;
The third day he rose again from the dead;
He ascended into heaven

I sincerely hope that the people of Egypt eventually get a government that is to their liking, but I also hope they don't return to being at war or almost-war with Israel again. Realpolitik certainly has its shortcomings, but U.S. policy towards Sadat and Murabak had its origin in a good-faith effort by the U.S. to bring an end to the continuous cycle of wars over there.

Fuchs
02-07-2011, 10:30 PM
So what? All non-arctic regions seem to be sources of constant troubles.

Isn't that an interesting coincidence with the distribution of human populations? ;)

davidbfpo
02-07-2011, 10:31 PM
For a change ITV News (UK commercial channel) have carried two reports on the protests in Alexandria; one on the protests, with an emphasis on the city being a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold, with a group of women and the second reportedly of the police firing from the rooftop of a police station on passing protesters. Sadly an uninvolved young girl is shot dead in her home.

Sorry no working link available.

The BBC Radio this morning reported the police were back on the streets in Cairo, although not the CSF (riot police) and we know the undercover police remained active - out of view.

It is curious that as the media reinforcements arrived the focus became a small area of Cairo, plus forays into middle class areas where vigilantes stood guard.

Bob's World
02-07-2011, 10:42 PM
So what? All non-arctic regions seem to be sources of constant troubles.

Isn't that an interesting coincidence with the distribution of human populations? ;)

Waaaaiit a second! According to the COIN gurus "ungoverned spaces" are the big problem areas, and that is pretttty much limited to Antartica. (Though for some reason AQ does not seem too interested in this 'prime' insurgnecy sanctuary) So it looks like constant trouble everywhere! :D

Cliff
02-07-2011, 11:05 PM
An interesting Thomas P.M. Barnett article (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7793/the-new-rules-guiding-egypt-into-the-axis-of-good) over at World Politics Review on Egypt. He lays out some good considerations for the likely winners and losers on Egypt, and why he thinks the US should let Mubarak stay till September.

I'm inclined to agree with him on the youth bulge and economic issues. I'm not sure if waiting till September will work, though I agree that that would probably make the outcome better for all concerned. Big question is how you would enforce any such deal... Like I said before, they need time to build governance.

V/R,

Cliff

Pete
02-07-2011, 11:48 PM
So what?
"Mit der Dummheit kämpfen Götter selbst vergebens," that's what.

Dayuhan
02-08-2011, 02:07 AM
An interesting Thomas P.M. Barnett article (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7793/the-new-rules-guiding-egypt-into-the-axis-of-good) over at World Politics Review on Egypt. He lays out some good considerations for the likely winners and losers on Egypt, and why he thinks the US should let Mubarak stay till September.

I'm not sure that's a choice the US gets to make. There are some good arguments for it, but also some against, and ultimately I suspect that any election help with Mubarak in power will be seen by Egyptians as hopelessly compromised... likely with good reason.



Is it more important to risk the possible rise of governments that may be less supportive of Western interests, but that draw their legitimacy from a governed populace that no longer feels the need for organizations such a AQ or the Muslim Brotherhood (in their current form, anyhow)

I see no evidence that any populace has ever felt the need for AQ as a lever against their own government. AQ has only been really successful when they embrace the "expel the heathen from the land of the faithful" narrative. If there aren't any heathen to expel their influence declines very quickly.

The idea that allies are states that support western or US interests needs to be revisited and questioned. Allies, reasonably, are states with whom we have shared interests. The Saudis, Kuwaitis, Qataris, and Emiratis are not supporting US interests when they ally with us; they are supporting their own interests. Their relationship with the US has brought them far greater security than they might otherwise have known (I doubt you'd find a single member of any of those populaces who would have welcomed invasion by Saddam) and very considerable prosperity. Whatever negative things can be said of Sadat and Mubarak (lots) they at least recognized that war with Israel was not in Egypt's interests, and concluded (fairly astutely) that if the Americans were willing to pay them to refrain from getting their asses kicked it wasn't a half bad deal.

Realistically, alliance can only be enduring if it's based on common interests. Of course even then it may not endure: interests and perceived interests change. Alliance based on one party imposing its interests on the other are, however, too unstable and too prone to backlash to be worth the temporary advantage they produce.

For today's relations with Egypt, what that means to me is that we need to let the process take its course and look for common interests with whatever government emerges. I suspect we'll find a few.

Fuchs
02-08-2011, 02:41 AM
I'm inclined to agree with him on the youth bulge and economic issues.

Interestingly, the economic growth rate of Egypt seems to have been higher than the population growth rate during Mubarak's reign.
The economy does not seem to be the problem in terms of GDP. He just failed spectacularly at income (and job) distribution.

91bravojoe
02-08-2011, 04:36 AM
The wretched Palin has announced how pissed off she is over the failure of America to announce who the next leader of Egypt will be:

http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/02/05/palin-obamas-3-a-m-call-went-to-answering-machine/

I usually agree with Chomsky, and he is certainly right in his specific examples of radical Islam being supported by the US. Saudi Arabia is the Wahhabi focus on the non-Arctic world. Chomsky's argument about how we don't want non-US-clients in the mideast is obviously correct.

I see John Bolton is running for President. BUWAAHAAWAA.

Pete
02-08-2011, 05:41 AM
Problems in the Middle East? You've got to be kidding! Perhaps this is the wrong place for this message, seeing how it mainly has to do with Infantry tactics and techniques.

Here's a war story. The oldest regiment in the British Army is the Royal Scots, which during the late 1600s was encamped in France next to the French Regiment de Picardy. One night the soldiers got to drinking together and a Frenchman of the Picardy Regiment bragged that it was an older unit than the Scots because it was descended from the old Roman Legion that had guarded Christ's tomb. Not to be outdone, a Scotsman said if his regiment had been there its guards would not have fallen asleep at their posts, and second off the prisoner would not have escaped! Since then the Royal Scots have been known as "Pontius Pilate's Bodyguards."

Dayuhan
02-08-2011, 06:31 AM
The wretched Palin has announced how pissed off she is over the failure of America to announce who the next leader of Egypt will be:

http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/02/05/palin-obamas-3-a-m-call-went-to-answering-machine/

I usually agree with Chomsky, and he is certainly right in his specific examples of radical Islam being supported by the US. Saudi Arabia is the Wahhabi focus on the non-Arctic world. Chomsky's argument about how we don't want non-US-clients in the mideast is obviously correct.

I see John Bolton is running for President. BUWAAHAAWAA.

Sarah Palin may not want non US clients in the ME, but she is not the nation, fortunately. An embarrassment to the nation, yes, but that's a different thing. I think there's a fairly widespread recognition of the difference between allies and clients in today's US, and I suspect that we'd be quite willing and quite able to deal with a non-client Egypt. In many ways it would be a relief.

Of course I also think Chomsky spouts ideologically driven nonsense with little or no substance behind it, so take that as you will.

CrowBat
02-08-2011, 06:36 AM
How does one assess such influence at all, let alone declare it "a matter of fact"?Look, like majority of the public, I do not know such figures like Palin personally. Correspondingly, I can only depend on her "talking" - to the media. I can't say whether the things she says are her own ideas or not, but it's obvious that a certain segment of the US population is listening to what she says. Thus, even though she has no relevant official executive powers, when she's complaining about Obama entering cooperation with the MBs (see her relevant statement from few days ago, already posted in this thread), there is little doubt she's exercising pressure upon the admin in the DC. And then there is no doubt that she's "better-heard" than the Egyptian public.


Noam Chomsky is a joke without a punchline; I've never seen a thing he wrote on matters political that was worth the bytes it took to distribute it.Can you prove his..."preaching" (?)..."thesis" (?) that the USA are at least ignoring, if not openly supporting a regime in Saudi Arabia that supports extremist Islamists (financially), as "wrong"?

Anyway, OK: since you don't like Chomsky, here a statement from somebody else with, essentially, the same opinion, though different side of the political tribune. The following is from BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/9390387.stm)'s "blog" about related events yesterday:


US Republican Congressman Ron Paul says on his blog: "We see now the folly of our interventionist foreign policy: not only has that stability fallen to pieces with the current unrest, but the years of propping up the corrupt regime in Egypt has led the people to increase their resentment of both America and Israel! We are both worse off for decades of intervention into Egypt's internal affairs. I wish I could say that we have learned our lesson and will no longer attempt to purchase - or rent - friends in the Middle East, but I am afraid that is being too optimistic."

Is Paul also "preaching rather adeptly to a choir that seems to suspend critical thought as they approach his revelations"?


Many of us don't fear independence at all, no matter what the Chomskies may pretend, and I'm not convinced that "The US" generically is all that terrified of it either.How would you then characterise Israeli reactions reported in the last few days, and how would you describe their effects upon the US decisionmaking?

Call it a guess, if you like, but I somehow doubt you're going to use the word "irrelevant".

Surferbeetle
02-08-2011, 08:23 AM
@Surferbeetle: "Leitkultur". "Leid" has a very different meaning...

Fuchs,

True.

Thanks for catching my typo.

From my sixth edition 1970 version Langenscheidt's Taschen-Worterbucher /Compact Dictionary - German


Leid: harm, injury, wrong, hurt, sorrow



Leiten: lead, guide, conduct, convey



Leitung: direction, guidance, management, conduction




I explained the 'Turkey is not European' thing elsewhere in the forum already (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5483&highlight=occident+turkey&page=2).

An arguable opinion which does not reflect existing legal frameworks with references provided here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=115220&postcount=159).

davidbfpo
02-08-2011, 08:33 AM
The potential impact of radicals and extremists from the Hamas-controlled Gaza strip on recent events, from an Israeli think tank: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/ipc_e165.htm

I do recall hearing the Egyptians moved an extra Army brigade into the Sinai, to provide security around the tourist areas - with Israeli agreement, as required under the peace accords.

Pete
02-08-2011, 09:41 AM
Were the Small Wars Council to become a going concern I wonder whether Fuchs could retire from his current job and support himself by operating a Schnell Imbiss Bratwurst kiosk in the Kitakidogo Social Club. It would gratify us old Ami farts from the Cold War to have a constant supply of grilled Bratwurst, Brotchen and heisse Senf. It would be a comfort to us old guys in our old age. Dad sad it was rough in Germany in 1945 but he wasn't there in '55, '65, '75 or '85.

Dayuhan
02-08-2011, 10:17 AM
Ya know yer on the innernet when somehow Sarah Palin, Noam Chomsky, and Ron Paul are dragged into a discussion of US policy toward Egypt. Not places I'd look for relevance, influence, or substance on the subject, and overall I prefer bratwurst, brotchen and heisse senf... but so be it.


Look, like majority of the public, I do not know such figures like Palin personally. Correspondingly, I can only depend on her "talking" - to the media. I can't say whether the things she says are her own ideas or not, but it's obvious that a certain segment of the US population is listening to what she says. Thus, even though she has no relevant official executive powers, when she's complaining about Obama entering cooperation with the MBs (see her relevant statement from few days ago, already posted in this thread), there is little doubt she's exercising pressure upon the admin in the DC. And then there is no doubt that she's "better-heard" than the Egyptian public.

There seem to be two assumptions here... first that the US has significant influence ofver the Egyptian succession, second that Sarah Palin has some form of influence over US policy. I'm not sure either is supportable.

I don't think anyone making policy today is listening to Palin or her audience, except perhaps the unfortunate charged with recording her inanities for use against her in potential campaigns down the line. She's not exerting pressure, or doing anything at all beyond making a public ass of herself. It's not an audience the current administration is concerned with, except to the extent that its existence helps to mobilize the current administration's base. There is no influence at all.


Can you prove his..."preaching" (?)..."thesis" (?) that the USA are at least ignoring, if not openly supporting a regime in Saudi Arabia that supports extremist Islamists (financially), as "wrong"?

There's a lot that could be said on that, but this would not be the thread. As in so many other places, Chomsky slides a few threads of truth through an ideological blender and comes up with a pretty meaningless set of conclusions. In any event the extent to which the US "supports" the Saudis is pretty negligible; one could easily say they do more to support us than we do to support them. They are not a US client by any means.

Chomsky routinely uses a technique common among those who rant on the ideological fringe. He pulls together an array of factoids that support his pre-ordained conclusion, yanks them out of any relevant context, bangs them together, declares all points to be "true", and announces the conclusion. It actually works pretty well, especially when the conclusion is addressed to an audience predisposed to accept it. The only way to argue against it is to break down the "facts" one by one and show how they were distorted. Few people have the patience, and the audience doesn't generally pay attention. Not generally worth the trouble to argue with the ideological fringes in any event.


US Republican Congressman Ron Paul says on his blog: "We see now the folly of our interventionist foreign policy: not only has that stability fallen to pieces with the current unrest, but the years of propping up the corrupt regime in Egypt has led the people to increase their resentment of both America and Israel! We are both worse off for decades of intervention into Egypt's internal affairs. I wish I could say that we have learned our lesson and will no longer attempt to purchase - or rent - friends in the Middle East, but I am afraid that is being too optimistic."

Our relationship with Mubarak is and has long been a cold war relic and as much an embarrassment as an asset. It endured through inertia and this is an excellent opportunity to let it die of natural causes. This is widely recognized and widely accepted; there will not be many tears shed when Hosni lands on the trash heap of history, in whatever condition he arrives there. Nothing really very earthshaking or controversial there.

Paying the Egyptians not to fight the Israelis probably seemed a good idea at the time, and may have actually been a good idea at the time, but these things tend to run on beyond any reasonable point of utility, and need to be shaken up. They are getting shaken up. We should be grateful.

What emerges next remains to be seen. Whatever regime emerges will undoubtedly be imperfect, will very likely be miserable, and will probably have some sort of relationship with the US. Whatever that relationship is, it will be criticized by people with ideological axes to grind and no responsibility to provide a more effective policy. So it goes. Very easy it is to point out what's been done wrong, especially with hindsight. It's very easy to demand that the US wave a magic wand and produce outcomes that serve some perceived interest or another. Forming and implementing better policies is a good deal harder.


How would you then characterise Israeli reactions reported in the last few days, and how would you describe their effects upon the US decisionmaking?

Call it a guess, if you like, but I somehow doubt you're going to use the word "irrelevant".

Ineffective shrieking? Of course they want the US to preserve Mubarak or install a clone, but the US probably hasn't the power to do that and probably wouldn't be inclined to do it if they could. Doesn't look like they'll get their way... a good thing IMO.

CrowBat
02-08-2011, 11:44 AM
Ya know yer on the innernet when somehow Sarah Palin, Noam Chomsky, and Ron Paul are dragged into a discussion of US policy toward Egypt. Not places I'd look for relevance, influence, or substance on the subject, and overall I prefer bratwurst, brotchen and heisse senf... but so be it.Ein Paar Frankfurter mit süßem Senf for me, please.


There seem to be two assumptions here... first that the US has significant influence ofver the Egyptian succession, second that Sarah Palin has some form of influence over US policy. I'm not sure either is supportable.Palin is "just another example". A hyperbole in regards of how little not only "the average Egyptian", but all of Egyptians (bar Mubarak) have to say about their own future (i.e. next to nothing) and thus an indication of how I think this affair is not only developing but also going to end.


There's a lot that could be said on that, but this would not be the thread. As in so many other places, Chomsky slides a few threads of truth through an ideological blender. and comes up with a pretty meaningless set of conclusions. In any event the extent to which the US "supports" the Saudis is pretty negligible; one could easily say they do more to support us than we do to support them. They are not a US client by any means.Using exactly the same approach ("breaking down the facts one by one"), I'm affraid, is likely to show this standpoint as positioned on quite shaky legs.

We all lack the time and no internet forum is ever going to be really suitable for presenting facts on point-by-point basis. The best we all can offer are (quite rough) "summaries" of what we think, or links to works that offer corresponding information. In this case, and Chomsky's ideology or methods by side, the sad fact is that at least the cited excerpt from that article is something that can be easily confirmed.

True enough, there are only few people "arguing" about what's going on in Saudi Arabia (for an example, see here (http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a8.html), or here (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,332946,00.html)). But then perhaps there are a few good reasons for this being the case. Whatever is the case (and regardless of reasons for this situation), Saudi Arabia as it exists nowadays would be impossible without a direct US involvement, back in the 1930s and 1940s. That's where it started. It went on with al-Sauds not only being supported through military- and security-related projects (financed by Saudi money, as compared with aid deliveries to Egypt), or there being a strong mutual inter-dependence in energy and financial sectors, but this going to such an extension that the direct involvement of members of the royal family in financing Islamic extremism is simply ignored by US authorities. Yes, no doubt, pressure was exercised to curb this and a lot has been undertaken. Yet, various cables from the last few years revealed by WikLeaks show that the flow of money is continuing - in cash, not via wire-transfers - and that little changed in regards of cooperation with various US authorities (read: FBI is still not permitted to investigate in the KSA).

There are many parallels between this situation, and that in Egypt.

Perhaps you're right when you say that the country is not an "US client". But, al-Sauds are, and they are the country since they do not tollerate any kind of opposition (perhaps that's the reason they prefer to export it instead?). And, al-Sauds are as much a US client like the entire USA - not to talk about certain segments within the US society (I dare mentioning a certain society named "Carlyle Group" here) - are clients of al-Sauds. This goes well-beyond a US-equiped and -instructed security system: it functions so that the Sauds sell their oil reliably and often at lower prices, and recycle these through massive purchases of US armament or investments in the USA, both of which keep large parts of the US economy in running condition.

Contrary to what you say about the US relationship to Mubarak, relationship to al-Sauds is also certainly no "Cold War relic", an issue that endures "through inertia", or something of that kind, but an active, ongoing relationship, to mutual advantage of the USA and the al-Saud family (including parts that support extremists). Thus, to say "they are not a US clients by any means", sorry, stands no proof.


Ineffective shrieking? Of course they want the US to preserve Mubarak or install a clone, but the US probably hasn't the power to do that and probably wouldn't be inclined to do it if they could. Doesn't look like they'll get their way... a good thing IMO.I explained this somewhere at the start of this thread already: one of funny, perhaps "ridiculous" things about such dictators like Mubarak is that they are so sensitive about every single, even the smallest, signal from the USA. Under specific circusmtances, a simple "go" from Obama, personally, would've been perfectly sufficient.

No such message has been sent to Cairo, though, while there is so much crying for Mubarak by all the Israeli representatives here in Europe, that our technocrats (some call them "politicians") are all falling in love with him, one after the other. I doubt the situation is any different in the DC.

Bob's World
02-08-2011, 12:03 PM
We are getting at the roots of the War on Terrorism here; or from the other side; the employment of terrorism to liberate the Middle East from overt Western interference.

The U.S. policy of controls over the politics of the Middle East made sense during the Cold War, but even then was a compromise of U.S. principles in the name of national security. The populaces of the region could generally buy into that being the lesser of two evils.

The escalation of U.S. controls over the politics of the Middle East in the post Cold War era is the result of the growing effort required to sustain a program of controls that is no longer viewed as necessary by the affected populaces. This problem is then enhanced by the growing impunity of many of these governments that have come to realize that the U.S. is convinced that it must sustain them in power at any cost.

This is the foundation that bin laden then built his "base", AQ, upon.

All the U.S. has to do is focus on getting our policies back in line with our espoused principles. That is step one.

Step two is to make it clear that we are changing ourselves. That we are recognizing that we got off track and that we believe that the principles that we hold up as "self evident" (granted by God) are granted to people everywhere, and not just in the U.S.

The hard part is breaking contact and falling back. This is true in platoon tactics, and it is true in superpower policy and strategy as well. To just abandon our position and run to the rear would be a disaster for everyone. We need to have a plan, we need to communicate the plan, and then we need to execute the plan. Done right, the U.S. will have even greater influence in the region once we have removed the systems of controls and manipulations we have in place now. We will have become the champion of the oppressed in deed as well as word; rather that claiming one, while sustaining the oppressors in power by our deeds. We still have the best product by far, it is just our sales and service plan that got off track.

Fuchs
02-08-2011, 12:26 PM
Were the Small Wars Council to become a going concern I wonder whether Fuchs could retire from his current job and support himself by operating a Schnell Imbiss Bratwurst kiosk in the Kitakidogo Social Club. It would gratify us old Ami farts from the Cold War to have a constant supply of grilled Bratwurst, Brotchen and heisse Senf. It would be a comfort to us old guys in our old age. Dad sad it was rough in Germany in 1945 but he wasn't there in '55, '65, '75 or '85.

Much has changed since '85. Back then, fast food in Germany was very multinational in Bonn, but not so much elsewhere. Today it's very variable.


The Turkish immigrants won the market share battle even against corporations with their small Döner businesses. Their beef/pita/salad based Döner sandwich got a little brother with chicken instead of beef when beef had a crisis in the 90's.

The other important fast foods are

Pizzas - more pizzerias in Germany than in Italy. Large pizza chains play a marginal role.

Currywurst with frites & curry/tomato sauce
Krakauer (another sausage), Nürnberger (small sausages)

Asia fast food; mostly chicken with rice and vegetables or some noodle fast food. Most are run by Vietnamese immigrants, even some "Chinese" restaurants.

Gyros - (Greek immigrants)

Burgers - McD and BK mostly (the only real fast food franchise successes in Germany), but the best burger I've ever tasted was from a butcher shop. The normal American-style bap for burgers is horrible, and the franchises never get the salad right either.

Roasted chicken half

Frikadelle (rissole) with mustard and bap

Finally, some salad bars and Subways.

I'm the right guy to write a business plan for people who want to set up such a small business with a credit, but I'm totally the wrong guy for running such a thing myself.


------------------

Back to Egypt; does anybody have a link at hand for a site that tracked how many people were in the streets when? It seems to be somewhat reduced to the symbol of tahrir square now.

Pete
02-08-2011, 02:02 PM
Damn, it all goes to show you can't go home again. All I wanted was a bratwurst but now all you can find there are pizza places. Compared to Egypt falling apart at least the good old Cold War was predictable, except for the occasional foray by the Baader-Meinhoff Gang.

omarali50
02-09-2011, 01:28 AM
If you are interested in what the liberal blogosphere is saying, here is a sample

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2011/02/on-the-turmoil-in-egypt.html#more

And Fuchs, Is there any Indian food in Germany? Especially Indian fast food? (maybe British-INdian food?)

Dayuhan
02-09-2011, 03:57 AM
Palin is "just another example". A hyperbole in regards of how little not only "the average Egyptian", but all of Egyptians (bar Mubarak) have to say about their own future (i.e. next to nothing) and thus an indication of how I think this affair is not only developing but also going to end.

I think you rather overstate the influence he has, especially now, in his dotage and with his world sliding apart around him. Even in his prime no despot rules alone: he needs the army, the police, the business elite, all kinds of key sectors around him, and he needs to keep doling out to feed and keep the barons in balance. When the edifice starts to shake there is little or no loyalty. Everyone in the picture knows Mubarak is gone, whether next week or in September makes no difference. The people around him may still be kissing ass in front of him, but the moment his back is turned they are plotting ways to turn the situation to their personal advantage and ways of covering their exits if things go badly. There will be lots of deals being cut behind his back.

Mubarak is not in charge; if he was this wouldn't be happening. He still has cards to play and he still has people behind him, but he doesn't know for how long: he knows better than most how fast loyalties can change and what can happen when they do.

Of course none of that means "the people" are calling the shots. They never are, even in a functioning democracy. It means nobody is fully in control,and everyone with an ambition is maneuvering for position. The kind is going down, there's no mechanism for succession that anyone has confidence in, the barons are cutting their deals and preparing for their moves, and the crowd is the joker in the deck. It will likely be messy and nobody, including Mubarak, is in a position to dictate the future.


I explained this somewhere at the start of this thread already: one of funny, perhaps "ridiculous" things about such dictators like Mubarak is that they are so sensitive about every single, even the smallest, signal from the USA. Under specific circusmtances, a simple "go" from Obama, personally, would've been perfectly sufficient.

You didn't explain it, you stated it. Repeating it doesn't make it true, and I doubt very much that it is true.

There's a lot of talk about the US "supporting the revolution" or "supporting the will of the people" but lovely as the idea may sound, the degree to which the US can or should get involved is open to a lot of question, even from supporters of the populace. There's a hair-thin line between supporting it and supplanting it, or trying to direct and manipulate it. The process the resistance is now going through, the negotiations among factions and between factions and the government, is an essential part of the process by which the post-Mubarak scene will be shaped. In order for a populace to remove their dictator they have to organize, those who fight him have to build coalitions, they have to cooperate and negotiate and balance their interests. All of that contributes to the ability to manage the next phase. It may seem quicker and easier for an outside deus ex machina to simply say "go", but even assuming that worked, which is far from certain, the opposition have failed to reach the requisite level of maturity and capacity to force change themselves, which would not augur well for the aftermath, which will be hard enough in any event

I personally think we're more or less on the right track: don't oppose the resistance, offer sympathy, work behind the scenes, speak for peaceful transition and democracy, but do not do their work of the resistance for them or openly intervene on their behalf. In the long run that would not be doing Egypt any favors: it's virtually impossible for us to intervene without taking over, or being perceived as taking over. The final step, of course, is willingness to work with whatever emerges after, even if it's not what we'd have hoped for. I hope we can do that, and I suspect that we can, at this point.


In this case, and Chomsky's ideology or methods by side, the sad fact is that at least the cited excerpt from that article is something that can be easily confirmed.

I don't think it is so easily confirmed, and the references one chooses to cite say a good deal about one's preconceived ideas... often more than they say about the matter under discussion.


It went on with al-Sauds not only being supported through military- and security-related projects (financed by Saudi money, as compared with aid deliveries to Egypt), or there being a strong mutual inter-dependence in energy and financial sectors

It never ceases to amuse me that people can see the Saudis ordering $60 billions in goods from American factories, in an industry under severe stress at a time of very high unemployment, and somehow translate that into us supporting them.

"Mutual interdependence" comes closer to the truth. Whatever that relationship was in the past, it has for some time been close to peer-to-peer. The US does not and cannot dictate to the Saudis. We've some influence over them, as they have over us, but no more than is normally the case among nations with interests in common and extensive economic connections. Neither they not their rulers are in any meaningful way US clients.

Of course all manner of relationships are routinely distorted, cherrypicked, and elevated to an exalted status by all manner of fringe conspiracy theorists. AIPAC, the Carlyle Group, and a whole bunch of others are favorite fodder. Some find it all very thrilling in a Robert Ludlum sort of way; I personally can't be bothered.

Dayuhan
02-09-2011, 04:14 AM
We are getting at the roots of the War on Terrorism here; or from the other side; the employment of terrorism to liberate the Middle East from overt Western interference.

A bit more complex than that, I suspect. The most egregious examples of terror against the US have been designed not to get the US out of Muslim lands, but to get them in: without a foreign invader AQ hasn't much to work with, and they needed us to do what we did. They made sure we would do it.



This is the foundation that bin laden then built his "base", AQ, upon.


Bin Laden built his base around opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. He has tried, repeatedly, to use that base against Arab leaders, but he's never had enough support to come close to success, even in the Saudi Arabia of the 1990s, which should have been the perfect field for that endeavor. The same people who send him money and men and cheer his every step when he fights the infidel far away want nothing to do with it at home, not because they love their governments but because they don't see him offering a better alternative.


The escalation of U.S. controls over the politics of the Middle East in the post Cold War era is the result of the growing effort required to sustain a program of controls that is no longer viewed as necessary by the affected populaces.

I've asked this before and never had an answer, but hope springs eternal: what exactly does the US control in the Middle East?


This problem is then enhanced by the growing impunity of many of these governments that have come to realize that the U.S. is convinced that it must sustain them in power at any cost.

Again, I think this has become a bit of a mantra, and needs to be examined. Impunity in these countries isn't growing, it's always been there. It's a political tradition in the region. The US hasn't opposed it, and couldn't do so with any effect, but we didn't create it and don't sustain it. It's not about us. It's the way they do things and the way they have always done things. Someday it will blow up in their faces and change will come... but it's not for us to say when.


All the U.S. has to do is focus on getting our policies back in line with our espoused principles. That is step one.

I don't see anything in our espoused principles that requires or encourages us to bring our ways to others or to interfere in the domestic policies of other nations.

I do not like the idea of installing or sustaining dictatorships, not because of espoused principles but because in the long run I think it works against our interests. Trying to impose ourselves as champion of the oppressed populaces is just as bad. Gently, subtly supporting change, yes. Giving it a quiet push at key moments, yes, though we have to very careful about how and when. Waving the flag of democracy and charging into the affairs of others... no.

91bravojoe
02-09-2011, 05:30 AM
The most egregious examples of terror against the US have been designed not to get the US out of Muslim lands, but to get them in: without a foreign invader AQ hasn't much to work with, and they needed us to do what we did. They made sure we would do it.

Confuses tactics and strategy. If Professor Pape and his group at the University of Chicago can be believed, the goal and the strategy are crystal clear: get the troops of "western democracies" out of Islamic countries.

That conclusion is based on thousands of hours of interviews with family members of deceased suicide bombers, as well as a smattering of conversations with live Jihadists.

Main paper:

http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/APSRAug03Pape.pdf

Feeble(because it argues about events which haven't taken place) rejoinder:

http://www.princeton.edu/~kramsay/Site/research_files/rejoinder3.pdf

From the rebuttal:


First, the article did not sample suicide terrorism, but collected the universe of suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1980 through 2001. It is the first database of its kind; United States, British, and Israeli officials tell me that they do not have comparably complete data.
There is no such thing as sample bias in collecting a universe.

Second, although it is true that the universe systematically studied did not include suicide terrorist campaigns that did not happen . . .

http://www.princeton.edu/~kramsay/Site/research_files/pape-respon.pdf

------------------

I always found the approach of Ashworth etc incredibly republican. Depends on something that did not happen, but we know what to think about it.

Dayuhan
02-09-2011, 06:02 AM
Confuses tactics and strategy. If Professor Pape and his group at the University of Chicago can be believed, the goal and the strategy are crystal clear: get the troops of "western democracies" out of Islamic countries.


Possibly some confusion among tactics, strategy, and policy here.

Certainly AQ's long term "policy goal" (or fantasy, possibly a more appropriate word) would be to expel the west and all who associate with them from the Middle East, establish a Caliphate, etc. By the late 90s, though, the operative goal was a lot simpler: survival. Pursuit of that goal required a jihad against an infidel invader in Muslim lands, and there wasn't one. AQ tried desperately to sell the idea of the US presence in Saudi Arabia in that role, but it didn't work, at least not in a sense widespread enough to make a difference.

The sequence that began with the 1998 fatwa and culminated in 9/11 were, as far as I can see, less about driving the west out or building a Caliphate than about provoking military occupation and providing AQ with the raison d'etre it lost with the Soviet withdrawal.

The beliefs of suicide bombers do not necessarily reflect the goals of AQ. The actual goals and the pitch used to persuade suicide bombers and jihad footsoldiers were likely very different. This is often the case: soldiers are always told that they are fighting for the noblest of motives. Hard to get people to blow themselves up by telling them that fundraising is way down and if we don't get the Americans to invade somebody it's gonna dry up completely.

Dayuhan
02-10-2011, 12:40 AM
Was looking at Google News this AM, good way to see what's being said about things in other parts of the world. Came on this:

http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=207553


Congress members wary of Muslim Brotherhood role in Egypt

Defense Minister Barak holds meetings in Washington with top officials to discuss Cairo crisis; legislators slam Obama administration for suggesting Islamist group should have some role in government.

WASHINGTON – Members of Congress warned about the risk posed by the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in a new Egyptian government Wednesday and scolded the Obama administration for suggesting an openness to the Islamic group having some role in its composition.

“The Muslim Brotherhood had nothing to do with driving these protests, and they and other extremists must not be allowed to hijack the movement toward democracy and freedom in Egypt,” declared Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, at the start of a hearing Wednesday.

Natural I suppose for the Jerusalem Post to play up that angle. The more I think about it, though, the more I think the US should be pushing for inclusion of the Brotherhood in Government, ideally in a substantial role. The reason why:

When Mubarak goes there's going to be huge euphoria and great expectations. Ding, dong, the witch is dead, Mubarak was the problem and Mubarak is gone, so the problems are over and everything's gonna be ok. All that is going to come to a crunching head-on collision with reality very quickly.

Very early in the new government's term some poor SOB is gonna have to crunch some numbers on revenues and expenses, assets and liabilities. Those numbers will be beyond ugly. The new government will have to manage a civil service, local government apparatus, military, and police that are riddled with patronage and an entrenched culture of corruption. They will not be amenable to reform. Prices of food and fuel will still be high. There will still be a huge demographic bulge of unemployed youth, and "create jobs" is easier said than done. Domestic investment will be constrained for years: I haven't seen figures on capital flight but you can bet Mubarak's cronies have been getting everything they can get their hands on out of the country, and that's plenty. Most of it won't come back. The foreign investment climate is not exactly hopping. Foreign aid may be sustained, but donor countries have their own issues and it's not likely to be increased. The new government is likely to be a coalition of groups that have little in common but opposition to Mubarak, and there will be all kinds of infighting and gridlock. I could go on (and on, and on) but that's enough. it will be very difficult, and there will be a lot of disappointment and frustration.

The last place we want to see the Muslim Brothers in all this is outside the tent in a pure opposition role, with no responsibility or accountability, blaming, criticizing, and building their own constituency and influence around that disappointment and frustration. Far better to have them sharing the hot seat, making their share of the mess and taking their share of the blame.

So we should make sure, IMO and as much as we can, that they are in the tent. The Israelis will have a cow and some Americans will shriek "who lost Egypt", but it may be time to do something sensible for a change. Fearful breach of precedent, yes, but some are worth breaching.

Surferbeetle
02-10-2011, 03:22 AM
Steve,

For what it's worth, I agree with this analysis...


I think you rather overstate the influence he has, especially now, in his dotage and with his world sliding apart around him. Even in his prime no despot rules alone: he needs the army, the police, the business elite, all kinds of key sectors around him, and he needs to keep doling out to feed and keep the barons in balance. When the edifice starts to shake there is little or no loyalty. Everyone in the picture knows Mubarak is gone, whether next week or in September makes no difference. The people around him may still be kissing ass in front of him, but the moment his back is turned they are plotting ways to turn the situation to their personal advantage and ways of covering their exits if things go badly. There will be lots of deals being cut behind his back.

...as well as this one.


Very early in the new government's term some poor SOB is gonna have to crunch some numbers on revenues and expenses, assets and liabilities. Those numbers will be beyond ugly. The new government will have to manage a civil service, local government apparatus, military, and police that are riddled with patronage and an entrenched culture of corruption. They will not be amenable to reform. Prices of food and fuel will still be high. There will still be a huge demographic bulge of unemployed youth, and "create jobs" is easier said than done. Domestic investment will be constrained for years: I haven't seen figures on capital flight but you can bet Mubarak's cronies have been getting everything they can get their hands on out of the country, and that's plenty. Most of it won't come back. The foreign investment climate is not exactly hopping. Foreign aid may be sustained, but donor countries have their own issues and it's not likely to be increased. The new government is likely to be a coalition of groups that have little in common but opposition to Mubarak, and there will be all kinds of infighting and gridlock. I could go on (and on, and on) but that's enough. it will be very difficult, and there will be a lot of disappointment and frustration.

The last place we want to see the Muslim Brothers in all this is outside the tent in a pure opposition role, with no responsibility or accountability, blaming, criticizing, and building their own constituency and influence around that disappointment and frustration. Far better to have them sharing the hot seat, making their share of the mess and taking their share of the blame.

We both agree that the journey towards equilibrium in Egypt will take some time, 'grown' in your paradigm and 'built' in mine. I am curious as to the shape of your predicted equilibrium and the steps it may require, beyond encouraging inclusiveness. From what I have observed Darwinian fights for power are often characterized by no holds barred struggles which usually occur behind a facade of adherence to socially acceptable mores. To me, grown implies a genetically defined endpoint, whereas built captures some of the 'creative tension' which is part and parcel of collective social experiences.

Some of the steps on the way towards equilibrium that I see include media access, technocratic transparency, and room for political discourse...however all of these require a powerful team of referees...perhaps a regulated MMA (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mixed_martial_arts) vs. 'Vale Tudo' MMA (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vale_Tudo) match analogy applies. I would say that the population of Egypt, who are but ‘one’ of the participants in this struggle, has a better chance of meeting some of it's aspirations because of the role that international/new media has assumed in acting as a referee (part of a team of referee's which still includes, from this armchair, the Egyptian Military). 'Neutral' technocrats, backed by power brokers/barons (building and maintaining bases of power and negotiating agreements), can also use new media as a tool to provide transparency into corruption and thus leverage public outrage in order to influence politicians. Democratic structures can act as relatively safe (as compared to war) arenas for political brawls among interested parties.

Like many others I am thinking about Indonesia as well as some of the Eastern Block countries in Europe, during their transitions to democracy, as case studies. Any recommendations?

Steve

Dayuhan
02-10-2011, 04:01 AM
Steve,

I tend to refer back to the Philippines and Indonesia, only because I know them best. Obviously those can only be very loose reference points; differences abound.

I don't know enough about the Egyptian political scene to have any detailed predictions of what will emerge.

I can think of a few plus points. A strong sense of national identity and national pride help. Egypt doesn't have the ethnic/sectarian divisions and history of minority rule that Iraq had, or Afghanistan's history of recent and violent internal conflict. The current resistance seems primarily aimed at Mubarak, not so much class-oriented. That reduces the "us and them" factor a bit.

The spontaneity of the rebellion is in some ways a downside. The forces that are actually driving Mubarak out are poorly organized with little clear representation. A crowd of a million can drive a government out, but you can't bring it into the back room when negotiations are going on. It will, however, be in the back of the minds of those who are negotiating that what happened before can happen again.

I suspect that whatever emerges first will be elite-dominated; and that's not all bad. Better an elite-dominated government that has an outside chance of governing and potential to evolve than a truly representative government that's so diverse and so inexperienced that it can't function at all.

The army will have to be in the mix, despite being identified with Mubarak. The business elite, same. Hopefully these will be somewhat constrained by the prospect of the crowd returning to the streets. The youth leaders need to be there but it remains to be seen whether their constituency and leadership role are more than transitory. The brotherhood needs to be there too: who they decide will represent them will be revealing.

I understand that current Egyptian law, heavily weighted to the advantage of the ruling party, could be an obstacle. There would be plus and minus sides to trying to write a new constitution: it may be necessary, but trying to do it at once could eat time and attention that might better be applied to getting the nation back on its feet.

All that might be a load of bollocks. I'd like to hear what those who know more than I do think.

Some current commentary on the Muslim Brotherhood seems to assume that if they are legal and included they will inevitably take over. I have doubts. That reminds me of the Cold War notion that any tolerance at all for Communists was a one-way road to Communist rule. As paranoia faded many nations discovered that the best way to disable a Communist is to give him a seat in Parliament. The same may be true of the Brotherhood.

We will see.

Steve

Cliff
02-10-2011, 05:03 AM
Contrary to what you say about the US relationship to Mubarak, relationship to al-Sauds is also certainly no "Cold War relic", an issue that endures "through inertia", or something of that kind, but an active, ongoing relationship, to mutual advantage of the USA and the al-Saud family (including parts that support extremists). Thus, to say "they are not a US clients by any means", sorry, stands no proof.

Crowbat -

I have to agree that the relationship with the KSA is mutually benificial. But I think the US' main "gain" out of the relationship is not oil (only 10.4% of US oil is from KSA, see here (http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm)), but security and stability. One of the main benefits is that the Saudis (along with the UAE and Qatar) help us deter the Iranians from dominating the region. This is one of the main reasons why we provide them with weapons, in spite of the drawbacks that you have pointed out.

I submit that you would be hard-pressed to argue that allowing Iran to dominate the region would be a good idea.

V/R,

Cliff

CrowBat
02-10-2011, 05:03 AM
I think you rather overstate the influence he has, especially now, in his dotage and with his world sliding apart around him. Even in his prime no despot rules alone: he needs the army, the police, the business elite, all kinds of key sectors around him, and he needs to keep doling out to feed and keep the barons in balance.If we would be talking about Iraq under Sadam (for example) I would be ready to agree with this without any problem. If we would be talking about Iran, I'd say this goes even further than described by you.

However, a large part of Mubarak's power is based on his fortune, with which he is buying his lieutenants as required. As the situation in the country is, even if only 10% of rumours are true, he surely has the money to pay large parts of state apparatus, as required and from his pocket, in order to achieve what he needs. In essence, he was all the time doing with various Egyptians what he did with that French minister, later the last year.


Mubarak is not in charge; if he was this wouldn't be happening.He can't be in charge of the minds of all the 80 millions of Egyptians, because nobody could do that and one can't kill ideas - particularly not the "popular" ones. That's why this happened.


Of course none of that means "the people" are calling the shots. They never are, even in a functioning democracy. It means nobody is fully in control,and everyone with an ambition is maneuvering for position. The kind is going down, there's no mechanism for succession that anyone has confidence in, the barons are cutting their deals and preparing for their moves, and the crowd is the joker in the deck. It will likely be messy and nobody, including Mubarak, is in a position to dictate the future.Until yesterday, I would have said that Mubarak was perfectly in control of almost everything that was going on in Egypt, bar protesters of course. He appointed a VP, who began manoeuvring for position in quite an arrogant, but successful fashion. His new government followed the same track. There was obviously a plan for a situation like this, and his lieutenants were sticking to that plan, working it down one point after the other - and quite successfully at that. Since the unions of large segments of the industry are on strike, this began to change, i.e. this revolution entered its new phase (just for comparisson: unions not siding with protesters was what made the difference in Iran, the last year).


You didn't explain it, you stated it. Repeating it doesn't make it true, and I doubt very much that it is true.I explained it too, already, but if I really have to repeat it, I'll do so, no problem.


There's a lot of talk about the US "supporting the revolution" or "supporting the will of the people" but lovely as the idea may sound, the degree to which the US can or should get involved is open to a lot of question, even from supporters of the populace.The essence is this aspect is that the US present themselves - in the US and abroad - as "the land of the free" and the "free land", "cradle of modern democracy", "seat of justice" etc. Because of this, in cases like this with Egypt the US has only two choices: present themselves as what they says they are, or present themselves as what so many of their enemies say the US are. "Walking the thin line" works for the opponents of the US, since it presents a true load of argumentation against the US. And, in the case of US-supported despots as eager for power as Mubarak it signals, "stay in power at least until we think about this one".


....It may seem quicker and easier for an outside deus ex machina to simply say "go", but even assuming that worked, which is far from certain, the opposition have failed to reach the requisite level of maturity and capacity to force change themselves, which would not augur well for the aftermath, which will be hard enough in any event.All perfectly OK and quite obvious. And still, every single minute Mubarak remains in his position makes this situation ever less predictable, though more likely to end in violence. If for no other reason then because there are plenty of young people on the streets of Egypt, protesting against what is very few old people that are in charge, because both sides tend to grow inpatient in such situations, and because - as we all should know - this "combination" tends to end without useful results, in violent confrontations.


...it's virtually impossible for us to intervene without taking over...Nobody is asking the USA to "take over". A step of this kind would not only be "wrong", but result in a catastrophe. All I'm telling you is what I'm "hearing" (literaly), i.e. reading in e-mails from a number of young Egyptians at the Tahrir Square and in Alexandria: Mubarak must go, first and foremost, and that's where the USA can "help" a lot - primarily through becoming more "direct" in their handling of Mubarak.

Then (I do have a feeling I'm repeating myself now, and not for the first time), as long as Mubarak is in power, nothing in Egypt is going to change, since he's going to remain in a position to keep on bribing members of his clique that are still in charge as he wants (and once they are in power of some kind, they are unlikely to "wish" to go away; see Soleiman). And when I say "nothing", then I mean the opposition too, then the opposition is not going to get any different (not even better organized) as long a Mubarak is still in power.

Surely, there is a number of Mubarak's lieutenants who meanwhile act on their own (though still in agreement with Mubarak) as well, since they know that when he falls, they're going to fall too. But, they are going to continue working in his interest - and, like Soleiman, practically continue ignoring protests, or at least ignoring their demands - only as long as he's in power.


I don't think it is so easily confirmed, and the references one chooses to cite say a good deal about one's preconceived ideas... often more than they say about the matter under discussion.Down at the bottom, you're always going to think about me whatever you like, regardless what references I use.


It never ceases to amuse me that people can see the Saudis ordering $60 billions in goods from American factories, in an industry under severe stress at a time of very high unemployment, and somehow translate that into us supporting them...."Mutual interdependence" comes closer to the truth....I'm also frequently amused about people prefering to rip statements out of the context in which they are issued (for the sake of argument?), instead of paying attention at the fact that right after that sentence, I also wrote, "...an active, ongoing relationship, to mutual advantage of the USA and the al-Saud family...".


Whatever that relationship was in the past, it has for some time been close to peer-to-peer. The US does not and cannot dictate to the Saudis."Dictate" - is definitely impossible, exactly because of "mutual interdependence" we're both talking about. Not only are such times a matter of past (and that since long), but also it is so that lot of power structures inside the USA would have to change in order to reach a position where the White House and/or State Department would ever come to the idea to issue specific demants upon the al-Sauds. For the time being (at least), this is not even distantly possible, then al-Sauds are "untouchable".

However, exactly that is the problem: the pillar of the US "non-Israel related" foreign policy in the Middle East stands, and falls, with al-Sauds.

We've some influence over them, as they have over us, but no more than is normally the case among nations with interests in common and extensive economic connections. Neither they not their rulers are in any meaningful way US clients.


Of course all manner of relationships are routinely distorted, cherrypicked, and elevated to an exalted status by all manner of fringe conspiracy theorists. AIPAC, the Carlyle Group, and a whole bunch of others are favorite fodder. Some find it all very thrilling in a Robert Ludlum sort of way; I personally can't be bothered.Sure. And there are also plenty of people that put their visor down as soon as they hear a trace of certain terminology. It gets particularly funny how the same people instantly use the terminus "conspiracy theorists" and all other sorts of similar semanthics of denial - regardless what it takes.

Quite defensive in my opinion, but then that's not my problem: I'm still waiting for my pair of Frankfurter with süßem Senf.

Cliff
02-10-2011, 05:06 AM
Found this analysis (http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0208/Five-reasons-why-Arab-regimes-are-falling) of why the Arab Regimes are falling on the World Politics Review media roundup. The author is a professor of political science at Cairo University and Central Michigan.

Touches on the varied sources of the unrest, especially the demographic ones.

V/R,

Cliff

Pete
02-10-2011, 05:43 AM
The army will have to be in the mix, despite being identified with Mubarak. The business elite, same. Hopefully these will be somewhat constrained by the prospect of the crowd returning to the streets.
As Lawrence famously said in the Seven Pillars, it's the former collaborators and businessmen who form stable governments, not the revolutionaries.

CrowBat
02-10-2011, 05:51 AM
Crowbat -

I have to agree that the relationship with the KSA is mutually benificial. But I think the US' main "gain" out of the relationship is not oil (only 10.4% of US oil is from KSA, see here (http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm)), but security and stability.OK, let me try again:

"... it functions so that the Sauds sell their oil reliably and often at lower prices, and recycle these [I meant the Petro-Dollars they earn that way] through massive purchases of US armament or investments in the USA, both of which keep large parts of the US economy in running condition."

Regarding "security and stability"... You say, "One of the main benefits is that the Saudis (along with the UAE and Qatar) help us deter the Iranians from dominating the region. This is one of the main reasons why we provide them with weapons, in spite of the drawbacks that you have pointed out."

I understand your standpoint and I'm ready to go as far as to say, "theoretically, it's perfectly OK". Practically, however, I often see it as "greasing mud into the eyes". Why? Well, I think this is not going to be possible to explain without going into quite some details.

I see myself as "specialized" in studying "air forces" and "ops". When I study these two topics in regards of KSA I can reach back on quite a fresh experience: the "war" against al-Houthis, in Yemen. In very short, somewhat generalizing terms, for the local military RSAF this war developed as follows: after being put on alert, the military rushed the local brigade, reinforced by certain "elite" elements (rangers, para-commandos etc.) to the scene. Driven rather by religious fevour than all the 20 years of training it received from its US instructors, this "unit" did exactly the same that led to an early demise of two "elite" armoured brigades of the Yemeni Army only a few weeks before: namely, it charged the enemy positions frontally even though having next to no clue what's going on. I hope that many here are going to agree, that it's little surprising the Saudi unit in question suffered considerable losses in the process (over 120 KIA and MIA on a single day).

This "slap on the fingers" convinced the rest of the military that this is going to be a "slightly" more serious affair than expected. Thus, even though al-Houthis surely did not bombard Riyadh or disrupted the work of the Saudi military on its home-bases in any other fashion, they required another three days to set up a joint command capable of coordinating the work of all the involved branches. Surely enough, the RSAF was airborne and flying very intensively, providing 24/7 air cover for the (mauled) brigade that was in contact with al-Houthis at the border, and the troops on the ground knew to appreciate the almost permanent presence of F-15s and Tornados above them - particularly in the light of the fact that many of them proved overweight, unfit, that their assault rifles proved too short-ranged, that they lacked even such basic equipment like binoculars etc., not to talk about their lack of any kind of training in navigation and manoeuvring in the field... But, eventually it turned out that F-15s and Tornados operating at above 15,000ft is not the best possible idea, particularly if this happens because somebody in Washington convinced al-Sauds that the Iranians supplied al-Houthis with MANPADs - while this was simply not truth... (al-Houthis actually supplied themselves from depots of some 20 various Yemeni arms-dealers, all of whom have since been arrested by the authorities; but that with "Iranians delivering arms" appeared more convenient as a PR-tool, so why change it only because it proved wrong?)...Whatever, intensive flying soon began pointing at maintenance problems related to the fact that there are jobs the RSAF ground crews simply refuse to learn doing; i.e. they order their "foreign contract personnel" to do it since in their opinion the party that sold them the equipment that's "not functioning" is responsible for making it functional again....Something like another "three days later", it turned out the RSAF is also short on PGMs, and in need of urgent resupply (I could go into some...funny...details about "whys" here too)....etc., etc., etc.. Once this all was over, the Saudis declared themselves for "victorious" - and then for "better than the Israelis", then they think they fought a "Hezbollah-type" force and won a war against it (ssshhh, please, don't tell them that the Yemeni government eventually felt forced to accept a ceasefire with al-Houthis and give them a share in power and politics), while the Israelis failed to do so in Lebanon, back in 2006....

And now imagine this "military" finding itself on the receiving end of an Iranian attack...

Thus, in summary, you say, "One of the main benefits is that the Saudis (along with the UAE and Qatar) help us deter the Iranians from dominating the region. This is one of the main reasons why we provide them with weapons, in spite of the drawbacks that you have pointed out."

I say: sure, the Saudis do not deliver as much oil to the US as certain other countries (see Canada for example), but, sure, they do buy much more US armament than the Canadians (in turn keeping large segments of the US heavy industry afloat etc., etc., etc.). The problem is that they can't really use this armament, nor does their government cares for its military to become capable of using this armament - and thus KSA remains dependable on US support should the situation become really serious.

Means: I'm sure the US means it serious with "security and stability"...But as it is, the situation is resulting in none, then as far as I know the Iranians (those between them that matter), they are not really deterred even by the US-, not to talk about the Saudi military.


I submit that you would be hard-pressed to argue that allowing Iran to dominate the region would be a good idea.I confess I'm convinced that Iran dominates the US minds already since years, and that - in the long run - I simply do not see the way the US can prevent them from dominating at least certain parts of the area.

Bob's World
02-10-2011, 11:00 AM
Crowbat -

I have to agree that the relationship with the KSA is mutually beneficial. But I think the US' main "gain" out of the relationship is not oil (only 10.4% of US oil is from KSA, see here (http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm)), but security and stability. One of the main benefits is that the Saudis (along with the UAE and Qatar) help us deter the Iranians from dominating the region. This is one of the main reasons why we provide them with weapons, in spite of the drawbacks that you have pointed out.

I submit that you would be hard-pressed to argue that allowing Iran to dominate the region would be a good idea.

V/R,

Cliff

Ok, I'll bite: How exactly do the KSA, UAE and Qatar "help us" deter Iran?

Pre-invasion Iraq certainly helped deter Iran, but it was the alliance with the US that was leveraged by those other three to deter not just Iran, but each other as well. The KSA could go a long way to solving some of their own internal revenue shortfall problems by rolling up a rich little neighbor or two (mostly formed by the Brits to ensure their share of the oil coming out of the AP following their eviction from Iran).

Israel and the Gulf States work hard to keep the U.S. thinking of Iran as "the enemy." Iran is not the enemy, Iran is both the past and the future of that region. Sure the Brits and the U.S. are both bitter because Iran dared to stand up and tell us both in turn to 'F-off,' but that fact alone validates the importance of Iran. What other state in the Middle East could expel both the UK and the US? That's that kind of moxie real Americans respect.

Someday we will either let the tail wag the dog, and get us into a fight with Iran; or we will swallow our pride and re-establish relations with this important nation over their protests. I hope it is the latter.

omarali50
02-10-2011, 05:03 PM
The US (or some parts of the US policy-making apparatus) keep repeating some line about the need to "deter Iran" which I just cannot figure out. We keep hearing that Israel is responsible for this nugget of strategic wisdom, but I still cannot figure out how Iran is a mortal threat to Israel?
It seems to me, its mostly about selling arms and making money for particular individuals (agents and contractors) and corporations (especially oil companies and arms manufacturers). All the rest is BS. Which is not necessarily a disaster provided the tail does not get to wag the dog....

Ken White
02-10-2011, 05:40 PM
The US (or some parts of the US policy-making apparatus) keep repeating some line about the need to "deter Iran" which I just cannot figure out...and some of us have an aggrandized sense of injury. There are also some who must have an 'enemy' against whom to fulminate or 'plan' -- strange though that is... :(

As Crowbat said, they're going to dominate parts of the ME and are going to influence things further afield. That's reality -- anathema to US politicians. :rolleyes:

carl
02-10-2011, 06:41 PM
What other state in the Middle East could expel both the UK and the US? That's that kind of moxie real Americans respect.

It would be a lot easier if I didn't keep reading about how their gov. wants to kill me.

omarali50
02-10-2011, 09:38 PM
Carl, you shouldnt believe everything you read. As far as I can tell, the US govt is more interested in killing some iranians than the Iranian govt is in killing random Americans. I have no love for the current regime in Iran (which has lost a lot of legitimacy domestically and will eventually have a new round of troubles at home, no matter what the US does) but really, if you leave them alone, they are very unlikely to send someone ten thousand miles to kill you. Its not a priority for them.
I am not saying they dont support some terrorists (even terrorists in this hemisphere, as in Latin America) but its more ### for tat than any real plan to launch war against the US no matter what.
But beyond the regime (which is fast becoming a dictatorship of the revolutionary guards) the people or Iran have no fundamental quarrel with the US. And Iran is a real country, with a real history and deep culture and its going to be around no matter what. Treating them with a little bit of respect would not be a bad idea.

tequila
02-10-2011, 10:03 PM
Given Mubarak's refusal to resign (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/02/2011210172519776830.html)despite elaborate hinting throughout the day, combined with Suleiman's order to the protesters to return home - we may finally see major bloodshed in the streets tomorrow. I think some Egyptian captains and majors are not going to sleep well tonight.

carl
02-11-2011, 12:03 AM
Carl, you shouldnt believe everything you read. As far as I can tell, the US govt is more interested in killing some iranians than the Iranian govt is in killing random Americans. I have no love for the current regime in Iran (which has lost a lot of legitimacy domestically and will eventually have a new round of troubles at home, no matter what the US does) but really, if you leave them alone, they are very unlikely to send someone ten thousand miles to kill you. Its not a priority for them.
I am not saying they dont support some terrorists (even terrorists in this hemisphere, as in Latin America) but its more ### for tat than any real plan to launch war against the US no matter what.
But beyond the regime (which is fast becoming a dictatorship of the revolutionary guards) the people or Iran have no fundamental quarrel with the US. And Iran is a real country, with a real history and deep culture and its going to be around no matter what. Treating them with a little bit of respect would not be a bad idea.

No quarrel with the Iranian people at all. Wish them all the best and my option for dealing with the country might surprise some people....But, when I am over on my little corner of the imperial frontier, those Quds force guys really do want to kill me. They just wait for the word, which thanks to stuxnet they haven't got. They have killed a lot of our guys.

I know most of the people are ok. Its those un-ok's who control the place...

Bob's World
02-11-2011, 12:25 AM
Containment doesn't work without something to "contain," and I really think it is as much our inablitiy to break free from "containment-think" as anything that keeps us poking sticks into places like N. Korea, Iran, Venezuala and even China.

This is why I am for a retirement of containment as the centerpiece of how we engage the world. It demands threats to encircle, and a systems of controls over those who live in that circle to implement.

Also an aspect of why I think we need to elevate Populaces in our equations of engagement. When we have the ass with the govenrment of Iran to be specific in our in our language to say "The government of Iran must..." rather than the standard lumping together of "Iran must..."

We live in dynamic times. We just need to get a bit more dynamic.

carl
02-11-2011, 12:40 AM
Containment doesn't work without something to "contain," and I really think it is as much our inablitiy to break free from "containment-think" as anything that keeps us poking sticks into places like N. Korea, Iran, Venezuala and even China.

I gotta ask. The phrase "poking sticks" implies being provocative, and in the context of your sentence, needlessly so.

How are we provoking the Kim dynasty in North Korea, other than objecting to them doing things like sinking ROK navy ships and killing the occasional South Korean over the years?

Dayuhan
02-11-2011, 01:23 AM
The KSA could go a long way to solving some of their own internal revenue shortfall problems by rolling up a rich little neighbor or two

The Saudis don't have internal revenue shortfall problems. They had a budget surplus well up in the billions in 2010, and that's after cranking public spending up so high they had a hard time finding more things to spend money on.

Too often we base assessments of Saudi conditions on data and observations that reach back to the oil glut. Big mistake: times have changed. There's also a huge difference between the way this oil surge is being handled and the way the last one was handled: partly because they see the logic in it and partly because they're worried about expropriation of assets in the event of another major terror attack, most of the money is being invested within the country. Salaries in the civil service (the largest employer by far of Saudi citizens) have seen huge increases, and there's been huge spending on job-creating industries, schools, medical facilities, infrastructure, etc. That may be a blatant payoff, but it is working: there's a lot less anti-government sentiment than there once was. As with China, I really don't see major civil disorder happening in the KSA or the Gulf states unless there's a major economic shock. The tension of the mid/late 90s is largely gone.

We need to get it through our heads that we are not "providing" arms to the Saudis to advance our purposes. They are buying them, for their own purposes. Maybe silly purposes, and they may or not be achieving those purposes, but that's their choice. It's not about something we are doing to deter Iran, or for any other purposes. It's a business deal. They are initiating it. It's not us helping or using them. If we didn't sell the stuff they could buy equivalent stuff elsewhere. If we backed out of these deals, how many seconds would it be before alternative proposals from China, Russia, the UK, France, etc were on the table? The $120 billion that the GCC countries are spending on US arms is largely seen in that region as charity, and there is some merit in that perception.

The US is not protecting the Saudis from their own people, or enabling them to oppress their own people, or giving permission to oppress their own people. They can do that themselves, they don't ask our permission, and they don't care what we think. They are not dependent on us and we do not control them.

The actual amount of oil the Saudis sell the US is irrelevant. Even if we didn't buy a drop from them, the US would still be very concerned with keeping that oil flowing, because if it stopped, the people who were buying it would then compete with us to buy the oil we are buying, and prices for everyone would go through the roof. It's not about how much they sell us, it's about the percentage of overall world production they represent, and the very large percentage of world reserve production that they represent.

We fought Saddam when he threatened the Gulf oil supplies, and we would fight Iran if they threatened the Gulf oil supplies. This has nothing to do with protecting the Saudis or defending the Saudis. It has to do with protecting and defending ourselves. Quite aside from the fact that invading and absorbing your neighbors is illegal and unacceptable no matter what their form of government is, the US cannot allow that much oil to fall under the control of a government openly hostile to us. It's not about empowering the Saudis to oppress, it's not subservience, it's not us doing their bidding... it's just a common interest. Common interests are what make alliances, not similar political systems or similar ideas on government-populace relations.


Israel and the Gulf States work hard to keep the U.S. thinking of Iran as "the enemy." Iran is not the enemy, Iran is both the past and the future of that region.

Iran is part of the past and future of that region. So are Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and others.

The Iranian government also works hard to sustain the perception of hostility. They are deeply invested in that perception and they need it to continue. It's not just about the history. The Vietnamese have as much historical reason as the Iranians to dislike the US, but their government has astutely recognized that getting along with the US and the west is in their interest, and set the past aside. The Iranian government could do the same, if they chose to. They don't choose to. They have as much to do with sustaining hostility as we do, and they do it intentionally and for their own purposes.

Of course we have no quarrel with the Iranian people. We had no quarrel with the Japanese people in 1942, but we still fought a devastating war with the country. Hostility is a choice of government, and it's not just a blind reaction to past affronts. It's a decision and it reflects a purpose. That purpose may be the government's, not the people's, but it's governments that start wars.

I don't think "the Iranians" per se have any real desire to invade the states across the Gulf and start a region-wide war. I do suspect, though, that there are people in that Government who have some ambitions and ideas, and it is possible that they could choose to carry them out. If their people allow them to try, and follow them, there will be a big mess, even if we have no quarrel with their people.


Someday we will either let the tail wag the dog, and get us into a fight with Iran; or we will swallow our pride and re-establish relations with this important nation over their protests. I hope it is the latter.

I doubt that the current Iranian government would allow that to happen, even if we tried: that dance takes two. They need somebody to hate: a common enough ting in repressive, extremist governments.

Dayuhan
02-11-2011, 01:30 AM
Given Mubarak's refusal to resign (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/02/2011210172519776830.html)despite elaborate hinting throughout the day, combined with Suleiman's order to the protesters to return home - we may finally see major bloodshed in the streets tomorrow. I think some Egyptian captains and majors are not going to sleep well tonight.

Mass rebellions of this sort are often decided, in the end, by a simple choice made by the armed forces and police. The order to disperse the crowd, to fire on them if necessary, will eventually be given. They will obey or they will not. If they obey, we have a Tiananmen Square scenario and the government continues, albeit unsteadily and in this case possibly unsustainably.

Mubarak will not leave because the crowd wants him to leave. He certainly isn't going to leave because the US President tells him to, no matter what some believe. He will leave if his army refuses to follow his orders. He won't have any choice.

omarali50
02-11-2011, 02:30 AM
Dayuhan, you make a lot of sense.

Dayuhan
02-11-2011, 02:57 AM
Dayuhan, you make a lot of sense.

Thank you, so do you ;)

tequila
02-11-2011, 03:12 AM
Mass rebellions of this sort are often decided, in the end, by a simple choice made by the armed forces and police. The order to disperse the crowd, to fire on them if necessary, will eventually be given. They will obey or they will not. If they obey, we have a Tiananmen Square scenario and the government continues, albeit unsteadily and in this case possibly unsustainably.

Mubarak will not leave because the crowd wants him to leave. He certainly isn't going to leave because the US President tells him to, no matter what some believe. He will leave if his army refuses to follow his orders. He won't have any choice.

But I wonder if parts of the Army are going to begin thinking for themselves. This is a conscript army, whose company and battalion officers come from the same urban middle class which is flooding the streets of Cairo and spearheading the strikes and demonstrations. Omar Suleiman had a chance to oversee some sort of transition, but he threw that chance away tonight with his "all you meddlesome kids go home" speech. The higher ranks of the armed forces appear to be with Mubarak, at least for now. The question is if the colonels, majors, and captains will follow them if the choice is between saving an 83-year-old Mubarak or firing on their own people.

Dayuhan
02-11-2011, 03:49 AM
But I wonder if parts of the Army are going to begin thinking for themselves. This is a conscript army, whose company and battalion officers come from the same urban middle class which is flooding the streets of Cairo and spearheading the strikes and demonstrations. Omar Suleiman had a chance to oversee some sort of transition, but he threw that chance away tonight with his "all you meddlesome kids go home" speech. The higher ranks of the armed forces appear to be with Mubarak, at least for now. The question is if the colonels, majors, and captains will follow them if the choice is between saving an 83-year-old Mubarak or firing on their own people.

Exactly. That's why there's a choice. The choice happens on all kinds of levels. For the footsoldier it may be a decision not to fire on his own people. For an officer it might be the realization that the regime is probably going to lose, and committing to the wrong side could be big trouble.

When we had this situation in Manila, many units near the city delayed movements, giving all kinds of excuses: the commanders wanted to avoid committing until they had a better read on which way the wind was blowing and which side was likely to come out on top. That's especially true a few steps below the top level, where people haven't had an opportunity to feather a nice cushy nest abroad for retirement if things go south. Nobody wants to be caught on the wrong side when the music stops, especially the people who don't have a bolt hole and are not influential enough to avoid being thrown to the sharks when somebody has to take the rap for the bloodshed.

All kinds of things influence these decisions. Again in Manila, the first real head-to-head between the armed forces and the crowd involved Marine units just back from combat in Mindanao. They were clearly not prepared to cope with crowd control or a confrontation with a crowd. When the first of their armored vehicles knocked down a wall (they cut through an empty lot to circumvent a barricade on a major thoroughfare) the driver came face to face with a group of maybe 3-4 guys standing in front of him. I don't know what orders he had, but he stopped. Once he stopped, a few dozen more people jumped in. When soldiers on foot came through the hole in the wall the people who came forward to meet them were women and middle aged men, well dressed, respectable people. The soldiers just stopped, didn't seem to know what to do. Within 10 minutes there were 500 people in front of them, in 30 minutes there were 5000. It snowballed from there. If there had been a dozen thugs with tear gas and truncheons in front of the Marines they would have gone through with ease. If anyone from the crowd had thrown a rock or a bottle things could have gone to #### in a heartbeat.

I don't think anyone but those individuals knows the names of those few guys who stood unarmed and did not move as a big chunk of steel rolled at them. I don't think anyone remembers the driver who stopped. I saw a man maybe 50 walk straight at a nervous kid who was pointing a rifle at him. He put his hands out and said "hijo, hindi kami kalaban" ("son, we are not enemies"). That's not from a news report: I was standing next to him. For sure nobody remembers his name. That little cluster of moments, though, had a huge influence on what followed.

It comes down to moments, and anyone who says they know what will happen is full of it. Having been there and done that I know how those people in the street feel, and I hope it goes right for them... but we shouldn't pretend the key choices are going to be made by the US, or by Mubarak or his officials, or by the leaders of the opposition. It's very likely that the people who will be involved in the key moments do not know that in a few hours or days or weeks they will stand center stage.

We will see.

Bob's World
02-11-2011, 11:16 AM
Not sure how this will play with the military, but having worked with these guys for several months I know how they think. There is no "commander's intent" in this culture. An order is black and white, and has no gray. Opportunity and risk alike are ignored in favor of doing exactly what one is told and no more or no less. Detailed planners and competent, oh yes. Independent thinkers? No way.

There is a rigid chain of command and no short cuts. Like a line of ants where if you break the trail the entire column stops and mills about. The LT talks to the CPT, who talks to the Major, who talks to the LTC, etc all the way up to Mubarak, then back down again; for virtually every matter. The populace will be way inside the OODA loop of the military. Down side is, that an order to attack is probably even harder to turn off that it is to turn on. But if the populace moves to where the Army isn't, the Army will likely sit and guard the empty space where the populace was.

CrowBat
02-11-2011, 04:10 PM
We need to get it through our heads that we are not "providing" arms to the Saudis to advance our purposes. They are buying them, for their own purposes. Maybe silly purposes, and they may or not be achieving those purposes, but that's their choice. It's not about something we are doing to deter Iran, or for any other purposes.Few observations and some rhethoric questions, out of pure curiosity...

Perhaps this is "reality", i.e. the world is really such a nice place. In the media, it looks like this (all nicely sorted out for the first source that reported it, and in chronological order):

As first, there is a report that the U.S. Set to Offer Huge Arms Deal to Saudi Arabia, $20 billion dollar deal (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/28/washington/28weapons.html?hp). Then there is the usual outcry: Israel cautious on US-Saudi arms deal (http://www.metimes.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20070729-033026-4607r). This problem is then solved in following fashion: Israel hails US military aid rise, over $30 billions! (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6920988.stm) - in reaction to which there is plenty of praise: Israel Says No Objections to US Gulf Arms Deal (http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-07-29-voa14.cfm).

But, now the US admin has a "problem": how to "explain" all of these sales to a country from which 14 out of 19 idiots from 9/11 came - plus provision of billions of US-taxpayer's money to Israel?

Hey, there [i]is a solution! Let's launch some fake news about the threat both of these "allies" are facing: Iran buys 250 long-distance Sukhoi fighter-bombers, 20 fuel tankers, from Russia (http://www.debka.com/headline.php?hid=4449). (Should somebody have a problem with the source, here the same from a far more "authoritative" source: Reports: Iran to buy jets from Russia (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1185379034835&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull) - the one above was just the first to launch the "idea"). And should that prove as "not enough" ("OMG, it could happen somebody to read such Iranian denials like this one": Iran Denies Purchase of Russian Fighters (http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8605100449)), this is at least as good for the same purpose: Iran 'pays Syria to spurn Israel (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22115591-2703,00.html).

As should be known, meanwhile, this affair did not end with a US$20, but a 60 billion deal...and, of course, anybody who comes to the idea to connect the dots in the same fashion like done above, must be a "conspiracy theorist". :o Therefore, it is so that the Saudis must be buying their weapons "for their own purposes", for example, as nicely explained here: Saudi king to press Obama for advanced F-15s to counter 'Iranian threat' (http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/ss_military0587_06_29.asp), or here: Cordesman: US Arms Sales To Saudi Arabia To Help Secure Saudi Oil Flow (http://arabianomics.com/2010/08/24/cordesman-us-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-to-help-secure-saudi-oil-flow/).

Surely enough, we are then often surprised when they get these weapons, but do not (or cannot) make use of them. For example, whenever there is a talk about the "threat from Iran", they cry for help - irrespectively how many weapons, ammo and instruction they have bought already: Saudi Arabia urges US attack on Iran to stop nuclear programme (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cables-saudis-iran). And if one call brings no response, then Saudi king ‘repeatedly requested’ US attack Iran: WikiLeaks documents (http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2010/11/saudi-king-urged-attack-iran/).

Obviously, nothing happened, i.e. their call received a negative answer. But still: if they need this armament for their protection and if it is so that "if we don't sell them, they'll get it somewhere else", then why do they call the US for..."help"?

(Well, good they have introduced a number of methods of reducing dependence on foreign military manpower in the last 20 years).

So, what's then the purpose of what the Saudis are doing? There is a good explanation:

It's a business deal. They are initiating it.
Apparently, it is (a business deal), and they do (initiate such deals). At the first look. At the second, the situation is...hm..."slightly" different, then most of what they bought recently (say, the last 5-6 years) "reads" like steps taken to remedy the "problems" pointed at in the following...."study" ('had to prevent myself from writing "arms catalogue"): Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century (http://books.google.at/books?id=CGEJvqjn-1MC&printsec=frontcover).

But then, it's obviously far more logical, almost "self-understanding", that the mentioned study and all these media reports followed each other by pure accident. Just business, nothing personal.


We fought Saddam when he threatened the Gulf oil supplies, and we would fight Iran if they threatened the Gulf oil supplies. This has nothing to do with protecting the Saudis or defending the Saudis. It has to do with protecting and defending ourselves.Perhaps I'm naive, but if this is the case, then why are we all the times explained the contrary, i.e. that all these sales are very much related to "protecting and defending the Sauds"?

And vice-versa: if this has to do with protecting the USA, West, rest of the world, Moon, the Mars people or whatever else, then why is the extremism spreading and the situation (see Iraq and Pakistan) worsening, instead of improving?


Quite aside from the fact that invading and absorbing your neighbors is illegal and unacceptable no matter what their form of government is, the US cannot allow that much oil to fall under the control of a government openly hostile to us.But Saddam was...OK, not "openly" but still... very friendly to the USA, back in the 1950s, again in the 1980s (see Rick Francona's "From Ally to Adversary", for example). His country was not only removed from the list of countries supporting terrorism, back in 1983, but it also received very "nice" loans, combat helicopters, and even ingredients for "senf". The ties became so close, that between 1986 and 1988, he several times requested deliveries of F-4 Phantom fighters. Indeed, even as of July 1990, he politely requested - and received - a "permission" (well, sort of it) for the "Kuwait business". And, if he would still be around to ask (not that I'm sorry he isn't), I'm sure even today he couldn't reasonably explain to himself, how come his person and his country then found itself on the receiving end of so much hatred and a major military attack by the same powers he has been said he is protecting against the Islamic extremism in Iran for an entire decade... (I'll not go into such "curious" details like the Iraqi "Kari" IADS being at its weakest exactly along the border to the KSA).


The Iranian government also works hard to sustain the perception of hostility. They are deeply invested in that perception and they need it to continue. It's not just about the history. The Vietnamese have as much historical reason as the Iranians to dislike the US, but their government has astutely recognized that getting along with the US and the west is in their interest, and set the past aside. The Iranian government could do the same, if they chose to. They don't choose to.Going back into "Devil's advocate mode" (until further notice): [i]But, they did. They have supported US operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, in 2001 and 2002. They wholeheartedly supported the case against Saddam, even applauded Bush and Powell in the UN. It's a "public secret" that a large number of the Tomahawks, plus a good deal of F-117- and B-1-attacks against Iraq in March 2003 went through the Iranian airspace - which would be impossible (at least equal to an act of war) without an agreement with Tehran. They have written almost a dozen of letters to the White House ever since, but never got a single response (BTW, in Iran it's considered as a "very brazen act", indeed "major offense" not to answer to somebody's letter). All they've got in response are threats, sanctions and yet more threats - all of these released through the media. So, what shall they do if the US simply refuses to get along with Iran (or, worse yet: have no clue how to do that)?

All they can say is, "sorry, we did not start" - which they really didn't (see the already mentioned Op Ajax).

[/End "Devil's advocate mode"]

So, we have the US that "didn't start", and the Iranians that "didn't start", and the Saudis that appear to be "initiating" but actually react to highly a successful, years-long PR-campaigns etc., i.e. they also "didn't start". (Trying to get myself back to the topic) There is also Egypt that "didn't start". Nobody started this; all is "mutual interest".

Hm... this is still prompting at least one "unpleasant question": what is the only common factor in all these cases?

tequila
02-11-2011, 04:33 PM
And ... he is gone (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121125158705862.html).

No reports of bloodshed. Apparently the Army allowed the crowd through to surround the state TV station.

One wonders how long Suleiman will last. I doubt very long at all.

CrowBat
02-11-2011, 04:35 PM
Hosni Mubarak resigns as president (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121125158705862.html)

Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian president, has resigned from his post, handing over power to the armed forces.

Omar Suleiman, the vice-president, announced in a televised address that the president was "waiving" his office, and had handed over authority to the Supreme Council of the armed forces.

It seems now it's the military that makes decisions.

slapout9
02-11-2011, 06:02 PM
John Lennon "Power To The People"


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y575x7hdrv4&feature=related

tequila
02-11-2011, 07:54 PM
A split between the military and Mubarak/Suleiman (http://english.ahram.org.eg/~/NewsContent/1/64/5417/Egypt/Politics-/Army-and-presidency-at-odds--says-former-intellige.aspx)?



Maj. Gen. Safwat El-Zayat, a former senior official of Egypt’s General Intelligence and member of the Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs, asserted, in an interview with Ahram Online, that the address delivered by President Mubarak last night was formulated against the wishes of the armed forces, and away from their oversight. He claimed that Vice Preisdent Omar Suleiman’s address, which came on the heels of Mubarak’s address, was equally in defiance of the armed forces and away from its oversight.

Attributing this information to his own sources within the Egyptian military, Maj. Gen. El-Zayat said there was now a deep cleavage between the armed forces, represented in its Supreme Council, and the Presidential authority, represented in both President Mubarak and his Vice President, Omar Suleiman.

According to El-Zayat, communiqué #2 issued this morning by the Supreme Armed Forces Council was not, as many people in Egypt and elsewhere understood it, an affirmation of the addresses of Mubarak and Suleiman, but rather an attempt to avoid an open conflict, while at the same time underlining that the army will act as guarantor for the transition to full democracy. He adivced that people should listen carefully to the anticipated communique #3.

Surferbeetle
02-11-2011, 08:30 PM
Crowbat,

Your post’s are interesting as always, I greatly appreciate your taking the time to provide references to further explain your points. If you don’t mind my joining in, your last post raises a couple of questions in my mind, and I am also interested in your take on how the recent events in the Arab world will be impacted by some of the latest political developments in Europe.

Let’s start off with discussion regarding business deals with the Middle East, and let’s consider three population observations for scale. My references are Wikipedia, the Economist’s Pocket World in Figures, the IMF (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm), and the EIA (http://www.eia.doe.gov/). The estimates provided by my references do not exactly match nation for nation in my spot check – but the estimates appear to be close enough for this discussion. The Arab League (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Arab_League_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)) is comprised of 22 countries, has approximately 300 million inhabitants, and has a combined GDP of approximately 2 trillion USD. The USA (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_between_U.S._states_and_countries_by_GD P_(PPP)) has 50 states (plus 5 territories + 11 small islands and the District of Columbia), has approximately 300 million inhabitants, a GDP of approximately 14 trillion USD, produces 1,665 million tons of oil equivalent, uses 2,340 million tons of oil equivalent. The EU (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_European_Union) is comprised of 27 countries, has approximately 500 million inhabitants, has a combined GDP of approximately 17 trillion USD, produces 460 million tons of oil equivalent and uses 1,229 million tons of oil equivalents.

Given these observations/baselines, and in the interest of an open minded discussion, are you able to provide an overview of EU27 foreign military sales and economic assistance during the time period you reference?

My viewpoint is that it’s not all sweetness and light, but neither is it all hatred and evil….


Perhaps this is "reality", i.e. the world is really such a nice place. In the media, it looks like this (all nicely sorted out for the first source that reported it, and in chronological order):
As first, there is a report that the U.S. [is] Set to Offer Huge Arms Deal to Saudi Arabia, $20 billion dollar deal (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/28/washington/28weapons.html?hp). Then there is the usual outcry: Israel cautious on US-Saudi arms deal (http://www.metimes.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20070729-033026-4607r). This problem is then solved in following fashion: Israel hails US military aid rise, over $30 billions! (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6920988.stm) - in reaction to which there is plenty of praise: Israel Says No Objections to US Gulf Arms Deal (http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-07-29-voa14.cfm).

If you have the means, the choice between a ‘Rolls Royce’ and a ‘Yugo’ as a daily ride is not a tough one. Besides, which ‘company’ is more likely to ‘sattel die pferden, wir reiten nach…’ to make sure things work? This appears to be primarily a marketplace driven solution, oder…?

Along these lines, China’s recent advances in manufacturing and servicing high speed trains make me wonder about the effects of even more competition in the marketplace of war armaments in a few years.


Obviously, nothing happened, i.e. their call received a negative answer. But still: if they need this armament for their protection and if it is so that "if we don't sell them, they'll get it somewhere else", then why do they call the US for..."help"?

This is a good question, what do you see as the answer?


And vice-versa: if this has to do with protecting the USA, West, rest of the world, Moon, the Mars people or whatever else, then why is the extremism spreading and the situation (see Iraq and Pakistan) worsening, instead of improving?

…my guess is that you see this as the answer to the previous question?


So, we have the US that "didn't start", and the Iranians that "didn't start", and the Saudis that appear to be "initiating" but actually react to highly a successful, years-long PR-campaigns etc., i.e. they also "didn't start". (Trying to get myself back to the topic) There is also Egypt that "didn't start". Nobody started this; all is "mutual interest".
Hm... this is still prompting at least one "unpleasant question": what is the only common factor in all these cases?

So, what then is your take on Mr. David Cameron's (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994) and Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy’s (http://www.france24.com/en/20110210-multiculturalism-failed-immigration-sarkozy-live-broadcast-tf1-france-public-questions) recent pronouncements on the topic of multiculturalism. I note that they are both in-line with Frau Dr. Merkel’s comments…will this lead to greater understanding and world peace or are they instead acknowledging the world as it is?

Dayuhan
02-12-2011, 02:33 AM
Mubarak resigns, but apparently is not leaving the country. Have to wonder if any assurance were made about possible prosecution or other issues regarding his personal fortune. Also have to wonder whether he'll continue to have influence behind the scenes, and what role, if any, Suleiman will have. Did the army get fed up and act, or has this been orchestrated to get the crowds off the street, followed by business as usual with cosmetic changes?

We'll see. Certainly not a bad way for events to go, but it ain't over by a long shot.

On points previous:



But Saddam was...OK, not "openly" but still... very friendly to the USA, back in the 1950s, again in the 1980s (see Rick Francona's "From Ally to Adversary", for example). His country was not only removed from the list of countries supporting terrorism, back in 1983, but it also received very "nice" loans, combat helicopters, and even ingredients for "senf". The ties became so close, that between 1986 and 1988, he several times requested deliveries of F-4 Phantom fighters. Indeed, even as of July 1990, he politely requested - and received - a "permission" (well, sort of it) for the "Kuwait business". And, if he would still be around to ask (not that I'm sorry he isn't), I'm sure even today he couldn't reasonably explain to himself, how come his person and his country then found itself on the receiving end of so much hatred and a major military attack by the same powers he has been said he is protecting against the Islamic extremism in Iran for an entire decade...


The 1950s were a long time ago; things change.

The idea that Saddam was a "US ally" during the Iran/Iraq war is a fairly common misconception, but it is definitely wrong. US policy then was effectively that neither side should be allowed to gain a decisive victory. There was never any illusion about Saddam being on our side or protecting anyone from Iranian imperialism; we just didn't want to see him lose, which could have left Iran in a dominant regional position. There was also no interest at all in seeing Saddam win. A cynical policy perhaps, and arguably one that extended a very destructive war, but by no means an unreasonable one.

The idea that Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks, based on wildly distorted out of context excerpts from a diplomatic meeting. It's fantasy, pure and simple. Everybody involved miscalculated: the US thought Saddam was going to negotiate with Kuwait and the troop movements were just a threat aimed at influencing the negotiations, Saddam thought the US would stop short of full-scale military action. He had no illusions about US approval, nor were there ever any bases for such illusions.



Going back into "Devil's advocate mode" (until further notice): But, they did. They have supported US operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, in 2001 and 2002. They wholeheartedly supported the case against Saddam, even applauded Bush and Powell in the UN. It's a "public secret" that a large number of the Tomahawks, plus a good deal of F-117- and B-1-attacks against Iraq in March 2003 went through the Iranian airspace - which would be impossible (at least equal to an act of war) without an agreement with Tehran. They have written almost a dozen of letters to the White House ever since, but never got a single response (BTW, in Iran it's considered as a "very brazen act", indeed "major offense" not to answer to somebody's letter). All they've got in response are threats, sanctions and yet more threats - all of these released through the media. So, what shall they do if the US simply refuses to get along with Iran (or, worse yet: have no clue how to do that)?

Obviously Iran was not going to have any complaint about US action against Saddam Hussein, or against a regime in Afghanistan heavily influenced by Wahhabi and Deobandi theology and ISI support, none of which are terribly sympathetic to the Shi'a.

Ask yourself: what exactly does Iran as a nation, or the Iranian people, gain from Iranian support for Hezbollah, or from the Iranian nuclear program, or from the constant decades-old deluge of frantic anti-US and anti-Israeli rhetoric? Iran gains nothing, but the regime gains the kind of permanent enemies that justify its existence. Without permanent enemies the regime might find its repression, corruption, and staggering economic mismanagement subject to more attention than they already get. Obviously the Iranian regime will not complain if the US acts in their interests (as in Iraq), but they will always find reasons to keep the hate going. They need to.


But, now the US admin has a "problem": how to "explain" all of these sales to a country from which 14 out of 19 idiots from 9/11 came - plus provision of billions of US-taxpayer's money to Israel?

In what country in the world can you not find 14 idiots?


And vice-versa: if this has to do with protecting the USA, West, rest of the world, Moon, the Mars people or whatever else, then why is the extremism spreading and the situation (see Iraq and Pakistan) worsening, instead of improving?

Who says extremism is spreading and the situation is worsening? Certainly prolonged US occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan has played into the hands of the extremists, but they're not having things their own way by any means. The end of the oil glut and the rush of prosperity in the Gulf has vastly reduced the appeal of radicalism there. AQ's efforts in SE Asia have fallen completely flat. It's a mixed situation and it's not running in one direction by any means.

I'm honestly not sure what point you're trying to make re arms sales to the KSA... clarification, ideally concise, would help.

Ken White
02-12-2011, 03:11 AM
The idea that Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks, based on wildly distorted out of context excerpts from a diplomatic meeting. It's fantasy, pure and simple. Everybody involved miscalculated: the US thought Saddam was going to negotiate with Kuwait and the troop movements were just a threat aimed at influencing the negotiations, Saddam thought the US would stop short of full-scale military action. He had no illusions about US approval, nor were there ever any bases for such illusions.I don't think that is at all correct. Ta'arof (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taarof) rears its lovely Persian head. He asked for Kuwait simply by saying it was historic Iraqi territory; April Glaspie -- unknowing US career diplomat from Canada and nominal Arabist-- replied, variously, that it was not a major issue to the US. See this (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_Glaspie). I know it's the Wiki but it's probably as accurate as anything on this; we cannot know for sure what either Hussein or Glaspie really said. This from that Wiki entry:
When these purported transcripts were made public, Glaspie was accused of having given tacit approval for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which took place on August 2, 1990. It was argued that Glaspie's statements that "We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts" and that "the Kuwait issue is not associated with America" were interpreted by Saddam as giving free rein to handle his disputes with Kuwait as he saw fit. It was also argued that Saddam would not have invaded Kuwait had he been given an explicit warning that such an invasion would be met with force by the United States.To most Westerners and even most Asians, the nominal interchange would not have been viewed as permissive -- to a ME resident steeped in ta'arof , it was an invitation. While ta'arof is a Persian custom, the various Persian Empires embedded the concept firmly in all the races and peoples of the ME.

From that Glaspie Wiki entry:
Journalist Edward Mortimer wrote in the New York Review of Books in November 1990:
“ It seems far more likely that Saddam Hussein went ahead with the invasion because he believed the US would not react with anything more than verbal condemnation. That was an inference he could well have drawn from his meeting with US Ambassador April Glaspie on July 25, and from statements by State Department officials in Washington at the same time publicly disavowing any US security commitments to Kuwait, but also from the success of both the Reagan and the Bush administrations in heading off attempts by the US Senate to impose sanctions on Iraq for previous breaches of international law.I think Mortimer was correct. So, not only Glaspie but actions of US Administration played into Saddam's perception that he had at least tacit permission if not approval to do what he did...

Thus to say that "...Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks..." is absolutely correct in Western terms. However, for a resident of the ME that statement is just as absolutely incorrect -- in their view, the US literally suggested that he invade -- as Crowbat intimates...

jcustis
02-12-2011, 04:25 AM
Mass rebellions of this sort are often decided, in the end, by a simple choice made by the armed forces and police. The order to disperse the crowd, to fire on them if necessary, will eventually be given. They will obey or they will not. If they obey, we have a Tiananmen Square scenario and the government continues, albeit unsteadily and in this case possibly unsustainably.

Mubarak will not leave because the crowd wants him to leave. He certainly isn't going to leave because the US President tells him to, no matter what some believe. He will leave if his army refuses to follow his orders. He won't have any choice.

And so it seems to end.

Dayuhan
02-12-2011, 08:06 AM
I don't think that is at all correct. Ta'arof (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taarof) rears its lovely Persian head. He asked for Kuwait simply by saying it was historic Iraqi territory; April Glaspie -- unknowing US career diplomat from Canada and nominal Arabist-- replied, variously, that it was not a major issue to the US. See this (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_Glaspie). I know it's the Wiki but it's probably as accurate as anything on this; we cannot know for sure what either Hussein or Glaspie really said. This from that Wiki entry:To most Westerners and even most Asians, the nominal interchange would not have been viewed as permissive -- to a ME resident steeped in ta'arof , it was an invitation.

I've heard this interpretation before, and I don't quite buy it. Saddam may have been steeped in Ta'arof, but he was anything but a virgin on the diplomatic scene; he'd been through these scenarios many, many times and was absolutely aware of the niceties and conventions.

Context is all too often forgotten. Glaspie didn't initiate that meeting; she was summoned on short notice, at a time of day that precluded instructions from DC. That doesn't happen by accident; it happens because the party doing the summoning thinks that consultation might bring an unwelcome position. A diplomat in that position has very limited options. There's no way in the world that Glaspie could have threatened the use of force without explicit authorization from on high, and Saddam unquestionably knew that. All she could do was to reiterate prior authorized positions filled out with boilerplate diplospeak, and of course Saddam knew that as well.

The other half of that "no opinion" comment is also overlooked: "We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly." What she said was boilerplate diplospeak for "we will not take sides on this, but we want it settled fast and we want it settled through negotiation, and these are the intermediaries that would be acceptable to us. I don't think there's any way Saddam would not have known that, and his advisers surely would have known it.

A lot of these comments sound ambiguous from the outside, but they are standard diplomatic templates that Saddam would have heard dozens or hundreds of times before: he was not some bumpkin colonel who seized power the week before. It's like the December Playmate of the Month hearing "come up to my place for a drink". Not likely that she wouldn't realize that more than a drink is being discussed.

I think the use of force was never threatened because nobody thought he would really do it. Saddam explicitly promised negotiations, and Glaspie (along with everybody else) came away thinking the troop movements were a negotiating ploy. Certainly Saddam never approached the US to find out how an invasion would be received, as has been alleged at times.

Tariq Aziz, who was present at the meeting, has stated several times that Glaspie had made nothing but routine comments that any diplomat would make, and that Saddam had no illusions about receiving permission.

CrowBat
02-12-2011, 08:14 AM
The Gong for the Round 2....

11 February, 2011
Egypt army to suspend parliament, sack cabinet: report (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/11/us-egypt-army-statement-idUSTRE71A4UE20110211)
(Reuters) - Egypt's higher military council will sack the cabinet, suspend both houses of parliament and rule with the head of the supreme constitutional court, Al Arabiya television reported Friday.
The army statement was expected to be delivered later on Friday and followed President Hosni Mubarak's dramatic resignation after 30 years in power.
It seems now that the Supreme Council of the Army removed even Soleiman from his position and is now running all affairs.


Crowbat,

Your post’s are interesting as always, I greatly appreciate your taking the time to provide references to further explain your points.Thanks, and you're most welcome. My standpoint is that nobody should have a problem discussing any topic with anybody, and that internet forums like this one exist exactly with the purpose of exchanging opinions to topics like these. Thus, the more participate, the more interesting it is going to get.

Please keep in mind, though, that my knowledge and understanding is rather limited to politico-military affairs, than the economy.

The reason for my answer to Dayuhan's post was his explanation that the US-Saudi relations are "business only", initiated by the Saudis rather than the US, and that the US neither has nor wants to exercise any kind of influence upon the Saudi government. I find this is very much relevant for the discussion here, because - as I explained before - the US obviously had very strong influence over Mubarak too (see Mubarak slammed U.S. in phone call with Israeli MK before resignation (http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/mubarak-slammed-u-s-in-phone-call-with-israeli-mk-before-resignation-1.342831?localLinksEnabled=false). Another, rather "personal" reason was that the expression "conspiracy theorist" was used in my direction, which I not only consider offensive (the only "worse" step than this would be to declare me for "liberal" - in US way of using that description), but also for denying reality.

In my response, I attempted to show how these relations actually function, i.e. that there is much more going on behind the scenes than "business only, nothing personal". Otherwise nobody would need any explanations for the media. One can ridicule my standpoint as a "conspiracy theory", but there is more than "circumstantial" evidence that there are unofficial connections between certain, say, "decisive" segments of the US establishment and al-Sauds (for those interested in more information about this topic, see such publications like "In Bed with the Devil", by Robert Baer). The rest is to follow bellow.


Given these observations/baselines, and in the interest of an open minded discussion, are you able to provide an overview of EU27 foreign military sales and economic assistance during the time period you reference?No, I'm not able to provide an overview of (all?) the EU foreign military sales. Not even to the Middle East alone. But then, I'm also not able to provide an overview of all the US, Russian etc. foreign military sales to the Middle East. The reason for this is that I never sought for publications containing such data.

What I can do is discuss specific deals/projects related to the defence (and air forces in particular) - most of which are, nevertheless, the biggest and most important deals of that kind. And, "by pure accident" (I guess?) the US deals with Saudi Arabia "happen" to be by far the largest of all the ones that are known.

But, if you're looking for some kind of "satisfaction", i.e. for examples of the EU's "aid".... Here a particularly "sweet" one: the green-painted, Italian-made Iveco "APCs" of the Egyptian CSF (the black-clad "Basiji") we've seen driving over the protesters on the streets of the Egyptian cities in the first days of the revolution, were provided within the frame of the EU-supplied aid to the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, as equipment "not intended for specifically military purposes". The project within which they were delivered is running since something like ten years, and was worth some €10 Million annually...


My viewpoint is that it’s not all sweetness and light, but neither is it all hatred and evil…Again: I'm not trying to point with finger or accuse anybody. I consider this discussion an "exchange of opinions", not "mine is bigger than yours" fight, and I find it "normal", "self-understanding" that every state and every government has its own interests (i.e. the interests of those who are running and backing the government in question) and is primarily working on pursuing the same.

I do raise the question, though: is this pursuit of interest of "business only, nothing personal" kind, is it as "innocent", "legitimate" and as "useful" as so many appear to be convinced it is, or do all these "affairs" actually serve some other purposes, while at the same time completely and blissfully ignoring the actual problem?


If you have the means, the choice between a ‘Rolls Royce’ and a ‘Yugo’ as a daily ride is not a tough one. Besides, which ‘company’ is more likely to ‘sattel die pferden, wir reiten nach…’ to make sure things work? This appears to be primarily a marketplace driven solution, oder…?This might appear so at the first look, but as I attempted to show with several examples, there is much more in the background.

Let me now try with help of your own example: I'm looking for an explanation for the Saudis actually buying "Rolls Royces with Yugo equipment". Namely, that's what one gets when ordering a downgraded variant of the F-15E (i.e. F-15S) in a deal including only one maintenance workshop and no PGMs (these had to be ordered separately, and then only in very limited numbers), as well as a "guarantee" they are not going to be deployed on specific bases on their own soil - and then still pays two times its usual "market" price, like the Saudis did...

This is something nobody, not even the Saudis I know, could explain so far.


This is a good question, what do you see as the answer? …my guess is that you see this as the answer to the previous question?Sorry, but the answer is negative: my second question was no answer to the first one. That aside, the purpose of both questions was to hear answers from people like you, not to get questions in response. ;-)


So, what then is your take on Mr. David Cameron's (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994) and Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy’s (http://www.france24.com/en/20110210-multiculturalism-failed-immigration-sarkozy-live-broadcast-tf1-france-public-questions) recent pronouncements on the topic of multiculturalism. I note that they are both in-line with Frau Dr. Merkel’s comments…will this lead to greater understanding and world peace or are they instead acknowledging the world as it is?I do not consider them relevant for the topic at hand, but have strong doubts they are going to lead to anything like "greater understanding and world peace".

To be continued...

CrowBat
02-12-2011, 08:31 AM
The 1950s were a long time ago; things change.Yes, they change, but then, the 1950s was just an observation for the point in time at which this friendship began. I'm sure you're going to agree that long-lasting friendships are of far higher quality than short ones (and that we're both beyond the age of enjoying one-night-stands ;-))?



The idea that Saddam was a "US ally" during the Iran/Iraq war is a fairly common misconception, but it is definitely wrong.This "misconception" was actually disproved during the recent Reappraising the Iran-Iraq War Thirty Years Later (http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/middleEastProgramme/conferences/iranIraq/home.aspx) Conference in London. Surely enough, evidence of Saddam advising the US (and receiving any sort of "blessing" from the DC) about his intention to launch an invasion on Iran, in September 1980, is still of rather circumstantial nature (well, he at least informed the Saudis and received their blessing, and there is little doubt the Saudis kept this info away from the DC). But the rest is meanwhile beyond doubt.


US policy then was effectively that neither side should be allowed to gain a decisive victory. There was never any illusion about Saddam being on our side or protecting anyone from Iranian imperialism...We're again at discussing the official and unofficial stances. Yes, the official US stance was "it would be good if both of them could lose that war". Unofficial stance was: "Let's help Saddam keep the Iranian extremists busy" - with the repercussion of fastening exactly the same extremists in Iran in power.


The idea that Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks, based on wildly distorted out of context excerpts from a diplomatic meeting.Ken answered this better than I ever could. Note that all the Iraqi generals that I interviewed meanwhile replied the same. Surely, everybody is free to call this "just another Iraqi conspiracy theory", but to me they seemed quite firmly convinced about this and certainly not thinking about this affair as any kind of "fantasy". (Indeed, I'll admit that "my" expression "Kuwait business" is actually exactly what I've heard from several retired Iraqi generals.)

You're right, Dayuhan (in your latest post), that Saddam was certainly no "diplomatic virgin". On the contrary. Alone from the studies of the Iran-Iraq War we can see that he knew very well how to (mis)use the diplomacy for his own purposes (a good example was when he used a member of the Qatari royal family to launch rumours that an Iranian F-14 pilot is about to defect to Iraq - in order to curb the IRIAF F-14 ops over the Khark and enable an IrAF offensive against that island, in summer 1985). But exactly that was the problem in this situation: because he was so good at this business, he understood Gilespy's statement as "no problem, go ahead".


Obviously Iran was not going to have any complaint about US action against Saddam Hussein, or against a regime in Afghanistan heavily influenced by Wahhabi and Deobandi theology and ISI support, none of which are terribly sympathetic to the Shi'a.Agreed.


Ask yourself: what exactly does Iran as a nation, or the Iranian people, gain from Iranian support for Hezbollah, or from the Iranian nuclear program, or from the constant decades-old deluge of frantic anti-US and anti-Israeli rhetoric?I went a step further and asked quite a number of Iranians. Their answers were as follows:
a) What does Iran gain from support for Hezbollah?
The same the US expected to gain from fighting Taliban in Afghanistan: keeping the opposition busy - and that away from its own turf.

b) What does Iran gain from its nuclear program?
B.1.) Sustainable and durable solution for providing energy for its oil/gas-export "triade", which is currently gulping immense amounts of power due to its dependence on entirely obsolete electric engines that are running its pumps (required to pump oil and gas over hundreds of kilometres of Iranian mountains and under the sea to such loading places like Khark, Sirri etc.);
B.2) Sustainable and durable solution for power supply required by its industrial and scientific development; and
B.3) Sustainable and durable solution for providing power required due to the population growth.

c) What does Iran gain from its frantic anti-US and anti-Israeli rhetoric?
Exactly the same US and Israel gain from their anti-Iranian rhetoric. Having enemies of that kind is good for the economy [well, at least the defence sector; my observation] and can be used for all possible practical purposes on the domestic as well as the international scene.

(And, please, don't blame the messenger.)

Iran gains nothing, but the regime gains the kind of permanent enemies that justify its existence. Without permanent enemies the regime might find its repression, corruption, and staggering economic mismanagement subject to more attention than they already get....I most sincerely hope you are aware of the fact, that from the standpoint of a great deal of the "US-enemies", this works exactly the other way too?

I.e. "Without permanent enemies, the US government might find its support for repressive and corrupt regimes in the Middle East a subject to more attention that they already get".


Obviously the Iranian regime will not complain if the US acts in their interests (as in Iraq), but they will always find reasons to keep the hate going. They need to.And vice-versa. The problem is: we all know that the Iranians are ruled by a mercilessly brutal regime. A significant segment of the Iranian society knows this as well (and the part that doesn't, doesn't care about the regime's foreign policy the least). Correspondingly, they meanwhile need no foreign enemies to use for keeping themselves in power.

Why does the US need to demonize Iran, while at the same time are best friends and closest allies of such oppressive regimes like those in Saudi Arabia, UAE - or like Mubarak's was?

Bob's World
02-12-2011, 02:24 PM
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Egypt-Military-Takes-Control-115935744.html

Some of the new players. I had the privelege of serving with their 3rd Mech Division out of Alexandria during the first Gulf War. It will be interesting to see if any familiar faces emerge.

If anyone has a good link to names and bios of the senior military leadership it would be interesting to see.

Entropy
02-12-2011, 03:18 PM
Ken,

There are two sides to that. First, from your wiki link there was an interview with Tariq Aziz on this topic:


Similarly, in a 2000 Frontline interview, Aziz declared, "There were no mixed signals", and further elaborated:
“ ..
.it was a routine meeting. ... She didn't say anything extraordinary beyond what any professional diplomat would say without previous instructions from his government. She did not ask for an audience with the president [Saddam]. She was summoned by the president. ... She was not prepared.... People in Washington were asleep, so she needed a half-hour to contact anybody in Washington and seek instructions. So, what she said were routine, classical comments on what the president was asking her to convey to President Bush.

Then there is the US side. DIA's warning element correctly gave warning for war and warning for the attack but they were not believed (http://cryptome.org/allen-wiik.htm):


On 25 July, I issued a "warning of war" memorandum which stressed that Iraq had nearly achieved the capability to mount a corps-size operation capable of defeating Kuwaiti forces and of occupying much of Kuwait. This report rated the chances of a "military incursion" at better than 60 percent. It further stressed that, even with major Kuwaiti concessions, the chances of some form of Iraqi military action remained significant -- 25 percent.

The Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), after reviewing the report, stated that the warning appeared to be "OBE," -- that is, "overtaken-by-events". He cited a cable which had just been received from the US Ambassador in Iraq who recounted Saddam's assurance that he had no intention of taking military action because of forthcoming talks between Iraq and Kuwait in Jeddah and Baghdad. In response I stated that Saddam could be engaging in deception, given the massive buildup of Iraqi forces along the border and the costs the Iraqi government was incurring to complete it. The Chairman of the NIC agreed and concurred in the issuance of the warning report.

and


As a postscript, at a session of senior military and civilian officers at the Pentagon, General Butler, the J-5, stated that the NIO for Warning had provided warning of war and warning of attack, but that he was not taken seriously because senior US officials talked with, and accepted the judgment of a number of leaders in the Middle East as well as the Soviet Union, all of whom were of the opinion that Saddam did not intend to attack.

In one sense, there is a chicken-egg argument here. Glaspie perhaps didn't sufficiently warn Saddam about consequences, but then her superiors in the State Department and at the senior level consistently believed that Saddam was bluffing in order to gain concessions despite the indications otherwise. So it's understandable that Glaspie would provide the standard line and that her superiors would not subsequently tell her to reinforce the message that the US would oppose an invasion because her superiors didn't believe Saddam would actually invade. This was reinforced by assurances from Saddam that he wouldn't do anything before the upcoming talks in Jeddah and Baghdad. The Jeddah talks collapsed the same day that Iraq's forces became fully prepared (what a coincidence!) and the invasion took place the following morning. The Baghdad talks, of course, never happened.

To me Glaspie had little to do with this. Iraq conducted a quite successful deception operation - their intentions were in motion before Glaspie was summoned.

RedRaven
02-12-2011, 03:40 PM
Council,

I think I am missing something very basic here... What was the proximate cause of the demonstrations, what actually kicked the whole thing off?

RedRaven

davidbfpo
02-12-2011, 04:42 PM
Red Raven,

All the reports seen here indicated it was the Tunisian protests success and the heavy handed response of the state to non-violent gatherings. Hence much of the media portrayal of a 'wave of protests weeping the Arab world'.

From a BBC Q&A:
How did it all start?

Egypt has long been known as a centre of stability in a volatile region, but that masked malignant problems which erupted in popular demonstrations against the 30-year rule of Hosni Mubarak on 25 and 28 January.

His National Democratic Party (NDP) monopolised political power through a mixture of constitutional manipulation, repression and rigged elections, cronyism, and the backing of powerful foreign allies.

The main drivers of the unrest have been poverty, rising prices, social exclusion, anger over corruption and personal enrichment among the political elite, and a demographic bulge of young people unable to find work.

The catalyst was fellow Arabs in Tunisia successfully overthrowing their autocratic ruler, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, with a popular uprising on 14 January.

Popular anger was fuelled by dozens of deaths at the hands of the security forces, while protesters' voices have been heard thanks to social media and the presence of independent news broadcasters at the scene.

Their rallying cries were "The people want the fall of the regime", "Mubarak, go", and "Illegitimate, illegitimate".

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12324664

The protests that followed were unusual - the protesters chased off the riot police; there was a good BBC-TV report on this yesterday, similar to this round-up:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12418163

Bob's World
02-12-2011, 04:56 PM
Council,

I think I am missing something very basic here... What was the proximate cause of the demonstrations, what actually kicked the whole thing off?

RedRaven

Raven,

To be sure, reasonable minds will differ. Much of that difference will be at how deep one chooses to look.

First, Proximate Cause is a legal term of art. "proximate cause is an event sufficiently related to a legally recognizable injury to be held the cause of that injury. There are two types of causation in the law, cause-in-fact and proximate (or legal) cause. Cause-in-fact is determined by the "but-for" test: but for the action, the result would not have happened. For example, but for running the red light, the collision would not have occurred. For an act to cause a harm, both tests must be met; proximate cause is a legal limitation on cause-in-fact."

Second, for my opinion I refer you to the article I posted here on insurgency a few months ago and the updated model and supporting graphic

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/05/the-jones-insurgency-model/

I contend that in Egypt the Conditions of Insurgency were/are out in phase II, but held below the line in a "suppressed" state by the government. Leaders of the rebellion also employed non-violent tactics keeping it below the line during the past couple of weeks as well. As to causation, I look to the four causal factors of the model. As to the catalyst that kicked this into motion, it was the example of Tunisia; just as the example of Egypt is now having a similar affect among similarly situated populaces across the region.

It will take some time for a new government to emerge and move the populace of Egypt down into phase 0, and much could go bad between now and then. A mistake would be to assume that this is over. This is merely the end of the beginning.

Ken White
02-12-2011, 05:03 PM
I've heard this interpretation before, and I don't quite buy it. Not a problem. We can disagree.

The context was not forgotten by me and at no point did I suggest that the "unknowing US career diplomat from Canada and nominal Arabist" was not manipulated. Those words of mine were deliberate. Sarcastic and deliberate.

I'll also reiterate that we do not and cannot know precisely what was said at the meeting, we have only ex post facto statements by her used in explaining that she agrees with you as well as 'corroboration' by not disinterested parties. :wry:
I don't think there's any way Saddam would not have known that, and his advisers surely would have known it.I think you just validated my suggestion; "So, not only Glaspie but actions of US Administration played into Saddam's perception that he had at least tacit permission if not approval to do what he did..." Perception and "tacit approval" being key.
I think the use of force was never threatened because nobody thought he would really do it.True. No one thought 19 people would fly airplanes into buildings either. No one in the West, that is.:rolleyes:
Saddam explicitly promised negotiations, and Glaspie (along with everybody else) came away thinking the troop movements were a negotiating ploy. Certainly Saddam never approached the US to find out how an invasion would be received, as has been alleged at times.Of course to the former, that's what would've been the western modus. Regrettably, Mr. Hussein was not a westerner...

Had not heard the latter before and IMO that would be totally out of character.
Tariq Aziz, who was present at the meeting, has stated several times that Glaspie had made nothing but routine comments that any diplomat would make, and that Saddam had no illusions about receiving permission.Aside from the fact that Tariq had his own reasons to say things, I did not contend that Saddam thought he'd received permission -- I said he'd applied the principles of Ta'arof to what he did hear and had likely manipulated to occur. I did say that many in the ME -- and I'll upgrade that to 'most' -- had seen "...in their view, the US literally suggested that he invade."

Entropy:

I noticed the Aziz comment and had read it elsewhere years ago. He was not an uninterested party. Regardless, his comment (and others of similar vein) do not discount my statement that. Glaspie and the US Administration(s) {Plural -- understanding of the ME is not a US strong point...:( } were manipulated by Saddam to tell him what he wanted to hear. From your link and that Allen of the CIA article: "I might add at this point that, later, there were reports that Iraq had prepared the attack force for its eventual move into Kuwait over about a three-month period. Additionally, the initial movement of Iraqi forces was reported 12 days before the actual attack against Kuwait." That also has been long known.

What has been longer known -- and deliberately disregarded -- is also in your link and Post:
""As a postscript, at a session of senior military and civilian officers at the Pentagon, General Butler, the J-5, stated that the NIO for Warning had provided warning of war and warning of attack, but that he was not taken seriously because senior US officials talked with, and accepted the judgment of a number of leaders in the Middle East as well as the Soviet Union, all of whom were of the opinion that Saddam did not intend to attack. ""

That needs to be written in stone somewhere because it's the point of my assertion -- the West in general and the US in particular does not understand and therefor gets continually manipulated by the ME. As you said:
Glaspie perhaps didn't sufficiently warn Saddam about consequences...because her superiors didn't believe Saddam would actually invade...The Baghdad talks, of course, never happened.

To me Glaspie had little to do with this. Iraq conducted a quite successful deception operation - their intentions were in motion before Glaspie was summoned.True dat. Glaspie was virtually irrelevant and most any westerner in her position would have done pretty much the same thing. Saddam wanted corroboration that what he was about to do would be met with little more than a hand slap, he got it. He did not get an invitation but he did get what he perceived was a "Get out of Jail free" card. He got -- and later used -- US lack of understanding, good guy attitude and dithering to point out to the broader ME that he was being picked on. You and others in the West may not believe that.

Far more importantly, most in the ME do believe it...

What Glaspie did inadvertently and what several US Administrations had done is react to Saddam as if he were a rational western head of state. A minor point is that he was in some senses irrational -- the far more important point is that he was not Western.

carl
02-12-2011, 06:40 PM
I wonder if I could solicit opinions about the Egyptian national character, if there is such a thing. Is it different from the other Arabs and how so? How did it affect the events in Egypt and how might it affect things in the future?

I figure you guys might have some experience and viewpoints that are of value.

What got me thinking on this was a story that says the organizers of the Tahrir Square demonstrations are calling upon people to return to the square today and help clean it up. I don't know how important that is but it got me thinking along this line.

Marc
02-12-2011, 08:16 PM
Council,

I think I am missing something very basic here... What was the proximate cause of the demonstrations, what actually kicked the whole thing off?

RedRaven

RedRaven,

In my view, there are two proximate causes of the demonstrations: population growth and rising food prices.

Like most autocracies, Moubarak's regime was founded on the passive acquiescence of the majority of the population. This acquiescence was generated by a patronage system that guaranteed survival and social security by subsidizing basic necessities like food. The problem is that economic growth in Egypt was insufficient to cover the cost of patronizing the fast-growing Egyptian population. As a result, Egyptians slowly sank into poverty. The recent rise of food prices exacerbated the situation. Egypt is the world's largest importer of wheat: 8 million tons per year. Of these 8 million tons, 6 million tons are dedicated to the subsidy program, feeding three quarters of the population. Moubarak simply did not have the cash to sustain this system.

Starting the revolution was easy. But where will Egypt find the cash to feed the Egyptians the day after the revolution? The person who can find the answer to that question will be the country's next president.

Dayuhan
02-13-2011, 01:16 AM
True dat. Glaspie was virtually irrelevant and most any westerner in her position would have done pretty much the same thing. Saddam wanted corroboration that what he was about to do would be met with little more than a hand slap, he got it. He did not get an invitation but he did get what he perceived was a "Get out of Jail free" card. He got -- and later used -- US lack of understanding, good guy attitude and dithering to point out to the broader ME that he was being picked on. You and others in the West may not believe that.


I totally believe that Saddam constructed a situation that he could use to persuade others in the ME, and probably a fair number of his own generals, that he had a pass from the US. I just don't think he ever believed it himself.

Looking at the sequence it seems fairly clear to me that the decision to invade was made well before the meeting with Glaspie. The meeting seems to have been called for one reason: to pass on the disinformation (ok, outright lie) that negotiations were in progress, delaying any US response and making it easier to present a fait accomplii. Anything Glaspie said was irrelevant, as you say, because everyone present knew she had no instructions and couldn't say anything but the usual diplomatic twaddle. I can't imagine that Saddam saw that twaddle as corroboration of anything, or that he cared: the point was to pass on wrong information, not to gain information about US intentions that Glaspie could not, under the circumstances, have provided.

The idea (not coming from you but widespread) that Glaspie could have prevented the invasion by threatening force in response is of course silly: ambassadors can't make that kind of decision on their own. If there was fault it was higher up. The idea that the US deliberately baited Iraq into invading to give them an excuse to go into the region with major military force is even nuttier, though a whole lot of people still believe it. The Middle East is one of the few places in the world where reflexive acceptance of conspiracy theory is even more prevalent than it is in the US. My own reflex position is more the opposite: never attribute to conspiracy that which can be adequately explained by ####up.


Yes, they change, but then, the 1950s was just an observation for the point in time at which this friendship began. I'm sure you're going to agree that long-lasting friendships are of far higher quality than short ones (and that we're both beyond the age of enjoying one-night-stands ;-))?

There are no lasting friendships in diplomacy, only lasting interests. Not all interests last. i don't think the US ever saw Saddam as a "friend", though at various points there may have been common perceived interests. The word "friend" may have been used, but I doubt that it was ever meant. Politicians and diplomats lie a lot; it's their job.


This "misconception" was actually disproved during the recent Reappraising the Iran-Iraq War Thirty Years Later (http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/middleEastProgramme/conferences/iranIraq/home.aspx) Conference in London.

Conferences don't prove or disprove anything. Lots of perspectives out there, few of them amenable to "proof" one way or the other.


We're again at discussing the official and unofficial stances. Yes, the official US stance was "it would be good if both of them could lose that war". Unofficial stance was: "Let's help Saddam keep the Iranian extremists busy" - with the repercussion of fastening exactly the same extremists in Iran in power.

Not a lot of difference there. The war probably did fasten the Iranian regime in power, but the US didn't initiate the war and couldn't have stopped it. Once it was on the policy of not letting either side gain a convincing win was probably reasonable, if cynical.


Ken answered this better than I ever could. Note that all the Iraqi generals that I interviewed meanwhile replied the same. Surely, everybody is free to call this "just another Iraqi conspiracy theory", but to me they seemed quite firmly convinced about this and certainly not thinking about this affair as any kind of "fantasy". (Indeed, I'll admit that "my" expression "Kuwait business" is actually exactly what I've heard from several retired Iraqi generals.)

I'm sure Saddam sold this idea to his generals and many others; that doesn't mean he believed it himself. Many Iraqi generals believed to the last that Saddam had WMD. Saddam didn't necessarily trust a lot of his people, and he didn't necessarily tell them the truth.


a) What does Iran gain from support for Hezbollah?
The same the US expected to gain from fighting Taliban in Afghanistan: keeping the opposition busy - and that away from its own turf.

It also keeps the opposition opposing; equally important.


b) What does Iran gain from its nuclear program?
B.1.) Sustainable and durable solution for providing energy for its oil/gas-export "triade", which is currently gulping immense amounts of power due to its dependence on entirely obsolete electric engines that are running its pumps (required to pump oil and gas over hundreds of kilometres of Iranian mountains and under the sea to such loading places like Khark, Sirri etc.);
B.2) Sustainable and durable solution for power supply required by its industrial and scientific development; and
B.3) Sustainable and durable solution for providing power required due to the population growth.

All of which could be achieved, without contention, under a number of fuel processing deals that have already been rejected.

The Iranian government could stop supporting Hezbollah, accept the fuel processing deals on offer, and drop the ridiculous anti-US and anti-Israel rhetoric without compromising its interests in any way. The advantages would be very substantial: there would no longer be any justification for sanctions, and the neighbors across the Gulf have demonstrated rather well that oil-producing countries that get on with the west do rather better than those who choose confrontation. There's no need to "tie down the opposition" if there is no opposition. The Iranian regime does not take that course because they need the permanent hostility to justify their own existence.



...I most sincerely hope you are aware of the fact, that from the standpoint of a great deal of the "US-enemies", this works exactly the other way too?

I.e. "Without permanent enemies, the US government might find its support for repressive and corrupt regimes in the Middle East a subject to more attention that they already get".


We work with governments who are willing to work with us, and governments with interests similar to ours. Alliances are made by common interests, not similar systems of government... always been that way. The extent to which the US "supports" or "props up" regimes in places like Saudi Arabia or the Gulf States is hugely overrated: we deal with what is, just as we deal with and trade with China. We may have our own beliefs but it's not our place or our job to impose them on others.


Why does the US need to demonize Iran, while at the same time are best friends and closest allies of such oppressive regimes like those in Saudi Arabia, UAE - or like Mubarak's was?

The Iranian regime is pretty much a self-demonizing system, not because of its internal repression but because of its consistently aggressive, harsh, and threatening positions toward neighbors and its deliberate isolation. They have the power to change that, and it is in no way purely a response to provocation.

Ken White
02-13-2011, 02:23 AM
I totally believe that Saddam constructed a situation that he could use to persuade others in the ME, and probably a fair number of his own generals, that he had a pass from the US. I just don't think he ever believed it himself.I don't know and, in truth the answer to that is as irrelevant as was Glaspie and what she said. The issue is not what Saddam believed, it is what the broader ME believed. More important than any of that history is the fact the US does not do a good job of spreading its beneficence in the ME. A huge part of that is failure to give ta'arof its due.

I've met as many or more Persians that hate it as I have that liked it -- but they all practice it as do most in the ME. It is a documented fact that most Arab armies have an operational problem in that subordinates do not report accurately but rather tell their Boss what they believe he'd like to hear. Ta'arof. Attacks have not been launched due to a junior person being given command. Ta'arof. Most of the ME is quite willing to believe the evils of the US because we (a) ignore the rules of ta'arof and (b) tend to tell people what we think -- an absoute no-no.

Like any cultural trait, ta'arof has it devotees and its haters -- it also is often manipulated, not least by suggesting to another that ta'arof not be practiced -- while continuing oneself to practice it thereby scoring points on he or she who took you at your word and did not follow the rules.
Looking at the sequence it seems fairly clear to me that the decision to invade was made well before the meeting with Glaspie.No question.
I can't imagine that Saddam saw that twaddle as corroboration of anything, or that he cared: the point was to pass on wrong information, not to gain information about US intentions that Glaspie could not, under the circumstances, have provided.He probably did not and would have done what he was going to do even if she'd been more forceful. I believe that he called the meeting not only for the purpose you cite but also for the one I cite -- he got most people in the ME to accept that the very inconsistent US polices and the rather innocuous diplomatic gabble were tacit approval of his plans -- there certainly was no disapproval expressed...
The idea (not coming from you but widespread) that Glaspie could have prevented the invasion by threatening force in response is of course silly...It exists but I don't think it's widespread. Most people know:
ambassadors can't make that kind of decision on their own. If there was fault it was higher up.Yes. That failure to understand all we know about what we're doing is the crux of the matter. We spend millions to train foreign area specialists and then our policy makers let their egos get in the way and refuse to listen to people who know the area. See Korea, Viet Nam, Dominican Republic, Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan (among others, not least the Philippines...).
The idea that the US deliberately baited Iraq into invading to give them an excuse to go into the region with major military force is even nuttier, though a whole lot of people still believe it. The Middle East is one of the few places in the world where reflexive acceptance of conspiracy theory is even more prevalent than it is in the US.Again thank you for the corroboration. The "whole lot of people" who still believe it are by a large majority in the ME. They believe it because we got suckered and out-ta'arofed.;)
My own reflex position is more the opposite: never attribute to conspiracy that which can be adequately explained by ####up.No conspiracy cited by me, just a pure ####up on the part of several US Administrations, Secretaries of State and Ambasssadors. Poor April just happened to be the one that got caught up in the large scam. She and dipwad Joe Wilson...

As I said earlier: "Thus to say that '...Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks...' is absolutely correct in Western terms. However, for a resident of the ME that statement is just as absolutely incorrect -- in their view, the US literally suggested that he invade."

That whole lot of people are the ones who are willing to believe Saddam got manipulated and the US is perfidious. Many there are going to believe that regardless but our pretty consistently inept diplomacy in the area is in large measure due to arrogance and an unwillingness to accept local norms into our calculations certainly exacerbates that. The invasion of Kuwait was but one small example.

Dayuhan
02-13-2011, 02:38 AM
We spend millions to train foreign area specialists and then our policy makers let their egos get in the way and refuse to listen to people who know the area. See Korea, Viet Nam, Dominican Republic, Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan (among others, not least the Philippines...).

Yes, area specialists (not all trained by Government) are consistently ignored; this I know well. Possibly the most egregious example was in post WW2 China, when area specialists who told us Chiang Kai-Shek was done and like it or not Mao was going to win were not only ignored but persecuted. Much the same happened to the OSS man on the spot in Vietnam, who reported that the French were toast and Ho Chi Minh could be dealt with. Hard not to wonder what would have happened if people had listened...


Again thank you for the corroboration. The "whole lot of people" who still believe it are by a large majority in the ME. They believe it because we got suckered and out-ta'arofed.;)No conspiracy cited by me, just a pure ####up on the part of several US Administrations, Secretaries of State and Ambasssadors. Poor April just happened to be the one that got caught up in the large scam. She and dipwad Joe Wilson...

As I said earlier: "Thus to say that '...Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks...' is absolutely correct in Western terms. However, for a resident of the ME that statement is just as absolutely incorrect -- in their view, the US literally suggested that he invade."

That whole lot of people are the ones who are willing to believe Saddam got manipulated and the US is perfidious. Many there are going to believe that regardless but our pretty consistently inept diplomacy in the area is in large measure due to arrogance and an unwillingness to accept local norms into our calculations certainly exacerbates that. The invasion of Kuwait was but one small example.

No, you didn't cite a conspiracy... others did hint at it.

Our people typically play to our domestic audience, which wants to hear and see very specific things. That often gets us into trouble, but I'm not sure there's any way to avoid it. Our predictability in such matters also gets us into trouble, but again it's a difficult thing to change.

Dayuhan
02-13-2011, 02:45 AM
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/only-someone-like-mubarak-could-defend-netanyahu-s-brand-of-democracy-1.343011


This was a civil uprising, one that did not suit the wild and violent image we insist on ascribing to all Arabs and to all Muslims. If only the square had been awash in blood, we would feel better. If only more heavily bearded young men and veiled virgins had gathered, we would be more sure of our predictions; if only Israeli flags had been burned in the streets, we could frighten ourselves and the whole world, saying we were right again.


Obviously a lot remains to be determined, but I don't think we or the Israelis should be hoping the new is a clone of the old, or even that it embraces similar foreign policies. I don't think we can expect a new regime to be pro-US down the line, and I think we can expect a somewhat more confrontational stance toward Israel. As long as it stops short of outright war or sponsorship of terror, this is not a bad thing at all. It could be a very good thing: an opportunity to show, not just tell, that we are willing and able to deal with regimes that don't see their interests as identical to ours.

Surferbeetle
02-13-2011, 03:25 AM
The Economist has an interesting debate currently running which speaks to some of the points we are covering here regarding the responsibilities of Elites to Society...

Global elite: This house believes that the global elite serve the masses. (http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/656)


Defending the Motion

Jamie Whyte, Journalist/author and head of research and publishing, Oliver Wyman Financial Services

Voluntary transactions benefit both parties. If they did not, they would not happen. In a free market, everyone serves those they deal with. Anyone who gets rich must have done others a lot of service.


Against the Motion

Daniel Ben-Ami, Journalist and author of "Ferraris For All: In defence of economic progress"

From the 1970s onwards the Western elite have retreated from the notion of progress. Although they pay lip service to economic and social advance they have become strikingly ambivalent in practice.


The moderator's opening remarks Feb 8th 2011 | Mr Saugato Datta

Societies have always had elites: rich people who exercise a great deal of influence over the societies in which they live. And for as long as they have had them, these groups have aroused in others a mix of envy and resentment. There appears to be no shortage of either sentiment today.

91bravojoe
02-13-2011, 08:47 AM
Carrying on with our press review:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/world/middleeast/13diplomacy.html?hp

Feels that the current American administration was, er, of polarized range.

Found a White House group "who worried that the American preoccupation with stability could put a historic president on the wrong side of history."

Bob's World
02-13-2011, 11:18 AM
Stability at the expense of the liberty of others IS the wrong side of history. During the Cold War we could rationalize such manipulations of the governance of others as part of our containment strategy.

That rationale is long gone, yet we have done little to empower the reestablishment of self-determination and peaceful evolution of governmental reforms to bring these populaces a greater sense of participation and legitimacy of their governments.

Tunisia and Egypt is the nose and head of the camel under the tent. The key now is to provide appropriate assurances that we will work with these people as the seek new guards to the future security; and also to get in front of the camel in our diplomatic engagements with the other dozen governments who are in-line to feel similar pressure. Moderate, reasonable reforms will go a long ways toward avoiding violence and chaos.

The Wild Card is AQ, who sees their rationale for existence slipping away from them. The timing could be right to execute more violence in an effort to once again get Western leaders and populaces to overreact and confuse popular quests for liberty as something much scarier and darker.

The voice of ignorance and fear is still very loud. While we are tipping toward the right side of history (at least as measured by the principles that Americans proclaim to the world), a bad event, a bad response, and we could be right back in the business of propping up despots and chasing ideologies.

davidbfpo
02-13-2011, 01:44 PM
Bob's World cited:
The Wild Card is AQ, who sees their rationale for existence slipping away from them.

A contrary viewpoint I encountered from a British Muslim community observer was that AQ had been undermined by the student-trader martyr in Tunisia; his actions had had a far greater, positive impact on the Muslims in the Arab world. Compared to AQ, what had they achieved for the "man in the street"? Years of repression and humiliation etc.

JMA
02-13-2011, 03:08 PM
Bob's World cited:

A contrary viewpoint I encountered from a British Muslim community observer was that AQ had been undermined by the student-trader martyr in Tunisia; his actions had had a far greater, positive impact on the Muslims in the Arab world. Compared to AQ, what had they achieved for the "man in the street"? Years of repression and humiliation etc.

Yes David there are many views on every aspect out there but once again the fact remains that this whole business has been yet another spectacular failure for the intelligence community. The two stumble-bums, the CIA and MI6 together with the hopeless incompetents (the State Department and the British Foreign Office) missed this one completely.

Surely governments need to focus on cutting costs there rather than with the military who will be required to face AQ where they next rear their ugly heads?

Bob's World
02-13-2011, 09:23 PM
If we approach the populaces properly we will achieve the same effect in the Middle East that the Brits achieved in Malaya (not talking the military tactics they applied prior to making the political fixes that addressed the concerns of the pop.) The Brits had co-opted legitimacy and exerted controls over governance. They ultimately removed those controls; and when the remnants of the insurgents filtered back in they found that the populace no longer needed them, as the populace had "won". Essentially both the Brits and the Insurgents were out, and the populace was in.

This is the opportunity unfolding in the Middle East. Arab heads of government are pissed at the US. They accuse the US of not being loyal. Loyalty is a two-way street, and besides, is our loyalty to some King or "President"? Or is our loyalty to some nation? I argue it is the latter, and when those leaders tarnish their positions by leveraging their trust in US support to them personally to act with impunity toward their own people they deserve what they get.

The US needs to make this clear that we are extremely loyal, but that our first loyalty as Americans is to support and defend our Constitution, not any particular president, our own or any one else's. When some government puts us in a position to make us hypocritical of our own principles in order to keep or commitment to them, they have breached the deal.

The sooner we get this cleaned up the better. This will disempower AQ. When AQ comes to these populaces looking for support, much like those Malay insurgents, they too will find that the populace has won, and that they are no longer needed.

davidbfpo
02-13-2011, 09:40 PM
As expected attempts to explain the new rulers; this thin profile is of the Army Chief of Staff:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8321715/Egypt-the-quiet-man-tasked-with-transition.html

Entropy
02-13-2011, 10:43 PM
Yes David there are many views on every aspect out there but once again the fact remains that this whole business has been yet another spectacular failure for the intelligence community. The two stumble-bums, the CIA and MI6 together with the hopeless incompetents (the State Department and the British Foreign Office) missed this one completely.

If you expect any intelligence service to predict emergence phenomena, then prepare to be disappointed.


Surely governments need to focus on cutting costs there rather than with the military who will be required to face AQ where they next rear their ugly heads?

How many air wings, fleets and combat brigades do we need to face AQ?

Dayuhan
02-13-2011, 11:07 PM
Three factors that will make a difference...

1: Short-medium term management of economic subsidies

Americans think often in terms of liberty and freedom and the ability to change governance, but in much of the world desire #1 is economic opportunity and a better life. If people don't think democracy is getting them there, they are very likely to back a return to authoritarian rule. What's the point of having influence over government if government still doesn't give you what you want? Unfortunately, what people want is often low prices, high wages, plentiful jobs, low taxes, great government services, and a host of other contradictions. Economic trade-offs are often poorly understood.

One of the things that pushed Egypt over the edge was a withdrawal of subsidies, particularly on wheat. This was less about "neoliberal policies" than about reality: with the population soaring, wheat prices rising, a sagging pound and a rising trade deficit the subsidized imports were just not sustainable.

The economists are of course right: the subsidies are an abomination and must go. Dropping them all at once, though, is a sure way to popular disillusionment. My preference (not that anyone cares) would be to restore them, even with foreign aid paying part, with a clear schedule for a gradual phase-out and a clear explanation (assuming optimistically that someone will listen) of why they have to be phased out. It's hard to explain in places where the idea that "government should feed the people" is entrenched, but it needs to be done.

Management of subsidies needs to balance economic necessity with the need to maintain popular confidence and support. They have to end, but sudden withdrawal can trigger disorder that could lead to a radical rise or a military coup. Worth keeping an eye on how policies emerge: immediate termination of subsidies is a danger sign; maintaining them without a clear plan for phase-out supported by information (and ideally economic improvement, though that will take time) is as bad.

2. The emergence of political parties

There will be pressure to hold early elections, but that's not always a good idea. It's hard to hold an election without parties, and it will take time for meaningful parties to emerge. Egypt looks likely to avoid the scourge of party differentiation along ethnic or sectarian lines, but there are still potential problems.

Looking back to post-Marcos Philippines, the pre-Marcos two-party system did not re-emerge. Instead there were dozens of parties, often with no ideological differentiation and in many cases little more than vehicles for personal ambition: if your party doesn't nominate you, start a new one. That left positions contested by absurd numbers of candidates, with winners holding far less than a plurality and a minimal mandate. Choices were uncertain and based on personalities, not platforms, and it's common for people to jump parties and parties to shift coalitions for transient advantage.

Indonesia has runoff elections for the two top candidates if nobody gains a clear majority... expensive and cumbersome, but at least there's a mandate.

The emergence of parties will give a good indicator of how democracy is coming together, before policies or their impact are seen. How do parties differentiate? Do they represent distinct policy or ideological positions, or are they personality-dominated? Are small parties with similar views forming coalitions, or will they all run their own candidates? Will dominant parties be able to nominate candidates and remain together, or will leaders who don't get nominated break away?

3. Justice vs Reconciliation

Always a huge issue after a peaceful revolt succeeds. Who do you punish for corruption and human rights abuse? How far down the food chain do you go? Wherever you draw the line, the people above point to those below and ask "why me and not him". Push too hard and you can spark massive capital flight, disrupt government, even spark a coup. Give a free pass and you get major popular resentment and encourage more corruption. There's no right call and whatever they do will piss people off, but it will be very interesting to see how the transition government proceeds (likely they will kick it down the road), what positions the emerging parties take, and what is actually done when an elected government takes power.